DANGEROUS RAPPROCHEMENT

RUSSIA AND JAPAN IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1916*

IGOR R. SAVELIEV, YURI S. PESTUSHKO

Now, shortly before the end of the 20th century, it is clear how tragic the beginning of this century was; when in a few years millions of lives were lost in the vortex of the first world war. The First World War was especially tragic for Russia that lost autocratic grandeur as well as its internal stability and order. These events mirrored the terrifying prediction of Petr Nikolaevich Durnovo, a member of the State Council, and baron Roman Romanovich Rozen,¹ former ambassador to Japan, who considered that participation in the war in Europe would drag Russia into revolution. However, the tsar and the government were deaf to this prediction, so the nightmare became a reality. Events in the Far East were just a faint echo of the struggle of giants in the West and, as John Stephan notes, “from Vladivostok, Berlin looked less threatening than Tokyo.”² The possibility of war with Japan was in the air in the Russian Far East from 1914 to the beginning of Japanese intervention in 1918. Memories of the recent 1904-1905 war with Japan was a warning of the possibility of new bloodshed. The remoteness of European Russia, with its army and armoury, and the proximity of a well equipped army of a neighbouring country alerted Russia to the outcome of a possible collision and gave rise to rumors about the approach of this conflict. In 1909, Russia’s periodicals and even the Priamur Governor-General, Pavel Fedorovich Unterberger, continuously repeated a rumor about the approach of a war with Japan, and military officers were ready to send their families to the other side of the Urals.³ Brittle peace with Japan was very important to Russia, as according to former Minister of Finance, Sergei Iulievich Witte, Russia needed peace for the reconstruction of economics undermined by the Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905.

As the domestic and foreign policy of Japan during the First World War is meticulously researched in the monograph recently published by Frederic Dickinson,⁴ the present paper concentrates on the relations of Japan with its closest

* The authors are grateful to Adam Clulow for his assistance, and anonymous reviewer of this journal for his valuable comments and suggestions.

¹ Notes by a member of State Council, former ambassador to the United States of America and Japan Baron Rozen // Istochnik 6 (Moscow, 1997), pp.32-56.


neighbor but most distant ally, Russia. These relations, as Dickinson mentioned, were a “keystone of the politics in Northeast Asia.” The present paper is based mostly on Russian and Japanese diplomatic documents and explores other sources in Russian, Japanese and English languages.

FROM CONFRONTATION TO RAPPROCHEMENT

The Russo-Japanese War, the first large-scale conflict of the 20th century, significantly changed the political situation in the Far East. The victory over Russia gave the Japanese Empire an opportunity to act the role of the leader in northeast Asia and let Japan position among Great powers. On the contrary, her defeat in the war seriously damaged international prestige of Russia.

In the decade after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the diplomatic relations between St. Petersburg and Tokyo gradually transformed from efforts to split up Manchuria and Mongolia into spheres of influence, into political rapprochement by the beginning of the First World War. According to the secret articles of the Russian-Japanese Convention of 1907 Russia reaffirmed Japanese special interests in Korea and South Manchuria as a sphere of Japanese influence, and Japan confirmed Russia’s priority in northern Manchuria. Furthermore, Russia and Japan made joint efforts to prevent the presence of other countries, first of all, the United States, in Manchuria that was agreed in the Russian-Japanese Convention of 1910. Consequently, when the Japanese annexation of Korea was announced on August 22, 1910, Russia expressed no objection.5 According to the Russian-Japanese Convention signed in 1912, Inner Mongolia was also split between Russia and Japan by Peking meridian. Russia secured the western part of Manchuria, and Japan dominated its eastern part.6

From the end of 1910 to the beginning of 1911, Russian ambassador to London, Aleksandr Khrisphorovich Benkendorf pointed out in his telegrams to St. Petersburg that the Russian government had to take into account international, especially British, public opinion in the creation of the Far Eastern policy. “What I read too often,” he reported, “is a prediction, that Russian government, considering its western border safe, would renew its [expansionist] policy in Asia.” To Benkendorf, even the concentration of a considerable contingent of troops on the eastern border could not decrease the acuteness of this problem. Benkendorf wrote to the Foreign Minister, Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, that he “could frankly say, that [renewing of expansionist policy in Asia]

6 Grimm, E.D., Sbornik dogovorov i drugih dokumentov po istorii mezhdunarodnykh otoshenii na Dal'nem Vostoke (1842-1925) (Moscow, 1927) [Below, Sbornik dogovorov]
is not possible without a long diplomatic preparation.”7 At the meeting of the Russian supreme legislative body, the Duma, in April 1912, Sazonov himself characterized the balance between the European and Far Eastern policies of Russia in the following way: “We need not to forget that Russia is a European power and the Russian state was created not on the banks of the Black Irtish, but on the banks of the Dnieper and Moscow-River. An extension of Russian possessions in Asia cannot be an aim of our policy, as it would result in undesirable displacement of the center of gravity in the state and, hence, in the weakening of our position in Europe and the Near East.”8

By concentrating “the center of gravity” in Europe, the Russian government looked for a guaranty to save its eastern border and, consequently, to preserve status quo with Japan, which military aid was also very important to Russia from the beginning of the Great War. Therefore, when Japan announced the notorious Twenty-One Demands to China, the Russian government acted fast in declaring that “the relations, established between Russia and Japan, assure the Russian government that the Twenty-One Demands did not contain anything contradicting the interests of Russia. The Russian government considered the Demands as appropriate to be claimed to the Chinese government.”9

In May 1915, Twenty-One Demands were accepted by Peking and gave the Japanese Empire new advantages, not enjoyed by Russia, in Manchuria. These included the prolongation of the term of exploitation of the South Manchuria Railway and the right for Japanese citizens to mine, live and rent land in South Manchuria.10

After enlisting some diplomatic support from France, Russia proposed to create a British-French-Russian-Japanese alliance. However, this proposal was rejected by London either in 1914 or in 1915 because Japan imposed conditions of the alliance that Japan should participate in joint economic enterprises of the leading powers in China and the Japanese subjects should be permitted to enter into British dominions.11 Thus, a quadrilateral alliance did not come into existence, and Russia and Japan made efforts for the concluding of a bilateral agreement. Despite the fact that the preliminary negotiations between Russia and Japan took place not earlier than in December 1915, rumors about the Rus-

---

9 Priamurskie vedomosti (Khabarovsk), February 3, 1915.
Russian-Japanese alliance appeared in the diplomatic circles of Great Britain and China even in the first months of the First World War. These rumors were probably based on the information about the negotiations on the terms of further agreement between Russia’s Military Minister, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov, and Field General Fukushima Yasumas in Mukden in May 1914.\textsuperscript{12}

However, even Russian politicians and statesmen did not share a consensus on the concluding of the alliance with Japan. In February 1915, Unterberger, a member of the State Council and former Priamur Governor-General, forwarded a letter to Ivan Logginovich Goremykin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which contained a warning to avoid negotiations with Japan on a political alliance until Russian troops returned to the Russian Far East. Unterberger warned Goremykin that Japan “would not be slow” in taking advantage of the war in Europe to interfere Russian interests in the Far East.\textsuperscript{13} The Russian Consul General to Seoul, Ia.Ia. Liutsh shared Unterberger’s opinion. According to Liutsha, the decision of the Japanese government to send two additional divisions to Korea and the declarations of Japanese military circles about a necessity to “increase military power” might be a threat to the Russian Far East.\textsuperscript{14}

In August 1915, Petr L’vovich Bark, the Russian Minister of Finance, proposed to Sazonov to take countermeasures against Japan aimed at the consolidation of the positions of the Russian Empire in the northern part of Manchuria. Bark insisted that Russia should obtain the right for Russian subjects to live in Manchuria and extend to 2002 the term of exploitation of the Manchuria Railway from the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{15} However, the Foreign Ministry did not share the point of view of Unterberger, Liutsh and Bark. Sazonov remained skeptical about Unterberger’s fears and commented about his note in the following way. “When Russia negotiated with Japan [on the matter of concluding a new Convention], Engineer General Unterberger was the Governor of Priamur’e and expected Japanese aggression against Russia in the nearest future. This fact must be taken into account.”\textsuperscript{16}

In December 1915, Grand Duke Georgii visited Japan to congratulate the Japanese Emperor upon his accession to the throne and to “thank for the aid that Japan had lent to Russia from the beginning of the War.”\textsuperscript{17} Grand Duke Georgii was accompanied by the Russian Foreign Ministry Far Eastern Bureau Chief, Grigorii Kozakov who had the task of negotiating a bilateral alliance.

\textsuperscript{13} Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, tom 7, chast’ 1, p.469.
\textsuperscript{15} P.L. Bark to S.D. Sazonov. August 17, 1915. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, tom 8, chast’ 2, pp.94-96.
\textsuperscript{16} Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, tom 7, chast’ 1, p.469.
\textsuperscript{17} Nichiro kôshôshi [The History of the Russian-Japanese Negotiations] (Tokyo, 1979), p.317.
From December 1915 to February 1916, Kozakov had a series of consultations with Ishii Kikujirô, the Foreign Minister, and Terauchi Masatake, the Governor-General of Korea. Japan’s major condition of the concluding of an alliance was extending its rights to the Changchun-Harbin Railway controlled by Russia. During the preliminary negotiations parties did not come to an agreement, but consultations for the concluding of a new convention and its major problem, possession of Changchun-Harbin Railway, were continued after Kozakov’s return to Russia and were surrounded by a number of rumors. Thus, negotiations about arms for the Russian army were interpreted as Russia’s consent to a compromise concerning the problem of Changchun-Harbin Railway in return for Japanese rifles. The British ambassador to Russia, George Buikenen reported to the British Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey, that Sazonov expressed Russia’s consent to transfer rights to the Changchun-Harbin Railway in return for one million rifles to the Japanese ambassador to St. Petersburg, Motono Ichiro in August 1915. One month later, Motono reported to Tokyo that Field General Mikhail Alekseevich Beliaev, who discussed possible conditions of the convention with Japanese representative Odagiri, expressed Russia’s consent to transfer northern Sakhalin to Japan in return for 200,000-300,000 rifles. However, as Beliaev reported later to the Russian Military Minister, Aleksei Andreevich Polivanov, he had not even met Odagiri, but had a meeting with his assistant, Major Izome and they did not discuss any possibilities of territorial compensations. These rumors circulating during the summer and fall of 1915 reflected Japan’s desire to take advantage of Russia’s deficit of arms which appeared after its defeat in the war campaign of 1915. Russia’s attempt to compensate for the loss of arms, finally, led to the conclusion of the political alliance with Japan.

In February 1916, the Japanese Foreign Ministry proposed to Russia that negotiations on the item of concluding a political alliance begin. The Changchun-Harbin Railway was still Japan’s major condition, and the problem of additional privileges in the Far East for Japanese fishermen had also arisen. Russia’s commercial and industrial circles vigorously opposed the conclusion of a Russian-Japanese alliance on the above-mentioned conditions, for fear of the penetration of Japanese investments into northern Manchuria and also of transforming of the Sungari River into a waterway for Japanese trade vessels.

19 Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, tom 8, chast’ 2, pp.80-81.
They feared that Vladivostok would yield to Dairen its significance as a major seaport for the transit of Japanese goods, and that the Ussuri Railway would lose its position as an important means of transporting goods from Khabarovsk and other parts of Russia. The negotiations between Russia and Japan dragged on until July 1916, but, finally, the Convention was signed in St. Petersburg on July 3.

One year later, in 1917, when Japan again put pressure on the Russian government regarding the territorial question, the Russian Provisional Government agreed to sell the Changchun-Harbin Railway to Japan. This was caused by the same motives as the plan to sell Kamchatka to the United States for twenty billion roubles. However, the Bolsheviks assumed power and interrupted negotiations before the Railway was sold to Japan.23

The Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916 contained the same articles as the Conventions concluded before. The Convention had two parts, main and secret. The main part of the Convention declared that both sides would not take part in a political alliance directed against one of them and, if sovereignty of any party would be threatened, the other side would take mutual measures for its defense. The secret part of the Convention reaffirmed the previous Russian-Japanese declarations to preserve the territorial and administrative integrity of China and stipulated that appropriate measures would be taken to avoid the establishment of political supremacy in China by a third country. Moreover, in the case of Japan or Russia becoming involved in a war with a third country, the other side must come to the aid at the earliest demand of the ally and not make peace with a third country without mutual consent. The Convention also pointed out that neither Japan, nor Russia could aid any other country without the provision of assistance for themselves from their allies.24

**Japanese Military Aid to Russia**

At the time of the outbreak of the First World War, Russia’s army as well as its economy as a whole was unprepared to send troops to the front line. Despite the fact that the Russian government had assigned more than 22% of the state budget to the army and navy between 1898 and 1913, the loses of the Russian army during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) had not been restored by 1914.25 In 1906-1913, the Russian government was largely concerned with financing for the construction of large warships, but the First World War required weapons for army much more than warships, and the Russian government had to reorient state naval factories to the production of land arms that

---

24 *Sbornik dogovorov*, p.191.
also required significant investments. The British ambassador to Russia, George Buikenen, described the state of Russian army on the eve of the war in the following way. “The Russia’s industry is in the backward state, it has not got enough plants and factories. Factories and plants that Russia possesses lack skilled workers. The most difficult task for the allies is to reequip Russia.”

By the beginning of the First World War, Russian army lacked 800,000 projectiles, 1,500 tons of gunpowder, one million of rifles with cartridges and 1,500 infantry tools.

After the fall of Qingdao in November 1914, the Japanese Empire became only a formal ally of Great Britain, France and Russia in the War against Germany, but played an important role in supplying them with arms and ammunition. Soon after the beginning of the war in Europe, in August of 1914, Russia and Japan began the negotiations concerning the supply to the Russian army of Japanese arms and ammunition that, as Dickinson mentioned, “played a crucial part in the Russian war effort.”

The Japanese government had formed a commission that was responsible for military aid to Russia. However, the Japanese industry was not ready to produce the arms required by Russia at the time of receiving the order because it lacked raw materials and needed to alter Japanese factories according to the standards of the Russian army. Therefore, the Japanese Military Ministry had to send arms to Russia from its own stocks up to the end of 1914. In this year, the Russian army received from Japan 80,790 rifles and other arms and ammunition for the total sum of 75,105 yen from Japan. However, this was a comparatively small amount and had a little effect on the fighting strength of the Russian army. At the same time, the deficit of the machine guns in the Russian army had grown from 833 to 140,722 by the spring of 1915. The summer offensive of the German forces led to new huge

---

26 The Baltic Squadron had been destroyed in the Tsushima battle of the Russo-Japanese War, and The Black-See Squadron was blockaded in Black Sea as Russian warships were prohibited to pass the straits connecting Mediterranean and Black Seas according to the Treaty of Paris (1856). See for example, Istoriia diplomatii (Moscow, 1959).
29 Galperin, Aleksandr L’vovich, Anglo-iaponskii soiuiz (Moscow, 1947). As Russia and France were the allies of the Great Britain, they also counted on the military help of Japan.
30 Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, p.145.
losses in manpower and equipment in the Russian army. The number of rifles declined from one and half million to 600,000, and the number of cannons from 6,000 to 4,000 by October 1915. Japanese military attaché attached to the Russian General Headquarter, Nakajima Masatake ironically wrote that “there was only one rifle in each one and a half kilometers on the Russian-German front line, which stretched for one thousand kilometers.”

The huge deficit of arms in the army was the main reason that the Russian government proposed to Tokyo in July 1915 to import raw materials from Russia for the production of arms. In total, Japanese plants had produced 400,000 rifles and 350 cannons for Russia from autumn of 1914 to April of 1915.

The method of Russia’s payments for the arms also was an important issue in the negotiations between the Russian and Japanese governments. The latter demanded to the Russian ambassador to Tokyo, Nikolai Malevski-Malevich that Russia pay for the arms and ammunition in cash. First 15 millions yen in gold must be paid at the Osaka Mint Bureau. Later, when the Russian government planned to pay some 315 million yen for arms by the Russian shares of stock, the Japanese Foreign Ministry denied the request, explaining this refusal by the inability of Japanese industry to produce arms for Russia in such large amounts. Actually, the Japanese government assumed that it would be impossible for the Japanese holders of Russian stocks to exchange them into cash if they would be “thrown” into the Japanese financial market.

34 At the end of June 1915, the British ambassador to Tokyo Sir Coyningham Greene offered Katō Takaaki to supply the Japanese military factories with raw materials from Great Britain. The Prime Minister of Great Britain Edward Grey sent an inquiry about the details of the raw materials’ supply to the British Embassy in Tokyo. However, the Japanese government did not respond to the proposal of London. At the same time, Greene reported to the British Foreign Office that the Japanese government might took into consideration Russian proposals to supply Japan with raw materials. Katō replied on the Greene’s inquiry not earlier than on July 29, explaining the delay by the negotiations with Russia on the same issue. Finally, the Japanese government promised to aid Great Britain with arms and did not give a definite reply to the British proposal. Coyningham Greene to a secretary of the Japanese Foreign Ministry Tokugawa. July 7, 1915; Katō to Greene. July 29. 1915. Nihon gaikô bunsho. 1915, vol.3, part 2, pp.1022, 1036.
less, in June 1916, the Japanese government agreed to take Russian shares to the sum of 50 millions yen as payment for only a sixth part of the produced arms.\(^\text{39}\)

Although the Russian government had almost stopped paying for Japanese arms and ammunition from the end of 1916, Tokyo did not break off the military aid to Russia\(^\text{40}\) because a large number of Japanese banks were involved into the payments for the arms orders placed by Russia and the raw materials had been already bought by Japanese military factories for these orders. In addition, the Japanese industry had been producing arms for Russia for four years, and Japanese government took this opportunity to improve the Japanese army’s own equipment. The Japanese government hoped that Russia would be able to pay its debts after the end of the war. The last batch of the military aid of 150,000 rifles was sent to Russia in the summer of 1917.\(^\text{41}\) In total, Japan had produced about 450,000 rifles for Russia during the First World War. By December 1917, the total Russian debt for Japanese arms and ammunition reached 23,142,556 yen, but the Japanese government agreed to deter payments of 20,848,002 and to receive the rest 2,294,554 yen by six payments (See table 1).

**Table 1. The structure of the Russia debts’ payments\(^\text{42}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Sum of payment (yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December, 1917</td>
<td>372,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 1918</td>
<td>476,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 1918</td>
<td>522,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1918</td>
<td>444,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1918</td>
<td>443,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1918</td>
<td>34,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,294,554</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total debt of Russia to Japan increased to 200 millions yen. However, it was not much larger than the debts of Great Britain and France (See table 2).

---


### Table 2. The Debts of Russia, Great Britain and France to Japan by 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The sum of debt (yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>190,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>130,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>540,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A special place in the history of the Russian-Japanese military cooperation belongs to Japanese volunteers who desired to fight for the Russian army. In the first days of the War, Russia, Great Britain and France demanded that Japan send troops to Europe. However, in the autumn of 1914, instead of soldiers, they received a detachment of the Japanese Red Cross that was able to deal with one hundred casualties.

At the same time, there were Japanese subjects who requested that the Russian government enroll them in the subsidiary Japanese corps and send to the Russian-German front line. The Russian government decided to send Japanese volunteers by the Trans-Siberian Railroad and to board the Japanese soldiers in cars that were between the cars with Russian soldiers to prevent a possibility of uprising. However, the idea of sending a Japanese army to the Russian-German front line did not receive support within Japanese political circles. Appeals by the Prime Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, for sending Japanese troops to Europe were severely criticized by an opposition political party Seiyûkai that argued the impossibility of further increasing the military budget. If twenty divisions were sent to Europe, the Japanese government calculated that it would be necessary to build vessels with a total displacement of 5 million tons that would require 700 million yen for construction and total expenses of one billion yen. According to Tokyo, the sending of a comparatively small numbers of soldiers to the European battlefields would not be able to change the situation significantly. As a result, no Japanese reservists were sent to the European front.

Nevertheless, military aid of Japan to Russia was the reason that Japan received technologies and raw materials from Russia’s allies which strengthened the Japanese economy and army. Although by the beginning of the War the debt of Japan was two billion yen, by its end, the Japanese Empire had turned into the main creditor of Great Britain, Russia and France. The number of factories in Japan grew from 125 in 1883 to 20,000 by 1917. Further, Japan assumed the place of Germany in the Far Eastern markets. At the same time, Japan’s aid to Russia as well as Great Britain and France could barely be consid-

---

44 A.A. Polivanov to S.D. Sazonov, September 1, 1915. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii, f.150, op.493, d.1901, l.1.
ered significant as the Japanese government often delayed the supply of arms and ammunition and sold mainly arms of the old standard.

**Japanese Communities within the Russian Far East and Their Economic Activities**

From the time of the absorption of the Amur and Maritime Provinces into the Russian Empire, Russia’s new territories attracted sojourners from neighboring China, Korea and Japan. In contrast with most Chinese migrants who shuttled forth and back between their homeland and Russia, Japanese merchants and Korean farmers settled within the Amur and Maritime Provinces. According to a survey carried out in 1897 by the Russian government, 42,823 Chinese, 26,100 Koreans and only 2,291 Japanese were living in the Priamur Governor-Generalship. Although the numbers of Chinese and Koreans were almost the same by 1910 - 61,429 and 60,800 respectively, the number of Japanese was constantly small - 3,896.

Japanese emigration to the Russian Far East dates back to the establishment of the economic relations between the seaports of Nagasaki and Vladivostok. In 1876, the Japanese Imperial Commercial Agency (Nihon Bôeki Jimukan), that also fulfilled the functions of a diplomatic mission, was opened in Vladivostok. Since its opening the Japanese Commercial Agent, Sewaki Hisato, attempted to consolidate the few dozen of Japanese subjects, living in Vladivostok. He was also successful in obtaining, for the Japanese trade company “Tokyo Bôeki Shôkai,” a contract for the construction of a mill and barracks for Russian troops. After the bankruptcy of its head office in Yokohama the Vladivostok branch was inherited by its former employee Sugiura Toshihiro, who entered the top guild of Vladivostok’s merchants by the end of the 1880s.

As soon as the number of Japanese in Vladivostok exceeded 1,000 people, in 1892, they founded an Association of Corporations (Dômeikai) which united all the Japanese professional unions in that city. However, not all Japanese were members of these unions, and so this association did not unite all residents, and in 1895 it was transformed into the so-called Association of Fellow Countrymen (Dôhôkai), which issued an instruction that all Japanese residents in Vladivostok must become members. Finally, it changed its name in 1902 and became the Vladivostok Resident Association (Urajio Kyoryûminkai),46 one of many such associations with the same name and the same regulations that appeared first in China, then in Great Britain as well as in British colonies and dominions.47 It is probably correct for professor Evgenii Genrikhovich Spal’vin

---

of the Oriental Institute to say that “Association’s activities were arranged according to Japan’s Government Regulations of Resident Associations abroad.”

It was necessary that candidates for the office of president and any resolutions adopted by the Association should be approved by the Japanese Commercial Agent (until 1907) and then by the Japanese Consul (after 1907). Both had the right to summon an extraordinary meeting of the Association that demonstrated the subordinate position of the Association to that of the official Japanese government diplomatic mission. In one of his reports, the Commercial Agent even mentioned that the association was a division of the Commercial Agency.48

Russian government officials considered that Association’s activities were “undesirable” and must be stopped. Thus, in July 1911, Vice-Minister of Home Affairs, S. Kryzhanovskii, reported to the Foreign Ministry that “all Japanese in Vladivostok were united in an illegal conspirative association financed by the Japanese government” and “served as a tool... to collect information” about the situation in Vladivostok. S. Kryzhanovskii concluded that it was necessary to require Japanese to close these associations.49 However, the Japanese Consul-General rejected even the fact of their existence. Chief officials of the Association declared its dissolution in 1912, but documents in Japan’s Diplomatic Records Office demonstrated that it continued to exist until the 1920s. According to Spalvin, associations existed in twelve Russian cities in 1909 and in eighteen cities by 1917.

Hunting for spies was another reason for this mutual distrust. Japanese in Russia as well as Russians in Japan were under constant supervision by governmental bodies. French historian, Henrie Labrout, who visited Vladivostok in 1911, noted

suspicious Japanese had been arrested in Vladivostok, Irkutsk or Chita every month. Who did not know a Japanese colonel, who gave himself out to be a professional photographer? Who did not know in Vladivostok that the Japanese Consul and some his compatriots have some kind of secret relations between each other?

Staying at the home of a Russian military officer, whose duty was to supervise Japanese residents in Vladivostok, Labrout was surprised that the officer’s baby-sitter was a Japanese woman, “not looking as a person of poor peasant origin.” When Labrout shared his surprise with the officer, he was answered with the usual Russian “it does not matter.”50 In fact, the Japanese were quite popular as servants in the houses of the Russian military and civilian

48 Arkhiv vostokovedov, Sankt-Peterburgskii filial Instituta vostokovedeniia RAN, f.1, op.4, d.27. Spal’vin, E.G., “Svedeniia ob iaponskikh obshchestvakh vo Vladivostoke. 1909,” 16.
49 S. Kryzhanovskii to A.A. Neratov, July 9, 1911. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii, f.148, op.487, d.759, l.4a.
officials, and this, of course, made information gathering much easier for the Japanese. Thus, Alexander Ivanovich Kokoshkin, the Vice-Prosecutor of Blagoveschensk, wrote to the Japanese dentist Kanayama Shôkô: “Last time you visited me, you promised to introduce me a Japanese [servant]. If he did not change his mind yet, please, send him to me.” At the same time, as Spal’vin noted, the Japanese Consul issued an order directed to all Japanese residents not to approach to Russian military objects so as to avoid possible suspicion. It is obvious, that most Japanese merchants and artisans were not involved with politics and military preparations, but merely enjoyed their high incomes in a neighboring foreign country.

The Japanese who resided in the Maritime and Amur Provinces were able to secure solid positions in the economic life of these two provinces, especially in Vladivostok. By 1903, Japanese people owned one-fifth (108 of 558) of all enterprises in the Maritime Province. Ninety-two were situated in Vladivostok, thirteen in Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk, and three in Khabarovsk. In Vladivostok Japanese owned 35 of 36 laundries, seven of eleven hairdressing salons, eight of nine watchmakers, 15 of 25 carpentries and 8 of 24 tailor shops. Some Japanese therapists also had a good reputation. Thus, Japanese dentist Kanayama Shôko, who was taught by American Theodore Gulick, spent more than ten years, working in Blagoveschensk. He worked on the teeth of most top officials of the city, including the vice-governor and the prosecutor as well as many members of the first Amur Cossack Regiment, which was billeted in Blagoveschensk.

The main category of Japanese sojourners within the Russian Far East were fishermen, coming every year to fish in Russian territorial waters along the coasts of Sakhalin and Kamchatka, areas very rich in fish. Geographical proximity let them to return to their families every autumn, leaving fishing settlements and warehouses on the southern seacoast of Sakhalin, particularly in Aniva Bay, and in other places empty until the following spring. Under the Fisheries Convention of 1907, Japanese fishermen received wider rights to the above mentioned region, such as the right to fish in both the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. This resulted in a considerable increase in the number of Japanese fishermen in the period from 1907 to 1913. According to Russian statistics for the same period, in 1912-1914, about 13,000-15,000 Japanese were working every year in fisheries leased by Japanese companies.

Shortly after the signing of the Fisheries Convention of 1907, the Japanese fishermen founded three large companies, “Roryô Suisan Kumiai”[Marine Products Association in the Russian Territory] in 1908, “Roryô Gyogyôken Hozen DÔmeikai”[Union for the Preservation of Fishery Right in the Russian Territory] in 1910, and shortly after their creation, the Union of Fishermen of the Russian Far East, which worked in the interests of the fishermen.

---

51 Private collection of documents owned by Nakamura Takashi.
52 Sbornik dogovorov, p.167.
ry] in 1913, “Nichiro Gyogyô Kabushiki Kaisha” [Japanese-Russian Fishery Stock Company] in 1914. The Regulations of the “Roryô Suisan Kumiai” declared that the company’s aim was “to establish peaceful and friendly relations between the fishermen of Japan and Russia.” In fact, however, all the above-mentioned companies were in strong competition with the Russian fishermen. Thus, the Regulations of “Roryô Gyogyôken Hozen Dômeikai” declared that its activities were aimed to protect the rights of the Japanese fishermen and enlarge their activities in the Russian territorial waters.

Japanese fishing companies struggled against the closing of fisheries as well as the prohibition to transfer fisheries from one leaseholder to another and to navigate from one fishery to another. “Roryô Gyogyôken Hozen Dômeikai” was especially successful in the competition for leasing most profitable fisheries in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan. The Japanese fishing company “Nichiro Gyogyô Kabushiki Kaisha” began its business activities with the fishery on the eastern coast of Kamchatka. Subsequently, the company united three quarters of the Japanese fishermen in the Russian territorial waters and became the largest company in fishing industry. Consolidation of Japanese fishermen into large companies by the beginning of the War largely ended the competition between small leaseholders of fisheries. As it could be clearly seen in Table 3, Russian fishermen lost the competition with the Japanese, mainly because of the lack of fishing boats.

**Table 3. The numbers of the Japanese and Russian fishing boats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of fishermen origin</th>
<th>Class of boat</th>
<th>Number of fishing boats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Sail-engine vessel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steamboats</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japanese type vessels</td>
<td>7,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European type vessels</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steamboats</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


56 Ibid., p.165.

57 *Priamurskie vedomosti* (Khabarovsk), February 8, 1914.

58 The Russian Consulate in Hakodate to N.A. Malevski-Malevich. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arhiv Dal’nego Vosto-ka, f.702, op.7, d.92, l.1.

The Russo-Japanese Fisheries Convention which aimed to regulate fishing in the Russian conventional waters, did not contain sufficient regulations to enforce this aim. Additionally, the administration of the Primor Governor-Generalship did not possess sufficient numbers of either inspectors, or ships to inspect all fisheries. This allowed the Japanese to fish even in the Amur estuary, which was not allowed by the Convention. Another rule limiting the number of laborers at each fishery was frequently violated by Japanese leaseholders who hired additional fishermen instead of “artel heads” and “masterovye,” categories of non-fishing personnel.\(^60\) The number of fisheries and volumes of fish fished by Japanese gradually increased from 1908, reaching their highest figures in 1914 (See Table 4).

### Table 4. Number of fisheries leased by the Russian and Japanese fishermen\(^61\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of fishes fished by Japanese (pieces)</th>
<th>Russian fisheries</th>
<th>Japanese fisheries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>107,105</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>197,047</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>284,9047</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>497,115</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>220,544</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>365,673</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>452,439</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>400,305</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, a fish processing industry was set by the Japanese companies “Tsutsumi Shōkai,” “Yushutsu Shokuhin,” “Ichii Gumi,” and produced mainly canned food, in Kamchatka. In 1914-1917, the production of this canned food increased 4.6 times.\(^62\) Thus, the Japanese virtually monopolized the fishing industry in the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk and they began fishing even in the Amur estuary.

---

60 The State Property Administration of Sakhalin and Maritime Province to the Foreign Ministry Far Eastern Bureau Chief. March 9, 1915. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Dal’nego Vostoka, f.702, op.6, d.193, l.10.


I. SAVELIEV, Y. PESTUSHKO

THE ROLE OF KOREAN INSURGENTS WITHIN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST, WITH REGARD TO RUSSIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR

Most Korean immigrants settled in the Ussuri Region in the south of the Maritime Province, between the 1860s and 1870s and engaged in agriculture. In 1863-1884, 1,164 Korean families with a total number of 5,447 people occupied 3,357 desiatins (9,064 acres) and founded 33 villages during almost thirty years from 1863 to 1892. Some of those villages were populated exclusively by Korean farmers, and only some Koreans, who were mostly engaged in trade, resided in Vladivostok and other Russian cities. In Vladivostok they lived in the “Korean settlement” (Shinhanch’on) which was located next to the “Japanese trade district” (Nihonjin shôtengai). However, Japanese and Koreans residents spent their everyday life inside their ethnic enclaves and did not communicate much each other until Korea became a part of the Japanese Empire.

The relationship between Japanese and Korean communities and their place in Russian foreign policy significantly changed in 1905, when Russia’s defeat in the war with Japan removed the last obstacle for establishing Japan’s protectorate over Korea. After this happened in November 1905 a part of those Koreans, who opposed the Japanese administration, shifted to the Russian Far East. Their exodus was especially large from the end of 1908 to the beginning of 1909, when large Japanese regular troops forced Korean guerrillas out from their homeland to China and the Russia’s Maritime Province. The Korean diaspora in Russia lost its exclusively agricultural nature, and farmers were partly supplemented by political refugees, adherents and direct participants in the struggle against the Japanese regime, including top leaders of the opposition. A Commissioner in the Russian Foreign Ministry, V.V. Grave, gave the following description of the social composition of the “Korean settlement” in Vladivostok of 1910: “The settlement is a center, around which Koreans, dissatisfied by the present regime in Korea, political refugees and all, whose staying in their homeland are threatened by danger to their lives, form groups. Prosperous and well-educated Koreans, accepted to the Russian citizenship, live here, and, finally, coolie-laborers, engaged in uncountable works in the city and port, huddle here too.” Thus, Vladivostok became a center of the activities of political opposition to the pro-Japanese regime in Korea. These activities culminated in January 1909, when a Korean ethnic organization, the National Association (Kungminhoe) was formed in the Maritime Province as many similar associations appeared in Hawaii and California to struggle against the Japanese regime in Korea.

63 Grave, V.V., Kitaitsy, koreitsy i iapontsy v Priamur’e: Trudy komandirovannoi po vysochaishemu poveleniiu Amurskoi ekspeditsii, vypusk 11 (St. Petersburg, 1912), p.128.
64 Ibid., pp.183-184.
65 S. Kryzhanovskii to A.A. Neratov, July 9, 1911. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii, f.148, op.487, d.759, l.4b.
The annexation of Korea by Japan stimulated Korean immigrants in Russia to apply for the Russian citizenship instead of becoming subjects of the Japanese Empire. In 1910, the year of Japan’s annexation of Korea, more than 10,000 Korean immigrants applied for Russian citizenship. Most of them were farmers who had already resided many years in Russia and who had lost ties with their homeland. However, some of the applicants were insurgents, who were recently forced to leave Korea. Thus, at the beginning of 1906, the detachment lead by Yi Pôm-yun, former governor of Kando (Jian’dao) Province and numbered 700 persons, shifted to the Russian territory.

Korean guerrillas activities in the Maritime Province arouse negative reaction by both the Japanese and Russian governments. Japanese troops shelled Korean villages on the Russian side of the border from the Korean territory. Moreover, the Japanese Consulate-General in Vladivostok and the Vladivostok Resident Association made attempts to establish control over Koreans in the Maritime Province and to prevent anti-Japanese movement among Korean immigrants. Thus, shortly before Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, Torii, a Russian-speaking former merchant, and Kido, an agent of the pro-Japanese “Association of Progress” (“Il’chinhoe”), were attached to the Japanese Consulate-General in Vladivostok by Governor-General of Korea with the function of supervising Koreans in Russia. Additionally, in September 1910, Russian authorities arrested an agent of the Association of Progress who arrived in Russia in the guise of a Buddhist priest to open new departments of the Association. Pavel Iurievich Vaskevich, an interpreter at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, reported to the ambassador Bronevski that the Japanese founded a Korean Resident Association (Chôsen kyoryûminkai) in Vladivostok to consolidate Korean immigrants under Japanese control. In July 1913, the Japanese newspaper “Jiji Shimpo” mentioned that the Governor-General of Korea sent two top-ranking officials on an official journey to each area, where many Koreans resided, to supervise them.

However, pro-Japanese propaganda had the opposite result. Many members of the Association of Progress were murdered by Korean nationalists. Assaults on other Japanese were frequent in Vladivostok and other Russian cities. Thus, the Japanese seizure of Korea strained relations between the two ethnic groups in the multiethnic Russian Far East. In addition, guerrilla activities strained relations between various social groups within the Korean diaspora in the Maritime Province. Insurgents were successful in obtaining support from their compatriots who had recently abandoned Korea and who did not as yet own agricultural property in Russia. Many of them immigrated to Russia in order to escape from the repressions of the Japanese administration.

67 Grave, Kitaitsy, koreitsy i iapontsy..., pp.198-199.
68 Kitai i Iaponiia, no.151 (Khabarovsk, 1913), pp. 43-44.
In 1906, one detachment of volunteers (uibyŏng) was formed in the Posyet District from Koreans, residing in the Maritime Province, by Ch’oi Ja Hyeon, who graduated from a Russian school and had a Russian name, Tsoi Petr Semenovich. Several thousand of these Korean guerrillas attacked Japanese troops from the Russian territory, and were a significant force within the total 44,000 Korean guerrillas in 1907 and 69,804 in 1908.\(^69\) In 1907, Korean settlers in Russia gathered 17,000 roubles and 260 rifles for guerrillas. They also took guerrillas, who intended to attack the Japanese, across unknown areas and ferried them by boats.\(^70\) An Chung-gun, who assassinated the Japanese Resident-General in Korea, Itô Hirobumi, in Russia-owned Harbin in October 1909, also resided in Vladivostok’s “Korean settlement” between 1907 and 1909.

However, those who settled in Russia in the late 19th century and who possessed large amounts of land were not enthusiastic in supporting guerrillas with arms and foodstuffs. According to the sources in the Far Eastern department of the Russian Historical Archives, guerrillas under the command by Yi Pŏm-yun even forced the Koreans within the Maritime Province to gather food, money and arms.\(^71\) Thus, Vasilii Andreevich Mun, a farmer and merchant from the Putsilovka village in the Maritime Province, as well as many other Korean immigrants complained the Russian authorities about the violence of Yi Pŏm-yun’s guerrillas and even fought them.\(^72\) Moreover, Korean merchants who successfully imported meat for the Russian army and resided in Vladivostok were notified by Japanese authorities, that “their commercial operations would be liquidated and property confiscated, if their compatriots in Russia actively resist against the annexation of Korea.”\(^73\) This, of course, made them extremely negative to the guerrillas activities.

Some leaders of Korean insurgents expected that the Russian government would be their ally and cooperate in the their struggle against the Japanese troops resided in the Korean Peninsula. In 1909, Kim In Sou, former Captain of the Seoul Imperial Guards, asked the Russian Foreign Ministry Far Eastern Bureau Chief, L.A. Bogoiavlenskii to supply guerrillas with arms, and pointed out that they would struggle against the “common enemy” of Russia and Korea. He also proposed to extend Russian citizenship to 1,300 Korean guerrillas.

---


\(^{70}\) Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Dal’nego Vostoka, f.1, op.3, d.1160, l.69-70, 206, 225.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., f.1, op.11, d.73.

\(^{72}\) When Yi Pŏm-yun was arrested by the Russian authorities in October 1910, he denied the fact of enforcing Korean farmers to collect money for his activities, but the Russians did not investigate this case carefully. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Dal’nego Vostoka, f.1, op.10, d.327, l.1,6, 57-58.

and to allot land to them. However, the negotiations revealed a difference between the Russian and Korean approach. Bogoiavlenskii argued to Kim In Sou that Russia was a Japanese ally and hence could not allow guerrilla activities in its territory and the protection of the anti-Japanese struggle might become a cause for a new armed conflict with Japan.\footnote{A Private Letter of the Foreign Ministry Far Eastern Bureau Chief L.A. Bogoiavlenskii to the Deputy Foreign Minister N.V. Charykov. Khabarovsk, January 31, 1909. Arkhiv vneshei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii, f.148, op.487, d.1096, l.86-87. See also: Pak, Boris Dmitrievich, “Uchastie koreiskoi emigratsii v Rossii v antiaponskoi bor’be (1906-1917)” in: Han Minchok Tok’ip Unton Sayu [A History of the Liberty Movement of the Korean Ethnicity] (Seoul, 1992), p.1108.} A negative reply was closely tied to the request of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to stop the activities of rebellious Koreans, as the Russian government was deeply concerned with the maintaining of friendly relations with Japan. Thus, Nikolai Malevski-Malevich, the Russian ambassador to Tokyo, wrote to Vasilii Egorovich Flug, the Military Governor of Maritime Province, that the requirements of the Japanese government to stop insurgents’ activities “could not be ignored by the Russian government.” Shortly after Japan’s request, in April 1908, the Russian Foreign Ministry pointed out to N.N. Martos, the Priamur Governor-General, that Korean guerrillas activities were “not acceptable,”\footnote{A Secret Telegram to the Lieutenant-General N.N. Martos, April 28, 1908. Arkhiv vneshei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii, f.143, op.491, d.88, l.22.} and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Petr Arkadievich Stolypin ordered Martos “to take effective measures to stop the anti-Japanese movement on the Russian border, and, if necessary, to move Korean leaders off Novokievskoe to places more distant from Korea.” Malevski-Malevich also reported to the next Priamur Governor-General, Pavel Fedorovich Unterberger: “Your Excellency knows, how the Russian government is interested in the removal of any suspicion of supporting an uprising in Korea. Therefore, I would like to ask you earnestly to take measures to disarm conspirators and predict the participation of the Russians in the conspiracy. If Yi Pôm-yun is a foreigner, he should be deported from the [Russian] Empire.”\footnote{Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Dal’nego Vostoka, f.1, op.3, d.1160, l.19, 68.} The Russian government continued this negative policy towards the Korean insurgents movement on the Russian territory, and two years later, after the annexation of Korea the Russian Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Petrovich Izvol’skii, stressed again the importance of maintaining friendly relations with Japan and need to suppress the anti-Japanese struggle of Korean guerrillas: “A danger of touching upon the Korean question, painful for Japan, is incommensurate with the benefit that we could have from the disturbances in Korea...”\footnote{Ibid., f.702, op.1, d.640, l.220.}

Nikolai L’vovich Gondatti, who replaced Unterberger in the post of the Priamur Governor-General, took various measures aimed at ending Korean guerrilla activities. Local authorities, for example the Governor of Nikol’sk-
Ussuriiskii District Kissel’man, had received instructions to stop the creation of new guerrilla detachments. Russian customs also confiscated weapons, and frontier troops worked to deter Koreans from crossing the border.78 Due to these measures, attacks of Korean guerrillas from the Russian territory stopped in March 1911. Three months later, Russia and Japan signed the Treaty of Extradition, allowing extradition of political criminals that was aimed to suppress activities of Russian socialists in Japan as well as rebellious Koreans in Russia. However, the Russian government did not agree to extradite guerrillas to the Japanese administration in Korea.79 The Japanese government and mass media continued to pay attention to the anti-Japanese activities in the Russian Far East. Thus, Japanese newspaper “Asahi” published articles advising Russia to retreat from calling 3,000 Korean volunteers to military service.80

In October 1914, when the beginning of the war in Europe made it especially important to Russia to preserve the status quo with Japan, activities by the Korean National Association were forbidden, and a Korean-language newspaper with the Russian name “Orthodoxy,” edited by a Korean Yi Gan, was prohibited. On November 22, 1914, the Japanese embassy in Petrograd forwarded a note to the Russian Foreign Ministry with request to extradite twenty-one leader of the anti-Japanese movement. A list attached to the note (Liste des Coreens dont l’expulsion de la Russie est desirable) included sixteen Koreans from Vladivostok, two from Novokievskoe, and three from Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk.81 Thus, Russia became an unwilling participant in the clash between two East Asian nations because of the Korean diaspora which scattered within Russia’s eastern outskirts. In the end, the situation was resolved due to a compromise. A number of Korean guerrilla leaders were arrested and some of them were deported to Manchuria, but no one was extradited to Japanese authorities in Korea.

**RUSSIAN-JAPANESE TRADE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR**

It is often the case that political rapprochement is an important factor in developing economic relations of the allies, but such a tendency was not observed in regard to the Russian-Japanese entente. Despite the fact that Japanese foreign trade showed more than double increase in total, the Russian-Japanese trade did not change significantly. For example, Japan exported goods worth 2,364,119 yen to Russia in 1913, 4,331,302 yen in 1914, and 3,172,771 yen...
in 1915.\textsuperscript{82} The United States, China, France, the Netherlands and Great Britain remained the primary trade partners of Japan before and during the war.\textsuperscript{83} According to the Japanese sources, the main reason of the stagnation in the economic relations between Russia and Japan were the extremely high Russian import duties. Almost all goods imported into Russia had imposed on them a custom duty of 100\%, except wheat flour (62\% custom duty), and tea (85\% custom duty). These custom duties were much higher than the import duties of the United States, France, Great Britain and Germany. For example, the import duty of wheat flour was 28\% in France, and the import duty on tea was only 4\% in the U.S.A.\textsuperscript{84}

However, Vladivostok was an important seaport for transit of the Japanese goods (See Table 5). By September 1916 the volume of the Japanese goods transported via Vladivostok to the European part of Russia increased 2.6 times when compared to the 1914 figures.

\textbf{Table 5. The Volume of the Goods Transported to European Russia via Vladivostok in 1914-1916 (in kilograms)}\textsuperscript{85}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>September, 1916</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11,648,000 (49%)</td>
<td>19,920,000 (49%)</td>
<td>30,752,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>208,000 (0.9%)</td>
<td>1,216,000 (2.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>5,776,000 (24.5%)</td>
<td>13,712,000 (33.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5,776,000 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5,760,000 (14.3%)</td>
<td>5,456,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>96,000 (0.5%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21,440,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, the Japanese government was especially interested in establishing a duty-free port in Vladivostok in order to increase transit trade with European Russia. Japan proposed this plan twice, in August 1914 and in March 1915. Japan’s proposal was examined by the Chambers of Commerce of Vladivostok and Harbin, but commercial circles in European Russia, who were concerned about a possibility of an inflow of cheap goods on the other side of the Urals, vigorously opposed the transformation of Vladivostok’ seaport into a duty-free port. Hence, Tokyo’s proposal was rejected. In the spring of 1915, the Japanese government proposed to revise the scale of taxation for goods imported from Japan into Russia, lowering taxes for silk products and fishing

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Japan and her Exhibits} (Tokyo, 1915), p.19.
nets. However, the Russian government refused to revise the taxation system “until the war in Europe would end.”

Another factor for the stagnation of the Russian-Japanese trade was the shortage of freight cars along the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Two hundred freight cars were needed daily for regular freights delivery to European Russia, but only 130 were available daily in spring of 1915, as it was found that the Tomsk’s railway junction was not able to receive transit goods from Vladivostok in large amounts and empty freight cars were returned to the Far East only after a long delay. By summer of 1917, because of the shortage of freights in the Trans-Siberian Railroad “the goods concentrated in Vladivostok formed huge stocks, and about two years were necessary to transport all them to the inland Russia.”

The Japanese largely monopolized and took advantage of the extremely profitable trade in Manchuria. The price of a barrel of American nails or a cut of wire which was sold by Japanese merchants was three times more expensive than goods imported directly from the United States. Sometimes, Japanese trade companies falsified maker marks on the products sold in Manchuria. For example, the goods of Russia’s Chepelevetskii Factory which were widely popular in the Far East before the War had marks of this firm and even the name “Chepelevetskii,” but “Osaka” was written instead of “Moscow” in Roman letters on the wrapper. Japanese merchants also began importing alcoholic beverages to Hunchun for contraband delivery to Russia.

Not many Russian companies traded in Manchuria. At the beginning of the First World War, the transportation of goods to Manchuria via Vladivostok strengthened the Russian rouble. However, as the road from Vladivostok to Posyet and Hanshi had not been repaired for a long time, the road became worthless and, as a result, the trade between Vladivostok and Posyet was reduced, consequently, goods were transported from Posyet to Manchuria via Hunchun. This circumstance gave Japanese merchants, who had exploited the road from Chonjin to Horion, the opportunity to increase their imports to Manchuria. As a result, the rouble decreased in value against the yen. Additionally, the Russian Consulate in Yanzigan reported that according to the information received from the Chinese merchants the Japanese made some “complicated banking operations” in Korea for the purpose of decreasing the rate of rouble as much as possible. The results of these Japanese activities revealed themselves very soon. First, roubles were exchanged at the decreased rate and then,

89 The Russian Consulate in Yanzigan to the Russian Imperial Mission in Peking. January 14, 1917. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Dal’nego Vostoka, f.1, op.8, d.3288, l.3.
roubles were no longer used in the purchases of meat in the districts along the Russian-Korean border with the exception of the Hunchun District.\(^{90}\)

**CONCLUSION**

The Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916 was not much different from the former Conventions, and neither the aims nor the specific tasks of the allied relations were mentioned in the Convention. Neither Russia nor Japan achieved their respective aims by concluding the Convention. The Japanese government was not successful in negotiations concerning the Changchun-Harbin Railway in Manchuria, and Russia did not receive all her desired military aid and guarantees of the peace for the Russian Far East. However, as Dickinson stresses, a series of agreements with the tsar strengthened the Japanese position in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and allowed Japan “to fortify Japan’s continental positions against the more obvious potential threats of the United States and Great Britain.”\(^{91}\) Hence, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916 de facto marked the breaking-off of the British-Japanese alliance and the transformation of Russia into Japan’s ally. Japan took advantage of the war in Europe to put political pressure on the allies and extend possessions in China and the Pacific.

Despite the increase in Japanese transit trade between 1914 and 1917 the volume of the goods exported to Russia by Japan remained practically on the same level. During the First World War, the Russian government acted quicker to restrain trade with Japan rather than to develop trade relations. Nevertheless, the Japanese Empire was able to strengthen its positions in the border trade with northern Manchuria and the south of the Maritime Province. Thus, in these ways, the First World War led to the strengthening of the Japanese economic positions in the Far Eastern possessions of the Russian Empire, which was one of the main causes of the growth of the Japanese communities within the Maritime and Amur Provinces. Efficient organization of Japanese communities in each Russian city and strength of the ties between them made it very easy for the Japanese government to control them through diplomatic representatives and Resident Associations.

---

\(^{90}\) Ibid., 14. The cited document recognizes that the information was unproven.