CHOSEN BY “ALL THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE”: THE IDEA OF AN ELECTED MONARCH IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIA

CYNTHIA HYLA WHITTAKER

Historians are accustomed to defining eighteenth-century Russia as an autocracy, an absolute monarchy with power so unlimited and alienating that it borders on the despotic. For instance, Richard Pipes, the eminent historian at Harvard University, characterizes the Russian form of government as a system that excludes “society from political decision-making,” and in which “a citizenry...as such does not exist at all...the people is the object of the ruling authority.” From this point of view, any suggestion that autocracy included an elective element must appear rather startling, if not downright bizarre. Despite the apparent incongruity, an electoral process indeed played an essential political role during the succession crises of the post-Petrine monarchy.

Successions in eighteenth-century Russia were unusual for an absolute monarchy. One peculiarity was their frequency. From 1725 to 1801, the throne changed hands nine times, much more often than in any other European state, the majority of which were also absolute monarchies. (One glance at the accompanying chart will remind the reader of the many eighteenth-century Russian monarchs; in contrast, in that time period, there were only two kings of France, three of Great Britain, and four of Poland, Prussia, and Spain). The accident of death, of course, played its role, but so did four coups d’état; and yet this was an era that celebrated absolute monarchy for its political stability and smooth transfer of power. An additional anomaly was that four women reigned in Russia, while the only female monarch from 1725 to 1800 in the rest of Europe was Maria Theresa of Austria.

The documents surrounding an accession were also unusual. Unlike the simplicity of announcement that heralded the dynastic successor in most absolutist monarchies (“The King is dead, long live the King”), the ascent of the Russian monarch was accompanied by detailed manifestoes, proclamations, and supplementary decrees. Since there were so many accessions, the documents are numerous and, I would argue, should be considered a separate genre of political literature unique to the eighteenth-century Russian monarchy. This

political literature further illustrates the extraordinary character of Russian accesses. In an absolute monarchy, rule is supposedly “unrestrained by law or public opinion.” And yet accession documents were formulated as apologias addressed to the public: they defended the legal right of the new ruler to the throne and carefully enumerated the bases for legitimacy, with a central sign of legitimacy election by the people.

Ambiguous terms such as the monarch, the people, the public, or election require definition. In our present discussion, “monarch” includes his or her regents or entourage of advisers. The term, the Russian people or public, operates on three levels. The first level, the political elite, or top stratum of the ruling class, refers to those directly involved in the affairs of church, state, army, and court; as in many pre-modern or early modern states, they were often equated with “the people” since they were considered, usually erroneously, representatives of the rest of the population. The second level encompasses the nobility in general; this group was “coterminous” with civil society and included most of the educated public. Normally, but not exclusively, the ranks of the nobility produced Russia’s thinkers, writers, and readers - the publika that Alexander Sumarokov defined as “people of knowledge and taste.” The great Carolingian writer, Hincmar of Rheims, referred to the above two levels of the public as the “weightier part” of the people, those whose support a monarch needed to rule effectively. A third level encompasses the people at large, al-

though in 1741 the serfs were excluded from this group of “loyal subjects.”\textsuperscript{5} All three levels were involved in the electoral process, but its chief players and the formulators of public opinion were drawn from the first two categories.

The meaning of “election” and the electoral process in the context of eighteenth-century monarchical successions will constitute the heart of this article. The first part of the discussion will provide a general description of electoral processes in eighteenth-century Russia, and the second part will offer concrete examples from each succession crisis between 1725 and 1801.

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Peter the Great bears responsibility for the many anomalous features of eighteenth-century Russian successions. The involvement of the public stemmed from his attempts to enlarge the ranks of the nobility and the educated and co-opt them into a partnership aimed at achieving change and reform. In the same vein, Petrine decrees addressed and sought the support of public opinion and thereby underscored its importance as a factor in governance. Peter thus began the creation of a modern political culture with an \textit{engagé} public, which was prepared to bridge the gap when his new succession law proved unworkable.

As is well known, the Emperor became convinced that his eldest son and heir-presumptive, Aleksei, was both unwilling and unable to continue the great work of modernizing Russia, and this led Peter to condemn primogeniture as a “bad custom.” In its place, his law of 1722 decreed that the only legal qualification for succession was appointment by a sitting monarch; the law intimated a second, but rather subjective, qualification, namely that the appointee be “worthy” or “fit” (\textit{dostoinyi}) for royal office. The new law ran in the face of tradition: it contained no stipulation that a successor be either Orthodox or a Romanov; and it denied centuries of absolutist theory by abrogating dynastic succession and its correlative of divine right. The decree proved so unpopular that Peter ordered his apologist, Feofan Prokopovich, to confront public dissatisfaction; at great length and with much intellectual finesse, \textit{Pravda voli monarshei} defended the Tsar’s right to change the terms of succession, a fundamental law of the realm.\textsuperscript{6} The public remained dissatisfied. As Montesquieu has noted, concerning succession “that which most sensibly strikes them [the people] is a certain order of birth.”\textsuperscript{7}

The problem with abrogating primogeniture was not just the unpopularity of the measure; the edict also removed one of the most attractive features of absolute monarchy - the smooth transfer of power. Montesquieu correctly decried Peter’s measure in his \textit{Spirit of the Laws}: “By the constitution of Russia, the

\textsuperscript{5} Polnoe sobranie zakonov [further, PSZ], vol.11, no.8474 (25 November 1741).
\textsuperscript{6} PSZ 6, no.3893 (5 February 1722), pp.496-497; the \textit{Pravda} was first published six months after the succession law and reprinted in PSZ 7, no.4870 (21 April 1726), pp.603-643.
Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his successor, whether of his own or of a strange family. Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary.” In truth, Peter’s innovation muddied and destabilized the entire process of succession. Three monarchs, Peter included, neglected to appoint a successor before they died, and this in effect caused an interregnum. Even when a successor had been designated, Peter’s criterion of “fitness” was three times linked to the Lockean notion of a revocable contract and operated as an excuse for overthrowing a perfectly legitimate but undesirable ruler or entourage.

The volatility of the succession process and the uncertainty of the possible successor led to a reassessment of the qualifications to rule. The accession documents demonstrate that in post-Petrine Russia, four signs conferred legitimacy: designation, dynastic inheritance, worthiness, and election. No eighteenth-century monarch possessed all four signs at accession, but each could claim at least two. After Peter’s law, of course, the only de jure basis for legitimacy was appointment by the previous ruler. But, de facto, candidates could not rely on designation alone, since the notion was unpopular. The tradition of dynastic succession remained strong, and no one ever dared claim the throne who was not related, if only by marriage, to the Romanov clan. Despite Peter’s forbidding it, primogeniture was invoked and stressed whenever appropriate; however, not once in the century did a Romanov come to the throne the first time he or she was next in the dynastic line.

The new succession law had argued that rational appointment, not the random chance of inheritance, would assure a “worthy” monarch, and candidates tried to demonstrate their worthiness with promises to act like a “reforming tsar” in imitation of Peter. The Emperor had also worked to secularize the monarchy, and only once was Providence or God’s intervention cited to endorse the succession. Peter, in other words, had succeeded in revolutionizing the monarchical idea: divine right gave way to royal duty, and the promise of progress replaced a dedication to the status quo.

The most surprising revelation of the accession documents is that a crucial sign of legitimacy in eighteenth-century Russia entailed election by representatives of the people. Election as a source of monarchical legitimacy is ancient and long-standing in absolutist theory and practice. Political thinkers, Feofan among them, agreed that power ultimately came from God but on earth originated in the people, who, as part of a social contract, transferred political authority to their rulers and their heirs either outright or by election.10

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8 Ibid.
10 For Feofan’s comments, consult the Pravda, pp.623-624 and 629-630.
rists usually elaborated these social contracts and elections as fictive, explanatory devices, but actual precedents existed in recent Russian history. When the Riurikid dynasty ended in 1598, a *zemskii sobor* - a representative Assembly of the Land - elected Boris Godunov. To end the Time of Troubles and choose a new dynasty in 1613, a *zemskii sobor* elected Michael Romanov and then in 1645 his son Aleksei. In 1682, when Peter’s entourage attempted to enthrone him and bypass his older half-brother Ivan, both factions organized elections.\(^{11}\)

Prevailing theory supported the events. According to Byzantine absolutist tradition, which Russia adapted, the people were to be consulted in the event of an interregnum, or if a change in dynasty were necessary, or even in moments of crisis or doubt. In the eighteenth century, the lack of clarity engendered by Peter’s law spawned constant crisis or doubt: an interregnum and a coup occurred three times each; and in one accession a change in dynasty was proposed. Precedent and legal theory thus demanded some form of election nearly every time the throne changed hands.\(^{12}\)

Eighteenth-century Russian literature reinforced these ideas. Popular works repeatedly described the country’s rulers, from Riurik on, as “elected” and suggested that “changing tsars who rule unjustly” should occur by “common consensus,” while choosing the “best person” to succeed should be done “by everyone.”\(^{13}\) The poet and dramatist, Sumarokov, claimed that willing obedience resulted from the fact that the people “picked” their rulers.\(^{14}\) Prince Michael Shcherbatov, the historian and political thinker, wrote that in Russia “the Sovereign is raised to the throne either by election or by right of birth.”\(^{15}\) Political texts agreed that when a ruler dies without instruction and there is no clear successor, the matter “reverts to the entire people” who have “the natural freedom to choose whom they want to rule over them.”\(^{16}\)

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\(^{11}\) In 1598, Patriarch Job intoned: “The voice of the people is the voice of God.” In April of 1682, the three-page official document describing Peter’s accession, in which his brother Ivan was bypassed, used the word election (*izbranie*) four times as the chief sign of legitimacy. As quoted by Donald J. Bennett in “The Idea of Kingship in 17th-Century Russia” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1967), p.16; PSZ 2, no.914 (27 April 1682).


\(^{14}\) A.P. Sumarokov, *Polnoe sobranie vsekh sochinii*, vol.6 (Moscow, 1787), p.284.


In the eighteenth century, the word election (izbranie), in a political context, always referred to choosing heads of state and especially those in an elective monarchy, and it was this word that was used in accession documents. Election, though, cannot be understood in a modern, formal sense, but in a traditional, informal sense, meaning a process by which consensus was reached.\footnote{Iu.S. Sorokin, et al., “Izbratel’nyi,” Slovar’ russkogo iazyka XVIII veka, vol.9 (St. Petersburg, 1997), p.9; on the importance of consensus in Russian history, consult: Edward L. Keenan, “Muscovite Political Folkways,” The Russian Review 45 (April 1986), pp.115-181.} Elections were nonetheless real, even if sometimes contrived, and the term was not just a rhetorical device. The electors were actual individuals and not merely members of an abstract body politic as in the Medieval sense of the term. In Russia, after the disappearance of the zemskii sobor, election by the people or “by the common will of all” or by “all the Russian people” meant primarily by agreement with the magnates of the realm, the political elite, who were regarded as representatives of the rest of the population.\footnote{Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp.211, 297; Nelson, “Kingship,” p.217; Norbert Elias, The Court Society (New York, 1983), pp.16-17.}

Russia’s ex officio electorate - “the people” - included the dozen members of the Synod and of the Senate, along with the roughly 200 highest-ranking military and civil service officers that comprised the Generalitet and who normally came from aristocratic families.\footnote{I will not fight the temptation to note that this body was roughly the size of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which ousted Nikita Khrushchev in 1964.} As in Byzantium, it was they who were to debate and then take the initiative, and other parts of the population were called in to ratify the choice. Widening this rather narrow circle of power brokers, if other members of the nobility were present at the time of the succession, they too became numbered among the “people.” When the throne was contested, the successful faction usually required the allegiance of the roughly 6,000 Guards of the Preobrazhenskii or Semeonovskii regiments, the elite nucleus of the regular army. Their status and personal interest in monarchical selection resulted from their duty to protect the person of the ruler and their being under his or her direct command. Ninety percent of their officers belonged to middle-level noble families, as opposed to aristocrats, and thus expanded the ranks of the electoral public. While the Guards relished demonstrating their growing political awareness and their influence over the political elite, they were not mere praetorians. After the creation of a school for cadets in 1731, which rapidly became an important center of learning, the men of the regiments qualified as informed members of the educated public.\footnote{Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and An Interpretation, vol.1 (New York, 1961), pp.419, 481. Also see: Christopher Duffy, “The Age of Marshal Münnich, 1725-41,” in Russia’s Military Way to the West (London, 1981), pp.42-43; Iu.N. Smirnov, “Rol’ gvardii v ukreplении organov vlasti rossiiskogo absoliutizma v pervoi polovine XVIII veka,” in Pravitel’stvennaia politika i klassovaia bor’ba v Rossii v period absoliutizma (Kuibyshev, 1985), pp.15-31; and I. Pushkarev, Istoriia imperatorskoi Rossiskoi gvardii, vol.1 (St. Petersburg, 1844), pp.60-61, 130.}
When post-Petrine accession documents used the term election, then, it meant that the available members of the ruling class had reached a consensus about the new ruler. How did they reach this consensus? During the previous reign or at the outset of the crisis, contending factions lobbied for their candidates, and we can be sure that issues of self-interest and kinship politics predominated. Byzantine intrigue and highhanded repression predictably plagued every reign, and, adding to the machinations, foreign powers intervened with money and influence hoping to effect foreign policy. Competition was fierce, and stakes were high. Victors would become the “favorites” of the new ruler, and they stood to rake in the spoils, presiding over a court clique and patronage network at the center of power and positioned to receive gifts of money, land, jewels, and high offices. Losers, along with their family and entourage, suffered any combination of arrest, torture, confiscation of property, exile, or execution. As Brenda Meehan has pointed out, everything “rested ultimately on the personal favor of the autocrat” once he or she was installed in power, and the Russians “devised no face-saving way of letting the new ‘ins’ come in without demolishing the ‘outs’.”

The succession, though, was not decided solely by intrigue, force, or patronage politics. Accession documents warrant a conclusion that issues of legitimacy figured just as prominently, and successful candidates needed to demonstrate their better credibility, “worthiness,” and greater ability to achieve the backing of the public in comparison with other contenders. In other words, this may have been an “era of palace revolutions,” but it was not anarchic power grabbing. A new, informal political process had come to govern the selection of a ruler.

Weighing all the arguments (and bribes, threats, and promises), the elite reached a consensus and made their choice. They then sought approval of the election through the acclamation of the Guards and other members of the nobility who happened to be on hand during the crisis. This was a crucial moment; for instance, in the complicated election of Anna Ivanovna, approval was delayed nearly a month. Acclamation was next sought from the rest of the population. An accession manifesto both announced and justified the election of a new monarch; it narrated the circumstances of coming to the throne, defended the legitimacy of the imperial person, sometimes elaborately, and conveyed the direction of future policy. This manifesto became the most significant document at the onset of a reign since it served as the preface to the traditional oath of loyalty, which was disseminated among the entire population.

23 Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation (New York, 1947), pp.432-495 (the three chapters covering this epoch are entitled “The Era of Palace Revolutions.”
The document thus represented a conscious effort to win the approval and support of those who had not participated in the election.

A convincing justification for the new monarch’s ascent was considered an essential part of the oath, as failure to prove legitimacy might lead to the appearance of pretenders or other forms of unrest. Neither automatic nor a rote exercise, the administration of the oath developed during the course of the century into a serious, far-flung, and time-consuming exercise that was the equivalent of seeking national ratification of the choice. Churchmen reminded the faithful that “taking an oath is a serious matter, and eternal damnation awaits anyone who swears to anything contrary to his conscience or against what he wishes or believes.” With this caveat, all Russian subjects (eventually, except serfs) and resident foreigners were asked to swear to uphold the new monarch. Printed in thousands of copies, the manifestoes and blank oath forms were sent by express messengers to all the provinces, every regiment and fleet, the Cossacks, and all foreign embassies. Officials, who faced imprisonment if records were incomplete, exchanged nervous correspondence about whether or not there would be trouble during these ceremonies held both at home and abroad. The signatures were then returned to the capital. Afterward, elaborate coronation rituals and celebrations, so well described by Richard Wortman, were orchestrated to reinforce the notion of “a consensus in favor of the new monarch.”

Election conferred moral and political authority on the new ruler and attempted to rectify a bad law that caused turmoil whenever the throne changed hands. The Russian response to this challenge appears quite civilized when we consider that similar circumstances in other countries engendered the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1714), the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1735), and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The process of election and the political discourse it entailed served to reconfirm what one scholar has described as “the consensus without which the ruler’s will could not be translated into effective policy.” A student of Byzantine politics likewise concluded that “the support of the people was indispensable even for the most uncompromising autocrat.”

In an age that held women inferior, female monarchs especially needed to reach out to a larger constituency in order to obtain and maintain their grip on their new position.
power. Tsarevna Sophia’s coup in 1682 provided an instructive example of the classic female accession crisis. She took advantage of the confusion as to who should succeed (the “fit” Peter or the older, but simple, Ivan); she courted the guards; she held elections; she offered public justifications; she made dramatic rewards and punishments. She herself had much at stake since the practice for female members of the royal family - on the grounds that no one was worthy to marry a tsarevna - was sequestration in the terem and a life of prayer, fasting, boredom, and spinsterhood. An official explanation followed Sophia’s bloody coup to make it palatable to the public; Sylvester Medvedev, a cultured and prominent member of her inner circle, heralded her as a “savior,” which became the usual appellation in the eighteenth century for a new ruler after a forced change in power.\(^30\) When eventually ousted as Regent, Sophia was forced into a convent and then to take the veil, the fate that awaited unsuccessful female power players.\(^31\) In hindsight, it might seem that Sophia’s mistake was to be satisfied with the title of Regent and not to immediately press for power in her own right.

Perhaps with this example, Catherine I, Anna, Elizabeth, and Catherine II all claimed election, all sought the support of the Guards, none served merely as a Regent, and all held the throne until their natural deaths. The four male monarchs were appointed and felt more secure; none sought electoral endorsement or strove to build a consensus when in power. Three of them lost the throne. Clearly, the new importance awarded to electoral or consensual politics and public opinion was an innovation that new monarchs could only disregard at their peril.

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While a general etiquette of accession came into place in the course of the eighteenth century, each episode possessed its own unique twist and problematic. The problems inherent in Peter’s decree of 1722 were compounded because he left behind a gaggle of heirs from both the Miloslavskii and Naryshkin clans, including one nine-year-old male and eight females (please see the accompanying chart). Four of these descendants would rule, but not in any logical dynastic order; whenever someone died, the deck was reshuffled. Since so few males were available and Russia had no Salic law barring women from the throne, the scramble for heirs revolved about the female branches of the Romanov family, including the dubious dynastic claims of wives. Although in

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the rest of Europe no wives ever succeeded their husbands as monarchs, in 1725 ample and recent precedent existed in Spain, France, England, and Sweden for inheriting a crown via the female line.

It is not surprising, then, that in 1725, the electorate was deeply divided, with one faction favoring the sole male and Prince Alexander Menshikov’s favoring Peter’s wife. Catherine’s claim to the throne was weak on three of four counts: Peter had not designated her; in dynastic terms, nowhere in Europe did wives claim the right to succeed their husbands; and this former servant girl lacked the ability to rule. But, Menshikov won her election. As one observer narrated, “the most distinguished nobility” gathered “in one room,” deliberated, and decided on Catherine. The Guards surrounding the chamber, out of loyalty to Peter, also vociferated in favor of his wife “on the strength of her recent coronation,” in which they had played a prominent role (Menshikov had also given them sixteen months’ of back pay). The announcement was issued in the name of the Senate, Synod and Generalitet.

The accession manifesto offered a masterly manipulation of the facts. Since Catherine had no real dynastic claim, her “marital kinship” was stressed. Since she had not been designated, Peter’s coronation of Catherine six months before was offered as proof that she was the “worthy” successor that Peter had in mind to carry on his policies. In particular, he had often publicly recognized her “manly services to the Russian state.” After this manifesto, by the way, the continuation of the Petrine legacy became a promise of all new monarchs, and the attribution of manliness became a staple compliment for female monarchs. Since dissension was expected among the common people, the oath did not ask them to recognize Catherine’s own claim to power but, rather oddly, to confirm the promise of loyalty taken to her and Peter as an imperial couple after the coronation. The weakness of her claim to legitimacy did indeed lead to political instability among commoners; a spate of “anonymous letters” - denunciatory missives surreptitiously tacked up in public places - raised constant doubts about Catherine’s right to rule and the propriety of the 1722 succession law. Even aristocrats contended that “by blood, by birth, and by sex...the lawful heir to the throne of Russia” was Peter’s eleven-year-old grandson, Peter Alekseevich.

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33 PSZ 7, no.4366 (15 November 1723); no.4643 (28 January 1725).
34 PSZ 7, no.4646 (2 February 1725); the edited copies of the oath are located in RGADA (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts), f.156, ed. khr. 218 (2 February 1725). Peter Tolstoi had the idea of linking the coronation oath to Catherine’s legitimacy: P.N. Durin, Istoriia Leibguardii Semenovskago polka, vol.1 (St. Petersburg, 1883), pp.182-183.
35 PSZ 7, no.4870 (21 April 1726); the anonymous letters continued throughout the reign: RGADA, f.7, op.1, ed. khr. 224, 229, 241, 215-216, 247-249 (1727).
To justify her power, Catherine tried to don her husband’s mantle as a “reforming tsar” by supporting the continuation of some of his projects such as the sponsorship of the Bering Expedition and the founding of the Academy of Sciences. But uneducated and with little experience in ruling, mostly she relied on the advice of her “favorite,” Menshikov, and of the Duke of Holstein, the husband of her elder daughter, Anna. Peter had broken Muscovite tradition and allowed the marriages of his and Ivan’s daughters to foreigners, all Central Europeans, and their influence began a pattern of German attempts to seize control of the throne in post-Petrine Russia. At any rate, Catherine’s rule was short.

When the Empress died, Peter Alekseevich, as the sole surviving male Romanov, possessed clear dynastic legitimacy, and no election seemed necessary. The young boy appeared on the balcony to the sound of cannon, drums and music, and the Guards three times hailed him with the cry of “Vivat!” However, since primogeniture carried no legal weight, a designation was concocted. Peter claimed in his accession manifesto that, in keeping with “our Grandfather’s” law of 1722, “our beloved Grandmother” (actually, Step-grandmother) had appointed him heir in a Testament “signed by Her Majesty’s own hand”; as proof, the will was appended to the oath of loyalty. The document, created while Catherine was on her deathbed, was never actually signed by her, but its authenticity was not really an issue; the public rallied around Peter’s grandson. Even though the Duke of Holstein was commander of the Preobrazhenskii Guards, and a member of his entourage was in charge of the Semeonovskii regiment, the Duke could not marshal their support to have him or his wife accede to the throne. In other words, the Guards alone could not put a monarch on the throne, as historians have often implied; they often supported, but never led, a coup.

Menshikov, by the way, had connived to win approval for his son and daughter to marry Peter and his sister, so he believed himself secure. Soon, his highhandedness led to his ouster and exile to Siberia, and the Dolgorukis and Golitsyns took his family’s place as favorites. Peter II’s accession seemed to indicate that when primogeniture operated, designation became a formality, the continuation of the Petrine legacy was assumed, and election was unnecessary. But Peter II died too soon to test this hypothesis, and the accession of Peter III would disprove it.

When Peter II passed away shortly before his coronation and without an appointed heir, according to Catherine I’s Testament, her grandson, the two-

38 *Zapiska o konchine gosudaryni imperatritsy Ekateriny Alekseevnny i o vstupleniia na prestol gosudar- ia imperatora Petra II Alekseevicha* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 1-2.
39 The document, the signature appended by Cabinet Minister A.B. Makarov, and the attestations of relatives are found in RGADA, f. 2, op. 1, ed. khr. 21 (1 February & 7 May 1727).
year-old Karl Peter Ulrich (the future Duke of Holstein and Emperor Peter III), should have inherited the throne. However, the Supreme Privy Council - which had taken charge of state affairs under Catherine I and Peter II, but with shifting membership - now claimed that the Testament was invalid since Catherine herself was never legitimate. Seizing the moment, they nominated Anna - the daughter of Peter’s half brother Ivan V who was not even mentioned in the Testament - and placed the famous Conditions on her rule. These actions were audacious and illegal. After all, according to the unwritten law of the Russian realm, in the absence of a clear successor, naming a new monarch was the province of the Senate, Synod and Generalitet, and changing the form of government demanded the convening of something resembling a zemski sobor. Understanding this, the Council issued an accession manifesto that claimed Anna had been chosen by the “general desire and agreement of the entire Russian people”; and they told Anna that the Conditions were likewise the desire of the “entire Russian people.” However, their claims of consensus were false, and the Councillors refused to work toward one, even though much sympathy existed for limiting monarchy. One group suggested the proper protocol: we must “convene the entire Generalitet...and the rank-and-file nobility, one or two from each family...and on the basis of the majority opinion write up a form of government for the state.”

The electoral public rebelled at the Council’s usurpation of power. As is well known, a serious debate over the future of Russia’s government ensued among the several hundred members of the nobility that were gathered in the capital for Peter’s coronation and marriage; in the end, they reached a consensus to recognize Anna Ivanovna as an absolute monarch, who achieved the throne “through election.” She quickly issued an accession manifesto that alluded to the disarray of the past weeks and justified her right to rule only on the basis of election: “And since all our loyal subjects unanimously asked that We deign to accept Autocracy for Our Russian Empire, as had our forefathers from the earliest times, We have so deigned....” For the rest of the century, it was recognized that she came to the throne “by election, not by blood.” Beginning a tradition, supplementary manifestoes in the week following the accession expanded upon her claims to the throne to reassure the public. They emphasized her Romanov bloodline and her promises to adhere to the Petrine example of reform.

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41 PSZ, no.5499 (4 February 1730).
42 Vnutrennyi byt’ russkago gosudarstva c 17-go oktiabria 1740 g. po 25-e noyabria 1741 goda po dokumentam (Moscow, 1880-1886), pp.546-550 (12 Jan 1741); RGADA, f.2, op.1, ed. khr. 55, l.2.; D.A. Korsakov, Votsarenie Imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny (Kazan, 1880), pp.271-272.
44 Ibid.
45 PSZ 8: no.5509 (28 February 1730); no.5510 (4 March 1730); no.5517 (16 March 1730); no.5909 (17 December 1731).
Just before her death, Anna Ivanovna designated as successor her two-month-old grandnephew, Ivan, the son of her niece Princess Anna of Mecklenburg and of Prince Anton of Braunschweig. The Empress had also appointed her favorite Biron as Regent, but, feared and hated, he lacked the support of the Senate, Synod and Generalitet; his rule lasted twenty-two days, and then he too made the trek to Siberia.\(^{46}\) Ivan VI’s mother, Anna Leopol’dovna, announced her assumption of the duties of Regent in a manifesto that conformed to the new rules of accession by explaining the change “as a result of the humble and sincere wish and request of all Our loyal subjects”; however, this election was fictional.\(^{47}\) Anna’s Regency lasted only a bit over a year.

Completely unprepared to rule, the Regent was poorly educated and indolent, “spending most of her time lying on a couch or at the card table.”\(^{48}\) Her husband, Prince Anton intrigued to obtain the title of Regent for himself, jealous as he was of Anna’s position and of her intimate relations with both Count Karl Lynar and Fraülein Julia Mengden (reaching for a curious \textit{ménage à trois}, Anna planned for her lovers to marry). One minister cited the precedent that in 1720 Queen Ulrica of Sweden abdicated in favor of her husband, the German Prince Frederick. At any rate, His and Her Imperial Highness, as Anna and Anton now officially titled themselves, quarreled constantly, and ministers took sides with one or the other. In the circumstances, little of importance could be accomplished, and the perception emerged that Germans were fighting over the spoils of the Russian throne; even the Swedes offered to send an army to get rid of the carpetbaggers and, of course, slice off some territory for themselves.\(^{49}\)

In addition, Regent Anna became intensely preoccupied with the problem of succession and badly overplayed her hand. She wanted to declare herself Empress and also to restrict her heirs to the German branch of the family, bypassing the Romanovs, even though Peter the Great’s daughter and grandson were still extant. She planned to issue a manifesto to that effect without seeking or even claiming the approval of Russia’s ex officio electorate. Archbishop Amvrosii of Novgorod warned her that altering the succession and in effect changing the dynasty to the House of Braunschweig demanded an “election,” since the procedure was a “custom” and a “fundamental law of the Empire,” but she went ahead with her plans.\(^{50}\)

\(^{46}\) \textit{PSZ} 11, no.8262 (23 October 1740).
\(^{47}\) \textit{PSZ} 11, no.8286 (11 November 1740); \textit{RGADA}, f.2, op.1, ed. khr, 52 (9 November 1740). Also see V.V. Andreev, \textit{Predstaviteli vlasti v Rossii posle Petra I} (St. Petersburg, 1870), pp.87-89.
\(^{49}\) \textit{Vnutrennyi byt’}, p.546 (12 January 1741); \textit{RGADA}, f.2, op.1, ed. khr. 55, l.2.
\(^{50}\) \textit{Vnutrennyi byt’}, pp.534-535 (17 October 1740). The protocols and drafts of manifestoes are located in \textit{RGADA}: f.3, ed. khr. 8 (1741), 1-35; f.2, op.1, ed. khr. 55 (2-7 November 1741), l.1-50.
Peter’s daughter Elizabeth was waiting in the wings and easily toppled this “government of foreigners.”51 Demonstrating a forceful transition and a sure grasp of the new etiquette of accession, Elizabeth readied the mandatory manifesto within hours of the coup.52 She admitted that Ivan held legal appointment to the throne but, overriding that consideration, she justified the seizure on the grounds that the “various persons” who acted as Regents had brought “such unrest and disorder that the country was threatened with ruin.” Lacking designation, she established her own legitimacy through claiming election. She was the choice of the people, she claimed, to save them from the grim rule of the Regents: “All Our loyal subjects, both clerical and lay, and especially Her Majesty’s Own Guard, beseeched Us.” For the rest of the century, it was commonplace to praise Elizabeth’s accession as the “wish of the people.”53

Elizabeth was in truth a popular choice both for dynastic and nationalistic reasons. Her manifesto emphasized her “legal right [to rule] by dint of the closest blood tie,” namely as Peter and Catherine’s daughter, while Ivan was a grand nephew of Peter the Great via a half brother and three-quarters German. Throughout her reign, she relentlessly depicted herself as The Daughter, Dschcher, who signified the return of “Russian blood” to the throne (Lithuanian mother notwithstanding).54 Actually, Karl Peter of Holstein should have succeeded, according to Catherine’s Testament, but he was thirteen years old and would have presented the prospect of another regency, presumably of Germans. In addition, as Elizabeth pointed out, the Testament stipulated that the successor be Orthodox and not in possession of another crown; Karl Peter was baptized Lutheran and heir to the Swedish throne.

Elizabeth also understood the seriousness of the oath. Within twenty-four hours, two officials and a secretary were stationed in every church in the capital with copies of the oath and manifesto ready to sign, and “no one was to be overlooked.” The oath was published in all the provinces and military units and translated into German in the appropriate districts, and the ritual proceeded smoothly.55 However, Elizabeth disenfranchised the serfs, I would guess because they might have been hostile to another female monarch.

Soon after the seizure of the throne, Elizabeth issued two more manifestoes, intended for public consumption, justifying her actions in more detail; they demonstrate that, in modern terms, she understood the need to manipu-

52 PSZ II, no.8473 (25 November 1741).
53 See, for example, Catherine II’s “Antidot’,” in P.I. Bartenev, ed., Osnovadatsatyi vek, vol.4 (Moscow, 1869), p.303.
54 RGADA, f.2, op.3, ed. khr 59 (14 February 1742); Ia.ia. Shtelin, Vsepoddanneishee pozdravlenie Imperatritse Elizavete Petrovne (18 December 1741) (St. Petersburg, 1741), p.2.
55 PSZ II, no.8474 (25 November 1741); the numbers were carefully tabulated as well: RGADA, f.2, op.1, ed. khr. 61 (1741-1742 gg).
late public opinion through the media. Elizabeth portrayed herself as a victim of “invidious” ministers, “godless criminals all,” who twice “stole” the throne from her, despite her mother’s desire that she succeed if Peter died without issue. She now claimed, on the basis of Catherine’s Testament, that the infant Ivan had “no claim whatsoever to the Russian throne,” which had properly been “returned” to its “legal heir.” More pertinent for this argument, she accused the major participants in the Regency of treason for not honoring the electoral process. She pointed out that they had plotted to remove the Romanovs from the line of succession in favor of the Braunschweig-Lüneburg-Mecklenburg line without consulting the Synod, Senate and Generalitet. Yet another sign of legitimacy was lacking; during the Regency, she said, they were “spoiling the work that Peter the Great had accomplished for the common good.” Elizabeth promised to undo the “violations” of previous rulers and restore Petrine rule so that the administration would operate “the way it did when Our Father...and Our Mother” were monarchs.

Contending that Ivan never had “any claim, lineage, or right” to the throne, Elizabeth attempted to obliterate his reign by ordering the public burning of all edicts, manifestoes, coins, documents, etc., that bore his name or likeness; she ordered the alteration of the official collection of laws so that neither his name nor his mother’s ever appeared, rendering this a “non-reign.” In another Stalinesque move, she supposedly secretly attended the trial of the Regent’s government listening from behind a curtain. Any ex-monarch while alive always represents a threat, and the baby was inhumanly incarcerated in the Schlüsselburg Fortress, where he would spend the rest of his miserable life.

One year after her accession, Elizabeth appointed her nephew, Karl Peter of Holstein, heir to the throne; he was baptized into the Orthodox faith and no longer claimed any right to the Swedish crown. She knew the winning combination well enough to seek the approval of the Senate, Synod and Generalitet, and to stress the fact that the designee was the grandson of Peter the Great. When Elizabeth died at the end of 1761, Peter’s accession had long been anticipated. As the designated successor and the only surviving male Romanov, he felt no need of election. The accession manifesto laconically stated that he deserved the throne “by right, by privilege, and by law.” Peter III also depicted

56 PSZ 11, no.8476 (28 November 1741).
57 PSZ 11: no.8480 (12 December 1741); no.8506 (22 January 1742).
58 By her order, (PSZ 11, no.8478, 3 December 1741), the pages that dealt with the reign of Ivan VI in the Full Collection of Laws were altered so that the words “the Reign of the Sovereign Emperor Ivan Antonovich” would no longer run across the top of the pages and were replaced simply by page numbers. The headings of the Regencies were declared simply “The Government of the Duke of Courland,” a title Empress Anna had given Biron in 1737, and “The Government of Princess Anna of Braunschweig-Lüneberg.” RGADA, f.2, op.1, ed. khr, 62 (18 October 1742).
59 PSZ 11, no.8658 (7 November 1742); “Opisanie obriada...,” RGADA, f.2, op.1, ed. khr.67 (6-7 November 1742).
himself as keeper of his namesake’s legacy by promising “to follow in the footsteps of the wise sovereign, Our Grandfather.” The accession oath was formulaic, and Peter did not take it seriously; reports indicated that, because of laxity, “many did not take the oath to the new Emperor.” In addition, he postponed his coronation and the additional legitimacy it conferred. In sum, Peter’s accession had the ring of a declaration, not an apologia, and he made no effort to reach out to the public for acclamation.

Historians have offered dozens of reasons why Peter III lost his throne, but Catherine the Great believed that one was paramount. Peter actually believed he was an autocrat, unfettered in power, and thus neglected to build a consensus of support among the Russian public. As Catherine explained: “He became conceited about his monarchical power...as though it by chance had fallen into his hands for his own satisfaction, and because of this he let his absolute power become forged with a despotic tendency in all matters of state.” At any rate, the thoroughly legitimate Peter III lost the throne to his willful, talented, and ambitious wife. Catherine II had no legal claim whatsoever to the throne, but artfully built her case for legitimacy. In her first manifesto, she outlined the dangers that Peter’s reign had posed: he threatened “to adopt another faith,” to conclude a peace treaty with Prussia that represented “virtual enslavement” for Russia, and to disrupt “internal order” and “unity.” She thus had “felt obligated” to “ascend the throne” once “having seen that this was the clear and sincere desire of all our loyal subjects.” Catherine’s was the only manifesto that spoke of “God’s help” during the coup - she could not bring herself to say that He actually caused her victory, but just that He lent her assistance. The oath, to which the manifesto was appended, dropped the epithet “true and born Sovereign” for obvious reasons and appointed her eight-year-old son, Paul, as heir. Perhaps remembering the fates of Sophia and Anna Leopoldovna, Catherine refused to become Regent, as many desired and expected, and instead seized power for herself.

Interestingly, except for the blood tie, Catherine repeated Elizabeth’s coup in every detail: they were almost exactly the same age; they overthrew legitimate monarchs and entourages who failed to acknowledge the new importance of the electoral public; they themselves handled that public with skill; and they claimed their essential legitimacy from popular election. Later, Catherine would write that the only reason for Elizabeth’s accession was that she was “the choice of the people” and said of her own reign that all endeavors must be “based on the voice of the people.” As in each case when women acceded, Catherine II and Elizabeth, like Catherine I and Anna Ivanovna, took power for themselves even though a male Romanov was available.

60 PSZ 15: no.11390 and no.11391 (25 December 1761).
62 PSZ 16, no.11582 (28 June 1762).
Catherine, again like Elizabeth, artfully addressed the public in a less hasty “detailed” accession manifesto that imitated her predecessor’s accusations of treason against those overthrown and the celebration of election at the hands of the people. As a preview of her Memoirs, Catherine portrayed herself as a hero and patriot and Peter as a villain and traitor, who was unfit for the throne. Her breathless indictment concluded that Peter had lost the “allegiance” of his subjects. She admitted that she seized power, but “election” endorsed the seizure: “No sooner had we announced our willingness [to rule] to the loyal subjects who had been selected and sent to Us by the people than we saw the general desire to declare allegiance to Us by people of ecclesiastical, military, and civic ranks.”

One English commentator, startled by the elective basis of Catherine’s power, marveled that “the most absolute power on earth is now held by an elective monarch.” Of course not everyone among the general public accepted the official version of events. Some believed she should have ruled as regent, and her position remained insecure for the first years of her reign. Throughout her time in power, dozens of pretenders, Pugachev most prominently, claimed to be the “rightful” tsar, Peter III.

Catherine ruled for thirty-four years. When Paul succeeded, he abandoned the eighteenth-century convention of designation or election. His manifesto, laconic like his father’s, spoke only of taking upon himself “the God-given burden” of “the throne of our forefathers, which we have inherited.” Five months after becoming Emperor, he abrogated Peter’s succession law and instituted a new one, based on primogeniture, a measure long desired by Russia’s leading statesmen. But the old conventions had not quite died out; Paul did not seek consensus and became unpopular and feared. After four years of rule, he was overthrown as an “unfit” monarch, and Alexander I, in his accession manifesto, reached out to the public, promising to rule in the spirit of Catherine II.

Once primogeniture was reestablished and sons were available, the need for election and defensive manifestoes had passed, and an era in the Russian monarchy ended. In the nineteenth-century, Russia’s absolutist form of government operated like a normal hereditary monarchy and the more intriguing characteristics of eighteenth-century monarchical politics disappeared.

To conclude, I might raise the question: Was the elective element so strong in post-Petrine Russia that we can speak of an elective monarchy? Well, yes

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64 Ibid., pp.216-223.
66 PSZ 24: no.17530 (6 November 1796); no.17909 (5 April 1797); see, for instance, Peter Pnin’s draft for a succession law in 1784, in E.S. Shumigorskii, Imperator Pavel I (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp.33-35.
67 PSZ 24, no.19779 (12 March 1801).
and no. It certainly was not the legal form of government as it was for instance in Poland, but it bore some of its traits. As in an elective monarchy, political crisis followed the death of a monarch, and the people - the elite and other members of an accepted ruling class - chose the new ruler, who then received “absolute” power. Unlike an elective monarchy, the Russian rulers always came from within a single dynasty, and the voting was not formalized. Unlike the fluctuating state policy that characterized the changing regimes of an elective monarchy, Russian policy maintained its continuity, and rulers followed the Petrine thrust in Europeanization, imperial expansion, and the retention of serfdom.

In sum, Russia’s form of government in the eighteenth century was unique and complex and seemed an amalgam of long-past traditions and contemporary political thinking. The idea of the revocable contract - ousting a leader deemed unworthy - was characteristic neither of elective nor of absolute monarchy but does recall Locke’s theories as well as the Kievan practice of removing an unfit Prince. It was also the custom in Kievan Russia, with all of its succession problems, to restrict leadership to the Riurikid clan, as Mongols and Tatars did to Chingisids and Timurids. And, as Peter reminded Russians in his 1722 law, the Muscovite tsar had the duty to appoint his successors. The emphasis on consensual politics in the manifestoes might suggest a reference to the mythologized concept of sobornost’ but also to contemporary trends in building a civil society.

This fusion of influences belies the simplistic and often-quoted characterization of the Russian form of government as “Autocracy tempered by assassination.” It was actually autocracy tempered by consensual accession. The idea of consensual politics in itself belies the stereotype - which I quoted at the beginning of this article - of a Russian political culture characterized by the alienation of state from society and by a servile, passive body politic. Instead, the succession crises of the eighteenth century articulated support for the Russian monarchy and brought on stage a public, a civil society, involved in political discussion and decision-making, whose opinion could elevate or oust an autocrat.

The eighteenth-century political culture could have, should have laid the foundations for a transition to limited monarchy, wherein public opinion becomes institutionalized in some type of representative body. For a multitude of reasons, the normal European “metamorphosis from absolute monarchy to democracy” did not occur. Therein, lies one of the many tragedies of Imperial Russian history.

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68 The full quotation by an anonymous Russian reads, “Every country has its own constitution; ours is autocracy tempered by assassination”; as quoted in Georg Herbert, Count Münster, Political Sketches of the State of Europe, 1814-1867 (1868), p.19.