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DEMOCRATIZATION AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN MULTIETHNIC COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CROATIA AND MACEDONIA

KUBO KEIICHI

INTRODUCTION

Is democratization possible in multiethnic countries? This question is not so novel. Already in 1861, John S. Mill wrote that "it is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities,"¹ thereby revealing his pessimistic view on the possibility of democratization in multiethnic countries. Many contemporary scholars have agreed with Mill and argued that democratization in multiethnic countries is very difficult, or even impossible, on various grounds. Some have pointed out that inter-elite competition in elections leads to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations: in a democratic regime, the elite need to seek the support of the electorate and they often appeal to ethnic cleavages to secure it, which brings about so-called "ethnic outbidding" and a "bankruptcy of moderation."² Others regard cultural and symbolic issues as fatal to democratic government, since they often cause zero-sum-type conflicts between ethnic groups and leave no room for compromise, which leads to stalemate in democratic government.³ When people vote according to their ethnic identity, the winner and the loser of the electoral competition could be (or could appear to be) permanent unless the ethnic composition changes drastically, and the loser might "equate democracy not with freedom or participation but with the structured dominance of adversarial majority groups."⁴

On the other hand, there have recently been some scholars who emphasize the possibility of democratization in multiethnic countries. Arend Lijphart,

1 John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York: Forum Books, 1958), p. 287.

2 Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), pp. 82-86; Airat R. Aklaev, *Democratization and Ethnic Peace: Patterns of Ethnopolitical Crisis Management in Post-Soviet Settings* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 62.

3 Aklaev, *Democratization and Ethnic Peace*, pp. 58-59; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. xviii-xix; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (1970), p. 359; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 566.

4 Timothy D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 31.

for instance, conceptualized “consociational democracy,” which achieves stable democratic government in plural societies with four major principles: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy.⁵ Donald L. Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly argue that carefully designed institutions such as a specific type of electoral system can provide political leaders with incentives for moderation and integration.⁶ Even though these scholars are not in accord on the measures needed to achieve the goal of sustainable democracy in plural societies and indeed contradict each other, what is common among them is that adequate institutions are important for democracy to be possible in multiethnic countries. This point is the main theme of a recent book, edited by Andrew Reynolds, which is “predicated on the idea that institutional design makes a difference in how effectively political leaders are able to manage conflict democratically in divided societies.”⁷ In this issue, other institutions such as presidentialism and federalism are also discussed by other scholars, while both Lijphart and Horowitz contribute articles from their own perspective.

In this context of academic discussion, the contrast of Croatia and Macedonia is quite interesting, for the inter-ethnic relations in those two multiethnic countries⁸ followed opposite courses after democratization, while there is no noticeable difference in terms of formal institutions. In Croatia the rapid deterioration of inter-ethnic relations between Croats and Serbs occurred after the founding elections and the use of force by the Croatian government on Serb territories caused a massive exodus of Serbs from Croatia, whereas Macedonia has managed to maintain relatively moderate inter-ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians since the founding elections in 1990, even after armed conflicts between Albanian rebels and the Macedonian army in 2001. There is, however, no significant difference in formal institutions: in both countries, “consociational” institutions such as grand coalition, mutual veto or proportional principles were not introduced after the founding elections; the found-

5 Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 25-52.

6 See for example, Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*; Donald L. Horowitz, “Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers,” in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 115-130; Donald L. Horowitz, “Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management,” in *Conflict and Peacemaking*, pp. 451-475; Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, eds., *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998).

7 Andrew Reynolds, ed., *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 3.

8 As for the ethnic composition in the two countries, see Table 1. The patterns of the ethnic composition in the two countries were identical in 1991: both had one dominant ethnic group that constituted a clear majority (Croats in Croatia, Macedonians in Macedonia) and one important minority group (Serbs in Croatia, Albanians in Macedonia).

Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Croatia and Macedonia, 1961-2001

Croatia						Macedonia					
	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001		1961	1971	1981	1991	1994
Croats	80.2	79.4	75.1	78.1	89.6	Macedonians	71.1	69.3	67.0	64.6	66.5
Serbs	15.0	14.2	11.6	12.2	4.5	Albanians	13.0	17.0	19.7	21.0	22.9
Yugoslavs	0.4	1.9	8.2	2.2	0.0	Serbs	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.0
Slovenes	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.2	Muslims	0.2	0.1	2.1		
Montenegrins	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	Yugoslavs	0.1	0.2	0.8		
Muslims	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.9	Croats	0.3	0.2	0.2		
Albanians	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	Montenegrins	0.2	0.2	0.2		
Macedonians	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	Slovenes	0.1	0.1	0.1		
Others	3.1	3.0	3.7	5.5	4.3	Others	12.0	10.1	7.5	12.2*	8.3**

Source: From 1961 to 1991, Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 33. For 2001, <http://www.dzs.hr/> (accessed on 30 November 2002, 12:50).

* Includes other listed groups for which values are not given. The results of the 1991 census were processed individually by each republic, and there was no uniform system of classification.

** Turks 4.0%, Roma 2.3%, etc.

Source: From 1961 to 1991, Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 33. For 1994, Duncan M. Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: finding its way," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 226.

ing elections were parliamentary elections in both countries, and exactly the same electoral system – the two-round majority system in single member districts – was used in both countries; both had a president who was elected by the new parliament after the founding elections; both were unitary states, composed only of municipalities and did not have any larger sub-national administrative unit, let alone a federal structure. In sum, there is no institutional difference that could explain the different courses of inter-ethnic relations in these two countries.

The contrast of the two countries deserves particular attention because Macedonia was not in a favorable position for successful democratization when compared with Croatia in terms of socio-economic factors. According to some scholars, for example, there is a correlation between per capita GDP and democracy.⁹ Barro also showed that educational attainment (especially primary schooling), having a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment, and enjoying a bigger population size all have a correlation with democracy. If

⁹ See, for example, Adam Przeworski, E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robert J. Barro, "Determinants of Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 107:6 (1999), pp. 158-183.

we compare Croatia and Macedonia in terms of these aspects, however, Croatia seems to have been in a much more favorable position than Macedonia on the eve of democratization, as Table 2 clearly shows. Therefore, the more successful management of ethnic problems in Macedonia cannot be explained by such socio-economic factors as per capita GDP or educational attainment.

Table 2: Basic Indicators of Development in Croatia and Macedonia

	Years	All Yugoslavia	Croatia	Macedonia
Population	1953	100	23.2	7.7
	1988	100	19.9	8.9
GMP*	1953	100	26.7	5.2
	1988	100	25.4	5.6
GMP per capita	1953	100	122	68
	1988	100	128	63
Average growth of GMP as a whole per capita	1956	4.9	4.6	5.1
	1988	4	4.8	4.1
Fixed assets per worker	1952	100	101	69
	1987	100	109.9	74.2
Live births per 1,000	1947	26.1	22.4	35.0
	1988	15.1	12.8	18.5
Deaths per 1,000	1947	13.9	8.9	21.3
	1988	9	11.4	7.1
Infant deaths per 1,000 live births	1949	102	112.0	136.1
	1988	24.5	12.4	44.7
Participation of women in total labor force (percentage)	1952	24.3	27.9	16.7
	1981	36.1	39.6	31.0
Illiterate population 8-10 years and over (percentage)	1952	25.4	15.6	40.3
	1981	9.5	5.6	10.9
Households per radio subscriber	1947	16.2	12.3	23.2
	1980	1.5	1.4	1.5
Inhabitants per doctor	1952	2565	1947	4324
	1987	534	477	530
Percentage of births with medical assistance	1952	38.7	59.6	23.3
	1979	86.9	98.9	79.5
Life Expectancy: Male Female	1952-54	56.9	59.1	54.9
		59.3	63.2	55.1
Life Expectancy: Male Female	1980-87	67.66	66.64	66.64
		73.23	74.15	75.16

* Gross Material Product, equivalent in the Yugoslav socialist system to the GNP in the capitalist system.

Source: Dijana Pleština, *Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 180-181.

In a word, while Macedonia was more successful in managing ethnic problems after democratization than Croatia, neither formal institutions nor socio-economic factors can explain the difference between the two countries. What are, then, the factors that could explain this difference between Croatia and Macedonia? In search of answers to this question, first I would like to briefly review the two cases in turn, showing that the interactions between the ethnic policies of the new governments and the actions of minority leaders were completely different in the two countries. After this overview, I will point out three factors that affected the course that the two countries took after the founding elections, namely (1) the power-base of the new governments, (2) the beliefs of the key leaders, and (3) the external environment.

ETHNIC POLICIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS AND THE ACTIONS OF THE MINORITY LEADERS

An important difference between Croatia and Macedonia was the nature of the ethnic policies of the new governments after the founding elections. In a word, the ethnic policies of the new Croatian government alienated and enraged the Serb elite, while the ethnic policies of the new Macedonian government succeeded in integrating the Albanian elite. It was not only the ethnic policies of the new governments, however, but also the decisions of the minority leaders that mattered in the determination of the course of inter-ethnic relations. The interaction of these two factors led to the deterioration of and escalation of tension in inter-ethnic relations in Croatia and the maintenance of moderate inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.

The Case of Croatia

In Croatia, the first round of voting was conducted on April 22, 1990, and the second on May 6 and 7. In the founding elections, the opposition party *Croatian Democratic Community* (CDC), led by the nationalist dissident Franjo Tuđman, won 205 out of 351 seats, defeating the former Communist party, *League of Communists of Croatia - Party for Democratic Change* (LCC-PDC), by a wide margin (see Table 3). Since the CDC secured an absolute majority, it could easily elect its leader Tuđman as President of Croatia in the Parliament; he in turn nominated the Prime Minister, and CDC members occupied the ministerial posts. Thus, the founding elections put the CDC in a dominant position in the new government, marginalizing other parties in the Parliament. An important fact one ought to notice is that the *Serbian Democratic Party* (SDP), a Serbian nationalist party, won only five out of 351 seats, and the votes of the Serbs were split among different parties, which shows that the political opening itself did not automatically lead to the polarization of the two ethnic groups.

Tuđman and the CDC had already revealed their Croatian ethno-centric tendencies in the election campaigns. Especially sensational was a remark by Tuđman at the founding congress of the CDC which positively appraised the

Table 3: Results of the Founding Elections in Croatia, 1990

	Seats	Percentage
Croatian Democratic Community	205	58.4%
League of Communists of Croatia - Party for Democratic Change	73	20.8%
Coalition of LCC-PDC & other parties	22	6.3%
Croatian Democratic Party	10	2.8%
Serbian Democratic Party	5	1.4%
Coalition for National Accord	11	3.1%
Independents	13	3.7%
Others	12	3.4%
Total	351	100.0%

Source: Vladimir Goati, *Jugosiavija na Prekretnici: od monizma do građanskog rata* (Beograd: Jugoslovenski institut za novinarstvo, 1991), pp. 100-105.

Independent State of Croatia, the Nazi-puppet state during World War II. Tuđman said “the Independent State of Croatia was not...a fascistic crime, but an expression of historical aspirations of the Croat nation for its own independent state, which acquired international recognition.”¹⁰ This remark, which had broken the taboo of the Communist era, shocked Serbs both within and outside Croatia who had lost their parents or relatives in the concentration camps under the *Independent State of Croatia*.¹¹ The LCC-PDC criticized this remark, arguing that the CDC was a party with dangerous objectives.¹²

With such a party securing an absolute majority in the parliament and such a person elected as president, it was quite natural that the Tuđman government adopted ethnocentric policies after the founding elections. At the inauguration ceremony held on May 30, 1990, Tuđman raised the Croatian traditional red-and-white chessboard flag, *šahovnica*, which was also used by the *Independent State of Croatia*. With amendments to the Croatian constitution in July, this flag became the official flag of the Republic, and this symbol also became the coat of arms of the Croatian police. The Croatian government further ordained that the use of the Latin script was obligatory even in areas dominated by Serbs, who regard the Cyrillic script as their “own” script (Serbs use both Latin and Cyrillic scripts).¹³ Serb police officers started to be dismissed and were replaced by Croats.¹⁴ Some opposition parties in the Croatian parliament criticized these Croat-centric policies of the Tuđman government, but Tuđman

10 Milorad Bučelić, “Duh NDH,” *Politika*, 26 February 1990.

11 See, for example, Radomir Simljanić, “Srbi neće da finansiraju Tuđmanovu NDH,” *Politika*, 2 March 1990; Miodrag Đurić et al., “Pravdanje Pavelićeve NDH,” *Politika*, 26 February 1990; “Naša Tema: HDZ i NDH,” *NIN*, 4 March 1990, pp. 9-15.

12 “HDZ je stranka opasnih namera,” *Politika*, 27 February 1990.

13 R. Dmitrović, “U Kninu latinica obavezna,” *Politika*, 3 July 1990.

14 Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, Revised Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1996), pp. 98-99.

and the CDC, which had secured an absolute majority, did not listen to such criticisms.¹⁵

Reacting against such Croat-centric policies, the SDP started to organize the Serbs, who had not been unified until then. On July 25, 1990, a big rally of Serbs was organized by the SDP, which allegedly about 120,000 Serbs attended, and where a “declaration on sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbs” was adopted, the “Parliament of Serbs” was established as an organ representing Serbs in Croatia, and the “National Council of Serbs” was formed as its executive organ.¹⁶ This did not mean, however, that all Serbs agreed on the course they should follow. The president of SDP, Jovan Rašković, had already started to claim the cultural autonomy of Serbs in May 1990, but he was against the idea of making a mini-state of Serbs in Croatia.¹⁷ In contrast, one of the leaders of the SDP and a mayor of the Knin municipality, Milan Babić, pursued the political autonomy of Serbs, based on a concrete territorial unit. Already at the end of May 1990, the government of Knin municipality led by Babić had proposed the formation of an association of municipalities, and three municipalities including Knin proclaimed an “Association of Municipalities of Northern-Dalmatia and Lika” in July, in which neighboring municipalities also started to participate later on.¹⁸

The deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia began escalating because Babić, rather than Rašković, finally took control of the SDP, since this increased the probability that Serbs would seek territorial and political autonomy, and the territorial and political autonomy of Serbs was regarded as harmful to the integrity of the Croatian state and thus unacceptable to the Tuđman government.¹⁹ The National Council of Serbs organized a referendum on the autonomy of Serbs in Serb-populated municipalities despite the strong objection of the Tuđman government. The voting on this referendum started on

15 Ratko Dmitrović, ““Dan Oslobođenja,”” *NIN*, 3 June 1990, pp. 13-14.

16 Milan Četnik and Radovan Kovačević, “Proglašena autonomija Srba u Hrvatskoj,” *Politika*, 26 July 1990.

17 Radovan Kovačević, “Intervju: Jovan Rašković, prvak Srpske demokratske stranke,” *Politika*, 6 May 1990; “Čija je Hrvatska,” *Danas*, 31 July 1990, p. 13. Issues related to the claim of Rašković were education, media, language, etc.

18 M. Četnik, “Dr Milan Babić proglasio Zajednicu opština severne Dalmacije i Like,” *Politika*, 3 July 1990.

19 I have not found yet a persuasive reason why Babić took control. Some people argue that the leak of manuscripts of the talk between Tuđman and Rašković held in May 1990, where Rašković criticized Slobodan Milošević, the then-president of the Republic of Serbia, brought Rašković into disrepute among Serbs. See Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, p. 97; Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 131. For the manuscripts of the talk carried in the Croatian magazine *Danas*, see “Čija je Hrvatska,” *Danas*, 31 July 1990, pp. 12-15. Rašković himself mentions the support of Milošević for Babić as a reason for his loss of power. See, Vesna Roganović, “Sve moje i Miloševićeve greške,” *Borba*, 12 April 1991. There seems to be still much room, however, for research on the intra-party power struggle in the SDP.

August 19 and concluded on October 1, when the National Council of Serbs proclaimed the autonomy of Serbs based on the result.²⁰ Even though the declaration did not specify the nature of the autonomy, it was highly probable that Serbs would seek political and territorial autonomy. Immediately after the conclusion of the referendum, Babić argued in his interview that “autonomy must have a territorial organization,” and that the most desirable solution was the recognition of the Serb autonomous region as a constituent unit of the Yugoslav federation.²¹

Against these actions by Serbs, the Tuđman government took a firm stance. In August, it sent special units of the police to Serb-populated areas, trying to obstruct the referendum, against which Serbs set up barricades, and Babić proclaimed an “emergency.”²² At the end of September 1990, it ordered a reduction of the arms of the police stations in Serb-populated municipalities, which led to a clash between Croat security units and Serbs.²³ When conflict between the Tuđman government and Serbs erupted, fear and anger started to grow among the Serb population, while even the LCC-PDC started to react against the actions of Serbs, claiming that the integrity and sovereignty of Croatia must be defended, even though some parties still called for coexistence with the Serbs.²⁴ In this way, interactions between the ethnic policies of the new governments and the reactions of the minority leaders led to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia.

In December 1990, the gulf between Croats and Serbs was further deepened when the new Croatian constitution was announced and Babić proclaimed an “Autonomous Region of Serbs of Krajina (ARS Krajina).” In the new constitution of Croatia, “the millennial identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood” were emphasized at the beginning, and the Republic of Croatia was defined as “the national state of the Croatian nation.”²⁵ Even though the state was also defined as “the state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Moslems, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality,” there was no specific provision on minority rights. The

20 According to the National Council of Serbs, 756,549 votes were for, and 172 votes were against autonomy, out of a total of 756,781 votes, with 60 votes invalid. See “Proglašena autonomija Srba u Hrvatskoj,” *Politika*, 2 October 1990.

21 Milan Četnik, “Kako će izgledati autonomija Srba u Hrvatskoj,” *Politika*, 7 October 1990.

22 “Specijalci iz Zadra razoružali Stanicu milicije u Benkovcu,” *Politika*, 18 August 1990.

23 Ratko Dmitrović and Đuro Đukić, “Dramatična noć u Petrinji,” *Politika* 29 September 1990; “Pogrom nad srpskim življem u Hrvatskoj,” *Politika*, 1 October 1990; Milan Andrejevich, “Crisis in Croatia and Slovenia: Proposal for a Confederal Yugoslavia,” *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* 1:44 (2 November 1990), pp. 29-30.

24 Radovan Kovačević, “Strah i zebnja u severnoj Dalmaciji,” *Politika*, 1 October 1990; R. Dmitrović, “Hrvatski komunisti se energično protive autonomiji Srba,” *Politika*, 23 August 1990; R. Subotić, “Za zajedništvo Srba i Hrvata,” *Politika*, 30 September 1990.

25 For the original text of this constitution, see Joseph Marko and Tomislav Borić, eds., *Slovenien-Kroatien-Serbien: Die Neuen Verfassungen* (Wien: Bohlau, 1991), pp. 437-448.

Croatian language and the Latin script became the official language and official script. In sum, it was obvious that Croats would be in the hegemonic position in the new state. The same month, Babić announced the formation of the ARS Krajina, in which all ten municipalities of the *Association of Municipalities of North-Dalmatia and Lika* participated. When he announced it, he criticized the Tuđman government, saying “Croats are attempting to make their own state by a majority of the parliament, hegemony, and the tyranny of majority, while the most important state organization for Serbs in Croatia is Yugoslavia.”²⁶ As his remark at this moment clearly affirms, the move of the Tuđman government toward secession from Yugoslavia, in addition to its ethno-centric policies, was an important factor which caused strong opposition by Serbs.²⁷

The tension between the Tuđman government and the Serbs escalated rapidly during the first half of the year 1991. On March 2, 1991, when the Serb population of the municipality of Paklac declared that they belonged to ARS Krajina, Croatian police forces were sent to attack, even though armed conflict was avoided by the intervention of the Federal Army.²⁸ On March 31, Serb forces occupied the Plitvice national park and fought with special units sent by the Croatian government, leading to two deaths, one on each side.²⁹ On May 2, there was a clash between Serb forces and Croatian police forces, causing 12 deaths among the Croatian police and three among the Serbs.³⁰ In April, about 20 people died in various clashes.³¹

In May 1991, the rupture of the two ethnic groups became decisive. Whereas a national referendum on the independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia was held on May 19, where 78% of the national electorate supported independence, Serbs boycotted this Croatian referendum and held their own referendum as “a negation of the (Croatian) referendum” on May 12, where 83% of the electorate voted and 99.79% of the votes cast supported the unification of ARS Krajina with the Republic of Serbia.³² When the Tuđman government announced the

26 M. Četnik, “Proglášena Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina,” *Politika*, 22 December 1990.

27 In October 1990, the Croatian government and its Slovenian counterpart announced the proposal of a confederation by the republics of Yugoslavia, revealing their centrifugal attitudes toward Yugoslavia. Later on, together with the Slovenian government, the Croatian government took such steps as the secret formation of its own army, refusal to pay any contribution to the federal fund for underdeveloped regions, and secession from the federal legal system by denying the supremacy of federal laws over republican laws.

28 “Dramatični događaji u Pakracu potresli celu Jugoslaviju,” *Borba*, 4 March 1991; Rajko Đurđević, “Okupacija i evakuacija,” *NIN*, 8 March 1991, pp. 8-14.

29 “Više mrtvih i povređenih,” *Borba*, 1 April 1991.

30 B. Petković, “Vidanje rana i brojanje mrtvih,” *Borba*, 4-5 May 1991; Milan Andrejevich, “State Presidency Agrees on Measures to Prevent Further Ethnic Violence,” *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* 2:23 (7 June 1991).

31 Andrejevich, “State Presidency Agrees,” p. 18.

32 S. Stamatović, “Referendum kao negacija referenduma,” *Borba*, 13 May 1991; “Većina za prisajedinjenje,” *Borba*, 17 May 1991; S. Stamatović, “Jednoglasno za pripajanje Srbiji,” *Borba*, 17 May 1991.

declaration of independence on June 25, armed conflict broke out between Croatian forces and Serb forces, with the latter aided by the units of the Federal Army stationed in Croatia and paramilitary forces flooding into Croatia from Serbia, and escalated into a full-scale war in August, when the Croatian government finally issued general mobilization orders. The fighting continued until March 1992, when peacekeeping troops of the United Nations (UN) arrived in Croatia.

On December 19, 1991, Serbs in Croatia established a self-proclaimed "Republic of Serbs of Krajina (RS Krajina)," composed of Krajina, eastern Slavonia and western Slavonia, which in all covered almost one-third of the Croatian territory.³³ This "Republic" remained intact, protected by the UN, and effectively controlled by Serbs from 1992 until 1995, when the Croatian army successfully executed the military operation "Flash" against western Slavonia in May and operation "Storm" against Krajina in August. With the fall of Knin there was a massive exodus of Serbs out of Croatia into Bosnia and Serbia, which drastically reduced the number of Serbs in Croatia (see Table 1). The remnant of RS Krajina, the eastern Slavonia region, was put under the transitional administration of the UN (UNTAES), and transferred back to the administration of Croatia in January 1998. The Croatian government officially expressed its willingness to deal with the problem of Serb refugee returns but actually did not take any effective measures.³⁴ After Tuđman died, Stipe Mesić won the presidential election in the spring of 2000 and announced the refugee-return program after his inauguration. However, despite his repeated calls for Serbs to come back to Croatia, the progress of the return of Serb refugees remains tardy.³⁵

The Case of Macedonia

In Macedonia, the first round of voting was conducted on November 11 and the second round on November 25 in 1990 (the voting was re-organized for the third time on December 12 in several districts where it was recognized that fraud had been committed). In Macedonia, the founding elections brought a fragmented party system where no single party can secure an absolute majority (see Table 4). The strongest was the Macedonian nationalist party, *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unification* (IMRO - DPMNU), but there were also two socialist (or social-democratic) and non-nationalistic parties, namely the *League of Communists of Macedonia* (LCM) and the *League of Reform Forces of Macedonia* (LRFM), as well as two Albanian ethnic parties, *Party for Democratic Prosperity* (PDP) and *National Democratic Party* (NDP).

33 "Nova Republika – Srpska Krajina," *Borba*, 20 December 1991.

34 According to the UNHCR, an estimated 300,000 Serb refugees from Croatia still remained in Yugoslavia and 30,000-40,000 in Bosnia at the beginning of the year 2000. See the homepage of UNHCR: <http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/seo/croatia.htm> (accessed on 17 October 2000, 11:54).

35 See, for example, *RFE/RL Newsline* 5:37, Part II (22 February 2001).

Table 4: Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Macedonia 1990-2002

year/month	1990/11	1994/10	1998/11	2002/09
Electoral system	SMD TRS (120)		SMD TRS(85)+ PR(35)	PR(120)
Party	Seats			
Socialist Party of Macedonia	4	8	1	1
League of Communists of Macedonia	31			
Union of Social Democrats of Macedonia		58	27	60
Liberal Party		29	3	
Democratic Party		1		
Liberal Democratic Party			1	
League of Reform Forces of Macedonia	17			
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization- Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unification	38		43	33
Democratic Alternative			13	
Party for Democratic Prosperity	22	10	11	2
National Democratic Party		4		1
Democratic Party of Albanians			11	7
Democratic Union for Integration				16
Others	8	10	10	0
Total	120	120	120	120

SMD TRS = Single Member District Two Round System

PR = Proportional Representation

Source: For 1990 and 1994, See Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia," pp. 234, 236. For 1998: <http://www.sinf.gov.mk/Macedonia/EN/Political.htm> (accessed on 10 April 2002, 15:44). For 2002: http://www.dik.mk/kon_rezultati/REZULTATI.htm (accessed on 11 December 2002, 20:15).

This fragmented party system was a critical factor for the election as president of Kiro Gligorov, who determined the nature of the ethnic policies of the new Macedonian government.³⁶ In the parliament after the founding elections, the differences of the positions of the parties led to a political stalemate where no coalition could be established in order to form a new government, and after long discussion, the parties agreed that they would establish a new government without any party affiliation, and Gligorov, an unaffiliated but well-experienced politician, was chosen as president. Parties commissioned him to form a government, and Gligorov formed a so-called "specialists' government," led by Prime Minister Nikola Kljusev, which was mostly composed of independent persons who had a doctorate. This government also included three Albanian

³⁶ The progress from the founding elections to the formation of the new government in Macedonia is described in detail in Milan Andrejevich, "Macedonia's new political leadership," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe* 2:20 (17 May 1991).

ministers, which showed his willingness for power-sharing between Macedonians and Albanians.

Gligorov played an important role in the determination of ethnic policies thereafter. In the constitution-making process in 1991, for example, IMRO-DP-MNU and two Albanian parties collided head-on in the parliament. The former argued that Macedonia must be defined as the "Macedonian national state," and severely criticized Article 7 of the government draft which provided that the minority language could be officially used in municipalities where that ethnic group constitutes a majority, claiming "the elimination of Article 7, or bloodshed."³⁷ The latter argued that Albanians had been discriminated against as second-rank citizens and that they must be guaranteed collective rights equal to Macedonians. In such a situation, it was Gligorov who negotiated vigorously to secure concessions from both sides and achieve a compromise. The constitution proclaimed in November 1991 was actually somewhere between the claims of both sides: whereas the "historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people" was referred to in the preamble and the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic script became official, the definition of the state was neutral³⁸ and Article 7 of the government draft remained, guaranteeing Albanians the use of their language officially in municipalities where they constitute a "considerable number." The right to instruction in one's own language in primary and secondary education was also prescribed in Article 48 of the constitution, and prescribed in Article 78 was the establishment of the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations, composed of the president of the parliament and two members each from the ranks of the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanians and other nationalities, which considers issues of inter-ethnic relations in the Republic and makes appraisals and proposals for their solution. Even though Albanian members boycotted the vote on the constitution in the parliament, claiming that the collective rights of Albanians were not guaranteed, actually "Albanians and other nationalities received more than they could expect from their current power, thanks to the engagements of Gligorov."³⁹

Another aspect of the ethnic policies of the governments after the founding elections which prevented the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations was the continuation of power-sharing between Macedonians and Albanians in government. When the Kljusev government fell because of its failure to secure international recognition, a cabinet formation based on a party coalition started in Macedonia. Since then, all governments, including the current government after the September 2002 elections, have been based on some sort of coalition

37 D. Nikolić, "Nacionalna ili građanska država," *Borba*, 11 November 1991.

38 The state was defined as a "sovereign, independent, democratic and social state" where "sovereignty... derives from the citizens and belongs to the citizens." For the English translation of the Macedonian constitution, see the following homepage: <http://www.b-info.com/places/Macedonia/republic/Constitution.html> (accessed on 22 November 1999, 22:40).

39 Dragan Nikolić, "Pobedila politika Gligorova," *Borba*, 19 November 1991.

between Macedonian parties and Albanian parties, and all include some Albanian ministers.

In addition to the ethnic policies of the government, the decisions of the minority leaders also mattered for the maintenance of relatively moderate inter-ethnic relations. There were many issues on which Albanians were dissatisfied, such as census results,⁴⁰ higher education in the Albanian language,⁴¹ the official use of Albanian symbols,⁴² and equal opportunity for employment, especially in public sectors.⁴³ Albanian leaders sometimes criticized governments quite severely. However, they never took actions that would decisively cause relations with the Macedonians to deteriorate. For example, when Albanian local leaders announced the establishment of a self-proclaimed Albanian autonomous republic in April 1992, the leaders of the PDP severely criticized this move.⁴⁴ While suspicions were raised about the aspirations of Albanians in Macedonia for a so-called "greater Albania" – which means a unification of all territories of Albanians, i.e. Albania proper, Kosovo, and other Albanian-inhabited regions in Macedonia and Montenegro – and Albanian intellectuals in Macedonia sometimes actually argued for it,⁴⁵ Albanian party leaders never expressed such aspirations. When the Kosovo crisis broke out, in 1998, an influx of Albanian refugees into Macedonia occurred and Macedonians were on alert, but the Albanian elite did not take any opportunistic action to destabilize the country.⁴⁶ This attitude continued even after the revolts of Albanian rebels, called the "National Liberation Army (NLA)," in Macedonia in 2001; leaders of Albanian

40 They claimed that the result of the 1991 census was not correct since many Albanians boycotted the census, and that they actually constituted more than 40 percent. See for example, Dragan Čičić, "Šta kažu cifre," *NIN*, 22 July 1994, pp. 47-48. This issue was resolved to some extent by the execution of a census under the observation of the Council of Europe in 1994, but remains an important issue for Albanians, as the fact that Albanian rebels demanded a fair census as one of its objectives in the armed conflicts in 2001 shows.

41 Albanians were demanding a university with instruction in Albanian language. Their university in Tetovo actually started to function illegally in 1995, but the Macedonian government did not approve it as an official university.

42 This issue became acute after 1996, when some of the newly-elected mayors of municipalities where Albanians constitute a majority raised the Albanian flag on official buildings and got arrested, one being sentenced to more than 13 years.

43 Albanians claimed that they were underrepresented in public sectors. In the police and the army, for example, Macedonians constituted 93.9% whereas Albanians constituted only 3.1%. See, International Crisis Group, *Macedonia's Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf* (2 August 2000): http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/A400015_02082000.pdf, pp. 17-18.

44 Junusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Politics, Organizations, and Parties* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 116-117.

45 M. Kretić, "Traže veliku Albaniju," *Politika*, 2 February 1990; Radovan Pocin, "Posustajanje," *NIN*, 3 June 1999.

46 "Albania's New Environment," *RFE/RL Balkan Report* 3:30 (3 August 1999).

parties criticized the armed rebellion of the NLA.⁴⁷ This attitude clearly helped the realization of the “Ohrid Agreement” between the Macedonian parties and the Albanian parties in August 2001, which promised constitutional changes for the collective rights of Albanians. Armed conflicts stopped after this agreement was signed. In April 2002, the defense secretary Vlado Popovski said that the atmosphere between Macedonians and Albanians was good, and they were not going to fight against each other again.⁴⁸

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TWO CASES

After a brief overview of the two cases, it seems certain that the different courses of inter-ethnic relations were caused by the actions of new governments and minority leaders. In Croatia, ethnocentric policies triggered the furious reactions of Serbs, especially some of the Serbian elite, and pushed them to unify themselves, while reactive actions taken by Serbs in turn enraged the Tuđman government, and this vicious circle accelerated the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations. In Macedonia, in contrast, new governments succeeded in moderating its ethnic policies and integrating the Albanian elite, and the Albanian elite also did not take radical action to inflame the new governments or the Macedonian people. Here arise further questions: what are, then, the factors that made the ethnic policies different in the two countries, and what are the factors which made the attitudes and actions of minority leaders different in the two countries? In the following part, it will be argued that the power-base of the new governments, the beliefs of the key leaders, and the external environment were three critical factors.

(1) The Power-Base of the New Governments

The first factor that made a difference in the two countries was the power-base of the new governments. In this context, the difference of the emerging party system is important. In Croatia, the CDC secured an absolute majority in the parliament, and the Tuđman government was based on the CDC. Thus, it was a natural consequence that new policies it took after the founding elections were also based on the ethnocentric platforms they revealed during the election campaigns. Actually, even if Tuđman wanted to moderate the ethnic policies of the government, it would have been quite difficult, since there was a more radical nationalist fraction than Tuđman in the CDC, led by Croats from Herzegovina like Gojko Šušak and Vladimir Šeks. In sum, the power-base of the government, the CDC, put a certain limit on the options that the new government could take.

⁴⁷ *IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report* 224 (7 March 2001); *IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report*, 227 (16 March 2001).

⁴⁸ *RFE/RL Newslines* 6:72 (17 April 2002).

Obviously the results of the founding elections in Macedonia generated very different dynamics. The fragmented party system emerged after the founding elections, which led to the election of Gligorov as president and the formation of the Kljusev government, which was not based on any specific party in the parliament. This enabled the new government to take actions with relatively less restraint and to act as a moderator between two nationalistic groups.⁴⁹

The evolution of the party system after the Kljusev government also contributed to the continuation of power-sharing in the government. Because of the power struggles and disagreements between the Albanian leaders, there have always been two or more Albanian parties in Macedonia (see Table 4). This means that both ruling and opposition sides in the Macedonian community have their own coalition partner in the Albanian community, and therefore the government change in Macedonia does not necessarily lead to a cessation of power-sharing. This was the case for the government change in 1998, when the IMRO-DPMNU formed a coalition government with the *Democratic Party of Albanians* which had not participated in the former ruling coalition, and also for the government change in 2002, when the *Union of Social Democrats of Macedonia* formed a coalition with a new Albanian party, the *Democratic Union for Integration*.

(2) *Beliefs of Key Leaders*

The power-base of the new governments alone, however, cannot fully explain the difference between the two countries. While it is quite natural that a new government based on a nationalistic party take nationalistic policies, a new government which is not based on any party does not necessarily take moderate actions: it could equally abuse its relatively independent position to pursue particularistic interests, personal or ethnic. Here, the beliefs of the key leader, President Gligorov, matter. He tried to act as a leader of the state, beyond one specific ethnic group, unlike most leaders in the Yugoslav republics after the founding elections (Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, etc).

When we compare Tuđman and Gligorov, we cannot but notice the differences of their personal backgrounds. Tuđman participated in the Partisan warfare during World War II and was promoted in a military career under the Com-

49 A legitimate question which arises here is why different party systems emerged in the two countries. One important factor is the contrast of the defeat of former Communists in Croatia and the relative strengths which former Communists in Macedonia had shown in the founding elections. In other words, the fact that Macedonians showed relatively positive attitudes towards Communists, while a majority of Croats showed relatively negative attitudes, was an important factor in determining the party system after the founding elections in the two countries. In order to explain the difference of attitudes toward Communists in the two countries, in turn, we must examine such factors as historical developments of the two ethnic groups and their subjective perception on the political and economic system of the Communist era. This is beyond the scope of the present article and I would like to discuss it at the next opportunity.

unist regime, but after his resignation he studied history, became a professor of political science from 1963 to 1966, and started to be criticized for his Croatian nationalistic tendencies, being finally purged from his official position in 1967. He acquired a Ph. D. in history and published a book in English in 1981.⁵⁰ In a word, he was a specialist in history and had a firm nationalistic view on the history of Croatia, and thus was not prepared for compromise. Gligorov, in contrast, was a specialist in economics and held important public office as the Federal Secretary of Finance and Vice President of the Federal Executive Council (Vice Federal Prime Minister) in the 1960s. Such a background seems to have contributed to his pragmatic and well-balanced approach in determining policies. The fact that he had already successfully finished his political career long before the founding elections means that he did not have to appeal somehow to a dissatisfied electorate in an economic crisis to keep his power. This could probably explain why he did not convert to nationalism as Slobodan Milošević did.

(3) *The External Environment*

Last but not least, the external environment made a great difference in the two countries. Croatia is located between Slovenia and Serbia, both of which exerted a great influence on the course of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia. Macedonia did not have an external actor which would generate a considerable centrifugal force against the unity of Macedonia. The role of international society was also different in the two countries.

As discussed above, secession from Yugoslavia was an equally important factor which enraged the Serbs in Croatia. In this context, Slovenia was very influential since it insisted on organizing its actions of secession from Yugoslavia according to its original time-schedule.⁵¹ Croatia was not as well prepared for independence from Yugoslavia as a Slovenia that started to take centrifugal attitudes toward Yugoslavia much earlier. Thus Tuđman proposed that the Slovenian government delay taking decisive action toward independence from Yugoslavia, claiming that they should wait for Bosnia and Macedonia to make an anti-Milošević coalition with them, but the Slovenian government was not willing to delay its original schedule and showed its intention to go further without Croatia, if Croatia did not follow.⁵² This was a decisive factor which pushed the Tuđman government to take rapid, even hasty action for independence from Yugoslavia in the first half of 1991 in order to accompany Slovenia,

50 Franjo Tuđman, *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe* (Boulder, CO.: East European Monographs, 1981).

51 Slovenia conducted a national referendum on the independence of the republic on December 23, 1990, and was planning to achieve independence after six months, on June 26, 1991. The actual date of the declaration of independence turned out to be one day earlier, June 25, 1991.

52 Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, p. 149.

which in turn enraged Serbs in Croatia further and accelerated the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations.

Serbia also played an important role in the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia, since a supportive attitude of the Republic of Serbia was behind the belligerent postures and centrifugal actions of the Serb leaders in Croatia. For example, Milošević, the then-president of the Republic of Serbia, said that he was not against the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia if Croatia wanted it, but Croatia could not secede from Yugoslavia with Serbs, and the Serbs in Croatia should remain in Yugoslavia.⁵³ As some scholars put it, one minimum necessary, if not sufficient, condition for citizens to begin developing a “united orientation to the state” is that there are no realistic alternative arrangements to the existing states.⁵⁴ In the case of Serbs in Croatia, there were realistic alternative arrangements to the existing state of Croatia, namely, secession from Croatia and unification with Serbia, which was supported by the government of Serbia.

As for the role of international organizations, it was limited in Croatia. The European Community (EC) presented an adequate protection of collective rights of minorities as one of the prerequisites for state recognition. Eager for recognition, the Croatian government started to make provisions for explicit protection of collective rights of minorities in the summer of 1991, but it was obviously too late for any amelioration of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia. Moreover, the opinion of the Badinter Committee, which was set up by the EC to consider the request of the republics in Yugoslavia for state recognition, that Croatia was not qualified for recognition because of the lack of adequate protection of minority rights, could not prevent Germany from recognizing Croatia at the end of 1991. Thus Croatia was awarded recognition without paying the cost of making concessions towards the Serbs.

The attitudes and actions of the United States, the most influential external actor on the Balkan region in the 1990s, were also important. While the US tried to mediate the Croatian conflict as a member of the “Contact Group,” the US took an increasingly anti-Serb stance in the 1990s, which consequently benefited the Croatian side. Some scholars point out, for example, that the US pro-

53 “Intervju Slobodana Miloševića Sky News-u,” *Borba*, 9 August 1991.

54 Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, “Authoritarianism and Democracy in Africa,” in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds., *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 223.

55 The military assistance provided by the US for Croatia includes military training and NATO bombing against Krajina on August 4, 1995, which destroyed Serbian radar and anti-aircraft defenses. See, for example, Sara Flounders, “Bosnian Tragedy: The Unknown Role of the Pentagon,” in Ramsey Clark et al., *NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition* (New York: International Action Center, 1998), pp. 47-75; Col. George Jutras, “What about the US role in Croatian atrocities?”: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/JUT307A.html> (accessed on 17 August 2003, 19:17); Greg Elich, “The Invasion of Serbian Krajina”: <http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/elich/krajina2.html> (accessed on 13 August 2003, 19:40). As for the in-

vided military assistance to Croatia during the "Operation Storm" of the Croatian army against Krajina.⁵⁵ Even though the US took "the yellow-light approach"⁵⁶ toward Croatia and opposed, in appearance, the Croatian attack against Krajina, expressing a concern that Tuđman was preparing for an offensive in sector South and North, in reality the US supported Croatia by blocking Russian attempts to pass a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Croatian offensive against Krajina.⁵⁷ In addition, the US considered the success of the Croatian attack against Krajina as a positive change of the military balance on the ground, which could soften the tough position of the Serbs in Bosnia.⁵⁸ Such attitudes and actions of the US seem to have encouraged Tuđman to take a tough line with the Serb question, and thus hindered a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Macedonia, by contrast, was in a much more favorable position, since there was no external country that presented or supported alternative arrangements to the existing state for Albanians in Macedonia. Thus, there was practically no realistic alternative for the Albanians but to accept the existing state, even though the Albanians did not actively support it, as shown by the fact that they boycotted the national referendum on the sovereignty of Macedonia conducted in September 1991.⁵⁹ This seems to be an important factor behind the moderate actions of Albanian political leaders in Macedonia.

The role of the US and European countries was also different in Macedonia from Croatia: in case of Macedonia, the US and the European countries provided incentives for the Macedonian government to take a conciliatory line with Albanians. When the Macedonian conflict occurred in March 2001, for example, Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski at first showed a tough stance on Albanian guerillas, saying "nobody will negotiate with the terrorists" and "there will be no change in the constitution."⁶⁰ In such a situation, the US and the European Union (EU) started their involvement in order to achieve a peaceful solution of the conflict: the EU Foreign and Security Policy High Representative, Javier Solana, played a critical role in brokering the Ohrid agreement; the EU provided an economic incentive for a peaceful solution of the conflict by organizing a donor conference for Macedonia; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assured the disarmament of the NLA. Without such an active role of the US and the EU, a peaceful solution of the conflict by the Ohrid Agreement in August 2001 would not have been possible. Therefore, the US

crease of US military aid to Croatia since 1995, see Major Kristan J. Wheaton, "Success! Security Assistance and Its Impact in Croatia, 1995-2000," *The DISAM Journal* 23:1 (Fall 2000), pp. 67-73.

56 Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 122.

57 Elich, "The Invasion of Serbian Krajina."

58 Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 123-124.

59 Dragan Nikolić, "'Za' glasalo preko 74 odsto," *Borba*, 10 September 1991.

60 *RFE/RL Newslines* 5:54, Part II (19 March 2001).

and the EU played an important role in preventing an escalation of the conflict and achieving the maintenance of moderate inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.⁶¹

In addition, the role of international organizations also had a positive influence on inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. The civil police officers deployed by the UN, for example, provided Albanians with opportunities to express their complaints, and acted as moderators between the Albanians and the Macedonian government.⁶² Even though the “preventive” deployment of peacekeeping forces in Macedonia was primarily for the prevention of the spillover of armed conflict from outside, it also contributed to the moderation of domestic inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

Croatia and Macedonia followed quite different courses after the founding elections in terms of domestic inter-ethnic relations. Macedonia has managed its ethnic problems more successfully even though there was no difference in formal institutions and Croatia was in a more favorable position than Macedonia in terms of socio-economic aspects. In the present article, three factors were pointed out in order to explain the difference between the two countries: (1) the power-base of the new governments, (2) the beliefs of the key leaders, and (3) the external environment. In the closing section, in lieu of a conclusion I would like to explore the theoretical implications of the case study of the present article.

First, some scholars have assumed a one-way relationship between democratization and ethnic conflict management, arguing that democratization in multiethnic countries leads to the failure of ethnic conflict management and political destabilization, as presented at the beginning of the present paper. The results of the comparative analysis in the present article show, however, that the relationship between democratization and ethnic conflict management is of an interactive nature. On the one hand, successful management of ethnic problems leads to more successful democratization, as the Macedonian case shows. On the other hand, a process of democratization could affect the management of ethnic problems, since it could affect two factors that are important for ethnic conflict management: the power-base of new governments and the beliefs of key leaders. In the Croatian case, for example, the dominant position of the CDC and the selection of Tuđman as president of the republic were consequences of the results of founding elections in 1990. One should not, therefore, assume a one-way relationship between democratization and ethnic conflict management.

61 On the other hand, however, the rise of anti-Western sentiment among ethnic Macedonians was reported after the Ohrid agreement, because of the “excessively pro-Albanian” stance of Western countries. See Borjan Jovanovski, “Macedonians Turn against West,” *IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report* 286 (5 October 2001).

62 “Report of the UNPROFOR exploratory mission to Macedonia,” S/24923 Annex para. 12.

Second, some scholars have been emphasizing institutional factors in order to achieve successful management of ethnic problems in the democratic government. The case of Macedonia shows, however, that relatively successful management of ethnic problems has been possible even without formal institutions specifically designed to achieve ethnic power-sharing, owing to three factors pointed out in the present article. Even though this does not reduce the importance of formal institutions for ethnic conflict management in the democratic regime, those three factors should also be incorporated into theoretical discussion in order to study fully the success and failure of ethnic conflict management.

In fact, there are some studies that have shown the importance of one of the three factors pointed out here. Regarding the external environment, for example, David D. Laitin argues that, among six cases of post-Soviet republics, the crucial difference between violent war and low-level conflict is the threshold of external support for the minority that is provided by the national homeland.⁶³ As for the power-base of the new governments, Rossen V. Vassilev argues that the party fragmentation in the parliament enabled a minority party, the ethnic Turkish-dominated *Movement for Rights and Freedoms* (MRF), to exert an influence as a coalition partner and a political arbiter between two major parties, the *Bulgarian Socialist Party* (BSP) and the *Union of Democratic Forces* (UDF), and that the shifting alliances and de facto coalition of MRF with one of the two major parties contributed to the moderation of inter-ethnic relations.⁶⁴ The theoretical synthesis of these various case studies, however, has been barely conducted, and that would contribute greatly to the study of ethnic conflict management in democratic regimes. This task is clearly beyond the scope of the present article, and I would like to attempt it at the next opportunity.

Finally, in the case of Macedonia, power-sharing between ethnic groups has been established and maintained on an ad-hoc basis, rather than on the basis of formal institutions. Does this mean that power-sharing in Macedonia is precarious? I can only present an ambivalent answer to this question. On the one hand, power-sharing between Macedonians and Albanians in the parliament has endured for more than ten years since the founding elections, and it appears that ethnic power-sharing is now becoming a kind of unquestionable norm among both politicians and the electorate. This could even be interpreted as an *informal* institutionalization of the power-sharing in Macedonia, although it was started on an ad-hoc basis.

On the other hand, there are several factors which could negatively affect the continuation of power-sharing in the current form. As for the external environment, Kosovo, which borders the Albanian-inhabited area of Macedonia,

63 David D. Laitin, "Secessionist Rebellion in the former Soviet Union," *Comparative Political Studies* 34:8 (2001), pp. 839-861.

64 Rossen V. Vassilev, "Post-Communist Bulgaria's Ethnopolitics," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1:2 (2001), pp. 37-53.

Table 5: Natality of Ethnic Groups in the Former Yugoslavia, 1953-1981
(number of children per 1,000 women from 15 to 49 years old)

	1953	1961	1981
Total	106.1	89.1	67.4
Serbs	101.8	74.8	57.2
Croats	91.0	80.6	64.1
Slovenes	83.1	70.9	58.2
Macedonians	143.0	98.9	68.8
Montenegrins	133.6	116.0	61.2
Muslims	172.8	172.1	102.1
Albanians	229.9	223.9	149.2
Hungarians	72.2	59.4	54.1
Turks	136.8	140.6	105.7
Slovaks	84.6	68.4	58.1
Romanians	71.5	61.8	52.0
Bulgarians	101.3	77.5	62.9
Rusians and Ukrainians	91.4	70.8	30.5

Source: Dušan Breznik, *Stanovništvo Jugoslavije* (Titograd: Chronos, 1991), p. 70.

could be a destabilizing factor for Macedonia. Albanians in Kosovo are firmly determined to seek independence and show no sign of compromise, and the final status of Kosovo has not been determined as of the year 2003. In the course of the settlement of this issue of the final status of Kosovo, aspirant or frustrated Albanians in Kosovo might affect their fellows in Macedonia, encourage them to seek an exit from Macedonia and unification with Kosovo, and discourage them from continuing power-sharing with Macedonians.

Another important factor is the large disparity in natality between ethnic groups. In the former Yugoslav region, Albanians generally tend to have many more children than other ethnic groups (see Table 5), and, as a matter of fact, the ratio of Albanians keeps growing in Macedonia (see Table 1). If this trend continues, Macedonians might feel threatened by the growing proportion of Albanians in Macedonia in the future. Even though this might not necessarily lead to a cessation of power-sharing, it could encourage Macedonians to seek a different form of power-sharing, maybe a more formal one, in order to secure their current dominant position.

It remains to be seen whether, and how, power-sharing in Macedonia will endure or collapse in the future. At any rate, Macedonia will remain an interesting case for the study of democratization in multiethnic countries, and will remain an object of further study.