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The Moral Theory and the Theory of Real Man in Thomas Aquinas

Toshiya OZAWA

The ethics of Thomas Aquinas has these three elements. Happiness theory, Natural law theory, and Virtue theory. Which is the nuclear in his ethics? This paper thinks it is Virtue theory. Concerning Happiness theory, human goodness lies in happiness (end), and anything short of God as the ultimate end cannot satisfy human being completely. Were it really so, we could not act morally in our life. We cannot achieve the vision of God. The inclination and acts to good ends depend on the virtues that lead us to act rightly. Therefore Virtue theory is more essential than Happiness theory. Concerning Natural law theory, since all moral acts are ruled by moral rules which are derived from it, the morality lies in it. But only Natural law cannot create any acts, and the virtues acquired in the society can lead us to put natural law into practice. Therefore Virtue theory is more important than Natural law theory. As for Aquinas, as the knowledge of others and love to others is indispensable to the self-knowledge and self-love, men can act well in society according to following other people's behaviors. The morality lies in the process in which one actually forms the self by virtues.

The Justice of Soul and the Justice of Action :  
Two Conceptions of Justice in the *Republic*

Tsutomu NAKAZAWA

In this paper I examine David Sachs' critical interpretation of the arguments in Plato's *Republic*. Sachs contends that Plato commits the "fallacy of irrelevance" because he never confirms the connection between his own conception of Justice (Justice (P)) and the vulgar notion of Justice (Justice (V)). I examine the interpretations of R. Demos, R. H. Weingartner, R. Karut, and G. Vlastos, and maintain that Sachs' problem can be resolved by taking account of the function of the rational part of the soul and its relation to the other parts of the soul. I conclude that despite the criticism of Sachs, Plato does fairly give answer to the question of Socrates' interlocutors.

## Reason-Freedom-Virtue in Spinoza's Ethics

Takehide KASHIWABA

From earlier period of his philosophical writing, Spinoza argues *ratio* in terms of certain collective activity. This aspect of his philosophy seemingly remains the same in his masterpiece *Ethica*. Garber, however, points out that the collective character of *ratio* includes a kind of paradox, which the relationship between propositions concerning 'the dictate of reason' in part 4 in *Ethica* and Spinoza's definition of *homo liber* constitutes.

This paper aims to refute Garber's artful construal by showing Spinoza's normative ethical standpoint as a virtue ethics' one. Considering the essential connection, which is formed by *ratio*, *libertas* and *virtus*, a thesis in *Ethica* that a rational virtuous man is necessarily a social being will be demonstrated.

## La mémoire et l'oubli

— Bergson et Ricœur —

Shigeo OHKODA

La thèse centrale de *Matière et mémoire* de Bergson est que les images du passé ne sont pas conservées dans la trace cortical, le cerveau étant organe d'action non de représentation. Il insiste sur la survivance des images du passé indépendantes de la matière. Ricœur profite de cette solution bergsonienne de l'enigme de la mémoire, c'est-à-dire, celle de la présence de l'absence pour exprimer le caractère ambigu de l'oubli qui a rapport avec le pardon. Alors que la philosophie de Bergson était la pensée pour libérer les hommes du déterminisme, Ricœur l'interprète comme la pensée du pardon, c'est-à-dire, celle pour les libérer du passé irréversible.

## Anatomy of Sex and Love

Takuji SATOH

The ideology of romantic love often unites the purpose of sex and love within marriage. It gives us the illusion that sex and love have same structure, and that they aim marriage

likewise. The romantic ideology of the trustworthiness of the feelings of exclusively and constancy creates expectations that a marriage grounded in romantic love, good sexuality and succeeded procreation will be satisfying. But we are confronted by hard reality, the attenuation or death of sexual passion between the spouses. This is why, perhaps, we should not place emphasis on exclusivity of sexuality and love. Marriage need not be for sex (as in St.Paul), nor for procreation (as in Aquinas), nor for love (as in courtly love). In this paper, I point out a disparity among them, and examine the uniqueness and irreplaceability of our beloveds or particular objects we desire under suspicion of romantic ideology.

### Williams on Integrity and Moral Agency

Takahiro TSUZUKI

In this paper, I try to reappraise and defend Williams's well-known 'integrity objection' against utilitarianism. According to Williams, utilitarianism is not compatible with, (a) deep identification with any project, (b) display of integrity through deliberation, and (c) the idea that each of us is specially responsible for what he or she does. So if we recognize a value of integrity and related mentality, we have good reason not to be utilitarian. Many writers point to the weakness of this charge. They say that Williams defends unjustifiable kind of partiality, or that his argument attacks not only negative but also positive responsibility, or that sophisticated utilitarianism does not require utilitarian decision procedure so that it avoids this charge. I argue that the first two responses misunderstand Williams's claim, and that the third one fails, because utilitarian kind of reflection (not decision procedure) still prevents the deep identification with any project.

### Living with the Sick and the Disabled : Toward Deconstruction of Myth of Self-reliance

Yuichi MURAKAMI

Medical professionals must be able to find meaning in the life of the sick and the disabled. How can they do it? The starting point should be that they almost don't seriously believe the Sanctity of Life. For dependence, in the sense of "a burden" to others, seems to be feared by many individuals more than death. They, however, don't seriously seek independence. They only forget and fear our dependence to others. We should acknowledge that

we all, including the sick and the disabled, are in the interdependent social system. To find meaning in the life of the sick and the disabled, we must know ourselves no less than the sick and the disabled because we are ourselves the excluding system.

### A Critique of Virtue Theory in Ethics

Keiichi TAMURA

The revival of virtue ethics is a great event in 20th century philosophy. Virtue theory in ethics is required to provide a specification of morally right action when it is meant as a normative theory. Rosalind Hursthouse, for instance, tries to formulate normative virtue ethics. According to her, virtue theory is a good rival to deontology and utilitarianism. The aim of this paper is to criticize the attempt at normative theorizing of virtue ethics. Normative virtue ethics, pace Hursthouse, misses the point of normative theorizing. Normative virtue ethicists do not grasp that virtues are character traits whose point is to lighten our load in the decision-making process.

### Foucault and Williams : As the Critics of Modern Moral Philosophy

Koichiro MIYANO

I shall think of Foucault as the critic to the modern moral philosophy as well as Bernard Williams. For that purpose, I consider the common features and the differences concerning their distinction between “morality” and “ethics”. By interpreting Foucault’s arguments on the “normalizing power” as the critical analysis to the “modern moral system”, it becomes clear that they share critical interest for that system. In addition, I examine how they have accepted Nietzsche’s genealogy. Then, I take up the criticism to Foucault and the agreement to Williams by Charles Taylor. Through these examinations, I want to suggest that Foucault may share “ethical truth” with Williams.

## An Idea of Death in Eliade's Study of Yoga

— An Interpretation of Eliade's Thought as Study of Life and Death —

Fumiaki OKUYAMA

What did Eliade think about life and death? This is the topic of this paper. For the purpose of showing new way of explanation of Eliade's vision, I will reconsider his study of Yoga with a full understanding of today's discussion about life and death. Eliade notes the function of myth about death in subjects's society. In that society, death is regarded as initiation that is indispensable to move to another dimension. This focus on the function of myth relate to important concept of "terror of history". On the other, today's discussion about life and death premise the "Medicalization". In other words, only people getting influenced by the "Medicalization" is turned into an object of discussion. As I have already stated, Eliade notes the idea of life and death in subjects that excluded from modern public agency. This Eliade's viewpoint have possibility of broadening traditional study of life and death's horizon.

## A Dilemma of Political Liberalism between its Stability and its Difference Principle

Makoto IKEDA

Rawls holds that a political conception of justice should be "stable for the right reasons" (PL xlii) and develop in each of us the sense of justice, that is, the desire to adhere to the principles of justice. He tries to show that justice as fairness can pass this test, insisting that it can gain the support of an overlapping consensus among all reasonable comprehensive doctrines we espouse. But can the difference principle be in scope of the consensus? I think that justice as fairness might be bound to face a dilemma between its stability and an ambition to justify a certain principle of distributive justice.

R.M.Hare, moral thinking as thinking for living :  
Against Williams's attack.

Takeshi SATO

This paper treats R.M.Hare's ethics and its criticism by B. Williams. Hare tried to settle several moral conflicts from powerful rationalistic grounds. But Williams argued that such arguments fell into a fallacy typical in modern moral philosophy. According to him, we must first consider how we should live. Rational moral reason is merely one of answers to that question, and has no priority over any other reasons.

I will show Williams's objection is not correct, by distinguishing two types of Hare's utilitarianism. Contrary to Williams's criticism, deeply and sincerely Hare deliberated the problem "How we should live".

The Problem of Temporary Intrinsic and the Four-Dimensional Stage Theory

Reina SALJO

Things persist through changes. But how can they do so? This has been often called the problem of temporary intrinsic since David Lewis submitted it. Moreover, he proposed three solutions for this problem. ( i ) Relation-to-times view : what we usually call intrinsic properties are, in reality, relations, which thing bears to times. ( ii ) Presentism : the intrinsic properties of a thing are what it has at the present moment. And ( iii ) four-dimensionalism : incompatible intrinsic properties belong to different temporal parts of the one and same four-dimensional object. Each of these solutions has its own disadvantages as well as advantages. In this paper, I shall show that a new version of four-dimensionalism, namely Theodore Sider's stage theory, can avoid the disadvantages of the old four-dimensionalism while retaining all its advantages.