The Lost Chance of Conservative Modernization: S. F. Sharapov in the Economic Debates of the Late Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century⁠¹

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of “conservative modernization” is gaining wide acceptance in contemporary Russia. Striving to overcome backwardness while preserving traditional values, the political tradition of authoritarianism in Russia has found a champion in President Dmitri Medvedev.² These intellectual developments in Russia are paralleled by two interrelated and internationally significant discussions on the resilience of national traditions in an era of globalization and on the relevance of non-liberal capitalist models for late industrialized countries.³ These questions shaped the intellectual context in which Slavophilism is again being debated in Russian society, and Sergei Fedorovich Sharapov, one of the most outstanding representatives of the last, pre-revolutionary generation of Slavophiles, is returning to the newly erected pantheon of ideologists of “conservative modernization,” whose ideas are believed to replicate the concepts of Friedrich List and Gustav von Schmoller.

In the past fifteen years, works by Sharapov have been reprinted several times. They range from academic studies⁴ to unctuous publications by the na-

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³ See, for example, Peter Koslowski, ed., The Theory of Ethical Economy in the Historical School (Berlin-New York: Springer Verlag, 1995); Rudra Sil, Managing “Modernity”: Work, Community, and Authority in Late-industrializing Japan and Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

In which Sharapov is called the “classic [scholar] of Russian economic thought” and Slavophilism in general – “the highest intellectual achievement of humankind,” which “has far surpassed all Western economic theories.” Often criticized, ostracized, and sometimes ridiculed by his contemporaries, Sharapov, the author of fantastic Bellamy-styled novels, would certainly wish to wake up in today’s Russia, where he would be surrounded by caring attention and esteem.

The return of Sharapov to the focus of public concern is tightly connected with the rekindling of academic interest in this figure. The most policy-relevant question, which is discussed by both academics and political activists, is why the Slavophiles, and particularly Sharapov, their intellectual, political, and economic resources notwithstanding, ultimately failed to implement their programs in practice? The first explanation says that Sharapov’s ideology voiced the class interests of the landed nobility; so, the logical corollary is that Russia’s advance on its way to Western-style industrial capitalism precluded his ideas from rising to empire-wide prominence. The second explanation takes Sharapov’s ideas as non- and all-class advocacy of those who were “traumatized by Modernity”; his quixotic defense of archaic principles and institutions was doomed from the beginning because of the impossibility of arresting the flow of change. Finally, there is an interpretation, seconded by latter-day nationalist activists, which says that neo-Slavophilism was a sound alternative (a “third way”) to both capitalism and socialism, but that it was poorly effectuated by people who lacked the necessary abilities to rally social support in an era of mass politics.

The present study argues that Sharapov’s pronouncements were neither a “third way” alternative nor so archaic. Not trying to undervalue the failure of Slavophilism in the political struggle and its limitations as an estate- and class-centered ideology, this research shows that to a great extent, Slavophilism lost its cause precisely because this hybrid ideology was in many aspects too modern to be accepted by late imperial Russian society. This interpretation explains

5 Sharapov, Posle pobedy slavianofilov, p. 19.
6 M. F. Antonov, Ekonomicheskoe uchenie slavianofilov (Moscow: Institut Russkoi tsivilizatsii, 2008), p. 5.
9 Compare this with L. Engelstein’s argument that the Slavophile style of thought had nothing specifically Russian or archaic: Laura Engelstein, Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia’s Illiberal Path (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 111.
the popularity of Slavophilism in contemporary Russia and prompts scholars
to examine the ideas of one man who is nowadays so readily pedestalled in
place of the toppled Marx.

Born in 1855 to the noble family of a naval officer, Sharapov was raised
on an estate named Sosnovka in Smolensk Guberniia. He graduated from the
Moscow Military Gymnasium and afterwards studied at the Engineering Col-
lege in St Petersburg in 1873–1875. In 1880, Sharapov became a permanent con-
tributor to the weekly Rus’, edited by renowned Slavophile I. S. Aksakov, and
later launched a number of his own periodicals while collaborating in a dozen
other right-wing and moderate newspapers. Sharapov’s criticism of the official
economic policy, led by Sergei Iu. Witte, brought him fame and became his
life’s work, creating the impression that his ideas were in exact opposition to
the official policy.

**Fundamentals and Contradictions: Key Economic Ideas**

Witte’s elevation to power as minister of finance in 1892 drove the inau-
guration of a programme of industrialization, which implied stabilization of
the Russian currency based on gold and reduction of administrative restric-
tions on the migration of capital in order to mobilize foreign investments. At
the same time, Witte raised taxes, pursued a protectionist policy, and increased
state intervention in the economy. The results of his efforts are well known:
visible acceleration in economic growth of up to 8 percent per year in the
1890s and a 100 percent increase in industrial production during the decade
1890–1900. However, the costs of this achievement were critically assessed by
many contemporaries including noble landowners, hit hard by the fall in grain
prices and the rise in living costs, and patriotic intellectuals, saddened to see
the dominance of foreigners in Russian industry. The great famine of 1891–92
in the Volga region instigated public debates on the decline of Russian agricul-
ture and questioned the relevance of Witte’s policy towards a predominantly
peasant country. These debates later reverberated in academic studies of the

10 S. F. Sharapov, “Istoriia odnogo khoziaistva,” Rus’ 42 (1880), pp. 15–18; S. F. Sharapov, “Iz
vospominanii o D. I. Mendeleevu,” Russkoe delo (hereafter RD) 4 (1907), p. 5; S. F. Sharapov,
“Molodez’ prezhde i teper’,” in S. F. Sharapov, Sochineniia, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1900), pp. 32–33;
Gosudarstvennyi archiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 102, D-3, op. 99, 1901, d. 9, l. 36.
12 In this context, the term “Fronde” appears, for example, in Thomas S. Fallows, “The Russian
Fronde and the Zemstvo Movement: Economic Agitation and Gentry Politics in the
13 On the polemics of Witte’s policy in the late 1890s, see V. S. Diakin, *Den’gi dlia sel’skogo kho-
ziaistva. 1892–1914. Agrarnyi kredit v ekonomicheskoi politike tsarizma* (St Petersburg: Izd-vo
period, which have argued that Russia’s industrial upsurge was “artificial”: it did not eliminate sources of “backwardness” but instead created new social conflicts by sucking landholders dry through high taxes and disparity between the low prices of agricultural products and the high prices of imported goods.\(^{14}\) “Revisionist” scholarship has modified these claims, disputing the notions of an “agrarian crisis” and a “decline of nobility” and arguing that Witte’s policy created preconditions for sustainable economic growth and affluence.\(^{15}\)

Sharapov’s analysis corroborates the historiographic orthodoxy. Like many a conservative publicist, Sharapov diagnosed the “death throes” of Russian agriculture and prophesied the impeding collapse of the entire economy.\(^{16}\) He simultaneously offered two mutually exclusive explanations and remedies for this. On the one hand, he maintained that the state should more actively support the national economy. On the other hand, he referred indignantly to the bureaucratic “St Petersburg civilization,” which had completely destroyed

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individual initiative and grassroots activism. Sharapov opined that the harmony between the national economy and the state administration had been so dramatically troubled that Russia would need not a particular reform but a radical changeover of the whole socio-economic and political order. Bureaucracy, in his opinion, had alienated people from “living life,” denigrating the population to the position of cattle. A properly functioning economy could be grounded only on local activism, characterized by responsibility, creativity, and informality of social interactions. In consequence, Sharapov disapproved of state efforts to “artificially develop” industry in Russia. Sharapov argued that the main consumer of industrial products in Russia was the countryside population, which had been depredated and bled white by the state in order to support industry. This is why the official economic policy would end in deadlock.

Sharapov resolved the contradiction of “more state intervention but less bureaucratization” by designing a scheme of harmonious unity between autocracy and local self-government, grounded at the grassroots level on Church parishes. If the “classicists” of Slavophilism regarded the peasant communes as an embodiment of Church principles in social life, the later generations of Slavophiles sought an overarching social organism, larger than the peasant community, which would embrace the latter with the noble landowners, clerics, and village intelligentsia; the Church parish was the most likely candidate for this role. The revitalization of ancient Russian parochial organizations was a favorite topic among many religious activists, who appreciated Church parishes as a ready-made social structure of the Orthodox (Russian) population, which could increase its resilience against violent, revolutionary change and attacks from external and internal enemies.

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19 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Smolenskoi oblasti (hereafter GASO), f. 121, d. 555, l. 6 (letter to K. P. Pobedonostsev, October 20, 1901); Rus’ 31 (1881), pp. 22; Russkii trud (hereafter RT) 3 (1897), p. 4. For a discussion on the Russian conservatives’ accounts of industrial development, see M. N. Luk’ianov, Rossiiskii konservatizm i reforma. 1907–1914 (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006), pp. 180–181.
20 S. F. Sharapov, Opyt russkoi politicheskoi programmy (Moscow: Tipo-lit. I. M. Mashistova, 1905).
self-governing community of Orthodox believers provided an operational basis for combining business and morals, as well as politics and morals, lies at the center of Sharapov’s worldview. He regarded parishes as social loci where secular and religious elements could be harmoniously united, and this unity would transform everyday life into a “truly Christian life.” Sharapov intoned that in ancient Russia, “in our old parish, a Russian man prayed to Christ, lived for Christ’s sake, litigated for Christ’s sake, tilled land for Christ’s sake, traded for Christ’s sake, and all mundane things did for Christ’s sake.”

Sharapov elaborated his economic ideas thanks to his conversion (earnest, if not profound) into a Slavophile and especially because of his proximity to the circle of I. S. Aksakov, familiarity with the ideas of N. P. Giliarov-Platonov, and correspondence with K. N. Leont’ev. These new acquaintances had a decisive impact on the formation of Sharapov’s outlook as an Orthodox believer and spurred him to elaborate a Slavophile doctrine of the economy, which his elder companions deemed a necessary supplement to “classic” Slavophilism.

Many pre-revolutionary Russia economic thinkers attempted to reconcile profitable entrepreneurial activity with Christian morals. In the same vein, Sharapov deliberated on the possibility of such a scheme, which would make the moral economy more profitable than the capitalist economy. This was the leitmotif of his most important economic study, Paper Ruble (1895). However,

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24 On many occasions, Sharapov acknowledged Ivan Aksakov as his spiritual father: “You have created everything in me,” he confessed in 1885. See “Perepiska I. S. Aksakova i S. F. Sharapova (1883–1886),” pp. 157, 162.
28 GASO, f. 121, d. 504, l. 10 (letter to D. A. Khomiakov, March 12, 1905); Sharapov, “Markizm i russkaia ekonomicheskaia mys’,” p. 63.
the idea that a successfully elaborated managerial scheme could provide economic efficiency as well as justice displayed a certain technocratic penchant in Sharapov’s thought, alien to the half-mystic Slavophilism and romantic conservatism characterized by the “men, not measures” approach. In opposition to the anthropological pessimism of the “orthodox” conservatives, Sharapov maintained that socio-economic structures were responsible for the disorders of life in Russia, not the people.30

In his early years, Witte was also close to the Slavophile circle of Ivan Aksakov. Thus, in 1885, the future minister of finance warned against the unchecked surge of industrialization.31 Later in his life, when pressed to justify his policy and explain the low performance of Russian agriculture, he always supported the protective measures in the countryside but insisted that a strong domestic industry was essential for Russia’s political ambitions, a claim which no Slavophile would ever disprove.32 Sharapov and Witte disagreed on medium-term analysis: if Witte believed that accelerated industrial growth together with relatively low standards of consumption would trigger mechanisms of self-sustainable development, Sharapov’s stake was on a more gradual transition to a high-profit capitalist economy by means of heating up demand, but they both envisaged the state as a major economic agency.

The Slavophile concept of grassroots economic activism in the network of Orthodox parishes was paralleled by Witte’s idea that the Orthodox Church could call into being a new social sensibility, based on solidarity. He argued that Orthodox religion, unlike contemplative Protestantism and formalized Catholicism, could foster self-governing civic unions of believers. Hence, in order to fight back socialism and the egoism of capitalists, a wise ruler would first and foremost revitalize Orthodoxy and its social structures.33 Witte’s memorandum on agriculture of December 1904 demonstrates that he was considering a local all-class organization in the countryside analogous to the Slavophile parish, which would embrace peasants, noblemen, intelligentsia, and clergy.34

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34 S. Iu. Vitte, Zapiska po krest’ianskomu delu predsedatelia vysozhdennogo Osobogo soveshchania o nuzhdakh sel’skokhoziaistvennoi promyshlennosti (St Petersburg: Kirsbaum, 1904).
On several occasions, Sharapov made the revealing confession that if he had been in Witte’s place, he would at the beginning have acted precisely as Witte did. So, their ideological differences and the antagonism between them should not be exaggerated; they shared many theoretical principles and in the long run, they elaborated a similar hybrid model of conservative modernization. Sharapov was, however, a theorist rather than a practical person, which becomes clear when we trace specific aspects of his thoughts, such as agriculture, private property, village communes, industry, and finances.

**How to Be a Good Barin: A Countryside Idyll in Sosnovka**

At the age of twenty-three, Sharapov started farming on his estate Sosnovka in the Smolensk region. A young graduate from the St Petersburg Engineering College who had already experienced fascinating adventures as a volunteer during the Bosnian rebellion of 1875–76, a prisoner in Hungary, a day-laborer in Italy, and a respectable correspondent of the prestigious *New Times* newspaper in Paris, Sharapov figured that his entrepreneurial activity and knowledge of agricultural chemistry would make him a model landlord and his demesne a “truly European” and profitable. He deemed economic success in the countryside to be dependent on the landowners’ involvement in agriculture, aptitude for capitalist competition, managerial skills, and special knowledge. In 1881, anticipating Witte’s arguments and contrary to his later conclusions, Sharapov ironically remarked that “crisis in agriculture” existed on these farms, whose masters did not know how to farm.

On the pages of Aksakov’s *Rus’* he complained of the wrong educational system and gentry traditions, which had doomed him first to swotting Latin in a gymnasium and afterwards to a military career, not giving even the rudiments of necessary agricultural learning, “as if managing a large farm... is an inherited ability of a nobleman.” Later in his life, he entertained the idea of establishing an agricultural school in Sosnovka, training the peasant and urban

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youth in rural economy. Already in the early 1880s he had gained fame as a propagandist of artificial manure, advanced machinery, and other attributes of “European” farming. These two neighboring barins of the Viaz’ma district shared not only a populist background, interest in agricultural chemistry (a professional one for Engel’gard), disappointment in peasants as bearers of certain hazy but sublime “truths,” and plans to organize an agricultural academy for intelligent young people, but also the attempt to contemplate and construct a non-exploitative farming economy. On a deeper level, they shared a common belief in the transformative powers of science and the positivist style of thought in general, which profoundly distinguished them from the Slavophile romanticists.

Still, there was an important difference between Engel’gard and Sharapov; if the former wanted “first to be a good man, and second to be a good landowner,” Sharapov first of all strove to establish a profitable economy and then tried to rationalize the scheme, once discovered, as morally sound. Following his own principle, Engel’gardt came to the understanding that being a “good man,” that is, living a non-exploitative life, means that he had to cease to be a landowner altogether and to give his lands to the peasants. This conclusion challenged Sharapov to elaborate a different vision of an agricultural economy, in which the barin’s participation in farming was no obstacle but a precondition for the common affluence of the countryside.

The notion of “solidarity” is the key to understanding Sharapov’s position. Unlike the Slavophiles and the Populists, he did not extol the peasant com-

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41 Sharapov, Posle pobedy slavianofilov, p. 370. See the following from the same study: “A landowner may be a good farmer [khoziain], but he cannot do without agricultural chemistry... [He] may be slow in innovations [robkii] but if [he] know[s] that the yield of clover triples by means of kainite, [he] will not be afraid of spending money on it, if this promises benefits” (Sharapov, Posle pobedy slavianofilov, p. 361). He ironically recollected his youthful worship of science: “Science was our religion. If we could conduct a prayer service for or light candles before science, we would have done so” (Sharapov, Sochineniia, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1900), p. 32).


43 S. F. Sharapov, A. N. Engel’gardt i ego znachenie dlia russkoi kul’tury i nauki (St Petersburg: M. M. Lederle, 1893), pp. 31–36.
mune above all but called to find a modus of peaceful co-existence of the mir and noblemen’s grande culture. Otherwise, he concluded, peasant communes alone would depredate the land by uncivilized methods of agriculture, or the noblemen’s latifundia would turn peasants into landless proletarians.  According to his economic ideal, a landowner should be a manager of the business, organizing peasant labor and mediating between them and the outer world, as it had been before the Emancipation. Sharapov idealized the country before 1861, where Christian love and mutual assistance had supposedly governed economic life, when “a nobleman was a peasant’s pride, and peasants were the landowner’s brethren in Christ.” By contrast, after 1861, seeds of discord and conflict were sown in the country. Sharapov’s glorification of the pre-1861 period was a considerable departure from the Slavophile orthodoxy, because the elder Slavophiles were among the most ardent sponsors of the Emancipation and zealous critics of serfdom.

Sharapov’s system resembled the ancient métayage system, because he rented almost all his lands to peasants on short terms, credited them, controlled their work, and provided them with pedigree cattle and high-quality seed. His profits consisted entirely of rental payments. On the one hand, allotment holders, he insisted, were not hired proletarians, but individual entrepreneurs, interested in the results of the common work and bearing all of its risks. On the other hand, he took an active part in farming: “The whole summer, I manage all farming. I show where and what to sow and where to put manure; I swear like a trooper and run into scuffles.” He argued that before long, the métayage

44 This idea was consistently developed throughout his journalistic career. See GASO, f. 121, d. 535, l. 187 (letter to I. F. Romanov, September, 6, 1889); GASO, f. 121, d. 1046, ll. 71–76 (letter to A. S. Suvorin, September 27, 1891); S. F. Sharapov, “Krest’ianskii bank i deneghnaia reforma,” in Sharapov, Sochineniia, vol. 10 (Moscow, 1901), pp. 10–22; S. F. Sharapov, “Programma russkoi narodnoi partii,” RD 36 (1905), p. 6.

45 Zemledelets [Sharapov], “Schastlivyi ugolok,” Rus’ 31 (1881), p. 22; Zemledelets [Sharapov], “Derevnia. Pis’ma iz Sosnovki,” RD 7 (1890), p. 7; S. F. Sharapov, “A. P. Meshcherskii i ego raboty,” in Sharapov, Sochineniia, vol. 18 (Moscow, 1902), p. 13; Sharapov, “MD,” Sovde-

46 GASO, f. 121, d. 27, l. 15 (letter to the editing office of Novoe vremia, undated); Sharapov, “MD,” in Sharapov, Sochineniia, vol. 16 (Moscow, 1902), pp. 74–79, 83; Sharapov, “MD,” in Sharapov, Sochineniia, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1901), p. 77.

47 GASO, f 121, d. 1046, ll. 66–67 (letter to A. S. Suvorin, September 28, 1891); S. F. Sharapov, Derevenskie mysli o nachem gosudarstvennom khoziaistve (Moscow: Tip. L. F. Snegireva, 1886), pp. 96–97.


system would be replaced by cooperation on shares, based on joint economic interest. These just economic relations would gradually transform into moral ties between landlords and peasants, strengthening Christian morality and representing a better feat than “simply following Christ’s precept: sell your material possessions, and give the money to the poor.”\textsuperscript{50} He maintained that muzhiks were glad to work with him and that they did not envy him, but treated him trustfully and benevolently because this was their common cause; elsewhere, he mentions that Sosnovka’s peasants were, “broadly speaking, my family.”\textsuperscript{51}

By 1892, he averred, the system took its final shape, and a harmonious economic organism appeared on his estate, yielding revenue of two thousand rubles.\textsuperscript{52} For an economy of this size and region, this sum was not strikingly large but was still good enough. His scheme might have been feasible had the landed gentry possessed an intense feeling of mission and the desire to unselfishly serve Russia. Highly critical of noblemen’s privileges and skeptical about their abilities and resources,\textsuperscript{53} Sharapov concluded that this selfless mission was the only justification of the existence of the “first estate” in Russia.\textsuperscript{54} Sharapov extended the notion of solidarity in the countryside to the intelligentsia and clergy, proposing to provide teachers and priests with landholdings which should become (with some state assistance) exemplary economies, thereby commanding respect for their professions and knowledge.\textsuperscript{55}

The intellectual core of this concept was a desire to reconcile the image of the “good barin” of pre-reform Russia with the pressing need to be a skillful capitalistic manager and entrepreneur. The idea of producing social solidarity in agriculture by combining functions of nobility as an estate and landowners as a class makes Sharapov’s concepts distinctively hybrid. This is not to label his project as unrealistic; on the contrary, this synthesis is not only possible but inevitable in the first stages of capitalism in agriculture.

In the 1880–1890s, when landowners unanimously identified crisis in agriculture and growing pauperization in villages, Sharapov’s theory provided leverage for the self-preservation of the noble landlords. It justified the key role of the nobility in agriculture and warranted the inviolability of their landed property, which was much doubted in all spheres of society.

\textsuperscript{50} Sharapov [lead article], RD 36 (1906), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{51} GASO, f. 121, d. 535, l. 188 (letter to an unknown person, September 6, 1889).
\textsuperscript{52} S. F. Sharapov, “S dorogi,” RT 25 (1898), pp. 10–11.
\textsuperscript{53} For example, he offered pages of his newspaper to N. P. Aksakov, who elaborated the idea that nobility was inorganic and alien to the spirit of Russia: Sharapov [lead article], RD 6 (1889), pp. 3–4. See also GASO, f. 121, d. 617, l. 2 (“Politicheskaia programma,” undated, late 1880s); Sharapov, “MD,” Svidetel’ 25–26 (1909), p. 102.
It is well known that Slavophiles as well as Populists admired the countryside peasant commune (obshchina, mir) as a rudimentary form of a new, more perfect and just social order, grounded on common land ownership. Slavophiles and religiously anxious intellectuals also believed the commune to be the manifestation and guarantee of Russia’s superiority and universal mission. Sharapov’s take on this issue was, however, more nuanced and controversial. It represented his intermediate position between the left-wing Slavophiles with a strong Populist tinge, romantic bias towards mir, and collective forms of work and property on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the right-wing gentry opposition to the policy of Witte, which had no particular liking for the peasant commune and struggled for noblemen’s “rights and property,” to put it in the words of N. A. Pavlov.  

Although Sharapov declared that for him private property is “no sacred right,” he persistently opposed the idea of redistribution of arable lands that circulated on the left flank of the Slavophile camp. He argued that land had become capital long ago, and any encroachment on noble landholdings would ruin the Russian economy and lead to great injustice. Thus, already in Aksakov’s journal Rus’ he vociferously censored the idea that peasants were lacking land, thereby winning fame as an “iconoclast” who boldly contradicted the prevailing public view on “land shortage” in the countryside. Sharapov’s defense of gentry landownership culminated in the program of the Union of Noblemen, drafted with his active assistance, which said that private property should be firmly reinforced by the state and law.  

The following episode is characteristic of Sharapov’s position on this question. In early 1906, the “agrarian Fronde” was fearful of the plan of Min...
ister of Agriculture N. N. Kutler to partially expropriate private lands in favor of peasants. Goremykin and Kokovtsov evidently hoped that Sharapov’s newly established journal *Ploughman* with a circulation of between twenty and thirty thousand would torpedo this project and discredit Witte. Sharapov was evidently promised a subsidy from Kokovtsov, but whether this promise (unfulfilled) influenced his position or not, Sharapov unequivocally took the side of the most intransigent conservatives in the agrarian question. Thus, when in August 1906 S. E. Kryzhanovskii addressed Sharapov in order to commission him to write a manifesto on granting the crown’s lands to the peasants, the latter indignantly refused, arguing that this measure would only “fuel peasants’ appetites.”

However, his understanding of property differed from the profit-oriented capitalist notion, which stems from Roman law. Sharapov insisted that what was significant was not the ownership but the use of property, not the possessory right, but the right of the user, for example, to hold a lease for life. The land ultimately belonged to nobody but God and, by consequence, to all the people, but still, the inherited usufruct could not be violated because private capital had already been invested into the land. Thus, he argued that the commune was by no means antagonistic to the idea of private property; by contrast, the commune accustomed people to appreciate and strictly observe the possessory right.

Sharapov’s concept displays the hybrid nature of his worldview: it contains elements of both a feudal understanding of land holding as investiture and privilege and a bourgeois notion of land as capital. This vision represented his desire to benefit from capitalist civilization and to avoid the risks connected with private enterprise: as he wrote elsewhere, “outside of capitalism,

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62 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGIA), f. 1617, op. 1, d. 682, ll. 17–19 (letter to M. M. Andronikov, undated).

63 GARF, f. 1463, op. 2, d. 669, ll. 1–2 (letter to S. E. Kryzhanovskii, August 21, 1906).


65 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (hereafter RGALI), f. 572, op. 2, d. 27, l. 2 (letter to A. N. Engel’gardt, February 2, 1881); S. F. Sharapov, “K sporu ob obshchine,” in Sharapov, *Sochinenia*, vol. 19 (Moscow, 1902), p. 17. Similar ideas were developed in Scherbatov, *Obnovlennaia Rossiia*, pp. 65, 74; N. A. Engel’gardt [lead article], *Russkii vestnik* 9 (1905), p. 339; Stepanov [lead article], *Moskovskii golos* 2 (1906), p. 4; N. M. P-v, “Lomka krest’ianskogo byta,” *Mirnyi trud* 2 (1905), p. 103; Otdel rukopisei Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennoi biblioteki (hereafter OR RGB), f. 265, k. 156, d. 5, l. 6 (letter from F. D. Samarin to S. Iu. Witte, February-March 1906).

66 Sharapov, *Posle pobedy slavianofilov*, p. 120.
the property right is better secured,” because it cannot be expropriated.67 This phrase helps us to contextualize his outlook as a variant of the “petty-bourgeois” worldview, typical of a Victorian-style social utopianism.68 This type of utopianism allowed Sharapov to reconcile his petty-bourgeois mentality with support for the peasant commune and criticism of the agrarian law of November 9, 1906, which had inaugurated the dissolution of the village communes.69

Opposing the ideas of left-wing Slavophiles,70 Sharapov averred that the mir did not and should not represent an alternative to the existing socio-economic order. The significance of the commune lies in the fact that it organized the Russian people “from within” at the grassroots level and fostered the principle of local self-government. Consequently, the commune ameliorated the impact of formal (legal) and bureaucratic (external, inorganic) forces on the people.71 In Gramscian terms, the commune in his outlook represented the “trench system” of an ideal society, resilient to revolution.72

So, Sharapov argued that the peasant commune embodied not a form of collective land property or a “socialist” type of economy, but a form of socio-political organization. He insisted that the determinative factors of success in agriculture included the financial policy of the state, the efficiency of the credit system, and the dissemination of up-to-date machinery, methods, and knowledge in the countryside, but not preservation of the commune as such.73 Thus, his defense of the village commune could be interpreted not as an anti-bourgeois démarche, but by contrast, as a means to fortify the bourgeois society of petty proprietors.

"THE MERCHANTS’ TRIBUNE"

The concept of solidarity in agriculture is tightly interconnected with the idea of solidarity between labor and capital in industry. The “father-founders”

70 For example, Vasil’ev, Miru-narodu, pp. 791–792, 914–915.
72 Sharapov [lead article], Pakhar’, 11–12 (1906), pp. 10–13. Similar ideas were expressed in S. N. Syromiatnikov, Opyty russkoi mysli. 2 vols. (St Petersburg: Tip. A. S. Suvorina, 1901), vol. 1, pp. 149, 319; Stepanov [lead article], Moskovskii golos 35 (1906), p. 2; Moskovskii golos 36 (1906), pp. 1–2.
of Slavophilism did not leave any substantial account of the development of industry in Russia, but their successors in the 1860–1870s expressed a continuing preoccupation with the role of industry and industrialists in Russia. Konstantin Aksakov’s distinction between the inorganic, imitative “public” and the self-sufficient, naturally growing “people,” theoretically legitimized the alliance with the merchants. From the late 1850s onwards, I. S. Aksakov praised the leaders of the Muscovite bourgeoisie, because he believed that they, often scions of Old-Believers’ families, were part and parcel of the “people,” like peasants, not the “public.” Moreover, their entrepreneurial spirit, energy, activity, patriotism, religiosity, and allegiance to tradition made them the embodiment of the best of the Russian people. Thus, the Slavophiles viewed themselves as teachers and enlighteners of the merchants, reserving for them the role of docile, patronage-hungry children. This alliance lasted well into the 1880s, when Sharapov became secretary of the newly (1884) established Moscow branch of the Russian Society for Trade and Industry. Sharapov echoed I. S. Aksakov’s analysis when he wrote that merchants “stand together with the people’s Russia, bear its spirit, advance its ideas, think with its mind, and feel with its heart.”

According to the self-declared mission of an intellectual leader and protector of the merchants, Sharapov launched a campaign against the Polish textile industry on behalf of the Moscow merchants in 1885. He argued that foreign (mainly German and Jewish) capital had taken control of the Polish factories and, enjoying favorable taxes and transportation tariffs, was undermining the well-being of “nationally Russian” industrialists. Occasionally, Sharapov sup-

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ported the official protectionist policy to the detriment of the interests of noble landowners and in contradiction to the other premises of his economic program.79 Equating the interests of a particular group of bourgeoisie with the national interests of Russia or even with the interests of the whole of “Slavdom,” he demanded state support for the Moscow merchants supposedly standing at the forefront of the struggle against “Germanism.”

His argument resonated with the public, pressing the government to organize a special commission in order to check Sharapov’s statements. The commission did not verify his claims,80 but Sharapov had one more chance to confront officials in 1886, when the Slavophile spoke in favor of industrialists against the labor laws enacted after the celebrated strike at T. S. Morozov’s textile factory in 1885. This time, Sharapov opposed the introduction of officially appointed fabric inspectors on the grounds that this institution would violate patriarchal relations between workers and their masters.81 In principle, he insisted on improvement of workers’ conditions,82 but he believed that their employers knew how to do this better than the bureaucrats. In thinking so, he extrapolated his scheme of the ideal relationship between peasants and landlords to industry. The image underlying this analysis was still the distinction between “the public” and “the people,” according to which workers belong to the former, to the Westernized group, antagonistic to the Russian people’s ideals.83

We encounter this kind of analysis in Sharapov’s position on the labor question in the Industrial Committee, over which he presided in early 1903. There, he unabashedly proclaimed that the state should serve the interests of the industrialists in the conflict with the workers.84 During the tumultuous events of 1905–1907, Sharapov appeared as an accomplished hater of the workers. He insinuated that the pogroms had been inspired by the workers, and argued that their wishes to improve their conditions and to raise salaries should be resisted, because it would shift the rise in prices of manufactured goods onto the peasants.85 In his utopian novel of 1907, an imaginary dictator addresses the workers with the following words: “You, workers, are just an insignificant part

81 See, for example, Sharapov [lead article], RD 5 (1890), p. 1; Sharapov, “Obmen mnenii,” p. 14.
82 See, for example, Sharapov [lead article], Golos Moskvy 118 (1885), p. 1.
83 He juxtaposed “rioting workers” to the “people,” for example, in Sharapov [lead article], RD 4 (1905), p. 2.
84 “Proekt pamiatnoi zapiski fabrikantov, zavodchikov i raznykh promyshlennikov,” RD 25 (1905), pp. 9–10.
of the Russian people, and you have no right to decide on Russia’s future… But Russia is still well armed and our army is intact. We have enough cartridges and we will not be shooting upwards.”

Notwithstanding the Populist influences in his formative years, Sharapov’s journalist career is marked by pronounced criticism of socialism. He maintained that economic life could be organized either on the basis of struggle for benefits and commodities (he called this system “capitalism”) or on the basis of altruistic self-negation, characteristic of a monastery: tertium non datur. Because lay people were not yet ready to live lives of monks, any attempt to introduce principles of common labor and equal distribution of goods (“socialism” in his terms) would be doomed as being “immature.” On the ebbing tide of the Revolution, Sharapov wrote a study entitled “Socialism as Religion of Hatred” (1907), where he drew parallels between socialist ideas and Christian principles, arguing that socialism had distorted Christianity, having grounded its fundamentals on hate in place of love. This not very original argument is interesting because of its uncompromising stance. Sharapov rejected the possibility of an interim solution (for example, Christian socialism) by posing a dilemma: we have to choose between Christ and Anti-Christ. This means also that he designedly vilified the workers’ movement as diabolic dealings, thereby closing any possibility of a concession. This was the most glaring example of the betrayal of the democratic traditions of classic Slavophilism.

The coup d’état of June 3, 1907 and the parliamentary victory of the Octobrists, the party of constitutional bourgeoisie, prompted Sharapov to further reconsider his views. He woke up to the fact that industrialists and bankers were not part of the “land” and obedient disciples of Slavophile intellectuals, looking for protection from bureaucracy. Contrary to his earlier pronouncements, in 1908, Sharapov wrote: “A Western-like bourgeoisie, foreign to the Russian people and to the Russian spirit, emerged in Moscow. It craves political power and dreams of a leading role in Russia. But what is its right to dominance? What are its national, political, or cultural merits? Up to now, it has never gone beyond avarice, waste of money, and enormous debauchery.”

This analysis shows that Sharapov’s views on the bourgeoisie in 1880–90s did not differ considerably from the statements of the highest officials, who nurtured a hope that entrepreneurial activity and loyalty to the state and dynasty could be reconciled. The Revolution of 1905–1907 and the establishment of the Russian parliament radicalized Sharapov’s position and prompted him

86 Sharapov, Posle pobedy slavianofilov, pp. 122–124.
89 Sharapov, Posle pobedy slavianofilov, p. 251.
to abandon his long-cherished striving for solidarity of labor and capital on the one hand, and capital and political authoritarianism on the other. This is the aspect of his thought in which its petty-bourgeois character is the most visible.

**The Slavophile Financial Theory**

Already in 1888 Sharapov had addressed financial questions and proposed to build the Trans-Siberian Railroad by means of emitting each year 50 million paper rubles; in 1892–1893, his proposal appeared in Svet (editor V. V. Komarov) and Grazhdanin (V. P. Meshcherskii). Through the mediation of some statesman, supposedly K. N. Pobedonostsev, he offered his study to Aleksander III and to Witte. The tsar considered this idea sympathetically and requested that Witte examine it in depth.\(^{90}\) In November 1892, Witte composed a memorandum in which he took Sharapov’s side and spoke largely in favor of building the railway exactly in the way he suggested in his articles. In February 1893, Sharapov was appointed as an ad hoc functionary in Witte’s ministry, but he could not reap the fruits of his propaganda because by 1895, Witte had radically changed his mind, having become a supporter of the gold standard.\(^{91}\)

When the Ministry of Agriculture was established in 1894 with A. S. Ermlov as its head, Sharapov transferred there, continuing his anti-gold standard propaganda. Under the auspices of Pobedonostsev and having secured support from the Moscow branch of the Russian Industrial Society, he spread an anti-gold standard memorandum among the members of the State Council and attacked it in the press.\(^{92}\) In 1895, he published the study *Paper Ruble*, which is his economic magnum opus, eagerly reprinted and commented upon in today’s Russia.

Sharapov started his analysis from a discussion of the nature of money, arguing that it should not have its own value, being an abstract means of measuring labor. He proceeded to maintain that in a “properly” organized economy, money as mere “tokens of labor” would give advantage to simple toilers and would ruin greedy usurers. However, in a bourgeois economy, capitalists as owners of golden funds tried to bind money not to labor but to capital, introducing gold and thereby enslaving the working people. Up to this point, Sharapov agreed with utopian socialists like Owen, and moved in parallel with the Western followers of Puritan radicalism and anti-capitalist fundamentalism.\(^{93}\)

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90 Sharapov [lead article], *RD* 3 (1888), p. 2; Sharapov, “MD,” *Svidetel’* 12 (1908), pp. 61–62; GASO, f. 121, d. 539, l. 87 (letter to T. I. Filippov, undated) and L. 112 ob. (letter to S. Iu. Witte, January 14, 1893).


92 GASO, f. 121, d. 542, l. 450 (letter to K. P. Pobedonostsev, April 30, 1895); l. 451 (letter to A. S. Suvorin, April 30, 1895) and l. 458a (letter to N. M. Baranov, undated).

Neo-Slavophiles K. F. Odarchenko and A. V. Vasil’ev went even further towards utopian socialism; they proposed a currency system based on “labor money,” which in future would also disappear giving way to non-monetary exchange. “What seems utopian now,” Odarchenko concluded, “will become easy to accomplish when humanity spiritually regenerates.” Although Sharapov reserved his highest praise for Odarchenko’s theoretical studies, he deemed them untimely and emphasized an element completely foreign to socialism. His remarkable addition was the role of the tsar in a “Christian economy”; the tsar, mediating between the workers and the capitalists, set and warranted the measure of value – the ruble. In Russia, enjoying the absolutist rule of the tsar, money could be purely abstract, “paper-based,” whose purchasing power depends on the people’s confidence and love of the tsar. The more benign and strictly moral was the tsar, the more stable and strong would be the national currency. Thus, he claimed that “paper-based” currency in an autocratic state was the “most Christian form of money.” Old Slavophile imagery of the intimate union between the tsar and the people loomed beneath the surface of these arguments, put in the service of Sharapov’s central idea to substantiate the active (“creative” in his terminology) role of the state in the economy and the advantages of an autocratic monarchy.

Sharapov stressed that the “paper ruble” was unthinkable in parliamentary countries due to the spirit of distrust and struggle reigning there, which made it necessary to introduce some “security,” be it a constitution or gold, preventing the monarch from thoughtless emissions. In Russia, however, all necessary preconditions and traditions were already there. Thus, the old Russian silver currency system, established by E. F. Kankrin in 1839–1841, came close to his ideal, perfectly fitting the demands of an agricultural autarchy.

Thoughtful emission of paper money had another advantage as an instrument of economic policy. Sharapov calls his concept, resembling the theory of credit multiplier, the concept of “imaginary capital” (mnimyi capital). He reasoned that the state, having assessed the current resources and demands of the national economy, could emit a certain amount of money, which would be “imaginary capital,” because it did not yet match any real wealth. However, when this imaginary capital was injected into and absorbed by the national economy (by means of credit institutions or state-organized labor), it would evoke real work and real wealth (for example, a railroad constructed, an enter-

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96 Talitskii [Sharapov], Bumazhnii Rubl’, pp. 31–34.
98 Sharapov, “Marksizm i russkaia ekonomicheskaia mys’,” p. 55.
99 Talitskii [Sharapov], Bumazhnii Rubl’, pp. 61–62.
prise opened, a harvest reaped, etc.) So, this extension of money supply would correspond to the grown economy and increased turnover of capital. Sharapov asserted that the rate of interest and the wage rate were precise indicators of the need for imaginary capital in the economy: the higher the former and the lower the latter, the greater the demand for “paper money.”

It is not our intention to assess this concept from the viewpoint of latter-day economic theory, although some conservative scholars have given it high praise and even suggest that his Paper Ruble serve as a manual for up-to-date Russian financial policy, but in the late nineteenth century, this was a considerable divergence from the economic orthodoxy. Only a few Slavophiles and haters of Witte’s economic policy and Witte personally subscribed to some of Sharapov’s ideas in order to obtain intellectual leverage in their political struggle.

The theory of the “paper ruble” allowed Sharapov to make conclusions characteristic of his mentality and of the ideas of Slavophiles of the time. First, it would make the state the most important economic agency, while putting “capitalists” aside. On many occasions, Sharapov urged the state to draft empire-wide economic plans and to actively participate in the economy. Second, it would reward labor and disadvantage financial capital (and therefore capitalists), so that “money will run after manpower, not after capital as it does today.” Third, it would breathe new life into the credit system and stimulate individual initiative. The pressing need to provide easy access to cheap credit for the population was widely aired in the conservative press, and Sharapov took this issue to heart when, under the guidance of A. Ia. Antonovich, he elaborated new regulations for the State Bank, providing short-term credit for peasants. Fourth, it would make the Russian economy self-sufficient and in-

100 Ibid., p. 75.
103 Zemledelets [Sharapov], “Nash ‘narodnyi kredit,’” Rus’ 57 (1881), p. 16; Talitskii [Sharapov], “Kak razoriaiutsia gosudarstva,” Rus’ 6 (1885), p. 16.
104 Talitskii [Sharapov], Bumazhnyi Rubl’, p. 49.
106 GASO, f. 121, d. 542, l. 379 (letter to A. S. Suvorin, December 14, 1894); l. 400a (letter to K. P. Pobedonostsev, February 2, 1895); Sharapov, “Krest’ianskii bank i denezhnaia reforma,” pp. 5–20.
dependent of foreign investment, and, as follows from the previous conclusion, Sharapov argued that paper money would allow Russia to wage a long and fierce war with her adversaries, not fearing the collapse of the national economy.\(^{107}\) And finally, the seamiest side of Sharapov’s theorizing concerned the Jewish question; he insisted that paper currency would eradicate usury, economic parasitism, and stock jobbery, that is, activities which he and many of his fellow Slavophiles associated with the Jews.\(^{108}\) All in all, Sharapov’s theoretical study substantiated the radical reduction of the role of monopolist capital in the economy, providing for small owners and workmen.

**Sharapov and Witte: Dangerous Liaisons**

Neither *Paper Ruble* nor Sharapov’s propaganda in high spheres was a success. Having lost the battle in the State Council in 1895 and retiring from the ministry the following year, Sharapov did not lose the war. By the time he finished his career in state service, a group of like-minded intellectuals gathered around his newly launched periodical *Russian Labor* (*Russkii trud*). This weekly newspaper was conceived first and foremost to criticize the monetary reform of Witte. This attack on the gold standard found followers and sympathizers, including Professor A. L. Tsitovich, D. I. Mendeleev, Odarchenko, Vasil’ev, and Prince A. G. Shcherbatov.\(^{109}\) Sharapov’s attack on Witte’s financial policy rallied even broader support among the “Agrarian Fronde.” In 1897, Sharapov ventured (but in vain) to establish a political party, named “Union of Landowners,” enlisting support from newspaper editor A. A. Porokhovshchikov (1833–1918).\(^{110}\)

The anti-Witte group placed much hope on the newly established “Special Conference on the Needs of the Noble Estate,” headed by I. N. Durnovo, and energetically propagated its views there.\(^{111}\) The Conference was immediately in conflict with Witte, and only the intervention of Nicholas II saved it from imminent closure. In 1898, this group gave battle to Witte at an agricultural conference in Orel. *Russian Labor*’s delegation, including Sharapov, G. V. Butmi, P. V. Ol’, and A. A. Stakhovich, convinced the majority of the conference to support its cause.\(^{112}\) A number of influential politicians such as A. S. Suvorin, I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, Pobedonostsev, P. Kh. Shvanebakh (Schwanebach), V. K.

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\(^{110}\) GASO, f. 121, d. 543, l. 38 (letter to A. A. Porokhovshchikov, May 22, 1897).

\(^{111}\) S. F. Sharapov, *Chem spasti dvorianstvo?* (St Petersburg: Tipo-lit. M. M. Rozenoer, 1897).

Plehve, and P. L. Lobko also backed Russian Labor. Simultaneously, Sharapov concocted letters to the tsar, urging him to immediately arrest and prosecute Witte for embezzlement and intentionally ruining the Russian economy. Sharapov also launched a campaign against glaring misdeeds in the Ministry of Finances, setting in motion his vast relationships with the State Inspection and its head T. I. Filippov in particular.

Sharapov, who faced economic difficulties in 1901–1903 and a growing hostility to his initiatives in the press and in the upper echelons of bureaucracy, could hardly head off these attacks. Sharapov prepared a still heavier stab in Witte’s back, when in the spring of 1901 he contacted foreign journalists in order to start an anti-Witte campaign in France. Scholarship mentions Édouard Drumont’s attacks on Witte in the French press in 1901; it is very likely that this démarche was organized by Sharapov.

In the autumn of 1901, Witte initiated a rapprochement with the belligerent Slavophile. In October 1901, Prince M. M. Andronikov, Witte’s agent and a notorious adventurer, contacted Sharapov, conveying the fact that Witte was a devoted reader of Sharapov’s works. In exchange, Sharapov confessed that he admired Witte as a great statesman and even that he had “never ceased to love him owing to the memories of our past relations in Aksakov’s Rus.’” Sharapov promised his friendly assistance and support in the press if Witte recognized his economic mistakes and worked hard to make up for the calamities he inflicted on the Russian economy.

Early in April 1902, the two adversaries had a long talk, and although Sharapov failed to convert Witte into a supporter of the “paper ruble,” they agreed on a number of questions, including foreign capital and industrial development. In practice, Sharapov promised neither to criticize Russian finances in general nor attack Witte personally. In exchange, Witte agreed to assist Sharapov in re-opening his weekly Russian Labor (a promise which was never fulfilled). Soon afterwards, Sharapov solicited a government subsidy of 50

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113 Sharapov, “Zolotaia reforma,” p. 23; Sharapov, “MD,” Svidetel’ 16–17 (1908), p. 153; GASO, f. 121, d. 1058, ll. 108–111 (invitation cards, 1902 to 1904); A. S. Suvorin, Dnevnik (Moscow-Petrograd, 1923), p. 301; GASO, f. 121, d. 543, l. 44 (letter to I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, November 24, 1897); GASO, f. 121, d. 543, l. 188 (letter to N. M. Chukmaldin, February 9, 1900).
114 GASO, f. 121, d. 559, ll. 4–7 (draft of the letter to Nicholas II, September 18, 1899).
115 GARF, f. 597, op. 1, d. 834 (letter to T. I. Filippov, September 27, 1900); Sharapov, “MD,” [1898], RD 16 (1906), p. 3.
117 GASO, f. 121, d. 1013, ll. 5–6 (letter to M. M. Andronikov, October 13, 1901); GASO, f. 121, d. 7 “Diary,” entry of October 27, 1901; GASO, f. 121, d. 1045, ll. 23–26 (letter to Witte, March 29, 1902).
118 GASO, f. 121, d. 1046, l. 105 (letter to K. Iu. Kupalov, April 6, 1902).
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thousand rubles for the production development of his plough-making work-
shop “Pakhar’,” acting again through an intermediary of Andronikov. He
represented this business as a project of nation-wide concern, which would
allow production of light, cheap “peasant ploughs” in Russia. According to his
plan, these ploughs would oust foreign competitors and become marketable
elsewhere in Europe and both Americas. Sharapov was also appointed to
the position of chair of the Industrial Committee. This committee, opened on
February 10, 1903, discussed issues of protectionism, foreign capital, and small
credit, and suggested the establishment of the Industrial Bank.

These concessions obtained, Sharapov stopped his attacks on Witte in
the press, publishing sour-sweet articles in which he praised Witte’s genius
and mildly pointed out some of his errors in finance. But at the same time,
Sharapov did not cease plotting against Witte in the upper spheres, putting
pressure on Plehve, V. N. Lamsdorf, Pobedonostsev, and Kokovtsov. Details
are not known, but Sharapov’s consultations with Plehve in autumn 1902 prob-
ably pushed Witte into doing away with the Slavophile in one stroke. Already
in January 1903 information about Sharapov taking a state subsidy had been
leaked to the press. It is not clear where the leak came from, but Andronikov
seems the most likely source. In March 1903, Struve’s Liberation published a
mocking “obituary” for Sharapov, which completely ruined his reputation as
an independent journalist. Witte’s irrevocable fall from the political Olympus
in 1906, to which Sharapov had so greatly contributed in the preceding decade,
brought no relief to the Slavophile journalist. Attendant on his political calami-
ties was the collapse of Sharapov’s Sosnovka farm, and even his plough-mak-
ing “Pakhar’” Ltd went bankrupt in 1910. His short-lived rise to prominence
in the political arena during the tumultuous 1905–06 years was altered by a pe-
riod of obscurity, which was terminated by his premature death from a stroke
in 1911.

Conclusions

The core elements of the model of conservative modernization proposed
by Sharapov paralleled the ideas of Witte. It implied forced economic develop-
ment, which would allow Russia to speedily catch up with the advanced
Western powers, not destroying the tripartite political status quo: absolute

119 GASO, f. 121, d. 1013, l. 28–28ob (letter to M. M. Andronikov, April 6, 1902).
120 GASO, f. 121, d. 1013, l. 30 (letter to Andronikov, October 13, 1902).
121 GASO, f. 121, d. 1054, ll. 78–79 (letter to A. Ia. Antonovich, December 27, 1902).
122 S. F. Sharapov, “Po povodu novogo naznacheniiia S. Iu. Vitte,” in Sharapov, Sochineniia,
vol. 25 (Moscow, 1904), pp. 57–68.
123 GASO, f. 121, d. 1045, l. 46 (letter to V. K. Plehve, June 3, 1904); ll. 48ob.–50 (letter to Plehve,
June 28, 1904); l. 71 (letter to V. N. Kokovtsov, January 21, 1903); l. 73 (letter to V. N. Lams-
dorf, June 24, 1904).
124 GASO, f. 121, d. 32, ll. 60, 125 (documentation on the workshop “Pakhar’”).
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monarchy, Orthodox Church, and the dominant role of the Russian people within the empire. The history of interrelations between Sharapov and Witte shows certain “selective affinity” between the two intellectuals, who become enemies due to the self-destructive political struggle of the two groups in the government.

The Revolution of 1905–07 ushered in an era of parliamentary rule and human rights in Russia, thereby rendering Uvarov’s ideological “Triad” together with “conservative modernization” obsolete and irrelevant. At the same time, the Revolution disappointed those thinkers who contemplated a way out of the “iron cage,” an alternative to the regime of alienating bureaucratic and capitalist relations in the sphere of grassroots self-government and economic activism, in which social interactions, governed by mutual trust and morality, would maintain a profitable economy and a modern rational worldview. Sharapov’s theorizing followed this direction, contributing to the mainstream of socio-economic philosophizing of the twentieth century.

Sharapov, who came to Slavophilism from a Populist and positivist background, managed to hybridize the classic doctrine, adjusting it to the hybrid nature of the Russian economy at the turn of the century. In this sense, his ideas left behind much of the right-wing economic thinking of the time, focused on the preservation of economic traditions and privileges. However, as a type of petty-bourgeois utopianism, Sharapov’s theory favored private property, small-scale enterprise, and political traditionalism, while censoring monopoly capital, proletarian movement, and socialism. Considering its nationalist and anti-Semitic propensity, its bellicose imperialist ardor, we must assume that this utopia lacked intellectual barriers which could prevent it from being transformed into a fascist-like ideology.

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125 For an analysis of Max Weber’s notion of the “iron cage” see, for example, Lawrence A. Scaff, Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).