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# A study on Regional Income Disparity Arising from Regional Allocation of Investments in Discrete Space

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#### Abstract

This paper presents the discrete model for regional allocation of public investment and the detailed simulations concentrating on the controllability of the minimum proportion of investment. In addition, we consider the regional allocation model of public investment for the redistribution policy of population and one detailed simulation concentrating on the controllability of the degree of local autonomy.

Key Words: Regional allocation of public investment, Saving ratio, Productivity of investment, Local autonomy rate.

## 1. Introduction

One of the most important problems in the regional allocation of public investment is the regional income disparities. But, the detailed research of the regional income disparities has not been made.

In this paper, we shall formulate a more gereralized discrete model arising from the optimal policy and the local autonomy rate, and consider one theorem, four corollaries and the detailed simulations concentrating on the controllability of the minimum proportion of investment. In addition, we consider the regional allocation model of public investment for the redistribution policy of population and one detailed simulation concentrating on the controllability of the degree of local autonomy.

#### 2. Mathematical formation of models

This chapter presents the mathematical formulation of the regional development model and one theorem and four corollaries on the controllability of the minimum propotion of investment.

First, we shall consider the mathematical formulation of regional development model which holds the following conditions.

(1) The allocation of regional investment is aimed at maximizing the total outputs when the outputs of the each region should not bring about any wide disparity

at the end of the planning period.

- (2) The supply of funds for investment will be limited to the sum of savings in each region.
- (3) The productivity of investment, saving ratio and local autonomy rate are given through central government.
- (4) The investment for the dissolution of the maximum income disparity is given by the mutual consents of all regions.

The analysis is an explicit planning model for a closed economy and it is assumed that the planned saving equals the planned investment through the central government.

We define the notations as follows:

 $P_i^i$ : the productivity of investment of region j at i time.

 $S_i^i$ : the saving ratio of region j at i time.

 $U_i^i$ : the proportion of investment of shared to the region j at i time

$$\left(\sum_{j=1}^{M} U_{j}^{i} = 1, i = 1, \dots, N\right)$$

$$(1)$$

r: the local autonomy rate.

M: the number of regions.

N: the planning period time.

 $X_j^i$ : the regional income of region j at i time.

$$(X_i^i - X_j^{i-1} \ge 0, i = 1, \dots, N, j = 1, \dots, M)$$

 $C_j = X_j^0$ : the regional income of region j at initial time.

 $D_i^i$ : the minimum proportion of investment region j at i time.

$$(0 \le D_j^i \le 1/M) \tag{3}$$

 $Z^i$ : the national income at i time.

$$Z^{i} = \sum_{j=1}^{M} X_{j}^{i}, (i = 1, \dots, N)$$
 (4)

$$\operatorname{Min} X_{j}^{1}: \left\{ (1 + r \cdot P_{j}^{1} \cdot S_{j}^{0}) \cdot X_{j}^{0} + P_{j}^{1} \cdot (1 - r) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{M} S_{j}^{0} \cdot X_{j}^{0} \right) \cdot D_{j}^{1} \right\}$$
 (5)

$$\text{Max } X_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 1} : \; \left\{ (1 + r \boldsymbol{\cdot} P_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 1} \boldsymbol{\cdot} S_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 0}) \boldsymbol{\cdot} X_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 0} + P_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 1} \boldsymbol{\cdot} (1 - r) \left( \sum\limits_{j=1}^M S_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 0} \boldsymbol{\cdot} X_j^{\scriptscriptstyle 0} \right) \left( 1 - \sum\limits_{k \neq j} D_k \right) \right\} \qquad (\; 6\; )$$

Min  $X_j^1$  (Max  $X_j^1$ ) represents the minimum (maximun) value of the regional income of region j at initial time plus the regional income of region j based on the local government investment and based on the central government investment.

The performance equations from condition. (2) are as follows:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{M} (X_j^i - X_j^{i-1}) / P_j^i = \sum_{j=1}^{M} S_j^{i-1} \cdot X_j^{i-1} \qquad (i = 1, \dots, N)$$
 (7)

Where

$$X_{j}^{i} - X_{j}^{i-1} = P_{j}^{i} \cdot U_{j}^{i} \cdot (1 - r) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{M} S_{j}^{i-1} \cdot X_{j}^{i-1} \right) + P_{j}^{i} \cdot r \cdot S_{j}^{i-1} \cdot X_{j}^{i-1}$$
 (8)

The left-hand side represents total investment and the right-hand side represents total saving in the whole country at i time.

The boundary conditions are as follows:

$$C_j = X_j^0 \tag{9}$$

$$D_j^i \le U_j^i \le 1 - \sum_{k \neq j} D \tag{10}$$

The performance equations from condition (1) are as follows:

$$X_1^N = \dots = X_M^N$$

$$J = Z^N \to \text{Max} \qquad \left( Z^N = \sum_{j=1}^M X_j^N \right)$$

$$(11)$$

 $D_r$ : the limit point of controllability.

 $[0, D_r]$ : the feasible region of controllability.

With respect to the detail conception of computation and algorithm for the model, the reader may refer to the author's papers<sup>3,4,5)</sup>

Next, we shall consider the controllability of the minimum proportion of investment. That is, whether or not the model is to be controlled depends on the increase of the minimum proportion of investment. And it is described in the theorem which follows.

Theorem

Assume that  $S_j^i = S_j$ ,  $D_j^i = D_j$  and  $P_j^i = P_j$   $(i = 1, \dots, N, j = 1, \dots, M)$ . The controllability of the minimum proportion of investment  $(D_j)$  is not realized if at least one of the following 2 M cases such that  $X_j^1 \ge \min X_j^1$  and  $X_j^1 \le \max X_j^1$  does not hold.

Proof

First, we shall translate the model into the following equations. The equalities (8) and inequalities (10) can be replaced in terms of inequalities of  $X_j^i$  variables instead of  $U_i^i$  variables.

$$X_{j}^{i} - \left(1 + P_{j} \cdot r \cdot S_{j}^{i-1}\right) \cdot X_{j}^{i-1} - D_{j} \cdot P_{j} \cdot (1 - r) \left(\sum_{j=1}^{M} S_{j}^{i-1} \cdot X_{j}^{i-1}\right) \ge 0$$

$$(13)$$

$$\begin{split} X_{j}^{i} - \left(1 + P_{j} \boldsymbol{\cdot} r \boldsymbol{\cdot} S_{j}^{i-1}\right) \boldsymbol{\cdot} X_{j}^{i-1} - \left(1 - \sum\limits_{k \neq j} D_{k}\right) \boldsymbol{\cdot} P_{j} \boldsymbol{\cdot} (1 - r) \left(\sum\limits_{j=1} S_{j}^{i-1} \boldsymbol{\cdot} X_{j}^{i-1}\right) \leq 0 \\ (i = 1, \, \cdots, \, N) \end{split} \tag{14}$$

The equations (1) can be replaced in the following equations.

$$\sum_{j=1}^{M} \left\{ X_{j}^{i} - \left( 1 + P_{j} \cdot r \cdot S_{j}^{i-1} \right) \cdot X_{j}^{i-1} \right\} / \sum_{j=1}^{M} P_{j} \cdot (1 - r) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{M} S_{j}^{i-1} \cdot X_{j}^{i-1} \right) = 1$$

$$(i = 1, \dots, N)$$
(15)

The boundary conditions are as follows:

$$C_i = X_i^0 \tag{16}$$

$$0 \le D_j \le 1/M \tag{17}$$

$$X_1^N = \dots = X_M^N \tag{18}$$

It is clear from the system of equations that the equations (15) and (18) are the strong restrictions and the set of all feasible solutions of the inequalities (13) and (14) is the convex polyhedron. And the objective function is obtained as the sum of  $X_j^N$  at the planning period time N. Furthermore, the optimal solutions of  $X_j^i$  are realized in the order of the decreasing sequence such that  $N, N-1, \dots, 1$ . Then, whether or not the model is to be controlled depends on the conditions in which  $X_j^i$  satisfy the restrictions of the system of equations from (13) to (18) with the characters mentioned above. And the restrictions on  $X_j^i$  are the following 2 M cases such that  $X_j^i \ge \min X_j^i$  and  $X_j^i \le \max X_j^i$ .

O. E. D.

Next, we shall attempt to examine in more detail the structure of the controllability of  $D_j$  with most of the emphasis of the two-region case. The following corollaries may be developed from the theorem mentioned above.

# Corollary 1

Assume  $P_1 > P_2$ ,  $S_1 = S_2$ ,  $C_1 = C_2$ , when the disparity of productivity of investment between  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  increases, the limit point of controllability  $\langle D_r \rangle$  decreases and also the feasible region of controllability of  $D_r$  decreases.

Proof

Assume  $P_1 > P_1' > P_2$   $(P_1 - P_2 > P_1' - P_2)$ , without loss of generality, the following equation is satisfied by the theorem.

$$\begin{split} \left\{ D_{7} / (1 + r \cdot P_{1} \cdot S_{1}) \cdot C_{1} + P_{1} \cdot (1 - r) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \right. \\ &\times D_{r} = X_{1}^{1} \text{ or } (1 + r \cdot P_{2} \cdot S_{2}) \cdot C_{2} + P_{2} \\ &\times (1 - r) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) (1 - D_{7}) = X_{2}^{1} \right\} \\ &< \left\{ D_{7} / (1 + r \cdot P_{1}' \cdot S_{1}) \cdot C_{1} + P_{1}' \cdot (1 - r) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \right. \\ &\times D_{7} = X_{1}^{1} \text{ or } (1 + r \cdot P_{2} \cdot S_{2}) \cdot C_{2} + P_{2} \cdot (1 - r) \\ &\times \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) (1 - D_{7}) = X_{2}^{1} \right\} \end{split}$$

Where

 $X_j^1$ : the optimal solutions with  $P_1$  and  $P_2$ .  $X_j^1$ : the optimal solutions with  $P_1'$  and  $P_2$ . (j=1,2) This equation represents that the limit point of controllability  $(D_7)$  with  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  is smaller than the one  $(D_7)$  with  $P'_1$  and  $P_2$ .

Q. E. D.

# Corollary 2

Assume  $P_1 > P_2$ ,  $S_1 = S_2$ ,  $C_1 > C_2$ , when the disparity of the regional income at initial time between  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  increases, the limit point of controllability  $(D_r)$  decreases and also the feasible region of controllability of  $D_r$  decreases.

Proof

Assume  $C_1 > C_1' > C_2 (C_1 - C_2 > C_1' - C_2)$  without loss of generality, the following equation is satisfied by the theorem.

$$\begin{split} \left\{ D_{r} / (1 + r \cdot P_{1} \cdot S_{1}) \cdot C_{1} + P_{1} \cdot (1 - r) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \right. \\ &\times D_{r} = X_{1}^{1} \text{ or } (1 + r_{1} \cdot P_{2} \cdot S_{2}) \cdot C_{2} + P_{2} \cdot (1 - r) \\ &\times \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \cdot (1 - D_{r}) = X_{2}^{1} \right\} \\ &< \left\{ D_{r} / (1 + r \cdot P_{1} \cdot S_{1}) \cdot C_{1}^{r} + P_{1} \cdot (1 - r) \right. \\ &\times \left( S_{1} \cdot C_{1}^{r} + S_{2} \cdot C_{2} \right) \cdot D_{r} = X_{1}^{1} \text{ or } (1 + r_{2} \cdot P_{2} \cdot S_{2}) \\ &\times C_{2} + P_{2} \cdot (1 - r_{2}) \left( S_{1} \cdot C_{1}^{r} + S_{2} \cdot C_{2} \right) (1 - D_{r}) = X_{2}^{1} \right\} \end{split}$$

Where

 $X_j^1$ : the optimal solutions with  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ .

 $X_j^1$ : the optimal solutions with  $C_1'$  and  $C_2$ . (j=1,2)

This equation represents that the limit point of controllability  $(D_r)$  with  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  is smaller than the one  $(D_r)$  with  $C_1'$  and  $C_2$ .

Q. E. D.

# Corollary 3

Assume  $P_1 > P_2$ ,  $S_1 = S_2$ ,  $C_1 > C_2$ , when the planning period time N decreases, the limit point of controllability  $(D_7)$  decreases and also the feasible region of controllability of  $D_7$  decreases.

Proof

It seems to be clear that this corollary 3 can be proved by the theorem and corollaries 1 and 2.

O. E. D.

## Corollary 4

Assume  $P_1 > P_2$ ,  $S_1 = S_2$ ,  $C_1 = C_2$ , when the local autonomy rate r increases, the

limit point of controllability  $(D_r)$  decreases and also the feasible region of controllability of  $D_r$  decreases.

Proof

Assume  $r_1 > r_2$ , without loss of generality, the following equations are satisfied by the theorem.

$$\begin{split} \left\{ D_{r} / (1 + r_{1} \cdot P_{1} \cdot S_{1}) \cdot C_{1} + P_{1} \cdot (1 - r) \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \right. \\ &\times D_{j} = X_{1}^{1} \text{ or } (1 + r_{1} \cdot P_{2} \cdot S_{2}) \cdot C_{2} + P_{2} \cdot (1 - r_{1}) \\ &\times \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \cdot (1 - D_{r}) = X_{2}^{1} \right\} \\ &< \left\{ D_{r} / (1 + r_{2} \cdot P_{1} \cdot S_{1}) \cdot C_{1} + P_{1} \cdot (1 - r_{2}) \right. \\ &\times \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) \cdot D_{r} = X_{1}^{1} \text{ or } (1 + r_{2} \cdot P_{2} \cdot S_{2}) \\ &\times C_{2} + P_{2} (1 - r_{2}) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{2} S_{j} \cdot C_{j} \right) (1 - D_{r}) = X_{2}^{1} \right\} \end{split}$$

Where

 $X_j^1$ : the optimal solutions with  $r_1$ .

 $X_j^1$ : the optimal solutions with  $r_2$ . (j=1, 2)

This equation represents that the limit point of controllability  $(D_7)$  with  $r_1$  is smaller than the one  $(D_7)$  with  $r_2$ .

Q. E. D.

### 3. Simulations of the models

In this chapter, we shall consider several typical simulations of the models of two-region case to clear the meanings of the corollaries mentioned above. In these models, the productivity of investment and saving ratio are assumed to be a constant over time.

## (1) *Model 1*

In this model, we shall consider two simulations concentrating on the controllability of  $D_7$ . And two simulations are shown as follows: One is a simulation in which the productivities of investment are  $P_1=1.400$  and  $P_2=1.300$ , and the other is a simulation in which the productivities of investment are  $P_1=1.400$  and  $P_2=1.200$ . And the planning period times N are assumed as N=8, N=5 and N=3.

# a) The first simulation

The data used in the computation is shown as follows:  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$ ,  $S_1=S_2=0.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  (Billion dollars), r=0.0.




Figure 1. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .




Figure 3. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=5 by  $P_1=1400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .

Minimum Proportion of Investment




Figure 2. The Feasible Region Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .




Figure 4. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=5 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .




Figure 5. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=3 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .

Figure 6. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=3 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.300$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .

Where, the minimum proportion of investment are changed in the order of magnitude from 0.00 to 0.500. The results of the simulation at N=8, N=5 and N=3 are shown in Figure 1 to Figure 6. It is clear from Figure 1 that the decreasing rate of national income is small, but the maximum income disparity shows a rapidly decreasing rate as the minimum proportion of investment increases. And the value of the limit point of controllability  $(D_r)$  is 0.481 and the feasible region of controllability of  $D_r$  is from 0.000 to 0.481. Then, it is impossible to control the model when the minimum proportion of investment is more than  $D_r$ .

Next, to clarify the uncontrollable cause, the detailed process of the simulation is shown in Figure 2. In the graph, the dotted lines represent the values of Max  $X_j^1$  and Min  $X_j^1$  and the solid lines represent the optimal solution of the model based on the Decomposition Method according to the increase of the minimum proportion of investment  $D_r$ .

From the facts presented in the graphs and corollary 1, the uncontrollable cause is based on the conditions in which the restrictions such that  $X_1^1 \ge \min X_1^1$  and  $X_2^1 \le \max X_2^1$  does not hold.

The results of the simulations at N=5 and N=3 have a similar interpretation mentioned above. And the value of  $D_r$  is indicated as same value at N=8.

## b) The second simulation

The data used in the computation is shown as follows:  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $S_1=S_2=0.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  (Billion dollars), r=0.0.

The results of the simulations at N=8, N=5 and N=3 are shown in Figure 7 to Figure 12. It is clear from Figure 7 that the decreasing rate of national income is small, but the maximum income disparity showns a rapidly decreasing rate as the minimum proportion of investment increases. And the value of the limit point of controllability  $(D_7)$  is 0.462. The uncontrollable cause and the results of the simulations at N=5 and N=3 have a similar interpretation of the simulation a) mentioned above.

The major cause for the difference of  $D_r$  between two simulations a) and b) is based on the difference of productivity of investment of region II.

## (2) *Model 2*

In this model, we shall consider a simulation in which the regional incomes at initial time indicate different values  $C_1 \neq C_2$ .

The data used in the computation is shown as follows:

 $P_1=1.400, P_2=1.200, S_1=S_2=0.200, X_1^0=20, X_2^0=10$  (Billion dollars), r=0.0.

The results of the simulation at N=8, N=5 and N=3 are shown in Figure 13 to Figure 18. It is clear from Figures 13, 15 and 17 that the decreasing rate of national income is small, but the maximum income disparity shows a rapidly decreasing rate as the minimum proportion of investment increases. Next, it is clear from Figures 14, 16 and 18 that the values of the limit point of controllability  $(D_7)$  are indicated as 0.430 at N=8, 0.384 at N=5 and 0.293 at N=3. Then, we shall compare the differences between this simulation and the simulation b) in Model 1. The values of  $D_7$  are indicated as a larger decline than the value of  $D_7$  of the simulation b) in Model 1 as the planning period time N decreases. Thus, the major cause for these differences is based on the difference of the regional incomes at initial time.

It is clear from the fasts presented above that the difference of the regional income at initial time plays an important role in the controllability of  $D_r$ .

### (3) *Model 3*

In this model, we shall consider two simulations concentrating on the controllability of  $D_r$  in which the local autonomy rates are r=0.2 and r=0.8.

## a) The first simulation

The data used in the computation is shown as follows:

$$P_1 = 1.400$$
,  $P_2 = 1.200$ ,  $S_1 = S_2 = 0.200$ ,  $X_1^0 = X_2^0 = 10$  (Billion dollars),  $r = 0.2$ .

The results of the simulation at N=8 are shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. It is clear from Figure 19 that the decreasing rate of national income is small, but the maximum income disparity shows a rapidly decreasing rate as the minimum proportion of investment increases. And from Figure 20, the value of the limit point of controllability  $(D_r)$  is 0.451.

### b) The second simulation

The data used in the computation is shown as follows:





Figure 7. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .



Minimum Proportion of Investment

Figure 8. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .





Figure 9. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=5 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .



Minimum Proportion of Investment

Figure 10. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=5 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .

$$P_1=1.400$$
,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $S_1=S_2=0.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  (Billion dollars),  $r=0.8$ .

The results of the simulation at N=8 are shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. It is clear from Figure 21 that the decreasing rate of national income and the maximum income disparity show a slight decreasing rate as the minimum proportion of investment increases. And from Figure 22, the value of the limit point of controllability  $(D_r)$  is 0.307. Next, we shall compare the difference between two simulation a) and b). The value of  $D_r$  of the simulation b) is indicated as a larger decline than the value of  $D_r$  of the simulation a). Thus, the major cause for the difference of  $D_r$  is based on the difference of the local autonomy rates.

# 4. Regional Allocation Model for the Redistribution Policy of Population

This chapter presents the mathematical formulation of the regional allocation model of public investments for the redistribution policy of population and one detailed simulation concentrating on the controllability of the local autonomy rate.

In the model, the productivity of investments and saving ratio are assumed to be a constant over time.

The data used in the computation is shown as follows:

$$P_1 = 1.400$$
  $P_2 = 1.200$   $X_1^0 = X_2^0 = 10$   $L_1^0 = L_2^0 = 10$   $S_1 = 0.200$   $N = 8$ 

Where, the minimum proportion of investment, the degree of local autonomy rate and the saving ratio of region 2 are variables.

In the Figure 23, the real lines represent the national income at N=8 with the degree of local autonomy r=0.8 and the minimum proportion of investment  $D_r=0$ , and the dotted lines represent the national income at N=8 with the degree of local autonomy r=0 and the minimum proportion of investment  $D_r=0.4$ . Two simulations have the same controllability in the feasible space.

From the facts presented in the graphs, it is imposible to redistribute the population as the saving ratio of region 2 decreases, but it is possible to redistribute the population with the local autonomy policy as the saving ratio of region 2 increases.

It is clear from the facts presented above that the local autonomy policy and the saving ratio of developing region play an important role in the redistribution population.

## 5. Conclusion

In summary, we have investigated several typical simulations to clear the controllability of the minimum proportion of investment.

From the facts obtained in the theorem, four corollaries and the simulations mentioned above, the following four points may be concluded.

First, in model 1, it seems to be clear that the limit point of controllability




Figure 11. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=3 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .




Figure 12. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=3 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$  and  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$ .






Figure 13. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=20$  and  $X_2^0=10$ .



Minimum Proportion of Investment

Figure 14. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at  $N{=}8$  by  $P_1{=}1.400$ ,  $P_2{=}1.200$ ,  $X_1^0{=}20$  and  $X_2^0{=}10$ .



Minimum Proportion of Investment

Figure 16. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_r$  at N=5 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=20$  and  $X_2^0=10$ .





Figure 15. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=5 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=20$  and  $X_2^0=10$ .



Minimum Proportion of Investment

0.3

0.5

0,2

0.0

0.1

Figure 17. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=3 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=20$  and  $X_2^0=10$ .




Figure 18. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=3 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=20$  and  $X_2^0=10$ .




Figure 20. The Feasible Region of Controllability of  $D_7$  at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  and r=0.2.




Figure 19. The National Income nd Maximaum Income Disparity at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  and r=0.2.




Figure 21. The National Income and Maximum Income Disparity at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  and r=0.8.




Figure 22. The Feasible Region of Controllability  $D_r$  at N=8 by  $P_1=1.400$ ,  $P_2=1.200$ ,  $X_1^0=X_2^0=10$  and r=0.8.

Figure 23. Simulation of Redistribution Policy of Population.

 $(D_{r})$  is affected remarkably by the increase of disparity of the productivity of investment between  $P_{1}$  and  $P_{2}$ .

Second, in Model 2, when the planning period time N decreases, the limit point of controllability  $(D_7)$  is not so much changed at  $C_1 = C_2$ , but  $D_7$  shows a rapidly decreasing rate at  $C_1 > C_2$ . It indicates that the difference of the regional income at initial time plays an important role in the controllability of the minimum proportion of investment.

Third, in Model 3, it seems to be clear that when the local autonomy rate r increases, the limit point of controllability  $D_r$  decreases and the maximum income disparity shows a small value.

Fourth, in Figure 23, it seems to be clear that it is possible to redistribute the population with the local autonomy policy as the saving ratio of region 2 increases.

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