What is it like to be a generalist?

by

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I shall examine characteristics and objectives of 'General Education (Kyoyo Kyoiku)', by considering its Aristotelian foundation and tradition. It is necessary to have a clear view about what a generalist is like in considering general education. I shall discuss a human characteristic called 'generalist' which should be, at least partially, nurtured by the general education in our higher education. I shall suggest a ground design for a general education through the analysis of being a generalist. First, I shall raise a question concerning the relationship between intellectual discipline and moral discipline. Second, I shall characterize what a specialist is like, followed by characterizing what a generalist is like. Then I shall review how traditional education ever since ancient Greece has been nurturing generalists. I shall introduce how Aristotle, who is the founder of almost all academic disciplines, designs to educate generalists, by considering his arts of arguments such as dialectic and rhetoric. Through this analysis, I shall offer a new insight into the perennial problem of how it is possible for a man to possess both an acute intelligence and a moral decency. I shall try to elucidate one aspect of the generalist so that I can locate the problem within the context of the relationship between the specialist and the generalist. I shall re-interpret the notion of the generalist as one who understands the human being as a whole.

When man's activity of nurturing one's humanity (humanitas) is called by Cicero 'cultivation of soul (cultus animi)', he must have the discipline of the human being as a whole in his mind, implying both intellectual acuteness and moral decency as the objective of education (1). Cicero's thinking has caught the attention of people who have been in charge of general education over centuries. Let me quote a report of our well-known W.S.Clark from his First Annual Report (1877) of Sapporo Agricultural College, which was submitted to Kuroda Kiyotaka, the Minister of the Colonial Department. He wrote "It has been well said 'A country is nothing without men, men are nothing without mind, and mind is little without culture. It follows that cultivated
mind is the most important product of a nation. The products of the farm, the shop, the mill, the mine, are of incomparably less value than the products of the schools. If the schools of a people are well taught, all else will prosper.". In this paper, I shall seek a method as to how both activities, i.e. cultivating a decent character and cultivating a general ability of thought, are combined or reconciled so as to produce an integrated character of a well educated person called a 'generalist'.

2. A familiar example of a schism between being intelligent and being moral

First, I shall point out a schism which lies in contemporary general education between cultivating intellectual ability and cultivating moral decency. I shall put our issue in a familiar context. That is, the problem of the academic background-oriented society in Japan. In Japan, primary education as well as higher education has at least two objectives. One objective is to teach pupils indispensable subjects such as Japanese, Mathematics, History, Science and so on, as a preliminary for all pupils to gain basic knowledge and ability for their lives in this highly organized and complicated society with advanced technology. The other objective is to teach pupils morality as a basic understanding and skill for communication with other people. I shall call the former 'intellectual cultivation' and the latter 'moral cultivation'. However, the relationship between these two cultivations is not apparently as clear as it should have been, and has not been well understood even among teachers. For instance, teachers, on the one hand, encourage their pupils to study hard so as to climb up the hierarchy of this academic background-oriented society, which inevitably involves competition among pupils and thus makes good relationships with others difficult. On the other hand, teachers encourage their pupils to be kind to others and to develop friendships with each other. Perceptive pupils may be puzzled and perplexed by these two prima facie opposed directions in the actual area of education.

Philosophers have been presenting this kind of problem as tension between the theoretical aspect and the practical aspect of the human mind. While theoretical discipline has to do with truth and falsity, practical discipline has to do with good and evil (2). Each has sui generis its own objective and area to be considered. But there must be some connection between them, insofar as the human being is the unified agent throughout in his/her life. It is, however, not so easy to see the clear connection between cultivating intellectual ability and cultivating moral character in one's soul.

3. What is it like to be a specialist?

I shall discuss this issue from the viewpoint of what it is like to be a generalist. 'Generalist' and 'specialist' are words for the character of person named after his/her
soul's particular capacities or abilities. There are many kinds of capacities of one's soul, for instance, the five basic senses such as vision and hearing, various skills such as cooking and knitting, and also intellectual and moral virtues in the sense of excellences of soul by means of which one carries out excellent performances in the relevant areas.

Although I am concerned with elucidating what a generalist is like in this paper, it is rather easier to explain specialists. Let me describe the specialists first. They are the people who engage in somewhat qualified or professional specialties or expertise such as lawyers, medical doctors, professional athletes, scientists and fashion designers. They have their own established areas to be disciplined with and these areas are recognized by the public. There are clear scales or measurements in these areas by means of which it is judged whether or not one person is superior to others. In these areas, it is required to set a standard by fair methods with public transparency, so that any person can choose a safe and reliable way of life and gain something profitable from the relevant specialty by paying equalities to these skills. When I am sick, I go to see a medical doctor, expecting that he can cure my disease with his skill. Likewise, in everyday life, we depend on specialists in many areas.

4. What is common among specialists.

Is there anything common among specialists? If there is anything common, it must be cultivated by general education. How can one distinguish an aspect of the specialist from an aspect of the generalist within one person? A good carpenter may not be eloquent but can at least communicate with people. An excellent architect may not be a good father or a good citizen, but can express his thought in design. A respected doctor may not be good at calculation, but can reason on various things. All of them can think well at least in their areas. Thought requires the ability to think, and in most of the cases, with language. Also, all of them live as members of various societies. Life requires the ability to live in certain circumstances such as in societies and in nations. Language, thought and life are not confined to their own specialties. But it seems that there is a chasm between being good at thinking with language and being good at living. One may suspect that these areas may be also divided into specialties. But one cannot deny that everyone aims to live a good life by discerning something profitable, just, and in general, good from something bad in any situation.

What is it, then, for a person to be a generalist? While specialists are excellent in their own areas, they may not be good at the general area. What does the general area consist of? How does a generally educated person behave differently from a normal person? There are general academic disciplines which are required to be learned by anyone who tries to be an expert in some specific area, or to be reasonable and thoughtful in a general matter.
Now I shall argue that the generalist is a person who tries to answer, from the widest perspective possible, the basic and universal question inevitably addressed to all human beings qua human beings, that is, what the human being is. But this general question should be replaced by a more practical and concrete question in our context as follows: where (=in which place of logos (account, argument and thus understanding)) does one live in accordance with him/her self in plenitude, by being cured from one’s disintegration? In other words, the generalist is a person who tries to understand themselves by carrying out constant feedback with various human activities. A Self (=an Ego) is composed of many layers or dimensions; for instance, as a moral being, a social being, a biological being, a physical being and a metaphysical being, to which there are corresponding academic disciplines such as ethics, social sciences, biology, physics and metaphysics (or ontology). The generalist is the person who can somehow gain access to these academic disciplines, and thus acquire a bird’s-eye view of the human being in order to comprehend it as a whole. Hereafter, I shall call this manyfold structure of the Self as ‘the core structure of the human being’, which has a shape of a corn whose top is the tip on which each person stands, and whose bottom is the widest circle in which each one stands, as well as in each layer between them. For the core structure, I would like you to imagine a Self which is composed of these manyfold dimensions of being to which there are corresponding academic disciplines. At the bottom of the core, general education is placed, since any activity avails itself of this discipline. The discipline of General Education underlies all these academic activities in its widest applicability.

Anyone is living as an ethical being, insofar as he/she discerns a good thing from a bad thing. Anyone is living as a social being, insofar as he/she is a member of a society governed by such principles and rules as economics, politics and laws. Likewise, anyone is living as a biological being, insofar as he/she is begotten and eats and undergoes metabolism. Anyone is living as a physical being, insofar as he/she is under the laws of, for instance, gravity and light. Anyone is living as an ontological or metaphysical being, insofar as he/she understands his/her own being and non-being and one holds one’s own understanding of where one comes from at the time of birth and where one goes to at the time of death. Thus anyone has already somehow taken an attitude to his/her own being as a materialist or an agnostic or a theist, even if it is taken at the subconscious level. This being is called ‘existence’, according to the philosophical tradition of Existentialism. Even if it is taken at the subconscious level, it can be revealed by one’s actions in life, because the basic understanding of oneself or one’s own being is reflected in every piece of ordinary life. Thus the human being is a metaphysical and also religious being.

This core structure is designed to capture the generalist. In this sense, a generalist can be taken as a philosopher. Thinking of a human being qua human being is par excellence the work of philosophy, which comprises ethics as its part and is able to gain some access to the products of other academic (special) disciplines such as social
some access to the products of other academic (special) disciplines such as social and physical disciplines. I believe that it is necessary to interpret the notion of the generalist in this way to solve the puzzle of how one can be intelligent as well as morally decent, which are the objectives of education in general.

5. Liberal Arts

In this and the following sections, I shall review general education in the European tradition. Ever since late antiquity and the early medieval age, there have been disciplines called ‘artes liberales’ (liberal arts or arts of freemen) (3). These subjects consisted of trivium [the three disciplines] (grammar, dialectic and rhetoric) and of quadrivium [the four disciplines] (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). The trivium is concerned with language and its application in reasoning and persuasion. The quadrivium is concerned with arithmetic and geometry and their application in the motion of stars and in harmony of sounds. They cultivate basic intellectual abilities of the human soul. These can be applied to any reasonable activity of human beings.

In the contemporary age, while the trivium is developed as skills of critical thinking and of communication, the quadrivium is carried out as mathematical sciences which nurture the general ability to solve questions with the steady progress of reasoning. The core skill of critical thinking is composed of analysis, inference, explanation, evaluation, interpretation and so on. Its origin is systematically set out by Aristotle. Aristotle theorizes the methods of argument as Dialectic, Logic and Rhetoric. The European intellectual tradition has been exercising the discipline of thinking for more than two millennia under his foundation. Communication skills have also developed since the time of the ancient Greek orators and philosophers in their democratic institutions. Communication skills include public speaking, writing, techniques to find and analyze information, and the skill of getting along with others of different ages, religions and so on. These abilities make people think and reflect for themselves in a wide and deep scope. On the basis of these liberal arts, students build up their own individual areas as specialists. In our Core structure, the trivium and the quadrivium are located under the physical sciences and the ontology or the metaphysics at the bottom of any intellectual activity. Thus they can be applied to any academic discipline.

6. The Aristotelian Tradition of being a generalist

Aristotle characterizes two types of educated people, one as a specialist and the other as a generalist. He says in the Parts of Animals I.1 as follows:
Every systematic science, the humblest and the noblest alike, seems to admit of two distinct kinds of proficiency; one of which may be properly called scientific knowledge of the subject, while the other is a kind of educated person's competence. For an educated man is able to judge correctly which parts of an exposition are satisfactory and which are not. That, in fact, is the sort of person we take 'the man of general education (ton holos pepaideumenon)' to be. To be educated is in fact to be able to do this. In this case however, we expect to find in the one individual the ability to judge of almost all subjects, whereas in the other case the ability is confined to some special science.

Aristotle also describes the two kinds of educated man in the Nicomachean Ethics I.3 as follows:

Each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general.

Here Aristotle characterizes a generalist as a person who can properly judge whether what is claimed by a specialist in any discipline is appropriately proposed or not at the general level, in so far as specialists convey their views by using language, reasoning and numbers. A man of universal education is a person who has a method of judging appropriately at the level of formal argument whether a statement is made well or not, 'quite independently of the question whether the statements made be true or false' (439a14). That is, a man of all-round education is not required to possess specific knowledge of a specific area, but can think properly about what is raised by a specialist and determine whether or not it is properly presented by examining their language and reasoning at the universal level. On the other hand, a man educated in some special subject is a man who has a specific method of how to deal with special knowledge.

Since there are degrees of precision according to the natures of the relevant subjects such as mathematics and rhetoric, a man of general education is not necessarily required to present a strict argument like a mathematician. Aristotle mentions that 'It is the mark of an educated man in either case to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand demonstrative proofs from a rhetorician' (Nic. Ethics I.3). This is because a generalist knows the natures of all areas and activities of academic disciplines in his/her own way and thus can put human activities in their proper places of logos (account).
Thus, a man of general education must be equipped with the abilities of grammatical knowledge, logical reasoning and the skill of arguments in providing the pro (in favor of) and contra (against) arguments for a relevant issue on the basis of reputable opinions and also must be equipped with the ability of mathematical reasoning. These abilities will be widely applied to all intellectual activities.

7. Dialectic

In order to produce a generalist, it is important to nurture the skill of argument by offering pro and contra arguments on a relevant issue. This skill is called 'Dialectic' which is 'the art of examination' by Aristotle (4). Now I shall present an outline of what Aristotelian dialectic is as an example of general education. I shall point out that there has been a serious misunderstanding about Aristotelian dialectic among subsequent philosophers and commentators. They could not distinguish the theoretical aspect of his dialectic from its practical aspect, and as such they have not been confident, but hesitated to treat dialectic as one of the liberal arts.

While the theory of dialectic, as developed in the Topics, applies to argumentative arts such as rhetoric (dealing with persuasion), eristic (dealing with victory in discussion) and logic (dealing with valid reasoning), it has its own distinctive aims. Its goal is to set out a general way to establish whether a discussion is properly conducted at the formal level by presenting topos (topoi point(s)) through (or by) which one can confirm or overturn propositions put forward by the interlocutor. Unlike any particular sciences but like philosophy, dialectical argument is 'not concerned with any definite genus' (172a12). It considers universal statements at a level distinct from that characterized by the proper principles of a science. These statements can be examined using arguments or considerations based on the theories of categories (i.e. genera of predications such as what a thing is and how a thing is as genera of entities such as substance and quality), predicables (i.e. types of terms which are the constituents of identity predications such as essence, property and accident) and universal terms (such as sameness and difference).

Aristotle claims that one and the same proposition (predication) can be discussed 'dialectically' in the sphere of opinion and 'philosophically' with respect to its truth. In 'Of propositions and problems', he says 'there are three divisions, ethical, physical and formal (hai de logikai); philosophically we must treat these things according to the truth, but dialectically in terms of opinion. All propositions should be obtained in the most universal form possible'. When one considers ethical or physical propositions 'in their most universal form', they are analyzed at a level higher than that of their particular genus, by dialectically or philosophically using formal and general (logikai) concepts and propositions. For instance, the physical terms 'hot and cold' or the ethical
terms ‘good and evil’ can be treated dialectically in terms of, for example, ‘the same’ and ‘opposite’. The formal (logikê) proposition, ‘The knowledge of the opposites is the same’, can be applied both to ethical and physical issues. Dialectical practice examines propositions at this distinctive level. Like philosophy, dialectic has a universal dimension.

Dialectic, however, in contrast with philosophy, is ‘the art of examination’, ‘which a man may possess, even though he lacks knowledge’. The dialectician, who is confined to the realm of opinion (doxa), should carry out dialectically (dialektikôs) not philosophically (logikôs) his distinctive examination following Aristotle’s instructions about method. In Aristotelian dialectic practice, one cannot ask ‘What is F?’ directly. A dialectical problem must be set in a form to which it is possible to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. In a dialectical exchange, the person who examines a claim made by an interlocutor must put a proposition in the form of question: ‘is two-footed land animal the definition of man?’ and ‘is animal the genus of man?’ The answerer is required to say just ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Problems should be put as follows; ‘is two-footed land animal the definition of man or not?’ because the dialectical syllogism is concerned with contrary or contradictory pairs of propositions. Arguments for both sides are to be presented for these contrary conclusions which are expressed as one problem.

The dialectical syllogism is put forward as the engine of dialectical practice, underwritten by the results of the theory set out using topo. ‘Shared (Reputable) opinion’ (endoxon) is the opinion held ‘by everyone, or by the majority or by the wise’. If ‘the wise people’ give their opinion, it can be easily shared by ordinary people because of their authority. Dialectical propositions must be endorsed by reputable opinion. Dialectical arguments begin with shared opinion as a persuasive premise in a dialectical syllogism. Shared or reputable opinion determines the limits of dialectic. For instance, we can put his examination of two contrary claims in two contrary syllogisms: ‘Every pleasure is good’ and ‘Every pleasure is bad’ by offering respectively endoxic premises. The first syllogism goes as follows; Major premise ‘Anything which is pursued is good’, Minor premise ‘Every pleasure is something which is pursued’. Conclusion ‘Therefore every pleasure is good’. The contrary syllogism goes as follows: Major premise ‘Anything which leads to excess is bad’ and Minor premise ‘Every pleasure leads to excess’. Conclusion ‘Therefore, every pleasure is bad’. If these propositions were treated dialectically, by offering pro and contra arguments on the basis of shared or reputable opinions, the practice would remain at the level of opinion and does not seek its knowledge.

While the philosopher, engaged in a superior academic discipline, can make use of the dialectical examination of a proposition for his own purposes, he can also engage in dialectical practice by suspending (as a dialectician would) his own ontological commitments. In philosophy and dialectic, our intellectual ability is employed for dif-
ferent purposes. In Metaphysics, Aristotle says that “Philosophy differs from dialectic in the orientation of the ability. Dialectic is merely critical while philosophy claims to know” (1004b23f). The practice of dialectic is contrasted with demonstrative science and with philosophy, which claim to have necessary knowledge about the causal structure of nature. Since the practice of dialectic remains at the level of opinion, it cannot yield knowledge. But it is still possible for a dialectician to present counter examples and refute claims, and so avoid false opinions. Further, insofar as he follows the rules established by the theory of dialectic, he can gain legitimate agreement from others and thus strengthen his belief. Dialectical practice may, indeed, be useful in the acquisition of knowledge, when the relevant ability is re-directed towards philosophical practice. In these passages, Aristotle marks out the different goals of these two activities.

While the practice of a dialectician is to critically examine any proposed proposition, the theory on which he depends is grounded in a philosophical analysis of issues such as being and identity. A philosophical or formal (logikê) account of these topics, involving the predicables and the categories, is put forward in the Topics as the proper basis for dialectical and philosophical practice. It is unfortunate in the subsequent history of understanding Aristotelian dialectic that people could not clearly distinguish the theory of dialectic, which is established by a strict philosophical method called 'by the method of formal argument' (logikós) from the practice of dialectic which is carried out based on reputable opinions by the method called 'dialectically (dialektikós)'.

In the subsequent history of understanding dialectic, logical practice and dialectical practice are conflated. Philoponus discusses whether ‘The logical (formal) argument and dialectic’ (Hê logikê te kai dialektikê pragmateia) is ‘a part’ of philosophy or ‘a tool’ for philosophy. He claims that while Stoics regard it as a part, Peripatetics see it as a tool for philosophy. Here Philoponus uses the conjunction ‘and’ (kai) exegetically. If he means dialektikê to be the theory of dialectic, this discipline must be a part of philosophy. Otherwise, he and others fail to understand what ‘logikê’ means (5). In Aristotle’s view, while the dialectic as a theory of dialect is constructed by strict philosophical and logical arguments, the practice of dialectic is carried out in the realm of opinion. In the description of trivium, therefore, ‘diallectica’ should be understood as an art which involves ‘logica (the logic)’ in the sense that we contemporarily understand. Although people, sometimes, understand logic in terms of dialectic, they are not confident in this inclusion due to having been mislead to think that dialectic should be based not on philosophical and logical rigorousness but on reputable or shared opinions (6).

It may be helpful, at this point, to consider the relationship between Aristotle’s and Plato’s dialectics. They are both similar and dissimilar. Dialectic, based on synthesis and division, was, as Plato understood it, the noblest intellectual activity, a univer-
sal philosophical method for inquiry into real being. Aristotle, by contrast, downgraded dialectic, confining the practice of dialectic to the sphere of opinion. Further, since sciences and arts are classified according to their objects or regions and methods, dialectic cannot be, for Aristotle, the (or even a) universal science. Nonetheless he inherited from Plato a belief in the philosophical significance of dialectic and developed it as a theory of being and identity, outlining it in a formal manner (logikós) not to be found in any of Plato’s writing. Aristotle introduced the term ‘by the method of formal argument’ (logikós) to point to his new understanding of certain aspects of Plato’s dialectic.

Aristotle characterizes his own project at the end of the last book of the Topics and locates it in its proper historical context. He writes that ‘Our programme was to discover some faculty of syllogising about any subject put before us from the most shared (reputable) premises that there are’. In this project, he nurtured ‘the faculty’ of ‘being able to conduct an examination not only dialectically (dialektikós) but also as a person who knows (hós eidós)’. Here he suggests that he established his results as ‘a philosopher’ who grasps wisdom and contrasts his approach with the art of sophistry, ‘the semblance of wisdom without the reality’. He characterizes the man who knows as being able ‘to avoid falsities in the subjects he knows and to show up the man who makes them’. Aristotle places Socrates somewhere between the sophist and himself. ‘For this reason, Socrates only questioned and never answered, because he confessed that he did not know. But, we have made clear, in the course of what precedes, the number with respect to which and the sources from which, to defend a thesis will be accomplished, and also from what sources we will find the way out from these issues. In these remarks, Aristotle confirms that while he sees Socrates’ mission as his own, he is confident that he has found a way to escape the difficulties which beset his predecessor. This is why he can contrast himself with Socrates as one who knows with one who did not.

I have sketched so far some characteristics of dialectical discipline both in contrast with and in agreement with philosophy. Ever since the ancient Greeks, European people have been disciplined by this kind of training on argument and reasoning by the art of examination called ‘Dialectic’ and the counterpart of dialectic called ‘Rhetoric’. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion based on dialectic.

8. How to make a bridge between a specialist and a generalist.

Given that we have confirmed how nurturing generalists has been carried out by these traditional disciplines over centuries, one question now would be on the relationship between a generalist and a specialist. One may ask how a specialist can influence the activity of a generalist and vice versa. Training in a special science gives a
specialist a specific method and specific knowledge in detail. They spend a certain amount of time in their experiments and research. It is reported by Cicero that Archimedes, being so much absorbed in the spirit of flame of study (ardorem studi) to prove a figure on a sand, was not aware of his polis Syracuse being under attack by Roman soldiers and was eventually killed by them (Cicero, op.cit.V.19). Another not so well-known example is that a Japanese scientist at the time of the Second World War did not notice that the had begun, because he confined himself in his laboratory for many years. Specialists may be inclined to be involved in specific matters so much that they might lose a general point of view so as to put their activities in a wider context. They may tend to think of human matters from their own established perspective based on their specialty. For instance, a specialist of management who claims that ‘the goal of any firm is to maximize its benefit’, does not consider its place in society as a public vessel and its performance as a human activity. Also, a biologist who claims ‘Man is the vehicle of genes’ as the basic proposition of biology does not consider a more fundamental and teleological proposition such as ‘living is better than not living’ (Aristotle, 731b29). This may be called a kind of ‘fixed mind’ or ‘narrow scope’.

On the other hand, training in general arts such as dialectic, logic and mathematics provides a generalist with a basic power of thinking so that they can quickly analyze concrete matters raised in any subject in terms of formal structure, and put them into analyzed and ordered groups and systems. But generalists may be inclined to be involved in abstractive thought so much that they lose contact with concrete realities. This kind of thought is pejoratively described as being like a ‘Rocking chair’. They may have a tendency to be aloof from ordinary and basic human matters. We can say, following Kant’s maxim on the relationship between concept and intuition, that without being a specialist, a generalist is empty, and without being a generalist, a specialist is blind.

Given that these tendencies exist in each discipline, it is important to confirm that a person can be both a generalist and a specialist at the same time. It is because these two types are determined not by the extension of people but by the modes of thinking and the areas of thoughts. If a specialist talks about a general element in his/her activity by pursuing the possibility of general applicability of the particular method and by finding a general underlying method or underlying elements in his/her specific activity, he/she acts as a generalist. This suggests that everybody should try to have both perspectives of being a specialist and a generalist. This will give us a balanced as well as sharp power of thinking.

9. How a generalist can be morally decent.
However, you may still be puzzled how, given that a person becomes a generalist by excelling in examination at the universal level on any issue, he/she is nurtured to be morally excellent by such disciplines as well. One may doubt whether a man of acute intelligence would also be morally virtuous and practically wise. Indeed we cannot see the clear connection between cultivating intellectual ability in general and cultivating moral ability. We sometimes encounter the fact that intelligent people may not be morally honest and sincere. Should we abandon the ambition of understanding the human being as a unified being?

We can claim, nevertheless, good influence on moral characteristics to some extent. First of all, since the intellectual discipline in general, regarding either a specialist one or a generalist one, makes a person accustomed to think carefully and rationally on any matter, he/she becomes thoughtful. No man can be virtuous without being thoughtful. Second, the intellectual discipline nurtures intellectual curiosities for something new and thus keeps people’s minds fresh and alert. The more one gains knowledge of something, the more one is interested in the details of the thing thus far known. Intellectual curiosity is a major engine of intellectual cultivation. Since this makes it possible for one to encounter new things, such a person will easily get rid of the so-called ‘fixed mind’ which forces one to inevitably be stuck in matters with which the person has formally been preoccupied. Let us imagine a person who is addicted to something such as alcohol, a mobile phone or a love affair. By being addicted, I mean the state of mind in which a person is governed and controlled by that particular matter so that he/she fails to look from a bird’s eye point of view, which commands various elements of life to be considered. As a dialectician does, one has to be able to think in any situation in what sense the opposite view is plausible or true.

Academic discipline presupposes that the objects of inquiry are solid in themselves, even if it admits degrees of solidness according to the relevant subjects. People of intelligence themselves have been examined by the solid reality. If they have the wrong opinion about something, they will be corrected by the thing or truth itself. This nourishes them with awe and respect for the truth. Disciplined intelligence can see reality clearly without prejudice, so that it facilitates attaining the truth. The truth makes people free in the sense of being liberated from old prejudices, inclinations and even from the old Ego. Intellectual practice nourishes a man both as a generalist and as a specialist so as to be thoughtful. These characteristics are indeed indispensable for a practically wise person.

But still one may doubt whether intellectual discipline is directly connected to moral discipline. There does not necessarily seem to be a relationship between these intellectual characteristics and moral virtue. A man of virtue is supposed to be the person who makes the right deliberation and chooses the right action with respect to others, and even to oneself in any situation. A virtue requires moral sensitivity as well or
as the most important constituent. By moral sensitivity, I mean a state of mind which promptly responds to stimulation or involvement in a new situation with respect to right and wrong. This is a kind of hunch or a work of conscience which has to do with one's integrity and disintegration. This sensitivity is quite intuitive and thus seems to be remote from the ability of thinking and reasoning.

Aristotle himself is aware of the connection between intellectual cultivation and moral cultivation. He was skeptical about Socrates intellectualism which claims that gaining knowledge of what the virtue is is sufficient for being virtuous. It seems that while intellectual ability is one thing, moral sensitivity is another. Just as physical exercises are necessary for health in anybody, moral virtue together with moral sensitivity is something which should be equipped by repeated performance of virtuous acts for a healthy state of soul.

Aristotle says in Nichomachean Ethics II.4 as follows.

For the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance of just and temperate actions. Thus although actions are entitled just and temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would do, the agent is just and temperate not when he does these acts merely, but when he does them in the way in which just and temperate men do them. It is correct therefore to say that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate actions; and no one can have the remotest chance of becoming good without doing them. But the mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing philosophy and that this will make them good men. In so doing they act like invalids who listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his prescriptions. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of soul than will the mode of treatment produce health of body.

Aristotle claims in this passage that making a habit of virtuous conduct is at least a necessary condition for a man to be virtuous. It is indispensable for a virtuous man to have a stable character which is not easily affected by passion or dragged about by desire. A quick mind is not necessary for a virtuous person but may rather have an adverse effect in constituting a stable soul. A man of love suffers a lot, because he/she deeply catches others from the bottom of their heart. Only the depth of passivity produces the strength and height of thoughtful action. A habit of good conduct nourishes moral sensitivity and moral character. However much it may cost in many ways, to keep doing the right thing must be the basic way for any man to be virtuous.
Augustine once said that 'it is far better to walk on the narrow and right path with a crippled leg than to walk on the wrong and wide road with spreading out one’s arms'.

Aristotle’s remark is a definite warning against the overestimation of generalist education. Does this lead to independence between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues? Is the generalist discipline of no use to nourishing a moral being? But his emphasis of the contrast in these approaches, i.e., discussing about virtue and doing the right things is issued in the context of criticizing the intellectualism advocated by Socrates and Plato. Socrates sought to know for what a virtue is throughout his life, and held that gaining the knowledge of what a virtue is is sufficient for being virtuous, although he confessed that he did not gain that knowledge. That is why he continued to be a fierce inquirer in ethical matters. It is not the case that Aristotle denied any effect of the discipline of the generalist in cultivating a virtuous man.

In fact, the cultivation of a habit is applied to the intellectual discipline in general and physical discipline too. Whatever the discipline, a repeated performance is required for the body to be equipped with skill and ability. Indeed, a carpenter must be disciplined by his repeated performance of construction under the guidance of the master craftsman. A generalist must be disciplined by his repeated performance of gaining the skill of thinking and argument under the guidance of his/her mentor.

I claim that moral discipline is a particular way of nurturing a specialist and also a particular way of nurturing a generalist. It is like a specialist training to the effect that the agent does what is just and temperate ‘in the way in which just and temperate men do them’. There are mentors in this discipline as in the other specialist disciplines. The agent may not fully understand what the relevant thing is. It is not necessarily required to know intellectually the relevant thing. Simple repetition is more important than understanding at the formal level. But unlike other specialist disciplines, moral judgment and conduct are demanded in any situation, insofar as the agent is a conscientious being and a social being. We face the question of choosing between good and evil in almost any situation. In this sense, facing a moral question implies the basic question to the human being: who I am who is going to choose one rather than the other between good and evil. The issue of morality is deeply rooted in any human activity. In this sense, this discipline has an aspect of the generalist.

The generalist, who is equipped with moral and philosophical disciplines, considers moral behavior in his/her feedback with other human academic activities, stated above as the core structure. The human being should be understood by considering all possible human matters, so as to locate itself in its stable and deep understanding. This urges a man who tries to be morally good to locate him/herself in a wider context of being a human. The generalist can be helpful in this respect to break the deadlock in which potential moral persons are stuck. People may be acquainted with other approaches to the same thing i.e. endeavoring to be morally good. For in-
stance, Martin Luther criticized Aristotle who took it for granted that there are morally virtuous persons. Luther was determined to have the ability to be good from his own natural power. Luther understood that 'the human being is a sack which is filled by worms' and that only Grace can save the human being. But I cannot discuss this issue here. I shall leave open this possibility. It is enough here to confirm that the generalist is a thinker who is interested in any human matter and is always searching where he/she can live in accordance with him/her self in the widest context as possible. Also the generalist is an inquirer who is made open to any possibility of gaining a new Ego.

10. A poem instead of Conclusion

Finally I would like to quote a poem from one of my favorite generalists, Kenji Miyazawa. Tribute to each one of my students

These past four years
Have brought me great joy
I spent every day
Singing like a bird in the class
I swear
That I have never felt tired from the work

Oh, everyone, when the deep-blue horizon swells and rises
Do you all ever wish to be buried in there?
Indeed, on that horizon
You got to be a mountain of all sorts

Oh, everyone, this transparent pure wind
Which is blowing from your future sphere
Don't you ever feel it?
'It' is a beam of light being sent
And a determined wind from the south.

Everyone, do you ever wish to be forced and lead by this age
And bear like a slave?
Instead, everyone, build a further newer right age
Empty space constantly changes its form, depending on us
Tides or winds,
Step forward out of using-up all such nature powers
You got to strive for forming a new nature

Oh, Copernicus of novel age
From that exceedingly heavy law of gravitation
Release this milky way galaxy system

Oh, Marx of novel age
This moving world on blind impulse
Change it into a structure of great beauty.

Oh, Darwin of novel age
Get on a spaceship 'Challenger'
Which has more oriental tranquil manner.
Reach even the extra galaxy space
Then show us more transparently profoundly profound right geo-history
And widely corrected biology.
As if an act on impulse
Every labor of agriculture has been done
By cold transparent analysis
With their indigo shadows
Enhance it into the range of dance of art.

Oh, novel poets
Through a storm, clouds or light
Obtain some new transparent energy
Then imply the form which we should take
To the earth and its people.

Notes

(1) Cicero says that 'Princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esset inuria, ad Ptolomaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. Qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te hortamur excelleret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso oto scrispit, non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum V.19 ed.L.D.Reynolds (OCT 1948)

(2) Differences and tensions between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning can be said in many ways such as between theory and practice, fact and value. For instances, G Harman says that 'practical reasoning is concerned with what to intend, whereas theoretical reasoning is concerned with what to believe', S.G.Williams describes their differences according to the agreement among theoretical reasonings and the incommensurabilism among values. He says that 'when we reason practically, we may find ourselves confronted by genuine, unresolvable conflict; but when we reason in accordance with the canons of pure theory, we will not. And this asymmetry (says the incommensurabilist) can be used to explain certain differences in the ways in which conflict can manifest itself in practical and theoretical reasoning. The thesis that there are incommensurable values will thus be reflected in and confirmed by these manifestations of conflict'. S.G.Williams, Belief, Desire, and the Praxis of Reasoning, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society p.1989/90 vol.XC, p:120,123. One thing is sure that the theoretical aspect and the practical aspect of one's soul must be unified so as to
live as a whole human being. General education must contribute to elucidate this unity.

(3) H-I Marrou’s following book is useful to grasp historical transition of liberal arts. He raises ten people since Helaclidae of Pontus (fourth century BC) down to Lactantius (fourth century AD) with their understanding of liberal arts.

Henri-Irene Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture Antique p.216f (Paris VI 1958)

(4) On Aristotelian Dialectic, see Kei Chiba ‘Aristotle on Essence and Defining-phrase in his Dialectic’, in Definitions in Greek Philosophy, ed.D.

Chareles (O.U.P 2009)


(6) On this point, H-I Marrou’s following remark is important ibid., p.218.

Chez tous nous retrouvons le programme augustinien: culture litteraire, dialectique, mathematiques. A la base, une formation que nous reconnaissons bien, celle du lettre antique:a grammaire (entendue au sens large que nous avons appris a donner au latin grammatica) et la rhetorique. Si Seneque omet cette derniere ce n’est pas qu’il la neglige; c’est au contraire qu’il lui reserve une place d’honneur a l’intérieur meme de la philosophie:chez lui la premiere partie de celle-ci, logica, se subdivise en deux sections, rhetorique et dialectique.

Ceci nou explique d’autre part les omissions rencontrées, chez d’autres, de la dialectique. Du jour où s’était perdue la distinction aristotélicienne entre la logique, science du vrai, et la dialectique, art du vraisemblable, technique de la discussion, un certain flottement n’avait pu manquer de se produire. On pouvait tour à tour, après les avoir confondues, soit les ranger sous le nom de dialectica dans les études propédeutiques, soit les faire entrer, sous le nom de logica à l’intérieur de la philosophie.


(7) W.Jeager contrast Christian Paideia with Greek one as follows; ‘The Greek philosophers themselves had recognized the so-called liberal arts as the propaideia of philosophy. Now, in Clement’s scheme, philosophy itself is downgraded to a propaideia of Christian theology, which is the final gnosis. But only the propaideia
(philosophy) comes from man; the true paideia itself derives from God. WJaeger Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, P.134 (Cambridge 1961).

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