



Title	Although Clauses in English Discourse : A Functional Analysis
Author(s)	Mizuno, Yuko
Citation	北海道大学. 博士(文学) 甲第8429号
Issue Date	2008-03-25
DOI	10.14943/doctoral.k8429
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/32456
Type	theses (doctoral)
File Information	Mizuno 2007.pdf



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***Although* Clauses in English Discourse: A Functional Analysis**

(英語の談話における *although* 節 機能言語学的分析)

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Graduate School of Letters

Hokkaido University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Linguistics

by

Yuko Mizuno

2007

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The present dissertation could not have been completed if it had not been for kind help and continuous effort of a large number of people.

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dissertation advisor, Hidemitsu Takahashi, who has provided me continual and devoted guidance in my academic life at Hokkaido University for the past ten years. He has been a patient and encouraging advisor, putting in a tremendous amount of time and energy on reading and critiquing earlier versions of this dissertation. I am grateful to him for instilling in me a deep respect for the complexities of the data, for sharing his wisdom, and for making me realize the attractiveness of studying languages.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to Masuhiro Nomura for his encouragement, guidance, and help during my work at this dissertation. His invaluable comments and suggestions have profoundly influenced this work. Moreover, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to attend his exciting, inspiring, and enjoyable seminars, which led me to a better understanding of cognitive and functional linguistics. His seminars also taught me careful and thoughtful reading of scientific works.

I would also like to thank the other member of my committee, Eijun Senaha for his valuable comments and suggestions.

I was also blessed with the opportunity to spend seven months as a visiting student at University of Alberta. I am especially grateful to John Newman and Sally Rice for generously hosting me in their department in September 2005 to March 2006 and for sharing with me their time and

their deep insights into language.

I am also grateful to the staff and my fellow students in the course of Linguistics and Western Languages at Hokkaido University. My thanks especially go to Michiko Ezoe, Mitsuko Izutsu, Hisashi Kitamura, Yayoi Miyashita, Erina Munetomo, Nina Petrishceva, Keisuke Sanada, Takeshi Sugahara, and Yasuhiro Tsushima, with whom I had fruitful discussions and conversations on both linguistics and non-linguistics issues.

During these years I also benefited a great deal from fruitful and stimulating interactions with a number of people. I would like to thank Hideto Hamada, Hideo Ishida, Katsunobu Izutsu, Kaori Kabata, Seizo Kasai, Hiroaki Koga, Takehiko Kurihara, Satoshi Oku, Tsuyoshi Ono, Katsuhide Sonoda, Jun-ichi Takahashi, Hisao Tokizaki, and Kazuhiko Yamaguchi, from whom I have learned so much. I am also grateful to my colleagues at Asahikawa National College of Technology for their kind support.

For their help in providing data and native speaker judgments, I thank Randy L. Evans and Anthony E. Backhouse. I would also thank Mr. Evans for carefully reading the manuscript and making helpful suggestions. Any remaining errors or confusions are of course my own.

Portions of this study first appeared, in different form, as articles and oral presentations. Chapter 3 includes material from “The English connectives *but* and preposed *although*: their commonalities and differences,” *Papers from the Twenty-First National Conference of The English Linguistic Society of Japan* 21: 91-100, 2004. Chapter 5 includes data and discussions from “Preposed and Postposed *Although* Clauses,”

The English Literature in Hokkaido 50: 65-77, 2005. Chapter 3, 4, and 5 include materials from papers I presented at various occasions: at the twenty-first meeting of The English Linguistics Society of Japan, November 2003, at the forty-eighth and forty-ninth annual meetings of The English Literary Society of Japan, Hokkaido Branch, October 2003 and 2004 respectively, at the seventh conference on Conceptual Structure, Discourse, and Language, University of Alberta, November 2004, at the ninth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Seoul, Korea, July 2005, and at the Alberta Conference on Linguistics, Banff, Canada, October 2005.

Last but not least, I want to thank my parents, Masakatsu and Mariko Mizuno, and my younger sister Masae, for their love, patience, and support, which have been a constant source of strength for me and enabled me to complete the doctoral program.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The present study provides a comprehensive description of *although* clauses in English utterances. Like most adverbial clauses in English, *although* clauses can either precede or follow the main clause, as exemplified below:

- (1) a. **Although** she has always been terribly vain about her looks, I am very fond of her and value her friendship. (*Wake up*: 362)
- b. She refuses to talk to me about her problems **although** I have tried to open the lines of communication. (*Wake up*: 300)

However, concessive clauses such as *although* clauses are known to be different from other types of adverbial clauses in many ways (cf. König 1994: 679). For example, in contrast to other adverbial clauses, concessive clauses cannot be focused. This restriction underlies the following specific properties and restrictions. First, there does not seem to be concessive interrogative adverbs, analogous to *why* (causal), *how* (manner), *what for* (purpose), or *when* (temporal). Second, concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a focusing adjunct like *only*, *even*, *just*, *especially*:

- (2) a. q, only because p

- b. q, only if p
- c. q, only in order that p
- d. * q, only although p (König 1988: 149)

Third, concessive clauses cannot occur as focus in a cleft sentence:

- (3) a. It was because it was raining that...
- b. * It was although it was raining that... (König 1994: 679)

In addition, concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a polar interrogative:

- (4) a. Was he harassed because he was a journalist?
- b. Was he harassed although he was a journalist? (König 1994: 679)

Finally, concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a negation:

- (5) a. This house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.
- b. This house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-conditioning. (König 1988: 149)

(5a) and (5b) show that concessive connectives tend to take maximal scope and are therefore not easily interpreted within the scope of a negative operator. According to König (1994: 679), this constraint with respect to

focusibility indicates that concessive clauses are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other adverbial clauses.

Because of their interesting behavior, concessive clauses such as *although* clauses have been analyzed from several perspectives. König (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994), Rudolph (1996), Crevels (2000), and Izutsu (2005) propose semantic analysis of concessive clauses. Sweetser (1990) and Azar (1997) take a pragmatic approach to concessive clauses. Barth (2000) and Noordman (2001) provide a discourse-functional study of *although* clauses. Moreover, differences between preposed and postposed *although* clauses have been investigated in several studies (cf. Diessel 1996, Noordman 2001, Izutsu 2005, *inter alia*).

However, when one attempts to study the ways in which *although* clauses are actually used in English discourse, the following problems emerge. First, most of the studies of concessive or *although* clauses, except for Barth (2000) and Noordman (2001), are restricted to constructed examples. König (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994) offers a most comprehensive analysis of concessive relations and claims that *although* clauses may express at least three types of concessive relations, i.e., “standard,” “rhetorical,” and “rectifying,” illustrated in (6a), (6b), and (6c) respectively:

- (6) a. **Although** John had no money, he went into this expensive restaurant. (König 1988: 146)
- b. [Somebody is looking for a good actor with brown eyes.]

Although he certainly knows his job, he has got blue eyes.

- c. He is very intelligent, **although** some of the things that he says are a bit silly. (König 1988: 148)

According to König, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses can express standard and rhetorical concessive, but only postposed versions can express rectifying concessive. However, it has not been revealed whether the three types of concessive relations account for *although* clauses in naturally occurring discourse.

Second, while previous studies have identified differences between preposed and postposed *although* clauses in meaning (Izutsu 2005), processing procedures (Diessel 1996), and frequency (Diessel 1996, Noordman 2001), their differences with regard to information status escaped serious attention. A number of studies have revealed that purpose clauses, conditional clauses, temporal clauses, and causal clauses show a common tendency as in (7) below (cf. Thompson 1985, Ford and Thompson 1986, Ramsay 1987, Givón 1990, and Ford 1993):

- (7) Preposed adverbial clauses tend to be related to the preceding discourse as well as to the main clause, whereas postposed adverbial clauses tend to be only related to the main clause.

However, it has not been examined whether *although* clauses also conform to this tendency.

Third, the difference between preposed and postposed *although*

clauses with respect to coordinate/subordinate properties also escaped serious attention. Previous works suggest that adverbial clauses show a tendency as in (8) below (cf. Jerpersen 1949, Chafe 1984, G. Lakoff 1984, and Hopper and Traugott 1993):

(8) Preposed adverbial clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, while postposed adverbial clauses tend to be more coordinate-like.

For example, G. Lakoff (1984) shows that Main Clause Phenomena like inversion occur in postposed, but not preposed, *because* clauses:

- (9) a. We should go on a picnic, **because** isn't it a beautiful day!
b. * **Because** isn't it a beautiful day, we should go on a picnic.

(G. Lakoff 1984: 473)

However, almost no studies have investigated whether *although* clauses also conform to this tendency.

The goal of the present work is to answer the following questions:

- (A) Can the three types of *although* clauses proposed by König, i.e., standard, rhetorical, and rectifying, be identified in naturally occurring discourse and, if so, how frequently does each type occur?
- (B) Do *although* clauses conform to the common tendency of other adverbial clauses noted in (7) above? That is, do preposed *although* clauses have linkage to the preceding discourse far more frequently

than postposed versions?

(C) Do *although* clauses also conform to the common tendency of other adverbial clauses noted in (8) above? That is, are preposed *although* clauses far more subordinate-like than postposed versions?

Specifically, I claim the following points. With respect to the question in (A), contra König's (1994) analysis, preposed and postposed *although* clauses do not differ in the **kinds** of usages. Rather, the difference resides in the **frequency** of each usage. That is, preposed *although* clauses in my data are not restricted to standard and rhetorical concessive alone, but they express three other relations, rectifying concessive, contrast, and speech act relations. Likewise, postposed *although* clauses are not restricted to standard, rhetorical, and rectifying concessive; they express contrast and speech act as well. However, preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ greatly in their most frequent usage types. The majority of preposed *although* clauses express standard concessive, whereas the majority of postposed *although* clauses express rectifying concessive. In addition, three subtypes of rectifying concessive, which I will term as Canceling Assumption, Weakening Validity, and Exception, can be identified for postposed *although* clauses, which were not distinguished at all in the previous literature.

Second, as for the question in (B) above, *although* clauses can be said to conform to the general tendency of other adverbial clauses, in that the preposed version is far more frequently linked with the preceding discourse. Preposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding

discourse in 71% of my data (76 out of 107 examples). These thematic links can be identified in any one of four ways, i.e., by representing discourse-old information, by representing strongly or weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse. In contrast, postposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse in 17% of the data (15 out of 89). These thematic connections can be described in any one of three ways, i.e., by representing weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse.

Finally, with regard to the question in (C) above, on the whole, *although* clauses conform to the general tendency of other adverbial clauses in that preposed *although* clauses are far more subordinate-like than postposed versions. However, *although* clauses have the following distinctive properties, which have not been observed for other adverbial clauses. First, not only postposed, but also preposed *although* clauses allow Main Clause Phenomena to occur, which is indicative of coordinate-like properties. Second, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses allow non-assertive illocutionary force.

The data used in this study were drawn from a variety of English discourse, both fiction and non-fiction, and both conversational and non-conversational. Conversational data were drawn from radio programs. Non-conversational data were collected from a novel, letters to advice columns, and newspaper/magazine articles published in English-speaking countries. My data also include constructed examples

checked or provided by native speakers of English.

The outline of the present volume is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous research on concessive adverbial clauses and points out their problems. Chapter 3 examines whether three types of *although* clauses, i.e., standard, rhetorical, and rectifying, can be identified in naturally occurring discourse and how frequently they occur. Chapter 4 examines whether *although* clauses conform to the general tendency of adverbial clauses: whether preposed, but not postposed, *although* clauses tend to be related to the preceding discourse. Chapter 5 investigates whether preposed *although* clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, whereas postposed versions more coordinate-like. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the present work.

1.1 Key Words

1.1.1 Contrast Relation and Three Types of Concessive Relations

Earlier studies on inter-clausal relations have identified at least four different relations which may be expressed by *but* and/or *although*. Although these relations are labeled differently by different linguists, I will call the four relations Contrast, Standard Concessive, Rhetorical Concessive, and Rectifying Concessive.

Contrast

Contrast relation is illustrated in (10) below:

(10) John is tall **but** Bill is short.

(R. Lakoff 1971: 133)

According to R. Lakoff (1971), *but* expressing contrast can be characterized in terms of three features.¹ First, “the subjects of the two sentences are directly opposed to each other in a particular property” (R. Lakoff 1971: 133). Second, the order of the conjuncts can be reversed without change in the meaning. Third, contrast *but* can be replaced by *while*.

Standard Concessive

Standard concessive is exemplified below:

(11) **Although** John had no money, he went into this expensive restaurant.
(=6a)

In standard concessive, the speaker of *although p, q* asserts these two propositions against the background assumption that if ‘*p*,’ then normally not-‘*q*,’ which is not invoked in Contrast relation. For example, the speaker of (11) may assume that if one has no money, one normally does not go into an expensive restaurant. Unlike contrast, in standard concessive, the order of conjuncts cannot be changed. In addition, standard concessive cannot be expressed by *while*.

Rhetorical Concessive

Rhetorical concessive is illustrated below:

(12) [Somebody is looking for a good actor with brown eyes.]

Although he certainly knows his job, he has got blue eyes. (=6b)

Unlike Standard concessive, rhetorical concessive does not involve the assumption ‘if p , then normally not q .’ Instead, in rhetorical concessive, the first clause ‘ p ’ is an argument for a conclusion ‘ r ,’ whereas the second clause ‘ q ’ is an argument for the opposite conclusion ‘not- r ’ and the second conclusion carries more weight in the whole argument. For example, in (12), the propositional content of the first clause supports a conclusion that the actor is suitable, while the propositional content of the second clause supports the opposite conclusion, and the overall impact of this utterance is that the speaker does not consider the actor as suitable.

Rectifying Concessive

Finally, rectifying concessive is exemplified below:

(13) He is very intelligent, **although** some of the things that he says are a bit silly. (=6c)

Rectifying concessive can be characterized in terms of two properties. First, whereas in the Standard and Rhetorical cases the content of the main clause is emphasized, in the Rectifying case the content of the main clause is weakened. Second, rectifying concessive clauses are only loosely linked to a main clause than standard concessive clauses.

Some previous studies assume that only *but*, not *although*, can express Contrast (cf. R. Lakoff 1971 and Izutsu 2005). Moreover, König assumes that only postposed, not preposed, *although* clauses can function as rectifying concessive clauses. However, it will be observed that both preposed and postposed *although* clauses can express contrast and rectifying concessive as well as standard and rhetorical concessive.

1.1.2 Information Status

I employ information flow categories proposed by Prince (1992) and Birner and Ward (1998) in order to identify the types of connections *although* clauses can bear to the preceding discourse. Many studies over ten years have proposed a variety of information flow categories. Chafe (1987, 1994), for example, introduces three types of information status: ‘active,’ ‘semi-active,’ and ‘inactive.’ However, there is no effective way to determine whether a particular concept is in active, semi-active, or inactive state. Furthermore, these notions apply to concepts of objects, events, and properties, which are typically expressed in noun phrases, verb phrases, and adjective phrases. It is not clear whether these activation states are applicable to propositional contents of *although* clauses.

Prince (1992) and Birner and Ward (1998) provide a more promising approach to the present study. They introduce three information flow categories: discourse-new, discourse-old, and inferrable information.

Discourse-new Information

Discourse-new information is that which has not been evoked in the

preceding discourse. Example (14) below is a discourse-initial utterance:

(14) Last night **the moon** was so pretty that I called **a friend** on **the phone** and told **him** to go outside and look. (Birner and Ward 1998: 15)

Here, both *the moon* and *a friend* represent discourse-new information.

Discourse-old Information

On the other hand, discourse-old information is that which has already been evoked in the prior discourse. In example (14) above, *him* represents discourse-old information.

Inferrable Information

Finally, inferrable information is that which has not been explicitly evoked in the prior discourse but which the speaker believes the hearer can plausibly infer from elements that have been evoked. For example, in (14) above, *the phone* represents inferrable information.

This approach suits the purpose of the present study for the following reasons. First, these three information categories apply to propositions as well as entities (i.e., referents evoked by NPs). The present study deals only with the information status of the entire-state-of affairs expressed by the clause, not with the information status of its individual components part. Second, these information categories help identify and subdivide the types of *although* clauses which are related to the preceding

discourse, since if *although* clauses represent either discourse-old or inferrable information, they are undoubtedly related to the preceding discourse.

1.1.3 Coordination/Subordination

The traditional analysis of complex sentences makes a sharp distinction between coordination, illustrated in (15), and subordination, illustrated in (16). It also divides up subordinate clauses into three types: relative, complement, and adverbial clauses, illustrated in (16a), (16b), and (16c), respectively:

(15) Sidewalk cafés were everywhere, and the restaurants offered a range of cuisines. *(Asahi Weekly, August 31, 2003)*

(16) a. Last year, I was introduced to a woman **who lives 100 kilometers away**. *(Asahi Weekly, September 7, 2003)*

b. On the eastern side of North Africa, I found **that elbow-shaped macaroni was a more popular form of pasta**. *(ibid.)*

c. **Before we left**, our guide showed us the process of making coconut sugar. *(Asahi Weekly, June 2, 2002)*

However, a number of studies found that clause linkage types should not be viewed as a binary opposition between coordination and subordination but rather forming a continuum (cf. Foley and Van Valin 1984, Haiman and Thompson 1984, Lehmann 1988, Matthiessen and Thompson 1988, Hopper and Traugott 1993, and Ohori 2000, among others).

In an attempt to test the subordinate/coordinate-like status of preposed and postposed *although* clauses, I use four parameters that earlier works have proposed to define coordination and subordination: (A) whether *although* clauses can be syntactically independent of the main clause (cf. Foley and Van Valin 1984); (B) whether they can obtain independent illocutionary force (cf. Lehman 1988: 193); (C) whether they allow ellipsis of the subject (cf. Quirk *et al.* 1985: 923-924); and whether their propositional content can be presented as foregrounded as much as the main clause (cf. Reinhart 1984, Tomlin 1985, and Thompson 1987).

I will show that preposed *although* clauses are straightforwardly subordinate-like according to A, C, and D parameters, whereas according to B parameter, they are allowed to behave like a coordinate clause, as exemplified in (17) and (18) below:

(17) **Although** don't go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

(=57 in Ch.5)

(18) **Although** who knows what will happen in 100 years' time, it will stay that way for the foreseeable future.

(=53b in Ch.5)

In (17) and (18), the preposed *although* clauses allow imperative and rhetorical *wh*-question, which normally do not occur in subordinate clauses.

On the other hand, postposed *although* clauses are allowed to function like a coordinate clause (as well as a subordinate clause) in all of the four parameters.

Note to Chapter 1

- ¹ The label *Contrast* is used in Blakemore (1989) and Izutsu (2005). R. Lakoff (1971) uses the label *Semantic Opposition* instead of *Contrast*.

Chapter 2

Previous Studies on Concessive Adverbial Clauses

The present chapter looks at previous research on concessive adverbial clauses. A number of studies have analyzed syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of concessive clauses. König (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994), Rudolph (1996), Crevels (2000), and Izutsu (2005) propose semantic analyses of concessive clauses. Sweetser (1990) and Azar (1997) take a pragmatic approach to concessive clauses. Barth (2000) and Noordman (2001) provide a discourse-functional study of *although* clauses. These studies have proposed different semantic subtypes of concessive relations. Some employ a two level approach: “direct-rejection concessivity” vs. “indirect-rejection concessivity” (Azar 1997); and “direct concessive” vs. “indirect concessive” (Izutsu 2005). Others adopt a three level approach: “content,” “epistemic,” and “speech-act” (Sweetser 1990); “real concession,” “restriction,” and “hypothetical concession” (Rudolph 1996); and “standard,” “rhetorical,” and “rectifying” (König 1994). There are also studies employing a four-level approach: “content level,” “epistemic level,” “illocutionary level,” and “text level” (Crevels 2000); and “default order causal relation,” “reversed order causal relation,” “concessive relation,” and “speech-act relation” (Noordman 2001).

The next section discusses König (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994), which offers a most comprehensive analysis of concessive

relations within and across languages. Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 discuss Sweetser (1990), Noordman (2001), and Barth (2000), respectively. Sweetser (1990) makes a theoretical distinction within concessive relations, while Noordman (2001) and Barth (2000) focus on *although* clauses in English.

2.1 König (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994)

König (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988, 1991, and 1994) gives an extensive analysis of concessive clauses/adverbials and concessive connectives in a variety of European languages, both from a synchronic and from a historical point of view. Two points of his study are of particular importance to the present thesis, i.e., distinctive properties of concessive sentences and three different subtypes of concessive relations which can be expressed by *although*.

Distinctive Properties of Concessive Sentences

König reveals that concessive sentences and concessive connectives are remarkably different from other adverbial sentences and other connectives in a number of ways. First, in contrast with other markers of adverbial relations, concessive connectives have a fairly transparent etymology (König 1985a). They are typically composite in nature (e.g., *al-though*, *never-the-less*) and in most cases earlier and more basic meanings can be easily identified for these components. König (1985a) distinguishes five different types of connectives on the basis of their etymology and their historical development. He classifies *although* into

a group of connectives which contain a component which is also used as a universal quantifier.

Second, concessive clauses develop relatively late in the history of a language. There were few, if any, clearly concessive markers in Old English (cf. Burnham 1991, Quirk 1954: 14). Third, in language acquisition, too, concessive connectives come fairly late, by far later than conditionals, which are acquired fairly late themselves. According to König (1994: 679), these two facts suggest that concessive constructions are particularly complex semantically.

Fourth, in contrast to other adverbial clause types, concessive clauses cannot be focused. This restriction underlies the following more specific properties and restrictions.¹

() In contrast to most other types of adverbial clauses, there does not seem to be concessive interrogative adverbs, analogous to *why* (causal), *how* (manner), *what for* (purposive), or *when* (temporal).

() Concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a focusing adjunct like *only*, *even*, *just*, *especially*:

- (1) a. q, only because p
b. q, only if p
c. q, only in order that p
d. * q, only although p (=2 in Ch. 1)

() Concessive clauses cannot occur as focus in a cleft sentence:

- (2) a. It was because it was raining that...
b. *It was although it was raining that... (=3 in Ch. 1)

() Concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a polar interrogative:

- (3) a. Was he harassed because he was a journalist?
b. Was he harassed although he was a journalist? (=4 in Ch. 1)

() Concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a negation:

- (4) a. This house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.
b. This house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-conditioning. (=5 in Ch.1)

(4a) and (4b) show that concessive connectives tend to take maximal scope and are therefore not easily interpreted within the scope of a negative operator. König (1994: 679) takes this constraint with regard to focusibility to indicate that concessive clauses are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other adverbial clauses.

Lastly, concessive clauses are a dead-end street for interpretative augmentation. Several types of complex sentences may be interpretatively enriched and receive a concessive interpretation:

- (5) a. I have to do all this work and you are watching TV.

(König 1985a: 2)

b. Poor as he is, he spends a lot of money on horses. (*ibid.*)

c. There was a funny smile on Dickie's face as if Dickie were pulling his leg by pretending to fall in with his plan, when he hadn't the least intention to fall in with it.

(P. Highsmith 1978, Example from König 1985a: 2)

d. If the aim seems ambitious, it is not unrealistic.

(König 1994: 681)

On the other hand, sentences explicitly marked as concessives can never be interpreted as expressing another adverbial relation.

Three Different Subtypes of Concessive Relations

König (1994) proposes a suggestive, though not exhaustive, distinction within concessive relations. König (1994) identifies at least three types of concessive relations, i.e., "standard," "rhetorical," and "rectifying," and points out that *although* can be used in all functions.² First, standard concessive clauses are illustrated in (6a) and (6b) below:

(6) a. **Although** John had no money, he went into this expensive restaurant. (=6a in Ch. 1)

b. Fred is going out for a walk **although** it is raining.

(König 1994: 679)

In standard concessive, the speaker of *although p, q* (or *q although p*)

asserts these two propositions against the background assumption that the two types of situations, *p* and *q*, are generally incompatible (König 1994: 679). König describes this background assumption as follows: if ‘*p*,’ then normally not-‘*q*.’ For an example such as (6a) and (6b) above, the background assumption can be expressed as in (7a) and (7b) below, respectively:

- (7) a. If one has no money, one normally does not go into an expensive restaurant. (König 1988: 146)
- b. If it is raining, one normally does not go out for a walk. (König 1994: 679)

In standard concessive, the content of the main clause is emphasized and made remarkable through the addition of the concessive clause (König 1994: 681). In (6a) above, the content of the main clause *he went into this expensive restaurant* is strengthened and made remarkable through the addition of the *although* clause *John had no money*. In (6b) above, the *although* clause *it is raining* highlights and makes remarkable the content of the main clause *Fred is going out for a walk*.

Next, examples of rhetorical concessive are given below:

- (8) a. True he is still very young, but he has proven very reliable so far. (König 1994: 681)
- b. [Somebody is looking for a good actor with brown eyes.]
He certainly knows his job, but he has got blue eyes.

(König 1985a: 5)

- c. Even though this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater. (König 1988: 148)

Unlike the standard concessive, the rhetorical concessive does not involve the assumption ‘if p , then normally not q .’ It is not the propositional content of the two clauses that are directly incompatible with each other. The incompatibility lies in the conclusions which are based on these assertions. Following Anscombe and Ducrot’s (1977) analysis of *but* or its counterpart *mais* in French, König (1985b: 6) explains that a sentence of rhetorical concessive (such as ‘ p *but* q ’) expresses that the first clause ‘ p ’ is an argument for a conclusion ‘ r ,’ whereas the second clause ‘ q ’ is an argument for the opposite conclusion ‘not- r ’ and this second conclusion carries more weight in the whole argument (cf. Anscombe and Ducrot 1977: 28). This analysis may be described as in (9):

(9) p but q

(a) p r

(b) q not- r

(c) q carries more weight (König 1985a: 6)

Let us apply the analysis of (9) to the example of (8b) above. In (8b), the propositional content of the first clause *He certainly knows his job* supports a conclusion that the actor is suitable, whereas the propositional content of the second clause *he has got blue eyes* supports the opposite

conclusion that the actor is not suitable, and the overall impact of the relevant utterance is that the speaker does not consider the actor as suitable after all.³ As this example shows, rhetorical concessive clauses are used to concede the first assertion and to emphasize the second (König 1994: 681).

Finally, the rectifying concessive is illustrated in (10a) and (10b) below:

(10) a. Yes, it has come at last, the summons I know you have longed for.

I, too, though it has come in a way I cannot welcome.

(König 1994: 681)

b. He is very intelligent, **although** some of the things that he says are a bit silly. (=6c in Ch. 1)

The rectifying concessive clause can be characterized in terms of three properties. First, whereas in the standard and rhetorical cases the content of the main clause is emphasized, the content of the main clause is weakened whenever a rectifying clause follows (König 1994: 681). In (10b), for instance, the *although* clause serves to restrict the validity of the previous statement.⁴ Second, unlike standard uses, rectifying concessive clauses always follow the main clause. Third, rectifying concessive clauses are only loosely linked to a main clause than standard concessive clauses.⁵

Lastly, König's three subtypes, standard, rhetorical, and rectifying, have been given different labels by other authors. Standard concessive

roughly corresponds to R. Lakoff's (1971) "denial of expectation," Blakemore's (1989) "direct denial," Azar's (1997) "direct-rejection concessivity," and Izutsu's (2005) "direct-concessive." Rhetorical concessive roughly corresponds to Blakemore's (1989) "indirect denial," Spooren's (1989) "concessive opposition," Azar's (1997) "indirect-rejection concessivity," and Izutsu's (2005) "indirect-concessive." Rectifying concessive has also been called "restrictive" in Rudolph (1996) and Günthner (2000).

2.2 Sweetser (1990)

Sweetser (1990) takes a cognitive approach to the analysis of *although*. She claims that *although* may be interpreted as applying in one of three domains, i.e., content, epistemic, and speech-act domains. First, in the content domain, the state of affairs described in the *although* clause forms an obstacle for the state of affairs described in the main clause, but does not prevent its realization, as exemplified in (11):

(11) **Although** he didn't hear me calling, he came and saved my life.

(Sweetser 1990: 79)

In (11), "his coming occurred in spite of his not hearing, which might naturally have led to his not coming" (Sweetser 1990: 79).

Second, in the epistemic domain, the speaker, in spite of being convinced of the content of the *although* clause, still reaches the opposite conclusion stated in the main clause, as illustrated in (12):

(12) **Although** he came and saved me, he hadn't heard me calling for help.

(Sweetser 1990: 79)

In (12), “the *fact* that he didn't hear me is true in spite of the *fact* that he came, which might reasonably have led me to *conclude* that he had heard” (Sweetser 1990: 79).

Finally in the speech-act domain, the *although* clause forms an obstacle for the realization of the speech act expressed in the main clause, as exemplified in (13a), (13b), and (13c):

(13)a. **Although** I sympathize with your problems, get the paper in tomorrow! (Sweetser 1990: 79)

b. Mary loves you very much, Tom – **although** I'm sure you already know that. (*ibid.*)

c. I'm innocent, **although** I know you won't believe me. (*ibid.*, 81)

In (13a), the speaker performs the speech-act of command in spite of his/her sympathy. In (13b), the speaker makes the assertion that Mary loves the hearer very much despite its lack of Gricean informativeness. In (13c), the speaker asserts that he/she is innocent despite the fact that the hearer is not an appropriately receptive hearer.

2.3 Noordman (2001)

Noordman (2001) is among the few studies that focus on *although*

itself. Noordman distinguishes at least four kinds of relations that are expressed by *although* sentences: “default order causal relation,” “reversed order causal relation,” “concessive relation,” and “speech-act relation.” Noordman examines whether the different kinds of relations he proposed are actually found in natural discourse, whether they differ in frequency, and how they function in context.

Different Kinds of Although-Relations

Noordman restricts his discussion to three of the four *although* relations mentioned above: default order causal relation, reversed order causal relation, and concessive relation. The first two relations may be regarded as subtypes of König’s standard concessive, though Noordman does not refer to any of König’s studies. Noordman’s concessive relation corresponds to König’s rhetorical concessive.

First, the default order causal relation is illustrated in (14):

(14) **Although** John had worked hard, he failed the exam.

(Noordman 2001: 154)

Although sentences expressing default order causal relation raise an expectation which can be represented as “if p then not-q,” where p stands for the *although* clause and q for the main clause. The *although* sentence in (14) may evoke an expectation as in (15):

(15) If one works hard, one normally passes the exam. (*ibid.*, 157)

The relation between the two propositions in (15) is a relation between two events in the world: Working hard is a cause for passing the exam. Here, the consequence (passing the exam) is deduced from the cause (working hard).

On the other hand, the reversed order causal relation is illustrated in (16):

(16) **Although** John failed the exam, he had worked hard.

(Noordman 2001: 154)

Unlike *although* sentences expressing default order causal relation, those expressing reversed order causal relation raise an expectation which can be represented as ‘if p then conclude not-q.’ The *although* sentence in (16) may evoke an expectation as in (17):

(17) If John failed the exam, one may conclude that John had not worked hard.

The relation between the two propositions in (17) is not a relation between two events in the world, but between an event and a conclusion of the speaker. ‘John’s failing the exam’ is the cause for the speaker’s conclusion that John had not worked hard. The expectation in (17) is evoked on the basis of a causal relation between two events in the world: ‘not working hard’ and ‘failing the exam.’ Thus, in (17), the cause (not

working hard) is deduced from the consequence (failing the exam).

Noordman (2001: 158-159) notes that reversed order causal relations as in (16) in general imply Sweetser's (1990) epistemic relation, while default order causal relations as in (14) do not necessarily imply Sweetser's (1990) content relation.

Finally, the concessive relation is illustrated in (18):

(18) [In the context of the discussion whether a particular fiscal regulation has to be maintained or not.]

Although that fiscal regulation yields much money, it is not fair.

(Noordman 2001: 159)

In (18), the *although* clause and its main clause express opposite arguments. The *although* clause is an argument in favor of the fiscal regulation while the main clause is an argument against it.

Frequency of the Different Types of Although-Relations in Natural Texts

Noordman examines whether the different kinds of relations are found in natural discourse and whether the different kinds of relations differ in their frequency of occurrence. This examination is based on a total of 211 *although* sentences collected from the Dutch newspaper *Volkskrant* of 1993. The findings are presented in Table 2-1 below:

Table 2-1: Frequency of occurrence of *although*-sentences

(Noordman 2001: 166)⁶

	preposed	postposed
default order causal	101	45
reversed order causal	20	10
concessive relation	26	7

Main findings are as follows. First, default order causal relations occur much more frequently than both reversed order causal relations and concessive relations. Second, preposed *although* clauses occur much more frequently than postposed *although* clauses.

Example (19) below illustrates the default order causal relation:

(19) The League against Cursing came into conflict with the Ohra insurance company because of a TV commercial. The heavenly styled commercial shows a long queue of people in front of the gate of heaven. Peter passes by searching for many celebrities, but for the person with an Ohra insurance policy, who is at the back of the queue, all doors open without any problems. “Well, with Ohra you are somebody...” the commercial finishes with a sigh. **Although** no wrong word is uttered anywhere, the League received many complaints from shocked Christian supporters. According to the League, one may only talk about matters like the Last Judgment with “holy esteem and the greatest respect.” “You should not make light of it, or you would hurt many Christians in their deepest religious

experiences. Those commercial makers would not dare to make such jokes about other religions, because that might have entirely different consequences.” (Noordman 2001: 166)

The *although*-sentence in (19) expresses a default order causal relation. It may evoke the expectation that ‘if the commercial does not contain any wrong words, there will be no complaints,’ where offensive language is the cause for complaints.

A reversed order causal relation is illustrated in (20):

(20) Tourists who will go to Croatia this summer will not notice anything about the refugees who are presently still housed in hotels. The Croatian government will do everything to transfer the estimated eighty thousand refugees to non-tourist areas. This is what the Croatian Assistant Secretary of tourism, N. Bulic, said at the holiday fair that was opened in Utrecht last Tuesday. **Although** the big Dutch tour operators are avoiding Croatia and Slovenia this summer, both countries do everything to restore the holiday country image they had before the civil war. The former Yugoslavian federal states badly need the foreign currency to restore their damaged infrastructure and monuments and to getting[sic] the economy going again. “Tourism is simply the shortest way to get the foreign currency” said a representative of the Croatian embassy.

(Noordman 2001: 165)

The underling expectation in (20) is ‘if big Dutch tour operators are avoiding Croatia and Slovenia, you may infer that these countries did not do everything to restore the holiday country image,’ where ‘not doing everything to restore the image’ is a cause for ‘avoiding Croatia and Slovenia.’

Finally, the *although* sentence in (21) expresses a concessive relation:

(21) The leader of the Bosnia Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, expects heavy opposition of the rank and file of his party against the peace plan for Bosnia. On his way back from Geneva, where he assented to the constitution proposals of the mediators Lord Owen and Cyprus Vance, Karadzic said in Belgrade last Wednesday that he nevertheless thought that the parliament of the unilaterally proclaimed Serbian republic in Bosnia would agree with the plans. The peace that the Geneva conference was supposed to achieve, still seemed far away on Wednesday. **Although** Sarajewo experienced a relatively quiet day, there were heavy fights between Serbs and Muslims and between Muslims and Croatian[sic] in other places. In Gornji Vakuf, there was the first British casualty last Wednesday, a 26-year-old UN soldier who was shot to death behind the steering wheel of his military vehicle. (Noordman 2001: 165)

In (21), the *although* clause is an argument against the claim that ‘peace seemed far away’ while the main clause is an argument in favor of that claim.

Discourse Functions of Although Clauses

Noordman (2001) further investigates how frequently the *although* clause and its main clause have a thematic continuity with the preceding context and the subsequent context, separately for the different orders of the clauses and the different relations. This investigation is based on 83 sentences from the newspaper corpus mentioned above. The findings are presented in Table 2-2:

Table 2-2: Proportion of sentences that show a thematic continuity of the *although* clause and its main clause with the preceding context and the subsequent context (Noordman 2001: 160)

		<i>although</i> - preceding	main- preceding	<i>although</i> - subsequent	main- subsequent
default order	preposed (16)	.75	.56	.19	.94
causal	postposed (17)	.06	.94	.12	.88
reversed order	preposed (16)	.31	.56	.00	.94
causal	postposed (10)	.10	.80	.50	.40
concessive	preposed (17)	.88	.71	.29	.88
relation	postposed (7)	.43	.86	.57	.71

As for the default order causal relation, when the *although* clause is preposed, it is more highly connected to the preceding context than its main clause, whereas the main clause is more highly connected to the subsequent context than the *although* clause. When the *although* clause

is postposed, the preposed main clause is more strongly connected with both the preceding and the subsequent context than the *although* clause.

As for the reversed order causal relation, when the *although* clause is preposed, the postposed main clause has stronger continuity with both the preceding and the subsequent context than the preposed *although* clause. When the *although* clause is postposed, the preposed main clause is more highly connected with the preceding context than the postposed *although* clause, whereas the postposed *although* clause is more highly connected to the subsequent context than the preposed main clause.

As for the concessive relation, when the *although* clause is preposed, the continuity scores for the *although* clause and the main clause with the preceding context are about the same, whereas the postposed main clause has a higher continuity with the subsequent context than the preposed *although* clause.

2.4 Barth (2000)

Barth (2000) is also one of the few studies that focus on *although* itself. Barth (2000: 420-427) finds that concessive *although*-constructions can fulfill at least four discourse functions when they occur in spoken English. That is, restricting previous claims, introducing additional information, forestalling possible objections, and summarizing the previous exchange of arguments.

First, the most frequent function of *although*-constructions in spoken discourse is that of restricting previous claims. These previous claims can have been stated explicitly (restricting previous utterances) or merely

implied (restricting conclusions). This function is illustrated in (22):⁷

(22) (British English radio programme. Antony Clair is interviewing Professor Colin Blakemore, a well-known neurologist. Clair has been trying to pinpoint reasons for Blakemore's success, one of which he assumes to be Blakemore's having suffered from a gastric ulcer in his youth, which could have been fatal.)

01 Clair: .hh so there's a sense of living what on
borrowed time even;
that this is time you hadn't expected;
you pack it full;

05 you never know when the/ -

- > =although in fact that particular problem was eased as uh
the ulcer,
and the bleeding,
[and/

10 Blake: [i had an operation when i was i think twenty;

uh gastratomy, (Barth 2000: 421)

Barth offers the following account:

Following his statement in lines 1-5 that Blakemore is now living borrowed time, giving him extra energy to accomplish his job so successfully, Clair seems to have realized that his claim was slightly

overdramatized. In lines 6-9 he downplays it by referring to a fact which is familiar to him as a well-informed journalist, namely that *that particular problem was eased*. He thus restricts the validity of X, Blakemore's suffering being *the* reason for his success today.

(Barth 2000: 422)

A second function of *although* clauses is that of introducing additional information, as illustrated in (23) below:

(23) (American English radio show, Larry Bensky, the host, is interviewing Ann McBride, director of Common Cause, an American grass-roots movement for making politics more efficient. They are talking about support for their goals by politicians, such as the Republican congressman Shace. When interviewed the week before, Shace admitted that with the present reform measure they only achieved a compromise.)

01 Larry: he bAsically said;
...[2 lines reported speech omitted]
it's nOt even very gOOd;
05 but it's All we can get thrOUgh there;
X [=thAt's]=not=really gOOd enough.
X' Ann: [well]
Well It is nO:t good enough as it is right NOW;
X' a 10 althOUgh in the last wEEk,

uh our understAnding is,
 that they have wOrked to strEngthen their lObby/(.)
 lObbyist gIft ban, (.)
 Y .hhh but hE is at lEAst talking about
 15 pUtting these Issues on the TA:ble;
 and i'll tEll you whAt; (Barth 2000: 423)

I quote Barth's explanation of this example:

In this example, Ann first partly agrees with Larry's criticism that the reform measure they have achieved is *not good enough as it is right now* (lines 7-9). The stress on *now* indicates that at some other point in time it may be better. She then points out that the situation is, in fact, not as bad as her initial statement might suggest, since they have achieved partial success in working on a lobbyist gift ban (X'_a, lines 10-13). The information given in X'_a is less directly related to the line of argumentation in that it gives additional background information, whose relevance in the present context is signaled by *although*. (Barth 2000: 423-424)

A third function of *although* clauses is that of forestalling a possible objection, as illustrated in (24) below:

(24) (American English radio-phone-in show with Bernie Hermann on the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb. Bernie is defending it by referring

to the war situation at that time; he agrees with the previous caller, who has also pointed out that there was a danger of Russia possibly invading Japan.)

- 01 Bern: although the russians dId declare war on japan very very late,
and they dId go into manchUria;
Y but/h we were concErned, (.)
05 about their getting tOO strong a fOOthold in Asia.
And perhaps; (.)
X' uh althOUGH uh mister trUman never sAId that,
Y' uh uh that might have been an (Underlying)/
10 anOther one of the rEAsons, (.)
why the bomb was drOpped. (Barth 2000: 424)

Barth's explanation of this example is given below:

Bernie is of the opinion that the bomb may also have been dropped because the United States was *concerned about their* [Russia's – D.B.] *getting too strong a foothold in Asia* (Y, lines 4-7, 9-12). Nevertheless, he is aware of an objection which other people calling in on his show could possibly make, namely that no one ever mentioned this as a possible reason for the dropping of the bomb. He orients towards this by conceding that this is not a reason given officially: *Mister Truman never said that* (X', line 8), and thus

forestall such possible objections. (Barth 2000: 424-425)

Finally, a fourth function of *although* clauses is to summarize the points discussed in the preceding co-text in order to dismiss them, as illustrated in (25):

(25) (British English radio discussion in which the panel answers questions from the audience. Here they are discussing a proposed pay deal with the TGWU according to which its members would be given private medical treatment. After another panel member has criticized this proposal, Enoch Powell now takes a turn.)

X 01 Pow: i suppose i stArt with a prEjudice in favour of thOse who
are bArgaining,
arrIving at a bargain at the End of it,
which eh sUIts both pArties.

Y 05 but uh i dOn't like,
pAY:,
in the form of (.) frInge bEnefits or bEnefits in kInd,
or Anything Other than straight wAges;

10 i think it Always ends/ lEAds in the end to trOUble,
...[4 lines elaborating on the trouble omitted]

Y uh so,

X' althOUGH (.) i wouldn't with to interfEre with such a bar-
gain,

i wouldn't wish gOvernment or lEgislation to
20 interfere with such a bargain arrived at,
i i hOpe that sort of bargain is not going to become tYpi-
cal.
because... [5 lines on the reason omitted]
uh On the matter of uh (.) bUYing (.) cAre-

(Barth 2000: 425-426)

Barth explains this example as below:

After having pointed out how difficult it is to arrive at a bargain in remuneration negotiations (lines 1-4), Powell admits that payment *in the form of... anything other than straight wages... always ... leads in the end to trouble* (lines 5-15). Up to this point Powell has contrasted two propositions: X, that bargains which suit both parties are to be valued, i.e., promising some trade union members advantages is not to be criticized, and Y, remuneration other than in straight wages leads to trouble and is to be criticized. After his lengthy explanation of Y, he summarizes his point, redundantly marked by *so* (line 16), and, by packaging X and Y neatly in an *although*-construction, at the same time makes clear which of the two propositions has more weight. (Barth 2000: 426)

Barth (2000: 420) points out that these four functions occur in overlap with each other. For example, the *although* clause in (23) fulfills

three functions, i.e., it introduces additional information, restricts the validity of the previous claim, and forestalls a possible objection.

2.5 Summary

This chapter has overviewed the four previous studies of concessive adverbial clauses. König's study reveals distinctive properties of concessive sentences and identifies three different subtypes of concessive relations, i.e., standard, rhetorical, and rectifying. Sweetser (1990) takes a cognitive approach to the analysis of *although*, claiming that *although* may be interpreted as applying in one of three domains, i.e., content, epistemic, and speech-act domains. Noordman (2001) distinguishes three different types of *although* relations and shows the frequencies of their occurrence in naturally-occurring discourse. Noordman also reveals that a thematic continuity of the *although* clause and the main clause with the context differ depending on the order of the clauses and the relation expressed by the *although* sentence. Barth (2000) shows that *although* clauses can fulfill at least four discourse functions in spoken English, i.e., restricting previous claims, introducing additional information, forestalling possible objections, and summarizing the previous exchange of arguments.

When one attempts to study the ways in which *although* is actually used in English discourse, however, the following problems emerge. First, most of the studies of concessive relations, except Barth (2000) and Noordman (2001), are restricted to constructed examples. König fails to examine whether the three subtypes of concessive relations, i.e., standard,

rhetorical, and rectifying, account for *although* clauses in naturally-occurring discourse. Therefore it is not clear whether these subtypes can be identified in actual data and how frequently they occur. Noordman (2001) did examine the frequency of occurrence of *although* sentences, but he overlooked the “rectifying” concessive identified by König. Chapter 3 will deal with these issues. Second, previous studies have identified differences between preposed vs. postposed concessive clauses in meaning (Izutsu 2005), processing procedures (Diessel 1996) as well as frequency (Diessel 1996). Moreover, Noordman (2001) shows that preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ in terms of discourse function and frequency. However, their differences with respect to information status, for the most part, escaped serious attention. Noordman (2001) is exceptional in this respect, but this study does not specify the patterns in which *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse. Chapter 4 attempts to clarify whether preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ in terms of their relation to the preceding discourse. Third, almost no study has analyzed *although* clauses with respect to coordinate/subordinate properties. Chapter 5 will closely examine whether preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ in degrees of subordination to a main clause.

The following chapter will examine whether and how frequently standard, rhetorical, and rectifying *although* clauses occur in naturally occurring discourse. The distinction among the three types of concessive relations is theoretically important, in that while these relations have been given different labels by different studies, each relation has been

identified in several studies, as summarized in Table 2-3 below.

Table 2-3: Previous proposals concerning the classifications of concessive relations

	Standard	Rhetorical	Rectifying
R. Lakoff (1971)	denial of expectation	-	-
Blakemore (1989)	direct denial	indirect denial	-
Azar (1997)	direct-rejection concessivity	indirect-rejection concessivity	-
Izutsu (2005)	direct concessive	indirect concessive	-
Spooren (1989) Noordman (2001)	denial of expectation	concessive opposition	-
Rudolph (1996)	real concession	-	restrictive
Günthner (2000)	-	-	restrictive
Barth (2000)	-	-	restricting previous claim

As noted above, Noordman (2001) examines standard and rhetorical *although* clauses used in newspapers and Barth (2000) identifies rectifying *although* clauses in spoken English. However, no study has compared the frequency of the three types of *although* clauses in the same corpus. The following chapter will use a corpus of newspaper articles recorded in LexisNexis Academics to examine the use of *although* clauses in actual text.

Notes to Chapter 2

- ¹ These properties are shared by causal clauses introduced by *since* and resultative clauses introduced by *so that* (König 1994: 679).
- ² According to König (1994: 681), concessive prepositions such as *despite* or *in spite of* and certain conjunctions such as *even though* are neither used in a rectifying nor rhetorical function.
- ³ König (1985b) uses the term “adversative relations” instead of “rhetorical concessive relations.”
- ⁴ König (1988) does not use the term “rectifying concessive,” but his explanation clearly suggests that the example of (10) can be regarded as an instance of this type.
- ⁵ König (1988: 148) points out that in addition to standard and rhetorical uses, at least three other uses can be distinguished: to anticipate a potential counterargument, to warn somebody against drawing the wrong conclusions, and to restrict the validity of a previous statement.
- ⁶ There are two sentences expressing a speech act relation in the newspaper corpus, but they are excluded from Table 2-1.
- ⁷ Transcription conventions are as follows:
- . final intonation falling to low
 - ; final intonation falling to mid
 - , final intonation rising to mid
 - final level intonation
 - X claim
 - X' acknowledgement
 - Y potentially incompatible claim
 - > line relevant for analysis
 - = latching
 - : lengthening

 - .hh in-breath
 - (.) pause
 - / break-off
 - () suggested transcription
 - [] overlap

one line \approx one intonation unit

Chapter 3

A Quantitative Analysis of *Although* Clauses in Naturally Occurring Discourse

The present chapter presents an analysis of *although* clauses based on the data collected from newspaper articles. As noted in chapter 2, König (1994) identifies three different types of concessive relations, i.e., standard, rhetorical, and rectifying. He also points out that both preposed and postposed *although* clauses can express standard and rhetorical concessive, whereas only postposed *although* clauses can express rectifying concessive. However, he fails to examine to what extent these three subtypes of concessive relations account for *although* clauses in naturally occurring data. This chapter examines whether these three types of *although* clauses can be identified in naturally occurring discourse and how frequently they occur.

Based on a survey of a total of 196 tokens of *although* clauses in actual data, this chapter argues the following points. First, contra König's (1994) analysis, preposed and postposed *although* clauses do not differ in the kinds of usages. Rather, the difference resides in the frequency of each usage. That is, preposed *although* clauses in my data are not restricted to standard and rhetorical concessive alone, but they express three other relations, rectifying concessive, contrast, and speech act relations. Likewise, postposed *although* clauses are not restricted to standard, rhetorical, and rectifying concessive; they express contrast and

speech act as well. However, preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ greatly in their most frequent usage types. The majority of preposed *although* clauses express standard concessive, whereas the majority of postposed *although* clauses express rectifying concessive. Second, three subtypes of rectifying concessive, which I will term as Canceling Assumption, Weakening Validity, and Exception, can be identified for postposed *although* clauses, which were not distinguished at all in the previous literature.

3.1 Data

The data used for the present research were collected from written corpus for the following two reasons. First, as reported in Ford (1993: 24), *although* clauses are relatively rare in spoken discourse. Out of the 194 adverbial clauses in the spoken corpus used in Ford (1993), only 3 were concessive and only one of them was introduced by *although*. Second, as seen in chapter 2, Barth (2000) analyzes *although* clauses in spoken corpus and finds that *although* clauses in spoken English can fulfill at least four discourse functions.¹ However, there is almost no study which analyzes the functions of *although* clause in written corpus. Noordman (2001) is exceptional in this respect, but this study overlooks the “rectifying” concessive identified by König. Therefore, I decided to collect data from written corpus.

I collected data from newspaper articles compiled in the LexisNexis academic database. I chose register-specific corpus rather than general corpus (e.g., the British National Corpus) because, as Biber *et al.* (2002:

5) note, “registers differ greatly in their grammar usage, reflecting their different communication circumstances” and “characterizations of *general English* are usually not characterizations of any variety at all, but rather a middle ground that describes no actual text or register” (Biber *et al.* 1998: 234). Among a variety of written registers such as fiction and academic prose, I chose newspaper articles for the data for the following three reasons. First, according to Biber *et al.* (2002: 4-5), newspapers, as well as fiction and academic prose, are major written registers. Second, *although* is more frequent in newspapers than in fiction. The frequency of *although* in fiction in the British National Corpus is 242.92 per one million words while the frequency of *although* in newspapers in the same corpus is 346.68 per one million words. Third, while newspapers and academic prose are two different registers, they share a main communicative purpose (Biber *et al.* 2002: 4-5). That is, while fiction focuses on pleasure reading, newspapers and academic prose are both expository.

Initially, I searched all major papers of August 14, 2006 which were available on the same day in order to collect texts containing at least one form of *although*, and obtained a total of 640 texts. Next, all these texts were sorted by relevance, i.e., according to frequency and relevancy of the term *although*, and only the first 100 texts were saved.² The total number of *although* in these texts was 207. Then, these examples were classified into three types in terms of whether *although* introduces a full content clause or a participial or verbless clause, and if it introduces a full content clause, whether the *although* clause is preposed or postposed.

Table 3-1 presents the total numbers for these three types of *although*.

Table 3-1: Numbers of each type of *although* in the data

preposed <i>although</i> clause	107
postposed <i>although</i> clause	89
participial or verbless <i>although</i> clause	11
total	207

Table 3-1 shows that *although* introducing a full content clause occurs a great deal more frequently than *although* introducing a participial or verbless clause. The table also shows that there is only a slight difference in frequency between preposed and postposed *although* clauses. The 11 examples of participial and verbless *although* clauses, such as those in (1) and (2) below, were excluded from further analysis.

(1) **Although** introduced to Sydney in the 1860s, they were less readily accepted here because of the popularity of horse-drawn omnibuses.

(The Daily Telegraph (Australia), August 14, 2006)

(2) His father had raced horses and Hunter followed him, **although** on a much smaller scale. *(Herald Sun (Australia), August 14, 2006)*

The 107 examples of preposed *although* clauses were analyzed in terms of whether they represent standard or rhetorical concessive relations, whereas the 89 examples of postposed *although* clauses were analyzed in

terms of whether they represent standard, rhetorical, or rectifying concessive relations.

3.2 Results

3.2.1 Preposed *Although* Clauses

Of the 107 preposed *although* clauses, 74 examples express standard concessive whereas 20 express rhetorical concessive. The remaining 13 examples cannot be classified into either standard or rhetorical, but into additional three subtypes. The following sections describe the five types of preposed *although* clauses identified in the data.

3.2.1.1 Standard Concessive

Not surprisingly, standard concessive is the most frequent type of preposed *although* clauses in the data. 74 out of 107 examples (about 69%) express standard concessive. As stated in chapter 2, in standard concessive, the speaker of *although p, q* asserts these two propositions against the background assumption that if ‘*p*,’ then normally not-‘*q*,’ as in (3):

(3) **Although** John had no money, he went into this expensive restaurant.

(= 6a in Ch. 2)

The background assumption in (3) is that if John has no money, he normally does not go into an expensive restaurant.

While König (1994) does not propose any subtypes of standard

concessive, the proposed *although* clauses of standard concessive in the present data can be classified into two subtypes in terms of the characteristics of the background assumptions. I will call the two subtypes Cause-Consequence and Consequence-Cause.

Cause-Consequence

In this type, there is a causal relation between the two propositions p and not- q in the background assumption “if p , then not- q .” That is, the event expressed in not- q is a consequence which might be caused by the event expressed in p . This type roughly corresponds to Noordman’s (2001) default-order causal and Sweetser’s (1990) content use of *although*. Examples of this type are given below:

(4) **Although** my class won a handball competition, I was not happy. This is because I had not done my best.

(South China Morning Post, August 14, 2006)

(5) Whereas not so long ago he would have laughed (but only to himself) at someone who had not learned how to set his or her digital watch, he was surprised to realize recently that, **although** he is annoyed with the apparent clumsiness of the cell phone he’s has[sic] yet to look at the instruction book. *(Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), August 14, 2006)*

(6) In recent years the loss of his sight had a profound effect on Hunter's lifestyle. No longer could he watch Richmond, the races, TV or read.

Nevertheless, Hunter was fiercely independent and **although** he found it increasingly difficult to master simple tasks on his own, he was determined not to enter a nursing home.

(Herald Sun (Australia), August 14, 2006)

In (4), we may assume that if his class won a handball competition, normally he was happy. However, this assumption is incompatible with the propositional content of the main clause. Here, the propositional content of not- q , i.e., that he was happy, may be regarded as a plausible consequence of the propositional content of p , i.e., that his class won a handball competition. Similarly, in (5), one may assume that if he is annoyed with the apparent clumsiness of the cell phone, normally he has looked at the instruction book. However, this assumption is in conflict with the propositional content of the main clause. The propositional content of not- q , i.e., that he has looked at the instruction book, may be regarded as a plausible consequence of the propositional content of p , i.e., that he is annoyed with the apparent clumsiness of the cell phone.

As Traugott and König (1991) and Smet and Verstraete (2006) point out, however, causal relations are “always a matter of the speaker’s perspective on the situation described rather than of the situations as such. ... It is a matter of the speaker’s point of view whether two events or situations are seen as causing each other” (Smet and Verstraete 2006: 379-380). Because of such a property of causal relations, they have been considered as a matter of degree by some researchers (cf. Myers *et al.* 1987, Izutsu 2004). Causal relatedness of the background assumptions

evoked from the *although* clauses in (4), (5), and (6) above are relatively strong. On the other hand, the *although* clause in (7) evokes a background assumption whose causal relatedness seems relatively weak:

(7) Furthermore, we must acknowledge that with aging comes decreased reflexes, vision and hearing. Senior drivers have to undergo a series of tests once they have reached the age of 80. **Although** seniors have to pass a written test and a vision test, this does not prove they still have the ability to drive. *(Ottawa Citizen, August 14, 2006)*

In summary, in the Cause-Consequence type, p in the background assumption “if p , then normally not- q ” expresses an event or a state which causes an event or a state expressed in not- q .

Consequence-Cause

As we have seen above, in the Cause-Consequence type, p expresses an event or a state which might cause the situation expressed in not- q . On the other hand, in the Consequence- Cause type, the relation between p and not- q is exactly the opposite. That is, p expresses not a cause, but a consequence which might be caused by the event expressed in not- q . This type roughly corresponds to Noodman’s (2001) reversed-order causal and Sweetser’s (1990) epistemic use of *although*.³ Examples of this type are given below:

(8) **Although** I am very much a career woman now, it was somewhat

unplanned because I started work when my husband, Ian, died in 1986.

(The Scotsman, August 14, 2006)

- (9) **Although** many businesses are still wary of investing in Argentina after the upheavals of the 2001 economic crisis, its undeveloped mining sector seems to be too good an opportunity to miss.

(Financial Times (London, England), August 14, 2006)

- (10) **Although** many drivers over the age of 24 share the misconception that all young drivers between the ages of 16 and 24 listen to loud music while driving, we aren't the only ones dialling cellphones while driving or searching for another CD or lighting cigarettes. Many senior drivers do all of these things but they are not necessarily targeted by society, including police officers.

(Ottawa Citizen, August 14, 2006)

- (11) THE original film of man's first steps on the Moon has been lost.

The footage of Neil Armstrong's historic moment is one of the most important artefacts of the 20th century. (...) Those tapes, although nowhere near the standard of normal television transmissions, would still be of far better quality than the video we have today, especially if processed using modern digital techniques. But rather than being prized as vital recordings, Nasa simply filed them away. And as personnel retired or died, the location of the tapes was forgotten.

Although this has attracted criticism, such problems are not unique to

Nasa.

(*The Daily Telegraph* (LONDON), August 14, 2006)

In (8), one may generally assume that if she is very much a career woman now, it was planned. However, this assumption is denied by the main clause. Here, unlike Cause-Consequence type, it is not the case that p causes not- q , because the temporal order of the two events is p following not- q . Rather, the propositional content of p , i.e., that she is very much a career woman, can be regarded as a plausible consequence of not- q , i.e., that it was planned. In (9), we may assume that if many businesses are still wary of investing in Argentina after the upheavals of the 2001 economic crisis, normally its undeveloped mining sector does not seem to be too good an opportunity to miss. However, this assumption is in conflict with the main clause. The propositional content of p , i.e., that many businesses are still wary of investing in Argentina, can be considered as a plausible consequence of not- q , i.e., that its undeveloped mining sector does not seem to be a good opportunity. This is not an example of Cause-Consequence because many businesses' being still wary of investing in Argentina ($=p$) cannot be interpreted as causing Argentina's mining sector to be not a good opportunity ($=\text{not-}q$).

In summary, in the Consequence-Cause type, p expresses an event or a state which might be caused by the event expressed in not- q .

3.2.1.2 Rhetorical Concessive

Rhetorical concessive is far less frequent than standard concessive in the data. While 74 out of 107 examples (about 69%) express standard

concessive, only 20 out of 107 examples (about 19%) express rhetorical concessive. Unlike standard concessive, examples of rhetorical concessive could not be classified into several subtypes. As stated in chapter 2, in rhetorical concessive, an *although* clause ‘p’ is an argument for a conclusion ‘r,’ whereas the main clause ‘q’ is an argument for the opposite conclusion ‘not-r’ and this second conclusion carries more weight in the whole argument. This analysis is described as in (12):

(12) although *p*, *q*

(a) *p* *r*

(b) *q* not-*r*

(c) *q* carries more weight (cf. König 1985a: 6)

Examples of rhetorical concessive in the present data are given below:

(13) The government is exploring the possibility of introducing a goods and services tax (GST). This is not the right time to impose such a tax. **Although** our economy is improving, it is still unstable. A lot of people are struggling to cope with the rising cost of living.

(*South China Morning Post*, August 14, 2006)

(14) As with Nancy's cannabis-based cottage industry, the logistics worked well for a single mom. **Although** it shoots in L.A., "Weeds," is a half-hour show with a 13-episode season, as opposed to the 22 usually

required by the networks, so Parker and her son, William, wouldn't have to be away from their New York home for more than a few months. *(Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2006)*

- (15) It is at least as brutal as the Nazis and communist enemies we have faced in the past. **Although** radical Islam is not militarily as powerful as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, it has the huge strategic advantage of suicide bombing, which is immune to deterrence.

(The Australian (Australia), August 14, 2006)

- (16) Becci Neal and Bridget Hannan, who drew up the transport element of the project, point out that the town's narrow streets are ideal for pedestrians and cyclists, but the two-way traffic system and the sheer number of cars make them "very unfriendly and unsafe".

Because the town becomes "extremely congested" in the summer months, it has "a stressful and polluted atmosphere which is hardly attractive".

Although there are bike-hire facilities, "there isn't actually anywhere to park your bike or safe routes for them to travel on".

(The Irish Times, August 14, 2006)

In (13), the propositional content of the *although* clause "our economy is improving" is an argument against the claim that this is not the right time to impose a goods and services tax (GST). On the other hand, the main clause "it is still unstable" is in favor of that claim. In (14), the *although*

clause “it shoots in L.A.” is an argument against the claim that “the logistics worked well for a single mom.” On the other hand, the main clause “Weeds is a half-hour show with a 13-episode season, as opposed to the 22 usually required by the networks” is in favor of the claim.

3.2.1.3 Speech Act

While König (1994) identifies only two functions of preposed *although* clauses, i.e., standard and rhetorical concessive, 13 out of 107 examples of preposed *although* clauses in the present data cannot be classified into either type. Instead, additional three subtypes can be identified, i.e., Speech-Act, Contrast, and Rectifying.

First, three examples in the data can be identified as what Sweetser (1990) called speech-act use of *although*. As stated in section 2.2, speech-act *although* clauses form an obstacle for the realization of the speech-act expressed in the main clause, as exemplified below:

(17) Wind, showers and rain are expected to ease from tomorrow afternoon or evening as a high pressure system moves over the country from the Tasman Sea and hangs around for most of the week. **Although** sunny days are on their way, don't expect balmy weather just yet.

(*The New Zealand Herald*, August 14, 2006)

(18) **Although** I am hardly a fan of President Bush, he has proposed some enlightened legislation that Brown-Waite has been reluctant to support. Having been the governor of Texas, I think Bush understands

the complexity of this issue.

(*St. Petersburg Times* (Florida), August 14, 2006)

In (17), the speaker requests the readers not to expect balmy weather in spite of the fact that sunny days are on their way. In (18), unlike standard concessive, there is no assumption that if the speaker is hardly a fan of President Bush, then the President has not proposed some enlightened legislation. Unlike rhetorical *although* clauses, the *although* clause and the main clauses do not support any opposite conclusions. Instead, the propositional content of the *although* clause *I am hardly a fan of President Bush* is in conflict with the *speech act* of asserting that President Bush has proposed some “enlightened” legislation.⁴

3.2.1.4 Contrast

The relation of contrast has been distinguished from that of standard concessive by many researchers and has been differently termed: “semantic opposition” in R. Lakoff (1971) and Spooren (1989), “contrast” in Blakemore (1989) and Izutsu (2005). According to R. Lakoff (1971), the relation of contrast is distinguished from that of standard concessive (or “denial of expectation” in R. Lakoff’s term) in terms of three respects. First, standard concessive involves a background assumption, while contrast does not. Second, for contrast, the order of the conjuncts can be changed, while it cannot for standard concessive. Third, contrast can be expressed by *while*, whereas standard concessive cannot. The present study follows R. Lakoff’s definition of contrast.

Some previous studies compare the uses of *but* and *although* and assume that while both *but* and *although* can express standard concessive, only *but*, not *although*, can express contrast (cf. R. Lakoff 1971 and Izutsu 2005). However, Mittwoch, Huddleston, and Collins (2002: 735) observe that the strength of the background assumptions (“the contrary-to-expectation implicature” in their term) evoked from *although* clauses may vary, as exemplified below:

(19) **Although** Sam was extremely rude to her, Beth defended him.

(Mittwoch, Huddleston, and Collins 2002: 735)

(20) **Although** many Gurkhas speak English, almost none speak Cantonese.

(*ibid.*)

In (19), the fact that Sam was extremely rude to Beth provides reasonable grounds for expecting she might not defend him. On the other hand, in (20), “the fact that many Gurkhas speak English doesn’t provide very strong ground for expecting that some Gurkhas would speak Cantonese. What is important is the *contrast* between English and Cantonese” (Mittwoch, Huddleston, and Collins 2002: 735).

My data also show that *although* can express the relation of contrast, as shown below:

(21) a. **Although** some organizations are sticking to training seeing-eye dogs or animals that help people who use wheelchairs, others are teaching dogs to respond when companions have seizures or to act

as hearing-ear animals to alert deaf people to crying babies or knocks on the door.

(Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Wisconsin), August 14, 2006)

In (21a), two groups of organizations are contrasted with respect to their programs of dog-training. This example fits R. Lakoff's (1971) definition of contrast. First, unlike standard concessive, the *although* clause does not evoke the background assumption that if some organizations are sticking to training seeing-eye dogs or animals that help people who use wheelchairs, others are not teaching dogs to respond when companions have seizures or to act as hearing-ear animals to alert deaf people to crying babies or knocks on the door. Second, *although* in (21a) is replaceable by *while*, as shown in (21b) below. Third, the order of the conjuncts can be changed, as shown in (21c):

(21) b. Some organizations are sticking to training seeing-eye dogs or animals that help people who use wheelchairs, **while** others are teaching dogs to respond when companions have seizures or to act as hearing-ear animals to alert deaf people to crying babies or knocks on the door.

c. **Although** some organizations are teaching dogs to respond when companions have seizures or to act as hearing-ear animals to alert deaf people to crying babies or knocks on the door, others are sticking to training seeing-eye dogs or animals that help

people who use wheelchairs.

One more example of contrast is given below:

(22) a. Portland's Youth Gang Outreach Program, born nearly two decades ago when the city was shocked by its first drive-by shooting, is on its deathbed. (...) Other cities across the country where gang outreach sprouted amid heightened violence have had mixed results sustaining it. **Although** Stockton, Calif.'s "Operation Peacekeeper" program is suffering from shrinking budgets, Boston's Streetwalker program remains strong with 25 city-paid full-time outreach workers.

(The Oregonian (Portland, Oregon), August 14, 2006)

In (22a), Stockton and Boston are contrasted with respect to how well they sustain their gang outreach program. This example also fits R. Lakoff's (1971) definition of contrast. First, unlike standard concessive, the *although* clause does not evoke the background assumption that if Stockton, Calif.'s "Operation Peacekeeper" program is suffering from shrinking budgets, then Boston's Streetwalker program doesn't remain strong with 25 city-paid full-time outreach workers. Second, *although* in (22a) is replaceable by *while*, as shown in (22b) below. Third, the order of the conjuncts can be changed, as shown in (22c):

(20) b. Portland's Youth Gang Outreach Program, born nearly two decades

ago when the city was shocked by its first drive-by shooting, is on its deathbed. (...) Other cities across the country where gang outreach sprouted amid heightened violence have had mixed results sustaining it. Stockton, Calif.'s "Operation Peacekeeper" program is suffering from shrinking budgets, **while** Boston's Streetwalker program remains strong with 25 city-paid full-time outreach workers.

- (20) c. Portland's Youth Gang Outreach Program, born nearly two decades ago when the city was shocked by its first drive-by shooting, is on its deathbed. (...) Other cities across the country where gang outreach sprouted amid heightened violence have had mixed results sustaining it. **Although** Boston's Streetwalker program remains strong with 25 city-paid full-time outreach workers, Stockton, Calif.'s "Operation Peacekeeper" program is suffering from shrinking budgets.

3.2.1.5 Rectifying

Although König (1994) points out that only postposed, not preposed, *although* clauses can function as rectifying concessive clauses, 7 out of 107 preposed *although* clauses in the data can be identified as rectifying concessive. According to König (1994), rectifying concessive *although* clauses differ from standard and rhetorical concessive *although* clauses in that the former weakens the main clause whereas the latter emphasizes it.

König's rectifying concessive *although* corresponds to Barth's (2000)

restricting *although*. According to Barth, restricting *although* clauses restrict previous utterances or a conclusion which can be drawn from the preceding utterance. Barth (2000: 412) also claims that restricting *although* clauses are characterized by a “*second* position which limits the validity of the previous claim.”

However, my data show that restricting *although* clauses may not only follow but also precede the main clause, as illustrated in (23):

(23) There were reports of serious casualties. The government claimed that 200 Tigers and 27 of its own forces were killed on Saturday alone. **Although** the wide discrepancy in the government's figures cast some doubt on them, the silence from the Tigers suggests they may have suffered heavy losses. (*The Independent* (London), August 14, 2006)

In (23), the main clause says that Tigers may have suffered heavy losses. However, the validity of this statement is restricted by the propositional content of the preceding *although* clause *the wide discrepancy in the government's figures cast some doubt on them*. Other examples are given below:

(24) NOFX was definitely the band many in the crowd had come to see. "They're my favourite here," said 7-year-old Emile Roy, from Sherbrooke, sporting a Ramones T-shirt and an Every Time I Die trucker cap. He was sitting atop his godfather's shoulders, listening to another "old-timer" act, Less than Jake. **Although** Emile was a little

younger than most of the people in attendance, the average age was firmly in the teens. (*The Gazette* (Montreal), August 14, 2006)

(25) "We are still hopeful that Wayne will be fit for Sunday but it may be a bit of a push. The groin injury is causing him a bit of bother and, **although** it is nothing too serious, it is enough to be a concern for the Fulham game."

(*The Guardian* (London) - *Final Edition*, August 14, 2006)

(26) In contrast, a recent court ruling in Crook County did advance the public interest. It may help to curtail the development boom voters unwittingly triggered in approving Measure 37. Circuit Judge George W. Neilson struck down a Crook County rule permitting development rights secured under Measure 37 to be almost immediately transferred to new owners, i.e., developers.

Although it may not be the last word on "transferability," the judge's ruling for the most part backed the position that Attorney General Hardy Myers has taken. He has held that development rights secured under Measure 37 belong to the original owner of the land and cannot be just passed along to a developer.

(*The Oregonian* (Portland, Oregon), August 14, 2006)

In (24), the main clause states that the average age of the people in attendance was firmly in the teens. The *although* clause restricts this statement by suggesting that not all of the audience were in the teens.

Thus, contra König's (1994) and Barth's (2000) claims, restricting *although* clauses may not only follow but also precede their main clauses.

3.2.1.6 Summary of Preposed *Although* Clauses

As we have seen, the preposed *although* clauses in the data can be classified into five subtypes: speech act, contrast, and rectifying as well as standard and rhetorical. Moreover, standard *although* clauses can further be classified into two subtypes: Cause-Consequence and Consequence-Cause. The number of examples of each type is shown in Table 3-2 below.

Table 3-2: Functions of preposed *although* clauses

Standard	Cause-Consequence	64	74
	Consequence-Cause	10	
Rhetorical			20
Speech-Act			3
Contrast			3
Rectifying			7
Total			107

3.2.2 Postposed *Although* Clauses

According to König (1994), postposed *although* clauses can express standard, rhetorical, and rectifying concessive. However, out of the 89 postposed *although* clauses in the data, the majority of examples (82 examples) classify as rectifying concessive, one example contrast, and two

examples speech act, which cannot be predicted by König's (1994) analysis. There are no clear examples of standard and rhetorical concessive. Examples which are ambiguous between standard or rhetorical and rectifying are classified into rectifying concessive. The following sections describe these three types of postposed *although* clauses.

3.2.2.1 Rectifying

Rectifying concessive is the most frequent type of postposed *although* clauses in the data. 82 out of 89 examples (about 92%) express rectifying concessive. As stated in chapter 2, the content of the main clause is weakened whenever a rectifying clause follows, as illustrated in (27):

(27) At least two of Dr Mahathir's children - Mirzan and Mokhzani Mahathir - were big in business until the 1998 Asian financial crisis forced their debt-heavy companies to be bought over by other Malaysian interests.

Mr Mirzan sold his shipping company to a unit of national oil company Petronas while Mr Mokhzani sold off his listed flagship companies Pantai and Tongkah Holdings to Malaysian interests.

Even so, they continue to retain business interests in the country from logistics and computers to luxury auto sales, **although** their scale of activity is nowhere near their pre-crisis peaks. (*The Business Times Singapore*, August 14, 2006)

In (27), the propositional content of the main clause *they continue to retain business interests in the country from logistics and computers to luxury auto sales* is weakened by the following *although* clause *their scale of activity is nowhere near their pre-crisis peaks*. Other examples are given below:

(28) But earning an Internet diploma from the program won't be cheap. Annual tuition for a full-time student is \$12,000, **although** the school will offer financial aid.

(*THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE* (California), August 14, 2006)

(29) Three years ago Colvin was all-OLB, all the time. That was before he broke his hip in his second game with New England, an injury that forced him to consider his OLB days might be over, and that a new position could be required. ... On the field, the Patriots are relying on the 6-foot-3-inch, 250-pound Colvin to get more things done this season, with his role expected to expand following the free agent departure of Willie McGinest. As for his hip, Colvin said it has improved each season, **although** it still stiffens after practices and games.

(*The Boston Globe*, August 14, 2006)

(30) Speculation has grown that Dr Castro was on the verge of death -- or had died already -- and that Raul Castro, the 75-year-old army chief, was finding it difficult to convince some of his more reform-minded generals that "Castroism" should -- and could -- outlive his brother.

The move has stirred hopes among Cuba's small but hardy band of dissidents, **although** none was expecting any sudden end to the repression that characterises the dictatorship installed by Dr Castro after seizing power from US-backed strongman Fulgencio Batista in 1959. *(The Australian (Australia), August 14, 2006)*

In (28), the financial burden on a full-time student expressed in the main clause is weakened by the propositional content of the following *although* clause *the school will offer financial aid*. In (29), the condition of Colvin's hip expressed in the main clause is weakened by the propositional content of the *although* clause *it still stiffens after practices and games*.

While König (1994) does not propose any subtype of rectifying concessive, at least three subtypes can be identified in the data with respect to the way in which the main clause is weakened. The three subtypes will be called Canceling Assumption, Weakening Validity, and Exception.

Canceling Assumption

In this type, the *although* clause weakens the main clause by canceling an assumption which is evoked from the propositional content of the main clause, as exemplified in (31), (32), and (33) below:

(31) Mr. Loving and Ms. Shelltrack have lived together for 13 years, longer than many modern marriages. They consider themselves engaged, **although** they have set no date for a wedding. "We never

really felt a huge need to do it. We're a family, regardless," Ms. Shelltrack says.

(St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), August 14, 2006)

(32) Next week, in Aachen, Germany, Zara is representing Britain in the World Equestrian Games. ... "Mum and Dad will both be in Aachen," she says. "**Although** Dad won't be advising me, because he trains the United States team.

(The Daily Telegraph (LONDON), August 14, 2006)

(33) On his release from jail in 2001, Lee assembled a new version of Love and began touring again, often playing Forever Changes in its entirety, complete with orchestra. He was to tour for the next four years to great acclaim, **although** there was to be no new material released.

(The Herald (Glasgow), August 14, 2006)

In (31), the propositional content of the main clause may evoke an assumption that if they consider themselves engaged, they have set the date for a wedding. However, this assumption is cancelled by the *although* clause *they have set no date for a wedding*. Similarly, in (32), the propositional content of the main clause may evoke an assumption that if the speaker's Mum and Dad will be in Aachen, her father will be advising the speaker. However, this assumption is cancelled by the *although* clause *Dad won't be advising me*.

Weakening Validity

This type of *although* clauses weakens the main clause by restricting the validity of what is stated in the main clause, as exemplified in (34), (35), and (36) below:

(34) Is there a link with the July 7 attacks? So far none has been established, although some of the suspects were said to have been in Pakistan at the same time as the suicide bombers Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shazad Tanweer. Who masterminded the operation? According to one report, one of those in custody is the British leader of al-Qa'ida, **although** the disparate nature of the terrorist networks means that there is no one "Mr Big" in this country. *(The Independent (London), August 14, 2006)*

(35) For his part, Musharraf has repeatedly dismissed ties between his nation and global terror plots, **although** current and former intelligence officials say his claims are politically based and demonstrably false.

(The Daily Telegraph (Australia), August 14, 2006)

(36) Officially, Israel has now accepted the UN ceasefire that calls for an end to all Israeli offensive military operations and Hizbollah attacks, and the Hizbollah have stated that they will abide by the ceasefire - providing no Israeli troops remain inside Lebanon. But 10,000 Israeli soldiers - the Israelis even suggest 30,000, **although** no one in Beirut

takes that seriously - have now entered the country and every one of them is a Hizbollah target.

(The Independent (London), August 14, 2006)

In (34), the main clause states that *According to one report, one of those in custody is the British leader of al-Qa'ida*. However, the validity of the report mentioned in the main clause is weakened by the following *although* clause *the disparate nature of the terrorist networks means that there is no one "Mr Big" in this country*. In (35), the main clause mentions Musharraf's dismissal of ties between his nation and global terror plots. However, the validity of his claim is weakened by the postposed *although* clause *current and former intelligence officials say his claims are politically based and demonstrably false*.

Exception

In this type, the *although* clause weakens the message of the main clause by providing an exception to what is stated in the main clause, as illustrated in (37), (38), and (39):

(37) I chose to volunteer through Teaching and Projects Abroad because it housed volunteers with families, not in hostels. Within minutes of our arrival at our new family home we were renamed. I was dubbed Michelle, after an aunt, but the family were astonished to discover that my real name had Islamic roots. My family was unusual in that they only spoke Wolof, **although** my 19-year-old "sister"

remembered a smattering of French from school.

(The Independent (London), August 14, 2006)

(38) Highs: Made with two types of melon, strawberries, raspberries, mandarins, grapes, pineapple, blueberries, blackberries and kiwis, this fruit salad, available from farmers' markets across Dublin, has the widest variety of fruits. ...

Lows: It will not be easy for most people to source. Because it is home produced there is no label, so it's impossible to gauge how much of each fruit was used, **although** there did seem to be an excessive amount of pineapple in the mix.

(The Irish Times, August 14, 2006)

(39) The death of 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger in 1999 was followed three years later by evidence that the first major gene therapy success treatment for a rare immune disorder known as "bubble boy syndrome" caused cancer. Since then, there has been steady progress toward new treatments for immune disorders, cancers, and blindness, **although** there is still no gene therapy product on the market in the United States.

(The Boston Globe, August 14, 2006)

In (37), the main clause states that the speaker's new family only spoke Wolof. However, an exception to this is provided in the *although* clause *my 19-year-old "sister" remembered a smattering of French from school.*

In (38), the main clause says that *it's impossible to gauge how much of*

each fruit was used. However, the *although* clause states that the amount of pineapple is exceptional.

As I argued in section 3.2.1.5, preposed as well as postposed *although* clauses can express rectifying concessive. The *although* clauses in (23) and (24) above, repeated below as (40), and (41), may be considered examples of Weakening Validity and Exception, respectively:

(40) There were reports of serious casualties. The government claimed that 200 Tigers and 27 of its own forces were killed on Saturday alone. **Although** the wide discrepancy in the government's figures cast some doubt on them, the silence from the Tigers suggests they may have suffered heavy losses. (=23)

(41) NOFX was definitely the band many in the crowd had come to see. "They're my favourite here," said 7-year-old Emile Roy, from Sherbrooke, sporting a Ramones T-shirt and an Every Time I Die trucker cap. He was sitting atop his godfather's shoulders, listening to another "old-timer" act, Less than Jake. **Although** Emile was a little younger than most of the people in attendance, the average age was firmly in the teens. (=24)

As we have seen, at least three subtypes of rectifying *although* clauses are identified in the data. However, three types are not intended to be exhaustive. For example, while the *although* clauses in (27), (28), (29), and (30) above can be regarded as examples of rectifying concessive,

they cannot be classified into any of three subtypes. Moreover, there is no clear-cut boundary among these subtypes. There are some examples in between, as illustrated in (42):

(42) MALAYSIAN diva Sheila Majid pulled out all the stops in her debut at the Esplanade over the weekend. ...There was a mellow glow about her throughout, **although** she seemed nervous at first, scrambling some of her sentences in banter - a poignant reminder of how industry insiders used to rib her about her tongue-tiedness, even aloofness, before audiences. (*The Straits Times* (Singapore), August 14, 2006)

In (42), the main clause may evoke an assumption that if there was a mellow glow about her throughout, she did not seem nervous at first. This assumption is cancelled by the *although* clause. At the same time, the *although* clause can be regarded as providing an exception to the propositional content of the main clause.

Ambiguous Cases

As noted above, while no example in the data is a clear case of standard or rhetorical concessive, some examples are considered ambiguous between standard or rhetorical and rectifying concessive. Examples which are ambiguous between standard and rectifying are given below:

(43) Paul Gelsinger, Jesse's father, warns potential volunteers to get

involved in gene therapy studies only after asking lots of questions about safety. "If it's not life-threatening, I would go for much more conventional treatment," he said.

Carlene Lauffer, however, said she would volunteer in a minute, **although** her arthritis is too advanced to qualify for Evans's research. Lauffer, 78, suffers from osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis and has had finger joint replacements and a hip replacement.

(The Boston Globe, August 14, 2006)

- (44) The ex-premier had also questioned ECM Libra's merger with state-owned Avenue Capital Resources in January, alleging that it had been pushed through unfairly to the government's detriment.

The latter allegation, especially, was given wide publicity, prompting Parliament's Public Accounts Committee to look into the ECM Libra-Avenue merger. That is still on-going, **although** the committee ruled that the merger did not break any laws or regulatory guidelines. *(The Business Times Singapore, August 14, 2006)*

In (43), the propositional content of the main clause *Carlene Lauffer said she would volunteer in a minute* might evoke an assumption that she is qualified for Evans's research. However, the following *although* clause cancels this assumption. Thus, the *although* clause might be interpreted as rectifying concessive in that it weakens the main clause by cancelling an assumption evoked from the main clause. At the same time, however,

this example may also be interpreted as standard concessive. We might assume that if her arthritis is too advanced to qualify for Evans's research, she would not say she would volunteer in a minute. This assumption is denied by the main clause.

Examples which are ambiguous between rhetorical and rectifying are given below:

(45) The final is scheduled for Friday, September 1st at Castle Avenue **although** Railway will be making an application to have it moved to the following day. *(The Irish Times, August 14, 2006)*

(46) While research seems to indicate that breast augmentation doesn't put women at increased risk of breast cancer, as many as 46 per cent of women with silicone-gel breast implants need additional surgery within three years because of leakage. Many women with implants have also reported systemic side-effects such as lupus and ME, **although** there is, as yet, no conclusive evidence that silicone implants are responsible.

(The Daily Telegraph (LONDON), August 14, 2006)

In (45), the propositional content of the main clause *the final is scheduled for Friday, September 1st at Castle Avenue* might evoke an assumption that the final will be held on September 1st. However, the validity of this assumption is weakened by the *although* clause *Railway will be making an application to have it moved to the following day*. Thus, the *although*

clause might be interpreted as rectifying concessive. At the same time, however, this example may also be interpreted as rhetorical concessive in that the main clause supports a conclusion that the final will be held on September 1st while the *although* clause supports the opposite conclusion.

According to König (1994), standard and rhetorical concessive *although* clauses differ from rectifying concessive *although* clauses in that the former emphasize their main clause whereas the latter weaken them. However, it is not always clear whether *although* clauses emphasize or weaken their main clause. Therefore, all ambiguous cases are regarded as rectifying concessive in the present analysis.

3.2.2.2 Contrast

I argued above that contrary to the standard view, preposed *although* clauses and their main clauses can express the relation of contrast. According to R. Lakoff (1971), contrast does not involve any background assumption and can be expressed by *while*. In addition, the order of the conjuncts which express contrast can be changed. While König (1994) does not point out this function of postposed *although* clauses, one example in the data is identified as expressing contrast:

- (47) a. A 1960 Falcon sedan in "excellent" condition is valued at \$6,825 while a 1960 coupe in the same shape is worth \$8,150, **although** a 1960 sedan in "good" shape is worth \$3,600 and a coupe in good condition is at only \$4,300, says the Collectible Vehicle Value Guide. (Chicago Sun Times, August 14, 2006)

In (47a), a 1960 Falcon sedan in "excellent" condition and a 1960 coupe in the same shape are contrasted with a 1960 sedan in "good" shape and a coupe in good condition respectively with respect to their value. This example fits R. Lakoff's (1971) definition of contrast. First, the *although* clause does not evoke the background assumption "if p, then normally not-q," i.e., if a 1960 sedan in "good" shape is worth \$3,600 and a coupe in good condition is at only \$4,300, then it is not the case that a 1960 Falcon sedan in "excellent" condition is valued at \$6,825 while a 1960 coupe in the same shape is worth \$8,150. Second, *although* in (47a) is replaceable by *while*, as shown in (47b) below. Third, the order of the conjuncts can be changed, as shown in (47c):

(47)b. A 1960 Falcon sedan in "excellent" condition is valued at \$6,825 and a 1960 coupe in the same shape is worth \$8,150, **while** a 1960 sedan in "good" shape is worth \$3,600 and a coupe in good condition is at only \$4,300, says the Collectible Vehicle Value Guide.

c. A 1960 sedan in "good" shape is worth \$3,600 and a coupe in good condition is at only \$4,300, **although** a 1960 Falcon sedan in "excellent" condition is valued at \$6,825 and a 1960 coupe in the same shape is worth \$8,150.

3.2.2.3 Speech Act

Two examples in the data can be identified as speech-act *although* clauses. Speech-act *although* clauses form an obstacle for the realization of the speech-act expressed in the main clause, as exemplified below:

(48) But she has her mother's attitude that you have to kick yourself back into touch. She looks like her mother, too, **although** she'd probably slap me for saying that.

(*The Daily Telegraph* (LONDON), August 14, 2006)

(49) This is the cheapest of the fruit salads tried, **although** there is not a huge difference in price between the least and most expensive. It tastes pretty good too. (*The Irish Times*, August 14, 2006)

In (48), the speaker makes the assertion that she looks like her mother despite the propositional content of the *although* clause that she'd probably slap the speaker for saying that. In (49), the speaker asserts that the fruit salads are "the cheapest," which is not untrue. However, the use of the term "cheapest" is qualified since there is not a huge difference in price between the least and most expensive.

3.2.2.4 Summary of Postposed *Although* Clauses

As we have seen, the postposed *although* clauses in the data can be classified into three subtypes: rectifying, speech act, and contrast. Moreover, three subtypes of rectifying *although* clauses are identified: *Canceling Assumption*, *Weakening Validity*, and *Exception*. The number

of examples of each type is shown in Table 3-3 below.

Table 3-3: Functions of postposed *although* clauses

Rectifying	Canceling Assumption	33	82
	Weakening Validity	7	
	Exception	9	
	Others	33	
Speech-Act			2
Contrast			1
Unclear			4
Total			89

3.3 Summary

The discussions of this chapter have come up with the following new findings. First, contra König's (1994) analysis, preposed and postposed *although* clauses do not differ in the kinds of usages. Rather, the difference resides in the frequency of each usage. That is, preposed *although* clauses in my data are not restricted to standard and rhetorical concessive alone; they express three other relations: rectifying concessive, contrast, and speech act relations. Likewise, postposed *although* clauses are not restricted to standard, rhetorical, and rectifying concessive; they express contrast and speech act as well. However, preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ greatly in their most frequent usage types. The majority of preposed *although* clauses express standard concessive, whereas the majority of postposed *although* clauses express

rectifying concessive. Second, three subtypes of rectifying concessive, Canceling Assumption, Weakening Validity, and Exception, can be identified for postposed *although* clauses, which were not distinguished at all in the previous literature.

Notes to Chapter 3

¹ The data used in Barth (2000) also show that *although* clauses are relatively rare in spoken discourse. The number of *although* clauses compiled from 58.5 hours of spoken English data was only 26.

² When **Sort by Relevance** is selected, LexisNexis Academic creates a formula to rank texts according to greatest frequency and relevancy of terms and displays most relevant texts first.

³ The *because* equivalent of Consequence-Cause *although* is exemplified below:

() Because the ground is wet, (I think) it rained in the early morning.

Example () does not mean that the wet ground caused the rain in the real world. Rather, () is normally understood as meaning that the speaker's knowledge of the wet ground causes the conclusion that it rained this morning.

⁴ In Mizuno (2004), I compared the preposed *although* construction "*although* S1, S2" and the *but* construction "S1 *but* S2." I found that while both these constructions have speech act functions, the preposed *although* construction is more restricted than the *but* construction. That is, in general, *although* clauses are incompatible with purely "phatic" or "interpersonal" ("less objective") propositional content: *Although* clauses prefer less phatic or interpersonal (more objective) propositional content, as show in the contrastive felicity between the (a) and (b) examples in () through () below:

() a. I sympathize with your problem, **but** get the paper in tomorrow!

b. **Although** I sympathize with your problem, get the paper I tomorrow! (Sweetser 1990: 79)

() a. I don't want to rush you, **but** let's try to catch the next bus. (Konishi *et al.* 1994: 243)

b. **Although** I don't want to rush you, let's try to catch the next bus.

() a. I'm sorry to bother you, **but** could you just check this translation for me?

b. (?) **Although** I'm sorry to bother you, could you just check this translation for me?

-
- () a. I love you, **but** please take those wet boots off the carpet!
(Sweetser 1990: 105-106)
- b. ?? **Although** I love you, please take those wet boots off the carpet!
- () a. I'm sorry **but** you'll have to do it again.
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1311)
- b. *? **Although** I'm sorry, you'll have to do it again.
- () a. Excuse me, **but** where is the post office?
(Konishi *et al.* 1994: 619)
- b. * **Although** excuse me, where is the post office?

It should be noted that the infelicity in (b) does not mean that the expression *I love you* per se necessarily conveys “phatic” message. Consider (a) below:

- () a. I love you, **but** Jim also loves you.
- b. **Although** I love you, Jim also loves you.

In (a), while S1 consists of *I love you*, it is uttered not to alleviate the offensive tone of voice, but to convey its non-interpersonal, or objective, propositional content. In this case, *although* is perfectly acceptable, as shown in (b).

Chapter 4

Information Status of Preposed and Postposed *Although* Clauses in Discourse

The present chapter compares preposed with postposed *although* clauses with respect to their information status. As we have seen in the previous chapter, like most adverbial clauses in English, *although* clauses can occur either before or after the main clause, as shown in (1) and (2):

(1) **Although** he could tell it was daylight, he kept his eyes shut tight.

(*Harry Potter*: 49)

(2) He hoped the roof wasn't going to fall in, **although** he might be warmer if it did.

(*Harry Potter*: 38)

A number of studies argue that constituent order is primarily determined by information structure. Specifically, it has been claimed that 'given' information tends to precede 'new' information in an utterance (cf. Prince 1981, Chafe 1987, Birner and Ward 1998). Following this line of thought, it has been suggested that the order of main and adverbial clauses is mainly determined by discourse factors. Thompson (1985), Ford and Thompson (1986), Ramsay (1987), Givón (1990), and Ford (1993), among others, have revealed that purpose clauses, conditional clauses, temporal clauses, and causal clauses show a common tendency as shown in (3):

- (3) Preposed adverbial clauses tend to be related to the preceding discourse as well as to the main clause, whereas postposed adverbial clauses tend to be only related to the main clause. (=7 in Ch. 1)

However, almost no study has examined whether *although* clauses also conform to this tendency. Noordman (2001) is exceptional in this respect. He examines how frequently preposed and postposed *although* clauses are connected to the preceding and following discourse. However, Noordman (2001) suffers from some problems. In particular, it does not specify the patterns in which *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse.

In an attempt to provide a clearer account of the ways in which *although* clauses are semantically connected to the preceding discourse, I employ the conception of information status as introduced by Prince (1992) and developed by Birner and Ward (1998). This approach is extremely useful in classifying and explicating the types of relation *although* clauses are capable of establishing with the preceding discourse.

The aims of this chapter are two-fold: () to examine whether *although* clauses also conform to the common tendency of other adverbial clauses noted in (3) above; and () to identify the types of connections that preposed and postposed *although* clauses can bear to the preceding discourse, which has been overlooked in previous works, and to clarify the frequency distribution of each type.

As stated in section 2.1, concessive (such as *although*) clauses are known to be distinct from other adverbial clauses in several respects (cf.

König 1985a, 1994). First, concessive clauses, which cannot be focused, are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other adverbial clauses. Second, concessive clauses develop relatively late in the history of a language and are also acquired much later than other types of adverbial clauses. Third, while several types of complex sentences have a concessive reading under certain contextual conditions, as shown in (4) below, sentences explicitly marked as concessives can never be interpreted as expressing another adverbial relation.

(4) (=5 in Ch. 2)

- a. Poor as he is, he spends a lot of money on horses.
- b. There was a funny smile on Dickie's face as if Dickie were pulling his leg by pretending to fall in with his plan, when he hadn't the least intention to fall in with it.
- c. If the aim seems ambitious, it is not unrealistic.

Based on a survey of a total of 196 tokens of *although* clauses derived from newspaper articles, this chapter comes up with the following findings. First, preposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse in 71% of my data (76 out of 107 examples). These thematic links can be identified in any one of four ways, i.e., by representing discourse-old information, by representing strongly or weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse. Second, postposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse in 17% of the data (15 out of 89). These

thematic connections can be described in any one of three ways, i.e., by representing weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse. There was no case of discourse-old information found in the postposed version. Finally, *although* clauses can be said to conform to the general tendency of other adverbial clauses, in that the preposed version is far more frequently linked with the preceding discourse. However, there is a possibility that *although* clauses may differ consistently from other adverbial (i.e., temporal or conditional) clauses in the exact degree of frequency of linkage with the preceding discourse.

Section 4.1 will review previous studies which examine discourse functions of adverbial clauses as a group, or particular clause types (i.e., purpose clauses, *if* clauses, *when* clauses, and *because* clauses). Section 4.2 will review Noordman (2001) and point out its problems. Section 4.3 will account for the method of the present study. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 will examine how preposed and postposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse, by examining naturally occurring discourse.

4.1 Previous Studies on the Discourse Functions of Adverbial Clauses

This section reviews previous studies which examine discourse functions of adverbial clauses as a group, or particular clause types.

Chafe (1984)

Chafe (1984) examines adverbial clauses as a group, based on data from dinner table conversation and academic writing. Chafe reports that

“if an adverbial clause appears in the same intonation or punctuation unit with its main clause, then the ordering of the two clauses is almost always with the main clause first and the adverbial clause second” (Chafe 1984: 440), and “the initial main clause expresses familiar information, while the bound postposed adverbial clause expresses something unfamiliar” (*ibid.*, 443).

Chafe also suggests that preposed adverbial clauses, which are separated by a comma or a prosodic break from their main clauses, serve as a kind of “guidepost” to information flow, “orienting the listener or reader temporally, conditionally, causally, or otherwise to the information in the main clause which is to follow” (Chafe 1984: 448). In contrast to the function of preposed adverbial clauses, postposed adverbial clauses separated by a comma or prosodic break from their main clauses, add comments on a time, condition, cause, etc., relevant to the preceding main clauses.

Thompson (1985)

Thompson (1985) examines the uses of initial and final purpose clauses in written English discourse. She reports that an initial purpose clause and a final purpose clause, which share the same morphology, “behave in radically different ways in the organization of the discourse” (Thompson 1985: 55). Thompson finds that “initial purpose clauses in English guide the reader’s attention in a very specific way, by naming a problem which arises from expectations created by the text or inferences from it, to which the following material, often consisting of many

sentences, provides the solution” (Thomson 1985: 67). Thompson illustrates this with an example from *The Joy of Cooking*:

(5) (Section on ‘Carving Meat’)... Keeping the knife blade sharp and under easy control is important. But of equal importance to the successful carver is keeping the V-edge true by the use of a steel. And the following procedure should precede the use of the knife before each carving period. The steel, which should be magnetized, realigns the molecular structure of the blade. *To true a blade*, hold the steel firmly in the left hand, thumb on top of handle. Hold the hand slightly away from the body. Hold the knife in right hand, with the point upward. Place the heel of the blade against the far side of the tip of the steel, as illustrated. The steel and blade should meet at about a 15’ to 25’ angle. Draw the blade across the steel. Bring the blade down across the steel, toward the left hand, with a quick swinging motion of the right wrist. The entire blade should pass lightly over the steel. ... (Thompson 1985: 64)

A portion of Thompson’s explication of this example is quoted below:

The text preceding the italicized purpose clause in this example is about sharpening a knife blade; the expectations which it raises, then, have to do with how to get the blade sharp, particularly with how to maintain equal angles on both sides of the ‘V’ formed by the edge of the blade (‘keeping the V-edge true’). Within that set of

expectations, the purpose clause *To true a blade* names the obvious problem; the material following it provides the solution.

(Thompson 1985: 65)

While the initial purpose clause plays a broad discourse role, the role of the final purpose clause is described as follows:

In fact, the role of the final purpose clause can be seen to be a[sic] much more local than that played by the initial purpose clause: it serves simply to state the purpose for which the action named in the preceding clause is/was undertaken. The scope, then, of a final purpose clause is restricted to its immediately preceding main clause, which must name an action performed by a volitional agent.

(Thompson 1985: 67)

Thompson illustrates this with example (6):

(6) George had always been my first choice for crew. Twenty –six years old, he had served in the army and later gone to the Middle East *to train soldiers for an oil-rich sheik*. With the money saved from this venture, he had decided to take a couple of years looking around the world and pleasing himself.

(Thompson 1985: 68)

I quote Thompson's explication of this example:

This example suggests a striking contrast with those of the initial purpose clauses which we have just been considering. Here there is nothing either in the text or derivable from it which creates any expectations within which training soldiers for an oil-rich sheik is a problem with which readers are expected to identify, nor is any solution presented. This final purpose clause serves simply to state what George's purpose was for going to the Middle East.

(Thompson 1985: 68)

Ford and Thompson (1986)

Ford and Thompson (1986) describe the discourse functions of initial and final conditional clauses in written and spoken English discourse. They argue that initial conditional clauses create a framework or background for the subsequent discourse. They find that "in terms of their connection with preceding discourse, initial conditionals...can be classified into four basic types" (Ford and Thompson 1986: 370):

() by repeating an assumption present earlier in the text; () by offering a contrast to an earlier assumption; () by providing exemplification of an earlier generalization; () by exploring options made available by earlier procedural or logical steps

(Ford and Thompson 1986: 361)

Ford and Thompson illustrate the second case in which the conditional offers a contrast to an earlier assumption with the example below:

(7) There is another intellectual virtue, which is that of generality or impartiality ... When, in elementary algebra, you do problems about A, B, and C going up a mountain, you have no emotional interest in the gentlemen concerned, and you do your best to work out the solution with impersonal correctness. But *if you thought that A was yourself, B your hated rival and C the schoolmaster who set the problem*, your calculations would go askew, and you would be sure to find that A was first and C was last. (Ford and Thompson 1986: 357)

On the other hand, Ford and Thompson describe the function of non-initial conditionals as follows:

Non-initial conditionals may tend to occur in places where such background is either less crucial to the understanding of the main clause, or where other material is more felicitously placed at the beginning of an utterance. A non-initial *if*-clause qualifies an associated proposition, but it does not display as clear a connection with preceding and subsequent discourse as does an initial *if*-clause.

(Ford and Thompson 1986: 370)

One of the factors motivating the choice of final over initial position is “the tendency for an ‘interesting’ subject to be introduced in a nondependent, rather than in a dependent, clause” (Ford and Thompson 1986: 360), as shown in (8):

(8) Our confused and difficult world needs various things *if it is to escape disaster*, and among these one of the most necessary is that, in the nations which still uphold Liberal belief, these beliefs should be wholehearted and profound, not apologetic towards dogmatisms ...

(Ford and Thompson 1986: 361)

The subject of the first clause in this passage, *Our confused and difficult world*, is “a new, heavy, and important referent in the text” (Ford and Thompson 1986: 360). As Ford and Thompson suggest, conditional clauses provide framework or background for the following material. Therefore, “it stands to reason that interesting, new, or heavy subjects don’t really belong there, but rather to be mentioned in the nonbackground portion of the sentence” (*ibid.*, 360).

Ramsay (1987)

Ramsay (1987) performs a quantitative analysis of the distributions of initial and final *if* clauses and *when* clauses, based on data from an English novel. She measures, among others, referential distance for subject NPs in *if* and *when* clauses, by counting the number of clauses between the appearance of the subject NP in *if* and *when* clauses and the previous appearance of a reference to that same NP. Her count indicates that preposed *if* clauses and *when* clauses “appear to be thematically linked to the main clause as well as, and even more frequently, to the preceding discourse,” and that “postposed clauses on the other hand,

appear to have a much higher referential continuity with the main clause” (Ramsay 1987: 402).

Silva (1981)

Silva (1981) examines the uses of temporal connectives in a collection of controlled oral narratives, produced by adult subjects telling a story “about three sets of story pictures, series of interrelated illustrations which develop a common theme” (Silva 1981: 284). Silva reports that “subjects tend to use preposed *when* clauses to introduce a new frame” (*ibid.*, 288). Preposed *when* clauses “provide the context for interpreting the present frame, thus filling the episodic gap” (*ibid.*). On the other hand, “in postposed cases, they set the stage for the next frame” (*ibid.*).

Schiffrin (1985)

Schiffrin (1985) examines constraints on two discourse options for the representation of cause and effect, i.e., *X so Y* and *Y because X*. Using quantitative analysis, Schiffrin demonstrates that speakers tend to “order antecedent and consequent propositions – cause and effect – so as to enhance topical continuity in the discourse” (Schiffrin 1985: 297). “*X so Y* is more frequent when X is the prior topic, and *Y because X* is more frequent when Y is the prior topic” (*ibid.*, 296).

Ford (1993)

Ford (1993) uses the framework of conversation analysis. She then

examines the uses of temporal, conditional, and causal adverbial clauses in a corpus of naturally occurring American English conversation. Ford finds that, in her corpus, in line with findings from prior text-based analysis, adverbial clauses serve discourse management functions: Initial adverbial clauses serve discourse-structuring functions, tying the present utterance back to the previous discourse and framing the discourse that follows, while “final adverbial clauses tend to work more locally in narrowing main clause meaning without creating links or shift points in a larger discourse” (Ford 1993: 146).

Ford also finds that, in addition to the information management functions, adverbial clauses serve interactional functions as well. Initial adverbial clauses “are invoked in attempts to shift the direction of talk, to close down others’ lengthy turns, to make or tone down offers, to persuade, or to mitigate the force of a dispreferred response” (Ford 1993: 62). On the other hand, final adverbial clauses after ending intonation “are very commonly responsive to understanding or agreement problems between speaker and recipient,” and “are also found to account for disagreement” (*ibid.*, 148).

The findings from these previous analyses can be generalized as in (3) above, which is repeated in (9) below:

(9) Preposed adverbial clauses tend to be related to the preceding discourse as well as to the main clause, whereas postposed adverbial clauses tend to be only related to the main clause. (=3)

Before examining whether *although* clauses also conform to this generalization, the next section will briefly review Noordman (2001). Noordman examines how frequently preposed and postposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding and subsequent texts.

4.2 Noordman (2001)

As stated in 2.3, Noordman (2001) distinguishes three kinds of relation that are expressed by *although*-sentences: “default order causal relation,” “reversed order causal relation,” and “concession relation,” and examines how frequently the main clause and the *although* clause have a thematic continuity with the preceding context and the subsequent context, separately for the different orders of the clauses and the different relations. This examination is based on 83 tokens of *although*-sentences collected from newspaper articles. The findings are presented in Table 2-2 in Chapter 2, repeated in Table 4-1 below:

Table 4-1: Proportion of sentences that show a thematic continuity of the *although* clause and its main clause with the preceding context and the subsequent context (Noordman 2001: 160)

		<i>although</i> - preceding	main- preceding	<i>although</i> - subsequent	main- subsequent
default order	preposed (16)	.75	.56	.19	.94
causal	postposed (17)	.06	.94	.12	.88
reversed order	preposed (16)	.31	.56	.00	.94
causal	postposed (10)	.10	.80	.50	.40
concessive	preposed (17)	.88	.71	.29	.88
relation	postposed (7)	.43	.86	.57	.71

Let us examine these findings in light of the generalization presented in (9) above. First, consider preposed *although* clauses. Table 4-1 above shows that 12 out of 16 (or 75% of) preposed *although* clauses expressing default order causal relations and 15 out of 17 (or 88% of) preposed *although* clauses expressing concession relations are thematically connected to the preceding context.¹ Thus, preposed *although* clauses expressing default order causal relations and concession relations tend to be related to the preceding context, and thus conform to the generalization in (9). On the other hand, only 5 out of 16 (or 31% of) preposed *although* clauses expressing reversed order causal relations are connected to the preceding context, which is contrary to the generalization in (9).

Next, consider postposed *although* clauses. Table 4-1 shows that

only 1 out of 17 (or 6% of) postposed *although* clauses expressing default order causal relations and only 1 out of 10 (or 10% of) postposed *although* clauses expressing reversed order causal relations are thematically connected to the preceding context. Thus, postposed *although* clauses expressing default order causal relations and reversed order causal relations tend to be only related to the preceding main clauses, and thus conform to the generalization in (9). On the other hand, 3 out of 7 (or 43% of) postposed *although* clauses expressing concession relations are connected to the preceding context, which is contrary to the generalization in (9).

Despite its interesting data and analyses, however, Noordman (2001) is inadequate in at least three respects. First, Noordman does not identify specific patterns of relationships which the *although* clause can bear to the preceding discourse. Noordman mentions that “it was judged whether the main clause and the subordinate clause were related as regards their content to the preceding and subsequent context” (Noordman 2001: 169), and as a check on this decision, he “tried to identify the relation between the clause and the context, using lists of relations such as presented by Mann and Thompson (1986, 1988)” (*ibid.*, 170). However, he does not clarify what kinds of relations the *although* clause tends to bear to the preceding discourse.

Second, Noordman’s analyses of examples are sometimes problematic. To take an instance of (10) below, Noordman judges that the *although* clause (10) is not related to the preceding discourse:

(10) Tourists who will go to Croatia this summer will not notice anything about the refugees who are presently still housed in hotels. The Croatian government will do everything to transfer the estimated eighty thousand refugees to non-tourist areas. This is what the Croatian Assistant Secretary of tourism, N. Bulic, said at the holiday fair that was opened in Utrecht last Tuesday. **Although** the big Dutch tour operators are avoiding Croatia and Slovenia this summer, both countries do everything to restore the holiday country image they had before the civil war. The former Yugoslavian federal states badly need the foreign currency to restore their damaged infrastructure and monuments and to getting[sic] the economy going again. “Tourism is simply the shortest way to get the foreign currency” said a representative of the Croatian embassy. (=20 in Ch. 2)

However, the content of the *although* clause *the big Dutch tour operators are avoiding Croatia and Slovenia this summer* is clearly related to the preceding discourse – though CONTRASTIVELY. The context preceding the *although* sentences states that the Croatian government will do everything to transfer the estimated eighty thousand refugees to no-tourist areas. This may evoke the expectation that the big Dutch tour operators are not avoiding Croatia and Slovenia this summer, which is contrary to the content of the *although* clause.

Third, the amount of data Noordman examined is simply too small to warrant meaningful generalizations. He examined only 49 preposed and 34 postposed *although* clauses. In contrast, the amount of data the

present study examines is more than double.

4.3 Method

4.3.1 Data

Given that, as reported in Ford (1993: 24), *although* clauses are relatively rare in spoken English discourse, I use the data of 196 *although* clauses from newspaper articles discussed in chapter 3. The total number of preposed *although* clauses is 107, whereas that of postposed *although* clauses is 89.

4.3.2 Three Types of Information Status

Numerous researchers over the years have proposed a variety of information flow categories. Mann and Thompson (1988), for example, identify more than twenty interclausal or intersentential relations. Although this approach is useful and comprehensive, it can be extremely difficult to single out only one relation for a given instance unambiguously. Chafe (1987, 1994) introduces three types of information status: ‘active,’ ‘semi-active,’ and ‘inactive.’ However, there is no effective way to determine whether a particular concept is in active, semi-active, or inactive state. Furthermore, these notions apply to concepts of objects, events, and properties, which are typically expressed in noun phrases, verb phrases, and adjective phrases. It is not clear whether these activation states are applicable to propositional contents of *although* clauses.

Prince (1992) and Birner and Ward (1998) provide a more promising approach to the present study. They introduce three information flow

categories: discourse-old, discourse-new, and inferrable information. Discourse-old information is that which has been evoked in the prior discourse, while discourse-new information is that which has not. Inferrable information is that which has not been explicitly evoked in the prior discourse but which the speaker believes the hearer can plausibly infer from elements that have been evoked.² Consider a discourse-initial utterance in (11) below:

- (11) Last night **the moon** was so pretty that I called **a friend** on **the phone** and told **him** to go outside and look. (=14 in Ch. 1)

Here, *the moon* and *a friend* both represent discourse-new information, *him* discourse-old information, and *the phone* inferrable information.

This approach suits the purpose of the present study for the following reasons. First, these three information categories apply to propositions as well as entities (i.e., referents evoked by NPs). Thus in an example like *My father was angry* we can not only talk about the informational status of the person referred to by *my father*, but also about that of the entire proposition “My father was angry” (cf. Ward, Birner, and Huddleston 2002: 1367-1369). The present study deals only with the information status of the entire-state-of affairs expressed by the clause, not with the information status of its individual component parts. Second, these information categories help identify and subdivide the types of *although* clauses which are related to the preceding discourse, since if *although* clauses represent either discourse-old or inferrable information,

they are undoubtedly related to the preceding discourse. The present study assumes information status to be one of the substantial factors that constitute relatedness between adverbial clauses and their preceding discourse.

4.3.3 Open Proposition and Focus

In addition to these three types of information status, I also use the notions of Open Proposition and Focus in identifying the types of links between *although* clauses and the preceding discourse. Following Prince (1986), Birner and Ward (1998: 12) define an Open Proposition, henceforth OP, as “a proposition containing one or more variables, and represents what is assumed by the speaker to be salient (or, ... inferrable) in the discourse at the time of utterance.” The variable in the OP is instantiated with the focus, which normally constitutes the ‘new information’ of the utterance. Consider (12) below:

(12) A: Are those cupcakes for sale?

B: No, they’re a special order. But the bagels you can have.

(Ward, Birner, and Huddleston 2002: 1369)

In (12), one component of the meaning of the underlined clause is the open proposition “You can have x.” This has not been expressed in what precedes, but it is inferrable from A’s question, which conveys that A wants to buy (hence have) something. *The bagels* instantiates the variable in the OP and represents discourse-new information.

4.4 Types of Preposed *Although* Clauses

A relatively large number (76 out of 107, or 71%) of preposed *although* clauses in my data are related to the preceding discourse in one of four ways: by representing discourse-old information, by representing inferrable information, by representing a discourse-old or inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse. I do not assume that the four different types of information status are clearly separable: rather, they form a continuum. Nevertheless, they serve as extremely helpful tools for analyzing data under investigation.

On the other hand, a relatively small number (31 out of 107, or 29%) of preposed *although* clauses have none of these relationships.

4.4.1 Preposed *Although* Clauses Related to the Preceding Discourse

This section describes four ways in which preposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse.

4.4.1.1 Preposed *Although* Clauses Representing Discourse-old Information

Firstly, preposed *although* clauses may be related to the preceding discourse by representing discourse-old information, as exemplified below:

(13) On Sunday, Raisin and his family had a tent where he sold his green and white "Raisin Hell" bracelets --- his nurses' idea, modeled after

cycling legend Lance Armstrong's yellow "Live Strong" bracelets --- and the newer "Raisin Hell" socks. More than 4,000 bracelets have been sold at \$3 apiece with proceeds going to the Shepherd Center. (...) **Although** the bracelets have been very successful, Raisin is thinking about a new slogan. "We might change it," he said, "to Raisin Hope." (*The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, August 14, 2006)

- (14) Last week, a colleague, originally from China, received his New Zealand passport, and is full of hope and optimism at the start of his new life. But a friend, originally from Malaysia, packed up and left for Australia - seven years after he became a New Zealander. This friend, a civil engineer in his 40s, had struggled to find gainful employment and has been offered a job in Melbourne in line with his qualifications. He thought it was an opportunity too good to be missed. Although he qualified for New Zealand residency because of his qualifications and experience, the only work he could get was as a supermarket assistant and part-time delivery person for a grocery shop. He told me he had migrated here with big hopes of a better life and prosperity for his family but after seven years, they had depleted their savings. **Although** he was settled here, he said he had to move and start all over again for practical reasons.

(*The New Zealand Herald*, August 14, 2006)

- (15) By air and on land, Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters battled fiercely Sunday in a last-minute surge of bloodletting before an

official cease-fire went into effect this morning. (...) The last-minute violence came amid signs of potentially serious snags in the Lebanese government's implementation of the U.N.-brokered truce. On Sunday afternoon, after sharp debate, the Israeli Cabinet formally approved the United Nations resolution calling for a cease-fire. (...) Under the U.N. resolution, both sides were to halt attacks this morning, although Israel is allowed to defend its positions. (...) **Although** Hezbollah is obligated to stop military operations and lay down its weapons, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, the organization's leader, has warned that his fighters will continue their campaign against Israeli soldiers as long as the Jewish state maintains troops in Lebanon.

(*Los Angeles Times*, August 14, 2006)

In (13), the second sentence states that more than 4,000 bracelets have been sold at \$3 apiece with proceeds going to the Shepherd Center. Thus, the *although* clause *the bracelets have been very successful* represents information which has been explicitly evoked in the preceding discourse. In (14), the propositional content of the *although* clause *he was settled here* has been evoked from the preceding sentence *He told me he had migrated here with big hopes of a better life and prosperity for his family*. Similarly, in (15), the *although* clause *Hezbollah is obligated to stop military operations and lay down its weapons* restates what has been overtly stated in the underlined sentence *Under the U.N. resolution, both sides were to halt attacks this morning*.

Two more examples of preposed *although* clauses representing

discourse-old information are given below:

(16) The Crosses have custody of Jeremiah, who was born with severe brain damage. They have four other children at home who help with Jeremiah, whom they hold nearly 24 hours a day. (...) The Crosses bring Jeremiah, who is subject to frequent seizures, everywhere with them, using a car seat and a special stroller that keeps the boy upright. **Although** he is usually in his family's arms, he can be put in the car seat or stroller for brief periods as long as someone is next to him.

(St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), August 14, 2006)

(17) One patient stands out in Jim Curran's mind. He was a New York actor in his late 30s whose face and neck were covered with purplish spots that even stage makeup couldn't mask.

The lesions were caused by Kaposi's sarcoma, a rare skin cancer almost never seen in someone so young. It would soon be epidemic among young men, one of many illnesses that overwhelm people left defenseless by the disease now known as AIDS.

But just three days after the first report of the disease, on June 8, 1981, "We didn't exactly know what we were dealing with," Curran says. **Although** no one knew it at the time, he says, the New York case and a few others marked a transition "maybe for the history of mankind."

(USA TODAY, August 14, 2006)

4.4.1.2 Proposed *Although* Clauses Representing Inferrable

Information

Second, preposed *although* clauses may represent inferrable information. I consider inferrability a matter of degree, and assume that inferrable information ranges from more strongly inferrable to less strongly inferrable.³ In (18), (19), and (20) below, the *although* clause seems to represent relatively strongly inferrable information:

(18) In recent years the loss of his sight had a profound effect on Hunter's lifestyle. No longer could he watch Richmond, the races, TV or read. Nevertheless, Hunter was fiercely independent and **although** he found it increasingly difficult to master simple tasks on his own, he was determined not to enter a nursing home.

(*Herald Sun* (Australia), August 14, 2006)

(19) Jeremiah Brower Cross could die any day, his doctors have warned since his birth, but some days the odds are greater. In May, while the 5-year-old had surgery at St. John's Mercy Medical Center, his mom and dad, Suzan and Sandy Cross, kept an eye on the clock, worried about the stress on his heart while he was under anesthesia. Surgeons were inserting into Jeremiah's stomach a feeding tube that would make it easier for him to take medicine when he needs it. They would also remove two decaying teeth. (...) Jeremiah will be 6 on Aug. 27, but when cradled in his family's arms he is still just a big, sweet baby, with thick, curly hair and the most beautiful blue eyes that will never see a thing. (...) **Although** the Crosses must be careful

about exposing Jeremiah to infections, they insist on taking him along when they go shopping or to visit their friends.

(*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (Missouri), August 14, 2006)

(20) All of that (finally) brings him to noting that he feels a bit sheepish about last week's column, in which he mentioned that he had bought a pile of eight-track tapes for his new old car. In fairly rapid succession he got five offers of eight-track tapes from discerning readers (readers who discerned that they didn't want their eight-track tapes anymore). **Although** Uncle Al is deeply grateful, he doesn't feel he ought to be in the position of having people give him stuff, even if it's stuff they don't want.

(*Star Tribune* (Minneapolis, MN), August 14, 2006)

In (18), the first sentence states that in recent years the loss of his sight had a profound effect on Hunter's lifestyle. Given this information, the reader may easily infer the information in the *although* clause *he found it increasingly difficult to master simple tasks on his own*, on the assumption that if one lost his/her sight, then he/she would normally find it difficult to master simple tasks on his/her own. In (19), the first sentence states that doctors have warned that Jeremiah Brower Cross could die any day. Given this information, the reader may easily infer the information in the *although* clause *the Crosses must be careful about exposing Jeremiah to infections*, on the assumption that if one has been warned by doctors that he/she could die any day, he/she must be careful not to be exposed to

infections.

On the other hand, in (21) and (22) below, the *although* clause seems to represent less strongly inferrable information:

(21) In 1995, Curran left the CDC for Emory University, where he helps train the next generation of public health experts. One of them may be his daughter, Kathryn, a student at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, who spent her summer working in a drug abuse research program in New Delhi. **Although** she frets about the pitfalls of going into a field "where everyone knows who my father is," she says she might chart a different path by working on HIV internationally. *(USA TODAY, August 14, 2006)*

(22) The city council of Black Jack soon will get another chance to step out of the 19th century in the area of human relationships. After hemming, hawing and back-and-forthing, Mayor Norman McCourt now is proposing that families with children be allowed to live in Black Jack even if Mom and Pop aren't married. Currently, the city denies such families occupancy permits. **Although** city leaders had coyly argued that the policy was only designed to prevent overcrowding, frat houses, that sort of thing, the implicit moral judgment of couples living in sin was unmistakable. The policy is out of touch with the realities of couplehood and family life in America.

(St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), August 14, 2006)

In (21), the first and second sentences state that Curran will help train the next generation of public health experts, and one of them may be his daughter, Kathryn. Given this information, readers may infer, though not strongly, the information of the *although* clause *she frets about the pitfalls of going into a field "where everyone knows who my father is."* In (22), the sentence preceding the *although* clause tells that currently, the city denies occupancy permits to families with children whose mother and father are not married. The information in the *although* clause *city leaders had coyly argued that the policy was only designed to prevent overcrowding, frat houses, that sort of thing* is not totally unpredictable, in that it says a plausible reason to deny such families occupancy permits.

4.4.1.3 Preposed *Although* Clauses Consisting of OP and Focus

In the third type, *although* clauses consist of a discourse-old or inferrable Open Proposition (OP) and a focus, as illustrated below:

(23)a. JUST like her character Nancy Botwin, the pot-selling mom in Showtime's popular series "Weeds," Mary-Louise Parker took the job because of her kid. For two decades, Parker has been one of the hardest-working actors in show business -- it was not unusual for her to do three movies a year, on top of an inevitably well-received play plus a little TV work on the side. Then, two years ago, she had a baby and that, as any working mother will tell you, changes everything. Suddenly, life on location seemed less appealing, 14-hour days impossible. (...) As with Nancy's

cannabis-based cottage industry, the logistics worked well for a single mom. **Although** it shoots in L.A., "Weeds," is a half-hour show with a 13-episode season, as opposed to the 22 usually required by the networks, so Parker and her son, William, wouldn't have to be away from their New York home for more than a few months. (*Los Angeles Times*, August 14, 2006)

- b. OP: It ("Weeds") shoots in X.
- c. Focus = L.A.

(24)a. At Nicolet High School, a service dog named Abner has accompanied Avi Semon, 20, to school for several years. The golden retriever/ Labrador mix was placed with the family in August 2001, and Semon's dad began taking the dog to class for short amounts of time. After the first year, Bruce Semon said, the family trained a teacher and an aide to handle Abner, so the dog could remain at school all day. Then Canine Companions for Independence, which trained Abner, met with school officials to ensure that they could work with the dog. (...) At Canine Companions, Abner is something of an anomaly. **Although** the organization has a breeding program and placed 196 service dogs in homes last year, only a dozen or so were autism-assistance dogs.

(*Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* (Wisconsin), August 14, 2006)

- b. OP: The organization (Canine Companions) has a breeding program and places X service dogs in homes last year.
- c. Focus = 196

In (23a), the *although* clause *it shoots in L.A.* consists of the OP in (23b) and the focus in (23c). The OP may be paraphrased informally as “Weeds shoots somewhere.” This OP can be inferrable from the first sentence *JUST like her character Nancy Botwin, the pot-selling mom in Showtime's popular series "Weeds," Mary-Louise Parker took the job because of her kid*; from the mention of the TV series “Weeds,” one is licensed to infer that the series shoots somewhere. In (24a), the underlined sentences mentions Canine Companions for Independence, which trained a service dog named Abner. This makes at least inferrable the OP in (24b). The *although* clause *the organization has a breeding program and placed 196 service dogs in homes last year* expresses this OP and the focus in (24c).

Two more examples of preposed *although* clauses consisting of an OP and a focus are given below:

(25)a. There isn't a single pedestrians-only street in Dingle and, if there is a traffic plan for the town, he hasn't seen it. Unlike Kinsale, there isn't even a car park on the outskirts where visitors could park and then take a leisurely stroll into the town centre. Apart from a few streets that have double-yellow lines, motorists park everywhere, particularly along the main approach road from an area known locally as "The Tracks" to the quays. As a result, Dingle is dominated by cars, whether parked or moving. "We made a few submissions to Kerry County Council suggesting that an empty site called The Mart could be laid out as a car park. But

although it's 200 yards from the centre - at most - the response we got was that it was too far for people to walk!"

(*The Irish Times*, August 14, 2006)

b. OP: It (The Mart) is X yards from the centre.

c. Focus = 200 yards

(26)a. But a friend, originally from Malaysia, packed up and left for Australia - seven years after he became a New Zealander.

This friend, a civil engineer in his 40s, had struggled to find gainful employment and has been offered a job in Melbourne in line with his qualifications. He thought it was an opportunity too good to be missed.

Although he qualified for New Zealand residency because of his qualifications and experience, the only work he could get was as a supermarket assistant and part-time delivery person for a grocery shop.

(*The New Zealand Herald*, August 14, 2006)

b. OP: He qualified for New Zealand residency because of X.

c. Focus = his qualifications and experience

4.4.1.4 Proposed *Although* Clauses Offering a Contrast to the Preceding Discourse

In the fourth type, the *although* clause does not represent discourse-old nor inferrable information. Nor does it represent an OP and a Focus. Instead, it offers a contrast to the preceding discourse (cf.

Mann and Thompson 1988: 254-255). That is, there is a potential or apparent incompatibility between the situations presented in the *although* clause and the preceding discourse, as exemplified below:

(27) Plans by Rio Tinto to invest about Dollars 700m in a potassium salt extraction plant in Mendoza province in Argentina, provide further evidence of the rapid expansion in the country's mining sector in recent years. **Although** many businesses are still wary of investing in Argentina after the upheavals of the 2001 economic crisis, its undeveloped mining sector seems to be too good an opportunity to miss. (*Financial Times* (London, England), August 14, 2006)

(28) A lot of people are struggling to cope with the rising cost of living. If the government introduces a GST, it will increase people's financial burden. **Although** Financial Secretary Henry Tang Ying-yen has promised to help the poor, this is not enough. (*South China Morning Post*, August 14, 2006)

(29) Radical Islam is different from communism, and from what we had come to know as fascism in Europe, by its ostensibly religious character. (...) By now it should be patently clear that we in the West are at war with a hydra-headed and barbaric enemy that has not a shred of humanity and relishes the bloodletting of tens of thousands of innocents, including other Muslims. It is at least as brutal as the Nazis and communist enemies we have faced in the past. **Although**

radical Islam is not militarily as powerful as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, it has the huge strategic advantage of suicide bombing, which is immune to deterrence.

(The Australian (Australia), August 14, 2006)

In (27), the first sentence reports that there is evidence of the rapid expansion in the Argentina's mining sector in recent years. This information is apparently incompatible with the propositional content of the *although* clause *many businesses are still wary of investing in Argentina after the upheavals of the 2001 economic crisis*, in that many businesses' being wary of investing in Argentina does not normally imply a rapid expansion in the country's mining sector. In (28), the sentence preceding the *although* clause tells that if the government introduces a GST, it will increase people's financial burden. However, the *although* clause *Financial Secretary Henry Tang Ying-yen has promised to help the poor* is apparently incompatible with the preceding sentence, since Financial Secretary's having promised to help the poor would normally decrease people's financial burden. In (29), the sentence preceding the *although* clause says that radical Islam is at least as brutal as the Nazis and communist enemies we have faced in the past. However, the *although* clause *radical Islam is not militarily as powerful as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union* is apparently incompatible with the preceding sentence, in that equality in brutality between radical Islam and communist enemies normally implies their equality in military power.

4.4.2 Preposed *Although* Clauses Not-Related to the Preceding Discourse

My survey shows that 31 out of 107 preposed *although* clauses do not seem to have explicit relation to the preceding discourse, as exemplified below:

(30) Doug Gulija missed the devastation tour - he was dealing with a mini-disaster of his own - but what he saw walking through New Orleans' French Quarter was enough to make him count his blessings.

"What you saw were a lot of restaurants ready to reopen, but there's nobody to work there because the people who lived in those outlying areas can't come back," said the owner of The Plaza Café in Southampton. "Emeril's place isn't even open right now, but his restaurant looks like he can walk in tomorrow and start serving dinner."

Gulija was in The Big Easy recently as New York State's representative in the Great American Seafood Cook-Off, where he pitted his striped-bass dish against offerings from chefs in 19 other states.

Although we thought it frivolous to hold a cooking competition in a city approaching the one-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, Gulija was told the event was viewed as important in reviving the city's tourist industry. "It was probably one of the reasons why I said yes," Gulija said. *(Newsday (New York), August 14, 2006)*

The *although* clause in (30) is not related to the preceding discourse, in that it has none of the relationships enumerated in section 4.4.1.

At least three patterns for this type can be identified, although they do not account for all the examples of this type.

The first pattern is the case where *although* clauses occur at the beginning of indirect or direct narration, as illustrated below:

(31) In addition to inadequate hydration, other risk factors for heat illness include: (...) - Use of possible performance-enhancing products such as Creatine. Noffsinger says that *although there is no published research to indicate problems with these products*, he believes they may contribute to long-term health challenges for young athletes.

(*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (Missouri), August 14, 2006)

(32) An architect who could not be identified for his own safety stopped to talk after walking his wife and 2-year-old daughter to a park in Alamar last week. Like other Cubans interviewed there, the architect described himself as a "Fidelista," saying he respected Mr. Castro as a "person with incredible vision."

Still, he complained at length about the Cuban economy, which runs on two currencies: one for Cubans and one for foreigners.

He said that *although he had helped the Cuban military design some of the elegant resorts that had attracted millions of tourists to the island*, he did not dream on his \$36-a-month salary of spending a night in one of them. (*The New York Times*, August 14, 2006)

(33) Meanwhile, the former head of royal protection, Dai Davies, says that although press intrusion could be "a constant pain" and made his job difficult, relations between royal protection officers and tabloid royal correspondents were good too. "*Although we once mounted an operation against one officer in Windsor who was leaking to the News of the World*, the likes of (the Daily Mail's diarist and former royal correspondent) Richard Kay and (former Daily Mirror royal correspondent) James Whitaker didn't give me, at my level, any problems at all. They cultivated their own contacts among officers of lower ranks who undoubtedly got a good drink out of it at Christmas. But as far as I'm concerned, that's fair game."

(The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, August 14, 2006)

In (31), (32), and (33), the italicized *although* clauses represent discourse-new information, but might be related to the previous narration, which is not quoted in this text.

The second pattern is the *although* clauses which represent discourse-new but nevertheless hearer-old information (cf. Prince 1992), as exemplified below:

(34) All-Ireland SFC Quarter-final/Laois v Mayo: The labyrinth under Croke Park can be somewhat crazy on August Sunday afternoons and **although** you are never quite sure who is going to pop up in conversation, even Mayo manager Mickey Moran looked surprised

when he was asked to evaluate Oscar Wilde.

(The Irish Times, August 14, 2006)

(35) The screen icon has spoken about resisting pressure to have cosmetic surgery on her nose early in her career. Even the Archbishop of Genoa once observed that **although** the Vatican opposed human cloning, "an exception might be made in the case of Sophia Loren".

(The Scotsman, August 14, 2006)

(36) The HIV epidemic has taken its worst toll among the poor, the poorly educated and marginalized populations. Not only is this situation exemplified by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-east Asia but it is also true in Canada. **Although** most Canadians know that intravenous drug users are particularly vulnerable, few are aware that as many as 30 per cent of all new HIV infections in Canada occur among aboriginal populations.

(Ottawa Citizen, August 14, 2006)

The *although* clause in (34) *you are never quite sure who is going to pop up in conversation* and the one in (35) *the Vatican opposed human cloning* might be common sense for almost all readers. In (36), the expression *most Canadians know that* suggests that the *although* clause presents hearer-old information.

The third pattern is the *although* clauses which occur at the beginning of the discourse, as illustrated below:

(37) **Although** my class won a handball competition, I was not happy. This is because I had not done my best.

(South China Morning Post, August 14, 2006)

(38) **Although** 700 pages seems awfully long for a novel with an obscure title by a relatively unknown author of four works of well-received fiction, by the time you finish reading "Tehano," you will be wondering why it was so short. *(Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2006)*

(39) **Although** he can save the day because he's a super-powered runner, Tim Allen can't carry the bantam weight of "Zoom" on his only-human shoulders. *(Newsday (New York), August 14, 2006)*

(40) **Although** many drivers over the age of 24 share the misconception that all young drivers between the ages of 16 and 24 listen to loud music while driving, we aren't the only ones dialling cellphones while driving or searching for another CD or lighting cigarettes. Many senior drivers do all of these things but they are not necessarily targeted by society, including police officers.

(Ottawa Citizen, August 14, 2006)

The *although* clauses in (37), (38), (39), and (40) occur at the beginning of the discourse. Because of their initial position, *although* clauses of this type cannot be related to the preceding discourse.

Table 4-2 below summarizes the information status of preposed *although* clauses in the corpus. Table 4-3 summarizes the types of relatedness. These tables show the frequency with which each type appears.

Table 4-2: Summary of the information status of preposed *although* clauses in the corpus

Information status	No. of clauses
related to preceding discourse	76 (71%)
not related to the preceding discourse	31 (29%)
Total	107 (100%)

Table 4-3: Types of relatedness of preposed *although* clauses in the corpus

Types of relatedness	No. of clauses
discourse-old	23 (30%)
inferrable (strong and weak)	26 (34%)
Open Proposition and focus	15 (20%)
contrast	12 (16%)
Total	76 (100%)

Table 4-2 shows that the majority of preposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse in one way or another. In this respect, the present result is consistent with the result reported in Noordman (2001). However, the two results do not exactly match in some way, in that 80% of Consequence-Cause *although* clauses of my data (8 out of 10)

are linked to the preceding discourse, whereas in Noordman, only 31% of reversed order causal *although* clauses, which roughly correspond to Consequence-Cause, have a thematic relation to the preceding discourse.

Table 4-3 shows that no one type of relatedness is particularly preferred. However, discourse-old and inferrable *although* clauses are somewhat more frequent than OP/focus and contrast *although* clauses. The former two types together account for 64% of all examples.

The result in table 4-2 implies that *although* clauses may differ consistently from other adverbial (such as temporal or conditional) clauses in the relative frequency of linkage with the preceding discourse. This is because according to Ford (1993: 26-62), preposed temporal and conditional clauses in conversational discourse invariably tie back to previous discourse – quite unlike *although* clauses (See also Thompson 1985 and Ford and Thompson 1986).

4.5 Types of Postposed *Although* Clauses

Not surprisingly, in contrast to preposed *although* clauses, a majority (74 out of 89, or 83%) of postposed *although* clauses in my data have no explicit relation to the preceding discourse. However, 17% (15 out of 89) are clearly related to the preceding discourse. Moreover, there is no single instance representing discourse-old information.

4.5.1 Postposed *Although* Clauses Related to the Preceding Discourse

First, this section illustrates postposed *although* clauses which are related to the preceding discourse. Unlike preposed *although* clauses,

only three types are found: representing inferrable information, representing salient OP and a focus, and offering a contrast to the preceding discourse.

4.5.1.1 Postposed *Although* Clauses Representing Inferrable Information

The first type is illustrated below:

- (41) Dr Mahathir seems aware of the possibility. On Wednesday, he said the government 'could go ahead' and scrutinise his family's interests in business. At least two of Dr Mahathir's children - Mirzan and Mokhzani Mahathir - were big in business until the 1998 Asian financial crisis forced their debt-heavy companies to be bought over by other Malaysian interests.

Mr Mirzan sold his shipping company to a unit of national oil company Petronas while Mr Mokhzani sold off his listed flagship companies Pantai and Tongkah Holdings to Malaysian interests.

Even so, they continue to retain business interests in the country from logistics and computers to luxury auto sales, **although** their scale of activity is nowhere near their pre-crisis peaks.

(The Business Times Singapore, August 14, 2006)

- (42) All gene therapy research is proceeding cautiously because of continuing public concerns about safety.

The death of 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger in 1999 was followed

three years later by evidence that the first major gene therapy success treatment for a rare immune disorder known as "bubble boy syndrome" caused cancer. Since then, there has been steady progress toward new treatments for immune disorders, cancers, and blindness, **although** there is still no gene therapy product on the market in the United States. (*The Boston Globe*, August 14, 2006)

- (43) "Klaus, could you answer that?" may not sound like a revolutionary sentence but in Germany's conservative boardrooms it is as near as one gets.

The person who said it last week - as he often has since he took over three years ago - is Harry Roels, chief executive of Germany's second largest energy group, RWE. The fact that this keen cyclist and lover of piano music calls his management board colleagues and other senior workers by their first names is a huge departure from the formal world of German business. (...)

But he is an outsider at RWE and Germany in at least two ways. First, he is Dutch and spoke only a little German before taking the job, **although** his German is now excellent.

(*Financial Times* (London, England), August 14, 2006)

In (41), the underlined sentence reports that two of Dr Mahathir's children were big in business until the 1998 Asian financial crisis forced their debt-heavy companies to be bought over by other Malaysian interests. Given this information, the information in the *although* clause *their scale*

of activity is nowhere near their pre-crisis peaks is at least weakly inferrable, since the scale of activity in business does not normally improve so rapidly after crisis.

In (42), the underlined sentence tells that all gene therapy research is proceeding cautiously because of continuing public concerns about safety. This information renders the *although* clause *there is still no gene therapy product on the market in the United States* at least weakly inferrable, since if all gene therapy research is proceeding cautiously, gene therapy product does not appear so easily.

4.5.1.2 Postposed *Although* Clauses Consisting of OP and Focus

Postposed as well as preposed *although* clauses may consist of a discourse-old or inferrable OP and a focus, as illustrated below:

(44)a. The rugged old FJ 40 had two doors and the FJ Cruiser has four doors. But the FJ Cruiser looks like a two-door model because it has two concealed rear-hinged doors that are opened with an interior handle that's tricky to reach after the front doors are opened. Athletic moves are needed to get in or out of the tall FJ Cruiser's roomy rear-seat area, **although** the rear clamshell "half doors" swing out 90 degrees.

(*Chicago Sun Times*, August 14, 2006)

b. OP: The rear clamshell half doors swing out X degrees.

c. Focus = 90

(45)a. Plans by Rio Tinto to invest about Dollars 700m in a potassium salt extraction plant in Mendoza province in Argentina, provide further evidence of the rapid expansion in the country's mining sector in recent years. (...) Ricardo Furfaro, Rio Tinto's spokesman in Argentina, says the mine is expected to generate exports worth Dollars 400m a year, **although** it will not be operational until 2009. With little demand in Argentina, Brazil will be the prime destination of the potash, for use in fertilizers, as well as India and China.

(Financial Times (London, England), August 14, 2006)

b. OP: The mine will be operational after X.

c. Focus = 2009

(46)a. Made with two types of melon, strawberries, raspberries, mandarins, grapes, pineapple, blueberries, blackberries and kiwis, this fruit salad, available from farmers' markets across Dublin, has the widest variety of fruits. It's amazingly fresh - as if the fruit was chopped and mixed only hours before going on sale (which it probably was). (...) It will not be easy for most people to source. Because it is home produced there is no label, so it's impossible to gauge how much of each fruit was used, **although** there did seem to be an excessive amount of pineapple in the mix.

(The Irish Times, August 14, 2006)

b. OP: There was an X amount of pineapple in the mix.

c. Focus: excessive

In (44a), the second sentence states that the FJ Cruiser has two concealed rear-hinged doors. This renders salient the OP in (44b). The *although* clause *the rear clamshell "half doors" swing out 90 degrees* consists of this OP and the focus in (44c).

In (45a), the first sentence refers to plans to invest a large amount of money in a potassium salt extraction plant in Mendoza province in Argentina. This makes inferrable the OP in (45b). The *although* clause *it will not be operational until 2009* expresses this OP and the focus in (45c).

4.5.1.3 Postposed *Although* Clauses Offering a Contrast to the Preceding Discourse

The third way in which postposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse is by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse, as illustrated below:

(47) Stanford University, home to some of the world's brightest college students, will open the nation's first online high school for the gifted this fall. (...) But earning an Internet diploma from the program won't be cheap. Annual tuition for a full-time student is \$12,000, **although** the school will offer financial aid.

(*THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE* (California), August 14, 2006)

(48) Mr. Loving and Ms. Shelltrack have lived together for 13 years.

longer than many modern marriages. They consider themselves engaged, **although** they have set no date for a wedding. "We never really felt a huge need to do it. We're a family, regardless," Ms. Shelltrack says.

(*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (Missouri), August 14, 2006)

In (47), the content of the underlined clause *earning an Internet diploma from the program won't be cheap* and the content of the *although* clause can be considered at least partially incompatible: If the school will offer financial aid, earning an Internet diploma from the program won't be so expensive. In (48), the underlined sentence says that Mr. Loving and Ms. Shelltrack have lived together for 13 years, longer than many modern marriages. This information is incompatible with the *although* clause *they have set no date for a wedding*, in that if a couple has lived together for such a long time, they would normally have set date for a wedding.⁴

While postposed *although* clauses in my data may relate to the preceding discourse by representing inferrable information, representing salient OP and a focus, or offering a contrast to the preceding discourse, examples of postposed *although* clauses representing discourse-old information were not found in my data. One may generalize then that discourse-old information prefer preposed *although* clauses to postposed.

4.5.2 Postposed *Although* Clauses Not-Related to the Preceding Discourse

My survey shows that a majority (74 out of 89, or 83%) of postposed

although clauses are not related to the preceding discourse, in that they have none of the relationships enumerated in section 4.4.1. This type of *although* clause simply provides a specification for the state of affairs described in the main clause, as illustrated below:

(49) We obviously need to do more to prevent illegal immigration, but the idea of suddenly telling over 10-million people - most of whom work and many of whom are paying taxes - that they should return to their country of origin is unworkable.

Of course, we could demand that they all wear some sort of identification showing that they are "illegals" - **although** I am not sure what being illegal means. They seem to be pretty much like the rest of us except for working harder. Maybe we could assign them numbers that could be tattooed on their arms?

(St. Petersburg Times (Florida), August 14, 2006)

(50) Lester said Evans is working with materials that have a long history of safe use and that a safety panel will monitor all aspects of the experiment. But Evans acknowledged that one serious side effect could derail the effort.

Paul Gelsinger, Jesse's father, warns potential volunteers to get involved in gene therapy studies only after asking lots of questions about safety. "If it's not life-threatening, I would go for much more conventional treatment," he said.

Carlene Lauffer, however, said she would volunteer in a minute,

although her arthritis is too advanced to qualify for Evans's research. Lauffer, 78, suffers from osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis and has had finger joint replacements and a hip replacement.

(The Boston Globe, August 14, 2006)

In (49), the *although* clause *I am not sure what being illegal means* qualifies the term “illegal” in the preceding main clause. However, the content of the *although* clause has not been evoked in the preceding discourse. In (50), the *although* clause weakens the preceding main clause by cancelling an assumption evoked from the main clause. However, the content of the *although* clause has not been evoked in the preceding discourse.

Table 4-4 below summarizes the information status of postposed *although* clauses in the corpus. Table 4-5 summarizes the types of relatedness. These tables also show the frequency with which each type appears.

Table 4-4: Summary of the information status of postposed *although* clauses in the corpus

Information status	No. of clauses
related to preceding discourse	15 (17%)
not related to preceding discourse	74 (83%)
Total	89 (100%)

Table 4-5: Types of relatedness of postposed *although* clauses in the corpus

Types of relatedness	No. of clauses
discourse-old	0 (0%)
inferrable	7 (47%)
Open Proposition and focus	5 (33%)
contrast	3 (20%)
Total	15 (100%)

Table 4-4 shows that postposed *although* clauses in the corpus are predominantly unrelated to the preceding discourse, while 17% (15 out of 89) of them are related to the preceding discourse.⁵ Table 4-5 shows that postposed *although* clauses in my data are related to the preceding discourse in only three ways: by representing inferrable information, by representing a salient OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse.

As Tables 4-3 and 4-5 show, only preposed (but not postposed) *although* clauses permit discourse-old information. In my data, 23 out of 107 preposed *although* clauses represent discourse-old information, whereas no examples of postposed *although* clauses represent discourse-old information. One possible explanation would be that postposed *although* clauses' reporting purely discourse-old information violates the general principle of placing old information before new in English utterances (cf. Prince 1981, Birner and Ward 1998).

4.6 Summary

The discussions of this chapter have come up with the following new findings. First, a majority (76 out of 107, or 71%) of preposed *although* clauses in my data are related to the preceding discourse. These thematic links can be identified in any one of four ways, i.e., by representing discourse-old information, by representing strongly or weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse.

Second, a small number (15 out of 89, or 17%) of postposed *although* clauses in my data are related to the preceding discourse. These thematic connections can be described in any one of three ways, i.e., by representing weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse. There was no example of discourse-old information found in the postposed *although* clauses.

Finally, *although* clauses can be said to conform to the common tendency of other adverbial clauses, in that the preposed version is far more frequently related to the preceding discourse. However, it is possible that *although* clauses may differ consistently from other adverbial (such as temporal or conditional) clauses in the relative frequency of linkage with the preceding discourse.

I hope that the analyses made here have provided a better picture of the ways in which *although* clauses are semantically related to the preceding discourse.

Notes to Chapter 4

- ¹ Noordman (2001) shows only proportions of sentences of each type, not the exact number of sentences. The number of sentences of each type shown in this chapter are calculated by the present author.
- ² Prince (1992) distinguishes two dichotomies: discourse-old versus discourse-new and hearer-old versus hearer-new. The present chapter uses only the former since this is the more useful distinction for identifying the connections between *although* clauses and the preceding discourse. *Although* clauses which represent hearer-old information, i.e., information which is assumed to be present within the hearer's knowledge store, need not be related to the preceding discourse.
- ³ The present study assumes that there is no clear-cut boundary between discourse-old information and inferrable information.
- ⁴ One more example of postposed *although* clauses representing a contrast to the preceding discourse is given below:

() The team won, 7-2, and though Max didn't pitch another perfect game, he did strike out 13. And his father looked on the brighter side in trading e-mails with us. "I'm just glad I didn't offer to shave my head or wear a skirt," he said. "That could get ugly, **although** I do have the legs for the latter." (Newsday (New York), August 14, 2006)

In (), the underlined sentence tells that Max's father is just glad he didn't offer to shave his head or wear a skirt. This information is apparently incompatible with the *although* clause *I do have the legs for the latter*, in that if he has the legs for wearing a skirt, he would not be reluctant to offer to wear a skirt.

- ⁵ Let me add that the majority (92%) of postposed *although* clauses in my data (82 out of 89) are classified as rectifying concessive, but Noordman (2001) does not identify this pattern.

Chapter 5

Coordination/Subordination Status of Preposed and Postposed *Although* Clauses

This chapter compares preposed and postposed *although* clauses in terms of subordination/coordination status.

The traditional analysis of complex sentences makes a sharp distinction between coordination, illustrated in (1), and subordination, illustrated in (2) below. It also divides up subordinate clauses into three types: relative, complement, and adverbial clauses, illustrated in (2a), (2b), and (2c), respectively:

- (1) Sidewalk cafés were everywhere, and the restaurants offered a range of cuisines. (=15 in Ch.1)
- (2) a. Last year, I was introduced to a woman **who lives 100 kilometers away**. (=16a in Ch.1)
- b. On the eastern side of North Africa, I found **that elbow-shaped macaroni was a more popular form of pasta**. (=16b in Ch.1)
- c. **Before we left**, our guide showed us the process of making coconut sugar. (=16c in Ch.1)

However, a number of studies have suggested that this taxonomy is problematic. For example, Langacker (1991: 417) points out as follows:

This taxonomy proves simplistic when measured against the actual complexities of multiclausal constructions, which do not in fact divide themselves naturally into a small number of discrete classes with uniquely characteristic properties. (Langacker 1991: 417)

Haiman and Thompson (1984: 510) also state as follows:

The more rigorous attempts to establish criteria, however, seem not to have been much more fruitful. In fact, the traditional criteria for “subordination”, including dependence, reduction, backgrounding, and preposability, among others, seem to be at best ex post facto rationalizations of our own (Western educated) “intuitions”, which renders them completely circular. Moreover, they are often inconsistent or language specific. The reason for this, we think, is that “subordinate clause” does not seem to be a grammatical category at all. (Haiman and Thompson 1984: 510)

Confronted with this sort of problems, some linguists have abandoned the coordination-subordination distinction altogether, as Cristofaro (2003: 22-23) notes:


A number of proposals on subordination have suggested that clause linkage types should not be described in terms of the binary opposition between coordination and subordination. Rather, they should be defined in terms of a set of mutually independent and freely

combined features, which form a more or less articulated continuum. Each clause linkage type may be more or less coordinate-like or subordinate-like depending on the parameter taken into account.

(Cristofaro 2003: 22-23)

For this kind of approach to clause linkage, see Foley and Van Valin (1984), Haiman and Thompson (1984), Lehmann (1988), Matthiessen and Thompson (1988), Hopper and Traugott (1993), and Ohori (2000), among others.

According to Hopper and Traugott (1993: 167-177), English adverbial clauses are more subordinate-like than coordinate clauses, but more coordinate-like than relative and complement clauses, as shown in (3):



Moreover, some studies suggest that adverbial clauses themselves show a continuum. That is, preposed adverbial clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, while postposed adverbial clauses tend to be more coordinate-like. G. Lakoff (1984) shows that “Main Clause Phenomena” (henceforth MCP) like inversion occur in postposed, but not preposed,

because clauses, are illustrated below:

(4) a. We should go on a picnic, **because** isn't it a beautiful day!

b. * **Because** isn't it a beautiful day, we should go on a picnic.

(=9 in Ch. 1)

Jespersen (1949) and Chafe (1984) also suggest that postposed adverbial clauses behave like coordinate clauses, as quoted below:

All three conjunctions (*as*, *since*, and *because*) are found in clauses placed last: here the statement of cause tends to be less intimately connected with the main fact and thus to be coordinated rather than subordinated. (Jespersen 1949: 394)

It (a postposed free adverbial clause) adds something to the assertion which has just been made. Of all the four types, this one comes closest to presenting a sequence of coordinate clauses, clauses of more or less equal status. (Chafe 1984: 446)

However, almost no studies have examined whether *although* clauses also conform to this tendency in spite of their interesting behavior. Earlier studies point out that preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ in their meaning (Rudolph 1996), discourse functions (Noordman 2001), processing factors (Diessel 1996), and frequency (Diessel 1996, Noordman 2001). However, their differences in terms of

coordination/subordination have escaped serious attention. G. Lakoff (1984) points out that MCP can occur in postposed *although* clauses, as below:

- (5) a. I've decided to stay, **although** here comes Harry – and you know what I think of HIM!
- b. I'm going to stay on my diet, **although** could I ever go for a deem sum brunch! (G. Lakoff 1984: 478)

However, the data G. Lakoff examined are restricted to constructed examples with inversion, not other types of MCP.

The present study aims to examine whether *although* clauses conform to the general tendency of adverbial clauses, or whether *although* clauses have distinctive properties which are not shared by other adverbial clauses. In order to test the subordinate/coordinate properties of *although* clauses, this study uses four parameters, both syntactic and semantic/pragmatic: (A) whether *although* clauses can be syntactically independent of the main clause; (B) whether they can obtain independent illocutionary force; (C) whether they allow ellipsis of the subject; and (D) whether their propositional content can be presented as foregrounded.

Specifically, I will argue the following points. First, on the whole, *although* clauses conform to the general tendency of other adverbial clauses in that preposed *although* clauses are far more subordinate-like than postposed versions. Postposed *although* clauses are allowed to function like a coordinate clause in all of the four parameters. On the

other hand, preposed *although* clauses are straightforwardly subordinate-like according to A, C, and D parameters, whereas according to B parameter, they are allowed to behave like a coordinate clause. Second, *although* clauses have the following distinctive properties, which have not been observed for other adverbial clauses. First, not only postposed, but also preposed *although* clauses allow MCP to occur, which is indicative of coordinate-like properties. Second, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses allow non-assertive illocutionary force.

Section 5.1 will survey three major previous studies on clause linkage. Section 5.2 will explain the method of the present study. Section 5.3 will compare preposed and postposed *although* clauses in terms of the extent to which they are allowed to depart from the (adverbial) subordinate status and function like a coordinate clause. Section 5.4 will conclude this chapter.

5.1. Previous Studies on Clause Linkage

This section surveys three major previous studies on clause linkage which have abandoned the subordination-coordination distinction: Foley and Van Valin (1984), Ohori (2000), and Hopper and Traugott (1993).

5.1.1 Foley and Van Valin (1984)

Foley and Van Valin (1984) distinguish three types of clause linkage: coordination, subordination, and cosubordination. This distinction is based on two parameters, [\pm dependent] and [\pm embedded]. The characterization of each clause linkage type is indicated in (6) below:

(6)	Coordination	Subordination	Cosubordination
	[- embedded]	[+ embedded]	[- embedded]
	[- dependent]	[+ dependent]	[+ dependent]

In coordination, neither clause is embedded in the other, and “neither clause is dependent on the other in any way” (Foely and Van Valin 1984: 239). Coordination is illustrated in (7) and (8) below:

Examples of coordination ([- embedded] [- dependent])

(7) a. The man bought some soap, and the woman will look for a new dryer.

b. The man bought some soap, and the woman will look for a new dryer, won't she? (Foley and Van Valin 1984:239)

(8) a. We thought Fred might bring a few friends to the party, but why did he bring the entire rugby team?

b. Make yourself at home, and I'll fix us a snack. (*ibid.*, 244)

Independent status of each clause in coordination is revealed when illocutionary force tests are applied, as in (7b). The fact that the clauses may have different illocutionary force “indicates that they are independent at the outermost level of the clause, hence are complete clauses in themselves” (Foley and Van Valin 1984: 239). The two clauses in (8a) and (8b) also differ in illocutionary force.

Subordination differs from coordination in two respects. First, one

of the two clauses is embedded in the other. Second, the subordinate clause is dependent upon the superordinate clause. Subordination is illustrated by adverbial clauses and *that*-clauses, shown in (9):

Examples of subordination ([+ embedded] [+ dependent])

- (9) a. Bertrand believes that Brownyn ate the last biscuit.
b. Because Johann kicked the vase over, it broke into pieces.

(Foley and Van Valin 1984: 239)

In (9a), *that Brownyn ate the last biscuit* is the subordinate clause which functions as an argument of *believe*. In (9b), *Because Johann kicked the vase over* is the subordinate clause which functions as an adverbial modifier of the main clause. “The illocutionary force test shows that no independent specification is possible in subordinate junct; the subordinate junct must have the neutral, unmarked form of a statement” (Foley and Van Valin 1984:239), as shown in (10):

- (10) a. *Bertrand believes that Brownyn ate the last biscuit, didn't she?
b. *Because did Johann kick the vase over, it broke into pieces.

(Foley and Van Valin 1984: 239-240)

The third clause linkage type, cosubordination, is like coordination in that neither clause is embedded in the other. It is also like subordination in that one clause is dependent on the other for some feature. Cosubordination is illustrated by the clause-chaining and switch-reference

phenomena widely found in Papuan and American Indian languages. In this construction, “the juncts are not in a subordinate relationship, as one junct is not embedded in the other. However, a dependency relation exists between the juncts in that they must have the same illocutionary force and share the same absolute tense” (Foley and Van Valin 1984: 257). Examples are given from Kewa in (11) below:

Examples of cosubordination ([+ dependent] [- embedded])

(11) [1= first person, 3 = third person, sg = singular, DS = different subject, SS = same subject, PST = past, PRES = present]

a. Ní réka-no áгаа lá-a.
 1sg stand-DS talk say-3sgPST

‘I stood up and he talked.’

b. Nipú táá-ma pámu-a-la.
 3sg hit-SS walk-3sgPRES

‘He is hitting it while walking.’ (Foley and Van Valin 1984: 257)

In (11), “only the final verb is inflected for the person and number of the actor and for tense (Foley and Van Valin 1984: 258). Cosubordination is also illustrated by the English participial constructions as in (12):

Examples of cosubordination ([+ dependent] [- embedded])

- (12) a. Paul sat playing his guitar for hours.
 b. Zelda lay reading a book in bed.
 c. Matthew stood singing on a street corner.

(Foley and Van Valin 1984:262)

The three clause linkage types, coordination, subordination, and cosubordination, are ranked as in (13) below in terms of the potential sententiality of the linked clause (Foley and Van Valin 1984: 266-267):

- (13) COORDINATE > SUBORDINATE > COSUBORDINATE
 [- embedded] [+ embedded] [- embedded]
 [- dependent] [+ dependent] [+ dependent]
 Weakest \longrightarrow Strongest

Coordinate clauses are more sentential than subordinate clauses; Subordinate clauses are more sentential than cosubordinate clauses. However, Foley and Van Valin do not distinguish preposed and postposed adverbial clauses with respect to sententiality.

5.1.2 Ohori (2000)

Ohori (2000) also distinguishes three types of clause linkage: coordination, subordination, and transordination, which roughly correspond to Foley and Van Valin's (1984) coordination, subordination, and cosubordination, respectively. The classification of Ohori (2000) differs from the one of Foley and Van Valin (1984) in three respects. First, while Foley and Van Valin (1984) use the term "cosubordination," Ohori (2000) uses the term "transordination" in its place, for the reason that the term "cosubordination" is not very suitable to express the relevant

phenomena (Ohori 2000: 312). Second, while the classification of clause linkage types in Foley and Van Valin (1984) is based on the parameters [\pm embedded] and [\pm dependent], the classification in Ohori (2000) is based on the following two parameters: [\pm dependent for distribution] and [\pm dependent for the representation of the grammatical category]. Each clause linkage type is characterized as in (14):

(14) Coordination	[- dependent for distribution] [- dependent for grammatical category]
Subordination	[+ dependent for distribution] [- dependent for grammatical category]
Transordination	[+ dependent for distribution] [+ dependent for grammatical category]

Third, while Foley and Van Valin (1984) and Ohori (2000) both classify complement clauses and adverbial clauses into subordination, Ohori further distinguishes adverbial and complement clauses on the basis of a sub-parameter, [\pm argument position]. Complement clauses are characterized by [+ argument position], whereas adverbial clauses by [- argument position].

Ohori's (2000) coordination, subordination, and transordination are illustrated in (15), (16), and (17) below, respectively:

Example of coordination

(15) They ate a lot, and went to sleep soon.

Example of subordination


(16) Because they ate a lot, they went to sleep soon.

Example of transordination

(17) Having eaten a lot, they went to sleep soon. (Ohori 2000: 288)

In (15), tense is represented in the two clauses. In (16), tense is represented in the two clauses as in (15), but unlike (15), the *because* clause is dependent on the main clause for its distribution. In (17), *Having eaten a lot* is not specified for tense: It is dependent on the main clause for its grammatical category as well as distribution.

The four clause linkage types, i.e., coordination, subordination (adverbial clause), subordination (complement clause), and transordination, are ranked as in (18) below, in terms of the strength of the connection between the two clauses (Ohori 2000: 289):



Unlike Foley and Van Valin (1984), Ohori (2000) ranks transordination and subordination (complement clauses) at the same level in the hierarchy, and ranks the adverbial clause as less syntactically integrated to the main clause than the complement clause. Here again, however, preposed and

postposed adverbial clauses are not distinguished.

5.1.3 Hopper and Traugott (1993)

A classification similar to Foley and Van Valin (1984) is also proposed by Hopper and Traugott (1993). Based on discussion by Matthiessen and Thompson (1988), Hopper and Traugott (1993) distinguish three types of clause combining: parataxis, hypotaxis, and subordination. This distinction is based on the same parameters as those of Foley and Van Valin (1984): [\pm dependent] and [\pm embedded]. The characterization of each clause combining type is shown in (19) below:

(19)	parataxis	>	hypotaxis	>	subordination
	[- dependent]		[+ dependent]		[+dependent]
	[- embedded]		[- embedded]		[+embedded]

(Hopper and Traugott 1993: 170)

Parataxis is illustrated in (20) and (21) below:

Examples of parataxis ([- embedded] [- dependent])

(20) Veni, vidi, vici.

‘I came, I saw, I conquered.’

(c. 146, Suetonius, Jul. 37; cited in Hopper and Traugott 1993: 172)

(21) Emily is training to be a speech therapist, and Joel works for a law firm in Philadelphia. (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 173)

Each of the three clauses in (20) is autonomous, but Hopper and Traugott consider this to constitute one sentence with multiple nuclei “because the punctuation represents a single unit, that is, a single overarching intonation contour” (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 172). The example in (21) is coordinated clauses with an explicit connective word.

Hypotaxis is illustrated by appositional relatives in English, as shown in (22), and adverbial clauses, as shown in (23) below:

Examples of hypotaxis ([- embedded] [+ dependent])

(22) Bill Smith, who is our president, would like to meet with you.

(23) If you keep smoking those cigarettes, you’re going to start coughing again. (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 175)

Subordination is illustrated by English restrictive relative, as shown in (24), and complement clauses, as shown in (25) below:

Examples of subordination ([+ embedded] [+ dependent])

(24) I think the guy who just walked out of the store resembles the photo in the post-office window. (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 176)

(25) That the Titanic sank was unexpected. (*ibid.*, 177)

The classification of Hopper and Traugott (1993) differs from the one of Foley and Van Valin (1984) in three respects. The first is terminological differences: The clause linkage which is defined by [- dependent] and [- embedded] is called coordination in Foley and Van

Valin (1984), but called parataxis in Hopper and Traugott (1993); The clause linkage which is defined by [+ dependent] and [- embedded] is called cosubordination in Foley and Van Valin (1984), but called hypotaxis in Hopper and Traugott (1993).

Second, Foley and Van Valin (1984) classify both adverbial clauses and complement clauses as subordination defined by [+ embedded], [+ dependent]. On the other hand, while Hopper and Traugott (1993) classify complement clauses as subordination, they classify adverbial clauses as hypotaxis defined by [- embedded], [+ dependent]. The present paper follows Hopper and Traugott's (1993) analysis of complement and adverbial clauses.

Third, Foley and Van Valin (1984) rank cosubordination that is defined by [- embedded] and [+ dependent] as "more" syntactically bounded than subordination. On the other hand, Hopper and Traugott (1993) rank hypotaxis that is defined by [- embedded] and [+ dependent] as "less" syntactically bounded than subordination.

5.1.4 Summary

The classifications of clause linkage types proposed by three previous studies surveyed above are summarized in Table 5-1 below:

Table 5-1: Previous studies on the coordination-subordination continuum

Foley and Van Valin (1984)

	Coordination	Subordination	Cosubordination
± embedded	-	+	-
± dependent	-	+	+
	conjunction	adverbial clause complement clause	clause chaining participial construction

Ohuri (2000)

	Coordination	Subordination adjunct	Subordination complement	Transordination
± dependent (distribution)	-	+	+	+
± dependent (grammatical category)	-	-	-	+
± argument position		-	+	
	conjunction	adverbial clause	complement clause	clause chaining participial construction

Hopper and Traugott (1993)

	Parataxis	Hypotaxis	Subordination
± embedded	-	-	+
± dependent	-	+	+
	conjunction	adverbial clause appositive relative clause clause chaining	complement clause restrictive relative clause

While the three analyses involve some differences, they together suggest that what is traditionally regarded as coordinate clauses, adverbial clauses, complement clauses, and relative clauses form a continuum in this order, as shown in Table 5-2 below:

Table 5-2: Continuum of complex sentences

		Foley and Van Valin (1984)	Ohuri (2000)	Hopper and Traugott (1993)
more coordinate-like		Coordination	Coordination	Parataxis
		Subordination	Subordination (+ argument)	Hypotaxis
		Subordination	Subordination (- argument)	Subordination
more subordinate-like		-	-	Subordination

According to these studies, adverbial clauses are more subordinate-like than coordinate clauses, and more coordinate-like than complement

clauses or relative clauses.

5.2. Method

5.2.1 Data

The data used for the present research were mainly collected from NHK radio English conversation textbooks, the novel *Harry Potter and the Philosophers' stone*, the magazine *Cosmopolitan*, and newspapers.

5.2.2 Four Parameters for Coordination/Subordination Status

In order to test the subordinate/coordinate properties of *although* clauses, I used four parameters, both syntactic and semantic/pragmatic, which earlier works have proposed to define coordination and subordination.

Syntactic Dependency

The first parameter is syntactic dependency: whether one of the two clauses of a complex sentence is syntactically independent of the other. As mentioned in section 5.1.1, Foley and Van Valin (1984) define coordination by the absence of dependency, whereas subordination and cosubordination involve dependency. We can say then that if *although* clauses can be syntactically independent of the main clause, they can be rated as more coordinate-like; if they cannot, more subordinate-like.

Independent Illocutionary Force

The second parameter is independent illocutionary force: whether

both of the two clauses in the complex sentence are allowed to obtain independent illocutionary force. As Lehman (1988: 193) notes, among others, “a subordinate clause may not normally have its own illocutionary force,” as illustrated below:

(26) *Betrand believes that Browyn ate the last biscuit, didn't she? (=10a)

(27) *Because did Johann kick the vase over, it broke into pieces. (=10b)

(28) *Mary burst into tears, because / after / if did someone kiss her?

(Foley and Van Valin 1984: 249)

(29) *I'll scream because / after / if kiss me! (*ibid.*)

On the other hand, coordinate clauses may have independent illocutionary force, as shown below:

(30) The man bought some soap, and the woman will look for a new dryer,
won't she? (=7b)

(31) We thought Fred might bring a few friends to the party, but why did
he bring the entire rugby team? (=8a)

Thus, if *although* clauses are allowed to obtain independent illocutionary force, they can be analyzed as more coordinate-like; if they are not, more subordinate-like.

Ellipsis of the Subject

The third parameter is whether the complex sentence allows ellipsis

of the subject following the connective. Quirk *et al.* (1985: 921-928) provide six syntactic features which apply to the central or ‘pure’ coordinators, *and* and *or*.¹ One of the features is that coordinators can link clause constituents. According to Quirk *et al.* (1985: 923), coordinators like “*and* and *or* may link constituents smaller than a clause; for example, they may link predicates, thus in effect allowing ellipsis of a second or subsequent subject.” This is illustrated below:

(32) She finished the report **and** went home.

(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1291)

(33) The Polish athletes have succeeded today, **but** may not repeat their success tomorrow. (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 924)

(34) I may see you tomorrow **or** may phone you later in the day. (*ibid.*)

On the other hand, subordinators like *before* and *for* do not allow ellipsis of the following subject, as shown below:²

(35) *She finished the report **before** went home.

(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1291)

(36) *He did not want it, **for** was obstinate. (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 924)

Examples (35) and (36) are completely ungrammatical. Thus, the ability of a connective to allow ellipsis of a subsequent subject is indicative of the connective’s coordinate-like status.

Foreground / Background

Finally, the fourth parameter is whether both of the clauses are presented as foreground, or only one of them is presented as foreground with other clause presented as background. The term “foreground” and “background” are introduced in Hopper (1979) and Hopper and Thompson (1980). The correlation between the foreground/background distinction and subordination is examined in Reinhart (1984), Tomlin (1985), and Thompson (1987), and is summarized by Cristofaro (2003: 26) as below:

Subordinate clauses (i.e., clauses introduced by a subordinating conjunction, nonfinite clauses, relative clauses, including non-restrictive: see Thompson 1987: 444) tend to code background information, main clauses are used for foreground information.

(Cristofaro 2003: 26)

Thus, if *although* clauses are presented as foregrounded, they can be considered more coordinate-like; if backgrounded, more subordinate-like.³

The following section will compare preposed and postposed *although* clauses in terms of these four parameters.

5.3 Comparison of Preposed and Postposed *Although* Clauses

5.3.1 Syntactic Dependency

This section compares the two types of clauses in terms of whether they can be syntactically independent of the main clause. My investigation of naturally occurring data shows that sometimes postposed

but not preposed *although* clauses are permitted to be separated from their main clause:

(37) a. Sam: Now tell me what's wrong. And don't tell me nothing is. It's written all over your face.

Naoko: I don't bore you with my problems.

Sam: I'm a therapist. It's my job to listen to people's problems. And you're my friend – always giving me food from the restaurant.

Naoko: There's not much to tell. (*sighs*) and I know what I have to do. **Although** you won't agree.

Sam: I promise not to give advice unless you ask for it. But tell me about it. You'll feel better.

(*NHK Radio English Conversation textbook*, June 1997: 53)

(38) a. Aisha: But it must be so hard to teach in a second language.

Lutz: In New York, everyone has an accent. Some students' accents are thicker than mine.

Aisha: That's true. **Although** PS 323 isn't quite as diverse as most city schools.

Lutz: Lucky for me. I was transferred to this school after a bad experience my first year.

(*NHK Radio English Conversation textbook*, April 2001: 46)

(39) a. (From the Editor) Do you know any single guys who are too

generous to keep to yourself? We're looking for America's most knee-weakening males for this special section in the November issue. Help us by nominating any supersmart, ultrasexy, and unattached guy you know. Sorry, he can't be your boyfriend. (**Although** one year, one of the winners was so touched by the fact that a gal pal nominated him, he looked at her in a whole new way and they fell in love!) (*Cosmopolitan*, May 2002: 44)

In (37a), (38a), and (39a), *although* clauses are separated by a period from the main clauses.

On the other hand, preposed *although* clauses do not have this syntactic option, as shown below:

- (37)b. ? **Although** you won't agree. I know what I have to do.
- (38)b. ? **Although** PS 323 isn't quite as diverse as most city schools.
That's true.
- (39)b. ??? **Although** one year, one of the winners was so touched by the fact that a gal pal nominated him, he looked at her in a whole new way and they fell in love. Sorry, he can't be your boyfriend.

The (a) examples of (37), (38), and (39) show that postposed *although* clauses can be syntactically independent of the main clause. In this respect, postposed *although* clauses are more coordinate-like, whereas preposed *although* clauses are consistently subordinate-like.⁴

5.3.2 Independent Illocutionary Force

Next, let us compare preposed and postposed *although* clauses in terms of whether they can obtain independent illocutionary force. I examined whether *although* clauses allow MCP (Green 1976, G. Lakoff 1984) to occur. MCP are defined as “constructions that are restricted in their use to expressing certain illocutionary forces that are specified as part of the grammar of English” (G. Lakoff 1984: 473). Hence, the ability of each *although* clause to allow MCP is indicative of the clause’s ability to obtain independent illocutionary force, hence coordinate-like status.

I found that MCP such as rhetorical questions, inverted exclamations, and imperatives, which normally do not occur in subordinate clauses, do occur in postposed *although* clauses.

First, I found 40 tokens of postposed *although* clauses in which a rhetorical question occurs.⁵ The rhetorical question may be a negative question, as in (40a) and (41a), or *wh*-question, as in (42a) and (43a):

(40)a. Nevertheless, "ER" has merit. It captures the comic-tragic roller coaster of emergency medicine, and its stories are probably more realistic than those on "Chicago Hope." The ensemble cast is talented: Edwards and Clooney are especially appealing (**although** aren't all these guys a bit too old still to[sic] be residents?), and Stringfield's story line perks up at the end of Episode 2.

(*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (Missouri), September 18, 1994)

(41)a. All that has been revealed by the potential collapse of ITV Digital's deal with the Nationwide League is that neutrals will watch Liverpool versus Chelsea or Arsenal against Newcastle United, but those interested when Wimbledon visit Grimsby Town are inside the ground, not sitting at home. The problem was the television companies did not understand the product they were buying and the football clubs would have been fools to tell them.
(...)

More than likely, this panic will be used as a way to cut costs and ditch staff. Karren Brady is already talking of getting rid of players at St Andrew's, **although** wouldn't similar changes need to be made if Birmingham failed once again to reach the Premiership?
(The Times (London), March 27, 2002)

(42)a. James Earl Jones is one of the biggest performers in the American theater today. It's not just his physical size that is imposing, **although** how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's chest, the broad expanse of the face or the massive hands, better described, really, as mitts? What clinches the impression, though, is the elemental force he brings to the stage.

(The Washington Post, March 27, 1987)

(43)a. A survey by human resources consultancy Development Dimensions International (DDI) found that only around half of

major UK companies have formal management succession plans. This may not matter too much in a family-run company where the present owner is confident that the next generation will take over the reins (**although** who can be absolutely certain that their offspring might not have a sudden change of career plan?), but it may well result in a crisis in other firms if the managing director is unexpectedly lured away by another company or succumbs to a heart attack or stroke. (*Printing World*, September 18, 2000)

In (40a), the postposed *although* clause allows the rhetorical negative question *aren't all these guys a bit too old still to be residents?* In (42a), the postposed *although* clause introduces the rhetorical *wh*-question *how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's chest, the broad expanse of the face or the massive hands, better described, really, as mitts?* Preposing the *although* clauses in these examples results in infelicitous sentences, as shown below:

(40)b.* **Although** aren't all these guys a bit too old still to be residents, the ensemble cast is talented: Edwards and Clooney are especially appealing.

(41)b.* **Although** wouldn't similar changes need to be made if Birmingham failed once again to reach the Premiership, Karren Brady is already talking of getting rid of players at St Andrew's.

(42)b. ***Although** how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's chest, the broad expanse of the face or the massive hands,

better described, really, as mitts, it's not just his physical size that is imposing.

- (43)b. * **Although** who can be absolutely certain that their offspring might not have a sudden change of career plan, this may not matter too much in a family-run company where the present owner is confident that the next generation will take over the reins.

Two more examples of postposed *although* clauses in which the rhetorical question occurs are given below:

- (44) The past is a foreign country (possibly Sweden, since it's full of people who are younger, thinner and sexier than we are...). You can't revisit. It's especially true of places like schools or universities. As Cyril Connolly pointed out in *The Enemies of Promise*, everybody has the same dream about going back to school or university: it's all so familiar, and you go into the classroom and it's all fine except there's no desk for you, and you go into the next class and there's still nowhere to sit and now everybody's looking at you and you realise you're buck-naked, and then the giant lobster in the green cocktail dress lurches out of the bookcase with a tray of suppositories and a well, as we've all had the dream there's no need to go on, **although** isn't it funny how you always wake up the instant before the falling Ann Widdicombe lands on you? Anyway, because of this, I've always given the alma mater a lot of width, berthwise. (*Scotland on Sunday*, April 8, 2001)

(45) Again, the steaks at this New Orleans-based chain were superb, and hot, hot, hot. Unlike Morton's or Nick & Tony's, they're served here on sizzling plates, sizzling in butter -- indeed, the chain's founder, the late Ruth Fertel, insisted on butter, and designed a broiler that reaches 1,800 degrees (Morton's boasts a 1,200-degree broiler, **although** how can it make that much of a difference at those temperatures?). The plates are heated to 500 degrees so the steaks stay hot while being eaten.

(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), March 7, 2003)

On the other hand, I have found no tokens of preposed *although* clauses in which rhetorical questions occur.

Second, I found two tokens of postposed *although* clauses in which inverted exclamations occur, as shown below:

(46)a. Such is the plight of the \$88 million ballplayer. Mike Mussina couldn't win for losing last night, **although**, boy, did he lose. Even before the Yankees' \$88 million man was administered a rude and early banishment by his former Baltimore Oriole mates, battered for six runs and nine hits in five innings, he was already coming up a loser on the public perception front.

(Daily News (New York), June 6, 2001)

(47) a. I hate it when the game comes on. All the men instantly lock on to

the screen instead of paying attention to me. That's why I love French wine. Or, more accurately, French winemakers. They like women. They're fascinated by women. They can't talk wine except in feminine terms. Jean-Noel Formeaux, ebullient owner of Chateau Potelle, in Napa, explains to me why he doesn't chase ratings (**although**, boy, does he get them). "It's like the Miss America Pageant. Always the girl with the big curves, the big hair, the big lips stands out. The small, graceful girl gets lost."

(*Rocky Mountain News* (Denver, CO), October 19, 2002)

In (46a) and (47a), the inverted exclamation, which does not normally occur in subordinate clauses, occur in the postposed *although* clauses. Preposing the *although* clauses in (46a) and (47a) results in infelicitous sentences:

(46) b. ***Although**, boy, did he lose, Mike Mussina couldn't win for losing last night.

(47) b. ***Although**, boy, does he get them, Jean-Noel Formeaux, ebullient owner of Chateau Potelle, in Napa, explains to me why he doesn't chase ratings.

Finally, I found 27 tokens of postposed *although* clauses in which imperatives occur, as exemplified below:

(48)a. My wife and I celebrated an anniversary last summer with dinner

out, and one of the dishes that appeared before us was a dish of cool foie gras topped with crunchy, chopped, sweet and salty almonds, topped in turn with half a peach. The fresh peach had been poached in chamomile tea and each gave a little of itself to the other (...)

Now, with cold weather upon us, peaches and other fresh, locally grown stone fruit are out -- **although** please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner, if by some miracle, you come upon some decent peaches in your supermarket. But we've got all manner of dried fruit (classic and unjustly neglected nowadays), pears (good candidates for poaching) and apples (not ideal). And we're looking at heartier, more wintry dishes to use them in. *(The Washington Post, January 16, 2002)*

- (49)a. Mothering Sunday, which started out in medieval times as the one day of the year when young indentured servants were allowed home for a few hours to see their mothers, has become irrelevant in an age of mobile phones (**although** please give your mother something a little more than a text message). It's merely an excuse to sell greeting cards, chocolates, flowers and overpriced restaurant meals. The worst thing about it is that it causes the motherless and childless more pain than pleasure. The entire day seems invented to remind the motherless of their grief, and the childless of their infertility. *(The Irish Times, March 29, 2003)*

- (50)a. Run don't walk to your nearest internet terminal for the telly event

of the week - the Melrose Place auction. Aaron Spelling's legendary soap may be no more, but on-line store www.amazon.com is flogging off memorabilia, presumably to save the studio hiring a skip. You can bid for any of seven wedding gowns - one complete with tyre tracks suggesting the bride wasn't long for this world - or perhaps the 'REAL!' ashes of Amanda and Peter. There are just a few days left, **although** please don't bid for the 'imitation tiles from the arch entrance in the courtyard (item number 684b)'. We fancy them for the bathroom. Or why not apply for your big telly break? TVX: The Fantasy Channel advertised in Media Guardian this week for a presenter for their new, wittily titled news bulletin, Nudes at Ten.

(*The Guardian* (London) May 28, 1999)

In (48a), (49a), and (50a), the imperative clause, which does not normally occur in subordinate clauses, occurs in the postposed *although* clauses. Preposing the *although* clauses in these examples results in infelicitous sentences, as shown below:

(48)b. * **Although** please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner, if by some miracle, you come upon some decent peaches in your supermarket, now, with cold weather upon us, peaches and other fresh, locally grown stone fruit are out.

(49)b. * **Although** please give your mother something a little more than a text message, Mothering Sunday, which started out in

medieval times as the one day of the year when young indentured servants were allowed home for a few hours to see their mothers, has become irrelevant in an age of mobile phones.

- (50)b. * **Although** please don't bid for the 'imitation tiles from the arch entrance in the courtyard (item number 684b)', there are just a few days left.

Two more examples of postposed *although* clauses in which imperative clauses occur are given below:

- (51) You will be asked how it is that pass rates at GCSE hit a new record every year. You should say that records are there to be broken. If pressed, go on to say that nobody complained when Paula Radcliffe broke a new record for the London Marathon (Gold star for David Miliband in conjuring that beauty up). Paula is a very good advertisement for British schooling because, as well as being very fast, she is also very clever. You might remember that she came top of the BBC's national IQ test last year with a score of 125, **although** don't get too carried away on this point. The BBC test also revealed that the average IQ is 104, when of course it should be 100, so there is possible "grade inflation" here, too.

(*The Times* (London), August 12, 2003)

- (52) This dream of a flexible screen is one that is high on the agenda for

several companies. Sharp's general manager for marketing Joe Costantino talks passionately about its plans for a screen you can roll up like a newspaper. Both Philips and a joint venture between Toshiba and Matsushita (Panasonic) are looking at polymer OELs as the future for larger screens. The advantage that polymers have is that they can be ink-jet printed at close to room temperature, making them more suitable for mass production using flexible plastic. Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology has already shown a 17-inch XGA wide-polymer OLED display, **although** don't expect to see one in your local store - or on the sleeve of your shirt - for some time yet.

(*The Age* (Melbourne), July 3, 2003)

So far, I have shown that postposed, not preposed, *although* clauses allow MCP to occur. One may say then that according to this test, postposed *although* clauses are allowed to behave like a coordinate clause, whereas preposed versions are consistently subordinate-like.

It should be noted, however, that some preposed *although* clauses allow MCP to occur. For example, the postposed *although* clause containing rhetorical *wh*-question in (53a) can be preposed felicitously, as shown in (53b):

- (53) a. "The Open is for male golfers at the moment as the Women's Open is for female golfers," he said. "It will stay that way for the foreseeable future, **although** who knows what will happen in 100

years' time. There's a world of difference between male and female golfers." *(The Scotsman, April 30, 2003)*

- b. **Although** who knows what will happen in 100 years' time, it will stay that way for the foreseeable future.

Likewise, some postposed *although* clauses in which imperatives occur, illustrated in (54a), (55a), and (56a), may also be preposed felicitously, as shown in (54b), (55b), and (56b) below:

- (54) a. Tickets for the Christmas Lectures are available to both Members and non-members of the Royal Institution, but are traditionally designed to appeal to children aged 11 to 18 years. We will still welcome children below this recommended age, **although** please bear in mind that some of the lecture content may be slightly advanced for younger children.

(<http://www.rigb.org/events/christmaslectures.html>)

- b. **Although** please bear in mind that some of the lecture content may be slightly advanced for younger children, we will still welcome children below this recommended age.

- (55) a. In life and in business, one of the greatest frustrations is when you confront more questions than there are answers, more unknowns than there are certainties. This is what makes sport such a popular medium and paradoxically, for many reasons, the more unanswered questions there are, the healthier the sport. Maybe

it's because sport is rarely a matter of life and death, **although** don't go telling your average All Black or Springbok supporter that. More probably it's because most sporting questions, while not immediately obvious, are definitively answered at a given point in time, that is by full time or the end of the season.

(Australian Financial Review, February 24, 2003)

- b. (?) **Although** don't go telling your average All Black or Springbok supporter this, maybe it's because sport is rarely a matter of life and death.

- (56) a. Seven seasons of Buffy were enough for Sarah Michelle Gellar; some cynics even say enough for the viewing public, **although** don't say that too loud in front of fervent fans. And while Gellar may be concentrating more on her movie career, there's not much chance of her starring as Buffy on the big screen.

(The Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) March 27, 2003)

- b. (?) **Although** don't say this too loud in front of fervent fans, seven seasons of Buffy were enough for Sarah Michelle Gellar; some cynics even say enough for the viewing public.

The examples of (55b) and (56b) are acceptable but slightly odd. However, the example in (57) below is perfectly useable:⁶

- (57) **Although** don't go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

It has been assumed that preposed adverbial clauses “do not allow any clause type beyond the declarative, irrespective of the type of conjunction that is used” (Verstraete 2004: 820). However, the examples of (53b), (54b), (55b), (56b), and (57) show that this assumption is not correct. Moreover, it has also been assumed that “only speech act constructions that (directly or indirectly) convey statements can occur in performative subordinate clauses” (G. Lakoff 1984: 475). For example, postposed *because* clauses are restricted to assertive illocutionary force, as Verstraete (2005) observes:

(58) I only made US\$ 6000 in the whole year, and even like the next two years, I was just like getting by, **because** don't forget that our expenses are very high. (Verstraete 2005: 621)

The *because* clause in (58) is not interpreted as a genuine order, but rather as a statement conveying the speaker's opinion that ‘our expenses are very high.’ However, examples (48a), (49a), (50a), and (57) show that both preposed and postposed *although* clauses are not so restricted. In (49a), for example, *please give your mother something a little more than a text message* is not interpreted as a statement, but as a genuine request.

Next, let us consider what kind of MCP can occur in preposed *although* clauses. Two factors seem to be relevant, i.e., their weight (or length) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1371) and emphasis. There is a general tendency for heavy and/or emphatic *although* clauses to prefer the postposed position to the preposed position.

First, consider the weight of clauses. In (53a) above (repeated below as 59), the rhetorical *wh*-question *who knows what will happen in 100 years' time* is relatively light. Hence, it can be preposed felicitously.

(59) "The Open is for male golfers at the moment as the Women's Open is for female golfers," he said. "It will stay that way for the foreseeable future, **although** who knows what will happen in 100 years' time. There's a world of difference between male and female golfers." (=53a)

On the other hand, in (42a) (repeated below as 60), the rhetorical *wh*-question *how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's chest, the broad expanse of the face or the massive hands, better described, really, as mitts?* is relatively heavy, and cannot be preposed.

(60) It's not just his physical size that is imposing, **although** how can you overlook the hulking torso, the rotund basso's chest, the broad expanse of the face or the massive hands, better described, really, as mitts? (=42a)

Likewise, in (57) (repeated below as 61), the imperative *don't go telling your sister this* is a short clause.

(61) **Although** don't go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly. (=57)

On the other hand, in (48a) (repeated below as 62), the imperative *please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner, if by some miracle, you come upon some decent peaches in your supermarket* is quite bulky in size, hence cannot be preposed felicitously.

(62) Now, with cold weather upon us, peaches and other fresh, locally grown stone fruit are out -- **although** please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner, if by some miracle, you come upon some decent peaches in your supermarket.

(=48a)

The second factor is the degree of emphasis. Compare examples (63) and (64):

(63) **Although** please don't go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

(64) ?? **Although** never go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

Sentence (63) is perfectly acceptable, where the imperative conveys polite request with the adverbial *please*. In contrast, sentence (64) is far less acceptable, where the imperative conveys strong prohibition with the emphatic negative *never*. The same account holds for (48a), where the appearance of *do* makes the imperative utterance more emphatic.

In summary, I have shown the following respects. First, contrary to

common belief, *although* clauses allow MCP to occur both in pre- and postposed position. In naturally occurring discourse, MCP such as rhetorical questions, inverted exclamations, and imperatives occur in postposed *although* clauses. Moreover, some rhetorical *wh*-questions and imperative *although* clauses can be preposed felicitously, while rhetorical *yes-no* questions and exclamatory inversion *although* clauses do not have this syntactic option. Second, however, there is a general tendency for heavy and/or emphatic *although* clauses to prefer the postposed position to the preposed position. Third, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses allow non-assertive illocutionary force.⁷

5.3.3 Ellipsis of the Subject

This section compares preposed and postposed *although* clause in terms of whether they allow ellipsis of the subject. Investigating naturally occurring discourse, I found 9 tokens of postposed *although* clauses which allow ellipsis of the subsequent subject, as illustrated below, but no such tokens of preposed versions.

(65) The last Australian Marlboro Man has recanted. Bruce Adams, the moustachioed macho man of the early '70s, famous for rescuing floodswept foals and staring into the middle distance while smoke curled from his cancer stick, has turned. He's become an ambassador for the National Heart Foundation, and he wants to preach on the evils of smoking. Mr Adams is keen on taking the glamour out of smoking for kids, **although** isn't sure yet how to do it.

(*Sydney Morning Herald*, September 10, 1999)

(66) What did you want to be when you left school?

I didn't have any clear idea going through school what I wanted to be when I left. I have always been interested in sport, **although** didn't necessarily consider sailing as an actual career until much later on. It wasn't until I was at university that I really decided on sports physiotherapy. (The Scotsman, March 19, 2003)

Example (65) is perfectly acceptable. Example (66) is an excerpt from an interview article, and sounds less natural than (65), but far more acceptable than (35) and (36) (repeated below as 67 and 68, respectively):

(67) *She finished the report **before** went home. (=35)

(68) *He did not want it, **for** was obstinate. (=36)

The connective *although* in (65) and (66) functions closely to the coordinator *but*.

Thus, while subordinators like *before* or *for* do not allow ellipsis of a subsequent subject, postposed *although* allows it. In this sense, postposed *although* is similar in behavior to coordinators such as *and*, *or*, and *but*.⁸

5.3.4 Foreground/Background

Finally, let us compare the two types of clauses in terms of whether

they are presented as foreground or background. I follow the definition of foreground and background proposed by Hopper and Thompson (1980). According to Hopper and Thomson (1980: 280), foreground is “the material which supplies the main points of the discourse,” while background is “the part of a discourse which does not immediately and crucially contribute to the speaker’s goal, but which merely assists, amplifies, or comments on it.”

First, in my data, I found no tokens of preposed *although* clauses which are presented as foregrounded. They are consistently presented as backgrounded, as illustrated below:

(69) ‘And finally, bird-watchers everywhere have reported that the nation’s owls have been behaving very unusually today. **Although** owls normally hunt at night and are hardly ever seen in daylight, there have been hundreds of sightings of these birds flying in every direction since sunrise. Experts are unable to explain why the owls have suddenly changed their sleeping pattern.’ (*Harry Potter*: 10)

Here, the *although* clause tells about usual behavior of owls, while the main clause reports their unusual behavior on the day of the utterance. The following sentence *Experts are unable to explain why the owls have suddenly changed their sleeping pattern* deals with the reaction of experts to the unusual behavior of owls, which is in continuity with the main clause, but not with the *although* clause. We can say then that this preposed *although* clause is presented as background.

On the other hand, some postposed *although* clauses can be perceived as foregrounded as much as the main clause, as shown below:

(70) Dear Ann Landers: For several months, my wife and I saved money so we could buy a new car. Although I tried to involve “Alice” in the decision process, she insisted that it was my call.

I found a great buy on a car, **although** it used up most of the money in our “car fund.” I called Alice to tell her what I was planning to buy and how much it would cost. She went to the bank for the cashier’s check and met me at the dealer’s. She never said one word about the car, the model, the color or the price.

As soon as we came home, Alice became irate. She said she had been “testing” me. She wanted me to offer to let her pick out the car, and she expected me to use less of the “car fund” to do it. She said I failed the test and it means I don’t care about her.

(International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2002)

The main point of (70) is that Alice, who is the wife of the writer, never seemed interested in picking out a new car, but nevertheless she resented the fact that the writer made all the decisions. The propositional content of the postposed *although* clause, that the car the writer found used up most of their “car fund,” contributes to the main point of this discourse. It is one of the reasons Alice blamed the writer, as stated in the underlined sentence *she expected me to use less of the “car fund” to do it.* Moreover, it has continuity with both the preceding and the subsequent

discourse, as suggested in the phrases *saved money*, *how much it would cost*, *the bank*, *the cashier's check*, and *the price*. We can say then that this postposed *although* clause is presented as foregrounded.

However, speakers do not always present postposed *although* clauses as foregrounded, as shown in (71), where the *although* clause is parenthesized:

(71) Help us by nominating any supersmart, ultrasexy, and unattached guy you know. Sorry, he can't be your boyfriend. (**Although** one year, one of the winners was so touched by the fact that a gal pal nominated him, he looked at her in a whole new way and they fell in love!) (=39a)

Finally, let me show that applying Erteschik-Schir and Lappin's (1979) 'lie test' to *although* sentences also suggests that preposed *although* clauses are consistently presented as background while postposed *although* clauses can be presented as foreground. The lie test is a test for a pragmatic concept which Erteschik-Schir and Lappin (1979) call 'dominance,' which is defined as follows:

A constituent *c* of a sentence *S* is dominant in *S* if and only if the speaker intends to direct the attention of his hearers to the intention of *c*, by uttering *S*. (Erteschik-Schir and Lappin 1979: 43)

According to Erteschik-Schir and Lappin (1979: 49), the dominant component of a sentence corresponds to the part of a sentence which is "of

more central importance than others.”

The lie test consists in “placing the entire complex sentence in a context of direct discourse” (*ibid.*, 46), and then denying or assisting a truth, probability, or interest value to the various parts of the sentence, by means of expressions such as ‘.. is a lie,’ ‘... is not true,’ ‘...is highly probably,’ ‘... is true,’ ‘... is amusing,’ etc. For instance, by this test, the sentence “Orcutt is a spy” is dominant in (72) but not in (73) below:

(72) Bill said: John believes that Orcutt is a spy.

a. which is a lie – he doesn’t

b. which is a lie – he isn’t (Erteschik-Shir and Lappin 1979: 46)

(73) Bill said: John carefully considered the possibility that Orcutt is a spy.

a. which is a lie – he didn’t (consider it carefully).

b. * which is a lie – he isn’t (a spy). (*ibid.*)

As such the lie test “is a device for identifying those sentences which can become subjects of further conversation” (Erteschik-Shir and Lappin 1979: 47). In order for a sentence to be a subject (or topic) for further conversation, it is necessary that both the speaker and the hearer be capable of focusing attention on it. Hence, the lie test succeeds in identifying possibly dominant constituents.

Let us apply the lie test to *although* clauses (cf. Izutsu 2002: 2):

- (74) A: **Although** she doesn't speak French, Sonia grew up in Paris.
B1: That's not true, she didn't, because she and I went to the same preschool in Japan.
B2: ? That's not true, she does, because she introduced herself in French at the party.
- (75) A: Sonia grew up in Paris **although** she doesn't speak French.
B1: That's not true, she didn't, because she and I went to the same preschool in Japan.
B2: That's not true, she does, because she introduced herself in French at the party.

The infelicity of the utterance of B2 in (74) indicates that the preposed *although* clause in the utterance of (74) cannot be the subject of further conversation. On the other hand, the felicity of the utterance of B2 in (75) shows that the postposed *although* clause in the utterance of A in (75) can be the subject of further conversation.⁹

One might argue that the primary factor that enables a postposed *although* clause to become the subject for further conversation is not its being dominant, but its linear closeness to the following context. However, this is not the case, since the example in (76) below shows that the linear closeness of a clause to the following context is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the clause to become the subject of further conversation:

(76) Bill said: This is the job that I worked on all morning, took a lunch break, and finished off by 2 p.m.

- a. * which is a lie; he didn't take a lunch break.
- b. which is a lie; he didn't work on it all morning. (Dean 1991: 50)

In (76), the first conjunct *I worked on (it) all morning* can be the subject of further conversation, but it is the farthest from the following context. The second conjunct *(I) took a lunch break* is closer to the following context than the first conjunct, but it cannot be the subject for further conversation. Therefore, the linear closeness of a clause to the following context is irrelevant to the ability of the clause to become the subject of further conversation.

Thus, the application of the lie test to *although* clauses shows that preposed *although* clauses are consistently presented as background in that they cannot be a topic for further conversation, while postposed *although* clauses can be presented as foreground in that they can be a topic for further conversation.

In summary, my data show that preposed *although* clauses are consistently presented as background, whereas postposed versions can be presented either as background or as foreground.

5.3.5 Summary

Table 5-3 below summarizes the results:

Table 5-3: Coordinate-subordinate properties of preposed and postposed *although* clauses

Parameters	preposed	postposed
(A) Independence	-	+
(B) Illocutionary force (MCP)		
inverted exclamation	-	+
rhetorical negative question	-	+
rhetorical <i>wh</i> -question	+	+
imperative	+	+
(C) Subject ellipsis	-	+
(D) Foreground	-	+

If *although* clauses satisfy a parameter, this is indicated by a ‘ + ’; If they fail, ‘ - ’ is entered.

First, postposed *although* clauses are allowed to function like a coordinate clause in all of the four parameters. They are allowed to be syntactically independent of the main clause (A), obtain independent illocutionary force (B), permit ellipsis of the subject (C), and be presented as foregrounded (D).

On the other hand, preposed *although* clauses are straightforwardly subordinate-like according to three parameters. They are consistently dependent on the main clause (A), do not allow ellipsis of the subject (C), and are consistently presented as backgrounded (D). According to the parameter of independent illocutionary force (B), however, preposed *although* clauses can be coordinate-like, in that they sometimes allow MCP to occur, which is indicative of coordinate-like properties. However, I have also shown that there is a general tendency for heavy/emphatic *although* clauses to prefer the postposed position to the preposed position.

5.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, I have argued the following points. First, *although* clauses accord substantially with the general tendency noted below:

(77) Preposed adverbial clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, while postposed adverbial clauses tend to be more coordinate-like.

(=8 in Ch. 1)

On the whole, preposed *although* clauses are more subordinate-like, whereas postposed *although* clauses are more coordinate-like. Second, however, *although* clauses have the following distinctive properties, which have not been observed for other adverbial clauses. First, not only postposed, but also preposed *although* clauses allow MCP to occur, which is indicative of coordinate-like properties. Second, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses allow non-assertive illocutionary force. These findings imply that concessive clause combining has distinctive properties which are not shared by other types of clause combining.

Notes to Chapter 5

- ¹ As Culicover and Jackendoff (1997) note, there are at least two uses of *and*, i.e., normal coordinating *and* and left subordinating *and* (e.g., *You dring one can of beer and I'm leaving.*) The latter is syntactically coordinate but conceptually subordinate. The conjunction *or* has also two uses, symmetric and asymmetric (e.g., *Eat your oatmeal or you'll be sorry!*) (cf. R. Lakoff 1971).
- ² There has been some interesting debate concerning the subordinate/coordinate status of conjunctions including *for* (cf. Ohishi 1976, Ohishi 1977, Quirk *et al.* 1985: 920-928).
- ³ A distinction similar to foreground/background was introduced by Talmy (1978), i.e., the distinction between figure and ground. As Reinhart (1984) argues, the two distinctions are closely related.
- ⁴ *Because*-clauses and *if*-clauses also can be syntactically independent:
- () A: Why did the car engine overheat?
B: **Because** there was no water in the radiator. (Taylor 1997: 294)
- () A: Are you going to that conference?
B: **If** my paper gets accepted. (*ibid.*)
- ⁵ I found no examples in which the non-rhetorical question, or true information-seeking question, occur in postposed *although* clauses.
- ⁶ I am indebted to Randy L. Evans for this example.
- ⁷ Takahashi (2005: 68-72) explains the felicitous appearance of ordinary (=non-rhetorical) imperative in *although* clauses in terms of the latter's looser integration into a main clause required by the former.
- ⁸ It should be noted that postposed *although* does not always allow ellipsis of a second subject. For example, in (), the subject of the main clause and that of the postposed *although* clause are identical:
- () In retrospect, we grew up surprisingly unspoiled, **although** we traded on our twinship shamelessly, a natural and easy thing to do.
(*Wake up*: 116)

However, the postposed *although* does not allow ellipsis of the second subject, as shown below:

-
- () * In retrospect, we grew up surprisingly unspoiled, **although** traded on our twinship shamelessly, a natural and easy thing to do.

Under what condition ellipsis of a second subject is allowed remains unaccounted for.

- ⁹ While a whole postposed *although* clause can antecede a pronoun, a nominal occurring in a postposed *although* clause cannot. Consider () and () below:

() Judy and Sally are friendly with each other and usually go out together. However, one day, **although** Judy went to see a movie, Sally went shopping. She wore torn jeans and a T-shirt.

() Judy and Sally are friendly with each other and usually go out together. However, one day, Sally went shopping **although** Judy went to see a movie. She wore torn jeans and a T-shirt.

In both versions, the pronoun *she* refers to Sally, not Judy. This shows that both preposed and postposed *although* clauses are less prominent than their main clauses.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In the present study, I have offered a comprehensive description of *although* clauses in English discourse. Specifically, I have clarified the commonalities and differences between preposed and postposed *although* clauses in terms of three respects: kinds of semantic relations they can express, information status, and coordination/subordination properties. First, I have shown that, contra König's (1994) analysis, preposed and postposed *although* clauses do not differ in the kinds of relations they can express. Rather, the difference lies in the frequency of each usage. That is, preposed *although* clauses in my data are not limited to standard and rhetorical concessive, but they express three other relations: rectifying concessive, contrast, and speech act relations. Similarly, postposed *although* clauses are not restricted to standard, rhetorical, and rectifying concessive; they express contrast and speech act as well. However, preposed and postposed *although* clauses differ greatly in their most frequent usage types. The majority of preposed *although* clauses express standard concessive, while the majority of postposed *although* clauses express rectifying concessive. In addition, I have shown that three types of rectifying concessive, which I termed as Cancelling Assumption, Weakening Validity, and Exception, can be identified for postposed *although* clauses, which were not distinguished at all in the previous studies.

Second, I have observed that preposed *although* clauses are far more related to the preceding discourse than postposed versions. Preposed

although clauses are linked with the preceding discourse in 71% of my data (76 out of 107 examples). These thematic links can be identified in any one of four ways, i.e., by presenting discourse-old information, by representing strongly or weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, or by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse. In contrast, postposed *although* clauses are related to the preceding discourse in 17% of the data (15 out of 89 examples). These thematic connections can be described in any one of three ways, i.e., by representing weakly inferrable information, by representing an inferrable OP and a focus, and by offering a contrast to the preceding discourse.

Third, I have found that preposed *although* clauses are far more subordinate-like than postposed versions. On the one hand, postposed *although* clauses are allowed to function like coordinate clauses in all of the four parameters: (A) syntactic (in)dependency, (B) (in)dependent illocutionary force, (C) subject ellipsis, and (D) foreground/background. That is, they are allowed to be syntactically independent of the main clause, obtain independent illocutionary force, permit ellipsis of the subject, and be presented as foregrounded. On the other hand, preposed *although* clauses are straightforwardly subordinate-like according to three parameters. They are consistently dependent on the main clause, do not allow ellipsis of the subject, and are consistently presented as backgrounded. According to the parameter of independent illocutionary force, however, preposed *although* clauses can be coordinate-like, in that they sometimes allow MCP to occur, which is indicative of coordinate-like properties.

This study has also identified the commonalities and differences between

although clauses and other types of adverbial clauses. *Although* clauses can be said to conform to two general tendencies of other adverbial clauses. First, like other adverbial clauses such as causal, conditional, temporal, and purpose clauses, preposed *although* clauses tend to be linked to the preceding discourse as well as the main clause, whereas postposed *although* clauses tend to be only related to the main clause. Second, like other adverbial clauses such as causal clauses, preposed *although* clauses tend to be more subordinate-like, while postposed *although* clauses tend to be more coordinate-like. However, *although* clauses have the following distinctive properties, which have not been observed for other adverbial clauses. First, *although* clauses may differ from other adverbial clauses in the relative frequency of linkage with the preceding discourse. That is, quite unlike *although* clauses, preposed temporal and causal clauses in conversational discourse invariably tie back to previous discourse (Ford 1993: 26-62). Second, not only postposed, but also preposed *although* clauses allow MCP such as imperative or rhetorical *wh*-question to occur, which is indicative of coordinate-like properties. Third, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses allow non-assertive illocutionary force. The latter two findings are consistent with, and support König's (1994: 679) claim that concessive clauses are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other adverbial clauses.

Finally, I would like to point out a few problems to be discussed in future research. First, the present work deals only with *although* clauses, but at least some of the relations expressed by *although* can be expressed by other connectives such as *though* and *but* as well. One interesting problem worth examining is whether these connectives differ in the relations they can express

and the frequency of each usage.

Second, the present study has found that unlike other adverbial clauses, both preposed and postposed *although* clauses allow MCP and non-assertive illocutionary force. This seems to support the claim that *although* clauses are less tightly integrated to a main clause than other adverbial clauses. Another problem to be discussed is to what extent different kinds of adverbial clauses (such as causal, conditional, temporal, and concessive) differ in their degree of syntactic integration to a main clause. Ohishi (1977) hypothesizes that English concessive and causal clauses are less integrated than conditional clauses, which are in turn less integrated than temporal clauses. However, this hypothesis has not been verified on a large amount of data. It is interesting to examine whether concessive, causal, conditional, and temporal adverbial clauses form a continuum ranging from less integrated to more integrated to a main clause. The present study has provided a first step by suggesting that *although* clauses are less integrated to a main clause than other adverbial clauses.

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