



HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY

Title	欧文要旨
Author(s)	
Citation	哲学 = Annals of the Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University, 46: 1(左)-2(左)
Issue Date	2010-03-21
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/45265
Right	
Type	bulletin (other)
Additional Information	



Instructions for use

Summary of the Articles

Emil Lask's Criticism on the Doctrine of the Primacy of Practical Reason

—A Phase of the Controversy between Rickert and Lask—

J.-W. Kim

Recently, much attention has been paid to the epistemology of Neo-Kantianism, especially of Baden School. It is well known that there was a controversy over the “object (*Gegenstand*)” of cognition between Rickert and Lask. The controversy has many phases, but almost no attention has been paid to the first phase. This paper aims to suggest a way of understanding the controversy based on the first phase. I shall argue that they were at cross-purposes because they had different conceptions of the “object” of cognition. While Rickert sought the *rule* to which we can appeal when we justify our judgment, Lask's contention was that the correctness of our judging acts must be conceptually preceded by the *truth*.

Scientific Anti-Realism and Naturalism

Takashi ASO

Can scientific anti-realism be compatible with naturalism? Philosopher Laudan advocates to regard scientific activity as “problem solving” process. This perspective indicates nothing with truth or whatever, hence his view is typically antirealist. And Laudan also sympathetic with scientific naturalism. In this article, I start with examining scientific realism and antirealism in general and Laudan's antirealist view, then examine naturalistic epistemology and Laudan's naturalism. In the last section, we will see that Laudan's anti-realist view is fully compatible with his naturalistic epistemology.

The Dilemma of Intentionality

Wai Ling Lai

The dilemma of intentionality in question concerns specifically about what a primitive

mental representation is ; i.e. either the representation's intentionality is genuinely relational or pseudo-relational, but neither alternative seems attractive as far as a naturalistic theory of intentionality is concerned. The objective of this paper is to show how a Fodorian notion of mental representation can solve the dilemma by incorporating a notion of homeostatic maintenance called *practical necessity*. As we shall see, the fundamental cause of the dilemma is an unrelatedness between the internal syntactic relation over which symbol manipulation operations are defined and the external relation that the representation tokens bear to the world, and the unrelatedness can only be resolved by a sustaining mechanism that is forceful enough to keep the two relations in phase with each other.