



Title	Nationalist China in the Allied Council ; Policies Towards Japan,1946-52
Author(s)	Daniels, Gordon
Citation	北大法学論集, 27(2), 188-165
Issue Date	1976-11-11
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/16208
Type	bulletin (article)
File Information	27(2)_p188-165.pdf



[Instructions for use](#)

Nationalist China in the Allied Council ; Policies Towards Japan, 1946-52.

Dr. Gordon DANIELS

Senior Lecturer in Modern
Far Eastern History, Centre
for Japanese Studies, University
of Sheffield, England.

In the years which followed Japan's surrender East Asia was transformed by political and diplomatic revolutions which erased the sympathies and suspicions of half a century. In China civil war produced a regime which abandoned friendship with the United States. In Japan, defeat and occupation welded an alliance with America which has survived continuous opposition.

The domestic significance of these complex changes is universally recognized. Their importance in Soviet-American rivalry is rarely neglected, but the history of Sino-Japanese relations is a largely forgotten aspect of the occupation years.¹⁾ Much documentation necessary for the study of this question is not yet accessible, yet sufficient material is available to illuminate some major themes of Kuomintang policy towards defeated Japan. In particular the Minutes of the Allied Council for Japan, the most public international forum for the discussion of occupation policy reveal many of the chief priorities of Chinese diplomacy.²⁾

Before discussing policies within the Allied Council it is necessary to outline the evolution of occupation administration, as this provided the essential framework for Allied rivalries during six and a half years of military control.

It is common knowledge that American power overwhelmed Japan in the summer of 1945, but the political consequences of her enormous power were as important as her military victories. American military success was the product of enormous wealth which supported

lavish intellectual preparation for the coming peace.³⁾ Furthermore the distance of the United States from the turmoil of battle permitted reflective planning which was impossible in more war torn states. In short, America was prepared for the occupation of Japan while her allies were not. On arrival in Tokyo Supreme Commander MacArthur possessed detailed plans which enabled his staff to begin major acts of punishment, surgery, and reform.⁴⁾ Consequently American troops not only occupied Japan in the first months of peace but they established a control structure which issued instructions to the Japanese Government with formidable speed. By the close of 1945 the press had been freed, political prisoners released, trade unions encouraged, and a purge of wartime leaders begun. Indeed, within the first four months of American rule the broad lines of policy had been determined, and two groups⁵⁾ of Japanese leaders pressed into a study of constitutional reform.

Against this background of an American monopoly of power, preparation, and information, the allies of the United States began to demand some role in determining the future course of Occupation policy.

Initially the Soviet Union suggested that the Allied Control Commissions which supervised administration in Eastern Europe should be paralleled in the Far East.⁶⁾ If America could have representatives in Romania and Bulgaria, Russia could fairly claim similar privileges in Japan. Alternatively, when a Chinese representative could participate in the London Conference, and attend discussions on the Balkans Russia could justifiably seek a role in Tokyo.⁷⁾ Two of Russia's clearest demands were rejected in exchanges with the United States in the closing months of 1945. Her suggestion that she should have a voice in selecting the Supreme Commander for Japan, and her claim for a Soviet as well as an American Supreme Commander, were firmly rebuffed by Washington. Notions of a Soviet zone of occupation, or of a Russian occupation force, independent of American control were, similarly, unacceptable to President

Truman.⁸⁾

Despite America's determination to maintain a monopoly of effective power it was impossible to discard the notion of some forum in which the Soviet Union and other allies would have an indirect, symbolic role in Occupation administration. Not only would such a body pose no threat to American omnipotence but some vehicle of consultation was desired by Britain, China, and Australia, as well as other friendly states.

At an early stage the United States suggested the establishment of an eleven power Far Eastern Advisory Commission to meet in Washington to furnish advice to the occupation authorities.⁹⁾ In contrast Stalin desired a body clearly parallel to the Control Commissions in Europe. This would meet in Tokyo where a sharp eye could be kept on the shoal of decrees which sped from the Dai Ichi Seimei Building.¹⁰⁾ Russia saw this as a Council of the four major powers of the Far East, not a wider committee embracing smaller states. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Moscow in December 1945 the United States and the Soviet Union¹¹⁾ finally agreed on a compromise formula for the control of Japan. The Advisory Commission was re-named the Far Eastern Commission. This was to consist of the eleven states which had defeated Japan, and would meet in the old Japanese Embassy Building in Washington.¹²⁾ Its role was to "formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished".¹³⁾ Clearly the distance which separated the Commission from its area of concern, and a procedure with a virtual great power veto, limited its effectiveness to a minimum. Its subsequent activities were largely confined to approving policies long after their execution. The second body which emerged from the Moscow Conference was the Allied Council for Japan.¹⁴⁾ This four power agency consisted of the United States, China, the British Commonwealth,¹⁵⁾ and the Soviet Union, and existed "for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme

Commander in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto¹⁸⁾". MacArthur was to "consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting". If a member of the Council disagreed with the Supreme Commander on a fundamental matter the Agreement specified that the Supreme Commander would "withhold the issuance of orderspending agreement in the Far Eastern Commission". Certainly the Council's brief was somewhat unclear, but the representatives despatched from Moscow, Canberra, and Nanking were surely not unreasonable in believing that the Council was intended to perform a useful function, if not a dominant one.¹⁷⁾

The First Meeting of the Council on 5th April 1946 certainly had the trappings of importance. The Supreme Commander himself attended the morning gathering at the Meiji Seimei Building. The press was well represented, and the occasion occupied the headlines in the following day's newspapers.¹⁸⁾ In contrast MacArthur regarded the Council with deep suspicion and his opening address may well have surprised Lieutenant General Chu Shih-Ming, W. MacMahon Ball, and Lieutenant General Derevyanko. After an eloquent appeal for international co-operation the Supreme Commander emphasised the "advisory and consultative" character of the Council, and stressed that it would not divide his "executive authority"¹⁹⁾. He underlined the importance of press publicity to avoid the "suspicion...distrust and...hatred so often engendered by the veil of secrecy"²⁰⁾, and declared "there is nothing...to conceal...from the eyes and ears of our fallen adversary".

Such publicity would hardly contribute to fruitful exchanges, and on this point, and other matters of procedure, the basic conflict in the Council soon became apparent. Soviet hostility to the United States would have been predictable. American sympathy for China and the British Commonwealth might have been expected, but the

division of opinion was far simpler. American behaviour indicated a calculated policy of treating all three allied representatives as pupils or novices in the messianic world of the Supreme Commander. In response there was almost total unity among the non-American delegates. There was of course some inherent confusion in a body where the Chairman, the United States representative, and the representative of the Supreme Commander were one and the same person; but in other respects too there were no concessions to the internationalism which MacArthur had preached in his opening address. General Chu, unlike his Russian colleague, always spoke in English, but when he asked if this was "considered the official language" he was told there was no reason to have one.²¹⁾ Similarly when the Chinese delegate asked why the wholly American secretariat was termed "international" he was told it was because it served all four representatives. Like his colleagues Chu understood that highly publicized sessions could produce no effective discussions, and criticized "all these lights blazing". He agreed with MacMahon Ball that plenary sessions should alternate with informal private²²⁾ consultations, and finally this was accepted by all Council members.

Unity among the non-American representatives was already apparent and their confrontation with the American Chairman was to continue for many months. Essentially, the Supreme Commander wished to make the Council a well publicized, ineffective body while Chu, MacMahon Ball, and, apparently, Derevyanko sought to use it to some creative end.

This unity of attitude towards American overbearance was strongly reinforced at the Second Meeting of the Council. This occupied 17th and 19th April 1946 and was in many respects the most significant in the history of the body. On this occasion Brigadier General Courtney Whitney revealed the crude reality of American intentions. In the main section of the meeting he took the rostrum to answer a written question from the Soviet Representative.²³⁾ This suggested that, despite the purge, not all undesirables had been removed from

positions of authority, and requested that the Council be informed as “fully as possible”²⁴⁾.

Far from attempting to divide or woo the allied delegates Whitney sought to demonstrate the immensity of American power and the triviality of the Council. He was very angry that the question had been asked and declared that he would give a detailed answer “if it took all summer”²⁵⁾. He then read a speech lasting three hours which occupied most of the morning and afternoon sessions of the meeting. This calculated filibuster listed over a hundred and ten ultranationalist societies, over a hundred control associations, and scores of categories of purgees. In addition to its numbing monotony the speech was scattered with sarcastic asides such as “the authority or influence of 185, 386 persons...has already been prevented. And I regret I don't have with me the names to give you”²⁶⁾. When the meeting was resumed two days later Whitney was as belligerent as ever. He denied that the Council had the right to interrogate him as a witness, and declared “the Council is not set up for the purpose of prying into SCAP affairs, attempting to find some weak point in SCAP armor, probing something by which to create national sensationalism”²⁷⁾.

After suffering this display of uncontrolled arrogance the Council members were driven to a renewed discussion of procedure. Without information it was impossible to render meaningful advice to the Supreme Commander, but a request for information had been the source of Whitney's tedious epic. A repetition of that was to be avoided at all costs. The Chinese, Soviet, and Commonwealth delegates united in claiming the right to place a time limit on Council speeches, but in reply the Chairman castigated them harshly, saying this would be “definitely undemocratic”. He added that the American Government “would never agree to such a proposal”²⁸⁾. Once again a feeling of impotence and triviality returned to the Council.

At the Third Meeting on 30th April Lieutenant General Chu made a serious attempt to transform the Council into an effective

body. With the support of the Soviet and Commonwealth delegates he suggested the creation of four specialist sub-committees covering politics, economic affairs, education and culture, and military problems.²⁹⁾ These groups would examine SCAP proposals, and pool specialist advice so that informed suggestions could be passed to the Supreme Commander. In particular, the Chinese representative hoped that these expert committees would be able to make field investigations of regions or problems, and be free to carry on discussions away from the publicity of formal meetings. If the Council was to have any independence some such bodies were essential, and the Commonwealth and Soviet delegates supported the proposal.³⁰⁾ General Chu was no bitter critic of MacArthur's policies, he merely sought an independent source of information. In reply Chairman Acheson merely stressed the letter of the Moscow Agreement,³¹⁾ which made no mention of sub-committees.³²⁾ Chu protested that the Agreement did not forbid the creation of such bodies, but no compromise could be reached. After attempting to dilute the proposal into insignificance Acheson finally declared "I don't see that there would be any work of this sort in which I or my staff might participate".³²⁾ From this it was clear that any attempt to co-ordinate independent research would provoke determined opposition from Occupation Headquarters.

At the same meeting the United States Representative cum Chairman revealed his power to obstruct discussion in a new and simple way. The United States was already supplying foodstuffs to Japan to relieve a desperate shortage. For political and humanitarian reasons she sought to minimise malnutrition and avoid starvation. In the aftermath of war when many countries were suffering from acute scarcities it was natural that MacMahon Ball sought to discuss "food for Japan" as "part of a world problem". He wondered whether the needs of Japan were "greater than the needs of...occupied or liberated countries, in other parts of the world".³³⁾ But in response Acheson made no attempt to justify or analyse American policy.

He ruled that the issue was “entirely outside” the scope of the Council’s activities.³⁴⁾

At the Fourth Meeting of the Council the three again confronted the Chairman on the question of information. General Derevyanko asked that all decrees be sent to the Council well before they were issued, so that they could be studied in detail. Yet once more the representatives found themselves caught in a vicious circle of American evasiveness. General Chu acknowledged that against a background of full information and study forty-eight hours would suffice to examine decrees.³⁵⁾ But the first months of the Council’s activities had shown that receiving the desired information at the appropriate time could hardly be taken for granted.

During the summer of 1946 the Council held general discussions on fishing, trade, labour, government property and zaibatsu dissolution. But it was on the issue of Land Reform that the Council made its most important contribution to Occupation policy.³⁶⁾ This was an issue on which all four delegates shared the same objective, and the major divide lay between the Council and the Japanese authorities. In December 1945 the Japanese Government passed Land Reform legislation but MacArthur’s aides considered it unsatisfactory. During the first months of 1946 the Occupation authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture discussed more radical proposals and in May the problem was placed before the Council. On 29th May and 12th June MacMahon Ball placed detailed recommendations before his colleagues.³⁷⁾ Five days later all four powers gave them general support. The Chinese representative Yorkson C.T. Shen agreed with the Soviet delegate that the plan should be implemented within two years, and the Council’s recommendations were accepted by the Supreme Commander. This document provided the basis for new legislation passed by the Diet in October 1946.

By early June the atmosphere within the Council had calmed, and there was less bitterness than in earlier months. Despite this improvement the Chairman was still prone to ruffle and tease the delegates

by presenting intensely complex issues and requesting immediate advice. In June he asked for plans to rehabilitate ex-officers but provided no statistical information.³⁸⁾ A month later he urged the delegates to suggest schemes for maritime quarantine, but none of them had scientific advisers who could provide essential data.³⁹⁾

Such action merely unified the dissident three, and this unity continued until the Eighth Meeting of the Council on 26th June 1946. On this occasion Atcheson raised in a new form the integration of repatriates into civilian society. This issue was to split the Council along a new divide and bring it once more to the attention of public opinion. The basic statistics of repatriation delivered by the Chairman told their own story. Of the Japanese who had been scattered over a vast arc from Manchuria to Indonesia, 93% of those in American hands had been repatriated; 94% of those in China, and 68% of those in British hands had also landed at ports in Japan.⁴⁰⁾ Less than 1% of prisoners in Soviet hands had been similarly released.

In these discussions the Chairman thanked the Chinese for their sterling co-operation. General Chu emphasised that there had not been "a single major unpleasant incident" during repatriation, and believed that most ex-prisoners were "fully saturated⁴¹⁾ with a deep sense of repentance as regards their behaviour in China". In contrast the Soviet delegate who had usually sought to widen discussion, against American resistance, now began a reverse course. He claimed that the issue of integration⁴²⁾ did not encompass repatriation, and sought to stifle the debate. For the first time there was a clear division between the Russian and Chinese delegates, and the closeness of feeling between Chu and Atcheson was more marked than in the past. During July 1946 there were few major developments but the Chinese representatives continually demonstrated their major strength in discussion. While the Soviet and Commonwealth delegates were skilled in debate, and in their different ways impressively logical, General Chu and Yorkson Shen showed a detailed knowledge of the Japanese scene which frequently demonstrated American

ignorance. During initial discussion of the purge Chu asked directly if Hatoyama Ichirō⁴³⁾ had been barred from public life. The question went unanswered. Japanese names and terms were invariably incomprehensible to American officials ; while the Chinese always showed a knowledge of nationalistic monuments which must have surprised their colleagues⁴⁴⁾. This expertise stemmed from a common script, education in Japanese universities, and a prolonged war in which knowledge of Japan was vital for China's survival⁴⁵⁾.

At the Twelfth Meeting of the Council on 13th August Chairman Atcheson employed a tactic which might almost have been designed to restore a measure of unity among the dissident three. At a procedural meeting, quite without notice, he suggested that the Council would benefit from a drastic transfusion of new diplomatic talent. He recommended that the Tokyo representatives of the Far Eastern Commission powers not represented on the Council, should participate in its meetings⁴⁶⁾. This was tantamount to rewriting the original Moscow Agreement and like General Whitney's celebrated performance it filled the delegates with irritated confusion. Perhaps this was the desired effect or Atcheson may have hoped that a larger body would be unlikely to arrive at a common viewpoint. Certainly this scheme was as drastic as the abandoned notion of committees, and for the first time the Chinese representative requested special advice from his government. The Commonwealth, Soviet, and later the Chinese delegate successfully resisted this novel plan, but its initiation showed that the American desire to castrate the Council was as strong as at the initial meeting.

In subsequent meetings on 4th and 18th September the Council turned its attention to the critical state of the Japanese coal industry, an issue relatively free from emotional overtones. In response to the Supreme Commander's question of "whether the coal industry should be nationalized or whether...the present system of subsidy financing should be continued"⁴⁷⁾ the Chinese delegation made their most important policy recommendations. These showed a deep

concern for the revival of the Japanese economy which conflicted strongly with much of Chinese public opinion. After hearing the Chief of the Industry Section explain that the loss of Korean labour and food shortages had reduced productivity in Japanese mines to half its wartime level, General Chu, for the first time discussed the interdependence of the Chinese and Japanese economies.⁴⁸⁾ He emphasised Japan's traditional need for coking coal for her steel industry, and the production difficulties of Chinese mines producing fuel coal.⁴⁹⁾ In view of this situation he suggested an emergency barter trade whereby China would supply Japan with coking coal in return for Miike coal for China. He also recommended the nationalization of some Japanese mines, an improvement in working conditions,⁵⁰⁾ and labour participation in management.

On 18th September the Chinese delegate reported that his barter plan had been enthusiastically received in Japanese business circles. He also read out a telegram from L.T.Zee, Chairman of the Fuel Control Commission in the Chinese Ministry of Economic Affairs. This stated "as soon as transportation improves in our Northern provinces we shall be able to supply twenty thousand tons or more of first and second grade coking coal per month". To underline this message General Chu reasserted the economic interdependence of China and Japan saying "no effort should be spared to provide for eventual free trade between China and Japan by legitimate businessmen of all nations. My country is prepared to support to the fullest extent the Supreme Commander in his efforts to expedite the economic rehabilitation of Japan. It is necessary for no other reason than the close relationship between the economies of the two nations ...the economic situation cannot be stabilised in one country without the same being effected in the other"⁵¹⁾. In developing the theme of improving output in the Japanese coal industry he suggested a well-developed range of policies in a plan worked out by his advisers. This suggested that mines producing less than half their 1944 output should be nationalized, as experience of the Yunnan Tin Consolidated

Corporation had shown that efficient results could be achieved by state enterprises.⁵²⁾ Where mines were too large, and therefore too expensive, to be bought by the state it suggested partial state investment and management. In other cases there could be private ownership and government management, while a sliding scale of subsidies and incentives could be used to stimulate efficiency. He outlined three principles as the basis of the Chinese recommendations. Firstly the state owned and administered mines should be operated on purely commercial basis as "industry should be independent of politics just as the church should be separated from the state"⁵³⁾. Next mines should be equipped with new machinery ; and finally, management should be democratized as far as possible, so raising miners' morale and efficiency. The aim of these changes was similarly three fold. Production would be raised, inflation stemmed, and the power of the zaijatsu and other monopolistic organizations weakened. The Occupation authorities and the Japanese Government never accepted these well considered proposals but they vividly illustrate a chief priority of Chinese policy.⁵⁴⁾

In October 1946 China, Russia, and the Commonwealth turned their attention to the forthcoming local elections. All hoped that they would be as successful as the April General Election and presented proposals to eliminate nationalistic influences. Yorkson Shen proposed that existing district governors should resign one month before local voting, and that the names of all purged officials should be made public at the same time.⁵⁵⁾ The Chairman made no positive reply to these suggestions but now antagonism had largely left the proceedings.

Towards the end of 1946, and increasingly during early 1947 Chinese policy turned more and more towards attitudes which anticipated future American policies. In January 1947 MacArthur banned a threatened strike of public employees, and economic recovery became the major focus of American attention. Similarly Yorkson Shen reiterated the need for economic reconstruction and

on 2nd April asked whether SCAP would "take any favourable view of making an early attempt to modify the existing control measures that have set a barrier between Japan and other countries". In reply Atcheson commented that the "Chinese Member (had) echoed some of the recent remarks of General MacArthur on the economic blockade of Japan"⁵⁶⁾.

In the spring of 1947 the concern of the Chinese representative for recovery and stability was further apparent in a new discussion of repatriated Japanese. On this occasion General Chu openly referred to the poor reputation which the Council enjoyed among journalists.⁵⁷⁾ To remedy this he suggested that his colleagues concentrate upon moderate, constructive discussions. Regarding the plight of repatriates he called for "an all round welfare programme, long term as well as short term" to be "systematically worked out", and for the public works programme to be rapidly expanded.⁵⁸⁾ In reply SCAP official Max Bishop outlined the comprehensive range of existing provisions. These included rations, grants, and temporary housing. From current trends it appeared that by the close of the year only 15% of five million repatriates would remain in temporary accommodation. The remainder would have returned to their families or found permanent dwellings.

In contrast to these optimistic estimates this meeting brought the first indications of the failing power of Kuomintang administration. Some 95,000 Japanese still remained in the provinces of Manchuria, and it was explained that these areas were not yet under Government control. Hence repatriation had been impossible.⁵⁹⁾

Throughout the spring and summer of 1947 economic revival continued to be the main theme of Chinese comments and recommendations. In April Yorkson Shen suggested an end to the fragmentary pattern of government agencies attempting to control inflation, and proposed its replacement by a central control mechanism. On the same occasion he advocated the expansion of food producing and distributing co-operatives, greater emphasis on coal

output, and a thorough going suppression of the black market.⁶⁰⁾ All these suggestions closely reflected contemporary tendencies in SCAP thinking.⁶¹⁾

Although Nationalist Chinese policy moved closer and closer to SCAP directives it was far removed from much public opinion on the mainland.

In early 1947 the Occupation authorities invited a party of ten well-known Chinese journalists to make a comprehensive tour of Japan to study recent tendencies. They visited Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, and other major centres, and held discussions with American, Chinese, and Japanese leaders. Some of their articles which appeared in the Shanghai newspaper Ta Kung Pao exhibited a good deal of scepticism towards Occupation achievements. One article by Editor Wang Yun-sheng entitled "Japan's Dangerous Road"⁶²⁾ contrasted American claims of democratization with the potential danger of a nationalist revival. Understandably the writer found many Americans unable to grasp the subtleties of Japanese behaviour and drew attention to dangerous elements of tradition remaining in Japanese life. Like the Chinese delegate on the Council he was acutely aware of nationalistic monuments, and in a second article "Japanese Thought : 1947" condemned the survival of Saigō's statue in Ueno Park. More understandably he was disturbed by the continuing popularity of the Yasukuni Shrine. Both these articles were heavy with suspicion. They emphasised the extent to which the growing civil war in China was reviving Japanese feelings of superiority towards her neighbour, and highlighted the danger of the United States regarding Communism as her only enemy. The "dangerous road", which formed the title of Wang's first article was that of Japanese using anti-Communism to ingratiate themselves with the United States so as to bring about a nationalist revival.

While Japan continued to attract the attention of Chinese public opinion, the Allied Council became less and less significant as a forum for serious discussion. In August 1947 Chairman Atcheson

refused, for the first time, to accept a Soviet suggestion for the Agenda. At the same meeting he informed the representatives that SCAP would no longer provide them with data on request as in the past it had been “unproductive of usefulness.”⁶³⁾ From this point on the conscious manipulation of the Council’s Agenda made its meetings even more barren than before.

Parallel with these changes in the Council the focus of American policy moved from Japan’s domestic condition to her diplomatic future. Persuaded that a prolonged occupation would become increasingly unpopular the United States attempted to convene a preliminary conference to discuss a formal peace treaty. America wished to invite the eleven victor states to an initial meeting, while Russia favoured a meeting of the Big Four. In contrast China suggested a compromise plan for an eleven power meeting with near veto powers for herself, Britain, America, and the Soviet Union.⁶⁴⁾

The Chinese Foreign Ministry clearly sought to mediate between the Soviet and American proposals but much of Chinese public opinion was deeply suspicious of the United States and its new warmth towards Japan. On 15 September 1947 a Joint Memorandum of the Members of the Control Yuan demanded the cession of the Ryukyus to China, a limit on Japanese industry to the level of 1930, and the implementation of a severe reparations programme. Eight days later the Resident Committee of the People’s Political Council issued an even sterner statement suggesting Chinese Trusteeship of the Ryukyus, military supervision of Japan for thirty years, and a restriction of production to that of 1928. Like earlier articles in the Shanghai press these documents emphasised the danger of America incorporating Japan into an anti-Communist front, thereby reviving her economic and military power.⁶⁵⁾

Within the Allied Council meetings became shorter and their contents less significant. In mid-August MacMahon Ball resigned as Commonwealth Member.⁶⁶⁾ Within the same week George Atcheson⁶⁷⁾ died in an air accident. With the disappearance of these two pow-

erful figures the vitality of the Council was even further impaired. In China civil war was threatening the basis of Nationalist power and her spokesman became less and less likely to dissent from the policies of her key ally, the United States.⁶⁸⁾

On 1st October the new Chinese Representative General Shang once more returned to the theme of economic recovery and regretted that "since the Sino-Japanese hostilities mines, industrial equipment, transportation etc. throughout China have been severely damaged" and therefore China could not supply Japan with sufficient raw material to meet her requirements. Perhaps of even greater interest was his suggestion that Japan, despite her many crises, might "find her way to render assistance to China in the industrial field" so that she might export more raw materials to Japan.⁶⁹⁾

Throughout 1948 the Council fell into a state of prolonged torpor. On 28th April "the three" protested that the Maritime Safety Board had been created without any prior notice.⁷⁰⁾ There was a flash of temporary unity but neither the new Commonwealth member, Patrick Shaw, nor his Chinese colleague objected to the contents of the new measure.

Between May and August the Council's Agenda was empty and the representatives attended pro forma meetings lasting one or two minutes.⁷¹⁾ On 28th August the Council discussed SCAP inspired action to remove the right to strike of public employees. The Soviet delegate made predictable criticisms. Shaw gave reluctant support. While the Chinese delegate, abandoned earlier ideas of democratic management, and approved the Japanese Government's action.⁷²⁾ By now his government was a struggling satellite.

On the Chinese mainland there was now a rising tide of opinion against the pro-Japanese course of American policy. On 7th April Wang Yun-sheng wrote to the American journal Pacific Affairs complaining that America was preparing Japan as an ally in case of war with the Soviet Union. In a lurid diatribe he attacked soft policies towards one time militarists, and new high targets for the

Japanese economy.⁷³⁾ In June many students in Chinese cities demonstrated against American policy in Japan, and professors, businessmen, and Members of the Legislative Yuan demanded that the Government oppose the United States. The ineffectiveness of Government policy towards the course of Occupation policy was a major source of widespread dissatisfaction. Once more the complaint was being raised that Chinese raw materials were fuelling Japanese industry and Japanese goods were said to be re-entering the Chinese market.⁷⁴⁾

In addition to the broad thread of American policy small but emotionally inflammable incidents further ignited opinion. In the summer of 1946 Tokyo police had fired on Formosans. Chinese stores and homes had been searched, and old prejudices were alleged to be rife.⁷⁵⁾ All such news provoked further hostility in Chinese cities. Students continued anti-American demonstrations and in June 1948 the American Ambassador in Nanking, J. Leighton Stuart, issued a statement pointing out the dangerous state of Sino-American relations. What was more he described the new objectives of American policy with a frankness which was often eschewed in the Allied Council. As if echoing the Kuomintang representative in Tokyo he implied that Japan's economic recovery would assist China, and stated "as a hungry and restless people (Japan) will be a threat to peace. Such a situation is made to order for Communism. If we are sincere in our profession that Communism in the general interest must be stopped then we must remove the causes which encourage Communism".⁷⁶⁾ Stuart was too sophisticated an Ambassador to express all his sentiments directly. He hinted at a reduction in American aid if the "Anti-American-Aid-to-Japan" movement continued, but this was a message to be inferred, rather than clearly understood from his remarks.

In January 1949 the Allied Council⁷⁷⁾ once more held a meeting which centred upon serious debate. In a discussion of the increasing size of Japanese police forces, the Chinese delegate made a firm

statement in favour of a force sufficient for law and order to be fully preserved.⁷⁹⁾ He condemned any notion of Japanese rearmament but in no way reflected the hostility to American policy which was prevalent on the mainland.

From January to December 1949 the Council delegates assembled twenty four times and found nothing to discuss. The Council was almost dead, but in an ever harsher atmosphere of Cold War it had a brief but spiritless role to play. Throughout Japan there was widespread anxiety at the fate of over 300,000 prisoners still in Soviet hands. Many citizens addressed letters and petitions to the Occupation authorities and Council members.

Finally in December Chairman Sebald placed the problem on the Agenda.⁸⁰⁾ Propaganda and humanitarianism were sourly mixed in this enterprise. Four large bundles of letters were brought into the Council Chamber while a further one hundred and two were placed in an ante-room. General Derevyanko claimed that repatriation was beyond the Council's terms of reference, and after twenty five minutes walked out of the meeting. General Chu complimented his own government on returning all prisoners, and the Commonwealth spokesman, W.R.Hodgson, suggested that the Swiss Government or the Red Cross might make investigations.⁸¹⁾ Throughout January and February 1950 there was further discussion of repatriation, and further walk outs. Finally, in May the Soviet delegate began to boycott Council Meetings.⁸²⁾ Somewhat sickeningly the press took a lively interest in these theatrical gestures. American housewives called at the Meiji Seimei Building for entertainment. Bright lights were turned on, and there was talk of television cameras.⁸³⁾

Throughout the summer propaganda alternated with empty agendas. Finally on 8th November Major General Kislenko, the Soviet delegate returned. Now the Chinese delegate represented no more than Taiwan and was deeply dependent on the United States. Chinese statements reflected this enfeebled position and descended to heavy irony and rough cut propaganda. Chen Yen Chun suggested

that Kislenko “had spent the past months…digging into the…number, whereabouts and conditions of the 370,000 Japanese prisoners…still under detention by the Soviet Government” and stated that “the Council and the Japanese people would be most anxious to hear the answer”⁸⁴⁾. In later comments he referred to the “pernicious germs of Soviet propaganda” and the Chairman cautioned him for such provocative statements.

During 1950 and 1951 the Council descended to the exchange of crude propaganda and predictable accusations. Now against the background of the Korean War, a new group of three aligned itself against the Soviet Union. Kislenko claimed that the Chinese delegate did not represent the Chinese mainland. His adversaries repeated their charges about missing prisoners. Russia attacked the Japanese Government’s “Red Purge”. The Chinese delegate said that “it did not quite go far enough”⁸⁵⁾. By the autumn of 1951 the possibility of creative discussion had totally disappeared and even the representatives tired of continual insults.

Between 24th October 1951 and 23rd April 1952 the Council held only two brief discussions.⁸⁶⁾ Its’ final meeting was held five days before the restoration of Japanese independence. Kislenko used the occasion to denounce the “illegality” of the San Francisco Treaty, and measures against left wing publications. The Chinese delegate had no instructions, and therefore no views on the Council’s demise.⁸⁷⁾

No one would claim that the Allied Council for Japan was a major agency of international co-operation. General MacArthur and the Kleig lights saw to that. Nevertheless its history is a significant litmus of changing antagonisms in East Asia. In particular the alienation of the Chinese delegate from his people, is a powerful allegory of Nationalist decline.

- 1) For an invaluable introduction to post-war East Asia see, Akira Iriye : The Cold War in Asia, A Historical Introduction, New York, 1974. For a brief summary of Chinese attitudes towards Japan in the post-war years see, Kawara Hiroshi and Fujii Shōzō : Nichū Kankei no Kiso Chishiki.

- Tokyo. 1974. pp. 374-75, 379-80.
- 2) Allied Council for Japan : Verbatim Minutes. Hereafter cited as VM.
 - 3) For a bibliographical survey of American planning for the Occupation of Japan see Robert E. Ward and Frank Joseph Shulman : The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-52, An Annotated Bibliography of Western Language Materials Chicago. 1974. pp. 33-39. For a useful outline of planning activities see Hugh Borton : American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan. New York. 1967.
 - 4) For a collection of important documents see, U. S. Department of State : Occupation of Japan : Policy and Progress. Washington. D. C. 1946.
 - 5) For the early phase of Occupation reforms, see Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai : Taihei'yō Sensōshi. Vol. 6. San Furanshisuko Kōwa, 1945-52. Tokyo. 1973. pp. 77-114.
 - 6) For a brief appraisal of the Commissions in Europe see, George F. Kennan : Memoirs, 1925-50. Boston. 1967. p. 235.
 - 7) For an outline of Soviet-American rivalry see, Herbert Feis : Contest Over Japan. New York. 1967.
 - 8) Harry S. Truman : Memoirs. Volume 1. Year of Decisions. Garden City. N. Y. 1955. pp. 431, 440-44, 455, 516-18.
 - 9) The members of the Commission were to be Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Commonwealth, United Kingdom, United States, and the U. S. S. R.
 - 10) The Supreme Commander's Headquarters in Tokyo.
 - 11) For an American assessment of the Moscow meeting see, Dean Acheson : Present at the Creation, My Years at the State Department. New York. 1969. pp. 426-28.
 - 12) George H. Blakeslee : The Far Eastern Commission. A Study in International Co-operation, 1945-52. Washington. D. C. 1953.
 - 13) Agreement of Foreign Ministers on Establishing the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, December 27, 1945. The text may be found in U. S. Department of State : Occupation of Japan Policy and Progress. Washington. D. C. 1946. p. 69.
 - 14) It is significant that the word "Control" does not appear in the name of the Council, or the Commission.
 - 15) "a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India". Agreement of Foreign Ministers on Establishing the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, December

27, 1945.

- 16) Ibid.
- 17) The Japanese press clearly regarded the Moscow Agreement as an important development. It was the lead story in the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, and the Yomiuri Hōchi on 29 December 1945.
The Council was to meet “not less often than every two weeks”, sufficiently often for useful work to be done.
- 18) MacArthur's initial address to the Council, appealing for world peace, was the lead story in the Asahi Shimbun, the Mainichi Shimbun, and the Yomiuri Hōchi on 6th April 1946.
- 19) V. M. First Meeting, 5th April 1946. p. 1.
- 20) *ibid.* p. 2.
- 21) *ibid.* p. 24. General Chu had been educated at M. I. T. and an American Staff College.
- 22) *ibid.* p. 20.
- 23) Whitney was Chief of the Government Section of the Occupation administration.
- 24) V. M. Second Meeting, 17 April 1946. morning session. p. 21.
- 25) *ibid.* p. 22.
- 26) V. M. Second Meeting, 17 April 1946. afternoon session. p. 20.
- 27) V. M. Second Meeting (continued) 19 April 1946. p. 10.
- 28) *ibid.* p. 15.
- 29) V. M. Third Meeting, 30 April 1946. morning session. pp. 1-2.
- 30) *ibid.* p. 2. and p. 5.
- 31) George Atcheson, Jr. Chief of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP (1946-47).
- 32) V. M. Third Meeting, 30 April 1946. morning session. p. 12.
- 33) *ibid.* p. 14.
- 34) *ibid.* p. 24.
- 35) V. M. Fourth Meeting, 15 May 1946. morning session. p. 25.
- 36) For a detailed study of this field of Occupation policy see R. P. Dore : Land Reform in Japan. London. 1959.
- 37) V. M. Seventh Meeting, 17 June 1946. pp. 4-5.
- 38) V. M. Eighth Meeting, 26 June 1946. pp. 25-28.
- 39) V. M. Ninth Meeting 10 July 1946. p. 10.
- 40) V. M. Eighth Meeting, 26 June 1946. p. 19.
- 41) *ibid.* p. 23.

- 42) *ibid.* p. 20.
- 43) V.M. Second Meeting. 17 April 1946. afternoon session. p. 22.
- 44) V.M. Tenth Meeting. 24 July 1946. p. 13.
- 45) Yorkson C. T. Shen received his M. S. from Tokyo Imperial University. Wang Kung Kee, Deputy Chief of the Chinese Mission in 1952 was educated at Waseda University, Tokyo.
- 46) V.M. Twelfth Meeting. 13 August 1946. pp. 3-4. for a contemporary American criticism of Atcheson's tactics in the Council see, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Volume 8. The Far East. Washington. D. C. 1971. pp. 332-334. Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Borton) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) SECRET. 7 October 1947.
- 47) V.M. Fourteenth Meeting. 4 September 1946. p. 9.
- 48) Joseph Z. Reday. Chief of the Industry Section of SCAP September 1946-March 1947.
- 49) V.M. Fourteenth Meeting. 4 September 1946. p. 14.
- 50) *ibid.* p. 15.
- 51) V.M. Fifteenth Meeting. 18 September 1946. morning session. p. 18.
- 52) *Ibid.* p. 20.
- 53) *Ibid.* p. 22.
- 54) In their non-ideological spirit the Chinese measures resembled the Temporary Coal Industry Control Act of December 1947, but the content of this legislation was less radical than the Chinese proposals.
- 55) V.M. Seventeenth Meeting. 16 October 1946. pp. 17-18.
- 56) V.M. Twenty-Ninth Meeting. 2 April 1947. pp. 12-13.
- 57) V.M. Twenty-Seventh Meeting. 5 March 1947. p. 3.
- 58) *Ibid.* p. 3.
- 59) *Ibid.* p. 20.
- 60) V.M. Thirtieth Meeting. 16 April 1947. p. 16.
- 61) For studies of these aspects of SCAP policies see, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. General Headquarters. Statistics and Reports Section. History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan. Tokyo. 1952. Monograph 30. Agricultural Co-operatives, 1945-December 1950. and Monograph 42. Fisheries, 1945-50. (available on microfilm from the National Archives, Washington. D. C.)
- 62) Wang, Yun-sheng : "Japan's Dangerous Road" in the China Magazine. Volume 17. September 1947. pp. 10-15. and "Japanese Thought : 1947" in

- the China Magazine Volume 17. October 1947. pp. 27-31.
- 63) Immanuel C. Y. Hsu: "The Allied Council for Japan" Far Eastern Quarterly Volume 10. February 1951. pp. 175-176.
 - 64) "Summary of Responses by Other Governments to United States Japanese Treaty Proposals" Department of State Bulletin. Volume 17. (November 1947) pp. 435-436.
 - 65) "Chinese Views on Japanese Peace Treaty : Joint Memorandum of Control Yuan Members" China Magazine Volume 17. November 1947. pp. 22-29.
 - 66) For the background to MacMahon Ball's Resignation see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume 6, The Far East. Washington, D.C. 1972. pp.268-269. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State. TOP SECRET. 1 August 1947.
 - 67) See William J. Sebald and Russell Brines : With MacArthur in Japan, A Personal History of the Occupation. New York. 1965. pp.58-59.
 - 68) V. Kudryavtsev: "The Japanese Problem is Sino-American Relations" Soviet Press Translations Volume 2. (15 November 1947) pp. 226-229.
 - 69) V. M. Forty-Second Meeting. 1 October 1947. pp. 9-10.
 - 70) V. M. Fifty-Eighth Meeting. 28 April, 1948. p. 1.
 - 71) From the Fifty-Ninth Meeting (12 May 1948) to the Sixty-Sixth Meeting. (18 August 1948) there were no items on the Council's Agenda.
 - 72) V. M. Sixty-Seventh Meeting. 28 August 1948. p. 21.
 - 73) Wang, Yun-sheng "Japan ; Storm Center of Asia" Pacific Affairs. Volume 21. (June 1948) pp. 195-99.
 - 74) James F. C. Liu, "Resurgant Japan, A Chinese View" Far Eastern Survey Volume XVII. Number 23. 8 December 1948. p. 270.
 - 75) "Protest of Representatives of Chinese Public Opinion Against American Policies in Japan" Soviet Press Translations Volume 3. Number 14. 15 July 1948. p. 420.
 - 76) J. Leighton Stuart "Campaign By Chinese Students Against American Policy in Japan" Department of State Bulletin. Volume 18. 20 June 1948. pp. 813-814.
 - 77) V. M. Seventy Seventh-Meeting. 5 January 1949.
 - 78) *Ibid.* p. 15.
 - 79) From the Seventy Eighth Meeting (19 January 1949) to the One Hundred and First Meeting. (7 December 1949) the Council had no items on its Agenda.
 - 80) For the background to this meeting see William J. Sebald and Russell Brines

: With MacArthur in Japan, A Personal History of the Occupation. pp. 141-42.

- 81) V.M. One Hundred and Second Meeting. 21 December 1949. p.25.
- 82) The Boycott continued from 10 May to 25 October 1950.
- 83) "Four Power Farce in Japan" Economist Volume 158. 11 February 1950. pp. 323-24.
- 84) V.M. One Hundred and Twenty Sixth Meeting. 8 November 1950. pp. 1-4.
- 85) V.M. One Hundred and Twenty Ninth Meeting. 20 December 1950. p. 41.
- 86) On 16-17 January 1952. Japan's Budget and the Security Treaty with the United States were discussed.
- 87) V.M. One Hundred and Sixty Fourth Meeting. 23 April 1952. p. 7.