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Articles

Russia's Perspectives on International Politics: A Comparison of Liberalist, Realist and Geopolitical Paradigms*

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The purpose of this article is to examine Russian perspectives on international politics. This study will focus on the following questions: What are the characteristics of the Russian understanding of major changes in international politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union; and, what are the implications of Russia's perspectives on international politics for IR theory in the post-Cold War era?

There are two approaches to analyzing Russia's perception of international politics. The first focuses on mapping foreign policy orientations in Russia and their influence on official Russian foreign policies. The second analyzes elites' and masses' perceptions of the general dynamics of international politics rather than foreign policies.

When we examine discussions on the orientations of Russian foreign policies, we discover a number of different schools. Scholars adopt different criteria for categorizing Russian foreign policy orientations. This categorization ranges from two orientations (Westernism / Eurasianism),¹ three (Liberalist or Atlanticist or Liberal internationalist / Pragmatic Nationalist or Eurasianist / Patriotic Nationalist or *Derzhavniki*),² four (Pro-Westernist or Moderate Liberalist / Centrist or Moderate Conservatives / Neo Communist / the Extreme right Nationalist),³ to even five (Expansionists / Civilizationists / Stabilizers / Geo-

* This work was supported by the research grant funded by the University of Incheon in 2007.

- 1 Alexander Rarl, "'Atlantistics' versus 'Eurasians' in Russian Foreign Policies," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:22 (May 29, 1992), pp. 17–22.
- 2 Alex Pravda, "The Politics of Foreign Policy," in S. White, Z. Gitelman, eds., *Developments in Russia and Post-Soviet Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 210–213; S. Neil McFarlane, "Russia, the West and European Security," *Survival* 35:3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3–25; Heinz Zimmerman, "Russian Foreign Policy under Yeltsin: Priority for Integration into 'Community of Civilized States'," *Journal of Communist Studies* 8 (December 1992), pp. 175–184; Heinz Zimmerman, "Vneshniaia politika Rossii: poiski novoi identichnosti," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (hereafter *MEiMO*) 2 (1994), pp. 5–15.
- 3 Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security* 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 9–14; Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition," in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda* (Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch. 7; Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (West-

economists / Westernizers according to geopolitical thinking in this case).⁴

These studies greatly contributed to delineating and distinguishing the “ideal types of foreign policy orientations” in discussions of Russian foreign policies and to analyzing how such differentiations influenced Russian foreign policies. They also contributed to identifying the ideological roots of Russian foreign policy thinking by revealing the struggles and competition among foreign policy groups in Russia.⁵ **It is true, however, that most of the existing studies on Russian foreign policy have concentrated mainly on identifying the uniqueness of Russian foreign policy in terms of actions and strategies rather than extending the understanding of foreign policy orientations to that of Russia’s perspective on general international politics. Yet analyzing foreign policies alone may not be sufficient to fully understand Russia’s perspectives on general international political dynamics. In this regard we can question the relationship between foreign policy studies and IR studies.**

While there have been scholarly disputes on the mutual relationship between studies on foreign policies and international politics, the two are generally regarded as being separate. The difference between them was especially confirmed by such scholars as Kenneth Waltz and generally accepted by other scholars of international politics.⁶ **However, if studies of international politics are compared to drawing a whole “forest,” foreign policy analysis can be likened to describing “trees.” In this respect, the two approaches can be regarded as being independent and complimentary.**

Theories on foreign policy mainly focus on various aspects and sources of a state’s behavior in the international arena, and thus have strength in explaining the rational or irrational behavior of states, considering various working variables in the policy making process. International political theories, on the other hand, focus on analyzing rational behaviors of a state with the strict assumption of “rationality,” adopting as small a number of variables as possible. That is why a state is regarded as a “unitary actor,” with interactions among various interest groups in domestic politics put aside. Accordingly, while the-

port: Praeger, 1996), Ch. 1 “Foreign Policy Values”; A. V. Kortunov, *Rossiiia i zapad: modeli integratsii* (RNF ROPTS Doklad No. 6) (Moscow: Rossiiskii nauchnyi fond, 1994); Andrei V. Kortunov, “The Northeast Asian Policy of Russia in the 21st Century,” presented at International Conference co-hosted by The Korean Association of International Studies and The Institute for National Security Strategy (Seoul, June 9–10, 1997).

4 Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-up,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36 (2003), pp. 101–127.

5 For example, Andrei P. Tsygankov’s works provide comprehensive explanations on Russia’s diplomatic policy. Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Idem, *Whose World Order? Russia’s Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).

6 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 121–122.

ories on foreign policy present complex realities, theories of international politics offer a succinct description of national behaviors with limited variables. Therefore, the latter may provide a more macro-outlook on the performance of a state in the international arena than the former, and the former can provide a more detailed description of a state's behavior than the latter. These kinds of complementarities should be taken into account in explaining a state's perspectives on international politics.

What is important to understanding Russian perceptions of international politics is to know, for example, the influence of external threats on Russian foreign policy and its self-image and perception of its prestige in the changing international environment. The various orientations of Russian foreign policy must not be understood only as an outcome of domestic political divisions and pluralism, because they may also be a product of external threats and shifts in international politics and of a changing self-image toward the outside world through the politics of identity.⁷ Hence, it may be necessary to bring Russian perception of international politics to the surface, because this perception lies behind phenomenal approaches to Russian foreign policy. Bringing Russian perception of international politics to the surface means understanding efforts to build international political theories in Russia. Therefore, this theory building approach to Russian foreign behavior reveals a meaningful distinction absent from existing studies on Russian foreign policy. It requires a clear distinction between international politics as "practice" and as "perception." Russia's international politics as "practice" is based on strategic intention and a judgment of capability that comes from recognition of its own identity, and it is expressed through its "foreign policies."

Yet such a simple analysis of foreign policy can hardly encompass the whole essence of international politics that Russia accepts and projects. Rather, along with the Russian "practice," an effort to understand international politics as "perception" must be added. Hence, the theory-building process of Russia's behavior can provide a more comprehensive explanation of Russia's foreign policies, combining the studies of Russian perspectives on international politics as practice and as perception complementarily.

For this task, we need to understand the ways of thinking that Russians have historically developed to ponder over the world and Russia's position in it. The results of Russian scholars' historical and philosophical thinking of Russia's worldview and identity have accumulated under the term the "Rus-

7 For domestic influence of Russia's foreign policy, see: Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For studies on external influences on formation of Russia's diplomatic policy, see: Bruce D. Porter, "Russia and Europe after the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy," in Celester A. Wallander, ed., *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

sian Idea,"⁸ and, in a sense, Russian history can be interpreted as the process of searching for the Russian Idea. The most obvious attempts to catch the essence of "Russian Idea" can be found in the works of Russia's prominent thinkers and scholars such as P. Chaadaev, V. Odoevskii, I. Kireevskii, A. Khomiakov, K. Aksakov, N. Danilevskii, A. Herzen, K. Leont'ev, F. Dostoevskii, V. Soloviev, E. Trubetskoi, P. Savitskii, V. Il'in, N. Alekseev, G. Florovskii, P. Bitsilli, L. Karsavin, N. Berdiaev, S. Frank, N. Gumilev and others.⁹ Since the famous controversy between the "Slavophiles and Westernizers" of the 1840s, three significant traditions of the way to think about Russia have formed: westernizer-atlantist group, slavophile-nationalist group, geopolitical-eurasianist group. These traditions have continuous effects on the political process and foreign policy itself.

The scholars and political figures, who belong to the westernizer-atlantist tradition, argue that priority should be given to collaboration and even integration with the West and the international community. These attitudes towards Russia's place in the world and its internal arrangements are supplemented by a strong Western orientation in foreign policy. They would not regard the West an adversary, but rather as a partner in the creation of a new world order. According to their opinion, the West and Russia now have the same values – democracy, a market economy, and human rights – and may soon be all threatened by migration, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and even military aggression from the developing countries in the South.

The westernizer-atlantist drive of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods has evoked an intellectual reaction similar to that of the Slavophiles in the late nineteenth century: an inquiry into the special character of Russia and into Russia's distinct and special role in world history as a bridge between East and West; a concern about descending into the materialist void of Western culture; and doubts about the wisdom of relying on Western models or Western assistance in the process of reconstructing Russia. The reaction is characterized by a nationalist desire to recapture the greatness of Russia and a dissatisfaction with its secondary role in world affairs. Notions of Russia's pursuit of an independent role consistent with its great power heritage play a very significant role in this perspective. This tradition is linked to the realist thinking of Rus-

8 On this idea, see: M. M. Maslin, ed., *Russkaia Ideia* (Moscow: Respublika, 1992); Robin Aizlewood, "The Return of the 'Russian Idea' in Publications, 1988–91," *Slavonic and East European Review* 71:3 (1992), pp. 490–499; D. Schlapentokh, "The End of Russian Idea," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 43 (1992), pp. 199–217; S. I. Kurginian, "Russkaia ideia, nationalizm i fashizm," in *Kuda idet Rossiia* (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1995), pp. 447–458; Tim McDaniel, *The Agony of Russian Idea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

9 On a short introduction of Russian intellectual history in the perspective of Russian Idea, see: Beom-Shik Shin, *Idei "Evraziistva" i sovremennyi rossiiskii ideino-politicheskii protsess* (Moscow: MGIMO, 1997), Ch. 1; Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates," *International Studies Review* 10 (2008), pp. 765–772.

sian foreign policy. However, according to this perspective, Russia can be a reliable partner only if the West treats her as a great power holding a suitably privileged position.

Since Nikolai Danilevskii, a strong tradition of geopolitical thinking has been at play in the formation of Russia's perspectives on international politics and its foreign policy. Notions of Russia's mission which stem from its geopolitically intermediate position between the West and the East are the basis for this tradition. However this tradition gained more and more resolute characteristics and was linked to the imperialist and isolationist thinking. However, a more moderate and revised version of this Eurasian perspective had been forming in the circle of politicians and scholars in the controversies around the Russia's foreign policies. Those who subscribe to this point of view affirm Russia's possibilities and need to balance between East and West as well as the desire to be a dominant great power in world politics as a result of its geographical position and mixed cultural heritage.

The three traditions of thought relating to Russia's worldview and its identity offer the starting point for further study of Russian perspectives on international politics. Currently, Russia is going through the difficult process of establishing its own perspective on international politics. Thus, this article searches for the pattern of Russian perspectives in formation, in order to illuminate the Russian way of thinking on the nature of international politics in the post-Cold War era. In addition, the implications of different perspectives for theory building in international politics will be examined.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

Unique features of Russia's perspectives on international politics as practice can be obtained quite clearly through the investigation of the debates on Russian foreign policy orientations.

First, Russian foreign policy has been framed out of identity politics among different political factions under highly politicized conditions.¹⁰

Structural changes in international politics in the 1990s complicated internal reforms in Russia and the aggravation of socio-economic conditions due to the rapid reforms intensified conflicts between conservatives and progressives in Russian domestic politics. Unfortunately, the aspirations of Russian reformist elites to make Russia strong could not reconcile with the conservative tendency the nation showed during the worsened economy in that period. The disharmony at that time raised a serious question about "Who are we Russians?" This led to conflicting evaluations of Russian identity, which caused a fundamental shift in domestic sources for foreign policies. This transformed

10 For interpretation on the formation of Russia's foreign policy as "politics of identity," see: Peter Shearman, "The Sources of Russian Conduct: Understanding Russian Foreign Policy," *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001), pp. 249-263.

Russia's perspectives on international politics, which brought about changes in its foreign policy orientation. The pro-Western liberalist foreign policy led by Andrei Kozyrev faced strong resistance from patriotic nationalists. This patriotic nationalism was triggered by NATO's expansionist policy externally and internally by Russian society's conservative response to the liberal reform measures.

Evgenii Primakov, then the newly-appointed foreign minister, tried to re-define and strengthen Russia's national interest by shifting the foreign policy priority from the West toward the East.¹¹ Such a foreign policy shift with its anti-Western tendency included strengthening the near-abroad policy, continuous attempts to form a trilateral alliance with India and China, and a strategic partnership with China. However, the policy turned out to be ineffective, putting Russia on a journey of great controversy in search of a genuine identity and national interest. With the end of "the Russian lost decade," V. Putin as the new leader of the twenty-first century took up the task of filling the wide gap between wishful thinking and grim reality in Russian foreign policy. Russia under Vladimir Putin employed a pragmatic approach to redefine what to adopt or reject, while compromising with the reality of the situation.

This development in Russian foreign policy correlates with the pattern of controversy among the three forms of thought in defining the identity and national interest of Russia and its foreign policy orientations: West-oriented Liberalism, Pragmatic Statism, and Tradition-oriented Nationalism. Each of these forms of thought proposed divergent Russian foreign policy lines, based on different diagnoses of Russian identity and its mission. In the process of foreign policy formation and politics of identity in Russia, these schools have articulated quite successfully their own ways of thinking about Russian foreign behavior. The debates among them also provide good windows to observe Russia's perspective on international politics. Conceptually, micro-level analysis of foreign policy and macro understanding of patterns of perspectives on international political dynamics are distinct, but the former renders some help in understanding the latter in reality.

Second, in the process of its development, Russian foreign policy has gradually formed a compromising pattern of thinking about foreign behavior. We need to put forward more detailed dynamics of identity politics in the area of the ideologically oriented foreign policy disputes in Russia.

Russian diplomacy, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been transformed according to the Kozyrev doctrine, the Primakov doctrine, and the Putin doctrine. These epochal features are defined as "Americano-centrism," the "Multi-polar Alternative," and "Integrationism" by V. Nikonov, or as "Liberal

11 A. Pushkov, "The Primakov Doctrine and a New European Order," *International Affairs* (A Russian Journal of International Relations) 44:2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 1-13.

Westernism," "Great Power Balancing," and "Great Power Pragmatism" by A. Tsygankov.¹²

Pro-Western Liberalism played a major role in defining Russian foreign policy under the A. Kozyrev doctrine, adopted in the first term of President Yeltsin, which defines Russia's identity as one of the agents in the West-/US-centered system of liberal democracy and the market economy.¹³ Significant challenges to this pro-Western foreign policy came not only from outside, or the expansion of NATO, but also from internal changes that brought more fundamental changes to Russian foreign policy. This change should be understood within the cultural and institutional context of Russian society, since this framework determines the conceptualization of "national interest" and/or the formulation of diplomatic and security policies.¹⁴

A number of studies of official comments or mainstream discourses in Russia about NATO expansion show that Russian elites and people do not consider it a serious threat to Russia. That means exogenous factors were not crucial to security concerns in Russia. Rather, the NATO expansion was a reflection of Russian domestic politics related to matters of prestige, status, and identity.¹⁵ As pointed out in Alexander Wendt's "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relation Theory," the international factor – namely NATO expansion, had forced Russia to redefine its national identity with a changed perception of the outside world, which in turn led to a redefinition of national

12 V. A. Nikov, "Resursy i priority vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii," A. V. Torkunov et al., eds., *Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i mirovaia politika* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2006), pp. 729–743; Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*.

13 For exemplary documents of Russia's diplomatic policy, see: "Osnovy kontseptii vneshnei politiki Rossii" (April 28, 1993).

For discourses of A. Kozyrev, see: Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia Looks West," *Moscow News* 39 (1991); A. Kozyrev, "Noboe myshlenie: K paritetu zdravogo smysla," *Novoe Vremia* 15 (1991); Andrei Kozyrev, "Rossiia v novom mire," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* 3–4 (1992); Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1992); Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia and Human Rights," *Slavic Review* 51:2 (1992); Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 73:3 (1994); A. Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995).

14 For studies with a similar question, see: Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993); Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rinner Publisher, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Particularly, see a chapter in this volume by Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of Cold War" (pp. 271–316).

15 Peter Shearman, "New Political Thinking Reassessed," *Review of International Studies* 19:2 (1993), pp. 139–159; Peter Shearman, "NATO Expansion and the Russian Question," in Robert G. Patman, ed., *Security in a Post-Cold War World* (NY: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1999), pp. 157–180.

interest. This means changes in Russian foreign policy reflect shifts in its perspectives on international politics first.

Criticizing intensively Western-oriented values, the new elite group in Russia justified the altered Russian foreign policy line with a regressive reflection on Russian tradition. The epistemic basis to support this “newly invented identity” has been drawn from Russia’s tradition as a major power, its geopolitical positions as a continental power, pride in its unique culture, and its distinguished tradition of a socialist alternative to western capitalism.

The emergence of the Primakov doctrine could be understood within this context.¹⁶ **The anti-Western orientations in foreign policy, called the Primakov doctrine,** were a serious attempt to restore Russia’s lost identity and prestige as an empire, and they implied a meaningful shift in diplomatic orientations seeking for, at least rhetorically, a strong Russia. Yet it failed to produce any substantial outcomes as well as major shifts in policies of western countries, because of the wide disparity between wishful thinking and the actual capability of Russia.¹⁷ **Its desired identity as a strong power, even though supported domestically,** was completely disregarded by the “Others,” namely the West. Recognition by the “Others” seemed possible only through a harmonious concert of the West and Russia. That is, working on an idea was one thing, and its application to real policy was another. This limitation forced Russia’s foreign policy to consider another readjustment.

The Putin government released a series of official documents reflecting such diplomatic readjustments.¹⁸ **The major shift of Russia’s perspective on international politics** can be found in these materials, indicating that the new strategies were based on realism and pragmatism. Contrary to the “rhetorical” Primakov doctrine, this pragmatic diplomacy set goals based on a realistic estimation of Russia’s capability. The September 11 terrorist attack and the War on Terrorism provided Russia with timely opportunities to restore its damaged pride and status. In other words, Moscow could improve its own image as a

16 For the arguments on the Primakov doctrine, see: E. Primakov, “*Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia nakanune XXI veka: problemy i perspektivy*,” *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’* 10 (1996); E. Primakov, “*Rossiiia v mirovoi politike*,” *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’* 5 (1998); B. El’tsin, “*Mesto i rol’ Rossii v period formiruiushchegosia mnogopoliarnogo mira*,” *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’* 6 (1998); Yevgeniy Primakov, *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millenium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

17 With regard to this change, see: Jeff T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

18 For example, see: “*Kontseptsiiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*” (January 10, 2000); “*Voennaia doktrina Rossiskoi Federatsii*” (April 21, 2000); “*Kontseptsiiia vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii*” (June 28, 2000). For materials on the discourses of foreign policy elite group at that time, see: V. Putin, “*Rossiiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii*,” *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (December 30, 1999); V. Putin, *Zaiavlenie prezidenta RF* (September 24, 2001); I. S. Ivanov, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii i mir: Stat’i i vystupleniia* (Moscow: MGIMO, 2001); I. S. Ivanov, “*Rossiiia v miroboi politike*,” *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’* 5 (2001).

cooperative partner with the US on the matter of global terrorism, no longer a junior partner of the US under A. Kozyrev nor a rhetorical anti-American balancer under E. Primakov, and so promoted its enhanced status as a strong power.

Yet it seems as though Russian foreign policy under Putin is a compromising one, for its perspective on international politics is to combine West-ern-oriented liberalism and the tradition-oriented nationalism, depending on domestic and foreign conditions. If external conditions are favorable to Russia to cooperate with the US and the West, its West-friendly image would manifest, but if conditions change, a different image of Russia will be projected.¹⁹ Although President Putin during his first term emphasized strengthening cooperation with the West, stressing a European identity,²⁰ this did not mean unconditional West-orientated foreign policy. This compromising stance was confirmed in Putin's second term, in a discourse that re-emphasized a multi-polar world order and an obvious countercheck against the US unilateralism. This is characteristic of Russia's policy toward Eurasia since 2005 and toward the West since 2007.²¹

Table 1. Types of Russian perspectives on International Politics Based on Foreign Policy Orientation

philosophical world-view	Atlanticism		Realism		Eurasianism	
support group	West-oriented liberals		Pragmatic statist		Tradition-oriented nationalists	
politician	A. Kozyrev	M. Gorbachev	V. Putin	E. Primakov	G. Zhuganov	V. Zhirinovskiy
foreign policy orientation	Globalism		Pragmatic Internationalism	Defensive Internationalism	Nationalism	
attitude toward the West	Cooperation with the West		Great power pragmatism	Great power balancing	Isolation from the West / Confrontation against the West	
IP perspective pattern	Convergence pattern (interdependence)		==> Compromising <== pattern (influence & int'l prestige)		Divergence pattern (<i>derzhavnost'</i>)	

19 I. Zevelev, M. Troitskii, "Semiotika amerikansko-rossiiskikh otnoshenii," *MEiMO* 1 (2007), pp. 3-17.

20 V. Putin, "Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniuu Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (March 16, 2003).

21 For documents that demonstrate the shifts in Russia foreign policy and perspective on international politics during Putin's second term, see: "Sovmestnaia deklaratsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki o mezhdunarodnom poriadke v XXI veke" (July 1, 2005); "Deklaratsiia glav gosudarstv - chlenov Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva" (July 5, 2005); "Sovremeni mir i Rossiia," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* 1-2 (2007), pp. 50-94. For the recent changes of Russia's relations with the West, see: Dmitri Trenin, "Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2007).

The characteristics of Russia's perspectives on international politics, which can be obtained by reviewing the process of foreign policy debates and the politics of identity in Russia, can be summarized as in Table 1. The results help us to understand the domestic roots of Russia's perspectives on international politics. If we examine the evolution of Russian foreign policy perspectives, the convergent perspective, based upon a liberalist approach, was dominant in the early age of reform, and a compromising perspective was formed after dialectic interactions with a divergent perspective, based upon conservative traditionalism.

As a result, the Russian perspective on international politics was constructed with fluctuations in the process of dramatic shifts in the post-Cold War era in both international and domestic politics. It is now in the process of balancing between a new liberalist perspective and a revived traditionalist perspective, in order to reach a compromise of its *Sonderweg* with general, dominant rules in international politics. In this regard the opportunistic character of the Russian compromising way of thinking on international politics can be understood as a result of the stabilization of its realistic foreign policy orientation. Russia's compromising character seems to share similarities with the realism paradigm, a dominant IR theory in the West.

RUSSIAN PERCEPTION OF THE CHANGES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

As seen above, our observation of Russian perspectives on international politics as a basis of Russian foreign policy, shaped through the process of seeking its own identity, provides a useful groundwork for a more systematic analysis of Russia's perception of the international order. There have been many attempts to understand this perception of international politics by going beyond the analysis of Russian international politics as "practice."²² Some scholars like E. Pozniakov have tried to tap any possibility to establish Russian perspectives on international politics, acknowledging the impossibility of universal international political theories.²³

Recently, some Russian scholars of international politics have been making diverse attempts to theorize Russian international political perspectives.²⁴

22 For international political study within Russia, see: I. G. Tiulin, "Novye tendentsii v rossiiskikh isseledovaniiaakh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii," Torkunov, *Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, pp. 48–65; Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, eds., *New Directions in Russian International Studies: a special issue of Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36:1 (2004).

23 He has been writing on this issue since the 1980s. For his important works, see: E. A. Pozniakov, *Filosofiia politiki* (Moscow, 1994). For an attempt to organize the Russian perspective on international politics from the Eurasian geopolitical viewpoint, see: A. G. Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii* (Moscow, 2000).

24 For study focusing on general theory of international politics, see: A. P. Tsygankov, *Teoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* (Moscow: Gardarinki, 2003); A. D. Bogaturov, A. H. Kosola-

Despite ideological differences among these studies, they attempted to systematize implications of Russian foreign policy disputes for international studies by going beyond analyzing actions and strategies of Russian foreign behavior. Such an attempt resulted in highlighting the importance of the problem of Russian perception of the international order and the issue of Russian identity in explaining the Russian perspective on international politics. The main issue, on which we concentrate here, is a matter of “international or world order.” How do Russian scholars acknowledge the changes, challenges and opportunities of a newly formulating world order in the post-Cold War era?²⁵

Russian Scholars' Analysis of Post-Cold War International/World Politics

One of famous Russian *mezhdunarodniki* (IR specialists), A. Salmin, who tries to analyze modern and contemporary international changes, explains the transformation of international order since the World War II, the so called “Yalta system,” by dividing it into four phases.²⁶ He distinguishes the world of empires-winners in 1945–1950; the bipolar world in the 1950s that did not last long; the weakening bipolarity during the late 1950s to the mid 1980s; and the major shift of Perestroika and the collapse of the USSR as could be seen from the mid-1980s. Especially, he regarded the fourth period of changes as a period of seeking a new world order from a new institutional and neo-liberal perspective.²⁷

Generally, the shift of an international order from one to a new one accompanies a major war or revolution. Although the collapse of the Yalta system was peaceful, contrary to the general discussion, it also involved common symptoms of a shift in the international order: a large-extent of geopolitical

nov and A. M. Khrustalev, *Ocherki teorii i politicheskogo analiza mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii* (Moscow, 2002); M. M. Lebedeva, *Mirovaia politika* (Moscow, 2003). For study expressing an interest in theoretical development of international politics in Russia, see: A. P. Tsygankov, ed., *Teoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii. Khrestomatiia* (Moscow: Gardariki, 2003); A. P. Tsygankov “Vneshniaia politika Rossii: 1991–2000, ch. 1,” *Pro et Contra* 6:1–2 (2001); S. A. Panarin, *Iskusheniia globalizmom* (Moscow: EKSMO, 2003); Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).

25 Prior to this argument, I want to distinguish the usage of international order and world order. Russian scholars use the term “world order” more often than the term “international order,” for they are getting used to a global strategic thinking since the Communist system. But recently they have begun to use these terms differently; “international order” describes those who emphasize nationalist or realist thinking, and “world order” describes those who emphasize global unity. This issue of terms reveals the difference of recognition on international politics.

26 M. A. Salmin, “Dezintegratsiia bipoliarnogo mira i perspektivy novogo mirovogo poriadka,” *Polis* 4 (1993), pp. 6-14; M. A. Salmin, “Rossiia, Evropa i novyi mirovoi poriadok,” *Polis* 2 (1999), pp. 10-31.

27 Salmin, “Rossiia, Evropa,” p. 17.

change; temporary disorientation that affected both winners and losers due to the loss of the competitor; reorganization of powers, coalitions and alliances; increased regional conflicts; regime changes, and the advent of new states. This instability stimulated a more comprehensive shift in the domestic politics of each nation to include the rise of political extremism and offensive nationalism, religious intolerance, increased tensions in racial and religious disputes, and increased immigration.

With these symptoms of a transition period, the most important feature of the change in post-Cold War international politics came from the disputes over the "legitimacy of humanitarian intervention" and "illegality of authoritarian regime." **In particular, there is a sharp controversy among UN, US, and other major powers on such vital issues as humanitarian intervention in the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, a reparatory attack on terrorism, preemptive strikes and so on, which leads to an altered framework of alliance or cooperation on a global level.** These issues of humanitarian intervention and the illegality of authoritarian regimes are considered by many Russian scholars as significant factors that affect the major powers' activities in current international politics, although they cannot be fully accepted from a viewpoint of international law, because of their violation of the principle of sovereignty.²⁸

Yet A. P. Tsygankov considers the current unstable international system to be a good opportunity to promote the progress of international order. The biggest challenge in this era of change comes from the enhanced recognition of the indivisible unity of the world,²⁹ and the biggest problem is the absence of an alternative world order to deal with the current international disorder. A new world order should be founded and realized over or beyond the existing international order, which is the main challenge of international politics in transition today.

Another feature of international studies by Russian scholars in the post-Cold War era can be found in the expectation of a new cooperative and integrative world order. There have been continuous discussions among Russian scholars on the new modeling of the international order, which could materialize global integrity in the transitional period of international order since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It seems that most of the Soviet/Russian scholars expect international law and international organizations to play a central role in formation of a new international order. Scholars such as Grigorii Shakhnazarov showed such a great interest in the role of international organizations such as the UN to the point that he considered the UN as a prototype of world government in the future.³⁰

28 A. D. Bogaturov, "Sovremennyyi mezhdunarodnyi poriadok," Torkunov, *Sovremennyye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, pp. 77–82.

29 Tsygankov, *Teoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii*, pp. 483–484.

30 G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "Mirovye soobshchestvo upravliaemo," *Izvestiia* (January 15, 1988).

Another discussion on an alternative world order within Russia might be drawn from observations on the developments of regional integration. E. Pozniakov and I. Shadrina, for instance, proposed that regional communities could be a basic unit to organize a confederation of states in the future.³¹ Yet neither the world itself nor the nations in it were prepared to meet the expectations for the development of a “global confederation of nation-states or regional communities” or “world government.”

More realistic arguments can be found, besides these improbable prospects, from the idea of a “general world committee.” The western scholarly group argues that the US, Japan, the EU and the USSR, or other regional powers could formulate a polycentric administrative structure based on their collective leadership. If China were to be included after solving its domestic problems of politics and democratization, it would be possible to organize a “general world committee.”³² Although many scholars agreed with this possibility, A. Bovin retorted that nation-states, searching to maximize their egoistic national interests, are unlikely to submit their sovereignty to the delegation of international society.³³

In Search of a New World Order

These various expectations for a “New World Order” became weakened with the decline of Russian influence after collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the US as a sole super power. Among US scholars there was a serious academic division regarding the next world order. Academics divided between optimists encouraged by the triumph of liberal democracy on a global scale and pessimists stimulated by the eruption of chaos and anarchy with a new type of clash based upon differences in culture, religion and civilization. Such positional differences can be seen among Russian Scholars as well.

N. Zagladin, taking an optimistic view, admitted Russia had become a cooperative actor for a stable world order, sharing values with the West, and pointed out that the anti-Western elite group in Russia interrupted this global cooperation for the future of international order.³⁴

On the contrary, many scholars suspect that the West maintains a geopolitical strategy to weaken Russia and enhance its influence by weakening the UN and expanding NATO. G. Diligenskiy, for instance, expressed a negative

31 A. E. Pozniakov, P. I. Shadrina, “O gumanizatsii i demokratizatsii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,” *MEiMO* 4 (1989), pp. 18-30.

32 For related discussion, see: Lucian W. Pye, “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,” *Foreign Affairs* 69:4 (Fall 1990), pp. 56-74; Dankwart A. Rustow, “Democracy: A Global Revolution?,” *Foreign Affairs* 69:4 (Fall 1990), pp. 75-91.

33 A. E. Bovin, “Mirovye soobshchestvo i mirovye pravitel'stvo,” *Izvestiia* (February 1, 1988).

34 N. V. Zagladin, “Novyi mirovoi bezporiadok i vneshniaia politika Rossii,” *MEiMO* 1 (2000), pp. 23-24.

opinion about the possibility of establishing a democratic order on a global level and the growth of civil society across the world, as western scholars expect.³⁵ **Their concern is in particular about the expansion of western culture.** Strong criticisms were raised about the imperialistic strategy and cultural expansionism of the West, especially the US. They contend that such a strategy is inadequate to meet the demands of the era in search for a new world order.³⁶

The division of opinions between new world order-seeking globalists and traditional international order-supporting realists is also reflected in Russian perspectives on international politics. Not all these arguments, however, recommend Russia's path to anti-Westernism. Rather, many scholars oppose the confrontation with the West based upon anti-Western values, arguing that Russia has shared common values with the West over a long period of interaction. They also emphasize preserving Russian values and interests in time of incorporation into the world economy and maintaining cooperation with the West.³⁷ **The moderate or compromising character of Russia's perspective on international politics is functioning here again.**

Analysis and the Future of International/World Order

With regards to the future of the international or world order, many Russian scholars take a negative view of the unilateral global leadership of the US, despite its dominance on military, economic, political and cultural soft power. Forecasts for the future of the international order vary according to their perspectives on international politics as shown below.

First, based on the liberalist paradigm, it is argued that the degree of institutionalization of international structures can be a crucial barometer to foretell the future of the new world order.

Concerning the feasibility of a global governance center as a future prototype of world government, Mark A. Khrustalev argues that the cooperation structure of the G7 can take the role of global governance center, which recognizes the fact that the international order is formulated and developed on the basis of the values and civilization of the West. Yet, it is true that the predictions on global governance center formation have begun to lose influence because of internal conflicts within the G7 structure.³⁸ **Disputes between the US and European countries can arise at any time within the current G7, and**

35 G. G. Diligenskii, "Demokratiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii," K.G. Kholodkovskii, ed., *Politicheskie instituty na rubezhe tysiacheletii XX-XXI vv.* (Dubna: Feniks+, 2001), pp. 27-44.

36 V. V. Lapkin, "Universal'naia tsivilizatsiia: Bolezn' rosta i ee simptomy," Kholodkovskii, ed., *Politicheskie instituty*, pp. 13-26.

37 O. T. Bogomolov, "Vyzov mirovomu poriadku. Ekonomicheskaia globalizatsiia ne reshaet mezhdunarodstvennykh i sotsial'nykh problem chelovechestva," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (January 27, 2000).

38 M. A. Khrustalev, "Evoliutsiia sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i osobennosti ee sovremennogo etapa," *Kosmopolis-Al'manakh* (1999), pp. 46-58.

moreover, a Russia-added G8 would be more fragile than ever before. “Two Europes,” stitched within the G8 structure, contains the dual possibility of mutual cooperation and mutual confrontation. It is generally agreed, however, that the G8 structure can provide global leadership as a center of the “New World Order,” if common interests could be found between the two Europes – EU and Russia.

According to N. Zagladin, international anarchy can be overcome by the formation of a “new unitary space” that promotes integrating tendencies through interaction among various international actors.³⁹ This is in line with the position that a new space for production and capital flow, emerging from regional community (eg. EU, NAFTA) formation and TNC activities, could promote the unity of the world order. Such an optimistic stance on the stabilization of international or global order through reinforced global governance is gaining more and more support within Russia, as well as in the West. Yet most of them support this with caution because of the difficulty in constructing a fairly functioning governance structure. For this reason, it has also been argued that in order to establish a fair global governance structure, it is necessary for the world order to achieve a sustainable democratic constitutionality, and it especially requires efforts to establish global civil society.⁴⁰

The main point of this global order issue involves a debate on globalization.⁴¹ **With the end of the Cold War, a global transition began to occur under the US initiative, to shape common rules around international trade and finance with the motive of “globalization.” The attempt of the US Superpower to create a unitary world faced several challenges, which included destabilization of the Weapon of Mass Destruction control system, the limitations of spreading the American standard of democracy, difficulties in establishing universal norms of a world market economy, increased cultural and racial conflicts, the rise of China, challenges from the Islamic world, and the uncertainty of multi-lateral governance building.** Facing these challenges, the US, for most Russian scholars, has reached its limit in capability as the hegemonic power to take a leading role in establishing a world order without the assistance of other major powers. The US’s attempt to form a new global order declined during the Bush administration, especially after September 11. The US switched its policy toward a unilateralism-based orientation. One Russian scholar said, “the US has ceased globalization,” pointing out the change in US attitude.⁴²

In sum, scholars under the influence of the liberalist paradigm keep their eyes on the development process of global society standing on economic inter-

39 Zagladin, “Novyi mirovoi bezporiadok,” pp. 23–24.

40 N. A. Kosolanov, “Kontury novogo miroporiadka,” *Postindustrial’nyi mir: tseñtr, periferiia, Rossiia, Sb. 1: Obshchie problemy postindustrial’noi epokhi* (Moscow, 1999).

41 V. B. Kuvaldin, “Globalizatsiia i novyi miroporiiaok,” Torkunov, *Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, pp. 89-105.

42 Author’s interview with Nikolai Kosolapov, Director of the department of research on international political issues at IMEMO on December 19, 2006.

dependence and democratic rules, emphasizing the importance of broadening the recognition scope toward the whole world beyond exclusive nationalism. They argue for Russia's participation in efforts to form and strengthen this new world order.

Meanwhile, scholars of the realist paradigm utilize concepts like the structure of polarity and configuration of political powers in international politics to forecast the future international order, acknowledging the existence of hierarchy in an international order that has survived all the waves of globalization in the post-Cold War era.

Scholars such as S. Rogov or K. Sorokin support the multi-polarity argument that was firmly shaped in Russia during the 1990s. They assert that a kind of multi-polar order, with several co-existing poles of power, such as the US, EU, China, and Russia, is forming today following the end of the bipolar structure.⁴³ According to them, interactions among these powers determine and shape the multi-polar structure of power configuration in the contemporary world. The principles of states' behavior under the structure of a multi-polar international order would be similar to those of the European concert system in the nineteenth century. This Russian perspective on international order is well reflected in the "Declaration on multi-polar world and formation of new international order" that Russia and China announced in 1997 and 2005 (see fn. 21).

What kind of actors would constitute poles in the multi-polar world, according to Russian realist views? Regarding multi-polarity in international politics, Russian scholars indicate there should be an agreement on the principles of a universal world order at least among the world's major powers, represented by the US, EU, Russia, and China. These major poles are regarded as formed by major states that have the intentions and capability to be independent centers of power in the post-Cold War world. This shows that Russia expects and hopes to be a major pole in the world order, at least from the statements produced by some Russian scholars.

There exist criticisms as well, however, that this multi-polar structure cannot properly reflect the reality of the US's dominance in international politics. It implies an acceptance of the US's status as the super power, as well as its global leadership. Yet most Russian scholars think that the US cannot determine all aspects of the international order.

Facing this criticism, some Russian scholars propose a pluralistic unipolarity that combines multi-polar traits with unipolarity. According to this argument, the world of broken bipolarity cannot be managed solely by the US, so the US should build up its leadership based on cooperation with alliances like the G7, which is estimated to have enough power to mitigate US ambition, al-

43 S. M. Rogov, "Rossiia i SShA v mnogopoliarnom mire," *SSHA:EPI* 10 (1992); K. E. Sorokin, *Geopolitika sovremennosti i geostrategiia dlia Rossii* (Moscow, 1996).

though it cannot be a match for US military power.⁴⁴ Another view in Russia is to describe this tendency by the similar but different terms “global democratic world” or global “*Pax Democratica*.”⁴⁵ This position emphasizes the role of collective leadership in the international order, entrusted by a global democratic society, regarding the central axis of international order as representative nations of a democratic world. These terms such as “global democratic world” or global “*Pax Democratica*,” emerged together with Putin in Russia, gradually replacing the use of the term, “multipolar unipolarity.” It could be said that through the use of such new terms, Russian scholars demonstrate the changes in Russian perceptions of international politics. That means the arguments have become more vocal that the US is facing limits in applying its power in international affairs, while Russia and China have restored or gained power in countering the US, and the EU is gradually enhancing its own independent voice and influence.

One of the most worrisome factors in this kind of realist argument about international collective leadership would be the issue of China. The formation of an international collective leadership led by the US is settled as a *de facto* reality of international politics, but is *de jure* rejected by China. Even though China is rising as a major pole of international order, based on rapid economic growth and military influence in the region, it has not been accepted within the structure of international collective leadership. Rather, Russian scholars consider China to be maintaining the position of checks and opposition against the US-led formation of a world order and to be inviting Russia to cooperate with the Chinese position. It is true that Russia does not fully agree with the US’s initiatives. Russia’s strategic concern plays a factor here. How Russia, as one of the G8 member states, could harmonize its position as a member of an international collective leadership and its relations with China as a newly emerging pole would be one of the key questions for the future of international order.⁴⁶

After all, some Russian realists also display opinions close to a structure of moderate or compromising way of thinking. According to Russian realists, there are two streams in international order: on the one hand, unilateral globalization or hegemonization based on unilateral American norms with less support of international society, and on the other hand, the attempt to shape a multi-polar world order resisting the US’s unilateralism and acknowledging the world from a perspective of diversity. The latter was derived from the responses of major powers to problems brought about as the US abandoned a policy of agreements, coordinating positions of the world’s major powers, based on the post-Cold War policy to construct a new international order by

44 A. D. Bogaturov, “Pliuralisticheskaia odnopoliiarnost’ i interesy Rossii,” *Svobodnaia mysl’* 2 (1996), pp. 25-36.

45 V. M. Kulagin, “Mir v XXI veke: mnogopoliusnyi balans sil ili global’nyi Pax Demokratika,” *Polis* 1 (2000), pp. 23-37.

46 Bogaturov, “Sovremennyi mezhdunarodnyi poriadok,” pp. 75-76.

consent. These two streams alternately appear in terms of coexistence and conflict.⁴⁷

Thus, Russian scholars are expecting that the “multi-polar unipolarity” would characterize the next world order as a result of interaction between the US’s attempt to hold unilateral hegemony and response of challenging powers rising at regional levels. They have geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies competing continuously, and continue to compete for energy resources and regional spheres of influence or power not only with the US but also with each other.⁴⁸ According to Russian scholars, it seems that the attempt at multipolarity will gain power gradually over the framework of a unilateral hegemonic system and bipolar rivalry of power politics. With these multi-polar traits, some important issues in managing world order are building a collective consent system for “global responsibility” to deal with nontraditional issues like the development of underdeveloped countries, migration, ethnic entanglements, and religious conflicts.

Besides these two exemplary positions, many Russian scholars discuss the international order in relation to “American Imperialism.”⁴⁹ Most of them are strongly influenced by traditionalist thought rooted in the geopolitical paradigm as well as Marxist traditions. They tend to interpret the changes of the post-Cold War international order in accordance with geopolitical patterns formed historically among the major powers. The structure of their arguments is not greatly different from those of classical geopolitics.

They share the common belief that the peculiarity of Russian civilization as a continental power is in discord with that of Western civilization and ocean power. They support the separation of Russia from the West, emphasizing an independent national developmental path and a tradition of Russian civilization that is fundamentally distinguished from the Western developmental path. They stress the recognition of a bipolar international order, based on the bisectonal bi-hemisphere world view, divided into “Atlanticism” – the ideology of sea power represented by the Anglo-Saxon nations, and “Eurasianism” – the ideology of continental power represented by Russian, German, and Chinese scholars. They assert the isolation from the Western developmental path or offensive expansionism of Russian power, warning that unconditional acceptance of western orientations, ignoring the traditional and historical, geopolitical conditions of Russia on the map of global civilizations, would ruin Russian values and threaten Russia’s existence.

Traditional nationalists, refusing to accept the Western developmental model and in opposition to pro-Western tendencies, maintain that Russia

47 Bogaturov, “Sovremennyi mezhdunarodnyi poriadok.”

48 I.G. Tiulin, “Novye tendentsii v rossiiskikh issledovaniakh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,” Torkunov, *Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, pp. 48-65.

49 For example, see: A. Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki* (Moscow, 1997).

should restore its “*Derzhavnost’*,” – the tradition of Empire and “strong state” since Tsarist Russia, and seek a national developmental model based on the peculiarity of Russia’s tradition.⁵⁰ **Therefore, the tradition of Soviet thinking and geopolitical tradition that Russia has sought since Tsarist Russia becomes an important factor in identifying their own thoughts on international politics.**

They argue that not only the expansion of NATO but also the spread of the US’s influence towards the Eurasian continent are violating the inherent interests of continental powers like Russia. They also maintain that Russia should be a powerful balancing power against the West-initiated formation of an international order or the US-led unipolar hegemonic system. For this, the strategies of strengthening national power around military build-up and spreading anti-Western ideology should continue. Furthermore, according to them if it is not allowed, Russia should pursue the strategic goal of maintaining its prestige and status as a strong power, even through the alliance with an anti-Western or anti-Oceanic power. Also, Russia should maintain its leading role as a continental power and its prestige as a global actor, by retaining geopolitical influence and by utilizing a countermeasure of territorial expansion.

Status of Russia in the Changing World

How does Russia recognize its status in the changing World? Russian elite groups maintain the view that in the process of forming a multi-polar world it would be difficult for Russia to take a role as an organizer or a coordinator in charge of major role in the new order, because of its limited internal resources and capability. If economic conditions improve with the domestic stability continued under/after the Putin administration, according to them, Russia will take on a role as an “opportunistic coordinator” based on its recovered influence. This prediction is mostly conditional, and the role of the opportunistic coordinator can be considered as the goal of Russia, executing a pragmatic foreign policy based on pragmatic realism as the Russian government has shown.

Russia retains its key position supporting the democratic attempts to derive the universal principles of state behavior in the process of forming a new

50 In this regard, it is worthwhile to pay attention to the discussion on the “sovereign democracy” of Russia. In a February 2006 speech, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s deputy chief of staff and main ideologist, laid out much of the vision of “sovereign democracy,” and it was further elaborated in detail in the brochure “Osnovnye tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiia sovremennoi Rossii.” On the meaning of the “sovereign democracy,” see: Masha Lipman, “Putin’s Sovereign Democracy,” *Washington Post* (July 15, 2006); Ivan Krastev, “‘Sovereign Democracy’ – Russian Style,” (November 15, 2006), http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp; Andrei Okara, “Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project?” *Russia in Global Affairs* 5-3 (2007). On the commencement of this idea, see: Vladislav Surkov, **interview by** Elena Ovcharenko and Larisa Kaftan, *Komsomol’skaia Pravda* (September 28, 2004), www.kp.ru/daily/23370/32473/print/.

world order. If the US pursues the establishment of a democratic world order, Russia would cooperate actively, but if the US continues its unilateral policy against the universal, consensual international order, Russia would have to check the US in alliance with other major powers.⁵¹

Russia's position can be observed from its duality of keeping a cooperative attitude with the US in the field of the War on Terrorism, environmental issues, and space development, but maintaining an opposing attitude in the field of Iranian or North Korean nuclear issues, the Middle East issues and the construction of the US military bases in Eurasia such as in Central Asia. Although some criticize Russian policy of this kind as "Opportunism" or "Hypocrisy," the Russian position could also be viewed as having internal and logical consistency.

If we summarize the features of the three main-stream paradigms on the international/world order in Russia, we can organize a scheme as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Positions on International/World Order in Russia

	Basis of Thinking	Type of Order	Main Axis of Order	Type of Perspective on IP
Global Order	Sociological institutionalism	World government / Confederation of states	UN / Regional Communities	Convergent
		Collective leadership	G8 NATO	Compromising
		Unitary governance space	Global Governance	Divergent
International Order	Political structuralism	Unipolarity	US	Convergent
		Multi-polar Unipolarity	US / Europe, Russia, China	Compromising
		Multi-polarity	Regional Powers	Divergent
Geopolitical Order	Geopolitical traditionalism	Sea-based power Hegemony	US + NATO	Convergent
		Balance between Sea-based and Continental Power	US + NATO / Russia-China-India (Iran)	Compromising
		Sub-regionally decentralized system	Regional Powers	Divergent

51 Regarding this issue, the 'anti-US alliance' argument, often discussed in Russia, was about Russia-China-India, Russia-France-Germany, and Russia-Iran-Iraq. Recently, a cooperative structure among Russia, China, and India has increased the feasibility of this argument.

FROM RUSSIAN PARADIGMS TO A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The various questions raised in Russian international studies discussed above could be useful as academic discussion topics in the future to understand their implications for general international political theories. These can be largely divided into questions on international political environments and questions on actors in international politics. And these factors of international studies can be aggregated into the form of a theory of international politics.

To begin with, the questions raised by the issue of international political environments are as follows.

First is the question of how Russia recognizes post-Cold War international politics. This question is about Russia's "perception of the world," including questions on stability and instability in international politics on the one hand, and on the other hand suggesting a question on a unique or new peculiarity of post-Cold War international politics that Russia acknowledges. Here the question of what are the sources of instability or stability is important. (Question 1)

The second question is whether the "international/world order" exists, as Russia acknowledges in post-Cold War international politics. If so, the question of the foundation of order and its ordering principles must follow. (Question 2)

Next, we can raise the following questions in relation to the issue of actors in international politics. First, there is the question of who or what the "main subject or mechanism" is on the international stage. This question about "recognition of the major actor" on the one hand can raise another question about the Russian perception of "strong power," defined in regards to state-centered thinking. On the other hand, for Russian scholars who argue for a decline of the nation-state as an actor, it would be a question of what other kind of entity would be an initiating axis to form an international order. (Question 3)

Second, there is a question about the "pattern of interaction" among actors on the international stage. This can be specified as a question of how actors like Russia identify themselves in international politics, as well as a question of what rules of the game have been mutually accepted among actors. (Question 4)

Understanding how the above-analyzed three paradigms form Russia's perspectives on international politics will provide comprehensive answers to these questions from Russia's point of view and create the basis of Russia's international political theory-building efforts.⁵² **When we organize the responses**

52 Furthermore, these questions could be utilized again as significant tools for building a theory of international politics in general and, at the same time, as criteria to assess general theories of international politics. Many tasks still remain, however, for a full-scale theorization, although these analyses on basic perspectives on international politics could provide a foundation for theorizing in international politics. In particular, discussion of the interaction between behavior and structure is one of the important topics in international political theories, as can be seen in the structuralist arguments. **And questions on regional order and its relations to international politics is also an important question that challenges theory building in the twenty first century.**

of the three paradigms of Russian’s international political thinking into these questions, accepting the risk of over-simplification, the results can be organized as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. A Summary of Russian Perspectives on International Politics

			Globalism [liberalist paradigm]	Internationalism [realist paradigm]	Traditionalism [geopolitical paradigm]
Environment	Q1	Sources of (in)stability	Asymmetric threat Violation of basic human rights Terrorism, WMD	Hegemonic Ambition Power transition Terrorism, WMD Non-traditional threats	West’s/Sea-based power’s imperialist intention. Cultural imperialism.
	Q2	Order	Globalizing order West-leading liberal democratic & market system	Multi-polar order International competition and cooperation	Multi-/Bi-polar order Competition between civilization
Actor	Q3	Main subject	Civilized States vs. Non-democratic states IO (UN, NATO) / INGO	Leading Sates (P5, G8) IO (UN, OSCE)	Civilizations Sea-/Land-based power
	Q4	Identity	Leading Western civilized states	Eurasian Great Power	Land-based Great Power Specific Civilization
		Game rules	Global standard Unity in diversity	Mutual understanding National interest	Geopolitical thinking Zero-sum competition

Hence, international political studies in Russia can be said, after having repeated diverse differentiation since the collapse of the Soviet Union and quickly acquiring the academic fruits of western international studies, to have a relatively stable internal tendency in forming Russian perspectives on international politics. Furthermore, the three main paradigms that emerged in the process of forming Russian perspectives on international politics are building an internal consistency in recognition of both international political theory building and foreign policy theory building.

As we can understand from these results, various points and arguments have been raised in Russia regarding foreign policy and the international/world order. How could the characteristics of the Russian perspectives on international politics be organized through this examination and what are the communication points between Russian perspectives on international politics and western IR theory?

Above all, after examining the arguments of Russia’s perspectives on international politics, I would like to point out that Russia is a normal country. The truth is that Russia has been incorporated into the robust global knowledge structure in which it can interpret from its own positions and has carefully acquired diverse types of thought, which have evolved in the course of international political fluctuations. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that different powerful nations can also have such divergent features in perspectives on international politics as Russia has. In this respect, we can organize

the characteristics of the Russian perspective toward international politics as follows.

First, it seems that the Russian perspective on international politics takes an open-minded approach toward the argument on global cooperation, based upon the tradition of globalism formed around the world, and keeps considering Russia's responsibility and role within the global unity newly being formed. In particular, Russia continues to ponder how to articulate its interests in a globalizing world under the tradition of globally scaled thinking that comes from the Soviet era. Some of the scholars, deeply affected by the liberalist or institutionalist paradigm of international politics also keep displaying their interests in an international political order of "unity in diversity."

Second, there is a very vigorous argument about the structure of power-centered polarity among Russian scholars under the tradition of internationalism. This shows that many Russian scholars are inclined towards a traditional realist thinking that mainly focuses on changes to the international order with shifts of the power structure of international politics. Hence, the dominance of realist thinking in Russia seems to be more intense than in the US or the Western world.

Contrary to this intensity, however, Russian realism seems to have a more conciliatory character. The reason for this might be related to Russia's status in international politics that Russia recognizes. It appears that Russia is strongly conscious of its in-between (or intermediate) position among the leading hegemonic powers to form an international/world order represented by the US, the West and the opposition powers. The current mainstream in Russian perspectives on international politics involves a strategy that seeks a Russian role between the two, maximizing Russian national interest. This conciliatory or opportunistic character in the Russian realist perspective toward international politics is working both to build support and draw criticism for Russia.

Thirdly, we include the assessment of the role of Russian scholars who are under the tradition of traditionalism. Many of the western critics recognize these discourses within Russia to be very dangerous. The role of such discourses, however, is very limited. Rather, we can determine that they played a positive role, to some extent, in the process of mitigating the overly-intensified globalist thinking in Russia right after the end of the Cold War and shaping the new Russian identity. Moreover, since their outward bellicosity was a reaction to the rapid downswing of Russia's international influence, it would be more objective to consider its fundamental characteristic as defensive or protective rather than as offensive. This explains why their goals have something in common with that of realists in that they seek to preserve Russian influence and restore its prestige.

In addition, I just want to add some points on the correlation between the theoretical attempts to understand Russia's foreign policy and Russian understanding of international politics. The attempts to understand theoretically Russia's foreign policy reveal great interest in the relationship between foreign

policy and international politics. Especially as a field of foreign policy studies of Russia, we could examine such debates on Russia's identity as a way to understand Russia's perception not only of international political changes but of domestic changes. However, international political studies in Russia seem to have less interest in the actors than the issue of structure in international politics. Therefore, the work of theorizing Russia's foreign policy that naturally focuses on actors can play a partial complementary role in the theorization of Russian international politics. The arguments on Russian foreign policy of the Western-oriented liberals provide various materials for views of international political theorists under the tradition of globalism, those of tradition-oriented nationalists about those under the tradition of traditionalism, and those of pragmatic statist about those under the tradition of internationalism.

In sum, we find that the process of Russia's adaptation to the drastically changed international/world politics has developed Russia's unique perspectives, which are nonetheless inter-communicable with the foreign academic community as well, based upon their own tradition of worldview and self-consciousness. Russia's westernizer-atlanticist tradition, slavophile-nationalist tradition, and geopolitical-eurasianist tradition have developed into a liberalist paradigm, realist paradigm, and geopolitical paradigm respectively after the collapse of Soviet Union. And these paradigms, even though they have more than a little difference in detail, have developed quite similar ways of thoughts on international/world politics to contemporary western IR theory. Furthermore the uniqueness of Russian IR thinking can contribute to the development of a general international political theory, providing the international academic community with its peculiar way of pondering various constructive subjects such as worldview and self-consciousness, identity politics and foreign policy, civilizations and region building, intermediate role and community building, geo-strategy and its deconstruction