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RUSSIAN EXPANSION TO THE PACIFIC, 1580-1700: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW*

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Russian history abounds in many superlatives as well as extremes. The most striking of these has been the country's astonishing territorial growth, which, between 1450 and 1900, transformed the insignificant Slavic Orthodox Principality of Muscovy into the largest contiguous multinational and multicultural empire in history. At its height in the second half of the nineteenth century that empire encompassed a very large portion of Europe, an enormous part of Asia, numerous islands in the North Pacific, and a nice share of North America. Next to the sheer size of this growth, the bulk of which was achieved by the sword, the most remarkable aspect of Russia's territorial expansion was its spectacular speed, its minimal cost (both human and material), and its durability.

Russian expansion in Asia has attracted scholarly attention over the years and a sizeable literature (monographic and periodical) has emerged, providing diverse interpretations. Some works view the expansion as a "civilizing and christianizing enteprise"; others consider it as "the gathering of Rus lands"; still others see it as "the urge to the sea"; and some think of it as "Russia's manifest destiny"; "a complex process of annexation (*prisoedinenie*) and assimilation (*osvoenie*"; and "a rapprochement (*sblizhenie*) between Russian and non-Russian peoples". Finally, there are some who view Russian expansion to the Pacific (and later to North America) as pure colonialism and imperialism similar to that practiced by other European powers at the same time.

While each of these views has some merit, none is fully satisfactory. Russian expansion to the Pacific cannot be reduced to a single formula, factor, or explanation, for, like all great events in history, Russia's *Drang nach Osten* was a process propelled by numerous pressures and forces that varied in purpose, intensity and time. The basic aim of this review is threefold: 1) to highlight some of the basic motives and direction of Russian expansion to the Pacific, 1580-1700; 2) to review the most essential sources on that problem; and 3) to analyze the most crucial works on the subject.

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I. MOTIVES AND DIRECTION OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION TO THE PACIFIC, 1580-1700

While there are a few written records indicating that some Eastern Slavic tribes comprising Kievan Rus were at various times involved in an "eastward drive", their incursions were sporadic, few, and localized, and they do not reveal any clear pattern or a long-term commitment[1]. Moreover, these incursions came to a sudden end about 1240, with the successful conquest of all Eastern Europe by the Mongols. During the subsequent two centuries of "Mongol Yoke" (1240–1480), the Rus eastward drive was limited to: a) frequent homage trips by high Rus officials to various political centers in the Mongol Empire; b) periodic sending of Rus recruits to serve in Mongol armies; and c) journeys into the Mongol world of Rus artisans and craftsmen on special assignments[2]. The only exception to these eastern activities was the trade contact Novgorod merchants developed with various tribes of the sub-polar region between the Gulf of Finland and the Ural Mountains.

But while the "Mongol Yoke" was a trying and humiliating experience for the people of Rus, it was not sterile. It offered Rus leaders, and especially those of Moscow, the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the size of the Mongol Empire and to know its strengths, weaknesses, customs, habits and practices. After 1330 the Muscovites used this valuable knowledge quite well. They exploited the existing differences among the quarreling units of the once powerful, but now rapidly disintegrating Golden Horde, the Western *ulus* of the Mongol Empire. They lured into Muscovite service prominent Mongol and Tatar individuals and their followers. And they also cautiously but persistently moved into the political and territorial vacuum to the east of Moscow that began to emerge with the disintegration of the Golden Horde. The process of Muscovite absorption of that vacuum was slow and without any long-term masterplan, because until 1550 each of the seven principal khanates of the disintegrating Golden Horde was still capable of creating havoc, and often did. Nevertheless, the break-up of the Golden Horde made the rise of the Muscovy Empire an irreversible process. In 1480 that process culminated in termination of the "Mongol Yoke"[3].

Because from 1480 to 1550 Muscovy was preoccupied with its European neighbors —

1) All scholars of Russian history from N. M. Karamzin to George Vernadsky discuss Russia's *Drang nach Osten*. For a brief review of this problem see, C. Raymond Beazley, "The Russian Expansion Towards Asia and the Arctic in the Middle Ages (to 1500)", *American Historical Review*, XIII, No. 4 (July, 1908). pp. 731–41; and George V. Lantzeff, "Russian Expansion Eastward Before the Mongol Invasion", *The American Slavic and East European Review*, VI, Nos. 18–19 (December, 1947), pp. 1–10.

2) Literature on the Mongol rule in Rus is voluminous. The best analysis in English is George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953). For further references see his bibliography, pp. 403–24.

3) Literature on the rise of Muscovy is abundant since every historian of Russia has analyzed this problem at some length. Among the many good works, the best is that by A. E. Presniakov, *The Formation of the Great Russian State: A Study of Russian History in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries.* Translated by A. E. Moorehouse. Introduction by Alfred J. Rieber (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

Sweden, Lithuania, Poland and the Ottoman Empire — its *Drang nach Osten* was relegated to a subordinate position. Ivan the Terrible altered the emphasis with his successful conquest of Kazan in 1552 and of Astrakhan in 1556. The spectacular success of this venture, which was propelled by defensive considerations, by government search for new revenues, by religious motives and by pressures of private interests, produced several momentous consequences. It revealed the existence of a great power vacuum along Muscovy's eastern frontiers. It opened the rich basins of the Kama and the Volga rivers to Muscovite colonization. It also gave Muscovy direct access to the markets of Siberia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, the conquest of Kazan and of Astrakhan made a deep impression on Muscovy's non-Slavic eastern neighbors, some of whom immediately expressed readiness to become Muscovite subjects. In addition, this conquest gave Muscovy an opportunity to pose as the principal heir to the legacy of the Mongol Empire — and hence as a major power in Asia. And finally, Muscovy's sudden occupation of the Volga River route gave it a shortcut to the rumored sources of exotic goods of the Orient[4]. This discovery soon attracted to Muscovy West European merchants and adventurers who, in their efforts to gain favor with the tsar and his immediate associates, employed every possible device, including bribery, deceit and fraud.

The immediate beneficiary of Muscovy's expansion into the Volga and the Kama basins was the Stroganov family. Their economic operations in the Kama region attracted cossacks, social misfits and other adventurers. In 1581 this motley band of restless riffraff, Muscovite and non-Muscovite, under the leadership of Ermak crossed the Urals, defeated the forces of Siberian Khan Kuchum, imposed payment of the *iasak* (tribute) on the natives they encountered, and laid Muscovy's claim to their territories. Because this venture was richly rewarding, beyond anyone's expectations, the government joined it immediately. Thus there was created an inseparable link between private and national interests. While at times these interests were at odds, for the most part they cooperated very closely not only in the Russian drive across northern Asia, but also in the North Pacific and in North America. This cooperation was dictated by the requirements of conquest and survival in distant and hostile surroundings. It was also mandated by the nature of the socio-political system of the Russian state.

From inception to the very end, Muscovy's drive to the Pacific proceeded along the region's great rivers[5]. Between 1585 and 1605 the Muscovites overran the central and lower systems of the Ob and Irtysh. By 1628 they had spread over most of the Enisei, the Lower and Stony Tunguskas and the Angara. In the 1640 s they sailed the length of the Lena, the Amur, Indigirka, Kolyma and the Anadyr. And between

4) For an analysis of Muscovite conquest of Kazan, see Jaroslaw Pelensky, ***Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology*** (The Hague: Mouton, 1974); see also Alton S. Donnelly, ***The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552-1740: A Case Study in Imperialism*** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

5) For a succinct statement on the role of rivers, see Robert J. Kerner, ***The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History. The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries, and Furs*** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), pp. 66-88.

1638 and 1650 they crisscrossed the Baikal region. As they sailed along these rivers the conquerors built *ostrogs* (forts) at various strategic locations: Tiumen in 1586, Tobolsk in 1587, Mangazeia in 1601, Tomsk in 1604, Eniseisk in 1620, Iakutsk in 1632, Okhotsk in 1649, and Irkutsk in 1652. They supplemented these and other forts (which served as centers of conquests and control) with a network of *zimovies* (literally winter quarters, but actually blockhouses), which they built at various key points.

Muscovy's conquest of northern Asia and subjugation of its peoples was the effort of seven distinct groups of people. These were: 1) the ***promyshlenniks*** (*i. e.*, entrepreneurs of all kinds, trappers and traders), who hunted and trapped fur-bearing animals and who also obtained furs from the natives through trade, extortion, theft and tribute; 2) state employees (*i. e.*, various administrative officials and military personnel) including ***streltsy*** and cossacks, who protected state interests; 3) war prisoners (Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Swedes and other Europeans, known in contemporary sources as *Litva*) dispatched to the region for safekeeping by Moscow authorities; 4) Muscovy's exiled political and religious dissenters whom local authorities often used for various assignments, including defense; 5) state peasants, craftsmen and priests, whom the government dispatched to various outposts to assist colonial administrators; 6) merchants, who went to the conquered wilderness voluntarily to seek their fortune; and 7) the ***guliashchie liudi*** (*i. e.*, runaway serfs and other social misfits and outcasts), who sought refuge in the region and who were willing and ready to join anyone on any assignment[6]. Regardless of their background or purpose, once they came to this inhospitable and far-away area many of the newcomers developed greed and a passion for adventure, with the result that some became heroes, some beasts, and some both.

From the midst of these diverse, yet numerically quite insignificant groups, emerged many leaders of the conquest. The most prominent among them were: Ermak, who in 1581 initiated Muscovy's march across the Urals; Feodor Diakov, the founder in 1601 of Mangazeia, which later served as the center that enabled the Muscovites to subdue the Samoeds, the Ostiaks and the Tungus; Peter Beketov, the organizer in 1632 of Iakutsk, which helped in gaining control of the Iakuts and in sending expeditions into the Amur Basin; Postnik Ivanov, who in 1638 reached the Indigirka River and subdued the Iukagirs; Vasilii Poiarkov, the first Russian to navigate in 1643 the length of the Amur; Erofei Khabarov, the leader, between 1649 and 1653, of two expeditions into the Amur Basin; Semen Dezhnev, the first known individual to sail, between 1647 and 1649, from Kolyma to the Pacific Ocean; and Vladimir Atlasov, the conqueror of Kamchatka[7].

These and countless other trailblazers and their followers (Russian scholars call

6) For further details see George V. Lantzeff, ***Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration*** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), pp. 47–76. For the latest Soviet outline of Russian conquest of Siberia, see A. P. Okladnikov and V. I. Shunkov, eds. ***Istoriia Sibiri*** (Leningrad: Nauka, 1968), II, pp. 25–60.

7) For additional details about these and other ***zemleprokhodtsy***, see George V. Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, ***Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750*** (Montreal-London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), pp. 127 ff.

them *zemleprokhodtsy, i. e.*, overland travellers) were simple and for the most part illiterate men. Some of them were even criminals. Yet they also were extraordinary individuals who, by chance rather than design, accomplished many "firsts". They were the first Europeans to navigate all major rivers of North Asia and to reach the Arctic Ocean at numerous points. They likewise were the first Europeans to come across many new species of animals, fish and plants of the region and to encounter many indigenous natives and to provide rough descriptions of their appearances, customs and habits. But, too, they were the first Europeans to slaughter many species of fur-bearing animals to near-extinction; the first to perpetrate genocide against those native tribes who refused to obey their orders; and the first to establish (by massive terror, slavery, exploition and every possible cunning means and device) a European colonial empire over an enormous portion of the Asian continent.

The most impressive aspect of Muscovy's conquest of northern Asia is the alacrity with which a handful of men accomplished it. Their speed can be explained by such factors as: the existence of large navigable rivers that allowed them to cover great distances in a relatively short time; the absence of any significant organized native resistance; the disunity among and the technological primitiveness of the native population; the conquerors' know-how and technological superiority; their excellent foritfications which the natives could not destroy; their skillful utilization of native guides who were familiar with local and regional geography, trails, problems, peoples and languages; the momentum of constant successes; and their bravery, brutality, cruelty, cunningness, ruthlessness and determination to survive and to succeed. The conquerors were also spurred on in their exploits by cold, hunger, rumors of the existence of fabulous Eldorados, and lust for wealth — gold, silver, precious minerals, walrus tusks, and especially furs which they obtained through the indiscriminate slaughter of animals and through the *iasak* (tribute) which they imposed on all native men between the ages of 18 and 50 (except the sick, the poor, the blind and converts to Orthodox Christianity).

When they marched across northern Asia — from the Urals to the Pacific — the Muscovites acquired not only a vast and rich territory but a great diversity of peoples, including the Ostiaks, Samoeds, Evenki, Nenets, Tungus, Iakuts, Buriats, Dauri, Koriaks, Chukchi and the Kamchadals. These and all other natives of northern Asia were very primitive technologically and often extremely hostile to one another — a situation that enabled the Muscovites to conquer, exploit and rule them with relative ease. Because of the dissimilarities of the natives, the conquerors treated each camp, settlement, or tribe differently, but whenever possible they pursued the following policy. They imposed the payment of tribute, the *iasak*, which represented both a sign of submission and allegiance to Muscovy's rule. They collected the tribute directly or with the help of native chieftains (*toions*), and, to assure regular payment as well as obedience, everywhere the conquerors instituted a hostage system. They treated the subdued natives who cooperated with the exploitative schemes reasonably well by the standards of the times, but exterminated or enslaved those who balked.

Whether they liked it or not, all natives of northern Asia were forced to accept Muscovy's rule, and as a major consequence the hitherto predominantly Orthodox and Slavic state of Muscovy was transformed, in the course of the seventeenth century, into the multinational and multicultural Eurasian Empire of Russia[8].

Until 1637 the conquest, exploitation and control of this vast, diverse and inhospitable, yet rich, Russian colony was the duty of several administrative departments in Moscow; thereafter it was under the jurisdiction of the *Sibirskii prikaz*. Because great distances between Moscow and the new colony made effective control impossible, the competence of the *Sibirskii prikaz* was limited to the appointment and dismissal of administrative colonial personnel. The most important appointee was the *voevoda* (usually a high-ranking service noble with some prior military and civilian administrative experience) who had full authority over all problems of administration. The *voevoda* was assisted by a number of lesser officials (recorders, clerks and the like) and such military units as *streltsy*, the cossacks, the deputized prisoners and even some loyal indigenous forces. Records indicate that many *voevodas* were cruel and greedy, that they greatly abused their authority, and that their arbitrariness frequently caused discontent not only among the conquered natives but among Russian units as well. To control their power and entrenchment, the authorities in Moscow limited the length of service for all *voevodas* to two years, and in some key outposts they appointed two *voevodas* so that they could keep an eye on each other's activities[9].

Throughout their sweep across northern Asia the Russians encountered little opposition to their presence, thanks to the technological primitiveness and sparsity of the indigenous population. Conditions changed, however, in the middle of the seventeenth century when the conquerors came into direct contact with the Manchu and the Chinese in the Amur Basin. Intoxicated with their earlier successes, the Russians at first refused to consider seriously Manchu-Chinese objections to their intrusion into the Amur Basin. The destruction of their fort of Albazin by a Manchu-Chinese force compelled the intruders to negotiate the frontier and other related issues. Tough bargaining produced the Treaty of Nerchinsk (August, 1689)[10]. That arrangement accomplished three basic things. It established a vague boundary between the two powers that placed the entire Amur Basin within the Manchu-Chinese sphere of influence, while the territory north of it became the Russian sphere. It placed limits,

8) For further details on the treatment of Siberian natives, see Lantzeff, ***Siberia in the Seventeenth Century***, pp. 87–115.

9) For a careful analysis of Russian administration of Siberia, see *ibid.*, pp. 33–86.

10) For a recent analysis of events leading to the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, see P. T. Iakovleva, ***Pervyi russko-kitaiskii dogovor 1689 goda*** (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1958). See also Mark Mancall, ***Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728*** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Vincent Chen, ***Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century*** (The Hague: Mouton, 1968). For a useful collection of documents on Sino-Russian relations in the seventeenth century see, ***Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVII veke. Materialy i dokumenty, 1609–1691*** (Moscow: Nauka, 1969–1972), 2 vols. See also Joseph Sebes, ***The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). The Diary of Thomas Pereira*** (Rome: 1961).

for the first time, on the Russian *Drang nach Osten.* And it laid down broad rules governing fugitives and trade between the two countries. The territorial provisions of the Treaty of Nerchinsk remained in force until the middle of the nineteenth century when the Russians altered them in their favor. The economic and other provisions were amended in Russia's favor in 1721 and again in 1768.

Although the terms of the Treaty of Nerchinsk did not mention it, the treaty nevertheless represented the culmination of a very successful century-old Russian push across a diverse and foreboding, but very rich colony. It is now apparent that this Russian colony was as rich as any of those staked out by such contemporary colonial powers of Europe as Spain, Portugal, England and France. The completion of the conquest of northern Asia set the stage for four eighteenth century Russian ventures : 1) a determined push across the North Pacific to North America : 2) a gradual penetration of the Kuriles towards Japan : 3) continued maintenance of economic interests in China ; and 4) the establishment of firm government control over the conquered region and taking of the first inventory of the area.

II. ESSENTIAL SOURCES ON RUSSIAN EXPANSION TO THE PACIFIC

Russia's sweep across northern Asia to the Pacific produced, as noted earlier, many far-reaching results. Unfortunately there is only limited written evidence about it. This seeming paradox, which is also pecular to similar headlong pushes, is easily explained. The immediate goal of the trailblazers, who crossed and subdued northern Asia, was to cover a certain distance, bring the conquered natives under Muscovy's suzerainty, collect the *iasak*, make some personal profit in the undertaking, and, above all, to survive. Since most of the *zemleprokhodtsy* were illiterate, they possessed neither the necessary means nor the interest to record the achievements of their trials and tribulations. Government officials who accompanied or followed them to establish administrative system in the conquered wilderness were often similar in outlook and action. Their contributions were essentially limited to recording, in a complex bureaucratic style in the Church Slavonic language, a few cursory de-briefing reports of selected journeys of leading trailblazers. Thus, while the Muscovites created an immense empire and made a great record of superhuman effort, they left only a very modest written evidence of their accomplishments. It should be noted, however, that some recorded evidence was irretrievably lost to natural and man-made disasters ; and that some of it is still covered with dust in various archives in the USSR and is accessible only to selected scholars.

The surviving published primary evidence on Russian expansion to the Pacific from 1580 to 1700 falls into the following categories, listed in order of their appearance, not their reliability ; 1) Oral traditions ; 2) Chronicles ; 3) Government decrees ; 4) Correspondence between central and colonial authorities ; 5) Treavel reports by the *zemleprokhodtsy* ; 6) Petitions by the *zemleprokhodtsy* and by conquered natives ; and 7) Accounts by foreigners. All of these sources must be viewed with caution because they were prepared by individuals whose knowledge of the area and of its problems was partisan, limited and inaccurate.

Oral traditions. Oral traditions (Russian and non-Russian) are the earliest sources on Muscovy's expansion to the Pacific. For obvious reasons the traditions of the victor are richer than those of the vanquished. They glorify, in songs and stories, the efforts of individual leaders as well as of groups. Ermak is portrayed not as a criminal but as a superman, a hero, a fighter for the rights of the oppressed and for the Orthodox Church. So noble and powerful did he become in the popular mind that soon many regions of the country tried to identify themselves with him in order to share his glory and his accomplishments[11]. Though unreliable, this oral tradition is important because a great deal of its content later became an integral part of the first written accounts of Muscovy's march across the Urals, which in turn influenced much of the subsequent writing and thinking about it.

Chronicles. Chronicles form the second vital set of early sources on Muscovy's push across the Urals. There exist three basic chronicles, named either after their compilers or the point of view they sought to convey. The earliest seems to be the *Esipov Chronicle,* named after Savva Esipov, a clerk in the Diocese of Tobolsk, who compiled it in 1636[12]. The actual title of his chronicle is: *O Sibiri i o sibirskom vziatii.* Obviously, his religious training and surroundings influenced the content of Esipov's work. But he also relied on the *Sinodik* (or the list of names to commemorate Ermak and his men), which had been prepared in 1622 by Kiprian, the Archbishop of Tobolsk; on the *Napisanie kako pridosha v Sibir* (a lost account reputed to have been composed about 1600 by survivors of Ermak's expedition force); and on a story (*povest*), written about 1630, entitled *O vziatii tsarstva Sibirskogo.* Esipov's chronicle abounds in references to the Bible and portrays Ermak's achievement as an act of Providence in behalf of Orthodox Christianity. It also pictures Ermak and his men as brave and virtuous individuals, and praises government leaders for building churches and cities in the conquered region. For inexplicable reasons Esipov gave no credit to the Stroganovs for their efforts in launching Muscovy's eastward drive.

Whether deliberate or not, Esipov's omission of the Stroganovs from the great story was corrected before the middle of the seventeenth century by an anonymous writer in a work entitled *O vziatii sibirskoi zemli.* Like Esipov, in compiling his work this author relied on oral traditions and on earlier written accounts which have not been preserved. And he also incorporated into his account the Stroganovs'

11) For a succinct statement in English on Ermak as a folk hero, see Terence Armstrong, ed. ***Yermak's Campaign in Siberia*** (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1975), pp. 13–18. This work includes translations of three basic chronicles: the Esipov, Stroganov and Remezov.

12) The ***Esipov Chronicle*** was discovered by historian G. F. Müller during his ten-year sojourn in Siberia as a member of the Second Kamchatka Expedition. Its full text was first published in 1824 by Grigorii I. Spasskii in the ***Sibirskii vestnik*** (No. 1), and republished in 1849 by P. I. Nebolsin as an appendix to his work, ***Pokorenie Sibiri*** (St. Petersburg: 1849), and in ***Otechestvennye Zapiski*** (vol. 63).

"papers" and evidence he secured from government sources. His story credits the tsar, the church, and the cossacks. But, in the final analysis the Stroganovs emerge as the real heroes behind Ermak's undertaking — an emphasis that caused historian N. M. Karamzin to name this the *Stroganov Chronicle*[13]. In this work the Stroganovs act as loyal subjects of the tsar. They outfit the cossacks on their trans-Ural journey to defend the country's eastern frontiers. And their successes over the Tatars are explained as products of the bravery of the men and their technological superiority.

The third chronicle is the *Remezov Chronicle,* composed in the late seventeenth century and named after its compiler Semen U. Remezov. Remezov was a minor government official in Tobolsk, who undertook numerous assignments in different parts of Siberia. On his journeys he assembled information from various sources, including earlier chronicles, interviews, and accounts of Siberian natives. He incorporated this material into a story which portrays Muscovy's conquest of Siberia as a triumph of Christianity over non-Christians and Ermak and his men as missionaries. Their lives before their mission are depicted as having been "sinful", and then "saintly" after they undertook their assignment. Remezov accords the Stroganovs a supporting role in the undertaking, and pictures them as providers of the necessities and of weapons for Ermak's cossacks. However he gives the government full credit for providing the final material aid which tipped the scale in Muscovy's favor[14].

One version of the *Remezov Chronicle* contains several inserts, written on a different kind of paper. This version is now known as the *Kungur Chronicle,* so named because it was apparently composed in the town of Kungur. No one knows who wrote it, but it was done before 1734 when Müller discovered it. The *Kungur Chronicle* differs from its predecessors (including the *Remezov Chronicle*) in content and style. It quotes the well-known written sources (although not always accurately), and cites native and Russian legends and stories. The *Kungur Chronicle* seems to have served as the basis of a work published in 1761, entitled *Istoriia o rodoslovii, bogatstve i otechestvennykh zapiskakh znamenitoi familii Stroganovykh.*

In addition to those already named, there exist two other chronicle-type works: The *New Chronicle* and the *Opisanie novoi zemli Sibirskogo gosudarstva.* The *New Chronicle,* which covers events between 1580 and 1630, relies on earlier chronicles and official documents and glorifies the Romanovs, the "rightful" heirs to the Riurikides. The *Opisanie,* in the opinion of most scholars, was written between 1685 and 1695 by Nikifor Veniukov, an official of the *Sibirskii prikaz,* upon his return from a mission to China. This work contains several official documents, Russian and native legends (similar to those in the *Kungur Chronicle*), and some geographic and

13) The *Stroganov Chronicle* was discovered early in the nineteenth century in the library of Count S. G. Stroganov by Grigorii I. Spasskii, who published it in 1821 in the *Sibirskii vestnik* (Nos. 13 and 14). It was republished in 1849 by P. I. Nebolsin in *Pokorenie Sibiri* (St. Petersburg: 1849).

14) Historian G. F. Müller discovered the *Remezov Chronicle* in Tobolsk in 1734 and subsequently used it in writing his classic work *Opisanie Sibirskogo tsarstva* (1750) which was republished in 1937 as *Istoriia Sibiri.*

ethnographic data.

The first to take notice of Siberian chronicles was Vasilii N. Tatishchev, "the father of Russian history". It was, however, Gerhard F. Müller, "the father of Siberian history," who began collecting them systematically during his ten-year sojourn in Siberia as a member of the Academy of Sciences on the Second Kamchatka Expedition (1733–1743). In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries other expeditions and scholars discovered new variants of Siberian chronicles as well as some additional material. Publication of Siberian chronicles was very slow. Müller suggested the idea in 1749 but received no support for it. In 1774–75 N. N. Novikov published a summary of Siberian chronicles, but not the chronicles themselves, in the *Drevniaia Rossiiskaia Vivliofika*, First edition, Parts VI and VII. His failure, however, to identify the author and to provide other pertinent information aroused considerable subsequent discussion among scholars. It was only in 1791 that the first Siberian chronicle appeared in print in the *Prodolzheniia Drevnei Rossiiskoi Vivliofiki* (Part VII).

Interest in history, generated early in the nineteenth century by romanticism and other forces, rekindled the idea of systematic collection and publication of material on Russian history in general and on Siberian in particular. The greatest single contibutors in that direction were Count Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, who sparked the interest and provided financial aid, and Grigorii I. Spasskii who, in the 1820 s published the Stroganov and the Esipov chronicles, among others. Their appearance and the discovery of other chronicle variants attracted the attention of scholars, and in 1841 a proposal was submitted to the government to collect and publish all Siberian chronicles. Emperor Nicholas I assigned the task to the recently organized Imperial Archeographic Commission. The latter agreed to do it at an appropriate time. That time came only in 1870 when the Commission assigned the task to one of its members, P. V. Pavlov. Pavlov worked eight years on the project, but failed to complete it. The Commission then assigned the responsibility to L. N. Maikov. His efforts were greatly hindered by the lack of funds. A gift by a St. Petersburg merchant made possible the appearance in 1880, through a photolithographic process, of only the *Remezov Chronicle*. The tricentennial of Ermak's trans-Ural odyssey regenerated some interest in Siberian history, but it brought no new funds. Maikov continued to work on the project until his death in 1900, and finished everything except the introduction. It took, however, an additional seven years for the Commission to process its own paper work before Maikov's labors were made available to scholars under the title of *Sibirskie letopisi*.

The *Sibirskie letopisi* contain the texts of seven versions of the Esipov, three versions of the Stroganov, one version of the Remezov chronicles, and a version of the *New Chronicle*. In 1914 S. F. Platonov and P. G. Vlasenko published the text of the *New Chronicle* in the *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (vol. 14). Currently Soviet scholars of the Academy of Sciences, Siberian Branch at Novosibirsk, and those at the Institute of History in Moscow are preparing for publication in one single set all existing versions of Siberian chronicles.

Because they alone have had access to the available material, Russian and Soviet scholars have, over the years, subjected the Siberian chronicles to careful scrutiny with the result that there has emerged a sizeable and controversial literature. The controversy revolves around the relationship of various chronicles to each other and the dates of their composition. Several nineteenth century Russian scholars (including G. I. Spasskii, N. M. Karamzin, and S. M. Soloviev) maintained that the *Stroganov Chronicle* was the oldest. Their views were later upheld by L. N. Maikov, the principal compiler of the Siberian chronicles[15]. This view was challenged in 1849 by P. I. Nebolsin, who suggested, on the basis of two new manuscripts, that the Stroganov and the Esipov chronicles relied on two earlier sources[16]. Late in the nineteenth century S. A. Andrianov insisted that the *Sinodik* was the source for the Esipov and that the Esipov was the source for the Stroganov chronicles[17]. This view was later upheld by a leading Soviet scholar A. I. Andreev[18]. Another leading Soviet expert, S. V. Bakhrushin, rejected this contention and suggested instead that the Siberian chronicles had a common source, which has not been preserved and which he called "Napisanie"[19]. D. S. Likhachev, another Soviet scholar, has advanced the view that the prime promoter and the principal source of Siberian chronicles was Kiprian, the Archbishop of Tobolsk[20]. While each of these views has some merit, none is fully convincing. And sooner or later there will appear new suggestions aimed at solving the riddle.

Government decrees. Another important reservoir of information on the Russian sweep to the Pacific consists of diverse types of government-issued documents. One vital category is composed of government decrees. These include official policy statements, treaties, important instructions and like material. This material was issued by the tsar or in his name by the appropriate *prikaz*. The language of these documents is Church Slavonic, the sentence structure bureaucratic — a combination that makes reading slow and painful. Early in the nineteenth century, legal experts of the Second Department of His Imperial Chancery, under the direction of Michael M. Speranskii, assembled in chronological order and published these and other documents pertaining to Russian history in a collection known as the *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, First Series (1649–1825). The first four volumes of this fifty-five volume set deal with the seventeenth century. Official statements that were issued before 1649 can be found in the *Polnoe Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogo-*

15) L. N. Maikov, "Khronologicheskie spravki po povodu 300–letnei godovshchiny prisoedineniia Sibiri k Russkoi derzhave", *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia*, (1881), No. 9.
16) Nebolsin, *op. cit.*
17) S. A. Andrianov, "K voprosu o pokorenii Sibirii", *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia*, (1893), No. 4.
18) A. I. Andreev, *Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri. XVII vek.* 2nd edition (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1960).
19) S. V. Bakhrushin, *Nauchnye trudy* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1955), vol. III.
20) D. S. Likhachev, *Russkie letopisi i ikh kulturno-istoricheskoe znachenie* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1947).

vorov (Moscow : 1813–1894), 5 volumes.

Correspondence. Another category of government documents consists of correspondence between officials in Moscow and those in Siberia. This category is quite voluminous, for the correspondence involves several lines of communication. It includes instructions from the *Sibirskii prikaz* to *voevodas* in Siberia; reports from the *voevodas* to various authorities in Moscow; instructions from the *voevodas* to their subordinates; and reports from those subordinates to their superiors. Until about the middle of the eighteenth century, some of this material was located in the *Siberskii prikaz* in Moscow, and some collected dust in various administrative outposts throughout Siberia. All this changed, thanks to the efforts of Müller. During ten years of travels in Siberia, as a representative of the Academy of Sciences during the Second Kamchatka Expedition, Müller examined thousands of documents in various stages of decomposition in over twenty local archives. He personally inspected and copied many documents; others were copied for him by local scribes. According to V. S. Ikonnikov, Müller's efforts resulted in thirty nine portfolios[21]. Following his appointment in 1766 as head of the archives of the College of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, Müller enriched his portfolios through his control of material in the *Sibirskii* and the *Razriadnyi prikazes* and through donations of sources by many of his friends. No one knows what Müller's portfolios actually contain because no one has thoroughly studied their content[22]. This much is certain. Because some of the archives he had copied were subsequently destroyed, Müller's portfolios are the only surviving evidence. In his lifetime, Müller published a good number of his finds in three principal works; 1) *Opisanie Sibirskogo tsarstva* ... (St. Petersburg: 1750); 2) *Ezhemesiachnye Sochineniia,* a monthly journal Müller edited between 1755 and 1764; and 3) *Sammlung der Russischer Geschichte* (St. Petersburg-Dorpat: 1732–1816), 10 volumes.

Müller's portfolios have served as a basic reservoir for several documentary collections on Siberia. These, in order of their appearance, include: N. N. Novikov, ed. *Drevniaia Rossiiskaia Vivliofika* ... 2 nd edition (Moscow : 1788–1791), 20 volumes; Arkheograficheskaia Kommissiia, *Akty istoricheskie* ... (St. Petersburg : 1836), 4 volumes, and *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim* ... (St. Petersburg: 1846–1872), 12 volumes; A. A. Titov, ed. *Sibir v XVII veke : Sbornik starinnykh statei o Sibiri i prilezhashchikh k nei zemliam* (Moscow : 1890); I. P. Kuznetsov-Krasnoiarskii, ed., *Istoricheskie akty XVII stoletiia, 1633–1699 : Materialy dlia istorii Sibiri* (Tomsk: 1890–97), 2 volumes; A. P. Alkor and B. D. Grekov, eds. *Kolonialnaia politika moskovskogo*

21) See *Opyt russkoi istoriografii* (Kiev: 1891), vol. I, Book 1, p. 120.

22) There are several brief analyses of Müller's life and achievements. The best eighteenth-century account is by A. Büsching, *Beyträge zu der Lebensgeschichte denkwürdiger Personnen* ... (Halle: 1785), III, pp. 1–160. A nineteenth century treatment is by N. N. Golitsyn, *Portfeli G. F. Millera* (Moscow: 1899). Twentieth century statements include S. V. Bakhrushin, "G. F. Miller kak istorik Sibiri", in G. F. Miller, *Istoriia Sibiri* (Moscow: 1937), I, pp. 3–55; A. I. Andreev, "Trudy G. F. Millera o Sibiri", in *ibid.*, pp. 59–165; and A. I. Andreev, *Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri. XVIII vek (Pervaia polovina)* (Moscow-Leningrad: 1965), pp. 73–164.

gosudarstva v Iakutii v XVII veke: *Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov* (Leningrad: 1936); N. S. Orlova, ed. *Otkrytiia russkikh zemleprokhodtsev i poliarnykh morekhodov XVII veka: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: 1951); and G. N. Rumiantsev and S. B. Okun, eds. *Sbornik dokumentov po istorii Buriatii: XVII vek* (Ulan-Ude: 1960). Many documents from Müller's portfolios have also appeared in such journals as: *Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete: Russkaia Starina; Russkii Arkhiv; Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia; Krasnyi Arkhiv, Istoricheskie Zapiski*, and others.

Travel reports. These and similar source collections[23] also contain the fifth category of primary material on the Russian push across norhern Asia — travel reports, or debriefings of selected members (usually leaders) of the expedition upon their return from a mission. The debriefings were done in important *ostrogs* by the *voevoda* and his clerks who then forwarded vital information to the *Sibirskii prikaz* in Moscow and kept other information in their own files. These debriefings are quite informative. But they also must be used with caution. They seem to be fairly reliable when they deal with the area the *zemleprokhodtsy* actually visited, things they saw, and dangers they encountered. They are vague and unreliable when they describe places and people they only heard about from the natives. Also imprecise is the system of measuring distances between various points. All distances are presented in terms of days or weeks of walking or drifting on a raft or in a boat. While this information is highly imprecise by present-day standards, the seventeenth century Muscovites put it to good use. They not only organized new forays into the inhospitable wilderness in search of new inhabitants to pay the *iasak*, but they even prepared rough maps of various regions of the colony. An exception to the dull and imprecise reports of the *zemleprokhodtsy* is a highly readable and informative account by Archpriest Avvakum, who spent several years in exile in Siberia for his "un-orthodox" religious convictions[24].

Petitions. The sixth category of material on the Russian march to the Pacific consists of petitions. There are actually two types of petitions: those submitted by the *zemleprokhodtsy* to authorities in Moscow or to colonial officials in Siberia; and those submitted by the conquered natives to the same authorities. Petitions submitted by the *zemleprokhodtsy* include requests for tax exemptions, pleas for supplies and back pay, and appeals for permission to go into the wilderness to bring new natives under Muscovite control. They also include grievances against the brutality of their own leaders and of local officials and complaints against other trailblazers[25]. Petitions by the conquered natives include pleas to lower the assessment of the *iasak*, complaints

23) For a listing of additional collections, see V. I. Mezhov, *Sibirskaia bibliografiia...* (St. Petersburg: 1903), 3 volumes in two; and Robert J. Kerner, *Northeastern Asia: A Selected Bibliography:* (Berkeley: 1939), 2 volumes.

24) See his *Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma im samim napisanoe...* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1960).

25) Some of these petitions come from the *Tamozhnye knigi*. The *knigi* are fairly complete for the years 1625 to 1717 and they provide good information on the mobility of Russian personnel in Siberia. Unfortunately only limited material from this source has been published to date.

against local officials for excessive demands of bribes, and requests for protection against other natives[26]. These petitions, Russian and native, are very important because official failure to respond satisfactorily to them often sparked violent upheavals, caused desertions and mass flights, and brought on other complications. Thus far, no attempt has been made to assemble these petitions, scattered throughout various publications, into one single volume.

Foreign accounts. The final category of sources on Russian expansion to the Pacific from 1580 to 1700 consists of foreign accounts by contemporary European visitors to or interested observers of the Russian conquest of Siberia. In volume this category is very modest. Its quality, however, is fairly high. The first foreign visitor was Iurii Krizhanich, a highly educated Croatian Jesuit priest who spent fifteen years in exile in Tobolsk (1661–1676). In Siberia, Krizhanich met other fellow-prisoners, *zemleprokhodtsy*, local officials and natives. This experience resulted in two works: *Politika: Ili besedy o pravleni* — a major philosophical and political analysis of politics, economics, justice and society in general, which he wrote in Tobolsk (1663–1666); and *Istoriia Sibiri, ili svedeniia o tsarstvakh Sibiri i ledovitogo i vostochnogo okeana ...* which he wrote in 1680 upon his return from exile, for a Danish diplomat who helped him to leave Moscow. Krizhanich credited Ermak's success to Ivan IV's tyranny; to the historical assistance he received from the Stroganovs; to the bold efforts of his men; and to timely assistance from the government. *Istoriia Sibiri* is an original work. It provides information on resources, climate, communication, trade and population, both native and Russian. There is also some history. Krizhanich justified Ermak's initial foray across the Urals by defensive considerations. But he deplored subsequent Russian excesses against and exploitation of the conquered natives and criticized the Russians for their intoxication with successes and for their insatiable appetite for new territories. He thought that this appetite was bound to lead to a clash with China[27].

The second European to leave an account of Siberia was Nicolai G. Milescu (also known as Spafarii or Spathary), a Moldavian-Greek adventurer, who journeyed across Siberia in 1675–78 as Russian envoy to China. Diplomatically Milescu's mission was a failure because, on instructions from Moscow officials, he made unrealistic demands on the Chinese. His journey, however, produced the first lengthy description of the road between Tobolsk and Peking (via Lake Baikal and Seleginsk). In sharp contrast to the lively style of Krizhanich's writings or that of Avvakum, Milescu's report is dull. It lists all settlements, rivers, mountains and natural landmarks in the manner the Muscovite *diaks* liked to list. It is possible that Milescu's travel

26) The *iasachnye knigi* form an excellent supplement to native petitions. They contain information on the amount of the *iasak* each tribe was forced to deliver, the location of each tribe, and its numerical strength. This material is currently kept in the Central State Archive of Ancient Acts in Moscow.

27) The best biography of Krizhanich is that by V. Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića* (Zagreb: 1917). For his work on Siberia, see A. A. Titov, ed. *Sibir v XVII veke* (Moscow: 1890), pp. 115–216.

journal was actually kept by an anonymous *diak* from the *Posolskii prikaz*, who accompanied him on his mission. This possibility gains weight when one compares the style of Milescu's journal with his description of China (Milescu's other book) and with his negotiation tactics[28].

The third seventeenth century European who produced a work dealing with Russian Siberia was Nicholas C. Witsen, a well-to-do, well-educated and well-travelled mayor of Amsterdam. Witsen spent several years in Russia as a Dutch diplomat in the late 1660's and early 1670's. During his stay there he travelled to the Urals and to the Caspian Sea. He also studied Russian life and made many friends with high officials who supplied him with diverse information. In 1692 this experience and the assembled information resulted in the volume *Nord en Oost Tartarye*, which was republished in 1705 and again in 1785. The success and value of Witsen's work stemmed from the fact that it was based on documentary evidence. It included valuable data on geography, ethnography and linguistics for the area stretching from the Volga to the Pacific. Through this work, as well as his translation of a report by Feodor Baikov on Baikov's journey to Peking in 1654, Witsen emerged as the first conveyor to western Europe of fairly reliable information about Russia's Asian possessions, problems, and potential.

The following brief resume of published source material on Russian expansion to the Pacific from 1580 to 1700 leads to two interesting conclusions. The first is that, judged by the sheer number of edited collections, the volume of published material is rather large. Close scrutiny of the content of that material indicates, however, that the actual volume is quite small. This paradox can easily be explained. The initial conquerors and their immediate followers, as noted earlier, left limited written evidence about their activities since most of them were simple and illiterate men of action. Moreover, many documents were irretrievably lost to natural and man-made disasters. Those that did survive have been stored in carefully controlled archives and scholars have been allowed only limited access to them. All evidence indicates that Imperial officials (especially those before 1880) were more liberal in issuing access permits than their Soviet counterparts have been. This situation has resulted in the proliferation of "new" documentary collections that, as a rule, include previously published material along with one or two originals (*podlinnik*). This state of affairs is both unhealthy and abnormal. It also is a detriment to the pursuit of knowledge and learning. Let us hope that this anomalous situation will change soon, perhaps in our lifetime.

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28) For the text of Milescu's works, see Iu. V. Arsenev, ed., "Puteshestvie chrez Sibir ot Tobolska do Nerchinska i granits Kitaia russkogo poslannika Nikolaia Spafariia v 1675 godu..." in *Zapiski imperatorskogo russkogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu etnografii*, vol. X, No. 1 (1882), pp. 1-214; and "Stateinyi spisok posolstva N. Spafariia v Kitai", *Vestnik arkheologii i istorii*, vol. XVII, Pt. 2 (1906), pp. 162-339. For a recent analysis of Milescu's mission, see Mancall, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-110.

Basil Dmytryshyn

III. CRUCIAL STUDIES CONCERNING RUSSIAN EXPANSION TO THE PACIFIC, 1580-1700

Genuine scholarly interest in Russian expansion to the Pacific started about the middle of the eighteenth century. Since then, although the interest has been quite erratic, a fairly large body of monographic and periodical literature in many languages has accumulated. It is beyond the scope of this essay to analyze the existing literature on this problem. Such an undertaking, though tempting and desirable, would require hundreds, perhaps thousands of pages. Instead, this brief review will limit itself to presenting the selected works of the most influential scholars in Russian and English. For the sake of space and clarity, this essay will first survey the basic works by Russian and Soviet scholars and then summarize those that have appeared in English.

There is a nearly unanimous consensus among scholars that Gerhard Friedrich Müller (1705–1783) initiated the true scholarly interest in Russian expansion to the Pacific; indeed that he was the "father of Siberian history"[29]. Born and educated in Germany, Müller went to Russia in 1725. He soon mastered the language and as a member of the Second Kamchatka Expedition travelled extensively throughout Siberia from 1733 to 1743, examining and gathering historical, geographic, ethnographic and linguistic material for the Academy of Sciences. All students of Siberian history and of Russian expansion to the Pacific have, over the years tapped the material that Müller salvaged. Indeed, Müller himself was the first scholar to make use of it in writing the first comprehensive history of Siberia, entitled *Opisanie Sibirskogo tsarstva i vsekh proisshedshikh v nem del ot nachala, a osoblivo ot pokoreniia ego Rossiiskoi derzhave po sie vremena ...*

Müller encountered many obstacles in making his work available to the public. The first volume was ready in 1748, but it was released only in 1750. The delay was ordered by the *Kantseliariia* of the Academy in response to anti-Müller charges by his jealous colleagues. The academic censors not only deleted some passages, but replaced Müller's introduction with their own. The final product consisted of five chapters that brought the account to the early seventeenth century. While annoying, these obstacles did not slow Müller's writing. In December 1751, the academic censors approved chapters VI-XI and in 1752 chapters XII-XXII. But, although approved for publication, these chapters did not appear in book-form. Between 1755 and 1764, Müller published selected passages from them (along with other material) in his journal *Ezhemesiachnye sochineniia*, and he also included much of that material in his *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte* (vols. VI and VIII). Pressed by other commitments, Müller then discontinued his work on Siberian history. In December, 1752, the Academy selected Johann Eberhard Fischer (1697–1771) to complete Müller's work and in February, 1753, Müller gave him twenty-three completed chapters.

29) This view is not shared by some Soviet scholars who argue that this honor belongs to S. U. Remezov, a petty seventeenth century Russian official in Siberia, who prepared a map of Siberia and who composed the *Remezov Chronicle*. See V. G. Mirzoev, *Istoriografiia Sibiri* (Moscow: 1970), pp. 31–36.

While he never finished it, Müller's *Opisanie Sibirskogo tsarstva* remains classic. Its value centers in its scope, in its loyal reliance on sources, in its methodology, in its incorporation of Russian and native Siberian folklore, in its attention to archeology and customs, in its rejection of speculations and doubtful hypotheses; in short, in its comprehensiveness and modern scholarship. Because it was the first clearly documented scholarly treatment, albeit skeletal, Müller's work set the standard for subsequent research on all aspects of Russian expansion to the Pacific and remained the indispensable guide for all future scholarship on the problem[30].

Selection of Fischer to complete Müller's work was both good and bad. Good because there was no one else qualified to do it; and bad because he was himself poorly qualified to undertake it. Born in Würtemberg, Fischer came to Russia in 1733 to teach Latin, his specialty, at the Academy's gymnasium. In 1739, the Academy dispatched him to Siberia to replace the ailing Müller. Fischer stayed in Siberia until 1747, but accomplished very little. He maintained the same record of achievement for the years 1747 to 1752. Fischer took Müller's material and by 1757 he had condensed it, rearranged it, and partially updated it. It was published in 1768 in two volumes entitled *Sibirische Geschichte von der Entdeckung Sibiriens bis auf Eroberung dieses Landes durch die russische Waffen*... A Russian translation of this work appeared in 1774. According to A. N. Pypin and other scholars, Fischer paraphrased ten of Müller's chapters for three-fourths of his work and appropriated the rest from Müller's unpublished material[31].

Scholarly interest in Russian expansion to the Pacific increased appreciably in the nineteenth century, thanks chiefly to the publication of many sources on diverse aspects of the problem and to the appearance on the scene of many qualified scholars ready and willing to interpret the available material. The first to make a substantial contribution was P. A. Slovtsov (1767-1843). Son of a priest, Slovtsov was born in Perm gubernia, and was educated in the Alexander Nevskii Theological Seminary in St. Petersburg. He became a historian of Russian expansion to the Pacific by accident, not by training. Shortly after receiving his first teaching assignment in Tobolsk, Slovtsov was arrested for making a critical remark about the monarchial system of government. Because the charges against him were weak, and because he promised not to repeat his mistakes, he was freed and allowed to enter government service. In 1808 Slovtsov's career came to a sudden end when he was accused of misappropriating government funds. He was arrested and banished to Siberia where he spent the rest of his life as a school principal, first in Tobolsk and then in Irkutsk.

The new assingnment enabled Slovtsov to travel a great deal and to gather information on the history of his involuntarily-adopted region. Between 1828 and 1838, Slovtsov published numerous articles on various topics of Siberian history in such news-

30) There are three excellent assessments of Müller's contributions. Büsching, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 1-160; Bakhrushin, "G. F. Miller kak istorik Sibiri", in Miller, *Istoriia Sibiri*, I, pp. 3-55; and Andreev, *Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri, XVIII vek (Pervaia polovina)*, pp. 73-164.

31) A. N. Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi etnografii: Belorussia i Sibir* (St. Petersburg: 1892), IV, p. 350; see also Bakhrushin, *Nauchnye trudy*, III, p. 62.

papers and journals as *Moskovskii Telegraf*, *Kazanskie Izvestiia*, *Sibirskii Vestnik* and *Vestnik Evropy*. In 1838 came the first volume of his monumental work *Istoricheskoe obozrenie Sibiri s 1585 do 1742 g.* (Moscow: 1838); the second volume, covering the years 1742 to 1823, was published in St. Petersburg in 1844. Slovtsov's work is complex. On the one hand it is embroidered with moral, religious and eighteenth-century rationalistic precepts. At the same time, it includes a great deal of common sense and candid personal observations. Its chief value centers in its attempt to present the positive role the government and the church played in Russian colonization from the Urals to the Pacific. Because Slovtsov was not a trained scholar and because he had limited access to sources, his style is awkward, his arguments weak, and his documentation inadequate. But while it has many shortcomings and errors, Slovtsov's work is very important because, as the first major study since Müller, it sought to explore many new issues and in doing so it spurred scholarly interest in Russian expansion to the Pacific. Its worth is best illustrated by the fact that it was republished in 1886[32].

After Slovtsov, in the course of the nineteenth century, many Russian scholars as well as publicists explored the complex problems of Russian expansion to the Pacific. Space will permit brief examination only of the works of one publicist, M. N. Iadrintsev (1842–1894), and of two scholars: P. N. Butsinskii (1853–1916) and N. N. Ogloblin (1852–?). Iadrintsev was born in Omsk and educated at Tomsk gymnasium and the University of St. Petersburg during the great student unrest in the early 1860's. There, he joined other students from Siberia in forming a "Siberian student club" interested in such Siberian problems as improved education, collection of ethnographic material, access to local archives, and the local press. Because officials interpreted Iadrintsev's interest in these matters as a manifestation of "Siberian separatism," he was arrested in 1863 and exiled to Archangel where he remained until 1874. While in exile, Iadrintsev wrote his first work, *Russkaia obshchina v tiurme i ssylke* (St. Petersburg: 1872) an indictment of the tsarist exile system. Upon his release in 1874, Iadrintsev wrote numerous articles for newspapers and journals, and, between 1876 and 1881, he participated in several surveys in Siberia to collect economic and ethnographic data. In 1882 he published his major work *Sibir kak koloniia. K iubileiu trekhstoletiia. Sovremennoe polozhenie Sibiri. Eia nuzhdy i potrebnosti. Eia proshloe i budushchee.* That same year, Iadrintsev founded a very influential weekly *Vostochnoe Obozrenie*. Later, he turned his interest to the indigenous population of Siberia which resulted in a new work entitled *Sibirskie inorodtsy, ikh byt i sovremennoe polozhenie* (St. Petersburg: 1891). Just before his death, Iadrintsev took part in an archeological expedition that discovered the ruins of Genghis Khan's capital, Kara Korum.

There is no doubt that Iadrintsev pursued many interests, and that he raised many legitimate questions. He advanced, for example, the idea that the natural

32) For a concise statement on Slovtsov, see Pypin, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 354–58; Bakhrushin, *Nauchnye trudy*, III, pp. 64–68; and Mirzoev, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–81.

environment of Siberia and the mingling between Russian colonists and Siberian natives produced a new type of individual known as the *Sibiriak*. He condemned the exile system and Moscow's exploitation of Siberia's natural resources. And, finally, he sought to clarify the future development of his native region. Obviously, Iadrintsev did not resolve these and other questions. But, by raising them, he forced other students of Russian expansion to the Pacific to examine them at some length[33].

Another careful nineteenth century student of Russian expansion to the Pacific was Butsinskii. A graduate, and later professor of Kharkov University, Butsinskii sought to understand the process of Russian expansion through the activity of Russian settlers in the new colony, and then through an in-depth study of administrative regions. The first approach resulted in a work entitled *Zaselenie Sibiri i byt ee pervykh naselnikov* (Kharkov : 1889). In this well-documented study Butsinskii advanced several novel ideas. He argued, for example, that since the government had built cities, villages, and churches and had organized the entire administrative apparatus, the credit for subduing Siberia belonged properly to the government and not to private entrepreneurs. Butsinskii also insisted that the Russians conquered Siberia peacefully, and that they hurt or misplaced only a very few natives. Throughout his work he praised tsarist policy and attributed mistakes or failures to temporary unfamiliarity by officials in Moscow with problems of the newly conquered periphery.

Butsinskii's other in-depth study of various regions resulted in two major works: *Mangazeia i mangazeiskii uezd, 1601–1645 gg.* (Kharkov: 1893), and *K istorii Sibiri: Surgut, Narym i Ketsk do 1645 g.* (Kharkov: 1893). In writing these books, he examined many sources. Unfortunately both works contain gaps and flaws. These seem to have been caused by the enormity of the task that no single individual was capable of completing in a lifetime, and by his apparently careless reading of some sources. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Butsinskii's regional approach was sound, and his pioneering effort inspired many subsequent scholars to follow in his footsteps[34].

The last true nineteenth century groundbreaker for the study of Russian expansion to the Pacific was Ogloblin. Educated in the Theological Seminary in Kiev and in the Areheological Institute in St. Petersburg, Ogloblin spent most of his life as chief archivist of the Ministry of Justice, then the prime depository of material of the *Sibirskii* and of the *Razriadnyi prikazes*. Through his long association with these archives Ogloblin became familiar with their content, and using this hitherto untapped reservoir of source material he wrote numerous articles for such journals as *Russkaia Starina, Istoricheskii Vestnik, Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, Chteniia, Bibliograf*, and *Knigovedenie*. In these studies Ogloblin provided fresh information on the exploits of such *zemleprokhodtsy* as Dezhnev, Stadukhin and Atlasov; revealed the underlying motives behind various uprisings against brutality,

33) For a succinct treatment of Iadrintsev, see Pypin, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 373–77; and Mirzoev, *op. cit.*, pp. 301–20.

34) For additional material on Butsinskii, see Bakhrushin, *Nauchnye, trudy*, III, p. 69; and Mirzoev, *op. cit.*, pp. 360–7.

oppression and hardships; and detailed little-known episodes about individuals who subdued for Russia an enormous wilderness of northern Asia.

Ogloblin's monumental work, however, for which he is most remembered, is his *Obozrenie stolbtsov i knig sibirskogo prikaza, 1592–1768* (St. Petersburg: 1895–1901). This epoch-making study, for which he received a premium from the Academy of Sciences, consists of four parts. Part I provides information on the administration of the *voevodstvos*; Part II deals with custom collections; Part III concerns itself with relations between Moscow officials and their subordinates in Siberia; and Part IV analyzes the nature and operation of the central administration in Moscow. Because for the first time it revealed the existence of very rich material, Ogloblin's *Obozrenie* instantly emerged as the basic guide for all scholars interested in Siberia and in Russian expansion to the Pacific[35].

The quantity of twentieth century research on Russian expansion to the Pacific has been overwhelming. The same cannot be said of its quality. This is due chiefly to the fact that since 1917 Soviet scholars have been pressured to adhere in their works not only to Marxist ideas but also to the current interpretation of those ideas by the men in power. Under V. I. Lenin, and for a few years after his death, in accordance with his criticism of imperialism, it was fashionable to condemn tsarist colonial policies, to expose their negative aspects, and to sympathize with the indigenous Siberian population. Under J. V. Stalin, on the other hand, it became mandatory to emphasize the positive role the Russians had played and to be silent about or to minimize their excesses. Since Stalin's death the official line has stressed common interests between Russian and non-Russian peoples of Siberia and the voluntary merger between them. These politically mandated shifts have affected not only the direction but the substance and the quality of research. Yet, notwithstanding these limitations Soviet scholars have produced many valuable studies.

The towering figure among Soviet experts on Russian expansion to the Pacific was Sergei Vladimirovich Bakhrushin (1882–1950). A graduate of Moscow University, where he studied under Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, Bakhrushin published his first wok on Siberia in 1916[36]. Subsequently he wrote over forty scholarly and popular items on Siberia. The content of this material reveals that his interest in Siberian history revolved around sources, historiography, Siberian natives, and Russian colonial policy. Bakhrushin's best known work is the *Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVI i XVII vekakh* (Moscow: 1927). He intended to transform this skeletal structure into a more comprehensive work and, in pursuit of that goal, wrote numerous articles, some of which became classics. Bakhrushin, however, never fulfilled his ambition. It is possible that this failure stemmed from the political climate under Stalin. But

35) For additional information on Ogloblin, see Bakhrushin, *Nauchnye trudy*, III, pp. 69–70, and Mirzoev, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–82. For inexplicable reasons a recently published survey of Russian historiography does not mention Ogloblin. See, V. E. Illeritskii and I. A. Kurdiavtsev, *Istoriografiia istorii SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do velikoi oktiabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi revolutsii* (Moscow: 1961).

36) "Tuzemnye legendy v 'Sibirskoi istorii S. Remezova'", *Istoricheskie Izvestiia* (1916), No. 3–4.

it is also conceivable that, when he became fully familiar with the problem and the available sources, Bakhrushin concluded that such an undertaking was beyond the capability of one individual.

In addition to being a productive scholar, Bakhrushin for many years was also an active professor at Moscow University and at the Institute of Peoples of the North in Leningrad. In both places he trained many new Sibirologists. For his scholarly endeavors, in 1939 he was elected a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and later received several medals. In recognition of his services, on April 28, 1950, the Council of Ministers of the USSR ordered the Academy of Sciences to publish his selected works. These appeared in four volumes entitled *Nauchnye trudy* (Moscow: 1952–55). The editors of this tribute, unfortunately, failed to include several important works by Bakhrushin, including his superb assessment of Müller as an historian. And they also criticized him, editorially and in footnotes, for his overestimation of Müller, for his exaggeration of the role the merchants and the *promyshlenniks* had played in Russian conquest of Siberia, for his failure to understand the proper function the government and the common Russian people had played, and for his alleged inability to appreciate properly benefits the Siberian natives had received from their Russian conquerors. Bakhrushin's own works are the best answer to these charges[37].

Another leading Soviet scholar of Siberia and of Russian expansion to the Pacific was Alexander Ignatievich Andreev (1887–1959). Born and educated in St. Petersburg, Andreev's scholarly outlook was shaped by his two principal mentors: A. S. Lappo-Danilevskii and A. E. Presniakov, eminent scholars of the pre-Petrine period of Russian history. With Lappo-Danilevskii's help, in 1913 Andreev started his life-long association with the Academy of Sciences, in various departments and capacities, first in the Academy's Permanent Historical Commission, then with the Archeographic Commission and, finally, in the Institute of History. During his 45-year long, distinguished career, he also worked in the archives of the Ministry of Communication; lectured at the University of Leningrad; researched in Moscow; and spent four years in the Krasnoiarsk region of Siberia.

Andreev's scholarly interest falls into two distinct periods. Until the early 1930's, he centered his attention on Muscovy and Novgorod. Thereafter, the problems of Siberia and of Russian expansion to the Pacific preoccupied him. With Bakhrushin, he edited two volumes of Müller's *Istoriia Sibiri* (Moscow: 1937), for which he wrote two lengthy aricles, "Trudy G. F. Millera o Sibiri" and "Obzor rukopisei G. F. Millera po istorii, geografii, etnografii i iazykam narodov Sibiri khraniashchikhsia v moskovskikh i leningradskikh arkhivakh i bibliotekakh". In 1940, Andreev successfully defended his dissertation entitled *Ocherki po istochnikovedeniu Sibiri, XVII vek* (Moscow: 1940), wherein, while paying tribute to Remezov's efforts, he scrutinized at considerable length the available resources. In 1960 there appeared an updated edition of this work, and

37) See V. I. Shunkov, "Trudy S. V. Bakhrushina po istorii Sibiri", in Bakhrushin, *Nauchnye trudy*, III, pp. 5–12.

five years later a companion volume covering the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1948, Andreev published a collection of documents entitled *Russkie otkrytiia v Tikhom okeane — Severnoi Amerike v XVIII v.* (Moscow: 1948), which, because of its great value, was soon translated into English. Throughout his career, Andreev published over 150 items. He also is reported to have left behind several completed manuscripts, including the third volume of Müller's history of Siberia[38].

The third influential Soviet scholar of Siberia and of Russian expansion to the Pacific was Victor Ivanovich Shunkov (1900–1968). Born in Siberia and educated at the Universities of Tomsk and Moscow, Shunkov had a very productive career. Although he lectured at various times at several institutions in Moscow, including his *alma mater*, he was really affiliated with only two: the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences (from 1934 to 1949), and the Library of Social Sciences of the Academy from 1949 until his death. Shunkov wrote two basic works. The first grew out of his dissertation entitled *Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVII-nachale XVIII v.* (Moscow: 1946). It dealt with the colonization of Western Siberia by runaway and state peasants; the second, an expanded follow-up, appeared in 1956 under the title *Ocherki po istorii zemlevladeniia v Sibiri, XVII v.* (Moscow: 1956). In these works Shunkov argued that credit for conquering and subduing for Russia the region east of the Urals belonged not to the *promyshlenniks* or to the cossacks, but to the hard and peaceful work of Russian peasants. This interpretation was in full accord with the prevailing Soviet official emphasis on the *narodnyi, i. e.*, peoples' effort. Although Shunkov wrote a number of articles and edited several works, including a five volume *Istoriia Sibiri* (Leningrad: 1968), his two *Ocherki* remain his chief contribution[39].

In addition to Bakhrushin, Andreev, and Shunkov, the names and basic works of several other Soviet students of Russian expansion to the Pacific must be mentioned. These, in alphabetical order, include: V. A. Aleksandrov, *Russkoe naselenie Sibiri XVII-nachala XVIII v.* (Moscow: 1964); M. I. Belov, *Semen Dezhnev.* 3 rd edition (Moscow: 1973) and *Istoriia otkrytiia i osvoeniia severnogo morskogo puti: Arkticheskoe moreplavanie s drevneishikh vremen do serediny XIX veka* (Moscow: 1956); B. O. Dolgikh, *Rodovoi i plemennoi sostav narodov Sibiri v XVII veke* (Moscow: 1960); A. V. Efimov, *Iz istorii velikikh russkikh geograficheskikh otkrytii v severnom ledovitom i tikhom okeanakh, XVII — pervaia polovina XVIII v.* (Moscow: 1950); V. I. Ogorodnikov, *Ocherki istorii Sibiri do nachala XIX st. Chast 2, Vypusk I. Zavoevanie russkimi Sibiri* (Vladivostok: 1924); and A. P. Okladnikov, *Ocherki iz istorii zapadnykh Buriat-Mongolov, XVII-XVIII vv.* (Leningrad: 1937), and *Russkie poliarnye morekhody XVII veka u beregakh Taimyra* (Moscow-Leningrad: 1948).

Foreign scholars — German, French, Japanese, Chinese, Canadian, British and

38) For a succinct summary of Andreev's career, see V. K. Iatsunskii, "Aleksandr Ignatievich Andreev", in Andreev, *Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri, XVII v.*, pp. 3–14.

39) See A. P. Okladnikov and O. N. Vilkov, "Viktor Ivanovich Shunkov — chelovek, uchitel i organizator nauki i bibliotechnogo dela", in *Itogi i zadachi izucheniia istorii Sibiri dosovetskogo perioda* (Novosibirsk: 1971) pp. 5–16.

American — have also studied various aspects of Russian expansion to the Pacific. The quantity of their research compares unfavorably with that of their Russian and Soviet counterparts. This is not only because of the language barrier, but also because both Imperial and Soviet authorities have placed insurmountable barriers in the way of their access to the archival material. They have been compelled to rely almost exclusively on the published evidence — a situation that has made their endeavors very spotty. For the purpose of this essay I shall confine my comments only to the works in English since they seem to be most outstanding in quantity as well as in quality.

The first work in English on Russian expansion to the Pacific was written by an Englishman, William Coxe (1749–1828). A well-to-do individual, Coxe spent several years in Russia during the reign of Catherine II, at which time he established close contacts with many influential persons, including Müller, from whom he secured important information on various aspects of Russian expansion to the Pacific. Coxe subsequently used this material to write *An Account of the Russian Discoveries Between Asia and America to Which Were Added the Conquest of Siberia*... (London: 1780). The work makes good use of documentary evidence and follows closely Müller's perception of Russian expansion. Its importance, the bulk of which deals with the eighteenth century, centers not on its original view, but on its impact. It was first published in 1780 and republished in 1804. It was also translated into French and German.

After Coxe the next serious thrust of interest in Russian expansion to the Pacific occurred in the twentieth century. Before the 1930's this revival was the effort of two individuals working independently: John F. Baddeley (1854–1940) in Great Britain, and Frank A. Golder (1877–1929) in the United States. Baddeley's contribution consists of a two-volume study entitled *Russia, Mongolia and China, Being Some Record of the Relations Between Them From the Beginning of the XVIIth Century to the Death of the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich A. D. 1602–1672*... (London: 1919; reprint New York: 1973). Its value centers in its judicious use of Russian sources, its fair analysis of Russian missions to China, its balanced review of Russian geographic and cartographic efforts, and its decent summary of ethnic problems inside Russia's new colony in Asia.

Golder, a graduate of Bucknell and Harvard, became involved in Russian expansion to the Pacific through his interest in the history of the Aleuts and in the natives of Alaska. He did extensive research at Harvard, Paris, and in Russia, and, based on the evidence he assembled, he wrote his first major work entitled *Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641–1850: An Account of the Earliest and Later Expeditions Made by the Russians Along the Pacific Coast of Asia and North America; Including Some Related Expeditions to the Arctic Regions* (Cleveland: 1914; reprint Gloucester, Mass.: 1960). Because Golder expressed some reservations about Russian achievements, several Soviet scholars have accused him of an anti-Russian bias. Recently he has also been criticized outside the Soviet Union[40]. Golder's other important works on Russian expansion include: *A Guide to Materials for American History in Russian Archives* (Washington: 1917), which he prepared for the Carnegie Institution; and *Bering's Voyages: An Account of the Efforts of the Russians to Determine the Relations of Asia and America* (New York: 1922–1925), 2 volumes. Both works contain material on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

From 1930 to 1956 the most forceful proponent of the study of Russian expansion was Robert J. Kerner (1887–1956). A graduate of Harvard, upon joining University of California at Berkeley, Kerner organized the Northeast Asia Seminar. Its aim was threefold: 1) to develop, with the help of other members of the history department, a well-integrated program that would offer courses on domestic and foreign policies of the countries that were either influenced by or came in direct contact with Russian expansion; 2) to attract the best and most dedicated students willing to master Russian, Chinese, Japanese, German and French; and 3) to publish a series of basic works that would help to clarify problems associated with Russian expansion to the Pacific. From inception, however, Kerner's dream encountered problems. One of these was his own demanding personality. Another was the failure of his departmental colleagues to support his vision. And, finally, many students shied away from the stringent requirements.

Yet, in spite of some setbacks, the Northeast Asia Seminar was a success. It resulted in three principal works by Kerner: "Russian Expansion to America: Its Bibliographical Foundations", in *The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, vol. 25 (1931), pp. 111–129; *Northeast Asia: A Selected Bibliography. Contributions to the Bibliography of the Relations of China, Russia, and Japan, with Special Reference to Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Eastern Siberia, in Oriental and European Languages* (Berkeley: 1939), 2 volumes; and *The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History. The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries and Furs* (Berkeley: 1946). In 1943 two additional by-products of the Seminar appeared and instantly became classics: Raymond H. Fisher's *The Russian Fur Trade, 1550–1700* (Berkeley: 1943), which argues that furs served as the principal propelling force behind Russia's *Drang nach Osten*; and George V. Lantzeff's *Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration* (Berkeley: 1943). Subsequently Fisher wrote several articles on various aspects of Russian expansion and a major study concerning Bering's two voyages *Bering's Voyages: Whither and Why?* (Seattle: 1978). Lantzeff's productive career was cut short by his death in 1955; but in 1973, Richard A. Pierce, one of his students, brought out Lantzeff's first documented survey of Russian expansion in English entitled *Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750* (Montreal-London: 1973).

It is very difficult to ascertain to what extent these pioneering efforts were responsible

40) Raymond H. Fisher, "Semen Dezhnev and Professor Golder", *The Pacific Historical Review*, XXV, No. 3 (August, 1956), pp. 281–92.

for attracting new scholars to develop interest in Russian expansion to the Pacific. Whatever or whoever did it, it is gratifying to record that during the past twenty years several important works were published in English in an effort to solve some of the problems and puzzles concerning Russian expansion. These, in alphabetical order, include: Terence E. Armstrong, ed. *Yermak's Campaign in Siberia* (London: 1975); Vincent Chen, *Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague: 1968); James R. Gibson, *Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and the Kamchatka Peninsula, 1639–1856* (Madison, Wisc.: 1969), and *Imperial Russia in Frontier America* (New York: 1976); George A. Lensen, *The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations 1697–1875* (Princeton: 1959); and Mark Mancall, *Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1971).

This brief resume of motives behind, sources on, and crucial studies about Russian expansion to the Pacific from 1580 to 1700 has brought out three important conclusions. The first is the fact that the expansion, although poorly documented, was a complex process that not only placed under Moscow's control a vast and resourceful area, but it also Asianized many Russians and Russianized many Asians. Second, while over the past two hundred thirty years scholars have studied Russian expansion and have written valuable books on isolated topics, regions, peoples, and places, their research has been spotty because it has been politically either hindered or directed, with the result that many problems still remain unanswered. And, finally, because of this, there is a real need to produce a comprehensive analysis that would explain not only when, but also how and why the Russians were successful in acquiring and in maintaining their empire while others (English, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish) failed. Obviously such an analysis cannot be made overnight. It will require many years of careful scrutiny of evidence by all interested scholars. Such an effort is needed. It should be done. Let us hope it will be done.