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Author(s)	Takahashi, Hidemitsu
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# Imperatives in Subordinate Clauses

Hidemitsu Takahashi

## 1. Introduction

It is sometimes assumed that adverbial conjuncts in English such as *if*, *when*, *because*, and *although* are always followed by a declarative as in (1), but not by a non-declarative such as the imperative and the interrogative, as demonstrated in the ungrammaticality of each sentence in (2) below:

- (1)a. She will get upset, if I exclude her.
- b. She got upset, when I told her she must leave.
- c. She got upset, because she lost her wallet.
- d. She got upset, although I didn't exclude her.
- (2)a. \*She will get upset if exclude her!
- b. \*She will get upset when exclude her!
- c. \*She got upset because did you exclude her?
- d. \*She will get upset, although don't exclude her!

The basic supposition is straightforward. Non-declaratives are main clause phenomena, which should not be allowed in subordinate clauses.

In his pioneering work on “performative subordinating clauses,” however, Lakoff (1984: (478-479)) contends that main clause phenomena including the imperative do occur in some adverbial subordinate clauses,

and that when they occur, they are restricted to those conveying statements. Compare:

(3)a. \*I'm staying because go home! (Lakoff (1984: 475))

b. \*I'm leaving because find out which girl pinched me.  
(Lakoff (1984: 476))

c. I'm staying because consider which girl pinched me.  
(Lakoff (1984: 476))

While each sentence in (3) contains a *because* occurring with an imperative construction, only (3c) is acceptable. Sentences (3a) and (3b) are ruled out, because, according to Lakoff, only speech act constructions that conventionally express statements felicitously occur in *because* clauses. That is, the imperative utterance *go home* in (3a) or *find out* in (3b) is interpreted as an order. In contrast, the imperative *consider which girl pinched me* in (3c) is functionally a statement, since the adverbial clause assumes that the addressee knows the answer to the question of “which girl pinched the speaker?”. Lakoff generalizes that imperatives felicitously occurring in *because* clauses are those conventionally expressing statements such as (3c) as opposed to ordinary imperatives such as (3a) and (3b) (cf. Lakoff (1984: 476)). More generally, he maintains that clauses expressing a reason or concession allow speech act constructions conveying statements (Lakoff (1984: 479)). Lakoff provides numerous examples in which subordinate clauses beginning with *although*, *except* and *since* allow such speech act constructions as inverted exclamations, tag and rhetorical questions. However, he does not offer any example of concessive clauses allowing the imperative.

The main aim of the present paper is to examine the validity of Lakoff's generalization as it applies to the imperative in concessive

adverbial clauses in naturally-occurring data. The paper argues the following points. First, reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative clauses they accept. Contra Lakoff's claim, concessive clauses with *although*, *though*, and *except (that)* allow imperative constructions conveying orders; imperative constructions do not need to convey statements to be permitted by concessive adverbials. Next, not all concessive clauses equally allow the imperative construction; *even though* does not as readily allow the imperative construction. Third, in conformity with Lakoff's prediction, the types of imperative constructions permitted by reason clauses are those in assertive (= rhetorical) usage. It is revealed that the verbs are restricted to the class of "cognition verbs" such as *consider*, *don't forget*, *remember*, and *bear in mind*, which must be used rhetorically. Fourth, *and*-conditional imperatives (or "pseudo-imperatives") are generally far less acceptable when they occur with reason clauses than their corresponding *if*-conditional constructions, which are normally considered close synonyms (cf. Fraser 1969).

Focusing on the first two findings, I present an analysis resorting to the notion of clausal integration as well as communicative functions of different concessive adverbials. Specifically, I put forward the following points. First, imperative constructions, both ordinary and rhetorical, are permitted by concessive adverbials (*al*)*though* and *except (that)*, because the latter provide a conceptually independent environment required by the former. Rhetorical imperatives are permitted by reason adverbials, because they are less independent than ordinary (=non-rhetorical) imperatives. Imperative constructions tend not to be permitted by *even though*, because of a serious clash in function. The former must WEAKEN the content of a main clause when they appear in concessive clauses, where the latter must EMPHASIZE it.

Section 2 briefly surveys previous research on this subject. Section 3 deals with imperative constructions in concessive adverbial clauses. Section 4 discusses imperative constructions including “pseudo-imperatives” (or *and/or*-conditional imperatives) in reason clauses. Section 5 proposes an analysis of two main findings made in sections 3 and 4.1.

## 2. Previous Research

The traditional view holds that the imperative construction should not normally occur in subordinate clauses both in English and other languages. In fact, most linguists have not paid much attention to the imperative in subordinate clauses. According to Foley and Van Valin (1984), for instance, “... the subordinate clause may not be independently specified for illocutionary force (Foley and Van Valin (1984: 249)),” hence the imperative *kiss me* does not occur with an adverbial clause:

(4) \*I'll scream because/after/if kiss me!

In a similar vein, Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 174) point out that “imperatives tend not to occur as dependent clauses,” hence there are no clear examples of a marker of imperativity functioning as a complementizer. Crosslinguistic research reveals that in languages with distinct imperative morphology, the imperative is excluded from dependent clauses.

It is widely believed that whereas coordinate clauses are independent speech acts, (adverbial) subordinate clauses normally lack illocutionary force (cf. Haiman and Thompson (1984), Lehmann (1988: 193), Cristofaro 2003, among others). This belief persists even in a most recent reference grammar book such as Huddleston and Pullum (2002), who hold that

imperatives are normally restricted to main clauses, so sentences like the following,

- (5) It's time we were going home, because don't forget we have to be up early in the morning.

are “of somewhat marginal grammaticality” (Huddleston and Pullum, 854).

Lakoff (1984) takes a significantly different perspective on this issue. He demonstrates that reason and concessive clauses do permit speech act constructions including inverted exclamations, WH-exclamations, rhetorical questions, Tags as well as imperatives, all of which are “constructions that are restricted in their use to expressing certain illocutionary forces that are specified as part of the grammar of English.” Lakoff's main claims directly relevant to the present paper can be summarized in the following three points. First, imperative constructions (and all the other speech act constructions) are permitted in reason (*because, since*) and concessive (*although, though, except*) clauses, but not other adverbial clauses (such as conditional and temporal). Second, reason and concessive clauses can be subsumed under a single class of “reason clauses,” in that “concessive clauses give reasons for the opposite of the main clause.” (cf. Lakoff (1984: 479)). That is, in “A although B”, B normally provides a reason for NOT A; to take an instance of *John stayed up although he was tired*, John's being tired would be a reason for not his staying up.

Third, not all reason and concessive clauses permit imperative constructions (and other speech act constructions); only those conveying statements permit them. He offers the following as a general principle:

- (6) Clauses expressing a reason allow speech act constructions that

convey statements, and the content of the statement equals the reason expressed. (Lakoff (1984: 479))

Consider (repeated here for convenience) (= (3a), (3b) and (3c), respectively):

- (7)a. \*I'm staying because go home!
- b. \*I'm leaving because find out which girl pinched me.
- c. I'm staying because consider which girl pinched me.

All these sentences contain an imperative clause beginning with *because*. While both (7a) and (7b) are ruled out, only (7c) is acceptable because this sentence conveys a statement.

This analysis is closely followed in a recent study, Verstraete (2005), who contends that “coordinate” *because* and *although* as well as *for* impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types (Verstraete (2005: 621)):

- (8) I only make US\$ 6000 in the whole year, and even like the next two years. I was just like getting by, because don't forget that our expenses are very high. (Verstraete's ex. 19)

The second sentence can be interpreted as communicating that “(I was just like getting by) because our expenses are very high,” which is functionally a statement. Just like Lakoff (1984), she claims that to permit the imperative construction, *for*, *because* and *although* clauses must convey assertive illocutionary force, since “the speech act in the secondary clause is invariably assertive,” whereas the speech act in the main clause has no inherent restrictions (cf. Verstraete (2005: 621-622)).

Lakoff offers a variety of (constructed) examples in which subordinate clauses beginning with *although* and *except* permit speech act constructions including inverted exclamations, Tags, and rhetorical questions. However, he does not provide any example of these concessive clauses allowing the imperative construction. I turn to the imperative in concessive clauses in the next section.

Before moving, Green (1976) merits some attention. To my knowledge, Green (1976) is among the few studies that have addressed the possibility of “pseudo-imperatives” (or *and*-conditional imperatives) appearing in subordinate clauses. According to Green, *and*-conditional imperatives are generally unacceptable in complement clauses, as the *a* and *b* sentences in (9) illustrate, but may become acceptable in “straight-forward” *because* clauses, as in (9c):

- (9)a. ??It seems that invite them once, and you're obligated to them forever.
- b. ??I realize that invite them once, and you're obligated to them forever.
- c. I won't even invite the Vandersnoots, because invite them once, and you're obligated to them forever.
- d. ?John's here, because look in the corner, and you'll see that's his umbrella.

She ascribed the poor acceptability of these pseudo-imperatives largely to morphological considerations. The unacceptable sentences violate the constraint that non-imperative clauses require overt subjects. “unembedded, they masquerade as imperatives; embedded, they can't, because imperatives as such cannot be embedded.” (Green (1976: 396)). Compare:

- (10)a. Cry and you cry alone, I realized.  
b. ??I realize (that) cry and you cry alone.

The *a* sentence is more acceptable even with a past tense than *b* with a present tense, she observes, because the subordinate clause looks like a main clause with its matrix clause postposed. We turn to this issue in section 4.2.

In this section, we have looked at the central claims made by Lakoff (1984), followed by Verstraete (2005). That is, speech-act constructions including the imperative are only permitted in reason and concessive clauses if they are functionally statements, i.e., in rhetorical use.

In section 3 below, I examine the validity of this generalization concerning concessive clauses allowing imperative constructions by looking at naturally-occurring examples.

### 3. Imperatives in Concessive Clauses

As we have observed above, according to Lakoff's (1984) analysis, imperative constructions permitted by concessive clauses should be those conveying statements or "assertive illocutionary force" (Verstraete (2005)). However, Mizuno (2004, 2005) presents counterexamples such as those in (11) and (12) below:

(11) My wife and I celebrated an anniversary last summer with dinner out, and one of the dishes that appeared before us was a dish of cool foie gras topped crunchy, chopped, sweet and salty almonds, topped in turn with half a peach. The fresh peach had been poached in chamomile tea and each gave a little of itself to the other (...) Now, with cold weather upon us, peaches and other fresh, locally grown stone fruit are out - **although**

*please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner*, if by some miracle, you come upon some decent peaches in your supermarket. (*The Washington Post*, January 16, 2002, Example from Mizuno 2005)

(12) The advantage that polymers have is that they can be ink-jet printed at close to room temperature, making them more suitable for mass production using flexible plastic. Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology has already shown a 17-inch XGA wide-polymer OLED display, **although** *don't expect to see one in your local store* — or on the sleeve of your shirt — for some time yet. (*The Age* (Melbourne), July 3, 2003, Example from Mizuno 2004)<sup>1</sup>

It is clear, as Mizuno observes, that the imperative *please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner* in (11) or *don't expect to see one in your local store* in (12) is construed as conveying an order rather than a statement, hence non-rhetorical in function.

In fact, it is not particularly hard to find similar examples. Observe:

(13) (...) We assume you have no intention of reporting your son, **although** if you are concerned about the children's welfare, *please reconsider*. (Dec 16, 2003, *Annie's Mailbox*, *Creators Syndicate*)

Here, the imperative verb (*please*) *reconsider* is politely suggesting an action on the part of the recipient of this letter, hence considered non-rhetorical in nature.

Other concessive adverbials such as *except (that)* and *though* also permit imperative constructions used non-rhetorically.<sup>2</sup> Such examples are typically found in written (notably, journalistic) discourse. This is

partly due to the tendency that *but*-constructions are predominant for the expression of concession in spoken language and the realization of concessive adverbials is relatively rare, although this does not mean of course that concessive adverbials do not occur in speech (cf. Barth 2000).<sup>3</sup>

Observe the use of *except* clauses permitting imperative constructions:

(14)a. CREATING confusion and unreasonable fears to defeat a bill is one of the oldest tactics in the Texas Legislature. But as the sponsor of HB 383, I feel compelled to shed some light on what the bill actually does. Current Texas law provides that parents have the right to use corporal punishment to reasonably discipline their children. What's wrong with that? Nothing — **except** if you are looking for that provision, *don't look in the Texas Family Code*. Look in the Texas Penal Code. You'll find that the corporal punishment provision is in the Penal Code as a defense to child abuse. As a defense to child abuse, that's what's offensive to most parents. HB 383 would simply move the provision to the Family Code. No more, no less. (February 25, 2005, *The Seattle Times*)

(14)b. He made two calls to his mother, concerned about the children. He wrote letters, setting up a cover story in which he claimed to have surprised an intruder in the house: two were to his brother-in-law, William Shand Kydd. Mrs Maxwell Scott posted them for him. Lucan then wrote a third to Michael Stoop, alluding to a “traumatic night of unbelievable circumstances”. It included the astonishing line, “I won't bore you, **except** when you come across my children *please tell them* that you knew me and all I care about is them.” The words have a goodbye ring. When Stoop received the letter he passed it on to the police, telling them he hadn't kept the envelope or noted the postmark.

(October 10, 2004, *SUNDAY TELEGRAPH*(LONDON))

(14)c. Then a spoken-word poet stood onstage and waved her arms around and riffed on the Con-stitution, the coun-try, coun-ter-revolutions — **except** in each of those c-words, *please insert the naughty c-word*. (The one we're not supposed to say in print.)

(April 26, 2004, *The Washington Post*)

(14)d. Johnson has always coached with that same sort of certitude. He worked at Washington from 1989-92 under the difficult regime of Lynn Nance, a period of dark times for the Huskies — **except** *don't tell Johnson that*. He's fiercely loyal to Nance and says he learned more from him than anybody except Mike Montgomery, his predecessor at Stanford.

(November 19, 2004, *The Seattle Times*)

The imperative *don't look in the Texas Family Code* in (14a), *please tell them that you knew me...* (14b) and *please insert the naughty c-word* in (14c) as well as the imperative *don't tell Johnson that* in (14d) seem to convey an order rather than a statement.

*Though* also readily permits the imperative construction, as demonstrated below:

(15)a. Pittsburgh had more fun in Coach Jamie Dixon's rookie season, **though** *don't blame its problems on a "sophomore jinx."* The competition in the Big East Conference, not superstition, has made things difficult for the Panthers, the second-year coach said. Pittsburgh has struggled again recently in Big East play after a strong stretch, but such is life in the nation's deepest conference. (February 25, 2005, *Los Angeles Times*)

(15)b. You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle, **though** if your house burns down, *please don't write in*. Cedar (available as oil, chips, blocks, balls and drawer liners) is a classic repellent. Moth eggs are killed by tumble drying and dry cleaning. (July 24, 2004, *The Guardian* (London))

(15)c. I am 23, my boyfriend is 34. He has a 10-year-old son, and we just moved back to his VERY small home town to get married and start a family. To root ourselves, so to speak. Well, here's the problem: I want his cousin instead. I took one look at this guy and I can't stop thinking about him! (...) This doesn't mean you should drop your boyfriend and chase after the cousin, or even drop your boyfriend and not chase after the cousin. (**Though** if you do drop your boyfriend, *please don't chase after the cousin*.) It just means you should tell your boyfriend you think you're in over your head. What you do from there is something you work on from there. (April 16, 2004, *The Washington Post*)

(15)d. Suicide was a perverse honor among the Nazis, as if it could confer martyrdom and expiate one's sins. Or maybe it was pure cowardice. Before Goering, as the Third Reich disintegrated, Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler had killed themselves. Hitler even offered the quick, ostensibly honorable exit to a respected opponent like Erwin Rommel. Of course, Stivers couldn't have seen this coming. He naively assumed Goering, with whom he bantered in English, was stable. In any event, unlike the other Nazi leaders who committed suicide, the Reichsmarschall was held accountable at trial. He simply hastened the punishment that was society's — in this case, the international community's — to administer. There is a reason death row inmates are often placed on suicide

watch, **though** *don't ask me to flesh out the logic.*

(February 23, 2005, *Los Angeles Times*)

(15)e. A WELCOME return to northerly winds will guarantee improved beach weather and water surface conditions. The swell is only small, averaging around 0.5m, initially from the east-southeast, but tending more east to northeast later. Winds will be light northwesterly early, ensuring the small waves will be clean. Nor'easters will kick in by mid-morning and become fresh during the afternoon. The northern ends of beaches will be the pick **though** *don't expect much power.*

(February 18, 2005, *The Daily Telegraph* (Sydney, Australia))

(15)f. "What does the panel think of Colin Cowdrey's feet?" came question No1. Chairman Freddie Grisewood: "Lady Violet Bonham Carter?"

Lady Violet: "I'm sorry but I am afraid I can't answer that as I have never heard of Mr Cowdrey and therefore don't know what feat he has achieved." And finally (**though**, *please, keep them coming*), Murray Walker to Bernie Ecclestone: "It's 17 years since you bought McLaren. You've had some good times and some bad times. What do you remember best?"

(November 20, 2004, *The Daily Telegraph* (LONDON))

(15)g. But where does one put such an enormous number of shoes, frocks and sweaters, jackets and jeans, coats and scarves? For, regardless of financial circumstances, we girls will always have more clothes than we know what to do with (**though** *please don't tell my husband*).

(October 30, 2004, *The Daily Telegraph* (LONDON))

(15)h. Airing diverse viewpoints is important, but not when these viewpoints are unfounded - or artificially inflated. Thomas Jefferson said:

“State a moral case to a plowman and a professor. The former will decide it as well and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.”

At the same time, while vote tallies might win elections, they matter little in intellectual discourse. We have no problems with, say, professors of finance, marketing or management — **though** *please don't ask* how someone who never solved any problems in these domains for any businesses, ever, gets such a title - presenting their views not just on economic and financial issues, but on the Middle East.

(June 6, 2004, *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec))

(15)i. Does Shakespeare really need this sort of help? Are we so incapable of engaging with this poetry that we have to have the equivalent of canned laughter to give us permission to emote? Can Dench not deliver these lines unaided? It implies less than full confidence in the power of the play and players that the audience should have their emotions hoicked around in this undignified manner. It's not just the RSC (**though** *please don't get me on to the women's "feisty" song*, accompanied by kitchen utensils, in the RSC's *Tamer Tamed*). There's an underlying problem: the world of sophisticated contemporary music seems barely to touch that of contemporary theatre.

(March 18, 2004, *The Guardian* (London))

Contra Verstraete's (2005) assumption, the imperative clauses in these *though* clauses are used non-rhetorically; they are not statements.

Next, let us compare *though* with *even though*. While *even though* is commonly treated as a mere emphatic form of *though* (cf. Quirk et al. (1985: 1099), Schourup and Waida (1988: 203), Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 736)), the above sequences containing a *though* clause become far

less acceptable if *even* is added. Some of them are illustrated:

(15)a'. Pittsburgh had more fun in Coach Jamie Dixon's rookie season, **?even though** *don't blame its problems on a "sophomore jinx."*

(15)b'. (...) You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle, **?even though** if your house burns down, *please don't write in.*

(15)d'. (...) He simply hastened the punishment that was society's — in this case, the international community's — to administer. There is a reason death row inmates are often placed on suicide watch, **?even though** *don't ask me to flesh out the logic.*

(15)e'. (...) Nor'easters will kick in by mid-morning and become fresh during the afternoon. The northern ends of beaches will be the pick **?even though** *don't expect much power.*

(15)g'. (...) But where does one put such an enormous number of shoes, frocks and sweaters, jackets and jeans, coats and scarves? For, regardless of financial circumstances, we girls will always have more clothes than we know what to do with (**?even though** *please don't tell my husband*).

(15)i'. (...) Can Dench not deliver these lines unaided? It implies less than full confidence in the power of the play and players that the audience should have their emotions hoicked around in this undignified manner. It's not just the RSC (**?even though** *please don't get me on to the women's*

“*feisty*” *song*, accompanied by kitchen utensils, in the RSC’s Tamer Tamed). There’s an underlying problem: the world of sophisticated contemporary music seems barely to touch that of contemporary theatre.

In stark contrast with other concessive adverbials *though*, *although*, and *except (that)*, *even though* generally disallows the imperative construction to occur.

So far, we have witnessed examples of concessive adverbials permitting ordinary (i.e. non-rhetorical) imperative constructions. It must be added that one can also find examples of concessive adverbials permitting imperative constructions expressing assertive force, as predicted by Lakoff’s analysis (1984). The following is one such example with *except that*:

(16) HDMI (High-Definition Multimedia Interface) is another way to get digital video from player to display, but it also carries digital audio. It has a smaller, neater plug. An adapter cable can feed a HDMI video signal to a DVI input and vice versa. HDCP (High Definition Compatible Digital) is a copy protection system. The details don’t matter much, **except that** *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP. If you’re buying a projector with a DVI input, make sure the brochure says “HDCP compliant”.

(October 20, 2004 *Herald Sun* (Melbourne, Australia))

In this example, the imperative *be aware* is used rhetorically, serving as a reminder. In other words, the whole adverbial clause is functionally a statement, since it can be paraphrased as “The details don’t matter much, except that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.”

Note that in the context of (16), *(al)though* can readily replace *except that*:

(16)a'. The details don't matter much, **(al)though** *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

However, *even though* cannot:

(16)b'. ?The details don't matter much, **even though** *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

The same contrast in acceptability can be discerned between *though* and *even though* in the following constructed example of rhetorical imperative with the form *don't forget*:

(17)a. You should ask Harry for help, *though* don't forget that he is busy.

(17)b. ?You should ask Harry for help, *even though* don't forget that he is busy.

One may generalize then that *even though* tends to disallow the imperative construction - both in ordinary (non-rhetorical) and rhetorical use.

Let me summarize the findings in this section. First, contra Lakoff (1984) as well as Verstraete (2005), concessive adverbial clauses permit not only rhetorical imperatives but also ordinary (=non-rhetorical) imperatives. Second, *even though* clauses tend to disallow both rhetorical and ordinary imperatives.

## 4. Imperatives in Reason Clauses

### 4.1 Imperatives in Reason Clauses

Lakoff (1984) offers one example of *because* permitting the imperative verb *consider* (example (3c) or (7c)). Verstraete (2005) provides an example of *because* with *don't forget* (ex. (5)). Similar examples can readily be found with the same verbs, as illustrated below:

(18)a. It will never end until we feel our powers, until we see how few and weak they are; (this was the merest wishfulness); and how strong they are, **for consider** what they have now, and in what sort of a country we are living. (*Winning karate competition*. Mitchell, David. London: A & C Black (Publishers) Ltd, 1991, pp. 10-108, BNC)

(18)b. Depressed people, whether they're police officers or men or women or kids, are at great risk for doing harm to themselves and others. And the more access they have to weapons, the more likely they are to translate that depression and sadness, and in this boy's case rage **because don't forget** that most boys are taught it's better to be mad than to be sad.  
(March 24, 2005, *Red Lake Indian Reservation News*)

In conformity with both Lakoff's and Verstraete's prediction, these reason clauses are making statements rather than conveying orders. (18b), for example, can be paraphrased as a *because* clause followed by a declarative: "And the more access they have to weapons, the more likely they are to translate that depression and sadness, and in this boy's case rage **because** most boys are taught it's better to be mad than to be sad."<sup>4</sup>

As examples below show, all the imperative verbs I found in reason

clauses in on-line corpuses are what might be termed as “cognition verbs” (cf. Declerck (1991: 168)). Included are *remember*, *bear in mind*, *never forget*, and *believe me*, as examples below illustrate:

(19)a. ... my only view is that, er, the reason is that, by the time it saw the light of day, **because** *remember*, the manuscript was in the, the manuscript was physically in the possession of the Bullitt family not the Freud family. (London School of Economics: lecture on the psychoanalytical study of society, Recorded on 21 January 1993, BNC)

(19)b. I don't know er why we're not more continually erm more on the case as far as our members of parliament are concerned **because** *remember* they're there for our benefit and front page of the Daily Mirror this morning. (James Whale Phone-in: radio broadcast (Leisure). Recorded on 30 October 1993, BNC)

(19)c. Well, no I'm trying to help you **because** *bear in mind* that if you are interviewed, that is a possible question. (Environmental Health Officers' conference: lecture. Recorded on [date unknown], BNC)

(19)d. We've heard the voice of the Party professionals, we've heard the voice of the Labour leadership, now let's all speak on behalf of the ordinary trade unionists and say with all the force that is necessary on behalf of those millions, men and women, young and old, we support the Party, we pay for the Party, we have a right to democracy in the Party **because** *never forget* it is our Party too, I move. (Trade Union Annual Congress (Business). Recorded on 7 June 1993, BNC)

(19)e. At this point I found myself wondering how anything so ugly could

be so beautiful **for** *believe me* that one cat had stirred a new urge in me, the excitement of catching something totally new.

(*Coarse Fisherman*. UK: Metrocrest Ltd, 1989, pp. ??, BNC)

(19)f. He says I come on too strong with these men, not sexually **because** *believe me*, I don't.

(*The Daily Mirror*. London: Mirror Group Newspapers, 1992, pp. ??, BNC)

(19)g. And er the reason we took the biggest jug we could find it wasn't so much to feed two children in the house you're parents also wanted a bowl **because** *believe me* in those times we were we were hungry, we were dear, very very hungry. (Nottingham Oral History Project: interview (Leisure). Recorded on [date unknown], BNC)

Note that all these examples convey statements and the imperative verb serves as a reminder. Some (or, in fact, many) of the imperative verbs above are parenthetically used, in particular, in (19a), (19b), (19f), and (19g). Lakoff's (1984) prediction is confirmed by naturally occurring data as far as reason adverbials are concerned. That is, reason clauses permitting imperative constructions are those conveying statements (or assertive illocutionary force). In addition, the verb type is restricted to "cognition verbs" in rhetorical use, exemplified by *consider* and *don't forget* as well as *remember*, *bear in mind*, *never forget*, and *believe me*.

#### 4.2 "Pseudo-Imperatives" in Reason Clauses

Above, we have observed that imperative verbs beginning with reason clauses are normally cognition verbs used as reminders. Does this mean that other (or "non-cognition") verbs never appear with reason clauses? Green (1976) offers one example of "pseudo-imperative" permitting *invite*,

a “non-cognition” verb to appear:

(20) (= (9c))

I won't even invite the Vandersnoots, because invite them once, and you're obligated to them forever.

Contra Green, however, the several speakers of English I consulted find this sentence only marginally acceptable.

To what extent are *and*-conditional imperatives permissible in *because* clauses with non-cognition verbs? To answer this question, I asked a total of eleven native speakers of English (ten North American and one British) to rate the degree of naturalness of ten different example sentences below in (21) and (22), on a scale of 1 (very unnatural), 2 (somewhat natural), and 3 (very natural).<sup>5</sup> As previous studies reveal (cf. Clark (1993), Takahashi (1994; 2004)), *and*-conditional imperatives are potentially ambiguous at least between positive vs. negative/neutral readings. By positive readings, I mean the case of *and*-conditional imperatives whose propositional content the speaker considers desirable, hence wanting it to happen. By negative or neutral readings, I mean the case in which the speaker considers the proposition undesirable, not wanting it to happen, or simply does not care at all whether it will happen. In an attempt to find differences (if any) in degrees of acceptability between these interpretations, I divide up test sentences into two groups: Group A (with positive readings) and Group B (with negative/neutral readings):

(21) Group A: *and*-conditional imperatives (positive readings preferred)

(a) You should include Nancy, because invite her, and she will be pleased.

- (b) You'd better hurry, because go now, and you'll be in time for the bus.
  - (c) You should contribute a few dollars, because give them something, and they'll be happy.
  - (d) He appealed to the Fox students to become leaders and fight for these people, because lead and have a vision, and people will follow.
  - (e) My big recommendation is to go to class, because do that, and you will notice themes he discusses and understand the subject.
- (22) Group B: *and*-conditional imperatives (negative or neutral readings preferred)
- (a) Don't ask him about his business deals, because bring them up, and he quickly changes the subject.
  - (b) You should not say anything, because tell the truth, and who'll believe you?
  - (c) You should not see her now, because feel slightly off-color, and she thinks you're dying.
  - (d) You mustn't commit suicide, because do that, and you won't have any chance of repenting it.
  - (e) I want to stress this point, because let that absurdity distract you, and you'll miss the important stuff.

The results of this acceptability test can be summarized as follows. First, the acceptability of these *and*-conditional imperatives is generally low - both in (21) and (22). The average score of Group A sentences is 1.76 and that of Group B is 1.54; the highest score is 2.2 point of sentence (22e), which is still not fully acceptable; 5 (out of 10) informants found it very natural. Second, there is no significant difference in acceptability between the two groups, although Group A (with positive readings) is only subtly more acceptable than Group B (with negative/neutral). Infor-

ments unanimously report that most of these sentences becomes far more acceptable if the imperative construction were converted into its corresponding explicit “If you (then)” construction.

I conducted the same test with other reason adverbials, *for* and *since*. I found that the sentences in both (21) and (22) become more unacceptable if *because* is replaced by *for* or *since*. The average score of Group A with *for* is 1.53 and that of Group B is 1.38. The average score of Group A with *since* is 1.20 and that of Group B is 1.06.

In conclusion, *and*-conditional imperatives are generally low in acceptability when they occur in reason clauses, and they are slightly better with *because* clauses than with *for* or *since* clauses.

In section 5 below, I attempt to explain the different restrictions over the use of imperative constructions between reason vs. concessive clauses, on the one hand, and between *though* and *even though*, on the other. Specifically, I propose an analysis resorting to the notion of varying degrees of conceptual independence of an adverbial clause from its associated main clause as well as different communicative functions of different concessive adverbials.

## 5. Analysis

The table below summarizes the main findings made in sections 3 and 4.1.

**Table 1** Distributions of clause types vs. reason/concessive adverbials

	plain declarative	rhetorical imperative	ordinary imperative
because	O	O	?
(al) though	O	O	O
except (that)	O	O	O
even though	O	?	?

First, as the table reveals, concessive adverbial clauses with (*al*)*though* and *except (that)* allow both rhetorical and ordinary imperatives, quite unlike reason (i.e. *because*) clauses allowing only rhetorical (not ordinary) imperatives. In 5.1, I suggest that this is due to the matter of conceptual compatibility between two constructions. Ordinary imperatives demand a more independent linguistic environment (than rhetorical imperatives), on the one hand, whereas concessive adverbial clauses are in general loosely integrated into a main clause, on the other.

Second, *even though* clauses tend to disallow imperative constructions, either rhetorical or ordinary, quite unlike other concessive clauses with *though*, *although*, and *except that*. In 5.2, I argue that this is because of a serious mismatch in function between *even though* and the imperative construction. That is, the imperative in concessive adverbial clauses must WEAKEN (or ‘rectify’) the content of the main clause, whereas *even though* must EMPHASIZE it.

### 5.1 Why do concessive adverbial clauses allow imperative constructions both in rhetorical and ordinary use?

Let us begin our discussions by taking a look at adverbials of concession within a broader perspective of clause combining. Classical studies of complex sentence structure assumed a clear-cut divide between coordination and subordination. According to this traditional division, coordinate clause structure is an independent structure, whereas subordinate clause structure is dependent. However, closely examining both Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages as well as spoken date, later studies found that clause linkage types should not be viewed as a binary opposition but rather forming a continuum (cf. Matthiessen and Thompson 1988, Lehmann 1988, Langacker 1991, Hopper and Thompson 1993, Ohori 2000, Diessel 2001, among others). Hopper and Thompson (1993), for example,

characterized the coordination/subordination continuum in terms of a “cline of clause combining,” with each clause combining structure elaborated by specification of the features  $\pm$ dependent,  $\pm$ embedded. Figure 1 is the illustration (based on Hopper and Thompson, 170):

Parataxis	>	hypotaxis	>	subordination
–dependent		+dependent		+dependent
–embedded		–embedded		+embedded

Figure 1 Hopper and Thompson’s “cline of clause combining”

According to Hopper and Thompson, the adverbial clause classifies as a case of hypotaxis, in which the relevant clause is “relatively independent” but not wholly included within any constituent of the nucleus (=main clause). Critically relevant here is Hopper and Thompson’s observation that adverbial clauses themselves show a continuum of looser-to-tighter integration, a continuum that correlates with their function (Hopper and Thompson (1993: 176)). To put it differently, some (adverbial) subordinate clauses can be more symmetric than asymmetric (cf. Verstraete 2005). In this regard, König’s (1994) following observation is particularly instructive. That is, the class of concessive adverbial clauses, which cannot be focused (*\*only although/\*It was although it was raining that Fred went for out a walk*), are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other types of adverbial clauses (1994: 678).

I would like to argue that only concessive adverbial clauses allow imperative constructions in ordinary as well as rhetorical use, because ordinary imperatives require a more independent linguistic environment than rhetorical imperatives, on the one hand, whereas concessive adverbials are capable of offering a more independent environment than reason adverbials such as *because*, on the other.

First, that ordinary imperatives are more independent than rhetorical imperatives may appear somewhat hard to prove. However, the following fact serves as direct evidence. That is, ordinary imperatives cannot be deleted when they appear with concessive adverbials:

- (23)a. We assume you have no intention of reporting your son, although if you are concerned about the children's welfare, *please reconsider*.  
(=(13)<ordinary imperative>)
- ≠(23)b. \*We assume you have no intention of reporting your son, although if you are concerned about the children's welfare  $\phi$ .

In contrast, rhetorical imperatives in many cases can be deleted without seriously affecting the grammaticality or interpretation of the entire sequence:

- (24)a. You should ask Harry for help, though *don't forget* that he is busy.  
(=(17a)<rhetorical imperative>)
- ≡(24)b. You should ask Harry for help, though  $\phi$  he is busy.
- (25)a. The details don't matter much, except that *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.  
(=(16)<rhetorical imperative>)
- ≡(25)b. The details don't matter much, except that  $\phi$  all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

Next, numerous studies suggest that concessive adverbial clauses are more independent of, and less integrated into, a main clause than other (such as reason) adverbial clauses (cf. Rutherford (1970), König (1988, 1994, 2000), among others). First of all, concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a polar interrogative (cf. König (1994: 679)):

- (26)a. Was he harassed because he was a journalist?  
(26)b. Was he harassed although he was a journalist?

Unlike (26a) with *because*, the content of the *although* clause in (26b) cannot be questioned.

Second, concessive clauses tend to take maximal scope and are therefore not easily interpreted within the scope of a negative operator, as clearly observed in the following pair (König (1988: 149)):

- (27)a. This house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.  
(27)b. This house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-conditioning. (König's ex. (10))

Similarly, sentence (28b) below with *although* does not normally make sense, because, unlike the *because* clause as in (28a), a concessive clause normally cannot be within the scope of negation:

- (28)a. She didn't marry him because he was rich.  
(28)b. ?She didn't marry him although he was poor.

Third, concessive clauses prefer a longer pause in cases like (29) below:

- (29)a. Her not coming to class because she's sick hardly surprises anyone.  
(29)b. Her coming to class(,)although she's sick(,) surprises everyone.

Sentence (29b) with an *although* clause requires a comma intonation, which is not necessarily the case in (29a) with *because*.

In summary, we can explain the felicitous appearance of ordinary (= non-rhetorical) imperatives in concessive adverbial clauses in terms of the latter's looser integration into, hence, semantic independence from, a main clause required by the former.

## 5.2 Why do *even though* clauses tend to disallow imperative constructions?

One general reason for this tendency resides in the fact that imperative constructions (or non-declaratives as a whole) are conceptual independent, whereas *even though* clauses are conceptual dependent than other concessive clauses. See below:

- (30)a. Your asking Harry for help (al)though he is busy (surprises everyone).
- b. \*Your asking Harry for help (al)though don't forget that he is busy (surprises everyone).
- c. \*We girls' having more clothes than we need (al)though don't tell my husband (hardly surprises anyone).

Quite unlike the declarative *he is busy* as in (30a), an imperative clause cannot occur within factual nominals, as illustrated by the ungrammaticality of both (30b) (rhetorical use) and (30c) (non-rhetorical use).

Conversely, *even though* can be characterized in terms of conceptual dependence. In fact, unlike other concessive adverbials, *even though* can readily be within the scope of question:

- (31) Shall we go for a walk even though it does look like rain?

According to Huddleston and Pullum, the matrix in this example has

interrogative force, suggesting that we should go for a walk, and this construction disallows *though* and *although* (2002: 736). Moreover, *even though* can be interpreted within a negative operator in the following construction, in which the *even though* clause acts as a subject nominal:

(32) Even though Arthur is a student does not entail Arthur is not a bank manager. (BNC, FAC 1780).

In this regard, *even though* is similar in function to *just because*, which also constitutes this subject nominal:

(33) Just because Arthur is a student does not entail Arthur is not a bank manager.

Note that *although* cannot be used in this construction (cf. Hirose 1991):

(34) \*Although Arthur is a student does not entail Arthur is not a bank manager.

It seems evident that *even though* clauses are a great deal more integrated into a main clause than other concessive adverbial clauses.

However, this analysis resorting to conceptual integration alone is insufficient. It does not explain why *even though*, as opposed to *because*, tends to disallow imperative constructions, both rhetorical and non-rhetorical. As we have already observed, *because* permits rhetorical (though not ordinary) imperatives. To solve the mystery of incompatibility between the imperative and *even though*, we need to delve into the semantic subtype(s) of concessive relation of adverbial clauses (excluding *even though*) allowing the imperative construction. Previous studies on

concession have proposed several different semantic subtypes. Some adopt a two-level approach: “direct-rejection concessive” vs. “indirect-rejection concessive” (Azar 1997); and “direct concession” vs. “indirect concession” (Izutsu, in preparation). Others employ a three-level approach: “content,” “epistemic,” and “speech-act” (Sweetser 1990); and “standard,” “rhetorical,” or “rectifying” (König 1988, 1994). There are also studies applying a four-level approach: “content,” “epistemic,” “illocutionary level (=speech-act),” as well as “text level” (Crevels 2000). According to Crevels (2000), for instance, the content-level use of concession is more tightly integrated into a main clause, while in contrast the illocutionary and the text-level uses are more loosely integrated and are sometimes expressed by asyndetic (=symmetric) means in some languages.<sup>6</sup>

Despite all the impressive research, one serious problem arises if one attempts to characterize the imperative in concessive adverbial clauses. Previous studies have based their classifications exclusively on cases where the concessive clause is occupied by a declarative; literally no study has analyzed cases where the concessive clause is occupied by a non-declarative. As a result, it is far from clear whether any of the proposed subtypes of concession truly captures the functional subtype of concessive clauses occupied by an imperative. Nevertheless, I suggest that the notion of “rectifying concession” in the sense of König (1994) is helpful in an account of why the imperative construction tends to be unacceptable in *even though* clauses.

According to König (1994: 681), the “rectifying concessive clause” can be characterized in terms of three features. Most importantly, whereas in the standard usage the content of the main clause is emphasized and made remarkable, the content of the main clause is WEAKENED whenever a rectifying concessive clause follows, as demonstrated below.

- (35) Yes, it has come at last, the summons I know you have longed for. I, too, *though* it has come in a way I cannot welcome.

(Example from König (1994))

In this rectifying concession, the *though* clause serves to weaken, as opposed to emphasize, the content of the main clause *I (have longed for the summons) too*. König (*ibid.*) observes that this use can be found in many European languages, being marked by *although* and *though* in English and invariably by *encore que* in French. Second, rectifying concessive clauses always follow, but do not precede, the main clause. Third, related to the first two features, rectifying clauses are more loosely linked to a main clause (than standard uses) and typically exhibit main clause word order in languages like German, where main and subordinate clauses are distinguished on the basis of word order.

Of crucial importance is König's remark that certain adverbial conjunctions including *even though* are not used in a rectifying function. My claim is that *even though* tends to disallow the imperative, whether rhetorical or non-rhetorical, because imperative constructions in concessive adverbial clauses are used solely to WEAKEN the content of a main clause, while *even though* is used solely to EMPHASIZE the content of a main clause, hence there is a mismatch in function. A careful observation reveals that the imperative construction never highlights, but rather undermines, the assertion of the main clause when it appears with a concessive adverbial. Let us look at some of the previous examples with concessive adverbials followed by ordinary (non-rhetorical) imperatives:

- (36) (= (15b))

You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them

down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle, **though** if your house burns down, *please don't write in*. Cedar (available as oil, chips, blocks, balls and drawer liners) is a classic repellent. Moth eggs are killed by tumble drying and dry cleaning.

(37) (= (14d))

Johnson has always coached with that same sort of certitude. He worked at Washington from 1989-92 under the difficult regime of Lynn Nance, a period of dark times for the Huskies — **except** *don't tell Johnson that*. He's fiercely loyal to Nance and says he learned more from him than anybody except Mike Montgomery, his predecessor at Stanford.

In (36), it is clear that the concessive clause *though if your house burns down, please don't write in please don't write in* weakens the author's assertion *I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle*. To see this, compare:

(36') You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle  $\phi$ . Cedar (available as oil, chips, blocks, balls and drawer liners) is a classic repellent. Moth eggs are killed by tumble drying and dry cleaning.

In this version without the *though* clause, the assertion "I prefer an actual flame in the form of candle" becomes stronger and more straightforward.

Similarly, the *except* clause in (37) weakens (part of) the assertion of its matrix clause. The immediately-following discourse coheres more directly with the directive speech act of this concessive clause. It pro-

vides reasons why one should not tell Johnson that Lynn Nance is responsible for the “difficult regime” and 1989-92 was a period of dark times for the Huskies.

About the same thing can be said concerning rhetorical imperatives appearing with concessive adverbials:

(38) (= (17a))

You should ask Harry for help, though *don't forget* that he is busy.

(39) (= (16))

The details don't matter much, except that *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

In (38), the *though* clause makes the suggestion of the main clause less emphatic; without it, the entire message would be far stronger and more clear-cut: “You should ask Harry for help  $\phi$ .” Similarly in (39), the *except that* clause makes the statement of its main clause far less definite than a simpler construction such as “The details don't matter much  $\phi$  .”

Next, let us look at *even though*. As previous research reveals (cf. Crevels (2000)), *even though* can be used for more than one function—not only for “content” or “direct-concession” use or but also for “epistemic” and even “speech-act” or “indirect concession” use. However, in whatever use, *even though* clauses invariably underscore the content of a main clause. Below are typical examples of *even though*:

(40)a. It's a great feeling when a wild animal shows you affection, but even though she was born in captivity she'll always be a wild creature with the instincts of a killer. (BNC, JYE 2973)

(40)b. It gave her the confidence to go out alone, even though walking was still difficult. (BNC, ASO 1048)

- (40)c. If your child finds reading difficult, don't provide books aimed at younger children because he may be bored by them even though he can understand them. (BNC, CB8 3057)
- (40)d. The effort of concealing her love was almost impossible even though it was imperative. (BNC, FS1 2480)
- (40)e. There's still something about railways even though they're not steaming. (BNC, KBK 4622)

To take an instance of (40a), the subordinate clause *even though she was born in captivity* serves to highlight, by way of contrast, the content of its associated main clause *she'll always be a wild creature with the instincts of a killer*. See that the assertion of this main clause will be diminished if this concessive clause is deleted:

- (40)a'. It's a great feeling when a wild animal shows you affection, but  $\phi$  she'll always be a wild creature with the instincts of a killer.

Similarly in (40c), the *even though* clause strengthens the author's message that (one should not give one's child books aimed at younger children because) he may be bored. Compare the following sequence without this *even though* clause:

- (40)c'. If your child finds reading difficult, don't provide books aimed at younger children because he may be bored by them  $\phi$ .

Likewise in (40d), the assertion of the main clause, the impossibility of concealing her love, is made remarkable by being contrasted via *even though* to the imperativeness of concealing it.

The same tendency can be seen in less standard usages as well:

(41) Even though this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater.

(Borkin's (1980: 50ff) example, cited in König (1988: 148))

(42) Even though it's none of my business, I think your behavior is a disgrace.

According to König (1988: 148), the *even though* clause of (41) does not express any factual conflict, so this use might classify as “dissonance of a rhetorical nature.” The fact remains, however, that the *even though* clause is used to emphasize the content of its associated main clause. According to Sweetser (1990) and Crevels (2000), (42) classifies as a speech-act use of concession. Again, the sole purpose of *even though* here is to make remarkable the content of the main clause (*I think*) *your behavior is a disgrace*. Compare (43) below, in which with the *although* version the assertion of the main clause is not so emphasized as in (42) above:

(43) Although it's none of my business, I think your behavior is a disgrace.

If the above analyses are correct, it is due to a serious mismatch in function that *even though* tends to disallow the imperative construction. *Even though* must EMPHASIZE the content of the main clause, whereas imperative constructions, both ordinary and rhetorical, must WEAKEN it whenever they appear with concessive adverbials.

In summary, ordinary as well as rhetorical imperatives are permitted by concessive adverbials because the latter are loosely integrated into a main clause. Imperative constructions tend to be disallowed by *even though*, mainly because the former is used to weaken the content of a main clause, while in contrast the latter is used to emphasize it.

What we have here is just another case of compatibility between constructions (cf. Takahashi 2004: chapters 3 and 4). The imperative normally does not occur with an adverbial clause, because the two constructions are incompatible with each other in their prototypical function, in that the former is a main clause phenomenon requiring a conceptually independent linguistic environment whereas the latter is typically dependent in conception. However, the two constructions may merge, provided that either the imperative or the adverbial clause (or both) departs from its ordinary use/function. The imperative deviates from its standard use and becomes less independent when it is used rhetorically and/or more parenthetically. Concessive adverbials except *even though* are also deviate from other adverbials and are more independent, in that they are loosely integrated into a main clause.<sup>7</sup>

## 6. Conclusion

Lakoff (1984) once proposed the view that clauses expressing a reason or concession allow speech act constructions conveying statements. This analysis is followed in Verstraete (2005), who assumes that imperative constructions permitted by reason and concessive adverbial clauses are restricted to those expressing assertive illocutionary force (or rhetorical imperatives).

The present paper examined the validity of Lakoff's generalization as it applies to imperative constructions in concessive adverbial clauses in naturally-occurring data. I have argued the following points. First, contra Lakoff (1984) and Verstrate (2005), reason and concessive clauses differ sharply in the kinds of imperative constructions they permit. Concessive clauses with *though*, *although*, and *except (that)* allow imperative constructions conveying ordinary (directive) force as well as assertive

(rhetorical) force. Second, quite unlike other concessive clauses, *even though* tends to disallow the imperative construction. I have offered an explanation resorting to varying degrees of clausal integration as well as different communicative functions of different concessive adverbials. Imperative constructions, both non-rhetorical and rhetorical, are permitted by concessive adverbials except *even though*, because the latter provide an independent environment required by the former. Imperative constructions in rhetorical usage are permitted by reason adverbials, because they are more integrated into a main clause than non-rhetorical (=ordinary) imperatives. Imperative constructions tend to be disallowed by *even though*, mainly because the former must weaken the content of a main clause, whereas the latter must emphasize it.<sup>8</sup>

It is hoped that the present work will contribute to the studies of intricate interactions between imperative constructions and adverbial subordinators in English and other languages.

## Footnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Accord to Mizuno (2005), the imperative construction may occur even with preposed *although* as well, but the occurrence is limited:

(i) Although please don't go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

(ii) ? Although never go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

Thus, sentence (i) is perfectly acceptable. (ii) is unacceptable presumably due to the presence of emphatic negative operator *never*.

<sup>2</sup> Matthiessen and Thompson (1988: 277), for example, explicitly classify *except that*

as an instance of concessive connective along with *although* and *even though*. In their framework, concessive is one of seven distinct “circumstantial relations”; other six relations include temporal, conditional, reason, purpose, means, and manner. In some other works, the treatment of *except (that)* is not so clear-cut. Thus, Quirk et al. (1985: 645) do not label it as a concessive adverbial but as a conditional instead, explaining that “*Except* is used without *that* in the sense ‘unless.’” (*ibid.* 999, note)

<sup>3</sup> Barth (2000) enumerates three reasons for the predominance of coordinate constructions over *although*-constructions for the expression of concession in spoken language. They include on-line production, room to manoeuvre (saving the speaker’s face), and politeness (saving the interlocutor’s face) (cf. Barth (2000: 418-420)). However, Barth distinguishes four distinct discourse functions of *although*-constructions when they (rarely) occur in spoken English. That is, they are used to restrict previous claims, introduce additional information, forestall possible objections, or summarize the previous exchange of arguments (Barth, 420-432).

<sup>4</sup> Based on the binary distinction between causal and inferential uses of *because* (cf. Hirose (1991)), Kanatani (2005: 23) claims that only the “inferential,” as opposed to “causal,” *because* clauses permit main clause phenomena such as (i):

(i) I’m leaving, because here comes my bus. (Lakoff (1987: 473)

(Kanatani’s ex. 13a)

Kanatani assumes that an adverbial clause is allowed to perform an illocutionary act separated from its main clause only in “inferential” constructions.

However, the facts do not seem so straightforward. For one thing, it is far from clear whether a sentence like (i) above unambiguously classifies as an “inferential” construction. Kanatani (2005: 23-24) treats (ii)a as an instance of causal *because*, and (ii)b as inferential:

(ii) a. The ground is wet because it has rained. (Kanatani’s ex. 4a)

<Causal use> In  $S_2$  because  $S_1$ ,  $S_1$  is a cause of  $P_2$

(ii) b. It has rained, because the ground is wet. (Kanatani’s ex. 10a)

<Inferential use> In  $S_2$ , because  $S_1$ ,  $P_1$  is a premise from which to draw the conclusion that  $P_2$

If one closely follows this criterion, sentence (i) above might as well be analyzed as causal, rather than inferential, use of *because*, in that the bus’s coming can be interpreted as a direct cause of my leaving. In fact, many of my own examples of *because* permitting imperatives classify as causal rather than inferential. For instance, consider (19d):

(iii) (=19d)

(...) we support the Party, we pay for the Party, we have a right to democracy in the Party **because** *never forget* it is our Party too, I move.

(19d) can be better analyzed in terms of causal *because*, in that  $S_1$  (*(never forget) it is our Party too*) is a cause of  $S_2$  (we support the Party, we pay for the Party, we have a right to democracy in the Party). Not much inference seems involved in this sequence.

<sup>5</sup> I gave the following instructions to the subjects of this survey:

### Instructions

*If*-conditional constructions such as (A) and corresponding pseudo-imperatives such as (B) are normally assumed to be perfect synonyms:

(A) If you invite the Williams once, you're obligated to them forever.

=(B) Invite the Williams once and you're obligated to them forever.

In this test, you are asked to judge the naturalness of each sentence below containing a pseudo-imperative by circling a number on a scale of 1-3. A 'natural' sentence is one that you can easily imagine yourself or other native speakers of English saying in a particular situation. Please judge only the naturalness of the sentence. For example, if you think 'Don't ask him about his business deals, because bring them up, and he quickly changes the subject.' is a very natural sentence, circle 3. If you think this sentence is somewhat natural (which means you find it slightly odd but not totally unnatural), you should circle 2. If you think this is a very unnatural sentence, circle 1, and so on.

Very unnatural	somewhat natural	very natural
1	2	3

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<sup>6</sup> Several different labels have been employed to denote the semantic relation expressed by adverbials of concession: "concessive" (Quirk et al. 1985), "contrastive/adversative" (Halliday and Hassan 1976), "opposition" or "conflict/clash" (Sweetser 1990). See Izutsu (in preparation) for a useful summary and discussion.

<sup>7</sup> The non-prototypicality of concessive conjuncts as adverbial subordinators is evident from findings made by previous research. Diachronically, concessive adverbial clauses develop relatively late, and developmentally, they are acquired

later than other types of adverbial clauses (cf. König (1994: 679), Diessel (2004)). As for the acquisition of English adverbials, the first conjunction that researchers found in spontaneous speech of young children is *and*, followed by *because*, *so*, *but*, and *when*, and conditional *if*-clauses; coordinate *or*-clauses, and temporal clauses marked by *while*, *since*, *after*, and *before* generally appear later. In contrast, *although* clauses do not occur at all in any of the corpora that have been examined. See Diessel (2004: 151) for a useful summary of previous studies on this subject.

- <sup>8</sup> It is worth mentioning here that what we are discussing here is varying degrees of conceptual integration of different adverbial clauses into a main clause, as opposed to the possibility of syntactically independent occurrence. Almost all the adverbial clauses including conditionals can occur independently as in “*If* you can sign up here. Thank you.”

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