The English Imperative:
A Cognitive and Functional Analysis

（英語の命令文 — 認知・機能言語学的分析）

Hidemitsu Takahashi

Doctoral Dissertation
in Linguistics

Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University
2004
Contents

List of Figures and Tables ........................................ v
Acknowledgments .................................................. vi
Abbreviations ...................................................... ix
1 Introduction ....................................................... 1
  1.1 Aim and Scope of the Work ................................. 1
  1.2 Theoretical Framework ..................................... 8
  1.3 The Structure of the Work ................................ 10
  1.4 Key Words .................................................... 11
      Force Exertion .............................................. 11
      Prototypical and Non-Prototypical Imperatives ........ 14
      Constructions and Compatibility Between Constructions .. 17
      Left-subordinating AND Construction ................... 19
      Asymmetric OR Construction .............................. 22
2 English Imperatives & Force Exertion ....................... 26
  2.1 Introduction ............................................... 26
  2.2 Hypotheticality, Non-past, and Second-person ........ 31
      Hypotheticality ........................................... 31
      Non-past ................................................... 33
      Second-person ............................................ 36
  2.3 Force Exertion ............................................. 39
  2.4 Force Exertion and Related Phenomena .................. 50
      Subjunctives and Infinitives ............................ 50
      ‘Forceless’ Imperatives .................................. 52
2.5 Force Exertion and Different Illocutionary Acts . . . . 57
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Notes to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 English Imperatives as a Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1 Image-schematic Models of Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . 73
  Action Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
  Canonical Event Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2 The Prototype Imperative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 English imperatives in the Passive . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.4 English imperatives with Perfect and Progressive Verbs . .104
  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
  Notes to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4 Conditional Imperatives in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.1 Previous Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2 Relevance Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3 Problems with the Relevance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.4 And-Conditional Imperatives: A Cognitive Analysis . . .140
  Left-subordinating And . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
  Non-prototypical Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.5 Or-Conditional Imperatives: A Cognitive Analysis . . . .154
  Asymmetric or . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
  Prototypical Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.6 Phenomena Pertaining to Conditional Imperatives . . . . .163
  Conditionality: IF-THEN vs. IF-NOT . . . . . . . . . . 163
  Negative Polarity Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
  Stative Predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174


List of Figures and Tables

Figures
1-1 English Imperatives and the Scale of Force Exertion . . . . 13
2-1 English Imperatives and the Scale of Force Exertion . . 43
2-2 Force Exertion and Different Illocutionary Acts . . . . 62
3-1 Action Chain & the Imperative . . . . . . . . . . 75
3-2 Canonical Event Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3-3 Canonical Imperative Event Model . . . . . . . . . 79
3-4 English Imperatives (4) on the Scale of Force Exertion . . 90
4-1 (=3-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4-2 AND/OR-Conditional Imperatives on the Scale of Force
Exertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3-4 English Imperatives (4) on the Scale of Force Exertion . . 208

Tables
1-1 Overall Parameters for Imperative Prototypes . . . . . . . 15
3-1 (=1-1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3-2 Overall Parameters for Passive prototypes . . . . . . . 94
3-1 Overall Parameters for Imperative Prototypes . . . . . . 209
Acknowledgments

This work presents many of the results of research that I have been carrying out at Hokkaido University for the past ten years or so. During the beginning period of this research, I was able to spend one year as a visiting scholar at University of California, San Diego. I am especially grateful to Ronald Langacker for generously hosting me in his department in August 1992 to August 1993 and for sharing with me his time and his deep insights into language. Special thanks to Suzanne Kemmer for in-depth discussion of an earlier version of chapter 2 that gave rise to many of the foundational ideas of this research project.


I must express my gratitude to the cognitive linguistics communities both at home and abroad and the linguistics communities at Hokkaido University, where I have benefited from so much interaction. In particular, I would like to thank Ad Foolen, Takeshi Fujita, Adele Goldberg, Peter Grundy, Hideto Hamada, Naoko Hayase, Mariko Higuchi, Paul Hopper, Yoshihiko Ikegami, Michael Israel, Katsunobu Izutsu, Hiroyuki Kageyama, Seisaku Kawakami, Yosikiyo Kawase, Toshiyuki Kumashiro, Mitsuru Maeda, Takashi Matsue, Yo Matsumoto, Hideki Mori, Yu-ichi Mori, Haruhiko Murao, Yoshihisa Nakamura, Heiko Narrog, Yoshiki Nishimura, Hiroshi Ohashi, Satoshi Oku, Haruhiko Ono, Klaus-Uwe Panther, Nina Petrishcheva, Shungo Shinohara, Jun-ichi Takahashi, Linda Thornburg, Hisao Tokizaki, Pascale Trevisiol, Eijiro Tsuboi, Yassuo Ueyama, Yasuo Urai, Arie Verhagen, Ann Wang, Yoshihiro Yamada, Kazuhiko Yamaguchi, Masa-aki Yamanashi, Minoru Yasui, members of Kyoto Language Forum, and all the colleagues in my department and students for insightful discussions of the issues raised in this work. I am most grateful to Masuhiro Nomura, Yoshihiko Ono and Makoto Shimizu, whose detailed criticisms and suggestions led to the many important revisions that went into the present form of this work.

For their help in providing data and native speaker judgments, I thank Diane Kakihara, Ron Scheffer, Joseph Tomei, and Randy Evans.
For help preparing the manuscript, I thank Yuko Mizuno, Keisuke Sanada, and Ann Wang. For carefully reading the manuscript and making helpful suggestions, I would like to thank Julia Leyda. Any remaining errors or confusions are of course my own.

I owe a debt of gratitude to Seizo Kasai, my advisor many years ago at Hokkaido University, for instilling in me a deep respect for the complexities of the data and sharing his wisdom.

Finally, I am immensely grateful to my wife Mami. I appreciate her patience and love both for me and for our children Hirona and Eiji and all her efforts for our physical and spiritual welfare. I thank all my family for helping me look at what I am doing from a distance.
Abbreviations

ACC: Accusative
COMP: Complementizer
COP: Copula
DAT: Dative
GEN: Genitive
IMP: Imperative
NEG: Negative
NOM: Nominative
PASS: Passive
PRT: Particle
PLR: Plural
POL: Polite
SFP: Sentence Final Particle
SUB: Subject
TOP: Topic
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Aim and Scope of the Work

This is a research project on the English imperative and its related phenomena. A characterization of the English imperative should, one would think, be simple and straightforward. What could be more basic than an indication of directive force? And what could be simpler morphologically than its exponent, namely zero, the absence of any verbal inflection?

Yet the English imperative poses a number of vexing descriptive problems. A simple characterization in terms of directive force is sometimes hopelessly unworkable. On the one hand, some uses of the English imperative do not convey directive force at all:

(1)a. A: Excuse me. Do you know where Starbucks is?
   B: Go straight ahead three blocks.

b. A: Do you mind if I use this chair?
   B: Go ahead.

c. (A, visiting B in the hospital, says)
   Get well soon.

With these imperative utterances, the speaker hardly commands the listener to perform the designated action; he or she is giving
direction/permission or making good wishes instead.

On the other hand, the English imperative may communicate just the opposite of what is actually said:

(2)a. Go on, shoot, if you can!
   b. (A, seeing B about to throw a snowball)

Threats or dares such as examples (2) actually warn the listener against carrying out the designated action. Furthermore, some uses of imperative seem to describe genuinely hypothetical situations:

(3)a. Put Randy Johnson on the mound, give him nine runs, and the Arizona Diamondbacks become about as unbeatable as a team can get.  (International Herald Tribune, April 25, 2001)
   b. Managing is like holding a dove in your hand. Squeeze too hard and you kill it; not hard enough and it flies away.
   c. A: A lot of people want the cheaper alternative. On the Net, you’re getting a new kind of self-service option. 
      B: Just look at how easy it is to order a book. Go to the right web site and type in a title, author or general subject. You get a list of the books from the database. Choose your title, type in your address and credit card number, and send your order. It’s on its way to you in one or two days, usually at a fat discount. Music is just as easy.  (NHK Business English, May 10, 2000)
The imperatives in (3a), for instance, report the result of the previous day’s baseball game; it is quite obvious that the readers are not being requested to put the ace pitcher on the mound and offer him nine runs. About the same thing can be said concerning the sentence in (3b). The italicized imperatives in (3c) merely describe step by step how one can order a book online. It might appear, in fact, that directive force is not a defining feature of the English imperative if a directive act is understood as an attempt to cause the listener(s) to carry out the action described by the proposition expressed.

Closely associated with the problem of force is the treatment of conditional imperatives, some of which are sometimes called ‘pseudo-imperatives.’ Should sentences such as (4) below be treated as imperatives?

(4)a. Sleep until noon and you’ll miss lunch.
   b. Do that and I’ll punish you.
   c. Bring alcohol to school and you’ll be suspended.

There is no consensus in the literature to this day concerning the exact status of this conjoined construction. Some scholars, who strongly associate the imperative with the exertion of force, regard ‘pseudo-imperatives’ like these as non-imperative sentences. Thus, Declerck and Reed (2001: 404) treat sentences such as (4b) as plain infinitives (neither indicatives nor subjunctives), or ‘moodless,’
on the grounds that the sentences do not express a promise but a threat, implying that the speaker does not want the hearer to do it.

On the other hand, others who pay attention to uses of imperatives lacking force think differently. They tend to classify ‘pseudo-imperatives’ as imperatives, since for them ‘force’ is not a defining feature of imperatives in the first place. This is a position adopted by Wilson and Sperber (1988), followed by Clark (1993), who contend that the pseudo-imperatives in (4) are imperatives used ‘with negative readings.’

I consider the sentences in (4) imperatives that more or less deviate from the norm, which leads me to argue that imperatives are potentially ambiguous with respect to the degree of force exertion. I suggest that this approach possesses an advantage over previous ones, in that it offers a unitary account of why some uses of imperatives seem genuinely hypothetical while others communicate just the opposite of what is actually said.

The study of the imperative in English has a long tradition in various disciplines. Researchers have analyzed the imperative from a variety of distinct theoretical perspectives--the formal framework of generative grammar (cf. Katz-Postal 1964; Lees 1964; Thorne 1966; Han 1998), the classic pragmatic analysis focusing on illocutionary forces and speech participants or situations (cf. Sadock 1974, Green 1975, Mittwoch 1976, Downes 1977), detailed descriptive and functional studies (Bolinger 1977, Davies 1986, Takahashi 1994),
philosophical studies (Hare 1970, Huntley 1984, Hamblin 1987, Merin 1991, inter alia), and relevance analyses (Wilson and Sperber 1988, Clark 1993). The main reason for presenting this work is the fact that the literature on imperatives, regardless of theoretical orientation, does not provide an answer to many of the important questions that crop up once one takes an interest in the imperative and its related phenomena. Let me give a few illustrative examples of this. First, it has long been recognized that some conditional imperatives license use of negative polarity items, whereas ordinary imperatives don’t unless overtly negated:

(5)a. Come any closer and I’ll call the police.
   b. Lift a finger to help her and you’ll be sorry.

(6)a. *Come any closer./Don’t come any closer.
   b. *Lift a finger to help her./Don’t lift a finger to help her.

Curiously, however, not all conditional imperatives permit negative polarity items to occur, as illustrated in the infelicity of (7) below:

(7)a. ?Come any closer and I’ll give you a candy.
   b. ?Lift a finger to help her and she’ll be happy.

Second, stative predicates, which are more or less ill-formed in independent imperatives, become more acceptable in conditional imperatives:
(8)a. Doubt that you will succeed, and you will not succeed.
    b. Appreciate literature, and you’ll be respected.

(9)a. ?Doubt that you will succeed.
    b. ?Appreciate literature.

In addition, why can’t or-conditional imperatives (11) obtain negative readings, although and-conditional imperatives (10) can? Consider:

(10) Leave now and you’ll get into serious trouble.

(11) ?Leave now or I’ll make you a nice dinner.
    (in the sense of ‘Don’t leave now; if you stay I’ll make you a nice dinner’)

In spite of their obvious merits and many fascinating insights into the nature of imperatives, previous works have not created a unified account of these phenomena. What has not emerged from all the impressive work and what is missing most is the concept of imperatives as a category. I am going to argue that the problems outlined above arise from a failure to appreciate all the conceptual factors involved in the various sorts of imperative utterances. Once these factors are properly elucidated, a characterization of the English imperative as indicating the notion of ‘force’ proves remarkably adequate in accounting for its usage.

Specifically, I make the following claims. First, the force of
the English imperative should be analyzed in terms of degrees, not in an all-or-nothing fashion. In addition, it is important to distinguish between different kinds of force—in particular, between directive and non-directive force, a distinction some languages like Japanese make by employing several separate imperative markers. Third, the force of the imperative can be reasonably treated as more subjective (or speaker-based) in nature than objective. In other words, the force of the imperative is more a matter of the speaker’s conceived world than the external world. That is, the imperative is paired with a conceived situation (as a chain of subevents) in which the speaker’s utterance (of an imperative) will typically (though not necessarily) cause the evoked proposition to become realized, although this may not happen in the outside world. This configuration helps explain why an imperative, such as Get well soon, Have a nice day, or even Please don’t rain, is employed meaningfully when it is quite obvious that one cannot actually command the addressee to deliberately get well, experience a nice day, or influence the weather.

Fourth, a comprehensive characterization of the imperative requires rigorous parameters for imperative prototypes, which are comprised of separate factors. Included are semantic role(s) and identity of addressee (individuated, non-individuated, and generic), the overall dynamicity of the event, and benefit (of Speaker, Addressee, or some other entity/entities), in addition to degrees and kinds of force. Fifth, an adequate characterization of conditional imperatives with connectives and and or requires, first,
the conceptions of prototypical as well as non-prototypical imperative. Moreover, it is necessary to look at two higher-level coordinate constructions—the left-subordinating and construction (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 1997) and the asymmetric or construction (cf. Lakoff 1971), respectively.

The principal goal of the present work is to propose a new approach to the problem of English imperatives—one that is compatible with the findings of previous descriptive, pragmatic, and logic-semantic analyses and one that provides the basis for a unified treatment for all uses of the imperative. This theoretical perspective is expected to systematically lay out the particular parameters relevant to the description of imperative utterances. Such a description should offer a revealing account of how imperatives can be viewed as a category. It will also permit one to explain why imperatives with strong positive forces and those without such forces behave the way they do as well as study the mechanisms relating the former to the latter.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

The present work is an attempt to provide a description of imperative sentences in English. The analysis of imperatives conducted here will focus on presenting an explanation of how aspects of imperative form give rise to a variety of meanings and functions. The theoretical foundations of this work are drawn from the theory of categorization (Rosch 1978, Lakoff 1987, inter alia), the gradient

Following the framework of cognitive and functional linguistics, I will treat the ‘grammar’ as a representation of the speaker’s construal of the conceptual content, not as an autonomous module of linguistic structure reducible to formal logic or a certain branch of mathematics. I will argue that imperatives can be best analyzed within such a framework. A large portion of the present study (cf. chapters 2, 3, and 4) is devoted to analyses of the English imperative and its related constructions, although one chapter (chapter 5) discusses imperatives in Japanese, a language with dissimilar grammatical structures.

The data can be described as mostly standard American English, and were drawn from several different sources. When necessary, the prior and subsequent context was noted for each token. Data were
collected from both speech and writing; the written sources include newspapers, magazines, novels, nonfiction books, academic prose, and email messages I encountered. Spoken data were drawn from personal conversations and radio programs. Data also include constructed examples as well as spoken and written examples generously provided by several linguists who are native speakers of English.

1.3 The Structure of the Work

The present volume is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I will sketch four basic features of English imperatives, hypotheticality, non-past, second-person, and degrees of force exertion, with particular emphasis on the last notion. The force exertion of an imperative is analyzed as constituting a continuum, and it is argued that this approach affords a unified treatment of a wide range of usage. Chapter 3 will begin with an image-schematic analysis of imperatives, followed by the comprehensive parameters for imperative prototypes, against which the less central cases can be related to the core cases. It is demonstrated that this description permits an explicit account of why imperatives in passives are generally awkward but become more felicitous in certain contexts, as well as why imperatives with perfect and progressive verbs look bizarre in some contexts but become more natural-sounding in other contexts. Chapter 4 will characterize two conditional imperative constructions, two apparently coordinate structures which have resisted principled
treatments. The former will be analyzed in terms of left-subordinating and construction occupied by an exemplar of non-prototypical imperative; the latter in terms of asymmetric or construction occupied by an exemplar of prototypical imperative. It will be illustrated that these analyses neatly explain why each conditional imperative sentence behaves the ways it does.

Chapter 5 will discuss five imperative forms in Japanese within the framework outlined in previous chapters. We will observe first that Japanese possesses a rich repertoire of imperative forms lexically distinguishing directive and non-directive force. Next, we will find that while the imperatives forms under discussion can be used without force or with negative force, most forms are constrained in occurrences—except for sitemiro which comfortably occurs with these interpretations. Finally, the felicity of passive imperatives in Japanese varies depending upon verb classes—in much the same way as in English. However, I point out that sitemiro is peculiar in that this form readily occurs with passives, regardless of verb or passive classes. I claim that this distinctive behavior can be attributed to sitemiro’s radical deviation from the imperative prototype—i.e., its grammatical status akin to a conditional connective.

1.4 Key Words.

Force Exertion
I employ the term force exertion to denote the conception of force
applied in imperative utterances. Together with three other features (hypotheticality, non-past, and second-person), force exertion is considered a central feature of the imperative. The idea that the basic meaning of the imperative is force is not in itself new. What is new about the work presented here is that force is understood in terms of varying degrees (including plus, zero, and minus) as well as different kinds (directive and non-directive). In this respect, I depart from the rigid all-or-nothing conception of (directive) force that has guided the majority of other work. The following is the definition of force exertion:

(12) **Force Exertion:** the degree of force that the speaker is applying (at the utterance time of an imperative) toward the addressee's carrying out some action.

I use the term force here to mean psychosocial influence the speaker exerts on the addressee to cause the latter to make the proposition true.

First, defined this way, the degree conception of force is useful in explaining the type of semantic ambiguity involving the following cases:

(13)a. Sleep until noon; you’re very tired.

   b. Sleep until noon and you’ll feel better.

   c. Sleep until noon and you’ll miss lunch.
In the proposed framework, the force of the imperative *sleep until noon* is strongest in the context of (13a), somewhat milder in (13b), and either absent or ‘negatively exerted’ in (13c). Sentence (13a) in its primary interpretation involves strong intention of the speaker to get the hearer to do the designated action. Sentence (13b) is somewhat ambiguous between command and conditional. Sentence (13c) is also ambiguous between warning/threat and conditional. The following figure illustrates this configuration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE:</th>
<th>MINUS MAXIMUM</th>
<th>ZERO</th>
<th>MILD</th>
<th>PLUS MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examples:</td>
<td>N O N - P R O T O T Y P I C A L</td>
<td>PROTOTYPICAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13c)</td>
<td>(13b)</td>
<td>(13a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The idea is that the imperative is potentially ambiguous regarding the value in force exertion, ranging between +1 (plus maximum) and –1 (minus maximum), although the imperative is typically used to exert strong (i.e., near plus maximum) force. That is, imperatives are normally employed in straightforward command or order, but the force of the imperative can be weakened in varying degrees or completely lost in non-prototypical usage. Moreover, the imperative can be postulated to occur at some minus point on the
continuum as it manifests itself in sarcasm and dares.

Next, a broad distinction will be made between directive and non-directive force. Compare the following pair, in which the force of the imperative is considered as directive (i.e., command or order) in (14) but non-directive (i.e., request or plea) in (15):

(14)a. Just hold your tongue.
     b. Be quiet.
     c. Shut up.
(15)a. Please, buy me a new bike, Dad.
     b. Help me, Father.
     c. [Excuse me. Can you tell me where IRS is?]—Go straight ahead.

In Japanese, directive force is normally denoted by command forms such as *siro* and *nasai* and non-directive force by request forms such as *kure* or *kudasai*. While imperatives in (14) can be translated into either form in Japanese, those in (15) are normally translated into request forms.

*Prototypical and Non-prototypical Imperatives*

A central claim of the present work is that English imperatives can, and should, be viewed as a category with central as well as non-central examples. Specifically, we propose the following as a characterization of prototypical imperative:

(16) The Prototype Imperative
i. The speaker exerts a high (near [+1]) directive force in a deictic setting toward the addressee, who will thereby perform an action in a hypothetical setting.

ii. The speaker plays the semantic role of causer-like agent, and the addressee causee-like agent.

That is, there is intention/volition on the part of the speaker to cause the hearer of an imperative to make the propositional content true, and the pressure/force is typically (though necessarily) strong.

The table below isolates the component parts constituting the notion of imperative prototypicality, identifying the following four parameters, some of which suggest a scale according to which imperative clauses can be measured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1-1: Overall Parameters for Imperative Prototypes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. DEGREE OF FORCE: (near)[+1] lower than (near)[+1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. NATURE OF FORCE: directive non-directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. SUBJECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. SEMANTIC ROLE: agentive non-agentive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. IDENTITY: individuated non-individuated/generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. BENEFIT: speaker addressee &gt; others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the most obvious association between the imperative and
the notion of force, the degree of force (in row Ai) can be taken as the primary criterion in the assessment of imperative prototypicality. In its most natural interpretation, Get out of my way or Just hold your tongue, exemplifies the most prototypical imperative, since the sentence involves strong directive force (prototypical in row A), the (implicit) subject (= an individuated addressee, plays the role of causer-agent (prototypical in row B), and the fulfillment of the designated situation is assumed to benefit the speaker (prototypical in row C). Conversely, Be sick (and they’ll put you in bed) is non-prototypical, or even peripheral use, in that the sentence hardly contains any force exertion (either directive or non-directive), the subject cannot be construed as an agent, and what is said is not in the interest of the speaker (or the addressee).

The category view of the imperative is of crucial importance in an analysis of imperatives. For one thing, it leads us to neatly explain the felicity of some passive imperatives in English, by resorting to features of non-prototypical imperative. In addition, it provides a clear picture of two conjoined conditional imperatives with and and or—i.e., in terms of non-prototypical and prototypical, respectively. It will be argued that and-conditional imperatives and or-conditional imperatives stand in complementary distribution within the category of imperative. Imperatives with strong force (i.e., instances of prototypical imperatives) are unwelcome in and-conditional imperatives but welcome in or-conditional imperatives. Conversely, imperatives without strong force (i.e.,
instances of non-prototype imperatives) are welcome in the former but unwelcome in the latter.

Constructions and Compatibility Between Constructions

As Goldberg (1995) argues convincingly, simple clause constructions are associated directly with semantic structures which reflect conceptual scenes basic to human experience. Numerous cognitive studies have revealed that clause structures reflect experientially grounded gestalts, such as that of someone deliberately transferring some energy to someone else, someone influencing someone else to change state (What if I get Samantha to pick up Emma at the school gate?), someone experiencing something (I feel pain), among others. Languages are comprised of constructions as the basic units. However, the repertoire of constructions is not considered an unstructured set; rather, there are systematic relations linking a variety of inheritance relations (Goldberg 1995: 67).

A basic axiom that is adopted here is that the imperative is one such construction in language, linked to other constructions such as the infinitive and the subjunctive. What has received relatively less attention in current discussion, however, is the problem of compatibility between constructions—i.e., the problem of how, and why, one construction (let us say, Construction A) is more compatible with another construction B, but not with still another construction C. I posit that two constructions more comfortably merge when the two are more compatible in conceptual terms. Conversely, two constructions do not readily merge if they
are conceptually INcompatible. This prelinguistic notion has important manifestations in the present study—in particular, when one attempts to explain why imperatives in the passive form generally look awkward (?Be helped by George) but become felicitous in some contexts (Be flattered by what he says; it’ll make his day).

I will hypothesize that the imperative and the passive are two constructions which are likely to ‘clash,’ because the two are conceptually incompatible in their central usage. The imperative prototypically evokes a ‘FORCE-CAUSES-AGENT-TO-ACT (ON SOMEONE/SOMETHING)’ scene, on the one hand, whereas the passive typically evokes a ‘PATIENT-AFFECTED-BY-AGENT’ schema, on the other. Conversely, the imperative and the active sentence are two constructions which readily merge (Help me!/Call me when you are ready!), on the grounds that the active sentence typically evokes an ‘AGENT-ACTS (ON PATIENT)’ scenario. The two constructions share a common semantic structure; the imperative subsumes the active construction in its prototypical structure.

It will be observed that passive imperative sentences become more felicitous (Be flattered by what he says; it’ll make his day), provided that the imperative and the passive become conceptually compatible. The idea is that passives and imperatives clash in their prototypical conceptual structures but become compatible if they are used in non-prototypical or peripheral senses. The apparently syntactic restriction can be viewed as the result of a mismatch between constructions—i.e., a mismatch between the prototypical conception of passives and that of imperatives.
Left-subordinating AND Construction

A characterization of the conditional imperative in (17) below has presented a serious challenge to most theories of grammar, semantics, and pragmatics, as well as analyses of imperatives, since the sentence behaves more like a conditional than an imperative:

(17) Bring alcohol to school and you’ll be suspended.
     <and-conditional imperative>

I argue that this sentence is not an isolated construction but is best analyzable as an instance of the higher-level left-subordinating and construction (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 1997).

Sentences (18) exemplify this special variant of and:

(18)a. One more can of beer and I’m leaving.
     b. You drink another can of beer and I’m leaving.
     c. Big Louie sees you with the loot and he puts out a contract on you.
     d. You give anyone too much money and he will go crazy.
     e. You made the slightest mistake and he jumped down your throat.
     f. [He’s very cantankerous.] I’ll offer him tea and he’ll demand coffee, I’ll cook the fish he wanted and he’ll say he wants chicken.
Note that all these sentences obtain a conditional sense. At least four (largely interrelated) features clearly distinguish the left-subordinating and construction from ordinary coordinate use. First, the two conjuncts follow the temporal order of iconicity; in $S_1$ and $S_2$, $S_2$ occurs after $S_1$. Second, they are mutually dependent upon each other in interpretation. Third, being semantically a conditional, the two conjuncts are symmetric in epistemic attitude. That is, if the left conjunct is considered ‘desirable’ in propositional attitude, the right is also considered ‘desirable’; if the left conjunct is considered ‘undesirable,’ the right is also considered ‘undesirable’; and if the left conjunct is considered ‘neutral,’ the right is also considered ‘neutral’ (cf. Akatsuka 1997; Clancy, Akatsuka, and Strauss 1997).

Finally, each conjunct resists a high degree of desirability, although it does permit ‘mild’ desirability. In the following pair, only sentences (19), but not (20), can be interpreted conditionally:

(19)a. Come and see me and you’ll see our new house.
   (=If you come and see me, you’ll see our new house)
   b. Finish your dinner and you can go out and play.
      (=If you finish your dinner, you can go out and play)

(20)a. Do come and see me, and you’ll see our new house.
      (≠If you come and see me, you’ll see our new house)
   b. I want you to finish your lunch and you can go out and play.
      (≠If you finish your lunch, you can go out and play)
   c. FINISH YOUR LUNCH!, and you can go out and play.
(≠If you finish your lunch, you can go out and play)

The sentences of (20) can only be read in terms of ‘command and afterthought’ sequence, not conditional, for the reason that the left clause is engaged in a directive speech act. Left-subordinating and is incompatible with the focal prominence of its left conjunct. As a consequence, sentences (20) are only interpreted in terms of coordinate and, not left-subordinating.

Compare uses of ordinary coordinate and:

(21)a. One more can of beer and I left.
   b. You’ve drunk another can of beer and I’ve left.
   c. Big Louie has seen you with the loot and he’s put out a contract on you.
   d. I am a middle-aged woman, and every week, I dine out with my elderly mother.
   e. Everyone was hilarious and I was miserable.

Unlike left-subordinating and, coordinate and is not conditional. Ordinary and is far less restricted in distribution. Two conjuncts need not be iconic in temporal order; they are conceptually more independent; and they can be either symmetric or asymmetric in propositional attitude (as in the ‘contrast’ use of (21e)). Finally, the two conjuncts are either assertive or non-assertive (as in (20)).

In summary, a full characterization of and-conditional imperatives requires the notion of left-subordinating and, a
conceptually though not syntactically subordinate construction which allows the imperative to appear if and only if the clause lacks strong force. The imperative and left-subordinating and are compatible if the imperative is employed in a non-prototypical sense, as opposed to prototypical.

**Asymmetric OR Construction**

The treatment of the other conditional imperative with disjunctive or has also been problematic in previous approaches. In particular, the absence of a ‘negative reading’ (as observed in the infelicity of ?Leave or I’ll make you a nice dinner) has resisted a principled explanation:

(22) Be careful or you’ll lose your bag.

<or-conditional imperative>

I claim that this coordinate sentence is also not an isolated construction but an instance of the superordinate asymmetric or construction (cf. Lakoff 1971). Sentences (23) illustrate this use of or, where the IF-NOT reading is implicated:

(23)a. Your money or your life!

b. Give me liberty or give me death!

c. I want you to be quiet or the security guards will put you outside.

d. We tell these companies to drop such dubious claims or face
stiff fines and other federal government regulatory
punishment.

e. I left early or I would have missed the train.
f. I didn’t have the time, or I would have joined.

Four features characterize asymmetric or as distinct from ordinary symmetric use. First, the left conjunct is focal in prominence, with the right backgrounded in conception. Second, two conjuncts follow the order of temporal iconicity of some kind; that is, $S_2$ is construed as occurring after the non-fulfillment (or non-truth) of $S_1$, as evidenced in the fact that the two conjuncts are irreversible without sacrificing naturalness:

(24)a. ?Your life or your money!

   b. ?Give me death or give me liberty!
   c. ?The security guards will put you outside or I want you to be quiet.
   d. ?We tell these companies to face stiff fines and other federal government regulatory punishment or drop such dubious claims.
   e. ?I would have missed the train or I left early.
   f. ?I would have joined or I didn’t have the time.

Third, the left conjunct is relatively independent in interpretation, although the right depends crucially upon the first. Thus, to the inquiry What should I do? one can respond meaningfully with Be careful
instead of the entire sentence of (22) above but not with you’ll lose your bag.

Fourth, two conjuncts are asymmetric in epistemic stance. Typically, the left conjunct performs a directive speech act, which is also interpreted as highly desirable, while the right conveys a consequence of the addressee’s non-fulfillment of the designated act, which is considered extremely undesirable, as illustrated in (22) as well as (23a) through (23d). Less typically, however, the left conjunct simply asserts the truth (and appropriateness) of its proposition, while the right conveys a consequence of this proposition’s being untrue, as demonstrated in (23e) and (23f).

Compare ordinary symmetric or:

(25)a. You can boil an egg, or you can make some sandwiches.
    b. Michael Owen is injured or he is suspended.
    c. Sleep until noon, or wake up early and take a shower.

In (25), the two conjuncts are presented more as alternatives, whether the reading is exclusive or inclusive, since each conjunct can be given equal prominence. Moreover, there is no iconicity in temporal sequence so that the order of two conjuncts can be reversed:

(26)a. You can make some sandwiches, or you can boil an egg.
    b. Michael Owen is suspended or he is injured.
    c. Wake up early and take a shower, or sleep until noon.
It will be argued that a unitary account of or-conditional imperatives needs to resort to the notion of asymmetric or, a special variant of or, which permits the imperative to appear only when the clause contains strong force (hence, a prototypical use). On this account, we can attribute the or-conditional imperative’s lack of negative reading (hence, the oddity of Leave or I’ll make you a nice dinner) directly to the requirement of the asymmetric or construction in its standard usage—namely, the left conjunct be associated with a directive speech act, involving a high degree of desirability.

In summary, the imperative and asymmetric or readily merge, in that the imperative in its prototypical use is fully compatible with this conjoined construction.
Chapter 2

English Imperatives and Force Exertion

2.1 Introduction

The imperative is frequently used in everyday speech. Formally, it is a sentence which occurs only in the main clause, normally has no grammatical subject and contains the verb in its most basic form.

There is a large body of literature on this grammatical structure, if one includes all the references on mood and conditionals addressing the imperative if only in passing. If we restrict our attention to the literature focusing on the imperative per se, we find that imperatives have been studied from at least five different perspectives: the formal framework of generative grammar (cf. Katz-Postal 1964, Lees 1964, Thorne 1966, Han 1998, *inter alia*), the classic pragmatic analysis focusing on illocutionary forces and speech participants or situations (cf. Sadock 1974, Green 1975, Mittwoch 1976, Downes 1977), detailed descriptive and functional studies (Bolinger 1977, Davies 1986, Takahashi 1994), philosophical studies such as Hare 1970, Huntley 1984, Hamblin 1987 and Merin 1991, and relevance analyses (Wilson and Sperber 1988, Clark 1993). Needless to say, a number of valuable insights have come from these studies. Just to name a few, it has been revealed in Wilson and Sperber 1988 that imperative utterances are not necessarily used with directive force (as in *Wake up!*), but sometimes they can be used
without it, if a directive act is understood as “an attempt to get the hearer to perform the action described by the proposition expressed.” (Wilson and Sperber 1988: 80). In fact, imperative utterances perform a rich variety of discourse functions and speech acts in everyday conversation; included are advice (If you want to go to Starbucks, go straight ahead two blocks), permission (Can I open the window?–Oh, open it, then), threats and dares (Go on. Throw it. Just you dare), good wishes (Get well soon), among others. It is also pointed out in Clark (1993) that imperatives may involve at least three distinct readings, ‘positive’ as in Be off or I’ll push you downstairs, ‘neutral’ as in Open the Guardian and you’ll find three misprints on every page, and ‘negative’ as in Come one step closer and I’ll shoot.

However, the literature on the English imperative, extensive as it may be, fails to provide a satisfactory analysis of this simple grammatical structure. To begin with, while mentioning the similarity between the imperative and other hypotheticals such as the subjunctive and the infinitive, it does not clearly distinguish the imperative from these other hypotheticals. Another, more crucial problem is that there is no consensus as to whether or not (directive) force is a defining feature of the imperative. While the majority of authors accept the notion of force as an integral facet of the imperative, some, notably Wilson and Sperber (1988), following Pendlebury 1986 and followed by Clark (1993), contend that the notion of force should not be incorporated into the semantic analysis of imperatives. Thus, Wilson and Sperber (1988) reject the force
account in favor of the ‘desirability’ approach, based on the observation that a number of imperative utterances are literally used without the predicted directive force as in *Can I open the window—Oh, open it then, Can I move this chair—Go ahead, Get well soon, or Have a nice day* (cf. chapter 4). As a natural consequence, opinions sometimes split as to whether or not a given clause should classify as an imperative. Let us consider the clause *Do that*. For Clark (1993), the clause *Do that* in *Do that and I’ll punish you* is an imperative, i.e., a ‘pseudo-imperative’ with a ‘negative reading.’ However, for Declerck and Reed (2001) it isn’t, since the whole sentence expresses a threat rather than a promise, so they regard this instance as ‘moodless’—neither an imperative nor an indicative or subjunctive (Declerck and Reed 2001: 404):

> ...*do that* is just a plain infinitive clause (i.e., a constituent with the verb stem) which names a particular situation. Treating it an imperative seems incongruous, since *Do that and I’ll punish you* implies that the speaker does not want the hearer to do it: what is expressed is just the opposite of what is expressed by the imperative *Do that* in isolation.

An important related problem is the exact status of a coordinate construction known as the ‘pseudo-imperative’: is the ‘pseudo-imperative’ an imperative? Again, the treatment varies among analysts. An author such as Clark (1993) considers it a kind of
imperative, but Declerck and Reed (2001: 404) treat it as a non-imperative sentence.

In this chapter and throughout this volume, I take the position that the imperative does involve the conception of force, but I argue that the force of an imperative utterance can best be analyzed in terms of degree, as opposed to an all-or-nothing conception. To my knowledge, few previous works (except for Takahashi (1994; 2000)) have explicitly proposed a gradient analysis of the force of an imperative, which I believe largely accounts for the inadequacies of previous analyses including the treatment of ‘pseudo-imperatives,’ conditional imperative sentences which will be dealt with in some detail in chapter 4 below. The present chapter introduces the notion of force exertion as an essential feature of imperatives. By force exertion I mean the most general conception of force that the speaker is applying toward the addressee’s action, with varying degrees of a wish/desire for the realization of the propositional content. It is demonstrated below that this feature is both unique and essential to the meaning of an imperative but not to corresponding subjunctives and infinitives; this concept allows for unified treatments of several syntactic and semantic phenomena pertaining to imperatives. The discussion of the chapter will include the comparison between an imperative like Sleep until noon and the corresponding subjunctive or infinitive as in I recommend that you sleep until noon/I recommend you to sleep until noon.

The approach of this chapter is both descriptive and cognitive. While the discussions generally proceed by examining examples, the
central part of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of force exertion, a mental concept not directly observable from the surface form of an imperative.

I will characterize English imperatives in terms of four basic features: hypotheticality, non-past, second-person as well as force exertion. The notion of force exertion is introduced as ranging between plus maximum [+1] and minus maximum [-1] including zero application [0]. Within this framework, the ‘command’ sense is not an essential feature, but rather the prototypical sense of an imperative grammatical structure, which occurs with strong force exertion. Contrary to the common belief, an imperative is potentially ambiguous relative to the degree of force exertion. The illocutionary force of the imperative is prototypically strong, but the force can be weakened in varying degrees—in fact, it can be completely lost.

In the next section (section 2), I give a brief discussion of hypotheticality, non-past, as well as the second-person nature of imperatives. Section 3 discusses the concept of force exertion; it is argued that force exertion can be best viewed as constituting a continuum and that it affords a unified treatment of a wide range of usage. I also discuss the relationship between English imperatives and a few ‘attitudinal markers’ such as please. Section 4 demonstrates that the degree conception of force exertion helps explain some phenomena pertaining to English imperatives. Section 5 discusses the way in which the notion of force exertion accommodates different illocutionary forces associated with imperative utterances.
2.2 Hypotheticality, Non-past, and Second-person

In this subsection, I briefly explain three features of the imperative that seem hardly controversial: i.e., hypotheticality, non-past, and second-person.

Hypotheticality

There is a general and reasonable agreement in the literature that the imperative is a hypothetical clause. Thus Bolinger regards the basic meaning of the imperative as 'hypotheticalness' (1977: 177-8); Davies as 'the presentation of a potentiality' (1986: 48); and Jacobs treats the imperative as 'in the hypothetical mood' (1981: 105). Following these previous studies, I assume that one important feature which characterizes the imperative is hypotheticality in the sense that an imperative involves its speaker presenting a possible situation to the addressee(s).

It goes without saying that hypotheticality is not peculiar to the imperative alone but common to the subjunctive and the infinitive as well. Thus if we compare the imperative in (1) with the corresponding subjunctive (2) and infinitive (3),

(1) Talk with your doctor. <Imperative>
(2) I recommend that you talk with your doctor. <Subjunctive>
(3) I recommend you to talk with your doctor. <Infinitive>
it is evident that the subjunctive and the infinitive as well as the imperative share the common feature of hypotheticality (cf. Jacobs 1981, Huntley 1984).

Note that the feature hypotheticality clearly differentiates a conditional imperative sentence from its corresponding if-conditional, which is generally believed to be a complete synonym, as demonstrated in the following examples: below from Davies (1979):

(4)A: Do you like Stilton?
   B: I adore it.
   A1: That’s good. #Like Stilton and you’ll love my soufflé.
   A2: That’s good. If you like Stilton, you’ll love my soufflé.
   [Davies 1979, ex. 84]

(5)A: Do you like Stilton?
   B: I don’t know, I’ve never tried it.
   A1: Well, wait a minute and I’ll get you some to try. Like Stilton and you’ll love my soufflé.
   A2: Well, wait a minute and I’ll get you some to try.
       If you like Stilton, you’ll love my soufflé.
   [Davies 1979, ex. 85]

The imperative Like Stilton is unacceptable in the factual context of (4), where the if-conditional is perfectly acceptable. Here, the speaker assumes that the addressee is fond of Stilton on the basis of someone else’s (in this case, the addressee’s) authority, an instance for which Declerck and Reed (2001: 2) would use the term ‘closed’ (as
opposed to 'factual') conditional.¹ In contrast, the nonfactual context of (5) permits both the imperative and the if-conditional to occur.

Non-past
The second obvious feature is non-past. It seems well-established that the imperative either refers to the present or the future. That is, it does not refer to a past situation, as illustrated in a by-now classic diagnostic test:

(6) Talk with your doctor now/tomorrow/next month.
(7) Talk with your doctor *yesterday/*last month.

One might argue that the examples below serve as counter-examples to the proposed non-past nature of imperatives:

(8) In those days Tim was always hungry. Give him a few dollars, and he was happy.
(9) A: How was the party?
    B: Turn up yesterday and you'd have had a real shock.

The imperatives obviously refer to a situation existent sometime in the past. The second sentence in (8) might be paraphrased as something like 'IF you gave him a few dollars, he was very happy.' Analogously, the utterance of Speaker B in (9) corresponds to a conditional such as 'IF you had turned up yesterday, you'd have had a
real shock.'² Probably the best way to explain these past-referring imperatives is to say that these are the imperative versions of the 'historic present.' That is, the speaker's temporal viewing position is anchored at the time of in those days or yesterday, from which perspective the supposed action of giving him money or showing up at the party may be viewed as if it were existent in the future (non-past relative to the speaker's viewing position). In such a case, we might as well call instances like these 'Historic Imperatives.'

The past-referring imperatives such as those in (8) and (9) above seem to occur under two conditions. First, some specific past setting must be either explicitly stated in the preceding utterance or implicitly understood.³ In (8) and (9) above, for instance, the past setting is explicitly contained in the preceding utterance In those days Tim was always hungry or How was the party?⁴ Second, the past-referring imperative must be interpreted in terms of conditional, not command. I will address this question in the discussion of force exertion shortly in section 2.

Let us ask whether the feature, 'non-past,' is peculiar to the imperative alone or whether it is common to the corresponding subjunctive and infinitive as well. Observe:

(10) <Subjunctive>

a. I recommend that you talk with your doctor now/tomorrow.

b. *I recommend that you talk with your doctor yesterday/last week.

(11) <Infinitive>

a. I recommend you to talk with your doctor now/tomorrow.
b. *I recommend you to talk with your doctor yesterday/last week.

It seems evident that both the corresponding subjunctive and infinitive only refer to the present or future.

Next, let me examine whether the two clauses might refer to a past situation in the way in which an imperative can do it in the special contexts we have seen in (8) and (9) above:

(12) In those days Tim was always hungry. *I suggest that you/*I ask you to give him a few dollars, and he was happy.

(13) A: How was the party?

B: *I suggest that you/*I ask you to turn up yesterday and you'd have had a real shock.

As is evident from the infelicity of these dialogues, neither the corresponding subjunctive nor infinitive can refer to the past even in limited contexts.

In short, the imperative can be characterized as being non-past with respect to the speaker's temporal viewing position. Typically, of course, the imperative refers to the present or future, whereas in limited contexts, the imperative can refer to the past. One may say that such past-referring imperatives still refer to the present or future RELATIVE TO the particular past time mentioned in the utterance.
Second-person
Next, the imperative is normally used without an explicit subject. However, the second person of the understood subject is another feature essential to the imperative, as evidenced in the fact that when the subject does occur, the second-person pronoun you appears:

(14) You/You guys stand up!

This is not to imply, however, that an imperative contains an underlying syntactic ‘you’ subject but rather, it is a matter of the gap between coding and construal—i.e., whether or not the addressee is given explicit coding (cf. Langacker 1991), as will be revealed in the image-schematic analysis of the imperative’s semantic structure in chapter 3. The imperative across languages in the world only optionally marks the explicit you subject because this referent entity counts as maximally ‘hearer-old’ (cf. Prince 1992; Birner and Ward 1998), an information status which warrants zero coding due to its highest accessibility for speech participants (Ariel 1988, 1990).

Interestingly, imperatives may be accompanied by apparently third-person subjects in their non-individuated usage:

(15)a. Someone get the barf bag!
    b. Everyone stand up!
    c. All the boys stand up!
The substitution of the imperative-heading noun phrases by pro-NP forms reveals the exact status of these imperative subjects:

(16)a. *She/*He get the barf bag!
   b. *They stand up!
   c. You boys stand up!

As the ungrammaticality of (16a) and (16b) as well as the grammaticality of (16c) show, those imperative-heading noun phrases are only superficially in the third person but essentially are in the second-person, where the imperative is interpreted as being directed at a non-individuated addressee.

Addition of a tag question serves as another useful diagnosis of the second-person nature of the imperative subject:

(17)a. Someone get the barf bag, *will he?
   b. Someone stand up, will you?

(18)a. Everyone/All the boys stand up, will they?
   b. Everyone/All the boys stand up, will you?

The third-person tag form in (17a) is simply ungrammatical, whereas the second-person form in (17b) can be acceptable if the reading is that you is generic, not referring to a specific individual. Similarly, the second-person tag form in (18b) generally strikes us as better-formed than the third-person counterpart in (18a), which is also permissible.
In a nutshell, the understood subject of an imperative should be viewed as being in the second person, even when third-person noun phrases appear. As we will discuss in some detail in chapter 3, a comprehensive analysis of the imperative needs to take into account the fact that the addressee is only typically (but not necessarily) individuated (\textit{Shut up/Hold your tongue}); he or she might be non-individuated (\textit{Someone get the barf bag/Nobody move}) or generic (\textit{Join the navy and see the world/Give a dog a bad name, and he’ll live up to it}).

Before closing this section, it would be worth noticing that second-person subjects should not be conflated with addressees in the external world. While the two coincide in the vast majority of imperative utterances, speakers may choose a variety of non-human as well as human entities as addressees. This explains why one utters sentences like \textit{Please don’t rain} and \textit{Bounce, you bastard!} (an angry tennis player yelling at his tennis ball). In the following examples, the speaker employs imperative sentences to advise herself:

(19)a. \textit{Get a grip}. She fumbled through a large purse and found a pencil-\textit{thin flashlight}. (\textit{Pelican}: 173)

\hspace{1cm} b. \textit{Run!} Her heart pounded like a drum. \textit{Run!} She tried to control her breathing, but she was battling hyperventilation. Her legs were rubbery. \textit{Run!} (\textit{Pelican}: 352)

\hspace{1cm} c. \textit{Wait,} until I tell Jeff about this, Dana thought. (\textit{Sky}: 255).
2.3 Force Exertion

In this section, I want to demonstrate that while being much less obvious than the other three features (hypotheticality, non-past, and second person), the notion of force exertion is crucially important to the interpretation of an imperative. Before looking at actual instances, let me define force exertion as follows (cf. Takahashi 1994; Takahashi 2000a):

(20) force exertion: the degree of force that the speaker is applying (at the utterance time of an imperative) toward the addressee's carrying out the action.

That is, an imperative involves a speech situation in which two (human) entities—speaker and addressee—interact with each other with respect to interpersonal, socio-psychological force (cf. Talmy 1988; (2000: chap.7)). I define force as psychosocial influence the speaker exerts on the addressee, thus causing the latter to perform some action. Understood this way, the force of an imperative can be equated with intention or volition on the part of the speaker to make the proposition content true in the real world. The stronger this intention or volition, the stronger is the force of an imperative. Thus, imperatives may be very fierce attempts as when the speaker insists that the addressee do something, or they may be modest attempts as when the speaker recommends that the addressee do it (cf. Searle (1979: 13)). In fact, imperatives could be attempts to suggest
the opposite of what is literally said, as we will observe shortly in an example like (22) below. Force exertion is a most general notion of force designed to subsume a wide variety of illocutionary forces associated with imperative utterances (see section 2.5 below). By action, I refer to both physical and non-physical action as manifested in verbs like kick and get up, on the one hand, and those like think, imagine, and understand, on the other. I also include ‘inaction’ as exemplified in Just sit still, Don’t buy anything, or Stay there. The addressee is normally a human entity but, as I have mentioned above in 2.2, nonhuman entities can readily be picked out as ‘addressees.’

Consider:

(21) Sleep until noon.

The preferred interpretation of (21) would be that the speaker is telling the addressee to sleep until noon; that is, a directive act. However, look at the identical imperative form in a different utterance:

(22) Sleep until noon and you’ll miss lunch.

[=(13c) in Ch. 1]

The speaker here does not tell the addressee to sleep until noon but the opposite. What s/he says is that 'IF you sleep until noon, THEN you will miss lunch, so you’d better NOT sleep until noon'; the speaker warns against the addressee’s carrying out the designated
action. The imperative here is taken to be both a condition and warning. In this interpretation, the speaker has little intention or volition to get the addressee to carry out the designated action—quite the contrary.

Compare (23), in which the identical imperative is interpreted as a command or serious advice:

(23) Sleep until noon; you are very tired.

[=(13a) in Ch. 1]

I hypothesize that the fundamental difference of the imperative between (22) and (23) follows from the difference in degree of force exertion: *Sleep until noon* in (23) occurs with a higher degree of force exertion, whereas *Sleep until noon* in (22) in its preferred reading occurs with a lower, or more accurately a minus degree of force exertion. I also hypothesize that an imperative in isolation as in (21) is potentially ambiguous concerning the degree of force exertion, despite the fact that the prototypical reading is the one with a high degree of force such as a command, order or request. Another way of saying this is that the force of the imperative is prototypically strong as in (21) as well as (23), but the force is either lost or lowered to a minus point in a sentence like (22).

Let us test the validity of these hypotheses. Recall that the adverbial please may frequently co-occur with imperatives and that when it does, it serves as 'attitudinal' in the sense that the word represents the speaker's serious request/plea for the addressee's
future action or situation. In such a case, we can predict that please favors an imperative utterance involving the speaker serious commitment to the realization of the supposed action. Let us examine whether please can co-occur with the imperative *Sleep until noon*; (24) corresponds to (22) above and (25) to (23):

(24) ?Please sleep until noon and you'll miss lunch.
(25) Please sleep until noon; you are very tired.

*Please* in (24) strikes us as somewhat odd and incoherent, although it can be felicitous in sarcastic contexts. In contrast, *please* in (25) is perfectly acceptable in default contexts. The relative oddity of (24) can be best explained by the mismatch between the most positive ring of *please* and the absence of strong force. Below we see that the occurrence of *please* with a 'lukewarm' imperative (or a mild suggestion as an alternative choice) as in (26) is also somewhat bizarre:

(26) Sleep until noon or it might also be a good idea to wake up early and take a shower.
(27)a. (?)*Please* sleep until noon or it might also be a good idea to wake up early and take a shower.
   b. *Please* sleep until noon — or it might also be a good idea to wake up early and take a shower.
The somewhat lower acceptability of (27a), if read without a pause, can also be ascribed to the poor compatibility between please and the degree of force exertion of the imperative, although the utterance gets more acceptable if the speaker utters the second or-clause after a long pause as in (27b), which allows for an after-thought reading. Thus, the appearance of please is strictly restricted to imperatives with strong force. This attitudinal item is generally incompatible with imperative utterances lacking strong force.

Taking into account the above discussion, let me propose as a working hypothesis that the force exertion of an imperative constitutes a continuum ranging from [+1] (plus maximum) to [-1] (minus maximum). This perspective is portrayed in figure 2-1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE: MINUS MAXIMUM</th>
<th>ZERO</th>
<th>MILD</th>
<th>PLUS MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;-1 ------------------</td>
<td>0 ---------------</td>
<td>+1 &gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples: (22) (26) (23) NON - PROTOTYPICAL PROTOTYPICAL

The idea is that an imperative may in principle be issued at every point on the continuum. The force of the imperative is prototypically strong, but the force can be weakened in varying degrees. The prototype vs. non-prototype distinction is not a simple binary concept, but defines a continuum. The higher on the continuum,
the stronger the force of an imperative becomes; around the zero point, the imperative becomes purely hypothetical; and the lower on the continuum, the ‘negatively stronger’ the force, from which arise such readings as sarcasm and threat or dare. The imperative in (23), which conveys a command, suggestion, or advice, is generally interpreted in terms of higher points (near [+1]) on the continuum; thus please prefers imperatives with such strong force. An imperative giving a modest suggestion as in (26) can be treated as occurring somewhere in the middle between [+1] and [0]. Imperatives used both as a condition and warning as in (22) above occur at some minus point. In light of these data, it seems more reasonable to treat strong force as a prototypical use, instead of an essential feature, of an imperative. The inherent meaning of an imperative is something much more schematic: i.e., HYPOTHETICALITY. Let me stress that the numerical value on the scale is used only for explanatory convenience; it does not imply that one can actually calculate the exact numerical value for each imperative utterance.

This framework helps explain the humor of the bumper sticker sign as well:

(28) Eat, drink, and get fat!

Here, the degree of force exertion seems to shift from positive to negative.
It is worth mentioning here that Clark (1993) proposes a tripartite division for the interpretation of the imperative—‘positive,’ ‘neutral’ and ‘negative,’ an approach quite similar in spirit to the present analysis. However, as I will demonstrate in chapter 4 below, there is an advantage in the degree analysis of the present study. Clark’s analysis does not adequately capture the subtle but important difference in the strength of force between *Arrive on time or the boss will get mad at you* (the or-conditional imperative) and *Arrive on time and you’ll catch the train* (the and-conditional imperative), both of which will be simply classified with ‘positive readings.’ In fact, the former involves greater force. For a critical review of this relevance account of imperatives and conditional imperatives, see chapter 4.

Let me note here that similar scales have been independently offered in a few previous works on other constructions or phenomena. Givón (1982) proposes a three-segment scale of evidentiality concerning certainty of a proposition; similarly, Akatsuka (1985) demonstrates an epistemic scale holding between the two conceptual domains, realis and irrealis; and Comrie (1986) also discusses the degree of hypotheticality regarding conditionals. Therefore my proposal in this chapter may be viewed as a natural extension of these works to the imperative, although these previous studies did not incorporate ‘minus degrees’ into their analyses.
The prototypicality of imperatives with strong force is supported by at least two facts. First, a linguistic construction has a strong tendency to evoke its most natural reading in default-contexts, i.e. prototype. Speakers of English generally interpret an imperative in isolated contexts in terms of command (or request), as most reference grammar treatments reflect this judgment.

Second, support also comes from frequency. Observation of naturally occurring data reveals that imperative utterances involve strong force in the vast majority of cases. In my survey, The Pelican Brief by John Grisham contains a total of 556 tokens of the imperative, and at least 513 (92.4%) of them can be interpreted in terms of strong force, where there is strong intention or attempt on the part of the speaker to cause the propositional content to become realized. Another novel, The Sky is Falling by Sidney Sheldon, contains a total of 314 tokens of the imperative, and at least 301 (95.8%) of them can be interpreted in terms of strong force; the speaker wants it to happen.

Given below are some examples considered more prototypical uses of imperatives. All these imperatives can be interpreted as serious attempts to get the addressee(s) to carry out the designated actions:

(29)a. The explosion knocked her to the sidewalk. She landed on all fours, facedown, stunned for a second, then immediately aware of the heat and the tiny pieces of fiery debris falling in the street. ...

There were shouts and voices in panic.
"Whose car is it!"

"Call 911!" (Pelican: 127)

b. "Sergeant Rupert. One of you guys," she said. This made him mad. "Get outta the car, lady" (Pelican: 130)

c. Sneller hesitated. "Can’t say." Khamel smiled slightly as he took some street maps from the briefcase. "Tell me about the maps." (Pelican: 196)

d. "... Tell her we’ll do whatever she wants. Tell her I’m sending a hundred agents in tomorrow to blanket the city. Tell her we’ll find the killer, etc., etc."

(Pelican: 235)

e. Coal stepped closer to Voyles. His eyes were glowing. "You bust your ass to make sure these names are kept out of the papers until they’re nominated. You make it work, Director. You plug the leaks and keep it out of the papers, understand." (Pelican: 85)

f. "If you want to help, go to the memorial service tomorrow. Watch everything. Spread the word that I called you from Denver where I’m staying with an aunt with a name you don’t know, ... Make sure that rumor gets started. ..." (Pelican: 178)

As expected, some of these imperative utterances differ in the degree of force. The request Call 911! (29a), for example, uttered in an extremely urgent situation, is perceived as involving stronger (or
near maximum) force than the request *Watch everything* (29f) uttered in a less urgent situation.

Given below in (30), (31) and (32) are examples treated as less prototypical, in which the speaker does not seem to exert much influence on the addressee toward a specific action. They are set-phrases/formulaic sentences (30), imperatives somewhat close to genuine hypothetical use (31), and sarcasm or dare (32):

(30) Set-phrases/formulaic expressions

a. Come on. / Listen. / Look. / Let’s say.

b. “Excuse me. Would you happen to know Kaura Kaas?” (*Pelican*: 327)

c. “Have a nice day, Grantham.” (*Pelican*: 93)

d. “I’ve never heard of Pryce and MacLawrence.”

   “Join the club. They’re both very young, early forties, ....”
   (*Pelican*: 100)

e. “Give me a break. I’ll never appoint a woman with a hyphen.”
   (*Pelican*: 49)

f. Rachel was very successful. She was always booked, and her work took her all over the world. Italy … England … Jamaica … Thailand … Japan … You name it. (*Sky*: 25)

g. “I hope you’re not making a big mistake. Have a nice wedding.”
   (*Sky*: 74)

h. “Because it’s cold out here. *Come on.*” (*Sky*: 120)

i. Jeff finally said, “*Take care. Good-bye.*” (*Sky*: 148)

j. The card read “*Dear Dana, have a safe trip.*” (*Sky*: 169)

k. “Well, *look who’s here.* Did you have a good trip?” (*Sky*: 304)
(31) <genuine hypothetical?>

a. [ambiguous between imperative and infinitive]

“That’s why they were killed, Thomas. Someone or some group wants a different Court, one with an absolute conservative majority. The election is next year. Rosenberg is, or was, ninety-one. Manning is eighty-four. Yount is early eighties. They could die soon, or live ten more years. A Democrat may be elected President. Why take a chance? Kill them now, a year before the election. Makes perfect sense, if one was so inclined.” (Pelican: 46)

b. [ambiguous between imperative and declarative]

Gregory Price was saying to Dana, “Do you know what’s great about the lumber business, little lady? Your product grows all by itself. Yes, sir, you just sit around and watch Mother Nature make money for you.” (Sky: 350)

(32) <sarcasm/dare>

a. “... But I suspect you’re correct.”

“Suspect my ass. ... Come on, Gavin, you can tell me. Who’s on the list?” (Pelican: 75)

b. Darby casually lit a cigarette and puffed as she walked. She could not inhale. She tried three days ago, and got dizzy. Such a nasty habit. How ironic it would be if she lived through all this only to die from lung cancer. Please, let her die of cancer. (Pelican: 205)
c. “We’re running a story in the morning about your client, Victor Mattiece, and his involvement in the assassinations of Justices Rosenberg and Jensen.”

“Great! We’ll sue your ass for the next twenty years. You’re out in left field, buddy. We’ll own the Post.”

“Yes, sir. Remember, I’m recording this.”

“Record all you want! You’ll be named as a defendant. This will be great! Victor Mattiece will own the Washington Post! This is fabulous!” (Pelican: 405)

Note that most examples in (30), (31) and (32) above cannot be interpreted literally. It should be stressed here that I do not assume a clear-cut division between prototypical (strong force) and non-prototypical (weaker force) instances; it is more reasonable to analyze the two as forming a continuum.

2.4 Force Exertion and Related Phenomena

Subjunctives and Infinitives

The conception of force exertion as outlined above clearly distinguishes the imperative from other hypothetical clauses. As we have observed above, the imperative is potentially ambiguous with respect to both the degrees and kinds of force exertion. However, no such ambiguity can be observed in either the subjunctive or the infinitive. Consider:

<Subjunctive>
(33)a. I request that you sleep until noon; you are very tired.  
   (cf. ex. 23)
   b. ?I request that you sleep until noon and you'll miss lunch.  
   (cf. ex. 22)
   c. ?I request that you sleep until noon, or it might also be a  
      good idea to wake up early and take a shower. (cf. ex. 26)

Only the a sentence with strong force is acceptable, whereas the b and  
c versions with minus or mild plus force strike us as terribly  
incoherent. Recall that the imperative form *Sleep until noon* would  
comfortably occur in each utterance, at a high point (i.e., strong  
force) (23), at a minus point (i.e., minus force) (22), and at a mid-  
plus point (i.e., mild force) (26). This shows that the corresponding  
subjunctive does not allow for either a negative or even a mild  
positive reading; the verb *request*'s complement clause in the  
subjunctive mood invariably involves strong force.  

The behavior of the infinitive patterns exactly like that of the  
corresponding subjunctive in (33) above:

<Infinitive>
(34)a. I advise you to sleep until noon; you are tired.  
   b. ?I advise you to sleep until noon and you'll miss lunch.  
   c. ?I advise you to sleep until noon, or it might be also a good  
      idea to wake up early and take a shower.
The utterance of the infinitive version *I advise you to sleep until noon* as opposed to the imperative *Sleep until noon* is restricted to a class of high points on the continuum. As expected, both the subjunctive form in (33a) and the infinitive form in (34a) perfectly harmonize with the emphatic attitudinal *please*:

(35) I request that you *please* sleep until noon; you are tired.
(36) I advise you to *please* sleep until noon; you are tired.

In conclusion, only the imperative is potentially ambiguous concerning the force exertion as described in (20) above and illustrated in Figure 2-1. No such ambiguity is observable in the corresponding subjunctive and infinitive.¹⁰

'Forceless' imperatives

Next, the framework I have outlined above will handle a few other examples which have been problematic to previous approaches. First, consider a threat. As I have introduced above, Declerck and Reed (2001: 406) treat the clause *Do that* in (37) as an imperative but a non-imperative clause in (38), since the latter conveys a threat (as opposed to a promise):

(37) Do that or I’ll punish you.
(38) Do that and I’ll punish you.
On the present account, the clause *Do that* in either utterance is an imperative, but one crucial difference resides in the degree of force. The imperative clause involves strong force in (37) and the force of the imperative is ‘lowered’ in (38) (For more discussion of ‘pseudo-imperatives’ see Chapter 4). The crux of the matter is not in the difference in clause type (imperative vs. plain infinitive) as Declerck and Reed suggest it is, but rather in the degree of force (strong vs. minus force) within the category of the imperative.

The following example of discourse contains one imperative clause which might be considered as ‘forceless’:

(39) A: I wonder if aging alone has that much to do with it. I know people in their 80s who have sharp minds and excellent memories. Maybe the boomers brain meltdown is actually an information overload. Just like my computer, they don’t have any disk space left.

B: That sounds more likely. *Add stress and depression* and you get messed-up memory. High blood pressure or too much booze does the same thing. (*NHK Business English, June 29, 1999*)

Here, B’s utterance *Add stress and depression* (and you get messed-up memory) is a close synonym to a pure conditional (*If you add stress and depression, you get messed-up memory*).

Two more examples are given below:

(40) Suicide is contagious. Look around at your family. Look closely
at the 4-year-old playing with his cars on the rug. *Kill yourself tonight*, and he may do it 10 years from now. (Ann Landers’ column, *Asahi Evening Press*, Feb 9, 1996)

(41) Managing is like holding a dove in your hand. Squeeze too hard and you kill it; not hard enough and it flies away. (Tommy Lasorda, U.S. former baseball pitcher and manager)

In (40), the first two imperatives suggest that the readers look around and look closely at the boy. In contrast, the third one *Kill yourself tonight* makes a sharp contrast; it is uttered without any force exertion or negatively. About the same applies to the imperative *Squeeze too hard (and you kill it)* in (41).

The problem of past-referring imperatives has also presented a serious challenge to most previous analysts. Clark (1993: 114-117), for instance, terms the following as a ‘genuine pseudo-imperative,’ as distinguished from the imperative (cf. chapter 4):

(42) Life was so hard in those days. Say one word out of turn and they’d dock you a week’s wages.

As we observed in section 2.2 above, such a past-referring imperative occurs, provided that some past setting is either explicitly provided or implicitly contained in the previous discourse, and the imperative is interpretable as a purely hypothetical conditional. In such a case, we can predict that past-referring imperatives must occur at (near) the zero point on the force exertion continuum; the addition
of an emphatic attitudinal should produce an unacceptable utterance. In fact, this prediction is borne out:

(43) Life was so hard in those days. *Please/*Do say one word out of turn and they’d dock you a week’s wages.

We obtain the same result if we add please or do to the similar instances we have observed above in (8) and (9):

(44) In those days Tim was always hungry. *Please/*Do give him a few dollars, and he was happy.

(45) A: How was the party?
   B: *Please/*Do turn up yesterday and you’d have had a real shock.

The only possible reading here is a plain hypothetical condition like 'IF you GAVE him a few dollars' of 'IF you HAD TURNED UP YESTERDAY'; no force is exerted.

Therefore we may restate the condition for the occurrence of the imperative in question in the following manner: a past-referring imperative might occur both if a past setting is explicitly stated or implied in the current context and if it occurs at (near) the zero point on the force exertion continuum.11

Finally, not many scholars have viewed the following concessive expressions as imperatives (except for Huddleston and Pullum (2002);
see 2.5 below). However, the concept of force exertion can accommodate these cases:

(46) *Love me or hate me*, but you are my daughter.
(47) *Believe it or not*, she is my daughter.

Let me stress that the italicized clauses satisfy at least three criteria for imperatives—hypotheticality, non-past and the implicit you subject. Once we have the understanding that command, or more accurately strong force exertion, is NOT an essential feature of an imperative, these concessive clauses do not pose any serious problem. The essential message of the concessive clause above is that ‘I DON'T CARE AT ALL whether you love me or you hate me’ or ‘I DON'T CARE AT ALL whether you believe or not.’ The clauses can be treated as variants of imperatives—instances almost entirely lacking force exertion. That this is the case can be shown by the addition of *please* or *do*:

(48) *Please*/do love me or hate me, but you are my daughter.
(49) *Please*/do believe it or not, she is my daughter.

As is evident from the oddity of (48) and (49), the speaker is not committed either to the addressee's act of 'loving me or hating me' or to the addressee's 'believing it.' Concessive imperatives like these simply classify as another instance in which an imperative is
postulated to occur around zero point on the proposed scale of force exertion.

It will be demonstrated below in chapter 4 that the analysis here will help characterize the evasive category of ‘pseudo-imperatives’ (cf. Lakoff 1966, Declerck and Reed 2001, Fillmore 1990) or ‘apparent imperatives’ (cf. Bolinger 1977) widely used to cover imperatives with stative predicates and/or those without overt force exertion.\textsuperscript{12}

\section*{2.5 Force Exertion and Different Illocutionary Acts}

As I have said above in 2.3, the notion of force exertion is an abstract notion intended to cover a variety of specific illocutionary acts. This section observes different illocutionary acts imperatives may perform, and then provides an idea of how some of these acts can be integrated into the scale of force exertion.

Quirk et al. (1985: 831-832), for example, enumerate the following illocutionary acts:

\begin{enumerate}[(50)a.]
\item ORDER, COMMAND
  \begin{itemize}
  \item Fire! [fire as verb]
  \item Make your bed at once.
  \end{itemize}
\item PROHIBITION
  \begin{itemize}
  \item Don’t touch.
  \end{itemize}
\item REQUEST
  \begin{itemize}
  \item Shut the door, please.
  \end{itemize}
\item PLEA
\end{enumerate}
Help!
e. ADVICE, RECOMMENDATION
   Take an aspirin for your headache.
   Lock the door before you go to bed.
f. WARNING
   Look out! Be careful! Mind your head!
g. SUGGESTION
   Ask me about it again next month.
   Let’s have a party.
h. INSTRUCTION
   Take the first street on the left.
i. INVITATION
   Make yourself at home.
   Come in and sit down.
j. OFFER
   Have a cigarette.
k. GRANTING PERMISSION
   Help yourself.
l. GOOD WISHES
   Enjoy your meal.
   Have a good time.
m. IMPRECATION
   Go to hell!
n. INCREDULOUS REJECTION
   Oh, come now. [‘You don’t really mean that.’]
o. SELF-DELIBERATION
Let me see now. ['Should I go straight home?']

They also note that imperative clauses followed by and or or may have a conditional implication, where the illocutionary force of the construction varies (ibid., 832 fn.):

(51)a. REQUEST
   Sit next to Joan and she’ll explain what you have to do.

b. PROMISE
   Finish your homework and I’ll give you some ice cream.
   Don’t make any noise and I’ll take you inside.

c. THREAT
   Make a move and I’ll shoot.
   Don’t make a move or I’ll shoot.

d. WARNING
   Join the committee and you’ll regret the waste of time.
   Don’t eat so much or you’ll be sorry.

Quirk et al are careful to note that precise distinctions are not always possible to make because “the illocutionary force depends on the relative authority of speaker and hearer and on the relative benefits of the action to each.” (ibid., 831).

More recently, Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 929-931) present the following sample of imperative utterances involving different illocutionary forces, although they admit that many of the examples here could be used in other ways than those suggested:
(52)a. ORDERS, COMMANDS, DEMANDS

Release all detainees!
Do as you’re told!
Keep off the grass.
Don’t move.

b. REQUESTS, PLEAS, ENTREATIES

Please help me tidy up.
Kindly lower your voices.
Open the door, will you?
Give me one more chance, I beg you.

c. ADVICE, RECOMMENDATIONS, WARNINGS

Keep your options open.
Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.
Wait until the price is right.
Mind the step.
Try your uncle, perhaps.

d. INSTRUCTIONS AND EXPOSITORY DIRECTIVES

Insert a cassette as illustrated with its labeled side facing you.
Take the first road on the right after the post office.
Compare these figures with those shown in Table 1 above.

e. INVITATIONS

Come over and see my etchings.
Bring your family too if you like.
Have some more soup.
f. PERMISSION

Yes, go ahead.

[Knock at the door] come in.

Yes, borrow it by all means.

g. ACCEPTANCE

Well, tell her if you want to—it’s all the same to me.

OK, buy it if you insist—it’s your money, after all.

Take it or leave it—it’s my final offer.

Huddleston and Pullum offer some useful guidelines for distinguishing these different illocutionary acts. Let me summarize them. With (a) orders, commands, and demands, compliance is required. With (b) requests, pleas, entreaties, compliance is not required. Categories (a) and (b) are both ‘willful directives,’ with the distinction gradient rather than categorical.

Next, advice, recommendations and warnings in (c) are a kind of non-willful directive; compliance is not for the speaker’s benefit but normally for the addressee’s. Instructions and expository directives (d) are also non-willful; compliance is primarily in the addressee’s interest. With invitations (e), the addressee can choose whether or not to accept, and doing so is primarily for his/her benefit. Invitations stand somewhere between the willful and non-willful categories. Permission (f) normally involves some action the addressee wants to do, and the speaker has the authority to permit or prohibit it; giving permission removes a potential obstacle. Finally,
acceptance is ‘the weakest kind of directive,’ and the speaker does not positively want compliance.

Huddleston and Pullum address the following rather special examples of acceptance, observing that “it is arguable that imperatives here have lost all directive force.” (2002: 931):

(53)a. Say what you like, it won’t make any difference.
   b. Double your offer: I still won’t sell.

They paraphrase these imperative utterances as concessive conditional statements—“Whatever you say, it won’t make any difference”; “Even if you double your offer, I still won’t sell.”

The figure below is not an exhaustive illustration, but it gives a rough sketch of how some representative illocutionary acts can be placed on the force exertion continuum.

---

**Figure 2–2: Force Exertion and Different Illocutionary Acts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE:</th>
<th>MINUS MAXIMUM</th>
<th>ZERO</th>
<th>MILD</th>
<th>PLUS MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;=1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON–PROTOTYPICAL</td>
<td>PROTOTYPICAL</td>
<td>ORDER</td>
<td>REQUEST</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INSTRUCTIONS/DIRECTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERMISSION/ACCEPTANCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CONCESSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

62
The idea of this figure is that there are differences in the degree of force within as well as across different illocutionary acts. On the one hand, orders and requests are normally greater in the strength of force than other acts such as recommendation, instructions, and permission if one disregards the nature of force. On the other, some orders, for example, are greater in the strength of force than other orders. In this regard, the recommendation as in (49c) *Keep your options open* or *Mind the step* seems greater in the exertion of force than other recommendations as in (52e) *Try your uncle, perhaps*. Illocutionary acts such as permission, instruction, and acceptance might be more ambiguous as to the degree of force, depending on the relative power relation of the speaker and hearer. Concessions stand around zero point on the continuum, in that imperatives seem to lack all directive force as Huddleston and Pullum suggest.

Before closing, let me mention one advantage of the perspective of this figure. A term like ‘warning’ is ambiguous since it implies both positive and negative force. To take one instance, Quirk et al (1985) classify the imperatives *Look out!*, *Be careful!*, or *Mind your head!* (50f) as ‘warnings,’ on the one hand, and *Join the committee and you’ll regret the waste of time* (51d) as ‘warning,’ on the other. The present framework helps clarify the difference. The ‘warning’ in (50f) is interpreted in
terms of strong positive force (=near plus maximum point), but those like (51d) in terms of some minus force (=between \([-1]\) and \([0]\)), where the speaker discourages the addressee from doing what is said.
Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to show the following points. First of all, the imperative can be characterized in terms of four features: hypotheticality, non-past, second-person and force exertion. The corresponding subjunctive and the infinitive share the first two features—hypotheticality and non-past. The second-person nature of the implicit subject as well as the wide range of force exertion represent two features unique to the imperative.

Next, an imperative is potentially ambiguous concerning the degree of force exertion, which can be viewed as constituting a continuum ranging from plus maximum [+1] to minus maximum [-1] including [0]. Force exertion is an abstract notion designated to accommodate different illocutionary forces of imperative utterances. Force is defined as psychosocial influence the speaker exerts on the addressee so that the latter is caused to do an action. In this sense, the force of an imperative becomes greater as there is stronger intention or volition on the part of the speaker to make the addressee realize the propositional content. The force of the imperative is prototypically strong but the force can be negatively exerted or completely lost in less prototypical or peripheral instances. From this perspective, a command or order is not an essential feature, but rather is a prototypical sense of an imperative occurring with strong force.
Notes to Chapter 2

1 Declerck and Reed (2001) distinguish between ‘factual’ and ‘closed’ conditionals, as demonstrated below in (i) and (ii) respectively. That is, a condition is ‘factual’ if it is known by the speaker (or the omniscient author) to be fulfilled, whereas a condition is ‘closed’ if it is known to be fulfilled on the basis of another speaker’s authority:

(i) (context: the speaker sees the milkman at the door)

*If the milkman is here, give him his money.

(ii) [“Mummy, the milkman’s here.”] — “If the milkman is here, give him his money.”

The unacceptability of the if-clause in (i) can be attributed to the fact that the speaker knows the condition to be a fact, hence s/he “cannot process a fact as a supposition” (Declerck and Reed 2001: 2).

2 Speakers of English generally find the utterance of (9) less acceptable than (8) because it deals with an actual event -- harder to see as a condition than the more generic and habitual situation in (8).
I am indebted to Paul Hopper for pointing out that the past setting does not have to be contained explicitly in the preceding utterance for this 'past' reading of an imperative.

These expressions might be treated as 'Space Builders' in the sense used in the Mental Space semantics (cf. Fauconnier 1985/1994).

Palmer remarks that "it may be best to restrict the term 'Imperative' to 2nd person forms and to use 'Jussive' for the others" (1986: 111). According to this criterion, while *Help me quick!* is an imperative, *Someone help me quick!* isn’t. In such a case, there seems no way to handle a case in which *Help me quick!* is issued with *someone* as a non-individuated subject in the speaker’s mind. Distinguishing between ontological third-person (REFERENT) and linguistic third-person (FORM) seems more useful; the form of imperative subjects such as *someone* and *all the boys* is in the third person, whereas the referent is in the second person.

Quite unlike emphatic attitudinals, the ‘non-emphatic’ attitudinal *just* is compatible with wider range. Thus, *just* not only occurs with strong force (*Just clean up this mess* or *Just hold your tongue*). Although the acceptability judgment of *just* accompanying an imperative varies among speakers of English, some judge the following ‘mild force’ imperatives as generally far better with *just* than *please* or *do*:
(i)a. Just sleep until noon, or it might also be a good idea to wake up early in the morning and take a shower.

(i)b. Just sleep until noon and you’ll feel better.

Threat is perfectly acceptable with just:

(i)c. Just do it and I’ll knock your head off.

Some (though not all) speakers find the following past-referring imperatives as acceptable:

(ii)a. In those days Tim was always hungry.

(?) Just give him a few dollars, and he was happy.

(ii)b. A: How was the party?

B: (?) Just turn up yesterday and you’d have had a real shock.

Just seems more flexible; the word tolerates a far wider range of force exertion.

I owe to Ronald Langacker the idea that the command may be viewed as a prototypical member of the imperative. The schematic sense of an imperative is also suggested by Palmer (1986: 29-30):
There is, moreover, a good case for arguing that the imperative is unmarked semantically as well.... The imperative seems to do no more than express, in the most neutral way, the notion that the speaker is favorably disposed toward the action.

Searle (1979: 13-14) presents the following three basic categories of illocutionary acts: illocutionary points, direction of fit and sincerity conditions. According this criterion, directives can be characterized in terms of (a) attempts (of varying degrees) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something (=illocutionary point), (b) world-towards (=the direction of fit), and (c) want (or wish or desire) (=sincerity condition). The present analysis of the imperative is basically compatible with this characterization of directives. However, the imperative seems more ambiguous than ‘directives’ as we have seen that this sincerity condition may be floated.

I am indebted to Suzanne Kemmer for this example. Throughout the following discussion, I will use the term ‘negative’ with a strictly interpretative meaning as distinguished from overt negation.
Needless to say, if the main verb is ask, demand, insist, invite, move, suggest, recommend or propose instead of request or advise, the pragmatic impact of the subjunctive will vary accordingly. In this respect, both the subjunctive and the infinitive are ambiguous—but only with respect to the nature, not the degree, of force. The strong force reading of the subjunctive/infinitive headed by these verbs can be ascribed to the fact that these verbs explicitly indicate a particular POSITIVE, as opposed to NEUTRAL or NEGATIVE, attitude on the part of a main-clause subject toward the action indicated by the subordinated clause.

To the extent that both stative and past imperatives function as (hypothetical) conditionals, they may be regarded as topic clauses (cf. Haiman 1978).

Bolinger remarks that the imperative Do that in the utterance of (i) produces a warning when it is issued with downmotion of intonation, whereas it becomes more like a plain condition when the downmotion is removed (1989: 153):

(i) Do that and you’re dead.
Such an observation suggests there might be a close correlation between the degree and kind of force exertion and the choice of intonation, an important topic meriting separate investigation.
Chapter 3

English Imperatives as a Category

In the previous chapter, I have characterized English imperatives in terms of four basic features, hypotheticality, non-past, second-person, and force exertion. Based on this analysis, this chapter will illustrate the way in which English imperatives can be characterized within the framework of currently available cognitive grammar. It will offer an image-schematic model of English imperatives, which affords a comprehensive definition of the prototype, as well as the schema, of the imperative. Next, I will demonstrate that this analysis permits a principled explanation of a few old problems pertaining to the compatibility between verb forms and imperatives in English that have resisted a unified account: imperatives with passive, perfect and progressive verbs. This chapter provides an answer for why some English imperatives in these verb forms strike us as more or less ungrammatical but may become acceptable in ‘appropriate’ contexts.

It will be demonstrated that cognitive grammar notions--notably the degree of force, image schemas, the prototype effect and constructions, are all useful in providing a unified treatment for these problems. The passive may occur in the imperative provided that the former and the latter are
conceptually compatible. It will be concluded that the imperative does not clash with the passive on syntactic terms but rather in terms of prototypes. The analysis above also permits a clear account of the problem with perfect and progressive verbs in imperatives.

3.1 Image-Schematic Models of the Imperative

The set of four features we have introduced in the previous chapter serve to distinguish clauses which classify as imperatives from those which do not. In this respect, this analysis appears to be descriptively accurate. However, it is not sufficient, in that it does not reveal anything about the relations between these features. For one thing, it does not explain how the force of the imperative correlates with the three other features of the imperative. Moreover, while it may make more sense to speak of degrees of ‘imperativeness’ with ‘better’ or ‘worse’ examples, an analysis of force exertion alone does not satisfactorily capture all the richness and varieties of the category of the imperative.

Let us look closely at each of the four features associated with the imperative. It seems evident that two features, hypotheticality and non-past, represent semantic notions which are ‘visible,’ in that they are morphologically coded by verbal inflection (i.e., the infinitive form). By comparison, the two
other features, second-person and force exertion, are notions considered ‘invisible,’ since these are mental notions not directly observable from the surface form unless overtly coded by attitudinal expressions (such as please or Tag questions) or explicit you subjects. This suggests that an adequate analysis of the imperative requires an integrated account of both visible and invisible semantic ingredients.

In order to better understand the imperative, I propose an ‘action chain model’ of this grammatical structure, which will be integrated into a ‘canonical event model’ (both introduced and developed in Langacker (1987; 1991; 1995; 2000), among others). This image-schematic analysis illustrates the way in which the four features of the imperative combine and interact with each other to comprise its entire semantic structure. In the next step, I proceed to providing a more comprehensive definition of exactly what it means for an imperative to be prototypical or non-prototypical. I contend that the rigorous parameters for the imperative will allow us to identify central cases and to explain the mechanisms relating the less central uses to the central ones.

Action Chain Model

Cognitive grammar work (such as Talmy 1988, Langacker (1987; 1991; 1995; 2000), inter alia) has repeatedly demonstrated the need for incorporating into linguistic research the conceptions of image-schemas and the relationships among them. In this view,
the semantic content of a given clause structure essentially resides in the conceptions of entities and their energetic interactions with respect to one another. Using one such model, which Langacker (1991: 283) labels as an action chain (or ‘billiard-ball’) model, we obtain the following portrayal (Figure 1) of the imperative with a transitive verb such as sentence (1):

(1) Call Sharon tonight.

As is standard practice, bold circles and arrows are used for profiled conceptions, and light ones for unprofiled conceptions. The idea is, i) The imperative is comprised of two separate (though interrelated) subevents, which combine to form a dynamic chain of actions; ii) The speaker and addressee both participate in this action chain as indispensable entities—the speaker as head, the addressee as a second entity engaged in further action; and iii) The imperative makes explicit only the addressee's action
and leaves implicit the two key entities; nor does it overtly
code the application of force unless otherwise stated.

This action chain analysis captures a few important facets of
the imperative, namely its second-person nature and force
exertion. However, the analysis is not capable of adequately
handling two other features: hypotheticality and non-past.
Moreover, it does not specify the semantic roles of participants
(speaker and addressee). A fuller characterization requires a
more elaborate and finely-grained model such as the 'canonical
event model' (cf. Langacker (1991: 285)).

Canonical Event Model
The canonical event model is a more elaborate model of clause
structure, which takes into account several semantic notions not
dealt with in the action chain model, namely, setting, semantic
role and viewer, as sketched in the figure below:
The idea of this figure is that the simplest transitive clause contains two participants which play semantic roles, agent and patient, respectively. These participants are engaged in a kind of energetic interaction in a specific conceptual domain called a 'setting' chosen to be highlighted by a conceptualizer. A transitive clause such as *John ate the apple in the kitchen*, where John acts as an agent and participates in an energetic interaction of eating an apple which is patient in the 'kitchen' setting, would be a straightforward illustration of this model.

To obtain a canonical event model of the imperative, let us first specify the *setting* and the *semantic roles* of participants. As for the setting, the first subevent is restricted to an extremely narrow speech situation, the here-and-now of speaking,
only populated by the speaker and addressee. It would be reasonable then to analyze this subevent as occurring in a deictic setting. On the other hand, the second subevent (or the addressee's action) is hypothetical in nature, regardless of whether or not the addressee's act will be realized in the objective world. For this reason, the second subevent may be treated as taking place in a hypothetical setting (or 'mental space').

Next, let us consider the speaker and addressee's semantic roles. To begin with, it would not be a gross oversimplification to regard the speaker and addressee as both agents, since both individuals are 'doers' after all, typically initiating a process, engaged in some volitional activity. It must be emphasized here that natural language affords multiple kinds of agency, and varying degrees of agency (cf. Delancey (1984; 1985)), and that the grammatical subject (or 'arguments' in general) may readily play more than one semantic role at once. Considering these factors, the speaker can be analyzed in terms of causer-agent, and the addressee in terms of causee-agent. The rationale behind this treatment is that in the prototypical scene of an imperative, the addressee is triggered to act or undergo a substantial change in state by the utterance of an imperative.

In light of these discussions, the canonical event model of the imperative would be something like the figure below:
This model incorporates, and refines, the action chain model in figure 1 above, by adding the notions of setting and semantic role. Two settings are assigned to two corresponding sub-events as indicated in the thin squares, where the addressee belongs in these two settings at once. The time of event 1 coincides with the time of utterance, and event 2 occurs only after event 1. It must be admitted that the figure appears to only illustrate the prototype command imperative; it only poorly portrays imperatives.
considered non-prototypical or peripheral. However, the spirit of the analysis here is essentially flexible in nature, capable of accommodating the whole range of uses—central cases as well as departures from the norm. Let me note that it does not matter much to the meaning of the imperative whether the addressee is actually in control of performing the designated action in the real world, as I have suggested in the previous chapter. The semantic import of the imperative can be equated with the *speaker’s conceptualization of* a series of events, in which his or her uttering the imperative acts on, and exerts social force to, the addressee. In some cases, the addressee may not be able to carry out what is said; nor is the designated proposition realizable in this world. This explains why one readily utters imperative sentences like *Get well soon!, Have a nice day!, Please don’t rain*. Understood this way, imperatives can more or less involve force depending on contexts. I treat the notion of force exertion as ultimately related to the degree of how much the speaker is seriously committed to the realization of the propositional content. In this respect, the force of the imperative is also intimately linked with the notion of ‘desirability’ (i.e., the speaker considers the propositional content as desirable, neutral, or undesirable), although this term is employed in subtly different senses by different linguists (cf. Akatsuka 1997, Clancy, Akatsuka, and Strauss 1998;
Before moving to the next section, it is worth mentioning here that the semantic structure of the imperatives illustrated above closely resembles that of English analytic causative constructions as discussed in Kemmer and Verhagen (1994) and Kemmer (2001). An analytic causative construction is structurally a complement construction, obligatorily containing two verbs, one dependent on the other, as exemplified in The movie made her cry. Kemmer (2001), for instance, conducts a comprehensive corpus-based analysis of English make causative constructions, thus identifying four recurrent patterns: experiential response make (How do you make a witch itch?), mechanical action make (they did what was needed to make the programme run), experienced perception make and body part experience make (You made me look ridiculous in there), and compulsion make (they made him pay back five pounds/My mother made me eat it). In particular, one finds an extremely interesting correlation in semantic structure between imperatives and compulsion make causatives, where the causers and the causees are human participants and the caused predicates are verbs that generally designate volitional events. Kemmer makes the following observation:

...all these examples describe a situation in which a human
entity exerts some social influence on another human, thus compelling the latter to carry out an action. Some volitionality has to be exerted by the causee to carry out the event, but it is clear that the action is not completely voluntary. By social force I mean that the causer has, by virtue of the social relation between him/her and the causee, the ability or power to get the causee to do the desired action, and exercises that power in initiating the causation. The power relation between the two participants is asymmetrical; the causer, if the caused event is to be realized, must be significantly more powerful... Further, for this compelled causation to occur, the causee has to understand what the causer wants him or her to do, and to know that not carrying out this action will lead to some undesirable consequence (at the very least, the displeasure of the causer). (Kemmer 2001: 820)

In fact, the types of verbs that most comfortably occur as complement verbs correspond to the types of verbs that tend to occur in prototypical imperatives. They include dynamic and volitional verbs such as obey (They kept passing laws and trying to make people obey) and marry (Please don’t make me marry him). In contrast, other ‘non-compulsion’ make patterns allow numerous non-volitional verbs to appear; included are itch, doubt, feel
good, feel like, shudder, chuckle, tick, tip down, among others, although they also contain volitional verbs like smile and laugh.

However, at least the following four peculiarities of the imperative should be mentioned as distinguished from compulsion make causatives. First, the causer and the causee are constrained to the speaker and the addressee, respectively, not other entities. Second, both the nature and degree of force is potentially ambiguous; the force of compulsion make is invariably both strong and compelling in nature. Third, and related to the first point, the designated event is restricted to the here-and-now of the speech situation. Finally, the power relation between causer and causee is only typically asymmetric; it can be symmetric. In fact, the causer can be less powerful than the causee in speech acts such as requests, pleas, and wishes.

3.2 The Prototype Imperative

From the discussions made so far, imperatives emerge as a category in the sense described in Rosch (1978) and Lakoff (1987). Researchers within the cognitive semantics tradition took seriously the role of categorization in linguistic structure. The first major advance was found in studies of lexical and morphological structures, as represented in such analyses as over (Brugman (1981; 1988)), the prepositions up and out in phrasal verbs (Lindner 1982), the verbs lie (Coleman and Kay 1981) and
take (Norvig and Lakoff 1987), the English suffix –er (Ryder 1991), modal auxiliaries (Sweetser 1990), the genitive morpheme (Nikiforidou 1991), among others. As Langacker clearly puts it,

A lexical item of frequent occurrence displays a substantial, often impressive variety of interrelated senses and conventionally sanctioned usages; its set of established values can be regarded as a complex category, ...” (1987: 370).

The categorization approach led to a theory of lexical networks, which deals with a lexical item as a structured set of minimally differing senses, with more central and non-central cases comprised of a small number of sub-types; it affords a better understanding of why the same word or morpheme can be used to express different concepts (cf. Lakoff 1987, Norvig and Lakoff 1987).

In recent years, we have witnessed a growing number of works extending the categorization analysis to the realm of larger linguistic structures, as conducted in studies of complex sentence structures (Sweetser 1990), conditionals (Dancygier (1993; 1998)), English double object constructions (Goldberg 1995), participial constructions and sentences with the verb have (Hayase 2002). It is revealed in Sweetser (1990) and Dancygier (1998), for instance, that different uses of conditionals are
linked with each other, with content (or predictive) use considered more prototypical and epistemic, speech-act, or metatextual less prototypical.

By the same token, different uses of imperatives may be central or less central examples of the category. While various senses may be connected by common resemblance to more central cases, the divergent interpretations of imperative structures have a common core. They are hypothetical, second-person, non-past, as well as expressive of (varying degrees of) force exertion. Based on the image-schematic analysis of the imperative’s semantic structure, I can define the prototypical imperative as follows:

(2) The prototype imperative
   i. The speaker exerts a high (near [+1]) directive force in a deictic setting toward the addressee, who will thereby perform an action in a hypothetical setting.
   ii. The speaker plays the semantic role of causer-like agent, and the addressee causee-like agent.

More generally, the model in figure 3 defines the schematic imperative as in (3) below:

(3) The schematic imperative
   i. The speaker exerts a varying degree of force (ranging from
(+1) to [-1]) in a deictic setting toward the addressee, who will thereby be engaged in a certain situation in a hypothetical setting.

ii. The speaker and addressee may play an agentive as well as non-agentive role.

That is, there is intention/volition on the part of the speaker to cause the addressee(s) of an imperative to make the propositional content true, and the pressure/force can be more or less strong, and positively as well as negatively exerted (cf. chapter 2.3). One obvious advantage of the imperative event model is that it captures the complete range of the four features of English imperatives discussed in chapter 2 in a more integrated manner.

In attempting a formulation of a prototype of any construction, it is always a problem to determine which properties to take into consideration. In table 3.1 below, I have tried to account for as broad a range of data as possible in terms of the minimum number of properties. Based on figure 3.3 and the description in (2) above as well as insights from previous research, we can isolate the component parts constituting the notion of imperative prototypicality, identifying the following three major parameters, some of which suggest a scale according to which imperative clauses can be ranked:
Table 3-1: Overall Parameters for Imperative Prototypes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. FORCE</th>
<th>&lt;PROTOTYPICAL&gt;</th>
<th>&lt;NON-PROTOTYPICAL&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. DEGREE OF FORCE:</td>
<td>(near)[+1]</td>
<td>lower than (near)[+1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. NATURE OF FORCE:</td>
<td>directive</td>
<td>non-directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. SUBJECT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. SEMANTIC ROLE:</td>
<td>agentive</td>
<td>non-agentive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Identity:</td>
<td>individuated</td>
<td>non-individuated/generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. BENEFIT:</td>
<td>speaker</td>
<td>addressee &gt; others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the most obvious association between the imperative and the notion of force, the degree of force (in row Ai) can be taken as the primary parameter in the assessment of imperative prototypicality. As could be expected, the features in the rows are to a large extent interrelated. Strong force (prototypical in row Ai), for example, tends to covary with agency (prototypical in row B), which is also likely to covary with the speaker’s benefit (prototypical in row C), as in Get up and go or Just hold your tongue. Conversely, zero force tends to covary with lack of agency and the generic addressee, as in exemplified in Give a dog a bad name (and he’ll live up to it). This does not mean, however, that the values necessarily covary within a given imperative. Zero force (non-prototypical in row Ai), for
instance, may covary with non-agentive (non-prototypical in row Bi) as well as agentive subject (prototypical in the same row):

(i) Imperatives are atypical when the speaker's force is non-directive (or mixed with other kinds of force). In line with our pretheoretical conception of the imperative, I treat cases of the absence of force as most deviant from the norm, hence peripheral, and cases of negative force as more non-prototypical than peripheral.

(ii) When the subject is a non-agent such as an experiencer, theme or patient, or when the understood subject is generic as in Shake before using, the imperative progressively deviates from its norm. Highly agentive events better fit the image schema of prototype imperatives than states as in Be sick (and they'll put you in bed).

(iii) Imperatives are more typical when the fulfillment of the proposition benefits the speaker, which is normally the case with a command or order. Imperatives are considered less typical when the action benefits entities other than the speaker. To take an instance of request, the action normally benefits the addressee rather than the speaker.

Consider:

(4)a. [parent to child]
Clean up this mess right now./ Just hold your tongue.

b. [host to guest]
   Please sit down.

c. [between two strangers]
   A: Excuse me. Do you know where Starbucks is?
   B: Go straight ahead three blocks.

d. [between coworkers in casual conversation]
   Regional accents can be a problem. Put a proper Bostonian
   on the phone with a Texas oilman and here comes mis-
   communication.

e. [teacher to student]
   Bring alcohol to school and you'll be suspended.

f. [between two persons in a strong argument]
   Say that again! (I’ll punch you in the nose.)

The imperative clauses here are arranged in decreasing order of
force exertion in their preferred readings, beginning with more
prototypical cases (i.e., strong (=around plus maximum) force)
and moving down to less prototypical cases (i.e., ‘weaker’
(=lower than plus maximum) force).

To illustrate an idea of the present analysis, the figure
below locates each imperative utterance in (4) above at different
points on the scale of force exertion portrayed in figure 2-1 in
chapter 2.
All that this figure is intended to show is that these imperatives differ as to the degree of force in their primary interpretations, and hence can be postulated to occur at different points on the force exertion continuum. It does not imply that one can identify the exact (numerical) value of the force of each imperative (cf. chapter 2.3). Nor does the placement of these imperative clauses suggest that *Just hold your tongue* (4a), for example, is invariably stronger in force than *Go straight ahead three blocks* (4c), or that *Say that again* (4f) should be located near minus maximum point regardless of context. Each imperative clause can move up and down the scale, according to the speaker’s communicative goal, i.e., how much the speaker wants the designated event to happen in a specific utterance.

Given the set of parameters above, we are in a position to offer a full characterization of each example of imperative utterance—in terms of the degree of ‘imperativeness’ against the
background of the prototype. The imperative in (4a), uttered from parent to child, represents the ‘best’ example of imperative, satisfying almost all the three criteria: the force is both directive and strong, the whole sentence deals with an event, with an individuated, agentive subject. The action seems to benefit the speaker (as well as the addressee), although all this depends on the specific purpose of the utterance. The imperative in (4b) is also prototypical, involving strong force, though this is not the ‘very best member’, since the illocutionary act is one of request or suggestion, which is categorized as non-directive force. In addition, the designated situation normally concerns the addressee’s benefit more than the speaker’s. Moving down, the imperative in (4c), giving directions, begins to depart from the imperative prototype, in that force is (if any) only mildly exerted; (non-prototypical in column Ai). The action is clearly in the interest of the addressee, not the speaker.

Probably more deviant from the norm is (4d), which is the closest synonym to the conditional If you put a proper Bostonian on the phone with a Texas oilman, here comes miscommunication. This use of the imperative ranks very low in all the columns. Crucially, the clause hardly involves any force in that the speaker is not requesting the addressee(s) to carry out what is said. Rather, this imperative describes a (supposed) situation, and the addressee is construed as more generic than individuated, although put is normally a verb of volition, hence some agency is
involved. In addition, the action does not seem to benefit anybody. Overall, example (4d) stands in the periphery of the category of the imperative, on the grounds that the clause classifies as a radical departure from the imperative prototype in most properties. In certain languages like Japanese, the idea of this sentence is far better conveyed by a temporal or conditional sequence (cf. chapter 5).

Next, the imperative in (4e) is ambiguous between straight condition (the absence of force) and warning (minus force), hence non-prototypical in column A. If interpreted as a warning, the imperative occurs at a minus point, hence negative force. The speaker's intent is to discourage the addressee from performing what is said. The action is not in the interest of the speaker; nor does it benefit the addressee—on the contrary. Finally, (4f) lies somewhere near the minus maximum point. This imperative is used as a dare/threat. Context makes it apparent that carrying out the designated action will result in an extremely undesirable consequence especially for the addressee. To the extent that the force is negatively strong, this imperative utterance can also be considered a non-prototypical use.

3.3 English Imperatives in the Passive
The definition of imperative prototypes helps explain the contrastive acceptability of English imperatives in the passive form such as those in (5) and (6) below:

(5)a. *George, be taken to church by your sister.
   b. *Be helped by Jill.

(6)a. Be checked over by a doctor, then you'll be sure there's nothing wrong.
   b. Be flattered by what he says, it'll make his day.

Many scholars have pointed out that passives with be occur more frequently in negative imperatives than positive (cf. Quirk et al 1985: 827), but I focus on positive imperatives in be-passives here.

It is well established that an active clause more readily passivizes if it is more transitive, i.e., when the patient is directly affected by the activity in question (Bolinger 1977, Hopper and Thompson 1980, Shibatani 1985, Rice 1987b, Langacker 1991, inter alia). In this connection, most previous works on passives are in general agreement concerning the following three points. First, the passive critically involves an agent (or something close to it such as an experiencer), which is invariably ‘defocused’ either syntactically or lexically (Shibatani (1985: 832)). Second, the passive with be is in principle more static than its active counterpart, although this
does not mean that the *be*-passive only refers to a state (cf. Givón (1981; 1990)). Third, the subject tends to be a patient (cf. Jespersen 1924, Givón (1981; 1990)). Taking these findings into account, I suggest the following as the prototype:

(7) The prototype passive

i. The subject is *directly affected* by an *external agent*.

ii. The subject plays the semantic role of *patient*.

Now, we obtain the following parameters for passive prototypicality, according to which passive clauses can be ranked.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-2: Overall Parameters for Passive Prototypes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. SUBJECT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>patient</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. AFFECTEDNESS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. DEFOCUSED PARTICIPANT</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The values in these three parameters are intimately interrelated. The subject's *patienthood* (in row A), the defocused participant's *agency* (in row C) and overall *affectedness* (in row B) normally go
hand in hand; one almost automatically follows from another, since the prototypical patient is a participant absorbing the energy transmitted from without and thereby undergoing a change in state (cf. Langacker (1991: 285)). Conversely, the passive departs from the prototype when the subject is not a prototypical patient, when the defocused participant might be viewed as an experiencer rather than an agent, or when relatively less affectedness is involved in the designated situation. Compare the following passives with human subjects:

(8a) She was taken to a hospital. (prototypical)
    b. She is well liked (by everyone). (non-prototypical)
    c. ?I was approached by the tram.

(8a) constitutes a paradigm example of passive, in which the subject entity is moved to a different location, which means that the subject is a patient, directly affected by the action via the force transmitted from an external agentive source. (8b) exhibits a non-prototypical passive; the subject is a non-patient, the defocused entity (everyone) seems an experiencer, and no substantial effect is produced. (8c) without context strikes us as somewhat bizarre because the sentence deviates extremely from the 'PATIENT DIRECTLY AFFECTED (BY AGENT)' schema characterizing the passive prototype; it only deals with the geometry of two positions.\[^6\]
Careful examination of the parameters of imperatives in table 3-1 and those of passives in table 3-2 above reveals a serious incompatibility between the imperative prototype and the passive prototype. Crucially, the semantic role of imperative subjects and that of passive subjects differ. Prototype imperatives demand an agentive subject, whereas passives prefer a patient. Agent and patient are normally two mutually exclusive semantic roles. Less seriously, the degree of dynamicity is different. The imperative prefers a dynamic reading, whereas the passive with be inherently stativizes the conception of the event, although be-passives may also vary in the degree of dynamicity.\footnote{7}

Now, we come up with the following working hypothesis:

(9) **Hypothesis**

The passive construction does not clash with the imperative syntactically but on conceptual grounds, i.e., the clash occurs between prototypes.

The data in (5) substantiate this claim. A semantic conflict occurs between the 'ideal' imperative vs. the 'ideal' passive. A linguistic construction has a strong tendency to evoke its most natural reading in isolated contexts, i.e., its prototype. Interpreted as a passive, the subject of the construction *Be taken to church by your sister* should be a patient. Interpreted as an imperative, however, it should be an agent. The subject
slot in (5a) demands both a patient and an agent at the same time, two semantic roles which are normally at odds with each other. In addition, the lexical content increases the conflict. An individual who is taken to church by another individual is interpreted as a participant close to prototypical patient, since s/he is physically affected by an external source such as an agent (by your sister). That is, the sentence lexically evokes the ‘PATIENT AFFECTED BY AGENT’ schema characteristic of prototype passives. Overall, the prototypicality of passives is both constructionally and lexically emphasized here (cf. Goldberg 1995, Rice 1987b). A similar account holds for (5b) as well.

Next, let us consider why the passive imperatives in (6a) and (6b) are better-formed. Previous work employed the notion of '(self)controllability' (Davies 1986) or 'willfulness' (Bolinger 1977). Note that controllability and willfulness are among central conceptions constituting the notion of agency. The approach followed in the present work naturally incorporates these pragmatic accounts. In fact, the present analysis will succeed where previous accounts fail, as later discussions will reveal.

As we have observed, the passive and the imperative do not readily merge, since the two constructions share very few characteristics in their prototypes. In (6a), however, the lexical content along with contextual assist serves to alleviate the conflict. While an individual who is examined by a doctor
appears to involve little agency, the additional context provided by the subsequent clause *you'll be sure there's nothing wrong* makes it apparent that the addressee is advised to act, i.e., to see a doctor with a clear purpose--for a checkup. S/he will not be forced to be examined; s/he *chooses to* act on his/her own will instead, which means that a great deal of agency is supplied contextually. Similarly, (6b) is best paraphrased as 'Try/Appear to be flattered...,' a reading suggestive of agency, although *be flattered* itself is not an action and the state of being flattered is not something that can intentionally be brought about. Viewed as passives, therefore, both (6a) and (6b) are non-prototypical in that the subject is not a straight patient in (6a) or not a patient at all in (6b); it is an active agentive patient in the former and a subtly agentive experiencer in the latter.

Viewed as imperatives, (6a) and (6b) might classify as near-prototype and non-prototype, respectively. (6a) can be treated as near-prototypical (if not prototypical) because the imperative evokes a conceptual structure close to the "FORCE-CAUSES-AGENT-TO-ACT" schema characterizing the imperative prototype. (6b) departs somewhat more from the prototype than (6a) in that the force/pressure seems not so strong as in (6a), with the subject's agency only subtly implied. Besides, *(try/appear to) be flattered* does not describe a physical action but an emotional experience. In a nutshell, both (6a) and (6b) are acceptable on
the grounds that non-prototypical exemplars of passives are acceptable within near-prototypical or non-prototypical uses of imperatives.

Not surprisingly, even in cases when be-passives are perfectly acceptable, speakers of English prefer to use get-passives if available:

(10) Get checked over by a doctor, then you'll be sure there's nothing wrong.

Here the intrinsic dynamicity and agency of get (cf. Givón and Yang (1993: 139)) makes the get-passive far better conform to the conception of the imperative, a construction which favors an active, (causee-like) agent subject.

Groups A, B and C below list at least three distinct patterns in which passives fare well with imperatives. Interpreted as passives, all the examples in these groups are non-prototypical, predominantly with an experiencer subject, except for (6a) and probably (14), imperatives with patient-like subjects. In most examples, the passive imperatives more or less deal with mental, (as opposed to physical) states, and not much affectedness is involved. Interpreted as imperatives, the three groups exhibit varying degrees of deviation from the prototype. Recall that imperative prototypicality is determined by three factors: the nature/degree of force (row A), the agency/identity of the
subject (row B), and dynamicity (row C) (cf. Table 3-1). Group A roughly satisfies all the three (hence, near-prototypical), Group B to a lesser extent (hence, non-prototypical) and Group C almost none (hence, peripheral). Group A includes set phrases such as (11) and negative forms like (12), cases frequently pointed out in the previous literature:

Group A: near-prototypical imperatives & non-prototypical passives

(6a)

(11) Be prepared./ Be warned.

(12) Don't be fooled by his act./Don't be taken in by the doctor, he's really a quack.

On the one hand, the examples in Group A exhibit near-prototypical imperatives, since they involve a strong, directive force causing the subject to act or behave in a certain way, although the conceived situation is not strictly an action in the truest sense of the word. On the other hand, the sentences in this group represent non-prototype passives, since the subject is not obviously a patient; nor is there much affectedness involved. Note that the don't form in (12), for example, greatly reduces the subject's patienthood, as compared to its affirmative counterpart, and instills a great deal of agency. All this means
is that non-central instances of the passive merge successfully with the near-prototype imperative.

The examples in Groups B and C present a serious challenge to previous pragmatic accounts, since they contain cases in which the imperatives are perfectly well-formed without involving any 'controllability' or 'willfulness.' Group B is comprised of two subgroups, in both of which the passive imperative needs contextual assistance to be fully acceptable. In the two acceptable sentences of (13) and (14), for example, the passive imperative generally occurs immediately after an ordinary command imperative:

Group B: non-prototypical imperative & non-prototypical passive

(6b)

(13)a. Oh, come on; be taken in just once - it isn't going to hurt you; do you think you're perfect?
[Bolinger 1977: 167]
b. Be impressed by his stamp collection if you want him to like you! [Dixon 1994: 132]

(14)a. Come to Palm Court and be entertained by Joe Loss and his orchestra! [Dixon 1994: 132]
a'. ?Be entertained by Joe Loss and his orchestra!
b. Come to my office, be amazed at the mess I've made.
b'. ?Be amazed at the mess I've made.
Viewed as passives, all the italicized examples in Group B are non-prototypical, exactly like Group A. As we have observed above concerning (6b), the passive imperative here involves an experiencer subject engaged in a nonphysical (mental) situation. To take an instance of (14a), the addressee is hardly conceptualized as a patient; s/he might be affected--but only mentally or emotionally, as suggested in the likely paraphrase *Come to Palm Court and ENJOY Joe Loss and his orchestra!*. Viewed as imperatives, the clauses in question are also non-prototypical. However, the examples in (6b) and (13) and those in (14) exhibit differing degrees of non-prototypicality. The second subgroup is more deviant than the first. The imperatives in (6b) and (13) contain positive force, which seems exerted to cause the addressee to behave on his/her own will. To take an instance of *Be impressed by his stamp collection* in (13b), the immediately following if-clause suggests that the speaker asks the hearer to pretend to be impressed, a reading implying deliberate action, i.e., agency. In this respect, the subject retains control over the proposed act/situation, although *be impressed* itself is a state, and not something that can intentionally be brought about.

In contrast, the sense of agency greatly decreases in (14). The italicized passive imperative conveys not so much a command as an outcome assumed to result from the action designated in the immediately preceding imperative. The passive imperative here, which might be termed ‘consequent imperative,’ does not involve
any sense of controllability or willfulness, since the addressee is incapable of choosing to be entertained or amazed. Quite unlike (13b), the hearers/readers are not asked to pretend to be entertained or be amazed either; rather, they are simply asked to visit so that they will be entertained or amazed. In such a case, the subject is hardly construed in terms of active, agentive entity. Nevertheless, a positive force still seems present, since the speaker is attempting to cause the hearer(s) to visit and be entertained or amazed. In this respect, the imperatives in (14) depart more from the prototype than those in (6b) and (13). Despite this difference in agency, the two subgroups might appropriately be subsumed under the rubric of non-prototypical imperatives in the important respect that the imperative contains a mild or weak, as opposed to strong, force. All the passive imperatives in Group B fare well precisely because imperatives and passives divert considerably from their respective prototype.

Finally, Group C remains a non-prototypical passive with an experiencer subject. As an imperative, however, this group departs farther from the prototype than Group B. While more than one reading is possible, the imperatives in (15a) and (15b) may obtain a purely hypothetical, conditional (IF-THEN) reading, a reading without any notion of force or agency at all:

Group C: peripheral imperative & non-prototype passive
(15)a. Be pleased to see him, you'll make his day.
b. Be impressed by his stamp collection, you will make his day.

The examples in Group C suggest that the imperative may permit a non-agentive, experiencer subject without containing any causal force only when it borders on the periphery. As a result, no serious conceptual conflict occurs in the merger between the imperative and the passive.

It will be observed in chapter 5 below that passive imperatives are on the whole similarly constrained in Japanese, although the language is equipped with multiple imperative forms behaving differently with respective to passives.

3.4 English Imperatives with Perfect and Progressive Verbs

The perfect verb is a verb form generally considered most incompatible with the imperative. Sentences (16) below are simply ungrammatical:

(16)a. *Have checked the facts.

   b. *Have prepared it.

Early generative grammar work (cf. Lees 1964, Akmajian, Steele and Wasow 1979) posits a strict rule which prohibits the use of
perfect verbs in imperatives. However, Bolinger (1977) and Davies (1986) present data showing that such restriction is far from absolute:

(17)a. Do have checked the facts before you start accusing the people.
   b. For heaven’s sake have prepared the thing in advance—an impromptu performance just won’t work.
   [Davies 1986: 16]

(18)a. Please, do have made that call by six o’clock.
   b. Please, do have made the effort at least once!
   c. Do have given some thought to the question, once you’ve decided to discuss it.
   [Bolinger 1977: 170]

Bolinger observes that the forms please and don’t (rather than do) generally serve to improve the acceptability of otherwise unacceptable perfect imperatives, and that the restriction may relate to accent (rather than time) since the imperative needs accent, which can be attached to the emphatic attitudinal.

First, let us discuss why the imperative does not readily permit the perfect verb in the first place. The present perfect tense is sometimes described as referring to ‘past with present relevance.’ More formally, “perfect sentences locate a situation prior to Reference Time. They have a stative value; and they
ascribe to the subject a property based on participation in the prior situation” (Smith 1994: 242), which leads us to obtain the following characterization:

(19) The semantic import of present perfect verbs:

The present perfect verb in its naked form normally locates a designated event at a time prior to the time of utterance.

In view of this, the bare have+V-ed form, unless otherwise specified, locates a designated situation at a time PRIOR TO the time of speaking, although this situation is seen as continuing in effect into the present. The perfect imperative in (16) above therefore sounds as if the addressee is ordered to begin, and complete, the act of ‘checking the facts’ PRIOR TO the utterance time of this sentence--a conception which directly contradicts the non-past feature of the imperative, since as we have repeatedly observed, the (prototypical) imperative locates the designated event POSTERIOR to the utterance time. If this analysis is correct, the awkwardness of (16) is mainly attributed to the understood time of the event. In simple terms, the imperative should be non-past in reference, while the perfect refers to a past time; *Have checked the facts is a bad sentence for much the same reason that *Check the facts yesterday is bad.

Next, while not all speakers of English share the acceptability judgments made by Davies, the sentences in (17) are
at least more natural-sounding than (16). For those speakers who find sentence (17) to be more felicitous, it is obvious that the added linguistic materials serve to remove the conceptual incongruity mentioned above. In (17a), for instance, the before-clause conjoins. In general, present-tense before clauses serve as future markers, when main clauses do not explicitly specify their temporal orientation; witness the impact of the before clause in (20b) below, especially where the main clause reads more in terms of future than habitual—a reading not readily obtainable in (20a):

(20)a. Stocks of food cannot be brought in.

b. Stocks of food cannot be brought in before the rains start.

I claim that this future marking function of before clauses is in operation in sentence (17a) above. The before contributes a sense of implied future reference, a conception more faithful to the ‘non-past’ feature of the imperative. This switching operation in reference time accounts for the elimination of the gross incompatibility of imperatives with perfect verbs.

While this shift in viewpoint to future remains the key factor in the improved acceptability, adverbials indicative of temporal bounding are not the only remedy. In (17b), the immediately preceding an imromptu performance just won’t work
makes it apparent that the imperative clause deals with a future situation as detached from the present moment of speaking. Communicators understand that the addressee is advised to both start and complete the act of preparation—not prior to, but AFTER the utterance, a conception which is more compatible with the imperative. A similar account holds for Bolinger’s examples in (18), in which the same effect of temporal adverbial phrases and clauses by six o’clock, at least once, or the once clause accounts for the improved acceptability.\textsuperscript{11}

If this analysis is correct, the ungrammaticality of sentences (16) can be explained in terms of another conceptual clash—the normal conception of perfect verbs vs. that of imperative constructions. The improved acceptability in (17) and (18) might be ascribed directly to the departure of present perfect verbs from their normal temporal orientation.

Next, English imperatives with progressive verbs do not look as ill-formed as those with perfect verbs. As a matter of fact, it is not particularly hard to make up appropriate contexts in which progressive imperatives naturally occur; Davies (1986) offers the following examples:

(21)a. Be waiting on the corner at six.

b. Be working hard when she comes in—then she will be impressed.

c. Don’t be messing about when the bell rings.
However, the reason the progressive version Be waiting or Be working hard in its naked form does not look just as good as its simple tense form Wait or Work hard needs clarification.

Previous work on English aspectual system has revealed that the progressive form in English (in the majority of uses) focuses on an interval, as opposed to the whole, of a durative, non-stative situation that includes neither the initial nor final endpoints of the situation (Smith 1994: 222-226). In plain terms, “the progressive refers to the middle of the situation while disregarding its beginning and (possible) end,” (Declerck 1991: 273), although it may connote dynamism and volition (Smith 1994: 222). Langacker (1991) proposes rigorous cognitive grammar definitions of the semantic import of the verb be and the participial –ing; that is, –ing converts a process into an atemporal relation, whereas be retemporalizes the participial predication (1991: 91); the progressive as a whole is characterized as imperfective (or unbounded in time) because “the profiled relationship is portrayed as stable through time” (1991: 92). Integrating all these, we come up with the following:

(22) The semantic import of progressive verbs:

The progressive form normally designates an interval of a durative situation that is unbounded in time.
Given this, one may say that progressives do not seriously contradict the meaning of imperatives; in fact, the implied dynamicity and volitionality as Smith observes is the kind of conception favored by the imperative. If there is a problem, it pertains primarily to the lack of boundedness, and secondarily to the absence of future reference. Languages are equipped with a number of means for conceptually bounding otherwise unbounded events (Talmy 1988: 189), and a variety of items may serve to bound a set of unbounded events designated in progressive forms. Thus, the adverbial at six temporally bounds the addressee’s durational activity of ‘be waiting,’ the prepositional phrase on the corner also bounds the event with respect to physical space, if not temporally. Likewise, two when-clauses, when she comes in and when the bell rings, bound the otherwise unbounded events to concrete moments in implicit future time. Why is the conception of boundedness more explicitly needed for progressive imperatives? Recall the semantic structure of the imperative as portrayed in figure 3 above, where the speaker’s force exertion and the addressee’s resultant action combine to form a dynamic chain of actions. In order to clearly order, and delineate, the causing event from the caused event, such a causal construal should prefer discrete (i.e., temporally bounded) events to non-discrete (i.e., unbounded). Imperative with simple verbs are generally bounded; they more readily imply the beginning of the action.
Compare the examples in (23) below, which suggest that the boundedness of participating events seems more stringently required in (analytic) causative constructions, as evidenced in the general unacceptability of be progressive verbs:

(23)a. *The movie made her be crying.
b. *The heat of the summer will make the rice be growing.
c. *I cannot let sentiment be entering into business.
d. *I had him be typing my letter.

Davies in effect points out the importance of such bounding operation when she observes that the added material here “allows the speaker to tell the addressee, not merely to do something, but to be in the processing of doing it at some particular moment” (1986: 15-16, italics mine). Once the (durational) activity is restricted to a concrete time (in the future), the progressive begins to fare well in the imperative.

It must be stressed, however, that not any temporal adverbial can do the job as is sometimes assumed; adverbials only indicative of vague or undifferentiated time spans (as opposed to specific moments) do not render the sentences fully felicitous:

(24)a. ?Be waiting on the corner some day/in the future.
b. ?Be working hard next semester — then she will be impressed.
c. ?Be playing the piano *for two hours*.

Adverbials denoting repetitive habits are not fully adequate either:

(25)a. ?Be working hard when you feel like it.
   
   b. ?Be calling me whenever you are in trouble.

All these examples show that adverbials of loose temporal bounding do not improve the acceptability of imperatives with progressive verbs.

Next, let me note that the bounding operation can also be achieved by the overall discourse instead of, or in addition to, temporal adverbial phrases/clauses:

(26) You want to see Professor Gates? That’s easy. Be watching the door, his class finishes at 10.

Here, the preceding and following clauses jointly bound the addressee’s act together with implied future reference.

Finally, as Quirk et al (1985) observe, progressive imperatives occur more often in negative form than in positive:

(27)a. Don’t be begging for money here.
   
   b. Don’t be bothering me.
   
   c. Don’t be kissing up to the boss.
This hardly comes as a surprise if we consider that negative imperatives generally involve strong force (cf. chapter 2), and that the sentences here may be paraphrased as “(Do something to the effect so that as a result) you are not begging for money, bothering me, or kissing up to the boss.” Cases like these can be neatly explained under the “RESULT-FOR-ACTION” metonymic inference, in the sense introduced in Panther and Thornburg 2000; that is, the action component (Do something) is inferentially interpreted via the resultant situation expressed in the imperative (you are not begging for money) (cf. chapter 4).

In a nutshell, progressive imperatives with don’t contain more boundedness and agency, a conception which fits in well with the prototypical imperative.
Summary

In this chapter, I have demonstrated the way in which English imperative can be characterized within the framework of cognitive grammar, by using the notions of image schemas and prototypes. As a result, I have obtained an integrated characterization of how the four features (hypotheticality, non-past, second-person, and force exertion) combine to constitute the semantic structure of the imperative, and have come up with a precise definition of the imperative prototype. According to this analysis, the prototype imperative involves a construal in which a speaker exerts a high degree of directive force in a deictic setting toward the addressee, who will thereby perform an action in a hypothetical setting; the speaker plays the semantic role of causer agent, and the addressee causee agent. More generally, in the schematic imperative, the speaker is exerting a varying degree (ranging from +1 to −1) of (either directive or non-directive) force in a deictic setting toward the addressee, who will thereby be engaged in a certain situation in a hypothetical setting; the speaker and addressee may play an agentive as well as non-agentive role.

Next, I have suggested that this analysis permits a principled treatment of both felicitous and infelicitous passive imperatives as well as subsuming important insights from previous syntactic and pragmatic accounts. The main point of the analyses
made here is that passives and imperatives clash in their prototypical conceptual structure but become conceptually compatible if they are used in a non-prototypical or peripheral sense. The once alleged 'syntactic' restriction can be viewed as the result of a mismatch between the prototypical conception of passives and that of imperatives.

Moreover, this chapter has offered a precise account of both felicitous and infelicitous imperative sentences with perfect and progressive verbs. Both perfect and progressive imperatives strike us as somewhat odd unless supplemented with appropriate linguistic materials or contextual assistance, because neither perfect nor progressive verbs per se completely harmonize with imperatives in conceptual terms.
Notes to Chapter 3

1 The viewer is omitted here because this notion does not concern the problem under investigation.

2 Within the framework of mental space theory (Fauconnier 1985/1994), an imperative would be analyzed in terms of a space builder, which evokes a hypothetical space containing a variety of entities including the addressee, and the parent space is a deictic space. Crucially, the actor in the hypothetical space corresponds to the addressee in the parent space. I believe the analysis in figure 3 is fully compatible with, and incorporates, this mental space analysis. I thank Arie Verhagen and Joseph Tomei for suggesting to me the implication of the present model for mental space semantics.

3 The case of double roles here is crucially different from the cases discussed by Schlesinger (1989), or Jackendoff (1990) where argument is assigned an action role and a thematic role in the same event. Rather, it is closer to the cases of causative predicates having a composite argument structure (cf. Alsina 1992), in which the causee is the patient of the causing event and the agent (and others) of the caused event.

4 Pérez Hernandez and Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) make succinct analyses of a variety of indirect directive speech acts within the framework of cognitive linguistics. By introducing a general type of knowledge organization
structure, which they term as 'propositional ICMs,' comprised of such parameters as cost-benefit, optionality, and power, together with the notions of scenario, metonymy, and metaphor, they examine issues including the prototype degrees of the constructions used to convey them and their image-schematic basis and cognitive motivation. On this account, Can you get me a cup of coffee? (interrogative) and Bring me a cup of coffee right now (imperative) differs not only as to the degree of strength of obligation involved but also as to the degree of optionality conveyed. The use of the interrogative clause type yields a higher level of optionality than the use of the imperative. They maintain the following (2002: 271):

What is of major importance to our purposes, however, is the fact that attributes like weak or strong are being applied to speech acts in the first place... Nevertheless, it seems plausible to posit that part of their conceptual make-up does have a preconceptual grounding in the force image-schema, which is evidenced metaphorically. We make use of our knowledge about forces to understand the effect that our directive speech acts can have on our addressees, and therefore, just as forces display degrees of strength, so do directive speech acts.

This analysis is closely similar in spirit to the approach of the present work, in that the notion of degrees is integrated into the force involved in indirect directive speech acts. In fact, their image-schematic
representations of a variety of speech acts including order, request, permission, threats, begging, among others are extremely useful in differentiating between different kinds of force conveyed in imperatives as well.

5 The stativizing function of *be*-passives is not integrated here because it is something inherent rather than a matter of prototypicality.

6 Compare *I was approached by a faculty member yesterday*, which is perfectly acceptable with implied sense of patienthood and effectiveness. See also Takami (1995), who discusses a special variant of passives, which he terms 'pseudo-passives' as exemplified in *The light was turned out* and *This lake should not be fished in*. He proposes a constraint to the effect that pseudo-passives in English such as these are felicitous provided that the subject is characterized by that passive sentence (1995: 59), which, he argues, explains the infelicity of *The bridge was walked under by Mary and her lover* or *The office was worked in*.

7 For example, Croft (1994: 113) distinguishes among process passive, anti-passive, and stative passive.

8 According to Saksena (1980), the 'affected' agent may appear in some languages, a fact suggesting that agent and patient do not constitute single primitive categories which are mutually exclusive.
I assume here that a construction carries an inherent semantic content independent of the information from lexical items (cf. Goldberg 1995).

I would like to thank Peter Grundy for informing me that sentence (6a) is unacceptable in British English.

Bolinger also finds that the following perfect imperative is also felicitous, expressing an ‘unverified wish’ (1977: 170).

i) [someone who was looking forward to participating in a job and appears on the scene uncertain whether he still have the chance, might say to his supposed collaborator] Don’t dare you have finished that work yet!

This imperative is clearly distinct from (18) above; referring to a past time, it hardly involves any force at all. Usage like this makes perfect sense within the present approach, since the meaning of an imperative is a matter of the speaker’s conceptualization of (a chain of) two events where the first causes the second (=designated event) to be realized.
Chapter 4

Conditional Imperatives in English

Given an analysis of English imperatives as a category, this chapter discusses *and/or*-conditional imperatives—coordinate sentences in which the first conjunct is an imperative, the second conjunct a declarative, and the two are conjoined by *and* or *or*. Beginning with a brief introduction of some previous proposals, I focus on comparing two approaches to this pair of constructions. One is a relevance approach of Clark (1993), based on Wilson and Sperber (1988), who rejects the force account and treats *and/or* as truth-functional connectives semantically reducible to logical symbols. The other is the cognitive approach of the present work, which adopts the gradient notion of imperative prototypes as outlined in previous chapters and treats these connectives in constructional terms—i.e., ‘left-subordinating *and*’ (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 1997) and ‘asymmetric *or*’ (cf. Lakoff 1971), respectively.

It will be argued that neither the *and*-conditional imperative sentence nor the *or*-conditional sentence is an isolated construction as is commonly assumed; instead, the former is best analyzable in terms of *left-subordinating and* (cf. Culicover and Jackendoff 1997), occupied by an example of non-prototypical imperative, and the latter in terms of *asymmetric or* (cf. Lakoff
occupied by an instance of **prototypical Imperative**. The two imperative sentences behave the way they do because each imperative construction inherits features from its respective ‘parent’ construction. An examination of two approaches reveals that the relevance analysis falls short of providing a detailed characterization of these constructions. In contrast, the cognitive approach, it is argued, not only offers a fuller characterization of two imperative constructions but it also better accounts for seemingly disparate data including the absence of ‘negative reading’ from or-conditional imperatives and the appearance of negative polarity items and stative predicates, and it does so in a more comprehensive manner, without relying too heavily on pragmatic considerations.

### 4.1 Previous Proposals

The sentence in (1), or sometimes both (1) and (2), have been labeled as ‘pseudo-imperatives’:

(1) Bring alcohol to school and you’ll be suspended.
    <and-conditional imperative>

(2) Be careful or you’ll lose your bag.
    <or-conditional imperative>

In each sequence, the left conjunct is an imperative clause, the right conjunct a declarative, conjoined by the connective *and* or
or. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, let me call the conjunction of an imperative and a declarative clause (1) **and-conditional imperative**, and the disjunction of an imperative and a declarative (2) **or-conditional imperative**.

It has been observed by many researchers that these constructions obtain a conditional interpretation. For example, (1) is sometimes paraphrased as *If you bring alcohol to school you’ll be suspended* and (2) as *If you are not careful you’ll lose your bag*. As a matter of fact, it was once claimed that ‘pseudo-imperatives’ are (at least partly) derived from *if*-conditionals (cf. Lakoff 1966, Fraser 1969). For example, Fraser 1969 proposed that *Talk and I’ll shoot Max* (=and-conditional imperative) and *Don’t talk or I’ll shoot Max* (or-conditional imperative), as well as *If you talk I’ll shoot Max* are all derived from a common underlying structure containing *if*. However, Lawler (1975: 371) points out the inherent inadequacy of such derivational accounts of these ‘elliptical conditionals’ as the following data reveal:

(3)a. Open the window and I’ll kill you/I’ll kiss you.

b. Open the window or I’ll kill you/#I’ll kiss you.

(3b) sounds odd with *I’ll kiss you*; to make sense, it is necessary to revise our assumptions that kissing is desirable (Lawler 1975: 371).
Bolinger (1977) offered a number of important observations concerning these ‘apparent imperatives,’ by discussing sentences like *Spare the rod and spoil the child*, *Cut ourselves off from that source of income and we’re ruined*, and *Break that vase and I’ll break your neck*. First, regarding conditions as the commonest non-command use of the imperative, he argued against distinguishing a pure set of imperatives that are commands and nothing else, for the reason that such an analysis would complicate the analysis of conditionals. Second, Bolinger suggests that the connective *and* may well be parasitic. By comparing a set of seemingly related constructions (*[If] you* *tell him anything*, *(and) he just looks at you blankly*), he remarks that “all barriers between *if*-conditions, coordinations, and imperatives may be flattened” (1977: 158). Third, to be felicitous, these constructions must involve the semantic relation of ‘intrinsic consequence,’ which refers to the cause-effect or condition-consequence connection between the two conjuncts, which Bolinger regards as ‘true condition.’ That is, *and*-conditional imperatives must express a semantic relation in which “consequences are the automatic result of the condition” (Bolinger 1977: 162). As a result, *and*-imperative conditionals are incapable of expressing what he terms ‘outlandish pseudo-conditions’ such as *There’s a man in the office, if you want to see him* (*ibid.*).

Next, Davies (1986) conducted a comprehensive descriptive analysis of imperatives including conditional imperatives.
Terming the and-conditional imperative an Imperative-like Conditional (or ILC) and the or-conditional imperative an Imperative-like Ultimatum' (or ILU), Davies handled the semantic asymmetry between the two constructions in (3) in pragmatic terms. On this account, the ILCs have imperatives which are not uttered in accordance with the conventions of utterance (Davies 1986: 206).

Recently, Dancygier (1998: 189-190) offered a most explicit answer to the question of why and-conditional imperatives imply a condition. She maintains that constructions such as (3a) above contain a set of conceptual features characteristic of prototypical predictive conditionals: namely, sequentiality, causality, and non-assertiveness (=potentiality). There is non-assertiveness (=potentiality), here introduced by the meaning of the imperative rather than by if, there is a content-domain relation between the two conjuncts, and there is the iconicity of events involved. Concerning the semantic asymmetry between and vs. or conditional imperatives, Dancygier also resorts to a pragmatic account somewhat similar to Davies’:

An imperative is uttered with its usual force (potentiality and acceptance); then or brings up an alternative. The alternative is also potential, but not accepted, and it will result in the state of affairs described in the second conjunct. Because the ‘cause’ event in the alternative construal is not desired, the ‘result’ event
is also presented as not desired. (Dancygier 1998: 189).

Despite all these important findings and proposals, the literature on imperatives, regardless of theoretical orientation, does not satisfactorily answer many of the important questions pertaining to the two conditional imperatives. Let me give a few illustrative examples. Why do or-conditional imperatives disallow negative readings, as demonstrated in the infelicity of (3b) *Open the window or I’ll kiss you*, although and-imperatives do allow it, as evidenced in (3a)?

Second, and-conditional imperatives (4a), but not or-imperatives (4b), may marginally refer to situations in the past:

(4)a. Jim was always hungry in those days. Give him a few dollars and he was happy.

b. Jim was always hungry in those days. *Give him a few dollars or he went berserk.*

Third, emphatic attitudinal items are incompatible with and-conditional imperatives but are fully compatible with or-imperatives:

(5)a. Do come tomorrow, and you’ll see our new house.  

(*If you come tomorrow, you’ll see our new house.*)

b. Step this way, please, and the doctor will see you.  

(*If you step this way, the doctor will see you.*)
(6)a. Do come on time, or you’ll miss the flight.
   b. Do shut up darling, or you’ll only make everything worse.

Sentences (5) read more like a sequence of command and afterthought than a conditional (cf. Bolinger 1977).

Fourth, and-conditional imperatives allow use of negative polarity items (NPIs), while or-imperatives disallow it unless overtly negated:

(7)a. Come any closer and I’ll call the police.
   b. Lift a finger to help her and you’ll be sorry.

(8)a. ?Come any closer, or I can’t hear you.
   b. ?Lift a finger to help her, or you’ll be sorry.

Moreover, stative predicates, which are normally ill-formed in ‘true’ imperatives, are generally more acceptable in both and and or conditional imperatives (cf. Lakoff (1966: 3-5)):

(9)a. Doubt that you will succeed, and you will not succeed.
   b. Know the answer and you will get an A.

(10)a. ?Doubt that you will succeed.
   b. ?Know the answer.

(11)a. Appreciate literature or college girls won’t like you.
   b. Know the answer or you’ll flunk.

(12)a. ?Appreciate literature.
   b. ?Know the answer.
With these questions in mind, we closely examine Clark’s (1993) relevance approach to this pair of imperative constructions. In this analysis, Clark distinguishes three distinct readings, ‘positive,’ ‘neutral,’ and ‘negative,’ of ‘pseudo-imperatives’ (and imperatives in general), but he rejects the force account of imperatives (following Wilson and Sperber 1988) and treats both and and or as truth-functional connectives semantically reducible to logical symbols.

4.2 Relevance Analyses

Wilson and Sperber 1988 proposed a semantic analysis of imperatives, intended to accommodate standard imperative utterances as well as many examples problematic for most previous theories. Wilson and Sperber choose to characterize the imperative in terms of 'potentiality' and 'desirability' but not the notion of 'force.' If a directive act is understood as “an attempt to get the hearer to perform the action described by the proposition expressed” (Wilson and Sperber 1988: 80), they claim, the force account of imperatives will be faced with a number of straightforward counterexamples, since none of the sentences below seem to involve the conception of directive force:

(13)a. ADVICE

Peter: Excuse me, I want to get to the station.
Mary: Take a number 3 bus.

b. PERMISSION

Peter: Can I open the window?
Mary: Oh, open it, then.

c. THREATS AND DARES

(Mary, seeing Peter about to throw a snowball, says threateningly)


d. GOOD WISHES

(Mary, visiting Peter in the hospital, says)

Get well soon.

e. AUDIENCELESS CASES

(Mary looks at the sky and says)

Please don't rain.

f. PREDETERMINED CASES

(Imagine a child, sent to apologize to someone, thinking to herself as she reluctantly approaches his door) Please be out.

[Wilson and Sperber 1988, exx. 1-7]

To take an instance of (13a), Mary does not care whether Peter will perform the designated action. Threats or dares (13c) actually warn the hearer against throwing the snowball (cf. Wilson and Sperber, 80-81).

Wilson and Sperber contend that Mary's imperative utterance in (13a) communicates that it is desirable (as well as potential)
to take a number 3 bus from Peter’s (hearer's) point of view. With permission (13b), while conceeding the desirability (to Peter) of opening the window, Mary guarantees its potentiality, thus removing the only obstacle to Peter's opening the window (W-S, 86). They maintain that the 'force' of an imperative utterance is not essential but rather only implicated by the combination of a pair of propositional attitudes (potentiality and desirability) and manifest contextual assumptions (ibid, 87).

Next, Wilson and Sperber treat certain ironic uses of imperatives as illustrated below as interpretive (as opposed to descriptive) utterances:

(14) Peter: Can I open the window?  
Mary: Go ahead and let in some nice Arctic air.  

[Wilson and Sperber 1988, ex. 11]

The distinction between descriptive vs. interpretive utterances constitutes an important facet of relevance theory’s view of communication and cognition (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 224-231). Under this analysis, when an utterance is used descriptively, the speaker herself is entertaining the thought represented; when an utterance is used interpretively, the speaker is attributing the thought represented by her utterance to someone (or to a range of people) other than herself at the time of utterance. Under this analysis, Mary in (14) conveys that she dissociates herself from
the thought of Peter’s opening the window, from which, they explain, arises an irony.

By extending Wilson and Sperber’s characterization of imperatives, Clark (1993) conducts a detailed relevance-based analysis of these conditional imperatives. He treats the imperative and the declarative in 'pseudo-imperatives' as an ordinary imperative and declarative, respectively, and deals with and/or as truth-functional connectives semantically reducible to logical symbols. First, Clark terms all the examples in (15) below as 'pseudo-imperatives,' whereas he regards the initial clause in each case as an ‘ordinary imperative’ and the second clause as an ‘ordinary declarative’:

(15)a. Come closer and I'll give you five pounds.
     <positive reading preferred>

b. Be off or I'll push you downstairs.
     <positive reading preferred>

c. Come one step closer and I'll shoot.
     <negative reading preferred>

d. Open the Guardian and you'll find three misprints on every page. <neutral reading preferred>

[Clark 1993, exx.1-4]

Clark's main arguments concerning these imperative constructions can be summarized in the following five points. First, the connectives and/or in these sentences are truth-functional
connectives (cf. Grice 1975), hence semantically equivalent to logical symbols '& ' and 'v' (Inclusive or), respectively (Clark, 80). Second, while being open to a variety of interpretations, 'pseudo-imperatives,' or imperatives as a whole, may involve at least three distinct readings, which he calls 'positive,' 'negative' and 'neutral' (Clark, 79). While the pseudo-imperative with and may involve all three readings, the one with or is restricted to a single, positive reading. Third, negative and neutral readings count as interpretive (i.e., echoic) utterances (Clark, 104-114):

(16) A: Have you read the manifesto?
    B: Yes. Vote for them and we'll all be rich and happy.
    [Clark 1993, ex. 18]

In Clark's view, B's utterance here can be echoic on the grounds that B does not seem to accept the thought that the addressee should vote for them; rather, the speaker is attributing such a thought to the hearer in order to dissociate herself from it, exactly like Mary's utterance in (14) above (Clark, 90). Fourth, the reason or-conditional imperatives lack negative and neutral readings is strictly a matter of pragmatics rather than semantics:

(17) ?Leave now or I'll make you a nice dinner.
    [Clark 1993, ex. 40]
According to Clark, this sentence is pragmatically ruled out because an alternative utterance like (18) below is readily available, a sentence which “would give rise to essentially the same interpretation and which are less complex”:

(18) Stay and I'll make you a nice dinner.
    [Clark 1993, ex. 41]

Clark ascribed the infelicity of (17) above to the fact that the sentence puts the hearer to 'unjustifiable processing effort,' hence risks misunderstanding (ibid, 107).

Finally, the following utterances classify as 'genuine pseudo-imperatives', as distinguished from 'pseudo-imperatives' which are essentially imperatives (Clark, 114-117):

(19)a. Catch the flu and you can be ill for weeks.
    b. Life was hard in those days. Say one word out of turn and they'd dock you a week's wages.
    c. Miss the train and we'll never get there on time.
    [Clark 1993, ex. 50]

Clark's arguments for excluding these sentences from 'pseudo-imperatives' run as follows. 'Pseudo-imperatives' with negative and neutral readings count as interpretive (as opposed to descriptive) utterances, in which the speaker is attributing to
the hearer (or to someone else) the potential thought that it is
desirable that the hearer carry out the designated action.
However, there is no way in which the speaker of (19) is
attributing to the hearer or anyone else such a belief, so these
examples do not fit the semantic analysis proposed by Wilson and
Sperber. Therefore, the strings in (19) should not be classified
as imperatives or 'pseudo-imperatives' at all.

Clark presents five independent reasons for his exclusion of
sentences (19) from the category 'pseudo-imperative.' That is,
the understood subject is more generic than individuated; this
string may take a first person (understood) subject (19c); when
an overt you occurs, it involves the weak, unstressed form, but
not the strong, stressed from; this string might refer to a
situation in the past (19b); and finally, this construction forms
negatives with not rather than do not or don't:

(20)a. My lecturer is a real tyrant. Not show up on time and
   he'll throw you off the course.
   b. The safety drill is important. Not listen and it'll be
      your own fault if you get into trouble.

[Clark 1993, ex. 55]

In particular, Clark treats the data in (20) with the negative
form of not as strong pieces of evidence supporting his claim
that the strings in (19) do not qualify as 'pseudo-imperatives,'
since, according to Bolinger (1977: 179), infinitives tend to form negatives with not and imperatives with do not or don't.

4.3 Problems with the Relevance Analysis

In this section, I will first discuss a few weaknesses and inconsistencies in the theory Clark has offered. I will then critically examine its explanatory power concerning the semantic asymmetry between two conditional imperatives.

First, let us take issue with Clark's account of the or-conditional imperative' absence of negative and neutral readings in terms of 'unjustifiable processing effort.' While this may appear to be one plausible explanation, exactly the same argument can be made concerning and-conditional imperatives:

(21) Bring alcohol to school and you'll be suspended.
(22) Don't bring alcohol to school; you'll be suspended.

Note that sentence (21) is a perfectly felicitous use of and-conditional imperative, which may involve 'negative reading.' One might argue if one closely follows Clark's claim that this sentence should be ruled out because it commands the listeners to exert extra processing effort, since the idea can be far more straightforwardly expressed by a sentence such as (22) with overt negation, which is more clear-cut and more readily available. The problem is that the principle of 'unjustifiable processing
'effort' in itself does not insure that it does NOT constrain the interpretation of and-conditional imperatives. That is, we would need an independent means to stipulate that this pragmatic constraint applies exclusively to or-conditional imperatives, not and-conditional imperatives.

It will be argued in section 5 that we can attribute the narrow range of interpretation of the or-conditional imperative directly to the asymmetric or construction; analogously, we can attribute a wider range of interpretation of the and-conditional imperative directly to the left-subordinate and construction.

Next, I would like to argue that the distinction Clark makes between 'genuine pseudo-imperatives' and 'pseudo-imperatives' is not empirically supported. As is widely known, the relevance account of 'pseudo-imperatives' depends crucially on the notion of interpretive (as opposed to descriptive) uses of utterances (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986). Clark excludes not only (23c) but also (23a) and (23b) from pseudo-imperatives on the grounds that none of these classify as 'interpretive' utterances, where the speaker should be not entertaining the designated propositional content herself but attributing it to the hearer or to someone else:

(23)a. Catch the flu and you can be ill for weeks.
   b. Life was hard in those days. Say one word out of turn and they'd dock you a week's wages.
   c. Miss the train and we'll never get there on time.
Contra Clark, however, his five pieces of evidence do not seem to support his idea of 'genuine pseudo-imperatives.' To begin with, some of Clark’s own examples of 'pseudo-imperatives' should be excluded from the category ‘pseudo-imperatives.’ Though Clark treats the generic (understood) subject as an indicator of non-imperative sentence, it is not uncommon that imperative clauses contain generic subjects:

(24)a. Go by air and you'll save time.
   b. See a penny, pick it up and you'll have good luck all day.

It must be pointed out that nothing in Clark's as well as Wilson-Sperber's semantic analysis stipulates that imperatives should not contain generic subjects. In fact, Clark's own example of 'pseudo-imperative' such as (15d) reads more generically than individually.

As for understood first-person subjects, it is undoubtedly true that second-person is a critical feature of imperatives (cf. Takahashi 1994; or see chapter 2), so Clark is correct in excluding (19c) from the imperative. However, even Clark's own example of pseudo-imperative construction such as (15d) above does allow for a first-person subject:

(25) Open the Guardian and we'll find three misprints on every page.
If one assumes as Clark does that constructions potentially capable of permitting first-person subjects should be excluded from the category of 'pseudo-imperatives,' sentence (15d) should also be excluded from 'pseudo-imperatives.'

Next, consider Clark's analysis of sentence (23b) as a 'genuine pseudo-imperative'--a non-imperative clause because of its reference to a past situation. This approach would predict that *Give him a few dollars* is a non-imperative clause in (26) but an imperative in (27):

(26) Jim was always hungry in those days. *Give him a few dollars,* and he was happy.

(27) Jim is always hungry. *Give him a few dollars,* and he'll be happy.

This does not seem an economical way of dealing with one and the same grammatical construct, although Clark is not alone in this type of inconsistency in the treatment of conditional imperatives (cf. Declerk and Reed 2001).

Finally, concerning the data in (20) with overt negation, speakers of English do not necessarily agree with Clark's acceptability judgments. Several speakers of English I consulted judge forms with *don't* as more natural-sounding than *not*:

(28) [corresponding to (20)]
a. My lecturer is a real tyrant. *Don't/Not* show up on time and he'll throw you off the course.

b. The safety drill is important. *Don't/Not* listen and it'll be your own fault if you get into trouble.

In short, Clark's five pieces of evidence do not straightforwardly support his classification of sentences (28a) and (28b) as ‘genuine pseudo-imperatives’ as distinguishable from 'pseudo-imperatives.' It must be therefore concluded that Clark's argument for ‘genuine pseudo-imperatives’ as a distinct class of non-imperative clauses lacks empirical support.

Clark’s idea is undoubtedly useful in categorizing a large variety of imperative utterances in terms of the speaker’s attitude (positive, negative, and neutral) towards the state of affairs described in the imperative clause. However, his system is inadequate to organize intricate imperatives. For one thing, it does not offer a principled explanation for the semantic asymmetry between *and* vs. *or* conditional imperatives. Under Clark’s analysis, the form *Do that* has a ‘positive’ interpretation regardless of whether it occurs in conditional imperatives with *and* (29a) or with *or* (29b) below:

(29)a. *Do that* and you will feel better.

b. *Do that* or I’ll punish you.
In this way, Clark’s system misses a subtle, but non-trivial, difference in the imperative’s intensity of force exerted in each sequence; it leaves the ‘hyperbolic’ nature (cf. Lawler 1975) of or conditional imperatives unexplained. Quite analogously, his tripartite distinction does not seem to satisfactorily capture the difference in the imperative’s strength of force between Arrive on time! (strong force reading) and Arrive on time and you’ll catch the flight (mild force reading). In addition, this approach has little to say about how, and why, the conditional reading arises from these two imperative constructions.

Overall, Clark’s relevance analysis of conditional imperatives (as well as Wilson & Sperber’s of imperatives in general) falls short of providing the detailed characterization needed for explaining the commonalities as well as differences between two conditional imperatives; it is too general if not totally incorrect.

The next section introduces an alternative, cognitive, analysis employing the conceptions of imperative prototypes as well as left-subordinating and and asymmetric or constructions. I show that a comprehensive account of conditional imperatives requires not simply a tripartite distinction of readings along the lines of Clark; rather, it must also take into account the degrees, and types, of force and incorporate finer analyses of the two connectives and/or.
4.4 *And*-Conditional Imperatives: A Cognitive Analysis

Here I put forward a view that the *and*-conditional imperative is not an isolated construction, but rather an instance of the higher-level left-subordinating *and* (cf. Culicover & Jackendoff 1997) construction occupied by an exemplar of non-prototypical imperative (Takahashi 1994, 1999, 2000).

Left-subordinating *And*

It has long been recognized that there is both a coordinate and a subordinate *and*. This point was made clear more than three decades ago by Culicover (1970; 1972) in his discussions of ‘OM-sentences’; (30) is an illustration:

(30) One more can of beer and I’m leaving.

This sentence has an interpretation in which the left constituent functions semantically as if it were a subordinate clause. Numerous others have also observed that *and* can be used asymmetrically, in the sense that the order of conjuncts cannot be reversed without causing a significant change in interpretation (cf. Ross 1967, Schmerling 1975, Lakoff 1986, and Deane 1992, among others). To my knowledge, Culicover & Jackendoff (1997) were the first to clearly define a conditional *and* as a fully established use, which they term as ‘left-
subordinating *and* as a clearly distinct use in both semantic and syntactic properties from ordinary non-conditional use.

Culicover and Jackendoff illustrate a class of such left-subordinating *and* sentences (31) as just another example of an apparently coordinate construction which is conceptually subordinate, which they view as a case of 'semantic subordination despite syntactic coordination' (Culicover and Jackendoff, 195):

(31)a. You drink another can of beer and I’m leaving.
   
   b. Big Louie sees you with the loot and he puts out a contract on you.

[Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 3]

According to Culicover and Jackendoff, left-subordinating *and* such as sentences (31) is restricted in distribution with respect to tense and aspect. The conditional reading is generally lost if the perfect tense occurs (32a and 32b), although perfect may appear in the left conjunct (probably not in the right) in some contexts (33) (Culicover and Jackendoff, 198, fn. 5):

(32)a. You’ve drunk another can of beer and I’ve left.
   
   b. Big Louie has seen you with the loot and he’s put out a contract on you.

[Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 4]

(33) [context: I’m about to open the door to find out whether or not you’ve broken anything] You’ve broken another vase
and I’m leaving. [ibid, 198f]

Next, left-subordinating and paraphrases only a subset of if-conditionals; it is incapable of paraphrasing irrealis conditionals (34a) or conditionals with abstract stative clauses (34b):

(34)a. If Bill hadn’t come, we would have been sad.
   (*Bill didn’t come, ls-and we were sad.)
   b. If $x$ is less than $y$, the derivative of $f(x)$ is positive.
      (*$x$ is less than $y$, ls-and the derivative of $f(x)$ is positive.)

[Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 10]

They also note that left-subordinating and also differs greatly from ordinary coordinating and in numerous syntactic properties. This apparently coordinate sentence consistently parallels if-constructions rather than ordinary coordinate use; for instance, it cannot undergo right node raising (35b) and gapping (36b):

(35)a. Big Louie found out about__, and-c Big Louie put out a contract on, that guy who stole some loot from the gang.
   b. *Big Louie finds out about__, ls-and Big Louie puts out a contract on, that guy who stole some loot from the gang.
   c. *If Big Louie finds out about__, then Big Louie puts
out a contract on, that guy who stole some loot from the gang.

[Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 8]

(36)a. Big Louie stole another car radio and-\text{-}c Little Louie the hubcaps.

   b. *Big Louie steals one more car radio \textit{Ls}-and Little Louie the hubcaps.

   c. *If Big Louie steals one more car radio, then Little Louie the hubcaps.

   [\textit{ibid}, ex. 9]

But it permits a reflexive pronoun in the left conjunct to be bounded by an antecedent in the right (37a), and a quantifier in the right conjunct to bind the pronoun in the left (38a)(39a):

(37)a. Another picture of himself\textit{i} appears in the newspaper \textit{Ls}-and Susan thinks Johni will definitely go out and get a lawyer.

   b. If another picture of himself\textit{i} appears in the newspaper, Susan thinks Johni will definitely go out and get a lawyer.

   c. *Another picture of himself\textit{i} has appeared in the newspaper and-\text{-}c Susan thinks Johni will definitely go out and get a lawyer.

   [Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 16]

(38)a. You give him\textit{i} enough opportunity \textit{Ls}-and every senator\textit{i}, no matter how honest, will succumb to corruption.
b. If you give himi enough opportunity, every senatori, no matter how honest, will succumb to corruption.

c. *We gave himi enough money and every senatori, no matter honest, succumbed to corruption.

[ibid, ex. 23]

(39)a. ((You) come up with) a few more nice stories about himi
      LS-and every senatori will change his vote in your favor.

b. If you come up with a few more nice stories about himi
   every senatori will change his vote in your favor.

c. *We came up with a few more nice stories about himi, and
   sure enough, every senatori changed his vote in our favor.

[ibid, ex. 24]

Furthermore, indefinite any can be licensed in the first clause by left-subordinating and (40a), exactly as it is licensed by if (40b):

(40)a. You give anyonei too much money and hei will go crazy.

    b. If you give anyonei too much money, hei will go crazy.

c. *You gave anyonei too much money and hei went crazy.

[Culicover and Jackendoff 1997, ex. 25]

Let me note that examples (38a), (39a) and (40a) above, which Culicover and Jackendoff classify as left-subordinating and constructions are and conditional imperatives.
What is most important for the present aim is the fact that the left-subordinating *and* allows a wide range of linguistic constructs to appear; the imperative is only one of them. It permits a declarative (31b) and even a quantified noun phrase (30)(39a) to occur as the left conjunct, and it allows for a non-declarative clause as the right.

In their discussions of ‘paratactic *and*-conditionals,’ Declerck and Reed (2001: Ch.11) offer a number of sentences which clearly fall under the rubric of left-subordinating *and*. Included are not only standard ‘pseudo-imperatives’ but also constructions containing an imperative (41a and 41b) or even a (rhetorical) interrogative (41c), as the right conjunct:

(41)a. Open that door and die/You will die!
   b. Buy a lottery ticket now and win £250,000.
   c. [Do just what you have to do and no more, and the manager will be happy.] Show initiative, and will he thank you?

   [He’ll think you want his job.]

[Declerck and Reed 2001, exx. 840a, 842, and 844]

In one example (42a), even the past-tense declarative appears in both conjuncts, and in another (42b), the first conjunct, as well as the second, contains the shortened future ‘*ll* form:

(42)a. [The foreman there was horrible.] You made the slightest mistake and he jumped down your throat.
b. [He’s very cantankerous.] I’ll offer him tea and he’ll demand coffee, I’ll cook the fish he wanted and he’ll say he wants chicken. [There’s no pleasing him.]

[Declerck and Reed, exx. 843c and 843d]

According to Declerck and Reed, this subtype of paratactic conditional always refers to a habit or general (timeless) truth (2001: 406).

Given all these analyses, and conditional imperatives might be reasonably treated as just one instance of the superordinate left-subordinating and construction. At this point we need to identify a common denominator of all the instances of left-subordinating and. At least four (partly interrelated) features distinguish left-subordinating and from ordinary coordinate use. First of all, the two conjuncts follow the order of temporal iconicity; \( S_2 \) occurs after \( S_1 \), in the ‘\( S_1 \) \&\& \( S_2 \)’ sequence (Dancygier 1998: 192). Second, being semantically a conditional, they are mutually dependent upon each other in interpretation; one clause cannot be adequately interpreted without the conception of the other (cf. Dancygier (1993; 1998)). Third, (related to second), being a conditional, the two conjuncts are generally symmetric in epistemic attitude (cf. Akatsuka 1997, Clancy, Akatsuka and Strauss 1998). That is, if the left conjunct is considered desirable, the right is also considered desirable (\textit{Sleep until noon and you’ll feel better}); if the former is considered undesirable, the latter is also considered
undesirable (Sleep until noon and you’ll miss lunch); and if the
left conjunct is neutral in attitude, the right is also neutral.
Compare contrastive and (a variant of coordinate and), which is
‘asymmetric’ in epistemic stance: [It just doesn’t make sense!]
You won a gold medal and the coach was still unhappy.

Fourth, the two conjuncts lack commitment to the truth of the
proposition. You drink another can of beer and I’m leaving (31a)
is an example of left-subordinating and, not coordinate, on the
grounds that the speaker is not asserting the truth of each
conjunct (i.e., non-assertive; cf. Dancygier 1998). Conversely,
You’ve drunk another can of beer and I’ve left (32a) exemplifies
coordinate and, in that the speaker is asserting the truth of
each conjunct; the proposition involves the speaker’s commitment.

Look at Clark’s three types of and conditional imperatives
again, repeated here for convenience:

(43)(=(15a, c, d))
  a. Come closer and I'll give you five pounds.
      <positive reading preferred>
  c. Come one step closer and I'll shoot.
      <negative reading preferred>
  d. Open the Guardian and you'll find three misprints on
every page. <neutral reading preferred>

The and conditional imperative shares the above four properties
of left-subordinate and construction. First of all, all these
sentences follow the order of temporal iconicity, where \( S_2 \) occurs after \( S_1 \). To take an instance of (43a), the event of the right conjunct “I’ll give you five pounds” is construed as occurring after the event of the left conjunct “Come closer.” Second, two conjuncts are more or less dependent on each other in interpretation. In (43c) and (43d), neither clause can be correctly interpreted without the conception of the other. In (43a), the two clauses might appear to be more independent of each other. Yet they are not complete clauses in themselves if we compare the following examples of paratactic and coordination, which lack temporal and causal (or ‘intrinsic’) sequence:

(44)a. Get on with your homework, and I haven’t heard you practice the piano today.

b. You wash the dishes, and I take out the garbage.

c. Have a lovely day and I expect to hear from you.

In (44), the two clauses are mutually independent in conception, hence non-conditional.

Third, it is evident that the two clauses are symmetric in the speaker’s attitude toward the propositional content. In (43a), desirable (your coming closer) leads to desirable (my giving you five pounds); in (43c), undesirable (your coming one step closer) leads to undesirable (my shooting); and in (43d), neutral (your opening the Guardian) leads to neutral (your finding three misprints on every page). Finally, the speaker is
not committed to the truth of the proposition of each conjunct. In neither clause is the speaker engaged in the act of assertion. He or she is involved in presenting a supposed situation.

One may conclude then that the and-conditional imperative is conditional because the sentence inherits features of its ‘parent’ construction, left-subordinating and, which is intrinsically conditional in conceptual structure.

Non-prototypical Imperatives
First, let me contend that only a class of imperatives defined as non-prototypical is allowed to occur as the left conjunct of left-subordinate and. This amounts to saying that use of the prototypical imperative is disallowed.

Let me explain first what it means for an imperative utterance to be prototypical or non-prototypical. As I have argued in previous chapters, imperatives can be analyzed as forming a category with ‘better’ or ‘worse’ exemplars, which center around the degree of force exertion. Against this proposed scale, a given imperative utterance can be ranked as more or less prototypical. Let me present the set of imperative utterances in (4) in chapter 3, repeated here as (45):

(45) a. [parent to child]
   Clean up this mess right now./ Just hold your tongue.

   b. [host to guest]
   Please sit down.
c. [between two strangers]
   A: Excuse me. Do you know where Starbucks is?
   B: Go straight ahead three blocks.

d. [between coworkers in casual conversation]
   Regional accents can be a problem. Put a proper Bostonian on the phone with a Texas oilman and here comes miscommunication.

e. [teacher to student]
   Bring alcohol to school and you'll be suspended.

f. [between two persons in a strong argument]
   Say that again! (I’ll punch you in the nose.)

As I have argued above, while precise distinctions are hard to make, these imperative utterances can be postulated to occur at different points on the continuum of force exertion. It is arguable that they stand in the decreasing order of force exertion in their primary readings if we disregard subtle differences in the nature of force—from prototypical cases, with strong force (a and b), non-prototypical cases, mild/weak force (c), around zero force (d), minus force (e), and strong minus force (f).

The following figure (Figure 3-4 in chapter 3) illustrates the proposed analysis, repeated here for convenience.
Support for the present claim that the and-conditional imperative classifies as a non-prototypical use of imperative comes from the impact of emphatic attitudinal markers. In general, the appearance of these forms blocks the conditionality of this coordinate construction:

(46)a. Hand me that hammer, will you, and I'll nail this down.
    (≠If you hand me that hammer,...)

b. Step this way, please, and the doctor will see you.
    (≠If you step this way, ...)

C. Do come tomorrow, and you'll see our new house.
    (≠If you come tomorrow,...)

Bolinger (1977: 164) judges sentences (46a) and (46b) with the attitudinal will you or please as commands rather than conditions. Similarly, concerning (46c) he points out that “the union of the two clauses is forced; the second is an afterthought, and much less like the result clause of a conditional sentence than the
one in *Come tomorrow and you’ll see our new house*, whose first clause may be a command as well as a condition." (Bolinger, 191). Considering that these attitudinal expressions are transparent indicators of strong force when they occur with imperatives, the impact of attitudinal items in (46) can be taken to suggest that prototypical uses of imperatives (i.e., imperatives with strong force) are conceptually incompatible with *and* conditional imperatives--or more generally, the ‘left-subordinating *and*’ construction. In other words, sentences such as those in (46) above are more interpretable in terms of coordinate *and*, which is non-conditional in conception.

This analysis is supported by the fact that the appearance of emphatic attitudinals disallows quantifier binding as well as the occurrence of indefinite *any*:

(38)a’. *Do/*Please give himi enough opportunity and every senatori, no matter how honest, will succumb to corruption.

(39)a’. *Do/*Please come up with a few more nice stories about himi and every senatori will change his vote in your favor.

(39)a”. *Come up with a few more nice stories about himi, will you, and every senatori will change his vote in your favor.

(40)a’. *Do/*Please give anyonei too much money and hei will go crazy.
Using *do, please, or will you* implies a specific and individual case the speaker wants to emphasize, so it suggests a strong force reading. The unacceptability of these sentences illustrates the non-prototypicality of the imperative in this construction. Declerck and Reed make a similar point, observing that the ‘paratactic *and*-conditional’ (*and*-conditional imperative) does not permit an emphatic negative imperative to appear, as shown in the infelicity of *Don’t you do that and I’ll give you £5* (2001: 404).\(^1\)

Above, I have characterized *and*-conditional imperatives in terms of left-subordinating *and* construction, occupied by an example of non-prototypical imperative. If this analysis is correct, an important question which naturally arises is, why the imperative must be non-prototypical in conception when it appears with the left-subordinating *and*. Though the exact mechanism is not entirely clear, what matters seems to be the requirement of semantic dependence between two conjuncts imposed. One may speculate that the exertion of strong force, a feature most characteristic of prototype imperatives, tends to make an imperative clause stand conceptually more independent of the right clause. As a result, the two conjuncts fail to form a composite whole, which is essential to the semantic structure of subordination (cf. Croft 2002).

It is interesting in this regard that even an *if*-clause, a parade subordinator, may perform a directive speech act as an
independent sentence, when the proposition of it involves a high degree of desirability, as exemplified in utterances such as *If you sign up here—Thank you* or *If you please excuse us*. In their discussion of ‘Covert-Q conditionals’ introduced by *if* (and other subordinators), Declerk and Reed (2001: 386) provide the sentences in (47) below expressing a very polite directive, suggestion or ‘weak manipulation’ (cf. Givón 1995: 122):

(47)a. If you want just a quick look inside? (request)

   b. If the gentlemen would move to the smoking-room now?

       (invitation)

   c. If you just go and sit and wait there, Miss …

[Declerk and Reed 2001, exx. 778a, 778b, and 778f]

In such a case, high desirability may have a decided impact upon the clause’s conceptual independence, which is a topic meriting further investigation.

In summary, the *and*-conditional imperative can be viewed as a non-prototypical use of imperative occupying the left-subordinating *and* construction. We can attribute the conditionality of the *and*-conditional imperative directly to features of this higher-level construction.

4.5 *OR*-Conditional Imperatives: A Cognitive Analysis
Next, I put forward a view that the or-conditional imperative is also not an isolated construction but an instantiation of the higher-level **asymmetric or** construction, occupied by an exemplar of **prototypical imperative**.

**Asymmetric Or**

As is well known, the connective or introduces an alternative. Or is typically (but not necessarily) exclusive rather than inclusive (cf. Quirk et al. (1985: 932-933)):

(48)a.  <exclusive or>

You can sleep on the couch in the lounge or you can go to a hotel.

b.  <inclusive or>

You can boil an egg, (or) you can make some sandwiches, or you can do both.

The difference is that exclusive or normally excludes the possibility that both conjoints are true or are to be fulfilled, whereas inclusive or implicates that each conjoin may be true or is to be fulfilled.

There is, however, another variant, which might be termed as **asymmetric or**, a kind of conditional use clearly distinguishable from both exclusive and inclusive or, which are essentially non-conditional. The following sentences (49) are examples of asymmetric or:
(49)a. I want you to be quiet or the security guards will put you outside.

b. We tell these companies to drop such dubious claims or face stiff fines and other federal government regulatory punishment.

c. Choose your financial planner wisely or suffer the consequences.

d. Give me liberty or give me death!

e. Your money or your life!²

f. I left early or I would have missed the train.

g. I didn’t have the time or I would have joined.

The idea of asymmetric or is not new in itself. It goes back to at least Lakoff (1971), who suggested that unlike ‘symmetric’ or, the order of the two conjuncts are irreversible without a drastic change in meaning in such conditional imperatives as Eat your oatmeal or you’ll be sorry! or Don’t leave or I’ll shoot!. She also pointed out that there is an ‘adversative causal link’ involved between the two clauses (Lakoff, 144).

Somewhat strangely, later work such as Davies (1986) (as well as Clark 1993) did not integrate Lakoff’s insight. While addressing Lakoff, Davies (1986: 214-215) did not rely on the category of asymmetric or in an analysis of or-conditional imperatives, partly because, she argues, there is more than one case of irreversibility where no obvious causality is contained
as exemplified in sentences such as *Have a cake, or would you prefer an ice cream?*, and partly because, she continues, the or in *or*-conditional imperatives is not syntactically or semantically distinct from that which occurs in ordinary or constructions, since, as she puts it, the interpretation depends on “the kind of relevance to the speaker’s purpose” (Davies 1986: 216).

Contra Davies, however, I claim that the asymmetric or construction is not only indispensable in a full analysis of or-conditional imperatives but also clearly definable in terms of the following four features, which are both semantic and pragmatic in nature. First and foremost, the left conjunct is invariably focal in prominence, with the right backgrounded. Next, two conjuncts follow the order of temporal iconicity of some kind; $S_2$ is conceptualized as occurring after the non-fulfillment (or non-truth) of $S_1$. Note that in none of the above examples is the order of the two conjuncts reversible without causing a drastic change in interpretation or sacrificing naturalness:

(50) (=corresponding to 49)

a. ?The security guards will put you outside or I want you to be quiet.

b. ?We tell these companies to face stiff fines and other federal government regulatory punishment or drop such dubious claims.
c. ?Suffer the consequences or choose your financial planner wisely.

d. ?Give me death or give me liberty!

e. ?Your life or your money!

f. ?I would have missed the train or I left early.

g. ?I would have joined or I didn’t have the time.

Symmetric or need not be temporally iconic, hence the two conjuncts are reversible as in *Michael Owen is injured or he is suspended* can be felicitously transformed into *Michael Owen is suspended or he is injured*.

Third, the left conjunct of asymmetric or is relatively independent in interpretation, although the right depends crucially upon the first. Fourth, two conjuncts are asymmetric (or ‘biased’) in epistemic stance. Typically, the left conjunct performs a directive speech act, involving a high degree of desirability, whereas the right conveys a most undesirable consequence of the addressee’s non-fulfillment of the requested action.³ Less typically, however, the left conjunct asserts the truth (and appropriateness) of some past action (49f) or simply asserts the truth of some past situation (49g), while the right communicates a consequence of the non-truth of this proposition.

Compare uses of ordinary symmetric or:

(51)a. You can boil an egg, or you can make some sandwiches.

b. Michael Owen is injured or he is suspended.
c. Sleep until noon, or wake up early and take a shower.

Here, this ordinary use distinguishes itself by the absence of features unique to asymmetric or. Crucially, the sentences need not follow the order of temporal iconicity; the two conjuncts are reversible, as shown in the felicity of *Michael Owen is suspended or he is injured*. Moreover, no strong bias can be discerned in attitude toward the left conjunct.

What directly concerns us here is the fact that asymmetric or permits clauses of different types to appear in both conjuncts. It allows the (main-clause) declarative (49a), (embedded) infinitive (49b) as well as the imperative to occur as its left conjunct; it permits the declarative, imperative (49c, d), or even noun phrase (49e) to occur as its right conjunct. One example from Declerck and Reed (2001: 402) includes a (rhetorical) question in the right conjunct:

(52)  Don’t eat that cheese, or what will we put in your sandwiches tomorrow?

Given all these data, it seems quite reasonable to treat or-conditional imperatives as just one manifestation of the higher-level ‘asymmetric or’ construction, which seems fully grammaticalized in the English language.

It is worth mentioning that some languages lexically differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric or in English. To
take an instance of Japanese, the disjunctive marker, *ka* or (*ka*)*soretomo*, is used for symmetric use, but not normally for asymmetric use; the other form, *samonaito* (literally, ‘so-not-if’), communicates the asymmetric sense, as demonstrated in (53) below:

(53) (corresponding to 49a)

\[
\text{sizukani site hoshii samonaito/*ka/*soretomo sotoni quiet be (I) want so-not-if/*or outside dasuzo. put you.}
\]

'I want you to be quiet or I'll put you outside.'

In this example, with the *samonaito* form, the order of two conjuncts cannot be reversed; this Japanese sentence functions exactly like English asymmetric or.

Prototypical Imperatives

Next, that the or-conditional imperative sentence, or more generally the asymmetric or construction, permits only an exemplar of prototypical imperative is evident from the above discussions. Quite unlike and-conditional imperatives, all the emphatic attitudinal markers indicative of strong force exertion are most welcome by or-conditional imperatives:

(54)a. *Please* come on time or you'll miss the flight.
b. Do shut up darling or you’ll only make everything worse.

c. Don’t you tease my dog or I’ll tell my mommy.

This analysis is fully compatible with, and incorporates, the earlier observations that or-conditional imperatives “share most of the characteristics of imperatives, and not conditionals,” (Culicover 1972: 297) or “behave like ordinary conventional imperatives” (Davies 1986: 208-209).5

The proposed analysis of or-conditional imperatives in terms of asymmetric or plus prototypical imperative offers a natural account for the infelicity of sentence (3b) or (17) above, repeated here as (55) and (56)--the absence of ‘negative’ and ‘neutral’ readings of or-conditional imperatives (cf. chapter 3; Clark 1993):

(55) ?Open the window or I’ll kiss you.

[=(3b)]

(56) ?Leave or I’ll make you a nice dinner.

[=(17)]

Critically, asymmetric or is biased toward the left conjunct in epistemic attitude; the construction in its typical usage requires that the left conjunct be engaged in a directive speech act, involving strong desirability. In such a case, it is only use of the prototypical imperative that meets this requirement. Within the framework adopted here, it is a constructional
requirement, rather than the pragmatic avoidance of unjustifiable processing effort (Clark 1993), that determines the limited reading of or-conditional imperatives. Or-conditional imperatives are 'hyperbolic' precisely because their 'parent' construction, asymmetric or, is inherently 'hyperbolic.'

The following figure illustrates the analyses made in this section.

![Figure 4-2: AND/OR-Conditional imperatives on the Scale of Force Exertion](image)

The claim is that the and-conditional imperative and the or-conditional imperative stand in complementary distribution within the category of imperative. Imperatives with strong force (=prototypical imperatives) are unwelcome in and-conditional imperatives but welcome in or-conditional imperatives; conversely, imperatives without strong force (=non-prototypical imperatives) are welcome in the former but unwelcome in the latter.
Recall that we have observed in example (4b) the infelicity of the or-conditional imperative’s past reference ([Jim was always hungry in those days.] *Give him a few dollars or he went berserk). We can also attribute this phenomenon directly to features of prototypical imperatives, which must be restricted to reference from the perspective of here-and-now of speaking.

In addition, the proposed analysis neatly explains the subtle but important difference in the strength of force between and-conditional imperatives such as (15a) and or-conditional imperatives such as (15b), both of which are simply ‘positive’ in interpretation according to Clark’s tripartite account.

4.6 Phenomena Pertaining to Conditional Imperatives

Having presented the proposed characterizations of two conditional imperatives, we can now proceed to showing how the analyses work in explaining three phenomena pertaining to the two imperative sentences.

Conditionality: IF-THEN vs. IF-NOT

As Dancygier (1998) clearly put forward, the conditional interpretation of and-conditional imperatives crucially relies upon features of predictive, or content-domain (cf. Sweetser 1990), conditional, which is the most standard conditional—non-assertiveness (or potentiality), iconic sequence, and causality between two conjuncts.
First, we look at the conceptual basis for the paraphrase relation between *and*-conditional imperatives and corresponding *if*-conditional sentences. Observe:

(57)a. Go by air and you’ll save time.
    b. Bring alcohol to school and you’ll be suspended.

(58)a. If you go by air, (then) you’ll save time.
    b. If you bring alcohol, (then) you’ll be suspended.

Sentences (57) and (58) above are sometimes judged as complete synonyms by speakers of English. Here one can do no better than follow the analysis proposed by Fauconnier (1985/1994; 1997) in terms of mental spaces, according to which *and*-conditional imperatives and corresponding *if*-conditionals share a common conceptual structure. Specifically, the imperative (P1) in sentences like (57) can be analyzed as a space builder exactly like the subordinator *if*, which sets up a (hypothetical) space C, distinct from the reality R. In the next step, the declarative (P2) will be taken as holding in an extension of C, not in the reality space R, with a set of entities corresponding across the two spaces. To take an instance of (57a), P1 (you) *go by air* sets up a hypothetical mental space, distinct from the reality, and then P2 *you’ll save time* will be taken as holding within this hypothetical space, as opposed to the reality space. The imperative in this construction shifts the viewpoint to the space it establishes. The clause thus invokes a special viewing
arrangement in which the content of the and-clause is apprehended from a fictive vantage point, rather than the actual point. This is the conceptual structure shared by both and-conditional imperatives and corresponding (predictive) if-conditionals, which directly accounts for the paraphrase relationship. This type of mental transfer to a fictive (temporal) vantage point is a well-attested phenomenon, pervasive in numerous subordinate constructions with when, until, before, after, while, among others.

Next, the mental space theory also affords a conceptual basis for the semantic affinity between or-conditional imperatives (59) and their near-synonymous if-not sentences (60):

(59)a. Come on time or you’ll miss the flight.
   b. Leave or I’ll call the police.
   c. Don’t you tease my dog or I’ll tell my dad.

(60)a. Come on time!—if not, you’ll miss the flight.
   b. Leave!—if not, I’ll call the police.
   c. Don’t you tease my dog!—if you do, I’ll tell my dad.

The imperative in (59) similarly sets up a hypothetical mental space C, distinct from the reality space R. But, in the next step, the declarative (P2) will be taken as holding in an extension of \( \neg C \), but neither C nor R. To take an instance of (59a), P1 (you) come on time sets up a hypothetical mental space, distinct from the reality, and then P2 you’ll miss the flight
will be taken as holding in an extension of the implied you don’t come on time, as opposed to (you) come on time or the reality.

Why does this configuration take place? Because or marks an asymmetric as opposed to symmetric alternative. This construction involves the sequence of ‘P₁ (HIGHLY DESIRABLE)-OR- P₂ (MOST UNDESIRABLE)’. According to the theory of Desirability (cf. Akatsuka), only undesirability, not desirability, leads to undesirability, as far as ordinary (i.e., non-concessive) conditional sequences are concerned; compare If you don’t listen to your parents (UNDESIRABLE), you’ll be sorry (UNDESIRABLE) and If you speak to her (DESIRABLE), she’ll be happy (DESIRABLE)). As a result, the situation you’ll miss the flight, normally considered undesirable, is only interpretable as a consequence of a symmetrically undesirable situation. Partly because the event of NOT COMING ON TIME is evoked as the most plausible alternative for the event of COMING ON TIME, and partly because someone’s failure to arrive on time is considered extremely undesirable in English and probably most other cultures, the or-clause is interpreted as holding inside this implied alternative space—a configuration which gives rise to an IF-NOT interpretation. With symmetric or constructions such as You can stay at the hotel or you can sleep in my house, such a mental space alignment does not arise.

The imperative in or-conditional sentences invokes a special viewing arrangement in which the content of the or-clause is interpreted from such an implied alternative vantage point,
rather than the viewpoint of the imperative itself. This conceptual structure accounts for the close semantic correlation between or-conditional imperatives such as sentences (59) and corresponding if-not conditionals such as sentences (60). In this respect, one may regard the implicit IF-NOT reading of or-conditional imperatives as one instantiation of the RESULT-FOR-ACTION metonymy in the sense defined in Panther and Thornburg (1999; 2000); see the last part of this section), where the causal (as well as undesirable) action is metonymically inferred via the overt resultant (as well as equally undesirable) state.

Negative Polarity Items

It is well documented that a certain class of negative polarity items such as lift a finger, (indefinite) any, or a (single) soul are licensed in and-conditional imperatives (and if-conditionals):

(61)a. Lift a finger to help her and you'll be sorry.

   b. Come any closer and I'll call the police.

   c. Mention that to a single soul and I'll never forgive you.

In contrast, these items are not admitted in or-imperative constructions:

(62)a. \*Lift a finger to help her or she will get mad.

   b. \*Come any closer or I can’t hear you.
c. *Mention that to a single soul or nobody will know the truth.

Nor are they sanctioned in independent imperatives unless overtly negated:

(63)a. *Lift a finger to help her.
    
    b. Don’t lift a finger to help her.

(64)a. *Come any closer.
    
    b. Don’t come any closer.

(65)a. *Mention that to a single soul.
    
    b. Don’t mention that to a single soul.

Next, negative polarity items are not licensed by all types of and-conditional imperatives but preferably by those with ‘negative interpretations’ (cf. Davies 1986, Clark 1993):

(66)a. *Lift a finger to help her and she'll be happy.
    
    b. *Come any closer and I'll give you a candy.
    
    c. *Mention that to a living soul and I'll appreciate it.

Unlike (61) above, sentences (66) are interpreted with ‘positive interpretations.’

As we have discussed above, and-conditional imperatives can be characterized in terms of left-subordinating and plus non-prototypical imperative. Within this framework, imperatives with
'negative interpretations' constitute a subset of non-prototypical imperatives--those with minus force. Let us examine how this characterization will correlate with the major proposals/findings concerning the problem of NPI licensing. Negative polarity items (or polarity items in general) are forms which systematically fail to appear in certain grammatical environments. They can be used most comfortably in overt negative sentences, but not in the corresponding positive sentences. Negative polarity items actually come in at least two varieties, 'strong' NPIs such as lift a finger or a (single) soul (minimizers) and 'weak' NPIs such as any or ever (cf. Heim 1984, Jackson 1994, van der Wouden 1997), which are also termed 'emphatics' and 'non-emphatics,' respectively (cf. Giannakidou 1998, 1999). In general, nonemphatics are licensed in a much larger number of linguistic environments than emphatics, both within and across languages (cf. Giannakidou 1999). The former are admitted not only by 'strong' licensers such as overt negation and without-clauses but also by 'weak' or 'indirect' licensers including conditionals, relative clauses with quantified noun phrases, too-clauses, strong intensional verbs, negation-implicating verbs, inter alia.

As previous research on NPI licensing has already revealed (cf. Ladusaw 1996, Israel 1996, Giannakidou 1999), a comprehensive theory of polarity sensitivity must deal with two fundamental issues--the semantic property of sensitivity and the licenser question. I limit my discussions here to show that the
present analyses of two conditional imperatives are fully compatible with the predictions of two recent theories of NPI licensing in two very different traditions: the analysis of ‘nonveridicality’ supplemented by negative implicature as an ancillary mechanism for ‘indirect licensing’ (cf. Giannakidou 1998, 1999), and the approach of ‘scalar reasoning’ as a general cognitive-pragmatic mechanism for NPI licensing (cf. Israel (1995; 1996; 2001), based on Fauconnier (1975a; 1975b)).

First, Giannakidou (1998, 1999) developed an analysis of NPI licensing as sensitivity to ‘nonveridicality’, a notion broader than such classic notions as ‘affectivity’ (Klima 1964) and ‘downward entailing’ (cf. Ladusaw 1980, Hoeksema 1983, Zwarts 1986, Van der Wouden 1997, inter alia, notably Ladusaw). Under this logic-semantic approach, a propositional operator Op is veridical iff Op p entails p. That is, whenever Op p is true, p is also true too (where p is an arbitrary proposition). Op p is nonveridical if this does not hold, hence nonveridical operators—although non-veridical operators do not entail the falsity of p. Negation, before, and without, for instance, count as nonveridical, hence they feature prominently as appropriate licensers of NPIs. In contrast, affirmative unembedded assertions and perception verbs, for example, are veridical, so they block the appearance of NPIs (Giannakidou 1999: 384).

By distinguishing between NPIs (a class of expressions that depend exclusively on overt negation for grammaticality) and APIs (=‘affective polarity items’ representing the general class of
affective contexts including negation), Giannakidou postulates the following licensing conditions for APIs:

(67) Licensing conditions for affective polarity items

i) An affective polarity item \( \alpha \) will be licensed in a sentence \( S \) iff \( S \) is nonveridical.

ii) A sentence is nonveridical if it is in the scope of a nonveridical operator.

iii) In certain cases, \( \alpha \) may be licensed indirectly in \( S \) iff \( S \) gives rise to a negative implicature \( \phi \) and \( \alpha \) is in the direct scope of negation at \( \phi \).

(Giannakidou 1999: 408)

According to Giannakidou (1998), the imperative is a nonveridical operator, in that \( \text{Be hungry} \), for instance, does not entail the truth of \( \text{you are hungry} \) (Giannakidou, 130-131), so NPI should be sanctioned; as an illustration, Giannakidou offers the example \( \text{Take any apple!} \) (1999: 374). However, the property of nonveridicality alone does not make correct predictions concerning the NPIs in imperative utterances; while sentences (61) are acceptable, (62), the \( \alpha \)-sentences of (63) through (65), and (66) are all unacceptable despite the nonveridicality of these imperative utterances. Although Giannakidou does not address the NPI licensing in and-conditional imperatives, it is obvious that the secondary mechanism of ‘indirect licensing’ in (67iii) above captures the contrastive acceptability in the set...
of imperative utterances introduced above. In particular, compare the sentences in (61) with those in (66). Only the former, but not the latter, convey minus application of force, hence they give rise to a negative implicature (cf. Linebarger 1980; 1987). In short, within the framework of Giannakidou’s ‘indirect licensing,’ imperatives are among a set of nonveridical operators which are simultaneously sensitive to the notion of negative implicature. This sensitivity explains the acceptability of NPIs in and-conditional imperatives with negative (as opposed to positive) force, although Giannakidou’s theory in itself does not address the question of why NPI licensors are nonveridical in the first place.

Next, Israel (1995; 1996; 2001) is more concerned with functional motivations for NPIs’ sensitivity to the semantic property of logical entailments or scalar inference (cf. Fauconnier 1975a; 1975b). Ultimately, he claims that polarity phenomena pertain not so much to a simple theory of logic-semantic entailment alone as to a general cognitive ability of scalar reasoning. The main point of this theory is that an NPI is a form which must properly express its emphatic and informative value via ‘scalar reversal’; otherwise, its appearance results in infelicity. Israel (1995) offers a most explicit account for why NPIs favor negative, as opposed to positive, sentences:

(68)a. Marianne didn’t sleep a wink that night.
b. *Marianne slept a wink that night.

Sentences (68) contains a text proposition Marianne didn't sleep a minimal amount. This entails that M didn't sleep a normal amount (such as 8 hours), where inferences are running from low to high quantity value, so the NPI may properly express its emphatic and informative value. However, the NPI is not allowed in the affirmative b-sentence, because Marianne slept a minimal amount does not entail M slept a normal amount. As a result, the NPI cannot express its emphatic value (Israel 1995: 216).

Applied to and-conditional imperatives, Israel’s scalar model account explicitly explains why NPIs are licensed. Sentence (61a), for instance, would entail that Help her (a normal amount) and you’ll be sorry, where inferences are running from low to high quantity, so the NPI properly expresses its emphatic and informative value. The model also accounts for why NPIs are banned in affirmative command imperatives and or-imperatives, since the imperative Lift a finger to help her does not invite any scalar construal; nor does *Lift a finger to help her or she will get mad at all. Under this approach, the primary property for NPI licensing can be identified as scalar reversal, a feature shared by both overt negation and left-subordinating and constructions but not by asymmetric or.

However, when it comes to and-conditional imperatives with positive interpretations such as (66), this Scalar Model alone does not seem to make correct predictions; rather, it incorrectly
predicts the NPI to be acceptable. To take an instance of the a-sentence, it entails something to the effect that Help her (a normal amount) and she'll be happy, where inferences are running from low to high quantity value, so the sentence should be acceptable. It seems clear then that to license certain NPIs, ‘weak’ licensers such as and-conditional imperatives (or more generally, left-subordinating and) need some negative implicature as well as scalar reasoning.

In summary, and-conditional imperatives fit in with Giannakidou’s proposed mechanism for indirect licensing of NPIs, in that they involve both the semantic feature of nonveridicality and a negative implicature when force is negatively exerted. Israel’s theory of scalar reasoning offers a succinct account of why some and-conditional imperatives are able to license NPIs without overt negation, although this proposal must integrate the requirement of negative implicature. Ideally, a theory is needed that combines the mechanism for scalar reasoning and the one for negative implicature.

Stative Predicates
Both and-conditional imperatives (69) and or-conditional imperatives (71) readily allow a set of stative predicates which would sound more or less awkward in straight imperatives:

(69)a. Doubt that you will succeed, and you will not succeed.
     b. Know the answer and you will get an A.
c. Be rich and you'll be respected.
d. Be intelligent and you'll get into M.I.T.

(70)a. ?Doubt that you will succeed.
b. ?Know the answer.
c. ?Be rich.
d. ?Be intelligent.

(71)a. Appreciate literature or college girls won't like you.
b. Know the answer or you'll flunk.
c. Be tall or you won't make the basketball team.
d. Be rich or you won't be respected.

(72)a. ?Appreciate literature.
b. ?Be tall.

[Lakoff 1966, 3-5]

First, the felicity of stative predicates in and-conditional imperative sentences (69) can be best accounted for in terms of aspects of non-prototypical, or more accurately, peripheral, imperative. Note that all the examples of (69) above read as more genuinely hypothetical than mild command. My claim is that when an imperative appearing with left-subordinating and involves around zero force and lacks features of agency and dynamicity, it hardly functions like an ordinary imperative, blends in with the infinitive (cf. Bolinger 1977), and behaves exactly like an if-clause. The felicity of stative predicates here can be directly attributed to features of peripheral imperative, as well as those of left-subordinating and.
Next, the acceptability of stative predicates in or-conditional imperatives (71) is problematic for most analyses of imperatives, since the imperative in this sentence is a 'true command' involving strong force, agency, and overall dynamicity—the kind of imperative which should not tolerate stative predicates. I would like to suggest that the felicity of these sentences can be best handled by the 'RESULT FOR ACTION' metonymic principle, in the sense outlined and developed in Panther and Thornburg (2000), who treated the following 'illegitimate' uses of stative verbs in (73) below as a special case of the EFFECT-FOR-CAUSE metonymy:

(73)a. Stand behind the yellow line.
   b. Have documents ready.

To avoid the proliferation of verb senses, Panther & Thornburg rejected positing two separate (stative and active) senses for the verbs stand and have. Under their metonymic account, the mental state of appreciation or knowledge is caused by the intentional effort of a human agent, in this case the addressee (Panther and Thornburg, 222). Applied to sentences (71), these or-conditional imperatives may be paraphrased as 'Do something to the effect so that as a result you appreciate literature (a), know the answer (b), or get tall or rich (c, d). They are careful to note that such conceptual metonymy does not operate at random:
(74)a. Know that John spent the night in jail.
   b. Be in love with your fiancé.
   c. Have a crush on your neighbor.

The sentences of (74) are not as good as (73), they say, because mental or knowledge states that cannot readily be attributed to an intentional causer are less likely to occur in action constructions (Panther and Thornburg, 221-223).

Given this metonymic analysis, we can treat the felicitous appearance of stative predicates in or-imperative constructions as just another case of this metonymic operation. Consider:

(75)a. Know your duties by 8:00 or you'll be cleaning latrines for the next four years.
   b. Know the poem by Friday. (Davies 1986: 13)
   c. Know the answer because your life will depend on it.
   d. Exist apart, in your new luxury condominium.

As these examples reveal, the or-conditional imperative such as (75a) is not the only environment sanctioning the occurrence of stative predicates. Time-bounding adverbials (by Friday), because-clauses, as well as locative phrases (in your new luxury condominium) also serve to increase the acceptability of stative predicates. Importantly, all the imperatives in (75) are interpreted as more directive than hypothetical, which goes to show that the dynamic, agentive, conception obligatory for the
RESULTANT-STATE-FOR-ACTION metonymy might be facilitated by numerous sources including, but not limited to, or-conditional imperatives.⁹

In this section, I have linked the felicity of stative predicates in some and-conditional imperatives directly to a central feature of peripheral imperatives: the absence of force. Conversely, we have ascribed the felicity of stative predicates in or-conditional imperatives to a representative feature of prototypical imperatives: the presence of strong force.
SUMMARY

In this chapter, I have compared two different approaches to and/or-conditional imperatives. I first examined Clark’s (1993) relevance analysis, which treated the and and or in these constructions in purely semantic terms as reducible to logical symbols, analyzed the imperative and the declarative as an ordinary imperative and declarative, respectively, and distinguished three separate interpretations of imperatives. I have found that his system is inadequate to fully characterize two conditional imperatives. For one thing, it does not provide an answer to why a conditional sense arises from these imperative constructions. In addition, the relevance principle of ‘unjustifiable processing effort’ does not satisfactorily explain why or-conditional imperatives are restricted to only ‘positive’ interpretations, either. Moreover, this analysis does not capture the subtle contrast in the imperative’s strength of force between the and-conditional imperative (Do that and you’ll feel better) and the independent imperative (Do that!) or the or-conditional imperative (Do that or I’ll punish you), all of which are categorized with ‘positive readings’ according to Clark’s proposal.

In contrast, the proposed cognitive account has analyzed the and-conditional imperative in terms of left-subordinating and plus non-prototypical imperative, and the or-conditional imperative in terms of asymmetric or plus prototypical imperative.
Within this framework, *and*-conditional sentences and *or*-conditional sentences stand in complementary distribution, since imperatives with strong force (=prototypical imperatives) are unwelcome in the former but welcome in the latter, whereas imperatives without strong force (=non-prototypical imperatives) are welcome in the former but unwelcome in the latter. Ultimately, we can attribute features of the *and*-conditional imperative directly to those of the left-subordinating *and* construction, which is iconic in clause order, lacks commitment (hence, non-assertiveness), and involves mutual dependence and symmetry between two conjuncts.

Similarly, we can ascribe features of the *or*-conditional imperative directly to those of the asymmetric *or* construction, which is also iconic but asymmetric in focal prominence and epistemic stance between two conjuncts and which involves the left conjunct’s relative independence. The approach adopted in this chapter offers a natural and unitary account of a set of seemingly disparate phenomena including the semantic difference between two conditional imperatives, the felicity of negative polarity items, and stative predicates.

There seems to be more to the features of the two conditional imperatives that can be explained by any single theory of syntax, semantics or pragmatics alone. I hope I have shown that the approach of the present chapter can afford a much richer characterization of two coordinate imperative constructions.
Notes to Chapter 4

1 I am not arguing here that for an imperative to be read with strong force, the appearance of emphatic attitudinals is needed. The vast majority of imperative utterances involve strong force without any overt strong attitudinal markers. The point I am making here is that these items serve to disambiguate the degree and kind of force exerted, which is normally implicitly contained in imperative utterances in English.

2 Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1303-4) offer similar examples in their analyses of many asymmetric constructions found in English:

(i)a. I'm leaving before the end or I'll miss my train.
    b. I left early or I would have missed my train.
    c. Hurry up or we'll be late.
    d. Don't do that again or you'll be fired.
    e. She hadn't spoken to John, who had had to leave early or he/*who) would have missed his train.

3 One finds in Akatsuka (1997: 344) the following analysis of a negated or-conditional imperative:

(i) Don't don't don't ever let me catch you with this ok or I'll give you good spanking.
(= If I catch you with this, I’ll give you a good spanking.

[undesirable]               [undesirable]

Unfortunately, this analysis does not accurately capture the semantic nature of this construction. I suggest that a more appropriate paraphrase would be something like the following:

(ii) Don’t ever let me catch you with this [desirable]; (If you do) [undesirable], I’ll give you a good spanking

[undesirable].

The speaker wants to make sure that the addresse should do his/her best NEVER TO DO IT AGAIN—an action/behavior which is treated as most desirable, hence directive force is being most strongly exerted.

This does not mean, however, that the ka or soretomo form can not be used asymmetrically:

(i) jiyu ka/soretomo si o.

liberty or death DO.

(Give me liberty or give me death!)
But ka and soretomo seems restricted to a coordination of two noun phrases and to a special, emphatic, context (such as political slogan).

5 Not surprisingly, the or-conditional imperative sentence comfortably translates into a command imperative in Japanese. See chapter 5 for further discussion.

6 In fairness, Clark (1993: 99-101) mentions the correlation between Finish your medicine or you’ll have a relapse (or-imperative) and the following sentences:

(i) You should finish your medicine or you’ll have a relapse.

(ii) You should finish your medicine. Otherwise, you’ll have a relapse.

(iii) You should finish your medicine or else you’ll have a relapse.

However, Clark did not pursue any further than suggesting that “or can sometimes be interpreted as meaning ‘or else’” (Clark, 101).

7 Giannakidou argues that entailing the falsity of p is the defining property of ‘antiveridical’ operators, which form a subset of the nonveridical; every antiveridical operator is also nonveridical but no vice versa. Sentence negation is the prototypical antiverdical operator (Giannakidou 1998: 109).
Smith (1994) makes a similar point when she remarks that states may become acceptable in imperatives or sentences with dynamic verbs involving the 'change into a state' (Smith, 43):

(i)a. I persuaded Mary to trust John.
   b. Don't be angry!
   c. John was deliberately angry.

The sentences here are accepted, Smith explains, because they all 'refer to the coming about of a state, an event which may indeed be under the control of an agent' (Smith, 43).

But, stative predicates remain unacceptable in sentences involving only the 'maintenance of a state' (ibid.):

(ii)a. *John deliberately knew Greek.
   b. *Know Greek!
   c. *I persuaded Mary to know Greek.

See Nishimura (2002a; 2002b) for useful discussions of other dimensions of metonymic operations in grammar across different languages.
Chapter 5

Japanese Imperatives and Force Exertion

I have examined English imperatives from the perspective of force exertion along with overall parameters for imperative prototypes. If this analysis is of universal validity, then we should expect it to apply to other (unrelated) languages. In this chapter, I discuss imperatives in Japanese, a language with dissimilar grammatical structures. I show first that Japanese abounds in imperative markers reflective of the power relationship between the speakers, politeness, and different illocutionary forces; most notably, Japanese imperatives lexically differentiate directive from non-directive force. Then I focus on four forms considered more representative plus one form functionally distinct from others. Specifically, I discuss the bare imperative and its polite alternative nasai, both of which I call ‘command forms’ based on their typical function, as well as kure ‘give (me)’ and its polite version kudasai, both of which I term as ‘request forms’ according to their central usage. I also analyze one more (command) form sitemiro ‘try’ (or its polite equivalent sitegoran(nasai)). I examine whether and to what extent these forms depart from their typical uses to be used without any force or with negative force. I point out that the five forms in question are constrained in subtly different ways and that sitemiro in general can be used most comfortably in these non-standard uses.
Next, I discuss passive imperatives in Japanese. We observe that (bare) imperatives in Japanese become more acceptable when they occur with verbs of high self-controllability (cf. Nitta 1992). I then point out that the form *sitemiro* permits a far wider range of passive imperatives, regardless of verb classes. I offer an explanation of this contrastive felicity in terms of the constructional compatibility between the imperative and the passive along the lines of my argument in chapter 3.

5.1 Introduction

In English, the imperative denotes a clause which normally has no grammatical subject ‘you’ and contains the infinitive verb. There is no need for lengthy discussion as far as the form of the English imperative is concerned. This is not the case with Japanese, since the language possesses a rich repertoire of imperative markers, which are capable of lexically coding subtly different illocutionary forces.

Previous literature has discussed Japanese imperative forms within the broad category of directive speech acts, as a ‘mood’ (Masuoka and Takubo 1992, Nitta 1999, inter alia) or ‘modality’ (Moriyama, Nitta, and Kudo 2000, among others), in which the speaker attempts to exert influence on the addressee. Some works have divided a variety of directive speech acts into three large categories, command, request, and prohibition (i.e., the negative imperative) (cf. Masuoka and Takubo 1992, Nitta 1999, Moriyama, Nitta, and Kudo 2000, *inter alia*), while others include other categories such as invitation, and

Two command forms treated as most representative in reference grammar works are the bare form and the polite form *nasai*. Let me briefly explain the Japanese verb system first. Japanese verbs can be divided into two main groups according to how they conjugate, i.e., change the endings to indicate, for example, a past, imperative, volition, or prohibition (i.e., negative imperative), although there are a set of irregular verbs. One group is called *godan* verbs. This group is also labeled as ‘-u verbs’ as the final ‘-u’ of the romanized dictionary form is dropped before other endings are attached. All ‘-u verbs’ have a dictionary form ending ‘-u’ as in *yomu* ‘read,’ *hanasu* ‘talk’ and have an imperative form ending ‘-e’ as in *yome* ‘read-IMP,’ *hanase* ‘talk-IMP.’ Another term (found in textbooks for Japanese learners) is group one verbs (Bunt 2003: 259). The other group is called *ichidan* verbs. This group is often called ‘-ru verbs’ as the final syllable ‘-ru’ of the dictionary form is dropped before other endings are added. All ‘-ru verbs’ have dictionary forms ending –ru (*taberu* ‘eat,’ *miru* ‘see/look,’ etc.) and have imperative forms ending ‘-ro’ (*tabero* ‘eat-IMP,’ *miro* ‘look-IMP,’ etc.). Another term is group two verbs (Bunt 2000: 27). The majority of Japanese verbs can be identified as either ‘-ru verbs’ or ‘-u verbs,’ although there are some ‘-u verbs’ ending like ‘-ru verbs,’ as well as irregular verbs.

Following the standard practice, I use *siro* as a convenient cover term for the bare (command) imperative, although this is actually the imperative form of the ‘-ru’ verb *suru* ‘do.’ Next, the polite form *nasai* is the imperative form of the honorific verb *nasaru* ‘do’ used
as an auxiliary. There are several other forms used as commands/orders. Included are the form *sitemiro* ‘do see/try’ and its polite alternative *sitegoran*(*nasai*), both of which are commonly used in spoken and written Japanese, and *miyo* ‘see-IMP’ and *seyo* ‘do-IMP’ which are normally used in written Japanese. In addition, there are some honorific forms including (but not limited to) *IRRASSYA1*, which is an auxiliary verb derived from the imperative form of the honorific verb *IRRASSYARU* ‘go/come’ as well as *TAMAE*, which is also an auxiliary verb derived from the imperative form of the honorific verb *TAMAU* ‘give.’

Next, two request forms treated as representative in reference grammar books are the form *kure* and its polite form *kudasai*. *Kure* is originally the imperative form of the verb *KURERU* ‘give (me)’ used as an auxiliary. *Kudasai* is also the imperative form, which is the honorific version of *kureru* ‘give (me).’ There is also a highly polite request form *O-V-Kudasai*. The –te form is also frequently used in the sense of a request, which some (though not all) authors regard as a shortened version of fuller request forms *te-kure* and *te-kudasai* (cf. Nitta et al. 2003: 74). The negative imperative is formed in the same way for all verbs—by adding the prohibition form *na* ‘don’t’ to the dictionary form of a verb, as in *yomu-na* ‘read-don’t’ or *taberu-na* ‘eat-don’t.’

I am not going to give a complete characterization of every imperative form in Japanese, which goes far beyond the scope of the present chapter. I limit my discussions to four forms considered more representative and one (command) form functionally distinct from other forms. Specifically, I discuss two command forms *siro* and *nasai* and
two request forms *kure* and *kudasai*. I also discuss in some detail
the command form *sitemiro*, which sometimes behaves more like a
conditional connective than imperative, as later discussions will
reveal. I exclude from discussions the *–te* form (used as a request)
and the prohibition form *na* (i.e., the negative imperative), as well
as the invitation (or volitional) form *siyoo* since these are not
morphologically imperative, although these forms are quite common and
may perform directive speech acts. I also exclude a number of
non-imperative forms which conventionally perform indirect directive
speech acts.

Before going further, it would be useful to briefly summarize the
social restrictions imposed on the usage of the imperative forms under
*siro* and *nasai* are used in the following ways. First, the bare form
*siro* is normally used only by male speakers, whereas the polite version
*nasai* can be used both by male and female speakers. Second, *siro* is
normally used when the speaker is older than, and/or socially superior
to, the addressee, or between the speakers in a close social
relationship. *Nasai* is also normally used when the speaker is older
than, and/or socially superior to, the addressee. However, this
principle may be flouted; for instance, to show closeness, an adult
daughter may use the *nasai* form to her mother; and a female speaker
may use *nasai* to her boyfriend or husband (Murakami 1993: 104-105).
Third, a speaker in extreme emergency may use the bare command,
ignoring the relative social status.

Sato (1992: 153-157) describes a set of social restrictions
imposed on the usage of two request forms *kure* and *kudasai* in terms of (a) the speaker’s gender, (b) relative social position, (c) closeness between communicators, and (d) (in)formality of situation. First, *kure* is in principle used by male speakers, whereas *kudasai* can be used both by male and female speakers. Second, *kure* is not used when the addressee is older than, or socially superior to, the speaker, although this form can be used in symmetric relation. In contrast, the polite version *kudasai* can be used when the addressee is older than, or socially superior to, the addressee. Third, *kure* tends to be used in close relationships—for example, between friends and between family members. In contrast, *kudasai* is normally used in more formal situations and/or in distant relation. Fourth, *kure* is generally used in more informal contexts than *kudasai*.

There is a general consensus among Japanese linguists that the bare command as in *hayaku siro* ‘Do it quick’ can sound rude and harsh, and Japanese speakers tend to avoid it in everyday conversation. Even the polite form *nasai* as in *hayaku sinasai* sounds too forceful and authoritative and Japanese speakers prefer not to use it. Instead, speakers resort to a variety of more indirect means including politer command forms or politer request forms as well as numerous non-imperative forms conventionally conveying directive speech acts. In my survey of *The Pelican Brief* (by John Grisham) and its Japanese translation (by Ro Shiraishi), I found that out of a total of 556 tokens of the imperative, 47 tokens (8.5%) are translated into the bare command and 5 (0.9%) into *nasai* (polite command), 56 (10.0%) into *kure* (non-polite request), and 22 (3.95%) into *kudasai* (and *o kudasai*).
(polite request). The form most frequently used is the \textit{–te} form with 69 tokens (12.4\%). I obtained a similar result in my survey of another mystery novel, \textit{The Sky is Falling} (by Sidney Sheldon), and its Japanese translation (by Tatsuyuki Tenma). I found that out of 314 tokens of the English imperative, 21 (6.7\%) are translated into the bare command, 22 (7.0\%) into \textit{nasai} (polite command), 9 (2.8\%) into \textit{kure} (non-polite request), and 44 (14.0\%) into \textit{kudasai} (and \textit{o kudasai}) (polite request).

Even here, the \textit{–te} form is frequently used with 35 tokens (11.1\%). This result is consistent with the common view that in giving orders or making requests Japanese speakers favor request forms rather than command, and non-imperative forms rather than imperative, although there are cases in which an indirect directive sentence such as ‘I want you to do …’ is translated into the bare command in Japanese.

5.2 Previous Proposals

In this subsection, I first introduce three studies which characterized Japanese imperatives in semantic and pragmatic terms.

Semantic/Pragmatic Characterizations of Japanese Imperatives

Masuoka and Takubo (1992) view the imperative as a grammatical mood conveying a variety of demands towards addressees, as represented in such illocutionary acts as command, prohibition or request. First, they define command as a ‘mood’ compelling the other party to perform some action. To be interpreted as a command, they maintain, a sentence
needs to present not only an action being compelled but also the speaker’s volition that the action be compelled.

Second, they distinguish between explicit vs. implicit commands. The former refer to forms which are ‘exclusively used for commands’ including the bare imperative, *nasai*, and the –*te* form of the verb; they view the bare imperative as the strongest type of command but *nasai* and the –*te* form as progressively weaker in the degree of compelling force. They point out that command imperatives prefer volitional verbs, although non-volitional verbs may occur with commands and perform such functions as pleas and curses. By implicit command, they refer to cases in which the speaker employs a non-imperative form to convey a command indirectly—via the speaker’s attitude or the intonation of the sentence. Included are the dictionary form of a verb, the combination of a verb’s dictionary form plus *koto*, an abstract noun meaning ‘thing,’ as well as the –*ta* form of the verb.

Third, Masuoka and Takubo (1992) characterize a request as a ‘mood’ asking the other party to do some action. They find requests to be politer than commands in that the speaker has more respect for the addressee’s will (*ibid.*, 121). They distinguish between direct vs. indirect request. Direct requests refer to such forms as *kure, kudasai* and *tyoodai* as well as interrogative forms such as *kureruka* ‘Can you ~ for me’ and *kurenaika* ‘Can’t you ~ for me.’ Indirect requests include declarative forms expressing the speaker’s wishes such as *hosii* or *moraitai* ‘I want you to do ~.’
Next, Moriyama, Nitta and Kudo (2000) make a point similar to Masuoka and Takubo (1992), in that with commands, speakers do not have much respect for addressees’ volition, whereas with requests, speakers politely ask a favor of addressees. They also note that the imperative form is closely associated with the speaker’s interest as manifested in the beneficial expression kure ‘give (me)’ or its polite form kudasai, although they point out that the form kure is stylistically vulgar and impolite, so less direct forms tyoodai or the –te form of the verb is more often used in everyday speech (ibid., 72).

Finally, Nitta (1999) conducts a detailed, theoretical analysis of imperatives in Japanese. First, he attributes the difference between command and request to the presence vs. absence of the speaker’s control over the addressee’s action. With commands, according to Nitta, the speaker attempts to control the addressee’s action, whereas with requests the speaker asks a favor of the addressee; only when the addressee complies does the speaker expect him or her to carry out the action (Nitta, 230). He also observes that the division between command and request is not clear-cut but should be viewed as a continuum instead.4

Second, Nitta lists the following pragmatic conditions for the use of imperative sentences from the perspectives of [I] the speaker, [II] the hearer, and [III] the designated state-of-affairs (239-240):

(1) Nitta’s Pragmatic Conditions for Commands

[I] S’s condition

[I, a] The speaker is in a position/situation to act upon H.
[I, b, 1] S wants H to carry out some action.

[I, b, 2] S considers the situation H fulfills to be beneficial/desirable for him/herself

[II] H’s condition

[II, a] There exists H as a performer of S’s directive speech act.

[II, b] H can deliberately attempt to perform, and accomplish, the action.

[III] Condition of the situation to be fulfilled

The state-of-affairs that is ordered is unfulfilled.

According to Nitta, prototypical commands such as (2) meet all of the above conditions:

(2) Oi, kuruma o tomero.

Hey, car ACC stop-IMP

‘Hey, stop the car.’

[Nitta, ex. 55]

In contrast, a wishing sentence such as (3) below does not; although the condition [I, b, 2] is met, condition [II] is not (Nitta 1999: 240-241):

(3) Asita, tenki ni nare.

tomorrow, good weather DAT become-IMP

‘May it be fine tomorrow.’

[Nitta, ex. 57]
Based on this comparison, Nitta contends that wishing is broader in conception than command. All commands are wishing sentences, but not all wishing sentences are commands. ⁵

Next, Nitta terms examples like those below in (4) through (6) as ‘ironical commands’:

(4) Baka  ie!
    nonsense talk-IMP
    ‘Talk nonsense!’ — That’s nonsense!

(5) Uso  o  tuke!
    lie ACC tell-IMP
    ‘Tell a lie!’ — That’s a lie!

(6) Uteru  mononara utte-miro.
    Shoot can if  shoot-try
    ‘Shoot if you can!’

[Nitta, exx. 101, 103, and 104]

Taken literally, the imperatives here appear to function as an order (to talk nonsense, tell a lie, or shoot). Actually, these utterances warn the addressee against doing the designated actions. Nitta explains that ironical commands fail to meet the condition in [I, b, 2] above, as speakers do not find the designated state-of-affairs to be desirable, although these sentences do satisfy the condition in [II] as they treat the other party as a self-controllable entity.

Finally, Nitta suggests that (at least) two types of command be
distinguished, achievement and process command, according to the nature of the verb as well as the conception of the entire clause (243). Compare:

(7) <achievement command>
    Moo ii, atti e ike.
    All right, over there go-IMP
    ‘All right, go over there!’

(8) <process command>
    Maa, otituke yo.
    Come on, calm down-IMP-SFP
    ‘Come on, calm down.’

[Nitta, exx. 69 and 70]

Nitta maintains that these two command sentences above are not totally identical in nature. In (7) (achievement command), the addressee is able to complete the action of ‘going.’ This type of action is perceived as highly self-controllable, since one can begin, perform, and finish the act of going on his/her own will. In (8) (process command), the addressee is unable to go through the whole routine; rather, he or she can only ATTEMPT TO calm down. This kind of action is relatively less self-controllable. Nitta also notes that the division between achievement and process command is not absolute, since imperatives with non-volitional verbs like sinpaisuru ‘worry’ might become more acceptable in sentences implying more self-controllability on the part of the subject entity (Nitta, 245).
Nitta’s (pragmatic) characterizations of Japanese imperatives is basically compatible with the approach of the present work. One difference worthy of mention is that Nitta’s conditions in (1) do not prioritize these pragmatic conditions. Another important difference pertains to the treatment of force exertion. Nitta does not consider that the imperative centers around the degree of force exertion; nor does he seem to treat it in terms of gradient.

It seems evident that there is a considerable overlap among these studies in the general (semantic and pragmatic) characterizations of imperatives in Japanese. In particular, we find that as we have observed concerning their English counterparts, Japanese imperatives can also be associated with such features as the exertion of force, the speaker’s interest, and desirability.

Different Illocutionary Acts and Discourse Functions

In chapter 2, we observed that English imperatives convey a wide variety of illocutionary acts and discourse functions. Here I introduce three descriptive studies to observe whether Japanese imperative perform similar functions: Murakami (1993) on the bare imperative (*sirō* and *sitemiro*), Nagano (1995) on *sitemiro* as compared *sirō*, and Sato (1992) on request forms *kure* and *kudasai*. These authors conducted comprehensive descriptive studies based on rich naturally-occurring data. We find that these command and request forms can be used to convey ‘non-commands’ and ‘non-requests,’ respectively, in addition to their standard senses.

Murakami (1993: 108-113) enumerates seven types in which command
forms *siro* and *sitemiro* can be used as ‘non-commands.’ The first is the case in which the speaker talks to him/herself:

(9) Kare wa zibun no kokoro ni aratamete iikikase-ta.

He TOP self GEN mind DAT again persuade-PST

“Hatarake. Hatakare. Sosite hatarake!”

Work-IMP Work-IMP And then work-IMP

‘He talked to himself again. “Work! Work! And work!”’

[Murakami, ex. 351]

The second is the case in which a speaker is giving a word of encouragement to his/her addressee; he or she does not want or force the addressee to initiate an action:

(10) (to a child practicing a bicycle-ride)

Erai zo, ganbare.

great-SFP, try hard-IMP)

‘Great, keep going.’

[Murakami, ex. 357]

The third type is the case in which the speaker is expressing his or her wishes:

(11) “Koohuku de are” to kare wa kokoro ni inot-ta.

happy be-IMP COMP he TOP mind DAT pray-PST

‘“Be happy,” he prayed.’
Here, the speaker is only praying that a certain state-of-affairs will come true.

The fourth type pertains to the form *sitemiro* as opposed to *siro*, and he terms it as ‘the presentation of a hypothetical situation.’ *Sitemiro* is originally a serial verb construction comprised of the verb *suru* ‘do’ plus the verb *miru* ‘see’ meaning ‘try.’ Murakami identifies three subtypes (1993: 110-111) of this usage. In the first, *sitemiro* allows a speaker to present a hypothetical state-of-affairs and then mention an expected consequence of this situation. The entire message gives a warning; the addressee is not literally requested to carry out the designated action:

(12) Kono mae no yooni, Yosimura to issyo datte-miro

last time GEN like, Yosimura with together COP-try

mendoona koto ni naru.

trouble DAT become

‘Just imagine that I am with Yosimura like before, I’ll/we’ll get into trouble.’

[Murakami, ex. 367]

The second subtype functions more like a threat. In this usage, the *sitemiro* clause is typically followed by a clause describing the speaker’s possible action as a form of retaliation:
(13) Moo itido itte-miro, kono ana ni butikomu zo.  
once more say-try-IMP this hole DAT throw-SFP  
‘Say that again, I’ll throw you into this hole.’  
[Murakami, ex. 373]

In the third subtype, the speaker presents a hypothetical action as a dare, knowing that the addressee is incapable of doing that action:

(14) Nige-rareru nara nigete-miro.  
run away-can if run away-try  
‘Run away if (you think) you can!’  
[Murakami, ex. 378]

The intended message here is that “I know you can’t.”

In the fifth type of non-command use, the command form allows the speaker to express reluctant acceptances or curses:

(15) Katteni siro! Sugiko towa zekkoo da.  
one’s way do-IMP, Sugiko from breaking off COP  
‘Let her do as she pleases! I break up with Sugiko.’  
[Mukarami, ex. 386]

In the sixth type, the command form is used in quotation:

(16) Tada hitotu moosiage-tai koto wa,  
only one thing say(HUMBLE) want thing TOP,
tetu wa akai utini ute, to yuu koto desu.
iron TOP red when hit-IMP COMP thing COP(POL).
‘One thing I want to say is strike while the iron is hot.’
[Murakami, ex. 394]

Finally, Murakami observes that a few verbs in the bare imperative form can express concession if they combine with a particle/particles. He lists the following four such constructions: ni-siro ‘PRT-do-IMP,’ ni-seyo ‘PRT-do-IMP,’ towa-ie ‘PRT-PRT-say-IMP’ and de-are ‘PRT-be-IMP.’ Example (17) illustrates the imperative form ni-siro used as a concessive phrase:

(17) Tatoe hahaoya ga sinbun o minakat-ta ni-siro, ...
    if mother NOM paper ACC see-not-PST PRT-do-IMP
    ‘Even if the mother didn’t look at the newspaper, …’
    [Murakami, ex. 398]

Nagano’s (1995) study merits special attention. She clearly demonstrates that in addition to the command use, sitemiro has the function of expressing genuine hypotheticality, a feature not shared by siro. That sitemiro can be genuinely hypothetical means, according to Nagano, that the verb lacks the sense of volitionality, the addressee is not an agent of the designated event, and there is hardly any force exertion in the sentence (Nagano 1995: 658). Nagano presents a number of examples where sitemiro but not siro can be used felicitously. In the example below with a first-person subject, the
a sentence is perfectly acceptable with *sitemiro* but becomes unacceptable when it is replaced by a bare command *sine* ‘die-IMP’ as the b sentence illustrates:

(18)a. Ore ga sinde-miro. omae-tati doosite kutteku.

    I NOM die-try. You PLR how eat-go

    ‘Just imagine that I die. How can you survive?’

(18)b. *Orega sine. omae-tati doosite kutteku.

    I die-IMP. you PLR how eat-go

She identifies two major patterns in which *sitemiro* can be perceived as genuinely hypothetical as opposed to directive. The first is a case in which *sitemiro* occurs with a non-volitional verb or indicates a non-volitional activity:

(19) Matigatte Handai ni gookaku site-miro/*siro,

    By mistake Osaka University DAT pass try/do-IMP

    Yatu-ra kosi nukasu zo.

    they(VULGAR) get flabbergasted-SFP

    ‘Just imagine that you get into Osaka University by chance,
    they will get flabbergasted.’

    [Nagano, ex. 17]

In the second pattern, *sitemiro* (or its polite variant *sitegoran(nasai)*) occurs with a volitional verb; the subject can be in the first person (20) and third person (21), as well as second person
(22):

(20) Watasi ga sonna koto o itte-goran/*ii-nasai,
    I NOM such thing ACC say-try(POL)/say-IMP(POL)
donna koto ni naru ka …
    What thing DAT become QUESTION
‘Just imagine that I say such a thing. What will happen?’
 [Nagano, ex. 18]

(21) Aitu ga hitokoto syabette-miro/*syabere,
    that guy NOM one thing say-try/say-IMP
subete wa osimai da.
    everything TOP over is
‘Just imagine that that guy says something. Everything will
be over.’
 [Nagano, ex. 21]

(22)a. Watasi ni yubi ippon hurete-miro/*hurero
    me finger one touch-try/touch-IMP
matomona karada de kaerenai yooni site-yaru.
    intact body in go gack-not-so that do-give (you)
‘Just touch me (a finger), and you’ll never be able to leave
here in one piece.’
 [Nagano, ex. 25]

(22)b. Ima omae ga deteitte-miro/*dete-ike,
    now you NOM leave-try/leave-IMP
oretati minna korosarete simau.
    We all be killed put away

203
'Just imagine that you leave now. All of us will be killed.'
[Nagano, ex. 27]

Nagano divides the cases with a second-person subject into two subtypes, which she terms as ‘warning/threat’ (22a) and ‘pessimistic prospect’ (22b), respectively (Nagano, 660).

Finally, Nagano mentions one more case in which sitemiro is far more acceptable than siro, although she does not view this as genuine hypothetical:

   Resent-PST-if refute try/do-IMP can-not will
   ‘If you resent it, just refute it. (I know you can’t.)’
   [Nagano, ex. 28]
(23)b. Yareru mon nara yatte-miro/*yare. (Yarenai daroo).
   do can thing if do-try/do-IMP cannot will
   ‘Just do that if (you think) you can! (I know you can’t.)’
   [Nagano, ex. 29]

In (23), the speaker believes that the addressee is incapable of carrying out the designated action. According to Nagano, a conditional clause frequently precedes a sitemiro clause, and a clause expressing the message ‘I know you can’t’ can follow. She concludes that while both siro and sitemiro are command forms, they sharply differ in function. That is, sitemiro but not siro has a unique feature of denoting genuine hypotheticality instead of a command.
Sato (1992) observes that the request form *kure* can be directed not only at the addressee but also at both the speaker and addressee and at nonhuman entities or someone not present in the speech situation. She maintains that when the *kure* sentence is not directed at the addressee, it ceases to be a request and functions more like a wishing sentence. She also identifies several cases in which request forms (both *kure* and *kudasai*) can be used in ‘non-request’ senses as well.

First, there is a case in which a speaker is giving a word of advice or encouragement, normally occurring with a verb of mental activity:

(24)  **Tonikaku**  ki o sizumete-kure.

*By all means, mind ACC calm down-give (me)*

‘By all means, calm down.’

The second type is a case in which the speaker is making an apology:

(25)  **Yurusite-kure.**

*Forgive-give (me)*

‘Forgive me!’

Sato labels the third type as a ‘shout’ (1992:126), in which the speaker is desperately crying for help:

(26)  **Tasukete-kure!**

*Help-give (me)*

‘Help me!’
In the fourth type, a speaker gives (reluctant) permissions or acceptances as a response to the addressee’s suggestion:

(27) Moo iiyo. Doodemo omae no kinomuku yooni site-kure.
    All right. whatever you GEN like do-give (me)
    ‘I’ve had enough. Do as you please.’
[Sato, ex. 119]

(28) A: Atasi de yoke-reba nokori-masu.
    I good-if stay-POL
    ‘If you need me, I’ll stay.’

B: Soo site-kure.
    it do-give (me)
    ‘Do that (for me).’
[Sato, ex. 126]

As these three studies reveal, both command and request forms in Japanese can be used in several non-standard senses. Command forms are capable of conveying non-commands including desire, wish, and permission as well as irony. *Siro* may also serve as a concessive clause by combining with the particle –ni. *Sitemiro* can express a genuine hypothetical state-of-affairs. Request forms can also be used for performing such illocutionary acts as advice/encouragement and (reluctant) permission/acceptance. 9

Given the findings of these previous works, I examine the five forms in question from the force exertion perspective along with the
parameters for imperative prototypes.

5.3 Japanese Imperatives and Force Exertion

Above in chapters 2, 3 and 4, I demonstrated that the imperative can be best analyzed as forming a category with ‘better’ and ‘worse’ examples, and that the imperative centers around the notion of force exertion. That is, an imperative utterance is potentially ambiguous as to the degree and kind of force exertion. To repeat, all of the clauses below classify as imperatives, but they are not identical in the strength of force exertion:

(29) (= (4) in chapter 3)

(29)a. [parent to child]

Clean up this mess right now./ Just hold your tongue.

b. [host to guest]

Please sit down.

c. [between two strangers]

A: Excuse me. Do you know where Starbucks is?

B: Go straight ahead three blocks.

d. [between coworkers in casual conversation]

Regional accents can be a problem. Put a proper Bostonian on the phone with a Texas oilman and here comes miscommunication.

e. [teacher to student]

Bring alcohol to school and you'll be suspended.
f. [between two persons in a strong argument]

Say that again! (I’ll punch you in the nose.)

In their primary readings, the imperative utterances above are arranged in decreasing order of force exertion. Figure 3-4 below shows an approximate point at which each imperative can be postulated to occur on the scale of force exertion. As I pointed out before, the configuration is not intended to identify the exact location but simply show that they differ as to the degrees of force exertion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE:</th>
<th>MINUS MAXIMUM</th>
<th>ZERO</th>
<th>MILD</th>
<th>PLUS MAXIMUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>+1&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples: (4f) (4e) (4d) (4c) (4b)(4a)
NON-PROTYPICAL PROTOTYPICAL

In an attempt to obtain a fuller characterization, I have also introduced a set of parameters for imperative prototypes, comprised of several components (cf. chapter 3):

Table 3-1: Overall Parameters for Imperative Prototypes
In what follows, I explore the way in which this framework helps characterize Japanese imperatives. In this section, I examine the ways in which the imperative forms in question deviate from the norm so that they can be postulated to occur at 'lower' (such as zero or minus) points on the force exertion continuum.

As a first approximation, it would be useful to compare Japanese translations of each imperative utterance in (29) above. In reporting these imperative utterances, Japanese speakers may say something like the following:

(30)a. Ima sugu tirakasita mono o katazuke-ro/-nasai.
    right now mess ACC clean up-IMP/-IMP(POL)
    ‘Clean up this mess right now!’
(30)b. Doozo suwatte-kudasai.
    please sit down-give(me)(POL)
    ‘Please sit down.’
The imperative in (30a) is a command, and either the bare form or the polite form is appropriate; request forms would also be appropriate if the speaker wants to make the message less forceful and more indirect. In (30b), the request form is preferred. The (polite) command nasai could be used in the form of osuwari-nasai ‘Please sit down’ when the guest is much younger than, or socially inferior to, the host. The sentence in (30c) is a request form, although a declarative form may be more natural. Command forms would be inappropriate here, because
they would sound too compelling and coercive. The sentence in (30d), with a genuine hypothetical reading, can be best translated into a declarative with the to form, a conjunctive particle which shows a natural link between two clauses, meaning ‘if’, ‘and,’ or ‘when’ (Bunt 2002: 135). Command forms (sito/nasai) would not be interpreted as indicating genuine hypotheticality in this sequence, although condition can be implicated. About the same can be said about request forms (kure/kudasai). In contrast, it is possible to use the form sitemiro or its polite equivalent sitegoran(nasai).

Next, in (30e), a declarative with the –to form seems to be the most natural translation in a default context. It is possible to use command and request forms if the speaker wants to make the message sound more sarcastic. Finally in (30f), sitemiro seems to be the only option; other command and request markers would be somewhat awkward.

We can make the following immediate observations. Most obviously, the division between directive vs. non-directive force, which is not transparent in the imperative verb in English, is explicitly coded in Japanese, as the contrast between (30a) and (30b) illustrates. Second, Japanese speakers sometimes employ polite request forms to give instructions or directions, even though there is no need to ask a favor of the addressee. Third, unlike other imperative forms, sitemiro comfortably conveys a genuine hypothetical condition. Fourth, request forms can be used for ‘ironical requests,’ a use not acknowledged in previous works such as Sato (1992). Fifth, both command and request forms can be interpreted negatively but except for sitemiro, they seem to be restricted in occurrences, as the
infelicity of them suggests in (30f).

Let me elaborate a little more on these observations.

Cases of Strong Force

The first observation made above is already evident from the discussions in previous sections. Japanese is equipped with lexical means of differentiating directive from non-directive force. To illustrate the contrast between English and Japanese, compare:

(31) a. Just hold your tongue.
   b. Shut up.

(32) a. Please, buy me a new bike, Dad.
   b. Get well soon.

The type of force is more directive in (31) and more non-directive in (32). While English imperatives in (32) can be translated into either command or request forms, those in (32) are normally translated into request forms rather than command.\(^{10}\)

Cases of milder force

In chapter 2 (figure 2-2), I analyzed some illocutionary acts in terms of ‘lower’ points on the force exertion continuum. They include instructions and expository directives as well as (reluctant) acceptance and permission, since there is not strong volition/attempt to get the addressee to do the action. What is interesting about (30c) is the fact that Japanese speakers may employ the (polite) request
marker *kudasai* 'give (me),' when the speaker does not benefit from his or her action at all. This association between politeness and the request form is quite understandable if one considers that politeness is intimately associated with indirectness (of imposition).\(^{11}\)

This does not mean, however, that command forms can never be used to convey 'weaker force.' The polite form *nasai*, for example, can convey (reluctant) acceptances and permissions, as evident from the discussions in the previous section (cf. Murakami 1993 and Sato 1992):

(33) Iya nara yame-*nasai*.

hate if quit-IMP(POL)

'If you don’t like it, quit now.'

(34) (Kaeri-tai nara) kaeri-*nasai*.

leave want if leave-IMP(POL)

'If you want to leave, leave now.'

In these examples, the preceding clause and/or the tone of voice serve to mitigate the intensity of a command/order.

Cases of Zero Force

Next, let us move down to (around) the zero point on the force exertion continuum. We have already observed two such cases, i.e., the imperative as a genuine hypothetical condition and the imperative as a concessive clause—both in English and Japanese.

First, we discuss the first case. Nagano argues that *sitemiro*
possesses the function of indicating genuine hypotheticality; *siro* can never be forceless, although it is hypothetical (cf. Nagano 1995: 658-660). Let us confirm the validity of this claim by looking at other contexts. Consider the following segment of English dialogue:

(35) (= (3c) in chapter 1)

A: A lot of people want the cheaper alternative. On the Net, you’re getting a new kind of self-service option.

B: *Just look at how easy it is to order a book. Go to the right Web site and type in a title, author or general subject.* You get a list of the books from the database. *Choose your title, type in your address and credit card number, and send your order.* It’s on its way to you in one or two days, usually at a fat discount. Music’s just as easy. (*NHK Business English, May 10, 2000*)

Speaker B employs five English imperative clauses to describe step by step how to order a book on the Web. The context here makes it apparent that except for the first imperative *Just look at how easy it is to order a book*, the speaker hardly exerts any force toward his/her addressee’s action. In particular, the implicit you is interpreted as either generic or ambivalent between generic and individuated. In other words, these four imperative utterances can be understood as being used without any force. Interpreted this way, both command (*nasai*) and request forms (*kudasai*) would not faithfully translate the intended message, since these forms would impose the designated
actions on the addressee. Conversely, *sitegoran(nasai)*, the polite equivalent of *sitemiro*, can be used here to convey the intended message, although in such a case the speaker must be older than, or socially superior to, the addressee.

Next, let us recall an extreme case in which the imperative refers to a past situation in English:

(36) (=8 in chapter 2)

In those days Tim was always hungry. *Give him a few dollars,* and he was happy.

Is this sentence translatable into an imperative in Japanese? As expected, command forms would be awkward:

(37)a. Kare ni sukosi o-kane o ?agero/?age-nasai,

          him DAT a few dollars ACC give-IMP/give-IMP(POL)
          (suruto) kare wa yorokonda(desyoo).
          then       he   TOP  happy was(would be)

Request forms would also be bizarre:

(37)b. Kare ni sukosi o-kane o ?agete-kure/?agete-kudasai,

          him DAT a few dollars ACC give-give(me)/give-give(me)(POL)
          (suruto) kare wa yorokonda(desyoo).
          then       he   TOP  happy was(would be)
Even *sitemiro* seems marginal, though it is somewhat better than other imperative forms:

(37)c. (?)Kare ni sukosi o-kane o agete-miro/agete-goran(nasai),
   him DAT a few dollars ACC give-try/give-try(POL)
(suruto) kare wa yorokonda(desyoo).
   then he TOP happy was(would be)

Let us turn to concessive clauses. As Murakami 1993 notes, a few verbs in the bare imperative form serve this function, with *ni-siro* ‘PRT-do-IMP’ one of them. It is worth stressing here that these verbs can only perform this function with the aid of a particle/particles.¹²

Let me summarize the observations so far. In general, both command and request forms cannot be used without force. There are two exceptions to this tendency, however. One is *sitemiro*, a command form capable of expressing a genuine hypothetical condition. The other is *ni-siro*, a particle plus bare command combination used to convey concession.

Cases of minus Force

In the discussions of imperatives with negative readings, it is useful to divide this usage into two different environments, (implied) conditional and non-conditional. The former include such uses as threats, warnings and ‘pessimistic prospects.’ The latter include dares and admonitions. The imperative translation of (30e), for example, would be an instance of the former, and (30f) instantiates
the latter. Though I am not going to provide a complete analysis, I point out that sitemiro in general more comfortably obtains negative readings than any other form.

Let us begin by looking at conditional environments. Above in (30e), we observed that both command and request forms can also be used to convey the idea of and conditional imperatives with negative readings. However, this does not mean that these forms imply condition without constraints. In similar condition-implying sentences below, siro and kure are not acceptable, although sitemiro is acceptable:

(38) <threat/strong warning>
Kondo sonna mane o site-miro/*siro/*site-kure,
again such thing ACC try-IMP/do-IMP/do-give(me)
zettai yurusa-nai zo.
absolutely forgive-not PRT
‘Do that again, and I’ll never forgive you.’

(39)(=(22b)) <‘pessimistic prospect’/strong warning>
Ima omae ga deteitte-miro/*deteike/*deteitte-kure,
now you NOM leave-try/leave-IMP/leave-give(me)
ore-tati minna korosarete-simau.
we all kill-PASS-put away
‘Just imagine that you leave now. All of us will be killed.’

One factor common to examples (38) and (39) as distinct from the imperative translation of (30e) resides in the (negative) intensity of force exertion. Here, the imperative is not just an ironical
utterance; rather, it reflects the speaker’s fierce attempt to warn the addressee against carrying out the designated action. In this sense, the negative force can be perceived as extremely strong. The same tendency can be observed when the sentence is accompanied by an emphatic item such as yubi ippon ‘(touch) a finger.’ Consider the following and conditional imperative in (40), an example from The Pelican Brief and its Japanese translation (41):

(40) The security man reached to assist her. “Here,” he said. She slapped his hand. “Touch me and I’ll sue your ass first thing tomorrow morning. Get away from me!” (Pelican: 354)

(41)a. Yubi ippon demo watasi ni hurete-gorannasai, finger one even me DAT touch-try-IMP(POL)
asita no asa itiban de kiso siteyaru kara. tomorrow GEN morning first thing sue give SFP

(Pelican (Japanese Translation): 209)

Context makes it apparent that the imperative Touch me in the coordinate conditional construction in (40) involves a strong negative force. The translator chooses the form sitegoran (the polite alternative of sitemiro) and the negative polarity item yubi ippon demo ‘even one finger’ to report the negative intensity of this utterance. As (41b) below illustrates, other (command and request) forms would be bizarre in this context:
One generalization we can make then is that as the condition becomes more negatively intense, forms other than sitemiro become less acceptable.

Next, let us consider cases of minus force in non-conditional environments. We identified at least two subtypes, namely, dare and admonition. In dares, as we have observed, the speaker apparently gives an order, being fully aware that the addressee is incapable of carrying out the designated action:

(42) <dare>
  a. (=(14))
  Nige rareru nara nigete-miro/?nigero. (dekinai daroo.)
  run away can if run away-try/run away-IMP. cannot will
  ‘Try to run away if (you think) you can! (I know you can’t.)’
  b. (=(23b))
  Yareru mononara yatte-miro/?yare. (yarenaidaroo.)
  Do can if do-try/do-IMP can do-not-will
  ‘Do it if you can. (I know you can’t.)’

As Nagano (1995) observes, siro (bare command) is unacceptable here. Request forms are somewhat better but still marginal:

(43)a. (=corresponding to (42a))
Nigerareru nara nigete-?kure/¬kudasai.
Run away-can if run away-give(me)/give(me)(POL).
(dekinai daroo.)
cannot will
b. (=corresponding to (42b))
Yareru mononara yatte-?kure/¬kudasai. (yarenai daroo.)
Do can if do-give (me)/give(me)(POL) cannot will

In the second subtype (admonition), however, *siro* (bare command) can be used in the following fixed constructions, which Nitta (1999) terms as ‘ironical commands’:¹³

(44) <admonition>

a. (=4)
   Baka ie/ii-nasai.
nonsense talk-IMP/talk-IMP(POL)
   ‘Talk nonsense!’ → That’s nonsense.

b. (=5)
   Uso o tuke.
   Lie ACC tell
   ‘Tell a lie!’ → That’s a lie.

Request forms do not replace command forms here, since it would result in oddity or a non-ironical request:

(45)a. (?)Baka itte-kure/itte-kudasai.
nonsense talk-give(me)/talk-give(me)(POL)
≠ Don’t talk nonsense.

b. Uso o tuite-kure/tuite-kudasai.

Lie ACC tell-give(me)/tell-give(me)(POL) ≠ That’s a lie.

*Sitemiro* can be used here, although because of implied conditionality the form would sound more natural if it is immediately followed by a clause portraying an undesirable or ‘pessimistic’ prospect.

Though the mechanisms are not completely clear yet, it is evident that there is a division of labor among different imperative forms. In general, *sitemiro* most comfortably occurs with negative force; and other forms can also be used with negative force--but not without constraints. That is, in conditional environments, standard command and request forms are incompatible with imperatives involving strong negative force. As for non-conditional environments, there are some differences in occurrences between dares and admonitions. Forms other than *sitemiro* are generally incompatible with imperatives used as dares. However, command forms can express admonitions in a few fixed constructions, whereas request forms cannot.

### 5.4 Passive Imperatives in Japanese

Earlier in chapter 3, I discussed the acceptability of passive imperatives in English. There we observed that passive imperatives are more acceptable with overt negatives than in affirmatives. The general tendency was that while the (affirmative) imperative does not
always mix well with the passive, the passive imperative becomes more acceptable when the imperative and the passive are compatible with each other in conceptual terms--in particular, when the addressee departs from the prototypical agent and thereby plays the double semantic role of agent and patient at once.

This section discusses passive imperatives in Japanese. First, I introduce the analyses of Nitta (1991), who observes that the felicity of passive imperatives (with siro) hinges on the classes of verbs and the classes of passives. Second, I point out that passive imperatives with sitemiro are far more acceptable than siro, regardless of verb and passive classes. I offer an explanation for the contrastive acceptability between passive imperatives with siro and those with sitemiro in terms of conceptual compatibility as I have discussed in chapter 4.

Just like English, passive imperatives in Japanese are more acceptable in overt negation than in the affirmative. Let me begin my discussion by introducing Nitta (1991), who conducts a most comprehensive survey of passive imperatives in Japanese. Nitta finds that passive imperatives like those in (46) are ill-formed but they are more acceptable in (47):

(46)  *Kare ni sin’yoo sarero.
     him by trust   PASS-IMP
     ‘Win his trust.’

(47)   Tamani kantoku ni sikkari kitaerarero.
       Sometimes manager by hard       train-PASS-IMP
'Get trained by the manager once in a while.'

His main argument is that the felicity of passive imperatives depends upon the types of verbs and the classes of passives. To account for the varying acceptability of passive imperatives, Nitta distinguishes three separate classes of passives, i.e. ‘true passives,’ ‘third-party passives,’ and ‘possessor’s passives’ on the one hand, and differentiates ‘achievement imperatives’ from ‘process imperatives’ on the other.

First, let me explain Nitta’s three classes of passives. By true passives, he refers to the standard case in which the object of the active counterpart is converted into the syntactic subject (Nitta, 32):

(48) <true passives>

Mado wa tozasarete-ita.

window TOP close-PASS-COP-PST

‘The window was closed.’

The possessor’s passive refers to the case in which a possessor entity stands in the subject position, immediately followed by his body part (or article) with the accusative marking (ibid, 34):

(49) <possessor’s passives>

Takesi ga atama o Hirosi ni nagurare-ta.

Takesi NOM head ACC Hirosi by beat-PASS-PST
‘Takesi was beaten on the head by Hirosi.’

By the third-party passive, he means a passive construction whose subject refers to an entity not participating in the designated event (*ibid.*, 33):

(50) <third-party passive>

Kare wa keikan ni musuko o nagu-rare-ta
he TOP police officer by son ACC beat-PASS-PST

‘His son was beaten by a police officer.’

In this sentence, the subject entity *kare* ‘he’ is completely an outsider to the designated event of beating, although this entity may be indirectly affected by this terribly undesirable incident. This passive type is sometimes called ‘indirect passive’ by some authors (cf. Shibatani 1985, Takami 2003). Nitta includes into this class the so-called ‘adversative passive’ as well:

(51) Boku wa ame ni hurare-ta.

I TOP rain by fall-PASS-PST

‘I was affected (adversely) by rain’s falling.’

Next, let me explain achievement and process imperatives. As we have observe in section 5.2, the achievement imperative refers to an imperative sentence which occurring with a verb of high self-controllability commands the addressee to complete the
designated action, as in *ike* ‘go!’ and *tatake* ‘Beat!.’ In contrast, the process imperative is an imperative which accompanied by a verb of less self-controllability tells the addressee to ATTEMPT TO or MAKE AN EFFORT TO carry out the action as in *otituke* ‘calm down!’ or *sinpai suruna* ‘Don’t worry!’ (Nitta, 56).

Nitta’s main claims can be summarized in the following three points. First, Japanese imperatives permit some true passives and some possessor’s passives to occur, whereas they do not allow third-party passives. Second, all the passive imperatives that are acceptable classify as process (as opposed to achievement) imperatives. Third (and related to second), only verbs of high self-controllability appear in passive imperatives, and when they do, they decrease in the degree of self-controllability and transform into process imperatives.

Consider the case of imperatives with true passives in (46) and (47) above. Nitta maintains that verbs in general decrease in self-controllability through passivization. The imperative verb *sin’yoo siro* ‘Trust me,’ for instance, is interpreted as a process imperative, since the act of trusting is not something completely self-controllable in that one can only ATTEMPT TO trust someone but cannot deliberately trust someone. Nitta explains that sentence (46) with the passive verb *sin’yoo sarero* ‘Be trusted!’ strikes us as bizarre because the state-of-affairs of being trusted is hardly self-controllable at all so that it does not fit into the imperative structure which prefers a highly self-controllable action.

In contrast, the verb *kitaero* ‘Train (yourself)!’ counts as an
achievement imperative, since the act of training oneself is of physical nature, hence highly self-controllable. Sentence (47) with the passive verb kitaerarero ‘Be trained!’ is at least tolerable, to the extent that the act of being trained preserves some sense of self-controllability, hence it is perceivable as a process imperative.

Next, Nitta demonstrates that command imperatives are also acceptable with some possessor’s passives when they occur with contact verbs (52), but not other (i.e. non-contact) verbs (53) (Nitta, 46):

(52) <possessor’s passives>
Itido gurai Takesi ni atama o tatak-are-ro.
once about Takesi by head ACC beat-PASS-IMP
‘Get beaten on the head by Takesi at least once.’

(53) <possessor’s passives>
*Dareka ni kao o mir-are-ro.
someone by face ACC see-PASS-IMP
‘Be spotted by someone.’

He attributes the contrastive felicity of sentences (52) and (53) to the presence vs. absence of self-controllability. Because the contact verb tatake ‘Beat!’ forms an achievement imperative full of self-controllability, Nitta explains, its passive form tatakarero ‘be beaten’ remains acceptable, although the sentence gets ‘demoted’ to a process imperative. In contrast, though the non-contact verb miro ‘see!’ is an achievement imperative in the active form, its passive
form *mirarero ‘Be seen!’ is not perceived as a process imperative, since hardly any self-controllability remains after passivization.

Nitta considers that possessor’s passives stand somewhere between true passives and third-party passives, and that the felicity of this passive class varies a great deal according to how much self-controllability is involved in the verb and the entire clause.

Next, Nitta maintains that command forms do not occur in third-party passives at all, regardless of verb classes (Nitta, 44-45):

(54) <third-party passives>

*Kodomo-tati ni sawag-are-ro.

Children by make a noise-PASS-IMP

‘Get affected (adversely) by children’s making a noise.’

(55) <third-party passives>

*Musuko o sin’yoo sarero.

son ACC trust PASS-IMP

‘Have your son win trust.’

The designated event in this passive class is far beyond the control of the addressee, who is not an event participant. For this reason, Nitta explains, these passive imperatives strike us as bizarre.

Let me note that Nitta’s analysis is applicable not only to command forms but to request forms as well. 14 Exactly like *siro and *nasai, *kure and *kudasai ‘give (me)’ are better-formed in true passives with highly self-controllable verbs as well as possessor’s passives with
contact verbs. In contrast, they are generally bizarre in third-party passives. However, I show below that *sitemiro* renders the majority of Nitta’s unacceptable sentences acceptable; this imperative form accepts all three passive classes.

First, let us examine *sitemiro* with true passives. The sentences below are perfectly acceptable when they occur not only with highly self-controllable verbs such as *kitaeru* ‘train’ (57) but also with less self-controllable verbs like *sinyosuru* ‘trust’ (56):

<true passives>

(56) Kare ni sin’yoo sarete-miro/*sarero.
    him by trust-PASS-try/PASS-IMP
    ‘Imagine that you are trusted by him.’

(57)(=(47))
    Tamani kantoku ni sikkari kitaer-rarete-miro/-rarero.
    sometimes manager by hard train-PASS-try/-PASS-IMP
    ‘Get trained by the manager once in a while.’

Next, *sitemiro* comfortably occurs with the possessor’s passive as well—not only with contact verbs (58) but also with non-contact (59):

<possessor’s passives>

(58) (=52))
    Itido gurai Takesi ni atama o tatak-arete-miro/*-arero.
    once about Takesi by head ACC beat-PASS-try/PASS-IMP
‘Get beaten on the head by Takesi at least once.’

(59) (=(53))
Dareka ni kao o mi-rarete-miro/=*rare-ro.
someone by face ACC see-PASS-try/PASS-IMP
‘Imagine that you are spotted by someone.’

Finally, *sitemiro* renders even some third-party passives more acceptable. In the following example of third-party passive, *sitemiro* is perfectly acceptable with *sawagu* ‘make a noise,’ a verb of high self-controllability:

<third-party passives>
(60) (=(54))
Kodomo-tati ni sawag-arete-miro/*-are-ro.
children by make a noise-PASS-try/PASS-IMP
‘Imagine that you are affected (adversely) by children’s making a noise.’

When the verb belongs to a class of lower self-controllability, however, the felicity varies according to the nature of the verb (and the entire clause). In (61) below, with a verb of lower self-controllability *sinyosareru* ‘trust,’ *sitemiro* is still odd, though it sounds somewhat better than *siro*:

(61) (=(55))
musuko o sin’yoo sarete-miro/*sarero.
son ACC trust PASS-try/PASS-IMP

However, the sentences in (62) and (63) below are perfectly acceptable with *utagau ‘suspect’ and *homeru ‘praise,’ different verbs of lower self-controllability:

(62) Musuko o satuzinhan dato utagaw-arete-miro/*-arero.
son ACC murderer as suspect-PASS-try/PASS-IMP
‘Just imagine that your son is suspected of murder.’

(63) Musume o homer-arete-miro, warui ki wa sinai.
daughter ACC praise-PASS-try, bad feeling TOP do-not
‘Just imagine that you daughter is praised. You won’t feel bad.’

Let me summarize the observations made so far. First, passive imperatives with the bare imperative (*sirō) are unacceptable when they occur with verbs lacking high self-controllability, but become more acceptable when they occur with verbs of high self-controllability. Second, passive imperatives are far more acceptable with *sitemiro than *sirō, regardless of verb classes and passive types.

Why does *sitemiro readily allow passives, although it is an imperative? To answer this question, we need to discuss the (in)felicity of passive imperatives with *sirō first. While Nitta explains the felicity of passive imperatives in terms of self-controllability alone, his account is fully compatible with, and
can be integrated into, the analysis of the present work outlined in chapter 3 above. That is, the felicity of passive imperatives is ultimately a matter of constructional compatibility between passives and imperatives. To illustrate, let me repeat the prototype configuration of each construction I presented in chapter 3 above:

(64) The prototype imperative \((=\text{(2) in chapter 3})\)

i. The speaker exerts a high (near [+1]) directive force in a deictic setting toward the addressee, who will thereby perform an action in a hypothetical setting.

ii. The speaker plays the semantic role of causer-like agent, and the addressee causee-like agent.

(65) The prototype passive \((=\text{(7) in chapter 3})\)

i. The subject is *directly affected by an external agent.*

ii. The subject plays the semantic role of *patient.*

The imperative and the passive do not readily merge because they share few characteristics in their prototypical structures. As I pointed out, there is a serious incompatibility between the imperative prototype and the passive prototype. Most notably, prototype imperatives require an agentive subject, whereas passives need a patient. Agent and patient are two semantic roles that are normally irreconcilable with each other. One entity normally cannot be perceived as a prototypical agent and prototypical patient of a single event. To become felicitous, passive imperatives need to meet two apparently conflicting requirements. According to Nitta, all the
felicitous passive imperatives in Japanese classify as ‘process (as opposed to achievement) imperatives,’ in which verbs of high self-controllability step down to those of lower self-controllability through passivization. This is how the imperative becomes conceptually reconcilable with the passive. Specifically, as the degree of self-controllability decreases, the imperative subject begins to deviate from the prototypical agent. This construal allows the subject to be perceived as a patient as well; in this way, the addressee can be understood in terms of both (less prototypical) agent and patient at once.

Conversely, when verbs of lower self-controllability occur with passive imperatives, they completely lose self-controllability through passivization. As a result, the imperative subject no longer functions as an agent, although it is conceivable as a patient. In other words, the sentence does not fit into the imperative configuration, though it does suit the passive.

Now we are in a position to explain why *sitemiro* permit verbs of lower self-controllability to occur in all three passive classes. One thing most relevant here is the fact that *sitemiro* simply tells the addressee to imagine a certain situation but it hardly compels him or her to realize that situation at all. Compare *siro* and *sitemiro* in (56) again, with a true passive with the verb *sinyosareru* ‘be trusted.’ The *siro* version tells the addressee that he or she must be trusted by some other entity; it urges the addressee to realize this situation. In stark contrast, all the *sitemiro* version tells the addressee to do is to IMAGINE a hypothetical state-of-affairs in
which he or she is trusted by someone; the sentence does not compel the addressee to realize this situation at all. To the extent that the addressee need not be perceived as an agent and patient at once, no difficulty arises in the interpretation of the addressee’s semantic role.

The same account holds for the example of possessor’s passives. To take an instance of (59), the sentence with *sitemiro* simply asks the addressee to suppose a hypothetical situation in which he or she happens to be spotted by someone. The realization of this situation is not being requested. Analogously, the *sitemiro* sentence in (62) or (63) tells the addressee to engage in a mental act of thinking about a hypothetical situation in which the addressee’s son becomes a murder suspect or the addressee’s daughter is praised. It follows then that the addressee need not act as an agent and patient at once.

This analysis is supported by the fact that *sitemiro* (and its polite version *sitegoran*) may readily allow first- and third-person subjects to appear while straight commands disallow them (cf. Nagano 1995: 659):

(20) Watasi ga sonna koto o itte-goran-nasai/*ii-nasai, …
    I NOM such thing ACC say-try-IMP/say-IMP
    ‘Just imagine that I say such a thing, …’

(21) Aitu ga hitokoto syabette-miro/*syabere, …
    That guy NOM one thing speak-try/speak-IMP
    ‘Just imagine that that guy says something, …’
It is clear that the addressee in these sentences is not an agent of the designated event. All he or she is required to do as an imperative subject is to imagine a hypothetical (undesirable) event in which some other entity acts as an agent. In this respect, ‘hypothetical’ sitemiro can be perceived as functionally closer to a (conditional) conjunction.\(^{15}\)

In summary, sitemiro more comfortably occurs with passives because this imperative form is permitted to radically depart from the imperative prototype and behave like a (conditional) connective. I suggest this deviation from the norm accounts for the conceptual compatibility between sitemiro and all three passive classes, i.e. the felicity of passive imperatives with sitemiro.
Summary

As an initial attempt to explore the universal validity of the framework outlined in previous chapters, I have discussed five Japanese imperative forms with respect to the force exertion continuum along with imperative prototypes. In particular, I have focused my attention on whether and to what extent these imperative forms are allowed to depart from the norm to be used without any force or with minus force. The main points I have attempted to show are as follows. First, Japanese abounds in imperative forms, lexically encoding directive and non-directive force in command and request forms. Second, the five imperative forms exhibit different sensitivities to the force exertion scale and linguistic environments in which they occur. Among these forms, *sitemiro* is peculiar in that this form comfortably occurs without force or with negative force. (Standard) command forms *siro* and *nasai* cannot be used as forceless imperatives, except for the specific form *ni-siro*, which serves as a concessive. Request forms *kure* and *kudasai* cannot be used as forceless imperatives at all. *Siro* and *nasai* as well as *kure* and *kudasai* can be used with negative force, but not as readily as *sitemiro*.

Third, the felicity of passive imperatives varies a great deal according to verb types—in much the same way as their English counterparts. However, *sitemiro* is far more acceptable with passives than any other form. This contrastive acceptability can be ascribed to *sitemiro*’s radical departure from the conception of imperative prototypes.
Notes to Chapter 5

1 The term godan means ‘five steps’ in Japanese, referring to the fact that the final kana (=Japanese character) of the dictionary form is dropped before other endings are added (cf. Bunt 2003: 25).

2 The term ichidan means ‘one step,’ since there is only one change required to make other forms, with the final kana of the dictionary form being replaced by the suffix. In other words, there is a consistent verb stem in all forms (cf. Bunt 2003: 27).

3 They also note that the –te form functions more like a request depending on intonation (Masuoka and Takubo 1992: 118).

4 Nitta arranges different command and request forms according to the degree of politeness as follows (1999: 232):

Command forms: yare ‘do’ LEAST POLITE

   yari-nasai    yari-tamae
   o-yari-nasai
   o-yari-nasai-[mase/masi] POLITEST

Request forms: yatte kure ‘do-give(me)’ LEAST POLITE

   yatte okure    yatte-kure-tamae
   yatte-kudasai  yatte-choodai
   o-yari-kudasai
   o-yari-kudasai-[mase/masi] POLITEST

5 A similar analysis is presented in Onoe (2002: 184-185), who characterizes the imperative in terms of two features ‘wishing’ and
'demanding.'

6 Other works term process command as effort command (cf. Miyazaki et al. 2000: 5).

7 *Da* is an auxiliary (suffix) in the plain form functioning principally as the ending required by nouns forming predicates and *na*-adjectives (adjectives ending with the –*na* syllable). The polite alternative form is *desu* (Bunt 2002: 15-17).

8 The basic meaning of the verb *simau* is ‘to put away.’ The use of –*te* form and *simau* phrase indicates the completion of an action. This form can also show that the speaker perceives the event negatively. Whether to interpret –*te simasu* as completion or negative judgment depends on the context (Bunt 2002: 50).

9 I do not consider the example of self-talk in (9) as a ‘non-command,’ since, as I have pointed out in chapter 2, the speaker may view him/herself as the addressee.

10 Japanese is equipped with a few sentence-final particles including *ne*, *yo* or *na*, which serve to soften the tone of command or request. The imperative *Get well soon* can be translated into the command form if it combines with one of these particles. I am indebted to Yoshihiko Ono for this information.

11 Matsumoto (1988: 420) points out that verbs of giving and receiving play a crucial role in making requests polite in Japanese.

12 These constructions might be viewed as instances of grammaticalization, where the bare imperative lost the conception of force and acquired new status as a concessive conjunction.
Yamanashi (2002: 232-233) treats this use as an instantiation of 'speech act construction' (cf. Lakoff 1984; Fillmore 1989) in which original pragmatic forces have become fixed through the process of 'decontextualization.'

Nitta finds that the volition form you behaves exactly like command forms regarding passives.

'Hypothetical' sitemiro might also be treated as an instance of grammaticalization, through which the imperative verb loses the physical sense of 'try' and acquires a new grammatical function of conditional connective. The trace of the (command) imperative remains, however, since this form is not normally usable when the addressee is older than (and/or socially superior to) the speaker.
Chapter 6

Conclusions and Prospects

In the present work, I have presented the basic elements needed for a unified analysis of the imperative in English. I have argued that the imperative is, in all of its uses, a marker of hypotheticality with varying degrees of force exertion ranging between plus maximum and minus maximum value including zero point. I have defined force as psychosocial influence the speaker exerts on the addressee, thus causing the latter to carry out some action. Understood this way, the strength of force can be equated with that of the speaker’s intention or volition to cause the propositional content to become realized. Imperatives are prototypically used with strong force, but less typically, the imperative may exert weaker as well as negative force; peripherally, the imperative may lose all its force. I have also treated the imperative as a construction, which typically (though not necessarily) evokes a conceptual scene in which the speaker exerts strong (directive) force toward the addressee, who will be thereby caused to act as an agent.

The approach presented here entails a more dynamic view of imperatives than previous approaches. It focuses on the ways speakers employ the imperative with varying degrees of force to achieve specific communicative goals in different linguistic and social contexts. A central claim is that a full characterization of imperatives requires an analysis of imperatives as a category,
with prototypical and less prototypical uses; the overall parameters for imperative prototypes include, primarily, the degree of force, and secondarily, the nature of force (directive or non-directive), the identity and semantic role(s) of the addressee, and the speaker’s benefit. This view of grammar considers that various imperative constructions exist along a continuum; certain ones are more prototypical, others are similar to the prototype to a limited degree, and still others share very few similarities with the prototype.

The categorization and construction analysis of the present study has proven itself to be effective not only in assessing the degree of ‘imperativeness’ of a given example, but also in providing a useful framework for explaining the correlations with other constructions such as conditionals, left-subordinating and, asymmetric or, and passives. This approach has led to clear-cut characterizations of two conditional imperatives; i.e., the and-conditional imperative (or ‘pseudo-imperative’) is an instance of non-prototypical imperative occupying the ‘left-subordinating and’ construction, and the or-conditional imperative an instance of prototypical imperative appearing with the ‘asymmetric or’ construction. These characterizations have afforded a simple and natural explanation for how, and why, the two conjoined constructions exhibit their apparently idiosyncratic behaviors in both syntactic and semantic terms. The theory also explains the limited felicity of passive imperatives both in English and Japanese.

A great deal more data need to be tested against the proposed analysis of the imperative to develop finer definitions and
procedures, which will allow us to independently measure individual tokens of imperative. Nevertheless, I believe that an approach based on the force exertion along with the overall imperative prototype is worth pursuing because it possesses an advantage over previous approaches, which do not account for all the data in a unified way.

Of course, I do not suppose that the present framework offers a complete theory of the imperative; it has its limitations. One limitation is that the theory itself does not explain when an imperative is avoided or favored in performing directive speech acts such as making requests or giving advice. Wierzbicka (2003: 30), for example, observes that from the perspective of a language like Polish, a heavy restriction is imposed upon the use of the imperative in English, so she continues that:

In English, the imperative is mostly used in commands and in orders. Other kinds of directives (i.e., of speech acts through which the speaker attempts to cause the addressee to do something), tend to avoid the imperative or to combine it with an interrogative and/or conditional form. (Wierzbicka 2003: 30).

In actuality, the imperative in English is used far more widely than Wierzbicka seems to assume, as we have observed in previous chapters (in particular, chapter 2). The fact remains, however, that English has developed a number of indirect means of performing directive speech acts to avoid the use of an imperative, as manifested in
interrogatives *Would you pass me the salt?/Can I have your name, please?* and conditionals *If you please excuse us.* For a complete understanding of the English imperative, the present theory should be supplemented by studies addressing these social and pragmatic considerations.

Before closing, let me mention a few cross-linguistic implications of the present study. As we have observed in chapter 5, Japanese lexically distinguishes between directive and non-directive force. One important issue worth examining is whether other (agglutinative) languages have similar coding devices. Another issue worthy of serious attention is how the imperative exploits the scale of force exertion in different languages. For example, what languages permit imperatives to be used without any force? Do all languages allow imperatives to obtain negative readings? If so, how are such readings constrained regarding linguistic environments? The present work is intended as a first step in laying the foundation for a unified account of all uses of the imperative in English and other languages.
References


Delancey, Scott. 1985. “Agentivity and Syntax.” In William H.Eilfort,


Benjamins.


Heim, Irene. 1984. “A Note on Negative Polarity and Downward Entailing-


Allen and Unwin.


Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.


Nagano, Yuri. 1995. “‘*Siro*’ to ‘*Sitemiro*’—Meireiga Kateio Arawasu Baai.” ['Siro’ and ‘Sitemiro’ – When the Imperative Denotes


Panther, Klaus-Uwe and Linda L. Thornburg. 2003. “Metonymies as
Natural Inference and Activation Schemas: The Case of Dependent Clauses as Independent Speech Acts.” In Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda L. Thornburg (eds.), _Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing_. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 127-147.


Ryder, Mary Ellen. 1991. “Mixers, Mufflers and Mousers: The Extend-
ing of the -ER Suffix as a Case of Prototype Reanalysis.”

Berkeley Linguistic Society 17: 299-311.


University of La Rioja.


Yoshikawa, Taketoki. 1975. “‘Sitemiru’ no Imi to Soreno Jitugen suru Joken [Meaning of the verb cluster ‘~te miru’ and Condition
for its realization].” Collected Papers of the Japanese Language School 2: 36-51.


**Sources For Examples**


