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Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: Maḥalla under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905*

NAGANAWA NORIHIRO

INTRODUCTION

Recent studies of Russian history tell us that both the imperial and Soviet states played decisive roles in utilizing confessional and ethnic categories in their political practices and that the peoples, in turn, appropriated these categories for their own self-identification.1 Using Raeff’s concept of a Polizeistaat, historians have found similar interactions in the formation of the Muslim community in the empire. The relation between the state and the community in this interpretation differs greatly from that depicted in the “history of a national movement,” which exaggerates hostile relations and the “essence” of the nation.2 Interrelationships between the state and community contributed to the formation of the regional Muslim identity in the heart of the empire.3

* I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for encouraging my reconsideration of the structure of the first draft. I also appreciate Paul Werth’s valuable comments. Vladimir Bobrovnikov’s suggestions in comparative terms were also useful in reexaming the draft from various angles. This research was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.


2 Robert Crews, “Allies in God’s Command: Muslim Communities and the State in Imperial Russia” (Ph. D. diss., Princeton University, 1999); idem, “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” The American Historical Review 108:1 (2003), pp. 50-83; Vladimir Bobrovnikov, “Islam in the Russian Empire,” Cambridge History of Russia 2 (forthcoming). I am grateful to V. Bobrovnikov for allowing me access to the draft. An interesting difference seems to exist between the Kazan and Ufa researchers, which is typically reflected in their evaluation of the Great Reform. For example, while A. Nogmanov from Kazan accentuates the imperial laws’ restrictive aspects based on a certain “ideology,” L. Iamaeva from Ufa regards that period as one of modernization of the empire and incorporation of Muslims into the process. A. Nogmanov, “Evoliutsiia
While attention has been devoted to interactions in the nineteenth century, the relationship between Muslims’ daily life and the administrative routine after 1905 remains to be studied more thoroughly, beyond the shadow of the national movement and the striking politicization of the issue of Islam among state officials and Muslim intellectuals. Robert Geraci examines the motivations of those – such as missionaries and pedagogues – who made commitments to non-Russians.\(^4\) Charles Steinwedel portrays governance after 1905 as the subjects’ active participation in civic life and the direct rule of a population according to the principles of ethnicity and a “national state.”\(^5\) Nevertheless, it remains unclear how common Muslims lived under the particular conditions that existed after 1905. This paper describes how local Muslims reorganized their maḥallas,\(^6\) their parishes, around the Friday mosques, through interaction with the state under the new regime.\(^7\)

Muslims under the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly, or Orenburgskoe Magometanskoе Dukhovnoe Sobranie (OMDS), perceived the law of April 17 on toleration of faiths and the Manifesto of October 17 in the course of the 1905 revolution as a restoration of the tradition of Catherine II. The empress had employed “pragmatic flexibility,” granting them the institution as official recognition of their faith. In other words, under Peter the Great, his female successors and after Alexander II, the government aimed at the simplification and leveling of socio-cultural relationships. It sought to sweep away privileges and


\(^{\text{2}}\) Allen J. Frank, Islamic Historiography and “Bulghar” Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998); Christian Noack, “State Policy and Its Impact on the Formation of a Muslim Identity in the Volga-Urals;” in Stephane A. Dudoignon and Hisao Komatsu, eds., Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Nineteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries) (London and N.Y., 2001), pp. 3-26.

\(^{\text{3}}\) Robert Geraci, Window on the East; National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca and London, 2001).


\(^{\text{5}}\) Hereafter, I will transcribe and italicize important Turkic or Arabic words at the first appearance. In subsequent usage, the transcription will be simplified, like Sharī’a and Sharia.

\(^{\text{6}}\) For a thorough depiction of local Muslim life in a specific area within the wide imperial context, see A. Frank, Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910 (Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2001). Also based on central official documents, my analysis puts more emphasis on the common effects that administrative operations exerted on mahallas of the Volga-Ural region and Western Siberia.
exception applied to Muslims as obstacles on the path of progress: the Muslim nobility had lost their status, if they were to keep Islam under Peter the Great; Muslim confessional schools became objects of national education reform after the 1870s.

The law of religious toleration in 1905 promised the revision of the existing laws and administrative system of non-Orthodox worshippers and the convening of a Special Conference for that purpose. Thereby questions concerning the reform of the Spiritual Assembly became central to Muslims. The government, which regarded the reform as overdue since the middle of the preceding century, held three Special Conferences: in 1906, 1910 and 1914. The Muslims in their turn developed petition campaigns; the Muslim deputies of the State Duma and other leaders examined the reform project in more detail than any other question.

Nevertheless, the final decade of the Tsarist regime is marked by an unprecedented widening of gaps between ideological conflict and pragmatic policies. On the one hand, confronting Muslim affairs, the policy makers were obsessed by such specters as “Pan-Islamism” and “unification of the imperial Muslims.” On the other hand, they were forced to react to intensified negotiation, based on the principle of tolerance. This paper explains how imperial law and administration, despite bureaucrats’ obsessions, continued to determine the reality of local Muslim communities “from above.” This study also explores the efforts of Muslims to reconcile Islamic tradition with the existing administrative order and to affect the policy-making process “from below” to maintain their economic life.


10 The gaps themselves were a pattern in the history of Russian policy toward the Muslims. Kappeler, “Czarist Policy,” p. 142.


12 Here, I do not underestimate the powers of “anti-Islamic” ideology in policy-making. To learn about the direct effects on Muslim communities, see my paper at the VII ICCCEES World Congress in Berlin (28 July 2005), “Political Reliability: The Kazan Provincial Governorship and the Control of the Muslim Clergies (1905-1917).”
These interactions are illustrated by combined examinations of Russian administrative documents and the Muslim press. I propose that this combination bridges the split existing in the historiography on Russia’s Muslims. Indeed, the post-1905 period witnessed Muslim publications making a great contribution in collecting common issues for Muslims living within similar administrative frameworks and in promoting their mutual discussion. One important Russian source was the protocols of the Special Conferences: especially in 1914, the existing administrative structures were subjected to scrutiny. The resolutions of the 1914 conference also ended in a defense of the status quo as a result of conflicting ideas among bureaucrats, as with other projects that had been elaborated in the second half of the preceding century. However, archival documents of the Spiritual Assembly vividly relate what really occurred in mahallas under the “status quo,” namely that mahallas were not simply passive objects of state reforms.

The Spiritual Assembly or OMDS in Ufa had jurisdiction over the Muslims living in the eastern part of European Russia and Siberia, who at the beginning of the twentieth century constituted roughly one-fifth of the empire’s entire Muslim population. This institution was subordinated to the Department of Religious Affairs of Foreign Faiths within the Ministry of the Interior. Imperial law clearly defined both the structure of mahallas and the role of the “Muslim clergy.” Although neither Islamic nor imperial law de jure situated the Muslim ecclesiastical class as an estate, legal practice and the administration forged a de facto Muslim dukhovenstvo within the empire. In general, they were also called mullah.

On the contrary, the state structure did neither guarantee nor even address the mahalla’s economic functions. The congregation had to take the initiative in seeking resources according to existing laws and administration: organizing parish councils (popechitel’stvo), legalizing pious endowment (waqf) from the rich, and seeking support from zemstvos. In the historiography two approaches have been employed to study activities inside Muslim parishes.


14 For an excellent monograph on the institution, see D.D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe Magometanskoe Dukhovnoe Sobranie v kontse XVIII-XIX vv.* (Ufa, 1999). While that author concludes that the institution had relinquished its authority over most of the Muslim clergy and intellectuals by the end of the nineteenth century, my paper shows that its roles and the expectations of Muslims increased after the 1905 Revolution.

15 By 1908, there were 4908 mahallas and 4,017,172 Muslims in the OMDS’s jurisdiction. Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA), f. 821 [Departament dukhovnykh del inostrannykh ispovedanii], op. 133, d. 625, l. 18ob.

Robert Crews described how lay Muslims as well as clerics competed with each other to associate themselves with the “Islamic orthodoxy” represented by the Spiritual Assembly. Stéphan Dudoignon described the politics over the division of capital in the mahalla. However, Dudoignon’s arguments constructed mainly on the basis of Muslim sources limits the evaluation of the role that the Spiritual Assembly played as a mediator between the state and local communities. In fact, it was this institution that formulated the procedure of making popechitel’sto and pious endowments by negotiating with the government. In spite of the bureaucrats’ fears of a “Muslim peril,” mahalla life was incorporated more organically than ever into administrative routine.

**Tsarist Law and the Mahalla**

*Parish Personnel*

Imperial law allowed each Friday mosque to have no more than three clerics: one *imām,* who was a leader of prayer; one *khaṭīb,* a preacher of sermons (or *Khutba,* and one *mu’ādhidhin,* who called the congregation to prayer. Usually, one person worked as imam, khatib and mudarris, or a religious teacher. During the sermons on Fridays and holidays, mullahs highly praised the names of the emperor and his family members, and also announced instructions of the government to the people. The omission of the royal names, let alone a prayer for the “Turkish Sultan,” was strictly prohibited, and could serve as sufficient grounds for dismissal from a post.

The law provided mullahs with rights not only to perform rituals but also to make their commitments to deal with civil issues, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance according to the Islamic law, *Sharī‘a.* The parish clergy was the court of the first instance and the Spiritual Assembly was the second. Although property cases were handed over to civil courts soon after the inheritors’ dissatisfaction with the judgment of the mullahs, the OMDS could issue the concerned persons with attestation of each quota defined by the Sharia.

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19 For example, instructions on the Manifesto of October 17, Tsentr’al’nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Respubliki Bashkortostan (TsGIARB), f. I-295 [Orenburgskoe Mago-metansko Dukhovnoe Sobranie], op. 11, d. 484, ll. 320-321.
20 Natsional’nyi arkhiv Respubliki Tatarstan (NART), f. 2 [Kazanskoe Gubernskoe Pravlenie], op. 2, d. 9221, l. 10.
21 *SZ,* 1896 edn., vol. 11, part 1, articles 1345-1348, 1399, 1418; RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 270-272.
With the introduction of the register books (*metricheskie knigi*) to the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly in 1828, mullahs were incorporated into one branch of civil administration; each year they received two register books from the OMDS and sent one back to it with the other being preserved in the mosque. Military authorities and zemstvos also used information of these books. After the introduction of universal military service in 1874, the mullahs were obliged to issue birth certificates for conscription.\(^{22}\) Zemstvos, engaged in averting such epidemics as small pox, required correct data on infants for effective vaccination and expected that the mahalla clerics would explain its usefulness to the congregation.\(^{23}\) The resulting deepened relations between the clergy and civil administration motivated the government to demand that they know the Russian language, which engendered the establishment of educational qualifications for mullahs.

Together with the register books, mullahs were obligated to send “marriage dues” to the Spiritual Assembly; at the bridal ceremony, or *nikāh*, each new couple paid the mullahs 25 silver kopecks. These dues, introduced in 1829 in connection with the increased operation of register books, were the main source of revenue for the OMDS. In 1913, the institution spent 20,077 rubles and 47 kopecks: that amount comprised 7864 rubles and 94 kopecks from the Treasury and 12,212 rubles and 53 kopecks from the dues. In 1914, when the Special Conference discussed the reinforcement of the OMDS’s staff, the increase of marriage dues to 50 kopecks was approved in accordance with the Ufa mufti’s suggestion. The Conference resolved that only the “State Church” was eligible for Treasury support.\(^{24}\) However, Muslims, claiming that they performed the same obligations to the state as Russians did, considered it expedient to increase the Treasury allocation. Muḥammad Sābir al-Ḥusnā, an imam of Ufa, proposed as an alternative that the marriage dues be collected not equally, but rather in proportion to the amount of bridal gifts, *mahr*.\(^{25}\)

To become a mullah, one had to be elected by two-thirds of the elder male parishioners with the volost and village headmen present. The resolution (*prigovor*) was sent through the uezd police directorate not to the Spiritual Assembly, but to the provincial governorship on which the appointment and dismissal depended. The governor’s board investigated whether the candidate had a certificate of the Spiritual Assembly and whether he was “politically loyal.” The board issued him an ukase of appointment if no obstacles existed. Thus, he was called a “licensed mullah”: *ukaznyi mulla*.\(^{26}\)

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23 For example, the mufti promised cooperation to the Ufa county zemstvo. TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 484, ll. 44, 68.

24 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 143ob., 145ob.


26 *SZ*, 1896 edn., vol. 11, part 1, articles 1431-1436.
The aspiring mullahs made a long journey from every corner of the OMDS’s vast jurisdiction to Ufa for the examination. This trend intensified after the declaration of toleration of faiths in 1905, which led to an increase in the number of mahallas;\textsuperscript{27} in 1904 the number of examinees was 333; in 1906, 694 examinees attended, and in 1909 – 995.\textsuperscript{28} Another factor helps to explain this intensification: aspiring teachers, \textit{mu’allimlar}, who finished schools of the new method, \textit{üşül-i jadid}, also traveled to Ufa to gain certification of the Spiritual Assembly.

In the jadid educational system, muallims, who were independent of mullahs, taught their own specialized subjects; thereby they became indispensable personnel in the mahalla schools. Jadid schools did not have the right to issue an official certificate. Therefore, inspectors of people’s schools, taking advantage of this fact, would force the teachers to leave and close the schools.\textsuperscript{29} The situation was all the worse because the authorities suspected that the muallims had provoked the Pan-Islamic movement among Muslims, which they felt threatened the state order.\textsuperscript{30}

It is not surprising that the Muslims tried to legalize them by using the existing examination of the Spiritual Assembly, the sole Muslim institution acknowledged by the government. This movement led the Muslim faction of the State Duma to prepare a bill on the OMDS’s right to issue the certificate for teachers.\textsuperscript{31} However, some contributors to Muslim newspapers, taking into account the huge expense incurred to travel to Ufa, suggested that the right be given to some madrasas in definite areas and that special teachers’ schools be opened for muallims and \textit{mu’allimas}, or female ones.\textsuperscript{32} Others considered the OMDS’s outdated examination to be already inappropriate for those required to have pedagogic knowledge and capability.\textsuperscript{33}

Mullahs and the congregation retained their communal life as the state administration worked in combination with the Spiritual Assembly. After the

\textsuperscript{27} Dudoignon underlined economic conditions for the increase. See his “Status, Strategies and Discourses,” pp. 60-65.

\textsuperscript{28} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 625, l. 28.

\textsuperscript{29} Muslim confessional schools, maktabs and madrasas, had been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education since 1874. Sbornik zakonov o musul’manskom dukhovenstve v Tavricheskom i Orenburgskom okrugakh i o magometanskih uchebnikh zavedeniakh (Kazan, 1902), p. 26.

\textsuperscript{30} TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 622, l. 53; M.N. Farkhshatov, Samoderzhavie i traditsionnye shkoly bashkir i tatar v nachale XX veka (1900-1917 gg.) (Ufa, 2000), pp. 66, 199-200; Waqt (10 April 1908), p. 1; 26 April 1908, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{32} Waqt (29 November 1912), p. 1; ibid. (12 April 1914), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{33} This was one of the questions that Ri‘ā al-Dīn Fa‘hr al-Dīn had posed in connection with school reform on the pages of \textit{Tarjumān} in 1905. For various answers, Ri‘ā al-Dīn Fa‘hr al-Dīn, \textit{Maktab wa zakāt, khatţa‘ wa zimstva yārdamî} (Orenburg, n.d.). Although the year of publication is not shown, \textit{Waqt} relates that it appeared in 1909. \textit{Waqt} (7 May 1909), pp. 3-4.
Great Reforms, modernization of the state structure changed the relations with the Muslim community: civil cases came to be examined in the reformed courts; young Muslims were conscripted according to lists that the mullahs provided; zemstvos were interested in preventing epidemics and, as discussed later, in spreading education among Muslims. It was expedient for the government to set educational qualifications for mullahs as heads of Muslim communities in the course of educational reform.

**Russian Language and the Muslim Clergy**

According to the address of the Minister of the Interior, D.A. Tolstoi, on July 16, 1888, Alexander III enacted regulations on educational qualifications for the Muslim ecclesiastical class under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly. The law, to become effective from January 1, 1891, demanded from the higher parish clerics, such as akhunds and khatibs, certificates of knowledge of two-year primary school, and from village mullahs, the ability to speak and read Russian. On October 11, 1890, the tsar again issued a law that contained virtually identical regulations to those of 1888. Then the Minister of Education clarified the concrete procedure of the examination. These regulations caused waves of protests from Muslims, including the “progressives.” However, after the 1905 Revolution, they began to protest against measures that the government took to exclude the teaching of secular subjects, including Russian, from their confessional schools.

What did this change in attitude towards the Russian language mean? There is good reason to believe that the nature of the interaction with the state changed at the turn of the century.

The question of compulsory study of Russian arose when regulations on education for Non-Russians were enacted in 1870 at the initiative of Tolstoi. The law forced Muslim communities to set up Russian language classes (russkie klassy) on their own account when opening new maktabs and madrasas. Owing to the admonition of Mufti Selimgirei Tevkelev to study Russian, the Samara governorship thought it necessary to set educational qualifications for mullahs.

Efforts of the educational authorities to introduce Russian language classes often met with the active and passive resistance of mullahs. To placate them, the educational authorities were forced to cooperate with the Spiritual Assembly, although it had refrained from handling the maktabs and madrasas since 1874. For instance, in 1877 in Chishme village of Ufa county, a Russian language class was opened, despite the 1870 regulation, at the expense of the education department of the Samara governorship. Other instances of mullahs’ resistance to learning Russian have been noted. The extension of compulsory Russian language classes was made difficult because of mullahs’ hostility. To gain their cooperation, educational authorities had to compromise with the Spiritual Assembly, which, since 1874, had been refraining from handling these schools.

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34 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, the third series, vol. 8 (St. Petersburg, 1890), no. 5419; Sbornik zakonov o musul’manskom dukhovenstve, pp. 18-20.
35 Sbornik zakonov o musul’manskom dukhovenstve, p. 27.
36 For Mufti’s admonition, Riḍā’ al-Dīn Fāḥr al-Dīn, Islāmlar ҳақиқида ҳукамат тадбирлари, birinchī juz’ (Orenburg, 1907), pp. 10-12; about the conflict between the Samara governorship and the Spiritual Assembly, TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 80, ll. 149-158.
Ministry of Education. The ministry sent a Muslim teacher from the Ufa Tatar Teachers’ School, who initially enjoyed the villagers’ confidence. However, because of the influence of their mullah Iakupov, who claimed that Qur’ān prohibited studying Russian, they stopped sending their children to the teacher and providing him with apartments and rooms. The inspector of the Tatar, Bashkir, and Kirgiz Schools of the Orenburg Educational District asked Mufti Tevkelev to reprimand the mullah.\(^{37}\)

However, it is noteworthy that the laws on educational qualification contributed, to a degree, to the spread of Russian language classes. Especially in Ufa province, they were supported by zemstvo subsidies. Now mullahs began to teach Russian and some centers appeared where aspiring mullahs could study Russian. In Ufa, the Russian class of Usmaniye Madrasa worked as such; in Belebei county the evening class for adults within Belebei Madrasa during 1896-1914 prepared 299 candidates for the post of mullah.\(^{38}\)

Nevertheless, regulations caused protests even among “progressive” Muslims. After the 1888 law, Akhmetdzhan Saidashev, a Kazan merchant of the first class, organized a large-scale petition campaign by mobilizing his commercial and family connections.\(^{39}\) At the beginning of the 1905 Revolution, the protest was shared by such leading intellectuals as Saidgirei Alkin, Gabdulla Apanaev and Yusuf Akchura. In the resolution approved at the meeting of Kazan and sent to Sergei Witte, they insisted that the functions of the Spiritual Assembly be reinforced. In this context, they demanded that the maktabs and madrasas be brought under its jurisdiction because they had a “purely religious character.”\(^{40}\)

The Muslims’ fierce protests compelled the government to alter its course of education policy. In the middle of 1905, as promised in the law on toleration of faiths, the Special Conference took place under the presidency of A.P. Ignat’ev. On behalf of the conference, V.P. Cherevanskii presented an elaborate report on Muslim-Sunnite issues, taking “more than 500” petitions from Muslims into account. He wrote that almost four-fifths of them demanded that mullahs be discharged from studying Russian. Cherevanskii concluded that

\(^{37}\) TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 524, l. 119. Many other documents in the same file illustrate the mullahs’ resistance, especially ll. 65-103.


\(^{39}\) The campaign is regarded as the first “all-national” movement headed by the Tatar bourgeoisie. R. Salikhov, Tatarskaiia burzhuaziia Kazani i natsional’nye reformy vtoroi poloviny XIX-nachala XX v. (Kazan, 2001), pp. 24-26.

\(^{40}\) RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 631, ll. 11-16. At the Third All Russian Muslim Congress, S. Alkin stated that the study of Russian is necessary even for those acquiring religious knowledge. Eventually, the participants approved the introduction of Russian language from middle school, rushdī maktab. 1906 sene 16-21 Avgustta İctima Etmış Rusya Müslümanlarının Nedvesi (Kazan, 1906), pp. 82-84.
the Muslims shunned interaction with the “progressive people of the Earth” and that even state policy would not help them.\(^{41}\)

In 1910, when the Special Conference was organized “for the Establishment of Measures for Counteracting Tatar-Muslim Influence in the Volga Region,” those present abandoned the principle of the 1870 regulations on the introduction of Russian into the Muslim community because of the influence of the participants’ biased attitude towards the enlightenment of the “East.”\(^{42}\) After that time, the government permitted only religious subjects in maktabs and madrasas. In the eyes of the jadid intellectuals, of course, the policy was a restriction on progress (\textit{taraqq}ī). Nevertheless, the policy also emphasized to them that the realization of their past demand had brought about the present restriction. How can the paradox be explained?

Policies after Alexander II appeared to the Muslim community as assaults on the guarantees of confessional autonomy that Catherine II had granted.\(^{43}\) It was not accidental that at the time of the 1905 Revolution, Muslims raised the demand for restoration of these “lost” rights. Therefore, representatives of the Muslim community, including the progressive elements, initially placed priority on regaining and preserving past autonomy rather than on changing the nature of their interaction with the state. Under these circumstances, it was important that Riḍā’ al-Dīn Fāhr al-Dīn, one of three assessors, Qādīs of the Spiritual Assembly, claimed that no rights had been guaranteed from the outset and that invoking the “imagined” edict of the empress had, on the contrary, deprived Muslims of rights to protect their interests.\(^{44}\)

The identity of the Muslim community had been shaped in the framework of the imperial administration with the Spiritual Assembly at the center since the end of the eighteenth century. However, the government construed the Muslims’ claims of this particularity as evidence of their “closed” attitude towards the state and “Western” civilization. After the 1905 Revolution, Muslim representatives began to change their tactics. In the press, withdrawing from their previous position, they strove to explain the necessity and utility of knowing the Russian language.\(^{45}\) In 1913, when the Department of Religious Affairs investigated the contemporary situation of Muslim confessional schools for the upcoming 1914 Special Conference, Mufti Muhammed’yar Sultanov invited religious scholars, ‘\textit{ulam}ā’, to a private conference. Based on a thorough analysis of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, the participants declared that religious and general secular subjects were compatible.\(^{46}\) At the 1914 Conference, as at the

\(^{41}\) RGIA, f. 1276 [Sovet Ministrov], op. 2, d. 593, ll. 99ob., 101ob., and 122ob.-123.


\(^{45}\) \textit{Waqt} (10 March 1907), pp. 2-3; 6 June 1914, p. 1.

\(^{46}\) \textit{Waqt} (2 November 1913), p. 1; \textit{Akt chastnogo soveshchaniia dukhovnykh litv okruga Orenburgskogo Majometanskogo Dukhovnogo Sobraniiia na 14 i 15 dekabria 1913 goda} (Ufa, 1914).
1910 Conference, some feared that the Muslims’ association with Russian culture through the language fomented “radicalism” among them, while others advocated raising the level of the educational qualification. Consequently, knowledge of Russian remained compulsory.\textsuperscript{47}

It is noteworthy that the Spiritual Assembly kept the principle of the necessity of Russian. From the government’s perspective, Mufti Sultanov remained strictly loyal to the regime until 1905, but thereafter fell obviously under the influence of the “Tatar narodniki.”\textsuperscript{48} In other words, it was this tactical behavior that permitted a consistent attitude: before 1905 he had been loyal to the principle of the 1870 regulations, but subsequently he tried to listen to the demands of progressive Muslims.

**Mosque Building**

With respect to the construction of mosques, tsarist law required the recognition of the Spiritual Assembly and the provincial governorship regarding the real necessity and financial capability of the community. The authorities’ approval depended mainly on two conditions: the presence of 200 male Muslims and the absence of a threat from the new mosque to nearby baptized Tatars.\textsuperscript{49}

The rule of the number of male Muslims per parish corresponded, on the one hand, to the minimum capability to maintain the mosque and its clergy. On the other hand, it functioned as a restriction against activities of small villages. For example, villagers of Mavliutova in Bakaev volost, Ufa county, which in 1902 comprised only 30 houses and 97 males, sent their resolutions to the Spiritual Assembly and the Ufa governorship. Despite the approval of the OMDS, the local authority declined on the grounds that people from a neighboring village also signed for these resolutions. While the Senate justified the petition from the village, the Ministry of the Interior supported the explanation of the provincial governorship.\textsuperscript{50} Some Muslims thought the official number too small. A person named “Altay” wrote that, in addition to the expense for parish schools, mullahs were to be paid 400-500 rubles annually. Thereby, even if half of the sum were covered by the Treasury, the congregation would have to be no less than 1000 and pay proportional “religious dues”\textsuperscript{51}.

The subdivision of a parish, which diminished its resources, often occurred especially where a parish had 400-500 males. That phenomenon is explainable in light of the politics within a village, even in a mahalla. In spite of their limited finance, residents wanted their own Friday mosque and place

\textsuperscript{47} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 307-311ob.
\textsuperscript{48} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 625, l. 14.
\textsuperscript{49} Sbornik zakonov o musul’manskom dukhovenstve, pp. 24-26.
\textsuperscript{50} Waqt (4 February 1912), pp. 1-2; Zapadnye bashkiry: po perepiciam 1795-1917 gg. (Ufa, 2001), p. 468.
\textsuperscript{51} Yıldız (10 July 1914), pp. 1-2.

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as many clerics as law permitted: one imam, one khatib and one muadhdhin. Division of the limited resources compelled imams to compete for authority, which fostered separation of the mahalla. The rich ones, bāy, sought to build religious institutions named after them.\textsuperscript{52}

Challenging the existing rule, the newspaper \textit{Waqt} proposed that the foundation of mahallas be permitted in cases where the congregation numbered at least 50 males. Where one mahalla was already functioning, it was proposed that its division be stopped whenever each newly formed mahalla would thereby have fewer than 400-500 males.\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, the rule in Imperial law was observed even after October 1917 by the Religious Department, \textit{Dīniya Niżāratī}, in the Muslim autonomy of Inner Russia and Siberia, which suggests that Muslims themselves accepted its effectiveness.\textsuperscript{54}

An exceptional case existed when the rule was not applied: the renaming of a mosque from a daily one, \textit{piatitremennaiia}, to a Friday one, \textit{sobornaia}. Only communities with Friday mosques were eligible to form mahallas as administrative units. Communities with daily mosques depended on the clergy of the Friday mosque not only to carry out such rituals as the Friday prayer, but also to record births, marriages, divorces and deaths in the register book. These satellites were not always located in the same village, but were often spread over several villages. The situation was serious especially in Siberia, where a small Muslim population was scattered over vast open spaces. The Friday mosque of Tarkhan village in Tiumen’ county, Tobol’sk province had gathered congregations from three outer villages before two of them became independent mahallas with their own Friday mosques. Then, the third village, although it had only 118 male Muslims, intended to leave because of the long distance to the Friday mosque. Moreover, the road was cut by two rivers that flooded in spring. Despite the claim of Tarkhan villagers that the separation would diminish their financial capability, the Religious Department of Muslim autonomy on January 8, 1918 gave the third village permission to organize a mahalla with the existing daily mosque being renamed as a Friday mosque.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Dudoignon, “Qu’est-ce que la ‘Qadimyiya’?” pp. 214-218; \textit{Maktab} 2 (1913), pp. 57-60.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Waqt} (4 May 1914), p. 1.

\textsuperscript{54} A case on the construction of the second Friday mosque by Teptiars in Imangulova village of Verkhneural county, Orenburg province. The final resolution to decline on account of the lack of numbers is dated December 24, 1918. TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 970. n. p. The Teptiars were those who had originally moved from the Volga-Kama region to the southern Ural and who had settled in Bashkir-patrimonial lands as tenant farmers, \textit{pripushchennik}. They formed an estate, \textit{soslovie}, which included not only Turkic Muslims but Finno-Ugric pagans. A manifesto of April 10, 1832 freed them from rents, \textit{obroki}, and gave them lands from the Bashkir forests. Since then, belonging to the Teptiars seems to have acquired an important meaning in self-identification. V.M. Cheremshanskii, \textit{Opisanie Orenburgskoi gubernii v khoziaistvenno-statisticheskom etnograficheskom i promyslennom otnosheniakh} (Ufa, 1859), pp. 165-168. See also footnote 85.

\textsuperscript{55} TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 970. n. p.
The second condition defining the approval of a mosque building was the absence of the threat of “seduction” for baptized Tatars. It acquired a more serious meaning after 1905: witnessing an apostasy phenomenon among baptized Tatars and pagans triggered by the law on toleration of faiths, both the government and Russian Orthodox missionaries labelled this “Tatarization” and “Islamization.”

Local missionaries thought it crucial for the Orthodox Church to intervene in the construction of mosques, although Catherine II had abandoned this course in her ukase of June 17, 1773.

In his report, which was presented by the Synod to the Minister of the Interior in 1910, Kazan Archbishop Nikanor wrote that permission to build mosques made people believe that the government protected Muslims, which fostered an increase of mosques in “apostate” villages. At the Kazan Missionary Congress in 1910, N. Sigorskii, secretary of Ufa Orthodox Spiritual Consistory, recommended that the provincial governorship consult with the diocesan authority about the conditions of any prospective location for construction of a mosque, and that local clerics provide information for the diocesan authority’s final decision. Sigorskii also pointed out the long official procedure for church building, while mosques, in his view, were built merely to meet the requirements of the parishioners’ numbers. Actually, by the end of the nineteenth century in Kazan province, the network of mosques had become denser than its Orthodox counterpart. Whereas a mosque, on average, served only about 910 Muslims, a Russian Orthodox church served as many as 2385 worshippers.

The Muslim community was, of course, opposed to the intervention of Russian Orthodox authorities; they regarded it as a serious violation not merely of the law on toleration of faiths and the Manifesto of October 17, but also of the historical tradition established by the “Grandma-Empress”, ‘Abī Pāḍshāh.

Even among the participants of the 1914 Special Conference, a remark was heard that such a measure was not compatible with “the general spirit of the doctrine of Orthodoxy, which is free from oppressing other faiths.” However, for prevention of “Islamic propaganda against the Orthodox believers,” they did not exclude the possibility of prohibiting construction of a mosque earlier than a church in a mixed-population area.

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56 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, l. 319.
57 In 1767, when the empress visited Kazan, she allowed two stone mosques to be built in the Old Tatar Quarter, which signalled the beginning of tolerance toward Islam. E. Malov, O tatarskikh mechetiakh v Rossii (Kazan’, 1868), pp. 42-50.
59 Missionerskii s”ezd v gorode Kazani 13-26 iiunia 1910 goda (Kazan’, 1910), pp. 347-350. In the section on Islam, two reports were published later as separate brochures. Ia.D. Koblov, O tatarizatsii inorodtsev privolzhskogo kraia (Kazan’, 1910); M. Mashanov, Sovremennoe sostoyanie tatar-mukhammadan i ikh otnoshenie k drugim inorodtsam (Kazan’, 1910).
62 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 321ob.-327.
experienced such a sharp contradiction between religious tolerance and the predominance of Russian Orthodoxy as in the last decade of the empire.\textsuperscript{63}

**Economic Aspects of Mahalla Life**

As explained above, Imperial law and administration provided mahallas with a detailed framework to define their existence. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the government also tried to incorporate the Muslim ecclesiastical class more effectively into the state administration by obliging them to study Russian. That represented a change in the nature of interaction between the Muslim community and the state. Not until the 1905 Revolution did the Muslims begin to accept that change. Faced with the challenges of nationalism across the empire, the government in its turn resorted to such ideological terms as “Pan-Islamism” and “Tatarization” in its blueprints of policy against the Volga-Ural Muslims. Still, the administrative routine continued to incorporate the mahallas into itself as long as Islam did not infringe upon the status of Russian Orthodoxy.

However, the government did not go so far as to pay the Muslim clergy from the Treasury, let alone to support the life of the mahallas,\textsuperscript{64} they were forced to find resources for themselves and made efforts to legitimize their activity by using both the Islamic tradition and the existing administrative order. In fact, Muslims did not always agree that the mullahs should receive a salary from the state for fear that the “bureaucratized” mullahs would thereby be separated from the people. The 1914 Muslim Congress decided that the parishioners should pay their mullahs.\textsuperscript{65}

The Spiritual Assembly in Ufa was, on the one hand, only one affiliate of the huge Interior Ministry. On the other hand, it was thereby able to incorporate the Muslims’ everyday needs into its own administrative machinery. After 1905, the Muslim press actively assisted the process. Muslims strove to receive official acknowledgement through the Spiritual Assembly mainly for the following necessities: the organization of popechitel’stvo (parish council); management of waqf (pious endowment); and receipt of subsidies from zemstvos. But an obsession served as a brake on the bureaucrats’ positive assessment of the Muslims’ movements from below: instruments initially devised to control the Muslim life would, as a result, reinforce the unity of the Muslim community, which was not compatible with the state’s interest. Nevertheless, in spite of


\textsuperscript{64} As an exceptional case, the government, faced with the famine in the Volga region in 1912, loaned 50,000 rubles to the Muslim clergy within three years; each mullah received 25 rubles and each muezzin 15 rubles. L.I. Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1936), p. 128; TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, dd. 40, 916.

\textsuperscript{65} Yüldüz (25 June 1914), pp. 1-2. The congress took place at the initiative of the Muslim faction in the State Duma from June 15 to 25.
their ideological perception, they either tried to regulate the newly appearing institutions or simply allowed the routine to continue.

**Parish Councils, Popechitel’stva**

At the turn of the century, new specialized personnel appeared in the mahallas to share the mullahs’ functions. As explained previously, special teachers, muallims, appeared as pedagogic personnel. Parish councils emerged as supervisors of the mahalla economy. Muslims under the OMDS jurisdiction usually called a councilor mutawallī, although mutawalli generally means an overseer of waqf. Indeed, the clergy were burdened with various duties: performance of religious rituals, education, supervision of parish property, and civil administration. Muslims realized that the mullahs’ monopoly of all aspects of life had brought disorder to the mahalla.66

The mahalla council consisted of clerics, senior members, persons of renown, pupils’ parents, merchants, and even noblemen. Mutawallis exploited various financial sources: collection from the congregation, private donations, subsidies from the zemstvo or city duma, and interest from banks on their deposits. They had command of all the property of the mosque and its schools. They played a decisive role also in educational life: entrance of pupils, invitation and dismissal of muallims, organization of libraries, observation of exams, to name but a few. If necessary, mutawallis, as advocates, made petitions to protect the interests of the mahalla before courts and other administrative organs.67

Faced with that reality, Muslims were forced to identify the status of the council both legally and theologically. *Waqt* showed the format of the resolution and the administrative procedure concretely. Parishioners resolved to elect several reliable persons as councilors. The resolution was first sent to the volost directorate or police for their approval and then to the Spiritual Assembly. Then the OMDS sent a book so that the council could record the revenues and expenditures, and inform the OMDS of its activities.68 The fact that the council levied “religious dues,” rūhānī nalog, on the congregation compelled Muslims to think of the relation between the new dues and traditional tithes, ‘ushr and alms, zakāt, ṣadaqa. Two imams from Samara province asked ‘ulamā’ for fatwās (legal opinions) as to whether the mutawallis could be regarded as collectors of tithes and alms in the sense of the Sharia.69 A man from Omsk, answering the call, insisted on a practical solution: the dues should be collected as “obligatory alms,” wājib ṣadaqa, according to each parishioner’s means. They were not only for the sake of a reward from God (thawāb), but also for perpetu-

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67 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 187ob.-192.
69 *Waqt* (18 June 1914), p. 3.
ation of the religious institutions.\textsuperscript{70} This practical approach seems to reflect the economic difficulties of the Siberian Muslims.\textsuperscript{71}

Having noticed an article in \textit{Waqt}, the Department of Religious Affairs in 1911 asked governors to investigate the councils’ activities. The Spiritual Assembly explained that because no regulations defined the way in which the property of a mahalla should be managed, the congregation did have a right to organize the council.\textsuperscript{72} In his report to the Department, the Kazan governor stated that the councilors were both reformers of the Muslim confessional schools and leaders of the “Pan-Islamic movement,” and that the authorities had difficulty in observing these councilors because they were tactically concealed. However, he also acknowledged that the institutions resulted from practical reality and suggested that they be framed legally in order to contain their harmful activities.\textsuperscript{73}

However, Sergei Rybakov, a specialist on Muslim affairs in the Department of Religious Affairs, anticipated a contradictory result of legalization. In the final report of the investigation, while considering the activity of the councils admissible, he claimed that the legal arrangement of the new institutions would lead to “the consolidation of Islam in Russia.” He suggested that the councils be placed under the jurisdiction of the provincial governors, who would strictly limit their activities to the economic sphere and not broaden them to include education.\textsuperscript{74} Based on the report, participants of the 1914 Special Conference agreed, in principle, with the specialist, but recognized the necessity of regulation of the councils’ form and competence.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{Waqf}

The institution of waqf (pious endowment) under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly has not been studied sufficiently.\textsuperscript{76} Indeed, the development of waqf in European Russia and Siberia was much weaker than in the Crimea and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{77} However, efforts of the OMDS from the 1890s to situate waqf in the existing administrative order increased endowments under its jurisdiction at the beginning of the century.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Waqt} (4 July 1914), pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{71} The Siberian Tatars often remained Muslims without a mosque. Dudoignon, “Status, Strategies and Discourses,” p. 68.
\textsuperscript{72} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 595, ll. 18, 64.
\textsuperscript{73} NART, f. 2, op. 2, d. 8961, l. 62.
\textsuperscript{74} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 595, ll. 29ob.-31.
\textsuperscript{75} RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 576, ll. 193ob.-194.
\textsuperscript{76} For a valuable exception, see D.D. Azamatov, \textit{Iz istorii musul’manskoj blagotvoritel’nosti: Vakufy na territorii Evropeiskoi chasti Rossii i Sibiri v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka} (Ufa, 2000).
\textsuperscript{77} By the end of the 1880s, the Assembly had information on only 21 waqfs in the entire jurisdiction. \textit{V pamiat’ stoletiia Orenburgskogo Magometanskogo Dukhovnogo Sobraniiia} (Ufa, 1891), pp. 34-35.
In 1894, the Spiritual Assembly presented to the Ministry of the Interior a draft of regulations on waqf. Pious endowment should be established by a rule, according to which the reception of bequeathed and gifted capital and goods to the benefit of religious institutions was to be allowed by the Minister of the Interior. Waqf should be managed by the mutawallis, who would be appointed and dismissed by the OMDS. If the founder of the waqf did not name them in the testament, they should be elected by the congregation of the mosque to which the waqf would belong. Mutawallis should work in accordance with instructions from the OMDS and send annual reports to it. Although the ministry made no clear judgment, the administrative routine started according to that draft.

Parallel to that process, in 1896, the Ministry of Education took measures so that the Spiritual Assembly should send heads of the educational districts all papers related to donations dedicated to maktabs and madrasas. Whereas Muslims regarded waqf as property that belonged not to man but to God, the Imperial law obliged all property to be possessed by a juridical person. The Muslims were thereby forced to entrust the waqf to their benevolent societies and parish councils. They hoped that waqf would be stipulated as a mahalla’s property because a mahalla was a “perpetual religious institution.”

Waqf was developing in some areas of Siberia, where indigenous Bukharan merchants played a great role in the local economy. In 1898, Ni‘mat Allāh Saidūkāf asked the Spiritual Assembly to obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior to donate 19,000 rubles to the second mosque of Embaev village in Tiumen’ county of Tobol’sk province. In that year, he received permission and deposited the sum in the state bank with annual interest of 3.5 percent. In the testament, he described in detail the purposes for which the profit was to be used, and directed that the mutawalli be a male inheritor and, if not found to be qualified, be elected by the congregation. In the third mahalla of Petropavlovsk in Akmolinsk province, the parishioners founded their council in 1915, and it was recognized by the governor in 1916. The councilors included an imam of the mosque and three merchants (two of them originating from Bukhara). In 1916, eleven persons of renown among the parishioners donated 7075 rubles, which were deposited in the local bank at 5.5 percent interest. After the October Revolution, the waqf was approved by the Spiritual Department of Muslim autonomy. Interestingly enough, the Department levied a five percent tax on the profit of waqf of both the town of Petropavlovsk and the village of Embaev according to a resolution of the Muslim Congress in May 1917. Apparently, waqf had developed sufficiently to have become taxable.

78 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 916, ll. 37-38ob.
79 Sbornik zakonov o musul’manskom dukhovenstve, pp. 47-48.
80 Waqt (29 April 1914), p. 1.
81 TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 689.
Petr Stolypin’s land reform affected waqf issues. The reform is usually explained by the phrase of “destruction of the peasant communes.” However, mahallas were not only economic but also religious communities. Having gained lands by virtue of the Stolypin reform, rich peasants could donate lands to their mahallas, so that the religious institutions could be supported by the profits. Such donated land seems to have become an important financial resource of mahallas. A Muslim newspaper detailed the procedure, through which the Interior Minister recognized the land as waqf. In 1913, Muḥammad Jān Mālikuf, a Teptiar of Staro-Turaevo village in Belebei county, Ufa province, became the owner of nine desiatina and 1706 sazhen of land by a decision of the land captain (zemskii nachal’nik). Since the Sharia permitted the spending of not more than one-third one’s properties for philanthropic purposes, Mālikuf decided to donate the gained land, the volume of which did not exceed one-third of his properties, to the benefit of the first mosque of the village. However, land was not always allowed for donation as waqf. In 1912, the Bashkirs of Kabanova village in Orenburg county decided to donate sixty desiatina out of the communal land freed from tax payment and to appoint seven mutawallis for management. The Spiritual Assembly asked the Ministry of the Interior for recognition, but the ministry declined the proposal because the law permitted the sale and gift of Bashkir-patrimonial (votchinnye) lands only to the Treasury and village inhabitants, in which the mosque and madrasa could not be included. Since Bashkirs continued to lose their patrimonial lands under Stolypin’s land reform, waqf could have served as a means to protect and exploit the lands for their communities.

84 TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 972, ll. 74-87ob.
85 It was common for petitioners to call themselves Bashkirs or Teptiars, but calling themselves Tatars seems not to have occurred. Instead, “peasants” was the common appellation, indicating the importance of belonging to a certain estate. On the association between ethnicity and the “Bashkir” estate in Bashkiria, see Paul Werth, “Tsarist Categories, Orthodox Intervention and Islamic Conversion in a Pagan Udmurt Village, 1870s-1890s,” in Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, Allen J. Frank, eds., Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1998), pp. 385-415.
86 TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 860, l. 74-77. Since the ukase of February 11, 1736, the government repeatedly permitted and then prohibited the purchase of Bashkir-patrimonial lands. The argument of the Interior Minister quoted here was based on the State Council’s opinion of April 20, 1898. This regulation prohibiting the noblemen’s purchase of Bashkir lands can be regarded as a protective measure for Bashkirs. SZ, vol. 9, Polozhenie o bashkirakh, articles 28 and 59; A.F. Riazanov, Orenburgskii krai. Istoriecheskii ocherk (Orenburg, 1928), pp. 116, 127.
87 In fact, Stolypin’s land reform did not address Bashkir-patrimonial lands. Bashkirs kept their right to deal with patrimonial lands except allotments for tax payment, nadely. However, in October 6, 1910 the Interior Ministry issued a circular that gave Russian peasants
Despite concern about the OMDS’s excessive commitment to the subordinate mahallas, the government was obliged to institutionalize the initiative from below. Contrary to the case of the mahalla council, which they recognized as having its origin from the reality of life, participants of the 1914 Special Conference on the whole claimed that the OMDS’s administration of waqf was not admissible. From their point of view, “the centralization of waqf management” would lead to reinforcement of the OMDS’s role, which would not coincide with the state’s interest. Nevertheless, they proposed that waqf be under the competence of the parish council, which was to be organized by official regulations.

**Relationship with Zemstvos**

It is worth emphasizing that the Muslims in European Russia enjoyed functions of local self-government that were derived from the Great Reform. With the enactment of the 1870 regulations on Non-Russian education, zemstvos began to support primary schools for Muslims. In the 1880s, according to proposals of inspectors of Russo-Tatar and Bashkir schools, zemstvos started to pay salaries to religious teachers invited to the state schools. According to the 1870 law, the Muslim community was compelled to cover all expenditures in order not only to establish Russian language classes in maktabs and madrasas, but also to appoint their religious teachers in the state schools. However, the Muslims had just rejected the obligation of the law, and the mullahs, who were expected to teach Islam in the state schools, had shown no desire to cooperate with the “missionary schools.”

For instance, in Ichkina village, Shadrin county of Perm province, a Russo-Bashkir school was opened in 1886 by the county zemstvo at the initiative of a Muslim councilor (glasnyi). Initially, the villagers petitioned the Spiritual Assembly not to open the school, but the OMDS declined on the grounds that the act was beyond its competence. In the next year, according to the proposal of an inspector of county schools, the Spiritual Assembly recommended the post of religious teacher to an imam of the village, who was expected to be paid sixty rubles a year.

After the 1905 Revolution, Muslims became more positively interested in support from zemstvos. The congregation of the fourth mahalla in Safarova village of Ufa county was too poor to build a maktab or madrasa on their own. They decided to depend on subsidies from the zemstvo. However, mullahs around the mahalla condemned them for violation of the Sharia. On August 8, the right to register themselves in Bashkir communities. This measure opened the way for rich Russian peasants and speculators to gain even the nadely of Bashkirs. Thus, having a tendency to sell their own disposable lands, Bashkirs continued to lose their patrimonial lands. **SZ**, vol. 9, *Polozhenie o bashkirakh*, article 16; Kh.F. Usmanov, *Stolypinskaia agrarnaia reforma v Bashkirii* (Ufa, 1958), pp. 85, 90-91.

89 TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 348, ll. 45, 47, 49-50; d. 524, ll. 35, 36.
1906, in response to a petition from an imam of the fourth mahalla, the Spiritual Assembly issued an official opinion, *fatwā*, that the Sharia did not prohibit the use of subsidies of zemstvo for construction and maintenance of confessional schools. 90 The newspaper *Waqt* considered the fatwa “crucial for all the community, *millat*” and called the readers’ special attention to it. 91 *Waqt* criticized a group of Kazan Muslims, who dismissed the Kazan county zemstvo’s suggestion to open zemstvo schools with lessons in the mother tongue, demanding, on the other hand, zemstvo subsidies for their confessional schools, which did not have Russian learning. The newspaper claimed now that “freedom of conscience” had been declared, it was useless to fear the study of Russian. 92 Noticing the reinforcement of missionaries’ influence in the zemstvo assembly of Kazan province, *Waqt* made an ironical criticism against Muslims indifferent to the zemstvo election, saying that they were paying a tax for their own Russification. 93

Zemstvos in Ufa province, where the Non-Russians comprised 60 percent of the population and 84 percent of them were Muslims, showed a special commitment in planting universal primary education among the Muslim population. The initiative was promoted by the law of May 3, 1908, which promised the distribution of 6,900,000 rubles to primary schools. Already in the same year a question about a school network for Muslims was on the agenda at the zemstvo assembly of Ufa province. 94 In the next year, the zemstvo board of Ufa county asked the Spiritual Assembly for information on the degree to which the Bashkir-Tatar population was ready for universal education. The Spiritual Assembly answered that the Muslims stood on the same level of life as the Russians and that all measures for development of the economy and culture would affect them equally. Furthermore, the OMDS advised that the school also teach the mother tongue and religion, in order to get rid of the Muslims’ biased attitude against the school. 95

The law of May 3 also posed to Muslim intellectuals a pointed question that they themselves tackled especially after the 1905 Revolution: the coexistence of imperial citizenship, *Rūsiya ғұрағұлдәнлығы* and nationality, *milliyet*. 96 The plan for introducing uniform primary schools forced them to wrack their brains for a method to guarantee the teaching of the mother tongue and religion within the curriculum. True, the jadids’ reform of maktabs continued, but the Muslim community began to doubt that the reformed maktabs could com-

94 XXXIV Ufimskomu ocherednomu Gubernskomu Sobraniu. Doklad Gubernskoi upravy po voprosu o shkol’noi seti v otnoshenii musul’manskogo naseleniia gubernii (Ufa, 1908).
95 TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 676, ll. 145-148.
pete with standardized state schools, or that they could afford more advanced reforms of the maktabs. Some Muslims expected that the entrance of maktabs into the official school network would guarantee resources for their survival; others, especially those from Siberia, thought that the maktabs were destined to die out. Various ideas on “Maktab or School?” developed in the Muslim press during 1913-1916.97

In fact, Muslim intellectuals and the zemstvo of Ufa province shared difficulties and efforts to formulate an ideal type of general education schools for Muslims. In 1911, the zemstvo board, inviting Muslim representatives, held a conference on that topic. Participants agreed that the entrance of maktabs into the school network was possible if they accepted the zemstvo’s educational program. However, zemstvo representatives said that the “confessional shade” of the maktabs would prevent them from entering the network. Muslims still could not identify the position of maktabs in the future school system.98

However, the educational authorities worked to deprive the zemstvos of the ability to “invade” their competence. The law of May 3, which demonstrated the intention of the Ministry of Education to take the initiative in the spread of the primary schools, on one hand, spurred the zemstvos to the project. On the other hand, it exacerbated the traditional conflict over the demarcation of competence. Ministry officials considered that the role of the local self-government had to be strictly limited to the financial sphere.99 The 1914 Special Conference on the Muslim question also revealed dissatisfaction with zemstvos, especially with their support of jadid schools. Those present considered their existence itself to be illegal because they were appearing without any sanction.100 However, the introduction of zemstvos in Orenburg province in 1913 made southern Ural an arena of creative interaction between the Muslim population and local self-government, which continued even through the turbulent era of World War I.101

**Conclusion**

Raeff said that administrative and social homogeneity throughout the empire remained the goal of imperial policy toward nationalities from the nine-
teenth century to 1917, but that the government understood that the methods
would have to become more flexible and gradualistic according to a process of
natural evolution, which peoples’ membership in the empire could accelerate
and facilitate.\textsuperscript{102} We add to that thesis the following points: once people accep-
ted the institutions that derived from the policy of “pragmatic flexibility,” they
made use of those institutions to suit their own needs and aspirations; also,
since these institutions were acknowledged officially and incorporated into the
administrative routine, they became vested interests, which were difficult for
the government to remove through its policy of simplification and leveling of
socio-cultural relationships.

Of course, imperial policy introduced uniformity not only to the forms of
mahalla life, but even to the very nature of Islam. However, that unification
also brought order and cohesion to the Muslim minority in European Russia
and Siberia. As R. Crews discusses, both the state’s and Muslims’ interests
in defining and maintaining “Islamic orthodoxy” formed doctrinal uniformi-
ty. Imperial law and administration provided the community with rules for
organizing the mahalla and dealing with family affairs. The government in-
corporated the Muslim clergy into civil administration by the register system.
Intensification of the relations between Muslims and the administration after
the Great Reform compelled the government to take up policies of cultural
assimilation. The control of maktabs and madrasas was moved to the Minis-
try of Education. Mullahs were forced to study Russian language. However,
these measures provoked Muslims’ resistance. Because the image of religious
tolerance that Catherine II had granted was so established in Muslims’ minds,
as expressed in the phrase “Grandma-Empress,” even at the beginning of the
1905 Revolution, the most progressive intellectuals also preferred to speak for
restoration of her tradition.

During the final decade of the empire, stark contradictions emerged in
state policy toward the Muslims. Whereas bureaucrats recognized the “con-
solidation of the Muslim community” as a result of institutionalization, they
usually associated it with “Pan-Islamism” and tried to limit the initiative from
below. However, the principle of tolerance, which the government had prom-
ised as a concession in 1905, obliged state officials to address the everyday
confessional needs of the Muslims.

Taking advantage of that fact, Muslims began to manage their mahalla
finances through their deliberate use of the imperial administration. The Spirit-
tual Assembly served as a mediator in negotiations with the state. The Mus-
lim press assisted the procedure. They tried to combine the Islamic tradition
and existing imperial order. Parish councilors (mutawallis) were elected as
property managers and pious endowment (waqf) was encouraged. Subsidies

\textsuperscript{102} M. Raeff, “Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy toward the Nationalities,” in E. Allworth,
from zemstvos helped schools open, although that presented another difficult question for the future of maktabs. The government then initiated measures to limit the mahallas’ and OMDS’s reforms, arguing that “unified Muslims” were a “threat to the state.” In practice, it usually allowed administrative routine to maintain the mahalla life.