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HEART-TO-HEART (INTER-JO-) RESONANCE : A CONCEPT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN JAPANESE EVERYDAY LIFE

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to clarify the basic process of intersubjective relationships from a Japanese perspective. For this purpose, particular emphasis is stressed on the Japanese terms *kokoro* and *jo*, and "the space of 'we'". *Jo* (emotion) is assumed to have the characteristics that are the movement from one's *kokoro* (the mind-and-heart) towards the other's *jo* within the space of "we". With new light on those terminologies, the basic psychological units will be considered as existing in the intersubjectivity, or the "inter-*jo*-resonance", not in an individual mind unconnected to the other. However, this is not an attempt to emphasize the cultural specificity of those terminologies, but to explore their universal features.

Key Words : *jo*, intersubjectivity, resonance, emotion, the space of "we".

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to elucidate the basic human intersubjective relationships from a Japanese perspective. For this purpose, particular emphasis is stressed on the Japanese terms *kokoro* and *jo*, and "the space of 'we'", which those Japanese words connote. It will be discussed theoretically how this terminology can be beneficial in the understanding of human relationships. The aim, however, is not an attempt to emphasize the uniqueness of the cultural ideas implied by those Japanese terminologies, but rather to explore their universal features, emphasizing intersubjectivity.

Unfortunately, such a culturally valid approach to the understanding of the processes of human relationships has been overlooked by a large number of Japanese researchers due to the overwhelming amount of individualistic, objective methodology in modern scientific research. The discussion in this paper will be begun by considering this point.

THE GENERAL SITUATION OF "SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY" IN JAPAN

In the last several years, children's "theory of (the other's) mind" has been one of the most noteworthy research topics in developmental psychology. In Japan, a con-

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siderable number of studies related to this topic have been made. Those studies, of course, have produced some new knowledge regarding the development of the understanding of the other's mind. Nevertheless, in spite of such a great deal of effort, surprisingly little attention has thus far been given to the basic understanding and importance of daily person-to-person communication in close relationships. In addition to this, there aren't any theoretical, or positive studies which attempt to explain "theory of mind" and how it relates specifically to person-to-person relationships within the context of Japanese culture. Furthermore, Japanese researchers of theory of mind are ambiguous about the concept of mind that they adopt into their works. They seem to confuse the concept of "mind" with the Japanese term *kokoro*, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

A similar ignorance of our cultural background is found in studies of the specificity or the universality of Japanese culture. Kudo and Matsumoto (1996) pointed out that there are two contradictions in previous studies of Japanese emotional expression. On the one hand, anthropologists (e.g., Benedict, 1946; De Vos, 1973; Lebra, 1976) have formed culture-specific, incompatible stereotypes of the Japanese expressions; blankness like a robot and meaningless over expression. On the other hand, recent positive studies of emotional expressions in different cultures have demonstrated their universality across different cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1971). This latter position has become prevalent among current researchers. Kudo and Matsumoto (1996) claim that whether Japanese express the same types of emotions in the same ways as Americans, French, Germans, etc. is still an open question. Harrè and Gillett (1994) also insisted, from the discursive approach, that the traditional theory of emotion is the outcome of hypotheses that limit the range of the basic emotions out of which all others are constructed. The contradictions remain unsolved. In other words, the issues of cultural specificity and cultural universality of emotion remains unsolved.

In Japanese society, emotional expression is regarded as the central cue of everyday person-to-person relations. Japanese people are expected to express their emotions differently, depending on the social relation of the partner to whom one is interacting (e.g., good friend, family, boss, stranger), or the situation socially involved (e.g., public or private). Due to the social constraints there may be more self-consciousness in the expression of emotion. But, aside from the significance within the culture, such cultural aspects of emotional expressions have hitherto been mostly ignored by Japanese psychologists. It is also a noteworthy fact that most of the studies that present the specificity or the universality of the Japanese culture were made by non-Japanese scholars.

Thus, it seems that Japanese researchers have been disregarding the gap between a vivid sense of everyday life in their own culture and the "scientific" attitude that has dominated the field of psychology. This attitude has been prevalent from the outset of psychological research in this country. Takahashi (1917), a frontier age psychologist in Japan wrote a candid excuse for the discrepancy after his argument in his book, when he said that the mind-body dualism is the only compatible idea with "scientific evidences", and that the layman's idea of "*kokoro*-body oneness (sin sin ichi nyo 心身

—如) “in everyday Japanese life cannot be matched with ‘modern scientific positivism.’ He admitted that a monismist can properly talk about the dualism because both ideas are just assumptions at different thinking levels; “just like that we can believe the Copernican theory as scientific knowledge, while we do the Ptolemaic theory as knowledge from everyday experiences” (p.22: underlines are added by the author). What this statement illustrates is that the scientific approaches to the *mind* by Japanese psychologists have put the dominant Westernized research methods and the everyday life experiences of Japanese people in juxtaposition. In other words, the scientific attitudes are unrelated to their everyday life. As Kodu and Matsumoto (1996) argued, it may be the fact that this scientific disconnection to the everyday senses of life is still overwhelming Japanese psychological studies, and too many researchers, without awareness of what they are doing, are likely to follow Takahashi’s point of view without even offering an excuse as he did.

MIND AND KOKORO

The English term, “mind” is usually translated as *kokoro* (心) in Japanese. For instance, “theory of mind”, “mind’s eye”, “mind reading”, and “to make up one’s mind” will be translated into “theory of *kokoro*”, “*kokoro*’s eye”, “*kokoro* reading” and “to make up one’s *kokoro*”, respectively. *Kokoro*, however, is a more comprehensive and holistic concept, it covers both mind and heart, i. e., the whole body of the inner-state or *psyche*. The following examples will illustrate the point that the concept of *kokoro* is not substantially equivalent to that of mind:

She is a *gentle-hearted* (*kokoro-yasasii*) lady.

The handicapped were hurt by the *heartless* (*kokoro-less*) words.

I did not *mean* what I said (I said the words not with real *kokoro*).

People with any *sense* (*kokoro*) won’t do such a thing.

Against her *will* (*kokoro*), she got divorced with him.

I thought that to *myself* (within my *kokoro*).

He is laughing on the outside and crying *inside* (in his *kokoro*).

The professor *knows* what’s what about cooking (having *kokoro* for cooking).

I was delighted by my mother’s *thoughtfulness* (expressing her *kokoro* to me).

My father did not have any *idea* who sent the letter (an idea in his *kokoro*).

As these examples show, *kokoro* has an integrated meaning of human nature different from the dualism that exists between mind and heart in Western thinking. At the same time, *kokoro* leans more toward the emotional sense of heart rather than the “rational” sense of mind. The Japanese character of *kokoro* (心), which *originated* in China, is an ideograph of the heart which was regarded as the seat for *kokoro* in ancient China and Japan. A classical and psychological theory of *kokoro* was proposed by the Zhu-zi school, one of the great Chinese Confucian philosophies founded in 12 century, which had a significant impact on Japanese classical thoughts regarding human nature. The school established the “*ri* (理)-*ki* (氣)” interaction theory of the universe. *Ki* is the energy of the universe, which makes and gives anima or energy to all

beings and materials, while *ri* gives *ki* its movement, order or lawfulness. As the result of the interaction between *ki* and *ri*, the nature of the whole of creation and its events in the universe are made up. In *kokoro*, *ri* corresponds to *sei* (性), the disposition or nature located in the deepest level of *kokoro* within the human being; *ki* forms *jo* (情), the essential activity of emotion and the essence of its expression. When *kokoro* gets active, *sei* transforms into *jo* as it moves up to the top level rendered by *ki*. The Zhu-zi school assumed that all people basically have four good natures; sympathy/compassion (*jin* 仁), morality (*gi* 義), courtesy (*rei* 礼), and wisdom (*chi* 智) which comprise *sei*, but sometimes *ki* in one's *kokoro* prevents these good natures from being manifest by synchronizing with other persons' *ki* or *ki* in social and natural environments. Thus, *jo* does not express the same nature as *sei*. It composes the entire range of emotion, both positive and negative, i. e., pleasure, happiness, love, sadness, anger, hatred, and desire. Accordingly, it can be said that the nature of *jo* is considered as essentially intersubjective or reciprocal, i. e., in "inter-*jo*-resonance". Because, the expressed *jo* is always the outcome of synchronization with other persons' moods or the atmosphere surrounding us.

The direct influence of the *ri-ki* or *sei-jo* theory with regards to the concept of

Table 1 A list of the *jo* (情) lexicon.

Modifiers & their meanings	Words & pronunciation	Meaning of the words
人 human beings	人情 nin- <i>jo</i>	warmheartedness, human feelings
感 feel, perceive	感情 kan- <i>jo</i>	feelings
表 the outside, the front, the face	表情 hyo- <i>jo</i>	facial expressions
同 the same	同情 do- <i>jo</i>	sympathy
友 a friend	友情 yu- <i>jo</i>	friendship
愛 love	愛情 ai- <i>jo</i>	love, affections, tenderness
心 the-mind-and-heart	心情 shin- <i>jo</i>	the inner state, the heart
動 move, motion	情動 jo-do	emotion
熱 fever, heat, hotness	情熱 jo-netsu	passion, enthusiasm
操 operate, manipulate	情操 jo-sou	sentiment
景 landscapes, scenery	情景 jo-kei	the sight with emotional involvement

kokoro has become relatively extinct in this age. *Ki* also has lost its theoretical significance. However, it is probably true that to pay great attention to the emotional aspect of *kokoro* is still valid in the Japanese society. To extend sympathy (*doujo* 同情) or kind consideration (*omoiyari* 思いやり) is one of the important virtues in the Japanese society. Lewis (1995) summarized the goal of Japanese elementary education as "minimizing competition and helping children develop the feeling that we're all in it together", "focusing discipline on what it means to be kind, a responsible member of the school community", etc. (p. 7). This emotion-oriented-ness of *kokoro* is incompatible with the concept of mind, in that "mind" implies a rather rational-oriented-ness like the faculty of thinking, reasoning, and acquiring or applying knowledge.

Interestingly, in Homer's age, ancient Greek people also deemed the heart (more precisely, the whole chest or midriff) as the thinking location (Broxton, 1951/1988). Thinking was regarded as being "more comprehensive, covering undifferentiated psychic activity, the action of the heart or the midriff, involving 'emotion' also"

(Broxton, 1951/1988 : p.14). It is also interesting that the Romans believed “even more than the Greeks, that the heart was important as the organ of consciousness, of mind” (Broxton, 1951/1988 : p.40). The most striking suggestion from Broxton’s account of Homeric notions of the process of consciousness is that thinking was described as “speaking”. People believed that a man spoke when he thought. “Deep reflections were conversations of one’s self with one’s mind or one’s mind with one’s self.” (p.12) This notion of the importance of speaking and conversations for thinking seems to have the monistic point of view when considering psychic activity and the human body. It also may have basic commonalities with the Japanese concept *kotodama*, and with Bakhtin’s term “voice”, as discussed later. Benjamin Franklin’s words will summarize the point of the discussion here: “The heart of a fool is in his mouth, but the mouth of the wise man is in his heart.”

JO AND RESONANCE

As illustrated in the previous section, *jo* is a basic figure of expressed *kokoro*, and the proto-emotion. The character *jo* (情) makes a syntax on emotional taxonomy by combining with other characters, as table 1 presents. The *jo* syntax denotes that *jo* possesses the nature to harmonize with the other’s *jo*. In other words, the concept of *jo* [in this case, 情 pronounced as *nasake*] implies that we have a basic emotional motive toward the other’s inner state. This character of *jo* can be explained by the notion of resonance or “voice”.

Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) was a great scholar in the latter half of 18 century, who founded the *Kokugaku* (Japanese classical literature) school. He is known by his outstanding works that re-evaluated the Japanese classical literature, “*Kojiki*”, which was edited in the early 7 century from oral literature, including pre-historic mythology and folk-tales. He noticed the term “*kotodama* 言霊” (the spirit-inspeech) in the book and considered the deep meaning associated with the fact that people in the pre-writing age had the belief that a spirit dwells in speech. Namely, if one speaks out in a happy voice, or an abusive one, the spirit makes the signified come true.

Interestingly, the social labeling theory of perceived emotion (Shacter & Singer, 1962 ; Shacter, 1965) appears to share some similarity to *kotodama*. According to the theory, if we label our arousal states as pleasure, we are happy. Words actualize the feelings that the label indicates. Similarly *kotodama* was believed to actualize the wishes that the voices indicated.

However, it is obvious that Norinaga’s consideration of *kotodama* had deeper implication for understanding of the nature of our emotion more than the social labeling theory. For Norinaga noticed the simple fact that people of old age naturally harmonize their expressions or actions to the other’s “voice” communicating by resonating to the speaker’s tone (Kobayashi, 1977). A nuance of the voice was considered an articulation of the movement of *jo*, that is, emotion, which is difficult to control and is often expressed unconsciously. The nuance itself has meaning as if a hidden power of the spirit dwelling in it brings the meaning into reality.

The following poem in “*Ryoujin-hishou* 梁塵秘抄”, which is a classical anthol-

ogy of Japanese folk songs and poems collected by Imperial command in 12 century, will serve as a good example of what is meant by the resonance of *jo* :

*Children are born for play, they are born for fun,
Hearing their playful voices, my body resonates with their tones.*

Norinaga's notation of "voice" is very similar to the concept of "voice" as proposed by Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986). Bakhtin introduced the term voice to express his basic proposition that the human mind functions in a communicative practice. In other words, voice makes it clear that even personal mind activities originate in processes of social communication (Wertsch, 1991). Speech is expressed by his/her voice as a communication process. In the process, the same word can be used to express different meanings depending on certain intonations in a context. Voice is not independent from the others voice. He considered voice as not a static entity, but as a dynamic process. He insisted that meanings are created when two or more voices meet together. Such dialogic mutual activation of discourse with voice is the basic form of communication. In this process, the voice of the communication process and the voice of one's own psychological process dialogues in his/her mind. That is to say, only at the moment that a listener responds to the speaker's voice, can meaning be composed both within the person and between the communicating persons. He exemplified "parody" as this "heterogeneous voice". The ironic and satirical sound of voice in a parody comes from the double presence of both the voice of the parodist and that of the parodied person's. In this sense, communication is the just matter of "meta-communication" (Bateson, 1972), in which words do not have the meaning that denotes the meaning. The following excerpt from free interaction in the home between ten-month-old Shiho and her mother will serve as a good example of voice-communication during playful teasing :

(Shiho and her mother are sitting together on the floor.)

Shiho: (Picks up a ball. Starts to suck and bite it looking at the mother.)

Mom: (Shows Shiho an exaggerated expression of surprise corresponding to each of Shiho's ball-biting actions.)

Shiho: (Bites the ball looking at the mother. Shows laughter.)

Mom: "Give me the ball please." (Offers her hands against Shiho.)

Shiho: (Bites it again looking at the mother. Shows laughter.)

Mom: "Why don't you want to do it?" (Shows Shiho the more exaggerated expression of surprise.)

Shiho: (Bites it again looking at the mother. Shows laughter.)

Mom: (Repeats the exaggerated expression of surprise.)

Shiho: (Bursts out laughing.)

Mom: (Expresses laughter.)

Shiho: (Bites it again.)

Mom: (Repeats the exaggerated expression of surprise.) "Stop biting, pleeease."

In the above interaction, it can be correctly assumed that Shiho's mother did not use surprise expressions and the word "stop" as conveying their literal meanings, but her posture and intonations articulated her intention to play with Shiho in fun. Shiho expressed laughter resonant with the emotional tones of her mother's expression, that is, her *jo*.

As mentioned previously, Harrè and Gillett (1994) proposed a discursive approach to emotion and emphasized that it has transformed the psychology of the emotions to the study of discourses. They maintained that "in explaining the discursive view, it will become clear that the old theory completely misses the psychological problems of the emotions, because it fundamentally misconstrues the nature of emotions and their role in human life." (146). They pointed out that feelings and displays are to be treated as being psychologically equivalent to statements. Emotions "should not be thought of as abstract entities such as 'anger' or 'chagrin' but as actual moments of emotional feelings and displays, moments in which we are 'feeling annoyed' or in which we are 'displaying our joy' in particular circumstances in a definite cultural setting." (p.146). An emotional feeling and the correlate display like Shiho and her mother's "joyful gestures" should, thus, be understood as a discursive phenomena, expressions of judgments in the performance of a social act. They are meaningful displays, performed according to the interactants' intentions. It is the episodes of everyday life in our culture or society, that will render us a resonant theory of emotion and display.

BEYOND THE REFLECTIVE EMPATHY

Traditionally, an ability to understand the other's feelings has been labeled as *empathy*. Empathy is defined as the vicarious sensation of someone else's emotional state or condition (Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989). In considering depressed refugees of the Kobe earthquake, we can imagine how they *felt* in the traumatic circumstances. Researchers of prosocial development have indicated the important role of empathy in prosocial behavior, especially as a key factor in altruism (Krebs, 1987; Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). In those studies, empathy has been explained along the lines of perspective-taking and distinguishing self from others. For, the researchers assumed, to share someone else's feelings, one needs to recognize that he or she is separate from the self, and to understand how things appear from his or her perspective. For instance, Hoffman (1987), who developed an influential account for a role of empathetic affect in the development of prosocial abilities, proposed four stages of its development; a). *Global empathy* is the stage when young infants experience empathic distress as a consequence of the arousal occasioned by someone else's distress; b). "Egocentric" empathy appears after children become able to distinguish self and others, but they may still find it difficult to infer another's internal feelings; c). *Empathy for another's feelings* comes during the preschool years indicating that role-taking skills have developed, and children differentiate between others' feelings and needs from their own by being sensitive to cues about others' feelings; d). *Empathy for another's life condition* is the final stage in the development of empathy, and appears by late childhood propped by the sophisticated representational ability to reflect others' distress

or disadvantage. Hoffman (1987) viewed the development of language as the core role of this developmental process, which enables children capable of labeling the other's emotions. Hoffman's picture of the development of empathic feelings indicates that researchers of prosocial development may have assumed the process of human *social development* as proceedings towards the goal of becoming a being who can generally reflect the other's mind, context-free, and by applying learned social labels. As some studies have shown, children sometimes act according to their impressions of social desirability rather than from the heart of their empathetic feelings (Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989).

In contrast to the above notion, it has been argued that there is an inborn empathetic distress reaction to others' discomfort (Sagi and Hoffman 1976). Infants have been shown to exhibit responses to the distress of others, differentiating exactly who is suffering. Hoffman (1987) described an 11-month-old who observed a peer fall over, looked on sadly, "and then put its thumb in her mouth and buried her head in her mother's lap, as she does when she herself is hurt" (p. 51). Thus, the arising question is why infants with the preverbal ability to empathize should need language or representational abilities to express empathy as they advance in development? Does the infant's ability to empathize disappear in the developmental process?

The answers to the above questions can be found in the inappropriateness of the reflective concept of empathy as a component of intersubjective relations. Empathy was originally constructed as an ability to project feelings that we have experienced in similar situations into a perceived object or another person (Lipps, 1903). In other words, when we extend our empathetic feeling to something or someone, we do not feel the other's feeling itself, but our own reappeared past feeling as reflected in the other, just like looking at our own image in a mirror. Thus, introspectively, the appearance of empathy depends on how we feel about the plight of the potential recipients of our concern. As Ishihara (1993) purported, the empathy theory cannot explain an excitement beyond our past experiences. Emotional experiences such as scenes of extreme cruelty that have never been seen before must be limited within the confines of an analogy to one's own past similar experience, or the result of the invitation of a fantasy which mentally constructs the situation in case. From this vantage point, researchers of prosocial development seem to be ignoring the limitations of the reflective concept of empathy in their accounts. In addition to this point, this prosocial empathy theory presupposes the existence of an individuality which may be preconditioned. A person's empathetic expression is considered an indicator according to his/her reflective or projective interpretation of the other's distress (Ishihara, 1993). The fundamental inadequacy of this explanation is individualism.

Alternatively, Stern (1985, 1995), Trevarthen (1977, 1979, 1982, 1984, 1993a, 1993b) and others (Bråten, 1988, 1996; Hundeide, 1993; Trevarthen & Hubery, 1978) introduced the concept of intersubjectivity and argued that it organizes our social behavior from very early in life. As discussed earlier, feelings and displays are to be treated as being psychologically equivalent to statements (Harrè & Gillett, 1994). Facial expressions as well as whole body postures display our emotions towards the other subject. For instance, in an intersubjective situation, our smiles make the inter-

action with the other enjoyable. In this sense, it is certainly of social import because it is part of the processes of a relationship. Trevarthen (1982, 1993) claimed that it is simply missing the point to regard the smile as a physiological response or as an outcome of some information-processing activity. The meaning of the smile is the crucial psychological variable, and this is wholly dependent upon social context: "Only the mind of another person can be affected by a smile. To smile, effectively, an infant must understand other persons". (1982: p. 78).

As the above discussion denotes, intersubjectivity shares something in common with the concept with *jo*. However, *jo* is not limited to person-to-person relations, but is manifested in respect to inanimate "beings" one is emotionally attached to. For instance, it is often observed that mothers show a grimace when seeing their baby being given a vaccination shot on the arm. To give another example, at the moment one of my students was playing a finger-puppet, and dropped its head on the floor, she twisted her face as if "she had hit her own head." As soon as she picked it up and placed it back on its body (her finger), she patted the head in an affectionate manner trying to "banish the puppet's head pain." Ishihara (1993) described a similar experience when he felt itchy on "his cheek" as he caught sight of a poster of a famous actress with a pin in "her cheek" on the wall of a train station.

In these episodes, the mothers, the student, and the psychologist, did not, in fact feel any pain, but they obviously and actually *felt* feelings through their bodies similar to "the other", or adopting Bråten's (1988) terminology, the *virtual alter*, who had. In other words, they felt "the other's" *jo directly through their bodies*, not vicariously, as the reflective empathy theorists insist. Once again recall that Harrè and Gillett (1994) maintained that we should not think of emotions as abstract monolithic-entities. Emotions are characterized by their gradient information as described by Stern (1985, 1995), in contrast to language which is a good media to deal with categorical information. *Jo* also is not a categorical concept. If one applies it to the above episodes, they may be explained as instances in which the protagonists in the episodes were essentially motivated to express their *jo*, predicated by, and related to perceiving "the other", the "virtual other" (Bråten, 1992). In other words, they were in the "inter-*jo*-resonance."

TWO TYPES OF WORLDVIEW ; THE POETIC AND THE SCIENTIFIC

Ishihara (1993) discussed that there are two types of worldview ; the poetic and the scientific. The former can be called subjective, while the latter is objective and analytic. In general, poets are good examples of persons who permit *jo* to emit out from *kokoro* towards "the other" freely, and are willing to unite themselves to the settings. They are the person who have the "inter-*jo*-resonance" with "the other's" *jo*. On the other hand, scientists are those persons who are likely to have a tendency to inhibit expressing their *jo*, and to view things rationally. As a warning of the present situation in which psychological research is overwhelmingly monopolized by the scientific view, Ishihara's comments command our attention. Monod's (1971), who is the Nobel prize biologist in France, described a "simulated experience" in which he experienced himself as if he had become a protein molecule while he was concentrating

on his thinking. He concluded, then, that such a simulated experience must be needed for the deepest level of recognition. Only a part of it can be described with the verbal language. We should remember that we all own the power to synthesize the self in surrounding situations, *joukei* (情景, see Table 1) as a poets, even if we are scientists.

THE SPACE OF “WE”

In the Japanese language, the word (and character) 間 (*aida/ma*), which means the space, the room, timing, or distance, has significant connotations regarding words relating to human relations. The word that means “human being” is *nin-gen* (人間), a combination of man (*hito/nin* 人) and space (*aida/gen* 間), literally *the personal space*. The human relationship is denoted as *aida-gara* (間柄), *the space with person characters* (a physical appearance or a social status) (*gara* 柄). The society or the living world is presented as *se-ken* (世間), *the world space*. The Japanese philosopher, Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960) noticed this commonality and incorporated it into his theory of human relationships. According to his theory, when a man has a relation with “the other” in a society it can be explained by using the word 間 (*aida/ma*), the space. By extending your personal space, it will become a space including other “characters”. By further extending the space, it will become the world space. He defined personal space as the place where the subject exists, then the space with characters as *the intersubjective space*. The intersubjective space is the basic living space where subjects, within the same physical vicinity, interrelate and socially bond with each other.

Watsuji did not describe emotional interchange between subjects clearly, but in the intersubjective space, especially in an intimate relationship *jo*, as an innate quality, exists and is emitted as the central component uniting the subjects. The interactions between the subjects, will then be mutually regulated within the boundary of “we”: It is as if “you feel as I feel”, “we are feeling it together, or “you know this as I know it”, or “we know this together”. In other words, in the intersubjective space, subjective experience is mutually revealed, and experienced as “we”. In this sense, the intersubjective space is *the space of “we”* (Nakano, 1994, 1995).

A characteristic of the space of “we” is that we cannot behave arbitrarily when we are in it. Once we have extended our *jo* to the other, or are aware of the companion’s *jo* being expressed to us. We wish to confine our repertoire of actions within the boundary of what is predictable and acceptable for the other. We are willing to accord our behavior as to promote a harmonious relationship with him/her, although potentially, we still have a great degree of freedom in our range of behavior. This is in contrast to the fact that potentially, we can act just as we like in front of a person totally unrelated to us without caring about the presence of that person.

A similar idea to the space of “we” has been termed *the companion space* by Bråten (1996). According to his definition, the companion space is the proprioceptive and alteroceptive space in which the infant’s bodily self is complemented by others in felt immediacy. This intersubjective phenomenological space of immediately felt experience is considered different from *the physical observation space*, available to the outside observer. He described the following incident, occurring in a summer cabin in Norway, to illustrate this distinction:

Katharina (26 weeks) reacted to the sobbing of her sister Kine (4 years) and was felt to comfort her. They were in bed with their mother who had the baby on her stomach fingering a piece of paper. Kine was lying beside, begging for a juice bottle. She started sobbing. Katharina then stopped what she was doing, stretched her arms and leanted over towards Kine. Their faces touched. Kine began to laugh. "She comforted me" she later explained. (p. 450)

Bråten explained that "to an outside observer, unaware of Kine's comment after the episode, this incident may appear as a random or accidental incident in the observation space: unable to keep her balance, the baby fell over her sister." But, from the point of view of the participants' companion space, another phenomenon emerges. "Lying beside them Kine may have felt excluded from the companion space shared by her mother and baby sister. Hence, her sobbing and begging for her bottle was a way of calling for attention and inclusion. When Katharina stops what she is doing and leans over towards Kine, Kine bodily feels to be included in the companion space." (p. 450). As Bråten concluded, it is not important whether or not Katharina actually sought to comfort her, Kine felt her move to be comforting, and read her intention as to comfort her. Kine's laughing indicated her excitement of feeling Katharina's *jo*, sympathy. At the same time, her laughing seems to have conveyed intimacy with her *jo*. Bråten did not describe Katharina's response to Kine's laughing, and whether or not she actually sought to comfort her cannot be unequivocally determined. However, the actions of stretching her arms and leaning over towards Kine had a significant impact. Given the quality of Kine's laughing, they seems to have represented her delight in having been comforted by her sister. Thus they both may have felt that *we* share *jo* mutually.

Actions in human interactions are substantially unpredictable. For example, parents may often feel it is difficult to interpret the cause of a baby's crying. Nevertheless, as Nakano and Kanaya (1993), Stern (1985, 1990) and Trevarthen (1979, 1990, 1993) have observed, a baby and its parent can and do effectively communicate with one another. They can, as Bateson (1979) put it, engage in "protoconversation", as they are in the space of "we". This fact will be given a explanatory power to the concept of the space of "we".

CONCLUSION

Each culture may have its own vivid vocabulary to depict the special aspects of the range of emotions. These vocabularies can present clearer meanings of emotional expression rather than the English terms which are currently used as the standard language in scientific research. For instance, the mind-body problem cannot be solved as long as the dichotomy between mind and heart dominates our research. A more unified inner state can be depicted by employing the holistic terms *kokoro* and *jo*, which have been discussed in this paper. Harrè (1995), Harrè and Gillet (1994) introduced the term "emotionology", which is a local "theory" of the nature and range of emotions as expressed through the use of specific vocabularies. *Kokoro* and *jo* are good examples of emotionology, but they, at the same time, offer a potential "universal theory"

of emotion more than a “local theory”. To present the essence of emotions in communication, *jo* is relevant. The basic concept of *jo* refers to the characteristics that are the endless movement from inside of one’s *kokoro* (the self *jo*) towards the outside of *kokoro* (“the other’s” *jo*) and its reciprocal nature. Thus, the basic units of psychological processes exist in the intersubjectivity, or the “inter-*jo*-resonance”, not in an individual mind unconnected to the other, as the Piagetian theory or recent studies on “theory of mind” have viewed.

It is time that we realize this monopolistic situation and reverse the tide of this so called “scientific” view in research to expand our understanding of human relationships more “resonantly”.

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