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in Japan's strategy. Group A: theories and stories rooted in Japan's traditional policy of defense, named 'hokumon-no-sayaku [key and chains of the northern gate]', against Russia's advance south. Group B: 'Hokushin' theories as the alternative strategy to Japan's 'Nanshin [Southern Advance]' after the Russo-Japan War. Group C: theories of expansion into Russian territory after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

(2) Stories about Nichiji's mission circulated differently in the continental colonies (China, Mongolia, and Korea) and northern areas (Karafuto and Hokkaido). In the continental colonies, the Nichiji legend didn't spread beyond believers of the Nichiren sect. In Karafuto, on the contrary, islanders in 1920s and 1930s hoped a 'new history', including the Nichiji legend, would support their own historical legitimacy (as all were post-1905 newcomers). Therefore, the legend of Nichiji was gradually accepted as a 'true and new history' of their own. Two monuments were important in changing legend into historical fact. 1) A large stone in Ako (a small village on the western coast of Karafuto) engraved with the holy mantra 'Namu-myoho-rengekyo,' supposedly by Nichiji, was protected as historical heritage although it lacked credibility. 2) The statue of Nichiji erected in Toyohara in August 1930 by believers of the Nichiren sect in Karafuto.

In conclusion, this paper indicates that 'Hokushin' theories are useful as a key concept for the modern history of Imperial Japan and its relations with Northeast Asia.

Geopolitics in Turkey: Between State Theory and Critical Theory

IMAI Kohei

This paper examines the aggressive acceptance of geopolitics in Turkish academism. In light of its specific geographical situation, geopolitics has been often used as a means of explaining Turkey's diplomatic behavior. Consequently, Turkish International Relations (IR) scholars have applied and developed concepts of geopolitics. This trend has been strong since the early 2000s and there are two reasons for this.

First of all, non-Western IR has recently emerged as one of the hottest topics in IR. Several scholars, especially from non-Western countries, have attempted to show original concepts, specific methods of the acceptance process, and advanced dimensions of IR in their own countries. Scholars

in Turkey are no exception. For Turkey, geopolitics is a concept that represents originality.

Secondly, Ahmet Davutoğlu, an expert in IR, has applied his thoughts on geopolitics to actual foreign policy. In 2001, he published *Strategic Depth*, which suggested, from the perspectives of geopolitics and history, the ideal diplomacy routes Turkey should pursue. After winning the election on November 2002, the Justice and Development Party promoted Davutoğlu to a Foreign Policy Advisor. He served as Foreign Policy Advisor from 2002 to 2009 and also served as Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014.

The acceptance of geopolitics in Turkey is classified into two theories. The first theory is “state theory,” and explains the characteristics of Turkey’s geopolitics. This paper analyzes three concepts of state: “insulator state,” “liminal state,” and “cusp state.” According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, an “insulator state” is defined as a state that is positioned between two different regions with regard to security, “but not strong enough to unify its two worlds into one.” A “liminal state” is defined as a state that is suffering from mismatches between its identity and geopolitical position. For example, Australia has a European identity but is positioned in an Asian/Pacific region. Turkey is also categorized as a “liminal state” because of its multiple identities. Generally, the “liminal state” concept connotes a negative meaning. The “cusp state” concept literally focuses on regional cusp countries such as Turkey. In contrast to “liminal state,” a “cusp state” enjoys a positive geopolitical position. According to Philip Robins, the particularities of the diplomatic behavior of “cusp states” include the promotion of linkages between different regions, playing the role of a mediator, and playing a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy.

The second theory concerning the acceptance of geopolitics in Turkish academism is critical geopolitics. According to John Agnew, critical geopolitics investigates and clarifies the geographical assumptions and designations that are involved in the creation of world politics. Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal) classifies critical geopolitics into four parts: 1) formal or “wise-man” geopolitics, which is the geopolitics interpreted by decision makers or intellectuals; 2) practical geopolitics, which is a diplomatic practice based on particular geopolitical situations concerning topics such as formal geopolitics; 3) mass geopolitics, which is popular in specific geopolitical thinking; 4) structural geopolitics, which concerns the structural changes of international systems and how they affect formal and practical geopolitics.

Turkish scholars like Pınar Bilgin, Murat Yeşiltaş, and Meliha Altunışık use formal and practical geopolitics to explain Turkish foreign policy. However, from the perspective of critical geopolitics their analyses remain incomplete. Concerning formal geopolitical analysis, there are three weaknesses: 1) their study of the intellectuals and decision makers who place importance on geopolitics are limited, 2) they downgrade the concept of “Neo-Ottomanism,” which was advocated

by Turgut Özal in the early 1990s, and 3) Yeşiltaş and Altunışık explain the diplomacy of Davutoğlu in a positive manner; their explanation is not critical analysis but problem-solving analysis. There are also three problems in relation to practical geopolitical analysis: The first is the validity of using geopolitical analysis for explanations. For example, “Sever Syndrome” or threat perception from the USSR is more suitable for Turkish foreign policy analysis. They also disregard the impact of the end of the Cold War, which is a second problem; the end of the Cold War triggered a dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy. This phenomenon diminished the threat of the USSR and opened new diplomatic opportunities in Central Asia, the Balkan Peninsula, and the South Caucasus. The third problem is the stagnation of Davutoğlu’s diplomacy toward the Middle East, as highlighted by the Syrian Crisis.

This paper discusses two theories of aggressive acceptance of geopolitics in academism in Turkey. As mentioned above, the acceptance and the application of geopolitics in Turkey is still unfinished. At the very least, expanding the “cusp state” concept in state theory and critical geopolitical analysis is essential for developing a Turkey-specific IR.

Survey of Former Japanese Residents and Their Descendants on the Northern Territories Issue

Alibay MAMMADOV

Research conducted in the past 10 years on the Northern Territories Issue (the Kuril Islands dispute), a territorial problem between Japan and Russia, has not paid sufficient attention to the views of former Japanese residents and their descendants. Consequently, my research aims to fill this gap by gathering data from former Japanese residents and their descendants regarding the Northern Territories. Data was collected in September 2014 through a questionnaire survey conducted of 49 ex-islanders, with the collaboration of Chishima Renmei in Sapporo and Nemuro.

The results showed that the majority of ex-islanders and descendants (84%) think that the entirety of the disputed territory (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, Habomai) are very important for them. Only 14% supported the Japanese government’s policy against Russia. 65% were opposed to it. Also, a majority (74%) of ex-islanders did not support Japan’s policy towards the Northern Territories.

Only 25% hopes that a solution to the territorial issue is possible. 24% believes that making the