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From Sojourner to Small Farmer : The Evolution of the Japanese Problem in California, 1885-1913

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Between 1885 and 1908 a great majority of Japanese immigrants came to the United States as sojourners. They had no intention to settle in the country. Their prime goal was to make a fortune quickly and return home. By 1913, however, they had shown a strong tendency to become permanent settlers in America. Swift demographic change, increase in business establishments, and the emergence of thousands of small farmers in the Japanese immigrant society indicated this tendency. In 1913 the California legislature enacted the state's first anti-Japanese land law to repress the tendency. Thus Japanese immigrants began to be attacked not only because they had supplied cheap sojourner labor but also because they had gained a solid foothold in the state's economy as small but independent entrepreneurs.

This paper will deal with this evolution of Japanese immigrant society in California and its relations with the host society. Historical studies of Japanese immigration have treated the subject from three distinct points of view, which correspond respectively to three different phases of the problem. One of them may be called the diplomatic approach, which sees Japanese immigration problems within a context of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan before the Second World War. A second approach is concerned more with the American domestic scene and deals with the problem as a case to illustrate the nature of the American democracy. The formation of the exclusionist ideology, the dynamics of integration, and the political conflicts over immigration policies have been among major questions asked from this point of view. Finally, there is a relatively new approach, one that focuses on the development of Japanese immigrant society itself by analyzing its social structure and cultural characteristics.

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These three perspectives have not yet been fully synthesized into a solid interpretation of the Japanese-American experience. My purpose in this paper is much more modest than a grand synthesis. I would like to make use of the third perspective to show how the internal development of the Japanese-American community altered the anti-Japanese movement.

I.

It is well known that the Japanese problem in the United States originated on the Pacific Coast in the late nineteenth century. As with most problems concerning the "new" immigration, it first assumed the form of a labor question. More specifically, it began as a part of the larger and older question of Oriental coolie labor. It was three years after the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 that the Japanese government legally permitted its citizens to work abroad. Within a few years, those concerned with the welfare of white laborers started warning against the use of Japanese immigrants to fill the labor shortage caused by the Chinese exclusion.

As early as 1889, when there were only about 1,000 Japanese in California, the Japanese consul at San Francisco called his government's attention to the rising animosity of California's labor against Japanese immigration. He sent home clippings from the San Francisco *Call* which contained warnings regarding the impact of the low wages of Japanese on the labor market in the United States.¹ Dennis Kearney, who had gained publicity by his fervent anti-Chinese propaganda since the 1870s, applied the same argument to the newly arriving Orientals and declared in 1892, "The Japs Must Go!"² By this time the new labor problem had also drawn the attention of state officials. In 1896 the Labor Commissioner of California, E. L. Fitzgerald, published the result of an extensive investigation of the problem. He warned that white migratory laborers were facing a new challenge :

[A]lthough... the prohibition to Chinese immigration gradually improved their chance, another pest in the shape of cheap labor followed closely upon the retreat of the Chinese. This later class of labor, has crept in so easily and so gradually that its danger up to one year ago was not given more than passing notice... [T]hey would quietly move to the farming and fruit-growing district, and beyond this they attracted little attention until the white labor

which had been in the habit of obtaining employment throughout the interior was confronted with an appalling condition, in traveling from place to place, seeking employment, and were refused same, while gangs of Japanese were busily engaged performing the work that they had hitherto been given.³

Against a backdrop of wandering white workers, this report gives the first official and prototypical formula for the Japanese problem. First, citing extensively the data he had gathered, the commissioner called the people's attention to the evil effect of the extremely low wages introduced with the Japanese aliens. According to the report, a regular farm hand had earned only 12.5 to 20 cents per day in Japan, while by his same efforts he could gain one dollar a day in California. Wages in other occupations, either in urban or rural districts in Japan, also hardly meant much to the people of the United States. As one white laborer complained in his letter to the commissioner: "We were getting \$ 2.50 a ton for picking prunes; but now we are glad to accept \$ 2.00 a ton, while the Japs are bidding for them at \$ 1.75... [U]nless some check is put to their inroads they are destined to drive, not only the whites, but the Chinamen out of the orchard work in this State."⁴

This kind of cheap labor was not the commissioner's sole concern. The ways Japanese immigrants were imported and distributed also annoyed him. Apparently there was a concerted effort between immigration companies or hotel keepers at the Japanese ports and the Japanese bosses on the West Coast to send, accept, and distribute groups of seemingly penniless immigrants to certain farms and railroad labor camps in the region. As we will see, this so-called "boss-gang" system worked as an effective labor-supply mechanism. Its very effectiveness made the labor commissioner suspect the existence of illegal arrangements for contract labor, although he could not prove the fact. At one point in the report, he recognized that the employers of the state were obliged to make contracts with the Japanese bosses because of the fickleness of the native white labor of "the tramp class." Nevertheless, as a protector of them, the commissioner concluded his report with the simple recommendation of excluding Japanese cheap labor entirely.⁵

Finally it seems worth noting that this official report initiated a long-lasting Janus-like portrayal of the Japanese people. In one part, Fitzgerald reports:

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The characteristics of the Japanese laborer who comes to this country show that he is unreliable as a worker; that he readily acquires that which is bad and is slow to take up that which is moral. . . . They are great lovers of drink, as the facts obtained. . . showed this lower class of Japanese civilization very partial to our wines and beer.⁶

But on the same page he admits :

With their keen perception, energy, and enterprise, together with dexterity and imitative faculties, the Japanese are quick to comprehend, and, as art or trade once learned, they become adepts; therefore, to work and learn with them means a competition with not only unskilled, but the highest branches of skilled, labor.⁷

Thus in this report an ethnic stereotype was defined. The Japanese immigrants were pictured as a people imported in groups as cheap labor with formidable competitive skills but with immoral and unchristian ways of life. Like most stereotypes, it conveys more about the mind of its authors than the actual life of the depicted. It certainly betrayed distrust lurking in the host society against newly arriving strangers. Like most stereotypes, however, this one was not just a fiction but rather a product of exaggeration of reality.

None denied that the picture drawn here conveyed some truth about the Japanese immigrants of the 1890s. Even the Japanese government at that time admitted that most of their emigrants to America were sojourners, whose primary objective was just to obtain the extraordinarily high wages. Japanese officials on the West Coast often reported in their diplomatic letters to the Foreign Office that it was not without reasons that some of their immigrants were suspected as contract laborers and refused entry on that ground. Such letters were full of records of immigrant's affairs which they handled in a peculiarly paternalistic way. As an important part of their routine work, they had to use their good offices to help immigrants who were rejected entry for various reasons, for controlling gambling, crimes, or prostitution in their immigrant society, and for investigating the working conditions of Japanese laborers. Ironically, in those early days, the Japanese diplomats on the West Coast—whose successors would later be obliged to assume the role of defending the immigrants—were most critical of the laborers and strongly urged the Japanese government to restrict immigration to America.⁸

By the late 1890s, the Japanese government had begun to deal with the emigration problem. In 1891 it established a section in the Foreign Minister's Secretariat specializing in emigration matters.⁹ A governmental ordinance for regulating immigration companies and protecting emigrants was issued in 1894, and two years later, as emigration increased after the Sino-Japanese War, it was expanded and enacted as a law. In order to improve the quality of emigrants, the government also ordered its prefectural authorities to tighten up the procedures for screening applicants for passports.¹⁰ Additionally, the government voluntarily restricted emigration to North America several times in the late 1890s.¹¹ All of these efforts represented a drastic change in the government's view of emigration. In the early Meiji years, most of the elite politicians had been reluctant to send their young subjects of conscription age abroad, since they considered them indispensable for their plans to build a modern army and to industrialize their country as quickly as possible.¹² For three principal reasons they now tried to implement a more organized emigration policy.

The first factor that precipitated the Japanese government's concern over emigration was the economic benefit that the earlier emigrants brought back to Japan. As a newspaper reported in 1902: "It is now widely known that emigration is a profitable enterprise. Today about a hundred thousand of our emigrants are spreading out to such foreign countries as Hawaii, North America, and so on. Although there are differences according to places and individuals, on the average each of those emigrants is saving one hundred yen per year and sending it home. Thus they contribute a total of ten million yen to the national economy. . . It should be emphasized that the immigration enterprise is not only profitable but also necessary."¹³ A get-rich-quick scheme of most of the early immigrants, made the enterprise profitable.

The second reason lay in emigrants' economic status as a "surplus population" in the rapidly industrializing Japanese society in the late nineties. The concern with this "surplus population" and its possible outlets also hastened the Japanese government to formulate an emigration policy. In 1890 Japan already had a population of over forty million in an area approximately the size of California. Most of the population inhabited the narrow arable strips lying along the coast line, which compose only 15 per cent of the total domain. Moreover, throughout the decade population growth averaged over 400,000 a year.¹⁴ Seen

from the government's point of view, California was now an important outlet for surplus population.¹⁵

The third factor was acute sensitivity on the part of the Japanese leaders and public to their reputation among Westerners. Unlike the first two factors which spurred the government to expand emigration, this sensitivity required a policy restraining unbridled emigration in order not to mar Japan's international dignity and reputation. In the 1890s, Japanese national pride had been badly hurt by a series of failures to revise its unequal treaties with the western countries. Therefore, many Japanese, particularly the leading politicians and diplomats, were worried about the negative effect their emigrants' bad reputation would have on the national honor, as well as on the negotiations for treaty revisions. Thereafter, until 1911, this concern would always constitute a part of the reason for Japan's voluntary restriction of emigration.

As both the reports of California's labor commissioners and the letters of the Japanese diplomats indicated, the Japanese question in North America during the late nineteenth century was, despite its distinct cultural or social overtones, essentially a labor-supply question. As long as it remained so, the question could be reduced to one concerning only the number of imported laborers. Conceiving it as such, the white labor unions continued to apply the same anti-Oriental exclusionist argument indiscriminately to both Chinese and Japanese, even after the two Asian powers had waged a war against each other and had become sharply conscious of their differences. From the labor unionist's point of view, the cultural differences between the two Oriental peoples were of only minor importance. Consequently, after the mid-1900s, when the Chinese population in the United States was drastically decreasing and that of the Japanese increasing, labor leaders like Samuel Gompers were still arguing for the exclusion of Chinese, Japanese, East Indians, and Koreans using the same anticoolie rhetoric.¹⁶

The warning against cheap Japanese labor was sounded persistently throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, for during that decade Japanese immigration reached the highest level in American history. The number of Japanese who came directly from Japan and were admitted to the continental United States jumped to 12,626 in 1900, up from 3,395 the previous year. Thereafter, several thousand direct immigrants reached the ports of the West Coast from Japan each year until 1908 (even during the years of the Russo-Japanese War). More-

over, this direct immigration, totaling about 50,000 between 1900 and 1910, was equaled by an indirect immigration by way of Hawaii as well as Canada and Mexico. As a result, the Japanese population in the United States, despite a considerable number of departures, increased dramatically. The United States census reports an increase in that decade from 24,326 to 72,157 for the entire country and from 10,151 to 41,356 for California.¹⁷ It is no wonder that in that decade California witnessed a heated and persistent anti-Japanese movement led by the Asiatic Exclusion League consisting of various labor unionists.

But if the Japanese question had remained simply one of supply of cheap labor, it might have ceased to be a conspicuous political issue after the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-1908 prohibited Japanese laborers from emigrating to the United States. The numerical expansion itself was perhaps not the most significant phenomenon about the Japanese immigrant society in this period. More importantly, that society had been undergoing a gradual structural transformation by 1910. Along with simultaneous changes in the opposite direction occurring in the Chinese immigrant society, this transformation brought a distinctly Japanese problem to the California scene, one which produced a new antagonism against Japanese among the white population.

II.

In 1909, when a scholarly magazine requested an article on oriental immigration, Chester H. Rowell, a progressive journalist in Fresno, California, wrote: "The Chinese problem is approaching its end, unless we reopen it. The Japanese problem is only beginning, and the end is not wholly within our control."¹⁸

At that time the so-called Chinese problem on the Pacific Coast of North America was not yet completely subdued. After a quarter century of exclusion, Chinese "coolie" labor was still an obsession among white workers.¹⁹ In addition, the Chinese' outlandish way of life, their clanish social web, their secret administration, and the infamous "tong wars" within the Chinese immigrant community were viewed with indignation by the white public, which considered them an affront to their democratic creed and Christian morals.²⁰

Nevertheless, the Chinese problem was much less conspicuous than a decade earlier. As a result of federal law which caused a demographic imbalance of age and sex distribution, the Chinese population on the

West Coast was at the time steadily dwindling.²¹ Discrimination had taken the edge off their economic and occupational competitiveness. Although some of them had succeeded in certain occupations, notably in restaurants and laundries, where they met with little native competition, the Chinese as a group generally failed to gain a foothold in other fields.²² Moreover, the Chinese were gradually flocking to the Chinatowns of some big cities.²³ The immigrant society within the walls of the Chinatown had established a semiautonomous social structure and was allowed de facto extraterritoriality by the white community. In other words, the Chinese society had been largely quarantined from the white population. So, around 1910, many Californians with Rowell regarded the Chinese problem as manageable and approaching its end.²⁴

According to statistical data, the Japanese immigrant society at the time was showing a quite different tendency. Aside from the general reverse trend of population growth, the most striking demographic difference between the two immigrant societies lay in their composition by age and sex. In contrast to the aging community of the Chinese, more than 60 per cent of the total Japanese male population in California was between twenty and thirty five years of age in 1910. A high birthrate (nearly 6 per cent of the total population was under the age of five, as against 2.4 per cent in the Chinese society of the same year) also reflected the youthfulness of the Japanese society.²⁵ As implied in the relatively high birthrate, the ratio of Japanese women to men had also been improving rapidly between 1900 and 1910. The number of Japanese women in California increased from 553 to 6,240 in the decade.²⁶ As the United States Immigration Commission reports, the majority of immigrant women from Japan entered the United States "as the wives of farmers or business men or as single women to be married upon their arrival to men of these classes." The commission's report suggests that the increase in the number of women and marriages accompanied "the rise of the Japanese from the rank of wage-earners to a position of independence."²⁷ By prohibiting immigration of laborers while allowing entry of the so-called "picture brides," the Gentlemen's Agreement was also responsible for the rectification of the previous imbalance between sexes. As a result, the ratio of seventeen males to one female in 1900 became 5.6 to one 1910.²⁸

Another factor differentiating the Japanese from the Chinese was the rate of illiteracy. Although 28.2 per cent of Japanese in California

had been illiterate in their own language in 1900, only 8.6 per cent were so ten years later. The latter record, exceeding not only that of Chinese (15.5 per cent) but also that of the category "foreignborn white" (10.0 per cent), signified the improvement in quality of immigrants from Japan.²⁹

At the same time it also indicated the effectiveness of the compulsory elementary school system of Meiji Japan. One may infer that most of the Issei immigrants who arrived during the first decade of the twentieth century had undergone this highly centralized and nationalistic education after 1890.³⁰ Through this education they seemed to acquire three things: the three R's, a work ethic, and a nationalistic ideology. The Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1890 encapsuled all these purposes. As a contemporary foreign visitor recorded: "The inspiring motive of education in Japan is found in [this] Rescript. . . . A copy of this is kept, often hanging framed in every school, and on special occasions it [was] read aloud, while all the scholars reverently listen with bowed heads."³¹ The United States Immigration Commission recognized the effect of this type of education among the Japanese immigrants:

[T]he Japanese are greatly interested in political matters, are intelligent, quick to absorb new ideas, and progressive, but have been accustomed to a somewhat different form of government and have exhibited a strength of feeling for and loyalty to their country and its Government and the Mikado, seldom, if ever, found among other people.³²

No doubt the ability to read and write was instrumental in establishing the Japanese immigrant society. But as many Issei themselves recalled later, the work ethic and discipline taught in their school days also proved of great value in their life in the new world.³³ The nationalistic ideology also was not useless to Japanese immigrants. It furnished them with a spiritual tie to their home land and an ideological basis for the Issei people's ethnic solidarity.³⁴ For the purpose of understanding the attitude and behavior shown by the Japanese immigrants during the crisis of 1913, it is important to remember that their relations with the Japanese Government were maintained historically through reciprocal exchange of paternalism and allegiance.³⁵

With its members increasing and their quality improving during the first decade of the twentieth century, Japanese society in California began to develop an extensive ethnic network of social and economic

establishments. During this decade, as the Immigration Commission realized, the Japanese immigrants in West Coast cities made more progress in business than in wage-earning occupations.³⁶ Having established such businesses as lodgings, restaurants, billiards, barber shops, house cleaners, and laundries as their favorite enterprises, the Japanese increased the number of their urban establishments from less than 100 to more than 2,000 within the decade.³⁷ Following a Japanese historian, this could be called the closing of the age of sojournership and the opening of the age of entrepreneurship in the history of Japanese Americans.³⁸

Nevertheless, this flourishing entrepreneurship had been seriously delimited by its intrinsic characteristics. The infant Japanese business generally lacked a sufficient supply of capital. Thus it took the form of a family industry, depending primarily on Japanese clients and closed off to the market of the white society. Consequently, the report of the Immigration Commission pointed out, "the trades which have been seriously affected by Japanese competition in most cities have been few."³⁹ The achievement by the Japanese was the result, not of serious competition with the white business establishments, but rather of "a retreat from competition," to use Roger Daniels's term. They succeeded in the "areas of the economy where their conflicts with organized labor would be minimal."⁴⁰ Therefore, in spite of the alarms sounded by the Asiatic Exclusion League and the Anti-Jap Laundry League, the remarkable increase in the number of urban business establishments did not itself imply a Japanese encroachment on the economy of the white society.

In contrast, the Japanese movement toward agricultural entrepreneurship brought a far more substantial advancement in economic status. Consequently, it stirred up a new kind of hostility after 1908. To understand this development in the Japanese problem, it is necessary to go back and analyze the historical context of Japanese agriculture in California.

As a labor commissioner of California had already reported in 1896, Japanese immigrant farm hands intruded quickly on certain seasonal labor markets such as "hop, beet, and fruit producers and packers."⁴¹ In the first decade of the twentieth century, while the aging Chinese farm laborers were gradually leaving the agricultural fields and turning toward their ethnic "ghettos" in the cities and towns, the young Japanese became the dominant labor force in rural districts.⁴²

By 1909 more than 40 per cent of the Japanese population found

employment on the farms of the western states. In California alone, about 30,000 Japanese were engaged in farm labor. At that time, the Japanese farm laborers virtually monopolized some crops. They comprised 95 per cent of the berry pickers, vegetable pickers, and celery hand workers, over 80 per cent of the workers in the beet industry, and more than 50 per cent of the grape pickers, pruners, and fruit pickers. Although these tasks were not congenial to the white laborers and the Japanese entered those areas again with little competition, these statistics were still astonishing considering that the Japanese constituted less than 3 per cent of California's rural population.⁴⁵

Aside from the cheap labor, several factors were conducive to their success. First of all, the majority of Japanese immigrants to North America had been farmers or farm laborers in their home country.⁴⁴ Farms must have been quite natural destinations for them, especially when they met invidious discrimination from white workers in big cities. Their experience with intensive farming at home and their traditional way of daily life helped them secure a firm hold on crops which required a large amount of manual labor during certain seasons.

The success of the Japanese farm laborers, however, was not due solely to their ethnic traits. A more important reason was probably the previously mentioned "boss-gang" system, which was a way of "marketing" cheap Japanese laborers.⁴⁵ When analyzed a little more thoroughly, this system appears to be a peculiar organization of Japanese farm laborers into groups ("gangs") led by influential Japanese leaders ("bosses"), most commonly formed along the lines of the *ken* (prefectures) in which they had lived in Japan.⁴⁶ In many cases laborers lived in boarding houses ("clubs" or "camps") owned by the bosses. The latter then sent their boarders in groups to various farm jobs in response to the demand of the white farmers. The conditions of employment were decided by negotiations between the farmers and the bosses.

Run by the bosses, who were well informed of both the situation of immigrant laborers and the conditions of farms in the neighborhood, the system worked as a convenient control valve for the supply and demand of the labor force in the particularly seasonal agriculture of California. Although the laborers were often ruthlessly exploited by the bosses, the system probably provided the newly arriving immigrants with the easiest way of securing employment.

Although it was always eyed with suspicion by the labor unions as

an apparatus for supplying cheap contract laborers, the system also proved to be beneficial to white farmers who required large numbers of seasonal manual laborers. By relying on the system, they were protected from the problems caused by an unstable labor supply. In addition, the bosses furnished them with the cheapest available labor by underbidding, not only the white men, but also the Chinese previous to 1900.⁴⁷ It was not surprising that the Japanese did not take long to become the predominant element of labor supply for certain crops.

By 1905 a new situation had evolved due to the success of the Japanese immigrants in dominating the farm labor market. To avoid the problem of labor shortages, many white orchardists and farmers now began to resort to easier and surer means, by leasing their holdings to Japanese. In addition, the Japanese acquired tenant farms from the Chinese. According to the Immigration Commission, the Chinese held the tenure of 1,060 farms in 1900 in the western states. By 1909 most of these Chinese tenants were forced to transfer their leases to the Japanese because of the diminishing supply of their own laborers.⁴⁸

"By leasing to one or several Japanese." the Immigration Commission explains, "the nucleus of the necessary labor supply is obtained and the tenant or tenants serve as 'bosses' to obtain the other laborers needed during the busiest seasons."⁴⁹ This explanation was sustained by California's farmers who were interviewed by the state's labor commissioner in 1909. Many of them responded that they leased their farms and orchards to the Japanese, not because of their preference for Japanese farmers, but simply because of a difficulty "to obtain good white help." While thus leasing their farms to Japanese immigrants, they took umbrage at the prevalence of Japanese laborers and their quick ascendancy to independent farmers. Some of them apprehended even an eventual control of their farming districts by the Japanese.⁵⁰ A farmer in northern California gave a typical example :

I have rented my ranch to the Japanese. They pay me cash and I save lots of trouble hiring help. Their object is to get what they can off it and then rent another place. The Japs will own this valley after a while. The restriction of Chinese immigration has worked a hardship on the producers of fruit in this valley. The Japs know it, and they are getting too independent.⁵¹

Beginning with leases to the bosses, the system spread rapidly among

Japanese immigrants during the 1900s. To most Japanese farm laborers with little capital, tenancy was the first possible step from seasonal migratory jobs to settled independent farming. Many of them started by leasing land for a share of the crop, a system in which the landlord supplied almost all of the necessary equipment. In some localities, according to the Immigration Commission, the lessor provided even the money necessary to pay current expenses, so that the tenant required no capital at all. Where sharecropping was not available as a common transaction, another way to independence was by leasing land for cash. In most cases the landlords allowed Japanese without capital to pay the rent in installments.⁶² Finally, due to their hard work, frugal ways of life, and a good harvest for a few years, quite a few tenants had become rich enough to buy their own farms.

Although most farms then operated by Japanese immigrants were much smaller than those operated by the white farmers, the increasing number of farms showed the remarkable progress of the Japanese as independent farmers. In 1900 the United States census recorded only thirty nine Japanese farmers with holdings of some 4,698 acres in the United States. Around 1904, expansion into lease farming was launched. Six years later, the United States census, although known today as underestimating most statistical figures concerning Japanese immigrants, found that 1816 farms totaling 99,254 acres in California were operated by the Japanese. Much more impressive figures were found in the Report of the Immigration Commission which was based on data gathered by the Japanese American Association of San Francisco. According to this report, the Japanese in California owned 16,449.5 acres, leased 80,232 acres for cash and 57,001.5 acres for sharecropping, and operated 3,000 to 3,200 farms in the year 1909. Thereafter until 1913, constantly fearing state legislation prohibiting them from owning and leasing land, Japanese farmers further accelerated establishing farms.⁶³

By 1913 Japanese immigrants in California had thus entered the so-called "settlement period."⁶⁴ They had evolved a sub-society, which was small and self-contained but almost parallel to the host society in that it contained both sexes (although its ratio was still ill-balanced), all age groups including young workers and children, a variety of businesses extending in both urban and rural districts, and a unique tradition and culture.

As was suggested before, this relatively quick success in settling was

partly due to the values and skills which the immigrants had acquired in families, schools, and work places in Meiji Japan. But an equally fundamental reason for the success lay in on conditions of the host society. As Stephen Steinberg argues regarding the general immigration: "America needed the immigrant at least as much as the immigrant needed America. . . . To be sure, the nation's expanding industries needed labor, but even more than that, they needed cheap labor."⁵⁵

This was the case of the Japanese immigration into California. California's expanding industries, particularly the farming of fruits and vegetables.⁵⁶ Native American farmers needed cheap labor and thus welcomed the Japanese, at least until they became too prominent in certain fields. Factories established by new urban industries in the state may also have needed a constant supply of cheap labor. Unlike the Chinese, however, the Japanese found little employment in shoe, clothing, and cigar factories. According to the Report of the Immigration Commission, this was partly because most employers, who had previously been forced by a hostile public sentiment to discharge their Chinese employees, were discouraged from hiring Japanese immigrants. "More important," the Report continues, "perhaps is the fact that, coincident with the immigration of the Japanese, cheap labor of other kinds has become available in the large number of Italians, Russians, Puerto Ricans, Spaniards, and others finding places in the population of San Francisco, where most of the manufacturing is conducted." Finally, in those urban industries the labor unions were too strong to allow the Japanese to become a major labor force.⁵⁷ Thus the Japanese tended to flock toward several economic areas where antipathy against them was slight and where they could succeed.⁵⁸

While the immigrants had remained cheap migratory laborers, anti-Japanese feeling in the state emanated mainly from the labor unions. Now, as they succeeded in settling into some small businesses and small farms, a new dimension was added to the Japanese problem: Anti-Japanese feeling spread to the middle strata of society. Unlike the time when most Japanese were segregated into camps or bunkhouses, the contact of the Japanese with the white society became wider, more frequent, and more consistent. Moreover, their settlement pattern was quite different from that of Chinese. An American citizen, rather sympathetic to Japanese immigrants, wrote in 1907:

Japanese were scattered all over the city of San Francisco.... They do not herd together nearly so much as do the great mass of immigrants that come to us from Europe. As is well known in the great cities of the East, and of the West as well, there are quarters set apart for the various nationalities. The Japanese live in various parts of our cities and towns, unless restricted by city or town ordinance.⁸⁹

This tendency of the Japanese not to live in a solid segregated area was elaborated upon later by a sociologist, R. D. McKenzie. According to him, a Japanese in the cities became unwilling to live in the slum quarters occupied by Japanese coolie labor when he gained a higher economic and social status. Consequently, this type of Japanese made "continual efforts to find a home in a white residential section which corresponds to his own economic status," only to face the antagonistic reactions of the white community. In the rural areas, the reason for the dispersion of the Japanese population lay not only in the desire for a better neighborhood but also in the nature of their businesses. As McKenzie recounted :

The fact that the Japanese have concentrated in truck gardening makes for their distribution around the peripheries of a few of the large cities of the Coast and in adjoining fertile valleys. The rather wide dispersion of population occasioned by any form of agriculture is also a factor for consideration. The Japanese population engaged in truck-gardening seems much larger than it would if huddled together in a few blocks in the center of the city, as the Chinese are. Moreover, the leading highways radiating from the large cities pass through or by these fertile garden spots cultivated by Japanese. This enables a larger number of whites to view the colored invader at work, and [the] less efficient white competitor, gaining thereby the impression that the Japanese are driving the whites away from the best land and forcing Americans to assume not only an inferior economic role, but also an inferior social role.⁹⁰

The Japanese problem now assumed deep cultural and racial overtones. Certainly the uniqueness of this problem as an immigration issue lay in the fact that the Japanese were the first racial immigrant group who, while climbing up the American economic ladder, eschewed a racial ghetto successfully and settled into the host society wherever it could. Thus, as McKenzie indicates, the more the Japanese succeeded in their

economic life, the more their social and cultural life was exposed to the eyes of the larger society. This is why the Japanese problem evoked serious controversies among white Americans about their assimilability. As Rowell observed: "Chinese will not assimilate with American life, and Americans refuse to assimilate with Japanese."⁶¹

III.

Exclusionists denied the assimilability of the Japanese to American society for several reasons. One reason lay in the distinctive cultural life of Japanese immigrants. Certainly most new immigrant groups were attacked by nativists for this same reason. Orientals, however, had probably the greatest difficulty in adjusting their life to western standards, not only because they were racial minorities, but also because their home customs and manners concerning diet, clothing, housing, marriage, family life, education, recreation, and neighborhood association were radically different from those of western society.

As was illustrated by the attitude of Japanese diplomats concerning immigrants, the Japanese government was painfully aware of this difficulty. Therefore, as Roger Daniels points out, unlike other foreign governments, it tried "to limit immigration to what it regarded as the 'better sort'" after the 1890s. It sponsored various schools and educational programs for emigrants, established a system of passport control, and directed its consulates to cooperate with the Japanese American Association in acculturating Japanese immigrants to American society.⁶²

Nevertheless, the cultural life of Japanese immigrants resisted easy accommodation. In 1907, while advocating a stronger emigration policy toward the United States, one of the leading Japanese magazines criticized Japanese emigrants in America for their unassimilability:

Unlike European immigrants, Japanese immigrants do not assimilate themselves to Americans. . . . There are still some who wear Japanese clothings. They stick to the Japanese style of housing and food and to the native language. . . . Even if they work in the same farms or factories as Americans, they will not talk to, associate themselves with, or cooperate with the latter. Thus those Japanese segregate themselves and form a solidarity completely separate from Americans.⁶³

No doubt this kind of cultural distinctness together with cheap labor

inaugurated the argument over the assimilation of the Japanese. Now the diffusion of Japanese immigrants as permanent settlers added another factor to the argument. Although the Japanese immigrants as an ethnic network tended to be self-contained, their residential mobility and growing visibility, along with their economic success, stirred up a new fear of interracial amalgamation among the white populace.

A resident in Florin, where the Japanese population was quite dense, testified that there were actually a very few cases of intermarriage between the Japanese and white races.⁶⁴ But these few cases would be enough to arouse the feverish racial antipathy that already lurked under the consciousness of the white people. In early April 1913, at the joint hearing of the California legislature, a farmer made a sensation in declaring his typical concern about the beginning of racial fusion. Chester Rowell, who attended the hearing, reported his speech:

A gaunt farmer rose to reply: "Up at Elk Grove, where I live," he said, "on the next farm a Japanese man lives, and a white woman. That woman is carrying around a baby in her arms. What is that bady? It isn't white. It isn't Japanese. I'll tell you what it is—

"It is the beginning of the biggest problem that ever faced the American people!"

Psychologically, this epitomized the whole question—the beginning of a race problem, multiplied in imagination by the possibilities of all the future.⁶⁵

Even though Japanese seldom did or could expand further than the Rocky Mountains, the racial question as to Japanese easily traversed them. Letters written by Californians and peoples of other states to California's governor or the State Department during the crisis of 1913 proved intermarriage between the two races to be one of the most predominant concerns among white Americans.⁶⁶ One wrote to the State Department to confirm a rumor which he had heard "that certain demands have been made upon the United States Government by the Government of Japan as to the rights of Japanese to acquire citizenship and to intermarry with Americans."⁶⁷ Another professed to defend the "clean race."⁶⁸ A Virginian encouraged Californians: "The South takes care of its 'Negro,' let Cal, hound the 'Jap.'"⁶⁹ From New York, the Aryan Pure Race Society of America telegraphed its sympathy with California's exclusionists.⁷⁰

Thirdly, the exclusionists denied the assimilability of Japanese immigrants for political reasons. At that time, Japanese immigrants in the United States were deprived of naturalization rights. The Naturalization Act of 1875 had given the right only to free white persons, aliens of African nativity, and persons of African descent.⁷¹ Belonging to none of these categories, the Japanese immigrants had been denied the right by the United States courts. They were thus distinct also for being ineligible for United States citizenship.

However, it must not be overlooked that in the early years the Japanese government had not seriously sought the right of naturalization for its emigrants. Sutemi Chinda, Japanese consul at San Francisco during the early 1890s, represented this negative stance of the Japanese government regarding the matter. In 1894, a Japanese immigrant had been denied citizenship by a United States court. When he asked the aid of the consulate, Chinda refused the petition on the ground that :

The Japanese law does not suppose that the subjects can cut off their tie with the Emperor at will and be naturalized in foreign countries. I absolutely cannot make any effort for him.⁷²

Japanese bureaucrats and nationalists had construed naturalization of their nationals in foreign countries as disloyal. This represented a national consensus at least before 1906. In that year, the exclusionists of California began to aim for legislation against Japanese immigrants that would take advantage of the latter's noncitizenship. Only after that year did some Japanese intellectuals urge their government to work for the right of naturalization for the sake of their immigrants, who were becoming willing to settle permanently in the United States.

These intellectuals could not fully persuade the Japanese government and people to regard their nationals in America, not as colonists loyal to their home country, but as free and independent immigrants. The political cartoons published in Japanese periodicals during the crisis of 1913 illustrate the Japanese view both of the United States and of their emigrants (See pp. 603-602). On the one hand, by depicting the Americans as powerful rascals, the cartoons revealed the tyrannical image held by the Japanese of Americans. On the other hand, by depicting the Japanese immigrants as helpless children in traditional clothing, the cartoons showed the paternalistic sentiment of the Japanese people toward the emigrants. The cartoons implied that Japanese are Japanese even if

they reside outside the country.⁷³

Therefore, as Carey McWilliams points out: "The Japanese government was always quick to lodge protests over mistreatment of or discrimination against its nationals and to defend them."⁷⁴ Even though the government's paternalistic protests were more for the sake of national dignity than for the welfare of the immigrants, these immigrants returned loyalty through their civic organization, the Japanese Association of America. From its beginning in 1908, the association assumed some important official roles for intermediating between immigrants and the home government. For example, it took charge of administering the registration of Japanese immigrants and gathering social and economic statistics to provide the home government with factual data for implementing the Gentlemen's Agreement. In addition, having consular officials at the top of its hierarchy, the association could promptly solicit the government for diplomatic aid whenever Japanese immigrants met with discrimination from the white society.⁷⁵


The close connection of the Japanese-American society with the home government no doubt intensified Californian's image of Japanese immigrants as clannish and unassimilable. As Bertram J. O. Schrieke points out: "Had the Japanese leaders in California tried to come to some arrangement with the local whites—this would have been difficult, of course—it would not have stirred up so much violent emotion."⁷⁶ Instead, when faced with discrimination, those leaders always resorted to their tie with the home country; thus they not only were treated by Americans as aliens but also acted as such.

Accordingly by 1911, even the State Department, usually most critical of Californians from a diplomatic standpoint, had agreed with them on the nature of the Japanese immigrant society. In a letter to President Taft, Secretary of State Philander C. Knox wrote:

I think also that as the Japanese apparently cannot be assimilated and are so clannish as to tend to create *imperium in imperio*, it is quite natural that the Pacific Coast should rather object to their taking up too much land.⁷⁷

Thus not only the Japanese but also the United States Government regarded Japanese immigrants as colonists. It is not surprising that the Japanese problem in California evolved into a serious diplomatic issue between the United States and Japan.

THE BIG STICK



Japanese agitation causes much concern to Government and people across the pond. *From the Nippon.*

NOW AND—BEFORE



IV.

White society's denial of the assimilability of Japanese immigrants on the grounds of racial difference deeply offended the Japanese government and people in the late Meiji period. Throughout the period, Japan had strenuously striven to westernize its army, politics, economy, and culture, for fear of becoming another China and falling prey to western imperial powers. Becoming a Great Power of the world through westernization had been the prime national goal in the period. Now, after a successful war against Russia, Japanese had finally come to believe that they had achieved this goal at a huge cost of human and material resources. In the Japanese mind, therefore, the denial of the assimilability of their emigrants into western society was construed as the Westerners' denial of their capability for westernization, and, further, the denial of the national accomplishment of Meiji Japan.

The Japanese people perceived anti-Japanese feelings abroad as stemming from two causes: on the one hand, the Westerners' fear of Japan's quick ascent in international politics, and, on the other hand, the racism deeply seated in western history. The immigration issue was sensitive because it could harm Japanese national pride and exacerbate their feelings of inferiority. This is why, despite the relatively minor effect that their immigration to North America had on Japan's national demography and economy, the California problem could incite a highly emotional reaction in the Japanese.

To make the matter more complicated, the general diplomatic relationship between the United States and Japan had been changing since the Spanish-American War. By 1905, as they had become aware of a difference in their interests concerning the future of China and the western Pacific, their naive friendship since Perry had gradually given way to an uneasy association. Then the relationship sharply deteriorated when the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty after the Russo-Japanese War turned out to be disappointing to the Japanese people stricken with a war of attrition. On September 5, 1905, a mass protest meeting, held by the opposition parties at Hibiya park in Tokyo, burst into a riot. In this turmoil, which resulted in the first martial law under the Meiji constitutional regime, the people's resentment was directed against not only their own government but also against the United States, which had mediated and arranged the peace conference.

About the same time, the Asiatic Exclusion League in San Francisco began to make repeated and unprovoked attacks on the city's Japanese establishments.⁷⁸ A year later, San Francisco's Board of Education decided to segregate Japanese children from the city's public schools; the first major diplomatic crisis between the United States and Japan ensued from this local decision. The political and diplomatic negotiations over the issue resulted in the agreement between the two countries to restrict the immigration of Japanese laborers.

Although these manifestations of hostility did not lead to any military confrontation, war rumors ran rampant thereafter on both sides of the Pacific. The old naive amity was thus impaired beyond repair by the time of the enactment of California's anti-alien land act.

The Japanese problem in California originated as a labor question. But by 1913 it had evolved into a complex issue. The California land legislation of 1913 was started as a bold undertaking by white America to wipe out the whole problem in a single stroke. However, the problem had been entwined too much with the past and future development of the state and had already involved too many national and international vested interests to allow a simple state-based solution.

NOTES

1. Toshisuke Kawakita to Tokunori Asada (Director of Commercial Bureau), December 26, 1889, *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* (Documents on Japanese Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai, 1936-), 1889, pp. 545-547 (hereafter cited as *NGB*).
2. Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 17, 20.
3. *The Seventh Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1895-1896* (Sacramento: State Printing House, 1896), pp. 101-2.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 122-123, 125-126.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-106, 126. Contract labor had been prohibited by the Foran Act of 1885 which aimed at protecting labor from the employers' attempts to use immigrants as strikebreakers. See Thomas J. Archdeacon, *Becoming American: An Ethnic History* (New York: Free Press, 1983), p. 144. In 1900, another labor commissioner tried in vain to find evidence of contract labor in Japanese immigration. But he declared that "many [Japanese] come under the term 'assisted'

immigrants,” by which he meant those who had made themselves “responsible to some other person for a debt” but remained “free to come and go at will, so far as [their] service and employment may be concerned.” *The Ninth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1899–1900* (Sacramento: State Printing House, 1900), pp. 18–19.

6. *The Seventh Report*, p. 110.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Sutemi Chinda, the Japanese principal negotiator as Ambassador in the crisis of 1913, was appointed as consul at San Francisco in September 1890. During this first service in the United States, he used his power to improve the quality of the incipient Japanese society on the Pacific Coast. Judging from his letters to the Foreign Office, his main norms of conduct were national pride and paternalism. On these norms, he endeavored to clear the Japanese society of crimes, particularly prostitution. He urged his government to control emigration of the lower class and activities of the immigration companies for the sake of national dignity. Sutemi Chinda to Shūzo, Aoki 10 March 1891, 25 April 1891, 7 May 1891, *NGB*, 1891, pp. 461–485; Takenori, Kikuchi *Hakushaku Chinda Sutemi den* (A biography of Count Sutemi Chinda) (Tokyo: Hakuyōsha, 1938), pp. 5–14; Irie Toraji, *Hōjin kaigai hatten-shi* (History of Japanese overseas), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Imin Mondai Kenkyūkai, 1938), 1: 311–312.
9. The section was established by Foreign Minister Takeaki Enomoto, who was exceptionally earnest about planning for Japan’s expansion based on emigration. His concern with the issue was probably too advanced to be considered seriously by other politicians, for the immigration section was to be abolished by his successor, Munemitsu Mutsu, a year later and the matter was again placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Commerce. Nevertheless, Enomoto’s endeavor succeeded in stirring up public argument over the population and immigration question. *Ibid.*, 2: 518–519; Japan, Foreign Ministry, ed., *Gaimushō no Hyakunen* (One hundred years of the Japanese Foreign Ministry), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1969), 1: 192, 194, 206–207. See also *Chōya Shimbun*, 5 August 1891, and *Yūbin Hōchi Shimbun*, 25 August 1892.
10. Irie, *Hōjin kaigai hatten-shi*, 1: 107–108, 113–119, 2: 517–524; *Gaimushō no Hyakunen*, 1: 866.
11. *Ibid.*, 1: 869–870; Irie, *Hōjin kaigai hatten-shi*, 1: 311–317.
12. *Ibid.*, 1: 3–4.
13. *Ōsaka Asahi Shimbun*, 20 October 1902.
14. Statistics Bureau, Cabinet, *Nihon teikoku dai sanjū san tōkei nenkan*

- (The thirty-third statistical yearbook of Japan) (Tokyo: Naikaku tōkei kyoku, 1914), p. 34.
15. "Shokumin-teki kokumin to shite no nihonjin" (Japanese as colonizers), *Chūōkōron*, June 1903, pp. 1-10.
 16. Samuel Gompers, "The Chinese Must Not Come," *American Federationist* 12 (November 1905): 833-834; Idem., "The Government to Import and Employ Chinese," *ibid.*, 13 (September 1906): 699-700; Idem., "Japanese Two-Months-A-Year-Labor in California," *ibid.*, (August 1910): 691-692; Augusta H. Pio, "Exclude Japanese Labor," *ibid.*, 12 (May 1905): 274-276.
 17. US., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, 2: 166. Most official and nonofficial statistics published at the time disagree on the exact number of Japanese in the United States. For example, *The Fourteenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1909-1910* (Sacramento: State Printing, 1910), p. 48, reports 40, 996 Japanese in the state in October 1910. According to H. A. Millis, *The Japanese Problem in the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915), pp. 24-25, the census understated the number of Japanese in 1910. On the other hand, statistics taken by the Asiatic Exclusion League obviously exaggerated the number. The league reported 130,000 Japanese in the continental United States, of whom 60,000 were in California. See Walter MacArthur, "Opposition to Oriental Immigration," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 34 (September 1909): 24. Between these two poles, the U. S. Immigrant Commission estimated the number of the Japanese in the continental United States in 1909 as between 95,000 and 100,000, of whom over 55,000 resided in California. See U. S., Congress, Senate, *Report of the Immigration Commission*, S. Doc. 633, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., 1911, vol. 23-25, *Immigrants in Industries*, pt. 25, *Japanese and Other Immigrant Races in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain States*, 23: 5-6, 21-22. According to this report, the number of Japanese who departed after 1908 (since when the departures of aliens from the United States was made a matter of record) were 4,796 (as against 9,544 admitted) in 1908, 5,004 (2,432) in 1909 and 4,377 (1,552) in 1910. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
 18. Chester H. Rowell, "Chinese and Japanese Immigrants—A Comparison," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 34 (September 1909): 9.
 19. For the typical argument against Chinese immigration by white labor, see the articles cited in note 16. See also John P. Young, "The Support of the Anti-Oriental Movement," *ibid.*, pp. 11-18; Walter Mac-

- Arthur, "Opposition to Oriental Immigration," *ibid.*, pp. 19-26; and A. E. Yoell, "Oriental vs. American Labor," *ibid.*, pp. 27-36.
20. Rowell, "Chinese and Japanese Immigrants," pp. 4-7. For a sociological discussion of the Chinatown, see Stanford M. Lyman, "Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation in San Francisco's Chinatown, 1850-1910," *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (1974): 473-499, rpt. in *The Asian in the United States* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1977), pp. 103-118.
 21. The Chinese population in California decreased from 72,472 in 1890 to 45,753 in 1900 to 36,248 in 1910. Their society grew aged, for nearly half of its male population were over forty five years old in 1910. The ratio of male to female population was twelve to one in 1900. In the next decade the number was a little improved: ten to one. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, 2: 157-158, 166.
 22. Carey McWilliams, *Brothers under the Skin* (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1948), pp. 98-99.
 23. In 1910, over 78 per cent of the Chinese in the United States lived in urban areas, while only less than 50 per cent of the Japanese did so; see Stanford Lyman, "Social Demography of the Chinese and Japanese in the United States," in *The Asian in North America*, pp. 134-135.
 24. Lyman, "Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation in San Francisco's Chinatown, 1850-1910," pp. 475-476. See also Stanford M. Lyman, *Chinese Americans* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1974), p. 82.
 25. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, 2: 158.
 26. *Ibid.*, 2: 157.
 27. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 22.
 28. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, 2: 157.
 29. *Ibid.*, 2: 160. The report of Immigration Commission of 1911 also recognized the high literacy of the Japanese immigrants. "It is evident... that the standard of literacy shown by the Japanese, as indicated by their ability to read and write their native language, is far higher than that shown by the Chinese, the Mexicans, and most of the south and east European races, if comparison is limited to those who are employed in the same industries and at the same kinds of work." *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 151.
 30. After 1890, when the highly nationalistic education was launched, the rate of elementary school attendance rose rapidly from about 50 per cent to 60 in 1895 to 81 in 1900 and to 92 in 1902. Department of Education, Japan, *Education in Japan Under the Department of Education: Administration and Work* (Tokyo: Department of Education,

- 1937), p. 6.
31. Ernest W. Clement, *A Handbook of Modern Japan* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1903), p. 210. For the text of the Imperial Rescript, see Ryūsaku Tsunoda, William Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, comps., *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 646-647.
 32. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 160.
 33. John W. Conner, *Tradition and Change in Three Generations of Japanese Americans* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., 1977), p. 84.
 34. Robert A. Wilson and Bill Hosokawa, *East to America: A History of the Japanese in the United States* (New York: Quill, 1982), pp. 186-187, explain the Issei's pro-Japanese outlook as a reaction to harsh and persistent discrimination against them. Of course discrimination and denial of citizenship were other important factors which molded their world view.
 35. In this regard, it is interesting to compare such civic organization of Japanese immigrants as the Japanese Association of America with that of the Chinese. In the former, top business leaders formed an interlocking directorate with diplomats at the consulate. Thus the association was informed of the intentions and directions of their home government through the consul. This was not the case for the latter. The Chinese were far more independent of their government's will. This is probably one of the principal reasons for intensity of the struggles for leadership in the Chinese immigrant society. Lyman, "Conflic and Web of Group Affiliation in San Francisco's Chinatown." For a detailed discussion of the relations between the Japanese Association of America and the Japanese government, see pp. 604.
 36. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 99.
 37. *The Fifteenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1909-1910* (Sacramento: State Printing, 1912), pp. 604-605, 622.
 38. Irie, *Hōjin kaigai hatten-shi*, 1: 473.
 39. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 102. This intrinsic weakness of Japanese business was observed by a Japanese visitor to California as late as 1915. See Shirō Kawada "Kashū shokan", (Observations on California), *Taiyō*, June 1915, pp. 136-138. The economic development followed by the Japanese immigrant society in the United States early in this century was by no means sociologically unique. A similar pattern can be widely observed in many so-called "middleman minority groups" that began their immigrant lives as sojourners and faced sharp hostilities on the part of the host society because of their racial or cultural characteristics. The "middleman

theory” seems useful to single out sociological similarities between the Chinese and Japanese immigrant societies at their initial stages in America. But it seems weak in differentiating between these two “middleman groups” at a certain point in history. See Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Micorities,” *American Sociological Review* 38 (October 1973): 583-594, and Edna Bonacich and John Modell, *Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

40. Roger Daniels, “Westerners from the East,” *Pacific Historical Review* 35 (November 1966): 378.
41. *The Seventh Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1895-1896*, p. 102.
42. According to *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910: Population*, 2: 157, the Japanese rural population increased from 6,905 (1.0 per cent of the total rural population of the state) in 1900 to 22,744 (2.5 per cent) in 1910, while urban population changed from 3,246 (0.4 per cent of the total urban population) to 18,612 (1.3 per cent). As suggested in note 17, the actual number of the Japanese was possibly underestimated in the census. See note 23, for the movement of the Chinese population.
43. *The Fourteenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1909-1910*, pp. 265-274.
44. According to the *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 8, more than 53 per cent of all the Japanese aliens who arrived at ports of the United States and Canada between 1901 and 1909 were classified under the categories of farmers or farm laborers.
45. The following description of the boss-gang system has relied mainly on the *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 61-68 and 25: 16-18. For a vivid account of a few examples, see Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), pp. 172-175. A similar system existed not only in agriculture but also in railroad construction. See *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23: 36-46, and also Karl G. Yoneda, “Japanese Labor History in the United States,” speech delivered to the Sociology Class, Hayward State College, California, 24 and 26 February 1970, original copy (call number C-Z 181) in Bancroft Library, University of California.
46. As to the importance of *ken* consciousness and *kenjinkai* (voluntary self-help organizations based on home prefectures), see S. Frank Miyamoto, “An Immigrant Community in America,” in *East Across the Pacific*, eds. Hinary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa (Santa Bar-

- bara : American Bibliographic Center, Clio Press, 1972), pp. 224, 231–232, and Connor, *Tradition and Change*, pp. 87–88. The former recounts the functions of *ken* organization among the Japanese as “a means drawing workers into particular business and training them,” “a network of relations that sustained the economy and determined its pattern,” and an organization for mutual assistance among *kenjin* (people of the same *ken* origin).
46. According to the report of the Immigration Commission, Japanese immigrant society inherited the boss-gang system from its Chinese predecessor. Although this may be true, the organization was not entirely foreign to the Japanese from the beginning, for the earliest immigrants from Japan emigrated in bands under the leadership of some ambitious pioneers. See Irie, *Hōjin kaigai hatten-shi* (History of Japanese overseas), 1 : 288–295.
 48. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 25: 287, 303–304.
 49. *Ibid.*, 25: 303.
 50. *Thirteenth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California, 1907–1908*, pp. 127–147. This report includes an interesting collection of the white farm owners’ opinions about white, Chinese, and Japanese laborers.
 51. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
 52. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 25 : 303–304.
 53. Exact figures of farms and acreage operated by the Japanese are difficult to obtain, for contemporary statistics violently disagree with each other. Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States*, pp. 193–194; H. A. Millis, *The Japanese Problem in the United States*, 131–132; and *Report of the Immigration Commission*, 23 : 76, 79.
 54. In “An Immigrant Community in America,” pp. 220–221, Miyamoto divides the pre-WWII history of Japanese Americans in Seattle into three periods : “frontier period, 1890–1907,” “settlement period, 1907–1924,” and “second-generation period, 1924–1941.” In the second “settlement period,” the city’s Japanese society witnessed the increase in numbers of women and of business establishments and other institutions. The periodization seems largely applicable to the Japanese societies in various localities of California.
 55. *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America* (New York : Atheneum, 1981), pp. 37–38.
 56. George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1951), pp. 4–5.
 57. *Report of the Immigration Commission*, S. Doc., 747, 61st Cong., 3d sess., 1911, *Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission*, 2 vols. (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1911), 1 : 663.

58. More than thirty anti-Japanese measures were introduced into the California legislature in 1913, including several antialien land bills. Those measures aimed at restricting Japanese businesses in agriculture, fishery, hunting, laundry, restaurant, and even detective companies. This variety represented the predominance of Japanese business in certain fields. Ujirō Ōyama to Tarō Katsura, 22 January 1913, *NGB*, 1913, 3: 3-7, and Ujirō Ōyama to Nobuaki Makino, 8 March 1913, *ibid.*, 3: 18-22.
59. Herbert B. Johnson, *Discrimination Against the Japanese in California: A Review of the Real Situation* (Berkeley, California: Press of the Courier Publishing Company, 1907), p. 27.
60. Cited in Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast: Their Legal and Economic Status* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 348-349. As to Japanese immigrants' tendency to scatter, see also Stanford M. Lyman, "Contrasts in the Community Organization of Chinese and Japanese in North America," in *The Asian in North America*, pp. 124-125, and Roger Daniels, "Westerners from the East," p. 379.
61. Rowell, "Chinese and Japanese Immigrants," p. 9.
62. Roger Daniels, "The Japanese," in *Ethnic Leadership in America*, ed. John Higham (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 39-40, 42, 44; Yuji Ichioka, "Japanese Associations and the Japanese Government: A Special Relationship, 1909-1926," *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (August 1977): 411-416; and Lyman, "Social Demography of the Chinese and Japanese in the United States," pp. 144-145.
63. "Tai-bei imin mondai no kaiketsu" (A solution to the immigration problem with the United States), *Chōōkōron*, November 1907, pp. 10-11.
64. Alice M. Brown, *Japanese in Florin* (Florin, Calif.: By the Author, 1913), p. 5, in Hiram W. Johnson Papers, pt. II, Box 41, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; hereafter cited as the Johnson Papers.
65. Chester H. Rowell, "The Japanese in California," *World's Work*, June 1913, p. 195.
66. Johnson Papers, Part II, Box 37; Department of State Decimal File, 1910-1929, File 811. 52/37, National Archives (hereafter referred to by only File numbers). Both contained many letters from the people to their governments. Although most of them provide stereotypical argument about the problem, the letters are invaluable expressions of public opinion in the years when mass polls were not yet available.
67. S. J. Skinner to William Jennings Bryan, 26 December 1914, 811. 52/37.

68. A. Anderson to Hiram Warren Johnson (hereafter referred as HWJ), 1 May 1913, Johnson Papers.
69. Anonymous letter to HWJ from Norfolk, Virginia, 26 April 1913, *ibid.*
70. Aryan Pure Race Society of America to HWJ, 26 April 1913, *ibid.*
71. Millis, *The Japanese Problem*, p. 303; Reed Ueda, "Naturalization and Citizenship," in *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 739.
72. Kaikokyu hyakunen kinen bunka jigyo dan, ed., *Nichi Bei bunka koshō shi* (The history of cultural relations between Japan and America), 6 vols. (Tokyo: Yōyōsha, 1955), vol. 5: *Ijūhen* (A volume on immigration), ed., Matsuzō Nagai, p. 65.
73. Supplement *The Japan Advertiser*, April 20, 1913.
74. McWilliams, *Brothers under the Skin*, p. 161.
75. Daniels, "The Japanese," pp. 39-45; and Ichioka, "Japanese Associations," pp. 409-437.
76. Bertram Johannes Otto Schrieke, *Alien Americans: A Study of Race Relations* (New York: The Viking Press, 1936), p. 29.
77. State Department to William Howard Taft, 25 March 1911, 811. 52/5.
78. Jean Pajus, *The Real Japanese California* (Berkeley, Calif.: James J. Gillick, Co., 1937), p. 7.