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HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY
My assignment here is to discuss the general topic of this conference “social reform and/or social control” from the point of view of American socialism during the Progressive period. Although it may seem a truism to say that socialism, as represented mainly by the Socialist party, occupied a marginal part of the Progressive reform, it is difficult to find an organic link between the two subjects. The reason for this difficulty lies in the present state of the historiography on these subjects.

First, a problem arises from the long-lasting preoccupation that historians of socialism have had with the question of why there is no socialism in America. This question was originally raised by Werner Sombart in 1905 and has invariably directed historians’ attention to American exceptionalism, which emerges when the lack of socialism in the United States is compared with the viable traditions of social democracy found in European societies.

However, Eric Foner has recently pointed out the intrinsic faults of the Sombartian question. Observing the undeniable trends of the post-WWII European social democracies which were deviating from revolutionary class politics and moving toward economic unionism and social reformism, Foner proposed the modified question “whether the experience of socialism in the United States is, in reality, exceptional, or whether it represents an extreme example of the dilemma of socialism throughout western society.” Historians have not succeeded in explaining the failure of American socialism because they have based their studies on a set of false assumptions “that under capitalism, the working class will develop class consciousness, expressed in unions and a labor or socialist political party, and that consequently the failure of either to emerge must be the result of some outside interference.” In fact, no advanced capitalist society has experienced a socialist transformation. With this in mind, Foner concluded, “American socialists
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were the first to face the dilemma of how to define socialist politics in a capitalist democracy." Because they overlooked these facts, historians of American socialism had been preoccupied with a "negative question [which] inevitably invites ahistorical answers." Consequently, few attempts have been made to locate socialism in the broader context of the Progressive reform or to understand its historical role in the development of American welfare capitalism before the First World War.

Secondly, the difficulty of combining socialism with social reform and/or social control has also been due to recent innovations in the field of social history. These innovations have decomposed the concept of reform, reemphasized that of social control, and produced a new set of questions which historians of socialism have been ill prepared to answer.

Indeed, during the last three decades, few concepts of real interpretive power used in the field of American history have received closer and more critical examination than that of reform. Particularly in the early 1970s, while historians of socialism were still largely concentrating their efforts on the perennial Sombartian question and its corollaries, many social historians began to challenge the social-reform synthesis of American history. Precipitated by both the contemporary rediscovery of wide-spread social and economic injustice and the collapse of a liberal political consensus since the late 1960s, they began to reanalyze a number of past social movements, organizations, institutions, and policies, which had previously been uncritically treated as reforms. The list of items reexamined is virtually inexhaustible: reforms of prisons, mental hospitals, and other coercive institutions to control the deviant; movements against intemperance and prostitution; settlement houses and other civic organizations for the promotion of the welfare of the poor; measures to rescue the unemployed; reforms of public and industrial education as a means to control the quality of the labor force; medical treatment; and even environmental improvements in urban life such as housing, public baths, parks, and playgrounds.

By exposing the hidden objectives of those reform measures and the unconscious motivations of self-appointed reformers, and by scrutinizing the latent power structure or class domination in social organizations, social historians have heaped reinterpretation upon reinterpretation of various ages of reform. Consequently, by the early 1980s, David Rothman, a leader in the field, declared that the term "reform" had become conceptually stifling for a number of historians. Based on his seminal studies of incarceration in both the Jacksonian and Progressive periods, Rothman con-
To label a movement 'reform' was to suggest that its programme was logical and appropriate, the very sort that men and women of good heart would propose. So one did not have to ask why this programme rather than another came forward; precisely because it was reform, its advantages were seemingly too obvious to demand investigation.  

Thus, in these attempts to understand social changes, social historians have forsaken reform as an analytical concept. Instead, they have introduced the concepts of power, order, and control as key terms. From the perspective of those using these terms, social reform is nothing more than "the designation that each generation gives to its favorite programs," and represented efforts by elites to maintain social order. Historians' tasks, then, should not be to applaud reforms, but to place them in a wider historical context. Social control has furnished historians with a perspective from which they can analyze power relations and class structures hidden behind the facade of reform. The concept helps historians "historicize" social policies and institutions, and thus delivers a powerful blow to any linear theory of progress, on which many liberal historians had predicated their studies of the American past.  

Until recently, historians of American socialism have not addressed themselves to the new dimensions of socio-historical changes opened up by social historians. Unlike labor historians, who have succeeded in incorporating the social historical perspective into their field and in turning the focus of their study from the institutional history of labor unions to the history of people in the working class, historians of socialism, though dealing with the basically similar social stratum of industrial America, generally have failed to go beyond the institutional history of a marginal third party. Many of them have closely reviewed the intra-party factional strife plaguing the Socialist party and the endless theoretical arguments in its rank over such issues as reform or revolution, immigration and race, and relations with labor unions. Regrettably, however, the scope of those scholarly undertakings has been limited by the stifling question of why, when, and how American socialism failed. The socialists' arguments have been treated largely as a kind of tempest in a teapot. Little has been asked about socialism's relations with other brands of reformism, and less concern yet has been shown towards socialists' positions on issues of social order and social control such as crime, juvenile delinquency, family and sex, intemperance, prostitution, education, religion and so on, — phenomena.
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which were acute during the Progressive period. Here it is necessary for historians of socialism to question the similarities and differences between socialists and other reformers on those issues; what objectives, attitudes, and beliefs socialists shared with others; and what contributions socialists and their ideas made to the general Progressive cause.

Furthermore, in order to grasp the destiny of socialism in the Progressive period one cannot stop with the question of how American socialists connected, or failed to connect, eclectic reformist tactics to their ultimate revolutionary objective. As social historians have powerfully demonstrated, any proposal for social change already implies the proposer's view of existing social order. This means, then, that it is essential to inquire into the socialists' conceptions of social order or disorder which lurked beneath their explicit proposals for reform or revolution. Thus the pre-WWI Socialist party's disintegration by the end of the 1910s must first of all be attributed to the decay of a unified vision of social order and social control among party members, which was then only compounded by external political pressure.

Before proceeding to an examination of these issues, a few words are in order concerning the patterns of intellectuals' response to social evils produced by industrialization and urbanization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. First, Social Darwinism exhibited an extreme pattern of response. As an apologetic of laissez-faire economy, it opposed any kind of artificial intervention in the laws of free competition, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest. From this point of view poverty and misery were simply the necessary evils of a free society. These evils could and should not be wiped out by any organized reform effort. As William Graham Sumner argued:

The hardships of life would not be eliminated if the laws of nature acted directly and without interference. The task of right living forever changes its form, but let us not imagine that that task will ever reach a final solution or that any race of men on this earth can ever be emancipated from the necessity of industry, prudence, continence, and temperance if they are to pass their lives prosperously. In this view, if one suffers from social misery, this is because one lacks industry, prudence, continence, or temperance, and is therefore responsible for one's situation. Any organizational effort to control social evils was not only futile but also counterproductive, for it would inevitably result in "the survival of the unfittest." For Social Darwinians, individual charity

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was the maximum allowable measure for alleviating suffering.

The second pattern of response to social evils was "environmentalism" to use Paul Boyers terminology. This response was based on the rejection of Social Darwinism. Widespread industrial and social misery, on the one hand, provided the rich with an opportunity to practice Christian charity towards the poor; but, on the other hand, it aroused a more serious concern about the defects of the industrial system itself and accelerated a serious search for a systematic means to remedy social evils. Thus, while Social Darwinism in its crudest form found its espouser in the Robber Baron, the reformist impulse began to sweep over a wider variety of people. The so-called "dissenters" from Social Darwinian individualism, though diverse in their ethics, social and intellectual backgrounds, and motivations, commonly emphasized the importance of the environment as a cause of social evil. While Social Darwinists stressed free competition as an aid to the progress of human society, these environmentalists underscored organizational work and collective action. For the latter, human intervention in checking free competition was indispensable for eliminating social evil.

The environmentalists, according to Boyer, can be categorized into two kinds — negative and positive. To control social evil and disorder, both types of environmentalists did not hesitate to utilize governmental power, and relied heavily on science and expertise for achieving a fundamental restructuring of the urban environment. However, they diverged considerably in their selection of the main sphere of activity. Because of their concern with middle class moralism the negative environmentalists chose the brothel and the saloon as their main battleground; but the positive environmentalists directed their main effort toward less coercive measures such as the settlement movement and campaigns for establishing municipal parks, playgrounds, and better housing. To understand socialism's relation to social control, one must recognize that the first sociological concept of social control was born within the rising tide of positive environmentalism. Edward Ross's *Social Control* (1901) was a clearly interventionist and anti-laissez faire tract, which placed a premium on cooperation and social harmony rather than coercion and conformity.

Although both the environmentalists and the advocates of harmonious social control dealt with social evils plaguing mainly the lower stratum of society, most of them detested the stratification of society into competing classes. Ross so argued:

> When class spirit has sapped social spirit and rent society in twain, the
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first effect is a weakening of social control and a drifting toward disorder.\(^{10}\)

Consequently, to improve the life of lower class people, both groups poured most of their efforts into the urban environment, not into the industrial environment. They then addressed such issues as slums, sanitation, sewage, public health, crime, and delinquency.

The third pattern of response may be called "industrial environmentalism". Although in practice it was closely interconnected with positive environmentalism, it inverted the priorities of the latter by attaching more importance to industrial conditions than urban living conditions. The advocates of industrial environmentalism ranged from such writers as Laurence Gronlund and Edward Bellamy to labor leaders, and to socialists. For them, all social evils stemmed from the miserable industrial conditions. Consequently issues such as wages, working hours, industrial safety, and insurance for the sick and injured were of prime importance for rectifying social disorder and misery. From this point of view, class solidarity and class consciousness were instrumental in the worker's fight against their industrial masters. Here the issue of social control took quite a different form. As Herbert Gutman vividly describes,\(^{11}\) factories in America between 1815-1919 witnessed a fundamental conflict between capitalists' determination to enforce uniform industrial discipline among heterogeneous workers on the one hand, and workers' effort to cope with the capitalist standardization on the other. Against a backdrop of this prolonged fight, "reform" measures based on industrial environmentalism did not merely benefit the worker, for, in the long run, they also resulted in the intensification of the capitalists' control over the workers and the rationalization of the industrial process as a whole.\(^{12}\)

Considering these three patterns of response to social order or disorder in urban industrial America, it is in a sense paradoxical to speak of a socialist view of social control. That is because socialism and social control represented opposing views of the social order of industrializing America. As a radical brand of industrial environmentalism, socialism, of course, attempted to foment workers' class consciousness which would then become instrumental in transforming the existing capitalist order. In contrast, the concept of social control, as mentioned above, stemmed from the middle-class reformers' fear of social and moral disorder. For many of these reformers, who were haunted with the nightmare of a class divided society, socialism meant nothing but "the triple menace of class warfare, alien
radicalism, and urban mass violence." From their point of view, social control was urgently necessary for fending off this menace without fundamentally changing the existing order. Social control attempted to establish a social equilibrium within the order by cultivating people's civic consciousness. Socialism was thus an anathema for most advocates of social and moral control. From the socialists' perspective, on the other hand, social control — either defined as the state's effort to maintain order through repressive or coercive measures or as the society's own effort to secure stability through citizens' voluntary cooperation — was a fundamentally conservative approach to social vice and disorder. Social control and socialism as the viewpoints of social order were thus inherently in conflict with each other.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the socialists could or did evade the question of social control in modern industrial life. Rather, the history of the pre-WWI Socialist party can be seen as a prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to search for a novel concept of social control which would not strengthen the present capitalist system.

In spite of its unifying goal of an eventual cooperative commonwealth, the Socialist party may be seen as attempting to encompass two conflicting visions of social order — and thus at least two identifiable visions of social control — during the Progressive period. One of these perspectives was derived from a social reality that consisted of large number of differentiated "enclaves," by which I mean not only racial and ethnic identities but also other social and political groupings such as occupations, crafts, unions, local and municipal political affiliations, various interest groups, and civic associations. These enclaves more or less institutionalized themselves to cushion the brutal effects of industrialization. The other perspective, in contrast, originated from the socialists' recognition of the tendency for modern industrialism to bulldoze these enclaves, a tendency which resulted in the increase of standardized, deracinated, and atomized proletarians.

Some socialists (notably Victor Berger of Milwaukee and Morris Hillquit of New York) tried to win the support of people in the enclaves by taking into consideration the peoples' heterogeneous background and potentials. It is from this consideration that the first perspective for social order stemmed. For the "enclave socialists," so to speak, put a premium on local autonomy. Berger, for example, claimed: "You in Seattle do not know about the needs of Milwaukee. We in Milwaukee do not want to interfere
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in the affairs of New York."¹⁴ In order to keep their enclave undisturbed by any outside force, this type of socialist even dared to revise some important socialist tenets. To quote again Berger's words: "Now I believe in the motto of Marx that the proletarians of all countries should unite, absolutely. But he [Marx] did not say, not would he say if they should unite in Milwaukee, Chicago or New York."¹⁵

The enclave socialists thus aimed primarily at rectifying the damage capitalist exploitation did to the people within their sphere. To stave off the destruction of community or organizational life and to stem the increase of vice and other undesirable tendencies, the "enclave socialists" tended to stress the here-and-now issues (the "immediate demands" in socialist terminology) which, if met, would solve the daily problems facing their constituents. These demands included industrial programs such as better wages, shorter working hours, insurance, pensions and sick benefits, as well as municipal programs such as free and better schools, public health and sanitation, better supply of food, municipal parks and playgrounds, better housing for the poor, a substitute for saloons and so on.¹⁶ As Berger said: "It is our duty to give this city the best kind of an administration that a modern city can get under the present system, and the present laws."¹⁷

By pursuing these "immediate demands" these socialists attempted to resist coercive and conformist measures which disregarded local needs and local diversity. Coercive measures of social control — typically taken by a kind of Americanization movement during WWI to which I will address myself in the last part of this paper — were seen as originating from a variety of sources. As might be expected, the main perpetrators were the representative interest groups of the middle and upper classes: nativists, business and factory owners, and of course the two major old parties and their leaders. Rather than bowing to conformist measures, the socialists believed that an improvement in the immediate environment could foster cooperative types of social control. In theory, therefore, they shared commonly a harmonious view of social control with Edward Ross. In practice, when advocating the immediate demands, these socialists became not dissimilar to the more moderate industrial and positive environmentalists, who were usually classified as progressives. To improve the living conditions of the urban working class, both progressives and enclave socialists emphasized science and expertise as a means to attain their objectives. Both attempted to control social problems by improving the environment rather than by enforcing a certain moral standard on the urban masses.

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The only difference between them lay in the rhetoric and the motives for proposing those measures. Unlike the progressives, who decried both unrestrained capitalism and violent class warfare, the socialists always tried to moor the “immediate demands” to the ultimate goal of realizing a cooperative commonwealth. For the socialists the fulfillment of the “immediate demands” was indispensable for realizing cooperative social control within their enclaves, which in turn would provide a foundation for the eventual non-coercive nature of a cooperative commonwealth. It is true that it was because of this difference that progressives like Jane Addams condemned the socialists for claiming “that nothing could be done to really moralize the industrial situation until society should be reorganized.” Nonetheless, the interesting point, here, is that the more the socialists became committed to “immediate demands” and social control within their narrow sphere of influence, the less they became restrained by the revolutionary rhetoric unifying the national party.

For the enclave socialists, the national Socialist party and its ultimate goal of a cooperative commonwealth was a kind of catalyst for an alliance of the various individual interests of the “enclaves.” Needless to say, such a unity was utopian in scope, and perhaps unworkable in practice because of the inverted priorities of the individual “enclaves”: their autonomy counted for more than the general unity. These socialists were not ready to sacrifice their respective interests for the visionary new order. In this sense, the unity of their national party was guaranteed less by the ultimate goal than by the ubiquitous national presence of urban and industrial vice and disorder.

These characteristics of enclave socialism and the course of its development may again be best illustrated by the case of Berger and his followers in Milwaukee. Their case is illustrative because under their leadership three enclaves — municipality, an ethnic group (German), and a labor union (the Federated Trade Council) — coalesced into a corporate unity. The case is illuminating also because, based on this unity, the socialists administered the city for a generation, from the Progressive period until the post-WWII years, and therefore had a long record of putting into practice a variety of “immediate demands.” The record thus shows the typical process in which the enclave socialists shifted the focus of their activities from the eventual goal of cooperative commonwealth to the social control of their enclave.

In a book published in the mid-1930s, Daniel W. Hoan, the mayor of
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Milwaukee for the previous two decades, proudly reviewed the record of his administration. He enumerated their achievements which included better payment for the city's workers; welfare programs for the poor and unemployed; the activities of the Health Department to improve the health of the community; educational progress; a modernized police administration and the lowest percentage of juvenile delinquency and crime of any of the large cities; the expansion of parks, playgrounds, zoo, other recreational places; effective fire protection; city planning; and public housing. According to Hoan, through all these achievements the Milwaukee socialists had by that time realized the best kind of social control of urban life and had made "Milwaukee a better place in which to live." But, here in the end, socialism had completely lost its revolutionary flavor and had become inseparable from welfare capitalism.

The Socialist party of the Progressive period, however, was far from unified under the leadership of the enclave socialists. It harbored another type of socialist — typically represented by the Industrial Workers of the World after its foundation in 1905 — who held a quite different perspective on the existing social order.

In an important sense, these socialists had a keener and more profound insight into the process of industrialization than the enclave socialists. The manifesto of the IWW illustrated that point. First, it deplored the miserable conditions of the worker in the machine age:

New Machines, ever replacing less productive ones, wipe out whole trades and plunge new bodies of workers into the evergrowing army of tradeless, hopeless unemployed.... The worker, wholly separated from the land and the tools, with his craftsmanship rendered useless, is sunk in the uniform mass of wage slaves.

Nevertheless, the manifesto continues, the worker saw his power of resistance broken by craft divisions, which were perpetuated from outgrown industrial stages. This situation became all the more deplorable because, unlike the workers, the capitalists carefully adjusted themselves to the new conditions.

The employers' line of battle and methods of warfare correspond to the solidarity of the mechanical and industrial concentration, while laborers still form their fighting organizations on lines of long-gone trade divisions.

For the radicals, present craft unionism (which, they thought, was supported by the enclave socialists) hindered the growth of class consciousness among the workers. Not only that, it also
permit[s] the association of the misleaders of the workers with the capitalists in the Civic Federation, where plans are made for the perpetuation of capitalism and the permanent enslavement of the workers through the wage system.

Then, they decried the way the enclave socialists proposed to work for "immediate demands":

Previous efforts for the betterment of working class have proven abortive because [they were] limited in scope and disconnected in action. Universal economic evils afflicting the working class can be eradicated only by a universal working-class movement.²⁰

As these passages show, these radical socialists paid much more attention to the effect of industrialization on the working class as a whole than on each enclave. Since modern industrialization was threatening the liberty of the entire working class, the piecemeal reforms within the industrial and municipal enclaves were, for them, not enough to defend it. To correct the above mentioned weaknesses, these socialists aimed at reversing the enclave socialists' view of social order. They declared the most important tenet for the working class movement in the new century of sweeping industrialization to be industrial unionism to which every local interest had to be subordinate. The manifesto of the IWW concluded:

A movement to fulfill these conditions must consist of one great industrial union embracing all industries — providing for craft autonomy locally, industrial autonomy internationally, and working-class unity generally.²¹

These socialists believed that, only if equipped with this overall industrial union, could the workers' fights for daily demands unite rather than divide their class interest and result in class solidarity. If the "immediate demands" were required within the limited scope of local and craft enclaves, they would never contribute to the general welfare of the working class. These radicals felt that too much emphasis on narrow "immediate demands" was not just a betrayal of the socialists' ultimate goal, but was in fact counter-productive because any success in achieving the demands and becoming local leaders of urban reforms would only further contribute to the viability and stability of a repressive capitalist order.

In rejecting any kind of attempt at social control within the capitalist system, these radicals strangely resembled the Social Darwinians. For them "social control" originated within the system itself and any differentiation between coercive and cooperative social control would have been viewed as mere obfuscation. As long as the capitalist system stood
unchanged and as long as capitalist society was a class society, the attainment of "immediate demands" was indeed meaningless. For the members of the IWW, conforming to the capitalists' standards of being a good worker was itself already a form of detestable social control. To avoid this pitfall they asserted that all workers' demands concerning wages, hours, and unionization, should be pursued through as radical labor measures as possible. Thus the "direct action" urged by them included strikes, boycotts, and sabotage. While Berger and Hoan needed the police power of Milwaukee in order to keep the city a better living place, Haywood also urged to win administrative control of the local government and its police power, though for the specific purpose of protecting the strikers.22

Considering that the United States at that time still remained highly localized and that the various enclaves enjoyed autonomy, and considering the rising tide of craft unionism, these radicals' recognition of the existing system was not fully substantiated by social reality.23 Nevertheless, they could find supporters of their view among the so-called fringe workers like the unorganized, migratory laborers, lumberjacks, western miners—workers who were not sheltered by any enclave and were most exploited under the existing system.

As historians of the Socialist party have repeatedly explained, the party suffered from the strife between its revolutionary wing and reformist wing. When a series of direct action by the Wobblies earned them the reputation of being the enemy of society, and resulted in their being ostracized and silenced, they responded by undertaking a campaign for the right of free speech. They were immediately confronted by local police and vigilante groups. Although their struggles usually ended in failure, the radicals did succeed in alienating themselves completely from other members of the party. Finally, in 1912, they were officially ousted from the party altogether. Their struggle continued down an increasingly lonely path in the years around the First World War, when mounting fanatical vigilantism and chauvinism repressed them to the point of extinction. The revolutionary industrial unionism breathed its last with its defeat in a series of great strikes in the steel and mining industries between 1919 and 1923.24 In March 1921, William Haywood, the most notable or notorious leader of the IWW, secretly left New York for Russia. With his departure, one could justly say, a uniquely radical, but still indigenous, view of American capitalism was gone forever.25

The First World War also wreaked havoc with what remained of the
Socialist party. By the end of war the unity of the national party was completely shattered. Even such a closely knit socialist enclave as that in Milwaukee witnessed serious intra-party conflicts and consequently lost some important members from its ranks. This situation did not result simply from the loyalty question which caused a major split between the native-stock and the hyphenated members, nor simply from the outright oppression by both public authorities or private vigilante groups. No one can deny that these factors were more or less responsible for the demise of the pre-WWI Socialist party. However, I believe that the more important, if latent, reason for the result was the disruption of a unified socialist vision of social order and social control in industrializing America. And the key term for comprehending this disruption is "Americanization", which reached its peak during the war.

The essential purpose of Americanization was to integrate heterogeneous groups of immigrants into the urban-industrial complex of modern America. As John Higham suggests, this movement had two sides derived respectively from two different civic-minded groups who had little in common with one another. One kind of Americanization, represented by social workers such as Jane Addams, stressed humanitarianism and cooperation for helping the immigrant to adjust to the new environment; the other, represented typically by nativist groups such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, emphasized loyalty and coercion for transforming the immigrant into a better kind of citizen. When the war broke out in Europe, Americanization swiftly gravitated towards the latter pole. With the nationalist feeling heightened on the one hand, and with the necessity of rationalization and mobilization of productive forces soaring on the other, Americanization gained in vogue. In this fever of Americanization the humanitarian side was forced to recede behind 100 per cent Americanism. The "enclaves" were sacrificed on the altar of nationalism and industrial productivity; and some advocates of Americanization (Frances Kellor, typically) began to forcefully implement their own brand of reforms, including the establishment of work safety ordinances; industrial education for safety in the factory; injury and sick insurance; and civics and English education for improving both industrial and civic life of the immigrant worker. Thus by precipitating this kind of Americanization, the war launched welfare capitalism on the American soil.

The impact of this aspect of Americanization on the Socialist party seemed less acute than that of the loyalty or hyphen question. Neverthe-
less, "Americanization at the factory gate" succeeded in propagating the values of rationalization, organization, and efficiency all over the country; and through the indoctrination of these values it succeeded in transforming a swarm of heterogeneous immigrants into "civilized" and trustable modern workers. In sum, Americanization improved the national industrial environment tremendously and in a remarkably short time. In this way, Americanization deeply undermined the very foundation of radical industrial environmentalism.

Confronted by this situation, as well as by the loyalty question, many important socialists eventually quit the party. Some of them — notably Algie and Mary Simons in Milwaukee — then swiftly subscribed to Americanization.

As in the case in Milwaukee, a few socialist enclaves survived the war and the fever of Americanization. However, their vision of social control was now geared not to the eventual goal of cooperative commonwealth but to the general welfare of modernized and civilized urban workers. Thus their past socialist vision proved ineffective in the coming age of welfare capitalism. But, considering the fervor and sincerity with which the pre-WWI socialists endeavored to seek a new form of social control and to improve the living and industrial conditions of the lower classes, these socialists seemed to deserve to be called the unintentional harbingers of welfare capitalism.

<NOTES>

4. Lately, however, the concept of social control has been made too inclusive to be a useful weapon for historical analysis. It can include anything from infant socialization to deviant and criminal control, from coercive apparatus of the state to social policy concerning public health, education, and welfare, and from moral vigilantism to cooperative voluntarism. Lawrence Stone points out this
pitfall by saying: "Since man is a social animal, and since all of social life involves some form of influence, molding, direction, or compulsion, the reduction of all social relationships to issues of power renders it almost impossible to make the fine intellectual, moral and material distinctions necessary for any serious evaluation of change in history." Stone, "An Exchange with Michel Foucault," *New York Review of Books*, 30 (March 31, 1983), 41-44. As efforts to articulate the concept, see Rothman, "Social Control"; John A. Mayer, "Notes towards a Working Definition of Social Control in Historical Analysis," in *Social Control and the State*, eds. Cohen and Scull, pp.17-38. Rothman categorizes two schools of social control: one placing a premium on stability, harmony, and cooperation, the other on conformity, conflict, and coercion. Mayer classifies social control into four types: coercive, semi-coercive, associative, and manipulative.


10. Ibid., p. 403.


12. On this point Christopher Lasch criticizes Jane Addams, the foremost positive environmentalist who was also deeply concerned with industrial conditions. He writes: "The trouble was that Jane Addams was asking, in effect, that young people be adjusted to a social order which by her own admission was
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cyclically indifferent to their welfare. . . . Industrial society, according to Jane Addams, was a terrific engine of repression; yet her own efforts seemed often to have as their aim to make its parts run more smoothly." Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 157.
16. As a favorable exposition of "immediate demands" by a socialist, see Carl D. Thompson, The Constructive Program of Socialism (Milwaukee: Social Democratic Publishing Co., 1908).
21. Ibid.


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