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[スラヴ研究 (Slavica)](http://hdl.handle.net/2115/5112)
On August 4, 1980, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Masayoshi Ito, expressed his interest in conferring with his counterpart of the USSR, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, should there be such an opportunity when both are in attendance at the upcoming United Nations General Assembly scheduled in September of this year). The Foreign Minister of the newly installed Japanese Cabinet under the premiership of Mr. Zenko Suzuki, however, did not fail to add a caveat that mutual concessions are needed if his meeting with Mr. Gromyko is to be fruitful. He said that there will be no point in talking with the Soviets so long as they persist in their self-righteous attitude about the Soviet military buildup on the Japanese claimed “Northern Territories” and the intervention in Afghanistan, and he added that it is the Soviet Union that has to change its attitude).

Anyone who is interested in international relations in the Far East must be aware of the fact that the issue of the “Northern Territories” has been the major stumbling block in relations between Tokyo and Moscow. From the Japanese perspective, improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations is out of the question unless the Soviet demonstrate a more conciliatory attitude concerning the four southern-most islands seized from Japan at the end of World War II. As mentioned above, one additional prerequisite for the improvement of bilateral relations between these two countries has been added: the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Several questions concerning the Japanese Foreign Minister’s intended meeting with Gromyko necessarily arise: for what purpose is he prepared to meet his Soviet counterpart in New York? Why did he announce his intentions? Is this simply a political gesture extended from Ito to Gromyko? The present article attempts to clarify these questions by tracing back over the past half year the nature of Soviet-Japanese relations from the Soviet incursion into Kabul (December 1979) until around the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet (July 1980). This report deals with the worst, or at least one of the worst, phases in the history of postwar Soviet-Japanese relations. Divided into two parts, the article will focus first on the Japanese reactions to the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan (Chapters II, III, and IV) and then it will discuss

2) *loc. cit.*
Soviet policies and strategies toward Japan during the same period (Chapters V, VI, and VII).

Before entering these discussions, however, a brief evaluation will be made in Chapter I of the two approaches which have characterized postwar Japanese foreign policy in order to locate the position of the Ohira government toward the Soviet Union during the period in question.

I. General Approaches in the Foreign Policy Orientation of Postwar Japan

Generally speaking, two differing approaches may be distinguished in the postwar foreign policy of Japan, and although each stems from the same physical environment and economic considerations of its proponents, the two approaches represent apparently opposing points of view. We will first examine a few of the geographical facts which have played an important part in the adaptation of certain foreign policies. Japan is a small insular country with poor and scant natural resources which make her dependent on outside sources for as much as 86 percent of her energy needs. Imports of essential resources reach percents as high as 99 percent of oil, about 66 percent of the coal, 47 percent of the original calories, and 60 percent of the total grain the country consumes. With a population of 110 million — half of that of the U. S. or the USSR — to support on an island which is equivalent in area to about one-twentieth of the U. S., or about one-sixteenth of the USSR, it is clear that Japan cannot be an autonomous state. The only option is for Japan to put intensive human labor into the procurement of raw materials and to manufacture high-quality goods which can be exported in exchange for more raw materials and from which she can make a margin profit. Under these imposed conditions, Japan is destined to be a "merchantilistic" state.

As previously mentioned, Japan's foreign policies have sprung from these considerations, however, different emphases have been placed on certain options.

One school of thinking has stressed that for her survival Japan must be engaged in a system of free and open international trade from which a free flow of goods and information can be obtained. Thus Japan must play a responsible role in cooperation with liberal capitalist countries to preserve this politico-economic system. Liberal capitalist countries such as the U. S., Canada, Australia, and the E. C. member states are Japan's most vital trading partners as well. Above all, cooperation with the United States is considered to be of vital importance to Japan's survival since the

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1) Professor Kei Wakaizumi similarly, but from a slightly different viewpoint, discerned two trends of thinking in postwar Japan, namely, "the conservatives" or "the realists" and "the reformists" or "the idealists". Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or Not to Act", Foreign Policy (No. 16, Fall 1974), pp. 30-47.
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U. S. is both the chief guarantee of the system and the major trading partner. Shigeru Yoshida, the founding father of the above-mentioned system of trade, believed firmly that cooperation with the United States is not only desirable but of absolute necessity for the survival and prosperity of Japan.

It goes without saying that for successful trade relations Japan depends upon economically and politically stable countries, which permit the transportation and exchange of goods, men, and information. For instance, since 81 percent of Japan’s imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf region via the Malacca Straits, political conflicts and other disturbances in these strategic Middle East and Southeast Asian countries are of paramount concern to Japan. Consequently, Japan must do all within her power to thwart any attempts to disrupt the peace and stability of these areas and to insure that her trading routes are not interrupted.

The second approach to foreign policy decisions argues that because of her dearth of essential natural resources, Japan must secure energy resources from any country which can provide them, irregardless of the differences in political and economic philosophy which may exist. In this view, Japan is not in a position to argue over the politico-economic strategies of those countries which are willing to purchase Japanese products. Some advocates of this view fear that dependence upon one particular group of countries for supply of raw materials and demand of Japanese products is, in the long range, risky.

This second approach of course recognizes that politico-economic stability in all corners of the globe is of vital importance to Japan. However, with this recognition, the advocates of this view have tended to conclude that in order to align itself positively with the countries upon which she may later depend, Japan must promote friendly relations and withdraw from antagonizing any country. Even though some countries may not yet be in a position to trade with Japan, their capability to disturb directly or indirectly the security and peace of countries important to Japan is of great concern to this group of thinkers. Thus it is felt that a posture referred to as “all-directional” diplomacy, which is often assailed as being “geisha-girl” or over “merchantilistic” without adhering to any specific principle except that of improving and promoting business. It follows that in this view Japan is encouraged to maintain an equal position towards the two Communist giants, the USSR and the PRC.

The difference between the first and second views towards foreign policy is best illustrated by the controversy held in 1951 over the question of with which countries Japan was to conclude the San Francisco peace treaty. The first type advocated concluding a separate treaty with only liberal democratic countries, while the second argued that the treaty should be concluded with all countries concerned—including the USSR, the PRC, and other Communist states. The controversy was partially resolved when the Soviet representative to the meeting left San Francisco before the
49 nations had affixed their signatures to the document, and thus the second view of foreign policy advocates lost ground and influence. None the less, the second view has been continued to the point where the Japanese Socialist and Communist Parties have demanded that the San Francisco treaty be abrogated. As seen, although the two views are diametrically opposed to each other, it is important to note that, closely examined, these two views complement or supplement each other, with the second view becoming a continued or an expanded extension of the first. Let me explain.

Like any other country Japan's cardinal interest lies in self-preservation. Thus when the question of self-preservation is at stake, Japan has no other option but to seek the help and cooperation of the U. S. and other Western countries. However, if this is not the question, it is natural and even healthy for Japan to demonstrate a more expansive economic and political interest in non-Western nations, including the so-called Communist states. We therefore can see that both of the above-mentioned views may be held simultaneously by a group or individual on either side. As a matter of fact, history has shown that since World War II, Japanese foreign policy has vacillated between the two differing conceptions. With this in mind, the question quickly arises: What factors demonstrate the strengths or the weaknesses of Japan which would swing the vote to one or the other view at any given moment? To answer, it is not one factor but many factors such as the basic policy orientations of the incumbent governing party, the position of the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) and its power relations with the opposition parties, the political maturity and mind of the general Japanese public, and so forth, which must be cited. In addition, international factors, including policies and pressures from the U. S., the USSR, and the PRC, undermine the ultimate decision made. Often, as a result of these many vital factors exerting their pressures on a particular view, the final decision is met with criticism and dismay by its opponents.

Against this background I would like to bring out more clearly the effects of the previously discussed views on the half year period I will cover in the remainder of this report: (1) During the half year period from the end of December 1979 to July 1980, continuous bickering has gone on among the proponents of these two schools of thoughts and policies; (2) Despite some difficulties, the first school, that is the one which insists on a cooperation policy with U. S., has won, and prevailed over the second in a more distinctive way than in any former period of postwar Japanese history; (3) None the less, both before and in the wake of the death of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, the architect of the first school of thought, there has been an observable gradual resurgence of the second school. I will illustrate further this observation in the first part of Chapters II, III, and IV.
II. Waiting, Hesitating, and Zigzagging

It can be safely said that on the level of principle the Japanese Government under Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira reacted rather promptly towards the Soviet military invasion into Afghanistan, which occurred at the end of December 1979. On December 29 Foreign Minister Saburo Okita called for an immediate halt to the invasion and at the same time ordered his Ministry to express Tokyo's protest against the Soviet action to the Soviet Ambassador to Japan Mr. Domitri Polyansky. On January 4, 1980, the first working day after the Japanese New Year holiday, the Ohira Government agreed to support the United Nations resolution condemning the Soviet incursion.

However, while adopting the principle of protest against the Soviet aggression in verbal measures on the one hand, it can be shown that in concrete measures, the Japanese government remained uncommitted and unsure of what responsive action to take. The Ohira Cabinet also appeared to vacillate as to what extent it should cooperate with the Carter Administration in the latter's strategy of letting the Soviets known that such military action would turn out to be very costly. The dictum “Act cautiously and carefully, watching how the Western nations react” underscored the basic attitude and policies of the Ohira Administration immediately following and continuing after the Afghanistan problem.

The inaction and indecision could not continue, however, and it was not long before the Ohira Cabinet found itself in a position of having to take a concrete stand against the Soviet Union as a result of firm pressure from Washington, LDP hawks, intellectuals, and other sectors of society. On January 5, after consulting with Vice Foreign Minister Masao Takashima, the Prime Minister, decided that in addition to having the Japanese Ambassador to the U. N. deliver a speech condemning Soviet expansionism, the nation should do something more to “express its displeasure” with the events in Afghanistan. Two days later, on the 7th, the Foreign Ministry announced that it was considering possible countermeasures against the Soviets in two major areas: (i) restrictions on personal exchanges between Japan and the USSR; and (ii) economic sanctions, including the suspension of joint economic development in Siberia.

The first measure, the suspension of person-to-person contacts, was not difficult to effect, in fact, was put into practice soon after announced. The following facts illustrate the immediacy with which this policy was enacted. On January 8 the pro-

posed visit of Mr. Gromyko to Tokyo was declared unaccepted5), and on the same
day a planned meeting with Mr. Polyanovsky was also called off and postponed indefi­
nitely by top members of the LDP6). A few days later, on the 11th, the scheduled
visit to Tokyo by members of the Supreme Soviet was rendered cancelled by the
speakers of both Houses of the Japanese Diet7).

In marked contrast, however, the second countermeasure, ie., the economic
sanctions against the Soviet Union, were not so easily implemented, although it was
in this area that the Japanese protest was considered to be most aggressive. Of
course, there were some Japanese, some representing the second view of foreign
policy, who feared that this measure would have a boomerang effect on Japan and
inflict great damage to the Japanese economy as well. This view was best expressed
by Mr. Shigeo Nagano, president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
who stressed the country's dearth of natural resources, as compared to the U. S.
situation, and indicated by these remarks that there is an inherent limit beyond which
Tokyo cannot cooperate with the U. S. policy against the Soviet Union. In his press
interview on January 7, Nagano warned:

Because of its paucity of energy resources, this country must explore many
areas in order to survive. This basic reality prohibits the separation of the
economy from foreign diplomacy. And in Japan's case, it is resources that
be obtained with expediency. What Japan has been doing in the Siberian joint
development ventures is not regarded as assistance to, nor cooperation with the
Soviet Union. It is an avenue through which Japan can buy the natural
resources she does not possess, ie., timber, coal, and so forth. The United
States is not in this position as it possesses all of the resources that Japan
has been purchasing from Soviet Union.

(Furthermore), whereas the United States exports computers and technical
equipment to the Russians, which serve to increase their military strength,
Japan, on the other hand, does not export such products8).

Immediately after the onset of the Afghanistan affair it does not appear that the
Ohira Administration had considered the option to voice its protest against the Soviet
action into the field of economy. In fact, on January 5 the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued a statement to the effect that such measures were not under consider­
ation9). Pressures from the LDP party, however, caused the Administration to shift
its position toward one advocating limited economic sanctions. And on January 8,
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top LDP leaders publicly announced their view that economic sanctions against the Soviet Union by Japan must be made "even in the face of resistance from the Japanese business community" 10). (Emphasis added by H. K.) They expressed: The view of business circles is quite understandable, and yet, the Government should pursue its own policy 11).

Nagano, although only temporarily, retreated. In another press interview on January 9th he commented: “Since the Siberian development project is being conducted largely by the official fund, namely, by funds from Japanese taxpayers, we will follow whatever the Government’s decisions are” 12). What Nagano said was regarded as a not a small “retreat” 13) from what he had stated only a few days before. At the same time, though, he did not fail to add a footnote to his remarks. “However”, he said, “there is no reason to decline the meeting with Victor Ivanov, the Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Trade” 14), who was scheduled to arrive in Tokyo for talks with Japanese businessmen on bilateral trade and economic projects. None the less, in spite of Nagano’s admonition, the Ohira Government refused Mr. Ivanov a Japanese visa.

The reaction of the Ohira Government with regard to the Soviet military aggression into Afghanistan in the first ten days of January 1980 was well summarized by Foreign Minister Okita in his speech at a luncheon for the Japan National Press Club on January 10. Having stated at the very outset of his speech that “a new phase in Japanese diplomacy has been ushered in by a series of recent events in such places as Iran and Afghanistan”, he continued with:

Although Japan was formerly interested mainly in economic recovery from her World War defeat, she now, whether she ilikes it or not, must demonstrate an interest in world affairs (as a whole). She is now in a transitory phase from as egocentric way of looking at things abroad to a more expansive way of responding more positively to other countries as impotent coinhabitants of the globe 15).

In the ensuing question and answer session, the Japanese Foreign Minister told newsmen that in regard to the U. S.-Iranian conflicts, the U. S. Administration had misunderstood Japan’s position due to the latter’s delayed reaction. As to the Afghanistan problems, however, Japan had quickly registered her protest against the Soviet invasion, as their action could not be recognized by Japan’s principle that

11) loc. cit.
13) loc. cit.
international conflicts should not be handled militarily\textsuperscript{16}). Compared to the utter importance of this principle, Mr. Okita continued, the question of how to manage the Siberian projects is of minor importance\textsuperscript{17}).

When discussion of the concrete countermeasures against the Soviet Union was raised, Mr. Okita suddenly hedged with the remark: “It corresponds to Japanese national interests that she consider the concrete measures cautiously, closely watching how other countries react to the problem”\textsuperscript{18}). He further emphasized that Japan would suffer heavier losses economically due to her greater dependence upon foreign energy and food sources as compared to other countries\textsuperscript{19}). In short, the Japanese Foreign Minister worked hard to construct a balance with regard to the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union by saying that “while taking a much severer attitude towards Soviet intervention in foreign affairs, Japan does not intend to change its basic policy of working towards the improvement of relations with its Communist neighbor”\textsuperscript{20}).

Pressures on the Ohira government to take more effective actions towards the Soviet Union continued. The Foreign Relations Committee of the LDP, chaired by former Foreign Minister, Zentaro Kosaka, expressed at its general assembly on January 11 that Japan should take stronger sanctions against the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{21}). Viewing Japanese responses to the Soviet invasion as lukewarm and slow, Australian Prime Minister Malcom Fraser also demanded that Japan take stronger reprisals during Mr. Ohira’s visit to Canberra in the middle of January\textsuperscript{22}). Around the same time, January 16–18, Japanese government leaders were holding three-day talks with White House special envoy Mr. Philip Habib, who was reported to have insisted that Japan terminate its loans and credits with the Soviets in order to cooperate with the U.S. in its containment policy against further Soviet expansion\textsuperscript{23}).

Having returned from his six-day tour of Australia, New Zealand, and Papua-New Guinea\textsuperscript{24)}, the Japanese Prime Minister made a speech at the Japan Press Club on January 22 in which the following important three points were delivered: (i) First, (on the issues concerning Iran and Afghanistan) Ohira stated that the foreign policy orientation of Japan was based on cooperation with the United States. He said, “It

\textsuperscript{16} The Sankei Shimbun, January 11, 1980.
\textsuperscript{17} loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{18} loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{19} loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{20} loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{21} The Asahi Shimbun, January 12, 1980.
\textsuperscript{22} The Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), January 16, 1980.
\textsuperscript{23} The Yomiuri Shimbun, January 19, 1980.
\textsuperscript{24} Ohira’s visit to these Pacific Ocean countries was bitterly criticised by the Soviets. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (Soviet Union) — hereafter cited as FBIS (SOV)— January 21, 1980, p. c 1.
is not sufficient to simply state this in words, nor useful unless accompanied by deeds.”25) “I am not sure whether every measure taken by Japan will be satisfactory to the U. S.”, he continued, “but I do not doubt that they are at least understood by the U. S.”26) (ii) Secondly, (on the character of the Soviet conduct of foreign affairs), the Prime Minister expressed, “The Soviet Union is a defensive, cautious, diplomatically skillful and experienced country, not a reckless country”27); (iii) Thirdly, (concerning Japan’s possible boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games), Ohira evasively stated: “It depends primarily upon how the Japanese Olympic Committee (J. O. C.) judges and decides5) For the time being, the Government intends to observe the reactions of Western and other countries”29). “Of course, the domestic public opinion must also be taken into consideration"30), Ohira said.

Not a few readers may have already begun to feel irritated and possibly alarmed because of the slow and inconsistent foreign policy stratagems of the Ohira Administration. Admittedly, this zig-zagging, non-committal type of policy making is an anachronism in the milieu of modern age government, and for Western observers it is particularly inscrutable. However, it must be seen — and believed — that Japanese government leaders decide policies in an indirect, rather than direct, process which more than likely involves waiting patiently until the last minute — when there is no alternative but to finally decide. Unlike their Western counterparts, these leaders do not dictate, initiate, nor discuss alternatives and plans with the general public and others concerned. Instead, they create an environment, mood or atmosphere out of which they can later insist that certain policies have evolved naturally as a matter of course. By taking full advantage of this manipulated environment and moment of decision, Japanese leaders are able to push through their policies without much opposition and resistance from those who are not in the know. We may observe at this point that former Prime Minister Ohira was, relatively speaking, a more articulate statesman than were many of his predecessors; however, in essence he did not deviate exceptionally from the traditional Japanese patterns of decision making.

III. Clear Manifestations of Cooperative Policy with the U. S.

With the Japanese politicians favored practice of manipulating public opinion at opportune times in mind, it is interesting to analyze the two incidents involving

26) loc. cit.
27) loc. cit.
28) loc. cit.
29) loc. cit.
30) loc. cit.
Russian-Japanese intrigue which surfaced in the news in mid January 1980. The first incident, reported on January 9, occurred in the Nemuro area of Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, and involved the arrest of three local fishermen by Hokkaido police for having Russian coast guards with small gifts to ease sea mile restrictions and fines for violations of such. The fact that Japanese fishermen were indicted for the first time by Japanese police, who, it appeared, had gone out of their way in this action, came as a shock to many. Looking more closely, however, it appears that the national government was actively behind the incident in order to arouse an anti-Soviet sentiment among the Japanese public. It was later revealed that the fishermen had in fact relinquished to the Soviets some strategic documents and information on the Hokkaido-based campaign to reclaim the “Northern Territories” mentioned in Chapter II.13

Soon after the first incident came the arrest on January 18 of Mr. Yukio Miyanaga, a retired major general, and two incumbent members of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces on charges of espionage for the Soviet Union. Miyanaga quickly confessed his role in passing secret military information to the military attache to the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, Col. Yuri Kozlov.

Some, of course, may contend that it was mere coincidence that governed the occurrence of these two incidents at precisely the time when the Government was against the wall to decide on stronger reprisals against the Soviets. None the less, both incidents did result in arousing the desired anti-Soviet mood of the general public, which in turn greatly facilitated the Government’s subsequent decisions.

On January 25, in his program speech at the plenary session of the joint Houses of the Diet, Mr. Ohira finally clarified his Administration’s major policy line regarding the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. In essence, he declared: “The Government intends to make efforts suitable for Japan which are based on its solidarity policy with the United States and which are in accordance with the stand of Western and other nation. Up to now, our country has made its stand clear through its activities in the United Nations and the suspension of personal exchanges with the Soviet Union. We will continue to consider and implement other appropriate measures, including a tightening of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Communist Area) controls on sales to Russia”22. Even more boldly, Ohira continued: “I think that in doing the above our country should not hesitate to make sacrifices. Moreover, I would like to make it clear that our country will do nothing that will impede reprisals taken by other countries or undermine their impact”33. (Emphasis added by H. K.)

3) loc. cit.
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Needless to say, the impact of these latter words was immeasureable. Mr. Ohira reiterated this attitude and policy orientation in the remaining session of the Diet. On February 1, in the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Ohira even went out of his way to amend his former views such as his statement that the Soviet Union is a defensive country, views which had been criticized both domestically and internationally, by saying that “In the Diet itself (where every statement is recorded and carries official and authoritative weight) I have never expressed that the Soviet Union is defensive or aggressive”\(^4\)). He went on to explain why he had not made this judgment: “It is not expedient for me to comment on whether a particular (foreign) country is aggressive or defensive”\(^5\)). Having made this reservation, however, the Prime Minister introduced a contrary statement: “It is an objective fact that recently the has been greatly reinforcing its military forces, judging from the Soviet military Soviet Union deployment in the Northern Islands (and in other areas). (Thus) I cannot help but regard the Soviet troops (there) as a potential threat to Japan”\(^6\)). This statement constituted a sensational remark, as it was the first occasion, believe ot not, that a post-war Prime Minister had ever officially in the Diet called Soviet forces “a threat to Japan”\(^7\)). When asked further by the Committee what he meant by “a potential Soviet threat”, Ohira replied that “It is not an erroneous interpretation that the Soviet capability to invade Japan exists and it is a question of Soviet initiative whether it is exercised”\(^8\)).

This shift in Mr. Chira’s views greatly encouraged high officials, especially those with responsibilities in defense affairs. In one notable slip of the tongue, Mr. Kichizo Hosada, the Director General of the Defense Agency, in a press interview given on February 4, commented that he personally regarded the Soviet armed forces as “a serious threat to Japan”\(^9\)), although he later revised the statement, saying that his view was not so different as that expressed by Mr. Ohira at the Diet session a few days earlier (emphasis by H. K.)\(^10\)). More significantly in a Budget Committee meeting in the Diet on the same day, Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki, councillor of the Japan Defense Agency, disclosed for the first time that about ten SS-20 mobile intermediate-range missiles had already deployed in the Far East\(^11\)). With these revelations, the issue of defense and security grew to major proportions, and in fact, became the biggest issue in the Diet during the first half of 1980\(^12\)). Several books and articles

\(^5\) loc. cit.
\(^6\) loc. cit.
\(^7\) loc. cit.
\(^8\) The Sankei Shimbun, January 5, 1980.
\(^10\) loc. cit.
\(^12\) loc. cit.
Hiroshi KIMURA

with title such as "Hokkaido Next After Afghanistan", "The Soviet Forces Have Landed in Japan", and "The 11-day War in Hokkaido", were released, some of which reached the bestseller lists.

Also in early February the Ohira Administration agreed that Japan would join the U. S. sponsored drive to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics, which was another concrete measure of anti-Soviet action protest\(^{13}\). Foreign Minister Okita stated that the decision was based on the fact that Japan’s foreign policy is in accord with policies set forth by the U. S. government\(^{14}\). This was, of course, a decision for the Japan Olympic Committee (JOC). However, the Committee shortly after assented to the Government’s demands, since the JOC is dependent upon government subsidiaries not only for sending delegations to the Games, but also for its regular year-round activities\(^{15}\).

Together with the policies of freezing official, personal, and cultural exchanges and the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, the restriction of economic relations with the Soviet Union became the third sanction. Although this sanction is considered to be the most powerful weapon against the Soviet Union, many have argued that it will have a back-fire effect on Japan with dire consequences. The concrete measures taken in the economic sectors were also in cooperation with the U. S. policy of retaliation against the Soviets.

The following restrictions and cancellations were put into effect. By refusing an entry visa into Japan to Vice-Foreign Trade Minister Victor Ivanov, the Ohira Government practically suspended the following economic projects and plans about which the Vice Minister was scheduled to confer in Tokyo: the coke and coal mining production projects in Southern Yakutsk; the third stage program for lumber resources development scheduled to begin in 1980; and the exportation of large steel pipes from Japan to the USSR\(^{16}\). The Government’s policies at this stage were of two types: the Export-Import Bank of Japan was forbidden to extend credits for new projects; but on the other hand, there was no policy to suspend the project agreements which had previously been concluded, although additional bank loans would be denied\(^{17}\).

Moreover, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) adopted a policy (i) of not permitting the export of goods enumerated in the so-called "COCOM List" which require a special application; and (ii) of freezing two items, including a special type of camera with high speed facilities, which also are acquired by special application\(^{18}\).

In an effect to rally behind President Carter's embargo of U. S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture decided to purchase an additional one million tons of wheat and corn from the U. S.\textsuperscript{19}. One group of professors boldly suggested that Japan go even further and purchase the whole 17 million tons of grain!

It is necessary to inject here that the above mentioned sanction were levelled against the Soviet Union despite the threat of retaliatory measures, especially in the sensitive area of fishing rights between the two nations. Although time and lengthy diplomatic negotiations have somewhat hammered out mutually satisfying policies on the "200-nautical-mile" problem\textsuperscript{20}, the Japanese have continued to find themselves on the weaker with regard to bargaining on the fish catch quota. The fishing quota and zone question did not escape Soviet Ambassador Polyansky's notice, as revealed in an interview with the Kyodo News Service on February 10 when he threatened: "We have no intention of restricting Japanese operations; however, if Japan chooses to follow the U. S.'s lead in imposing economic sanctions, we will take appropriate counter steps"\textsuperscript{21}.

With the initiation of the economic sanctions, the plenary session of the House of Representatives finally passed on March 13 the resolution to request the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The resolution was adopted by all of the political parties except the Japanese Communist Party, which insisted that Americans and Chinese also be condemned for their support of antigovernmental forces in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{22}.

The effect and direction of the Government's policies were further strengthened when Mr. Ohira visited Washington on April 31—May 1 and assured the American President of Japan's solidarity with the U. S. and of the nation's continuing support of the U. S. policies towards Iran and the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{23}. In the wake of the devastating blow to American military pride following the ill-fated U. S. mission to rescue the hostages in Iran, Mr. Ohira's guarantee must have come as a welcomed omen. Many in Japan felt that President Carter's appreciation for this effort and his friendship with Mr. Ohira influence his decision to attend the Prime Minister's funeral in June.

\textsuperscript{19} The Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), February 19, 1980; The Yomiuri Shimbun, February 20, 1980.


\textsuperscript{21} The Japan Times, February 10, 1980.

\textsuperscript{22} The Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1980.

\textsuperscript{23} Asahi Evening News, May 3, 1980.
IV. Need for Dialogue with the Soviets

As we have seen thus far, the foreign policy oriented towards cooperation with non-Communist and capitalist nations prevailed during the first half of 1980. Although this kind of policy orientation had rarely before been so clearly implemented, it must be seen that the rationale which considered cooperation with any country which serves the interests of Japan was also alive and well. Mr. Hisaya Usui, the former chief of the Moscow bureau of the Asahi Shim bun, explained the rationale of this second conception in the February 8 issue of the newspaper:

The cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy is, needless to say, based upon Japan-U. S. cooperation. Both the Japanese Government and business circles fully understand the American sentiments at present. However, we should remind ourselves of that the position of Japan is different from that of the United States in that the former undertakes Siberian economic developments in order to secure energy resources, whereas the latter does not have to do the same1).

On March 6, Mr. Shigeo Nagano, president of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told the press in a regular interview that Japan must deal with the Soviet Union more rationally than emotionally, and he stressed that economic cooperation with the Soviet Union is not to be regarded as assistance but as business. Nagano went on to reiterate his favorite theory:

The Japanese are buying unavailable natural resources from Russia in order to provide the Soviet Union with credits to purchase Japanese manufactured goods2).

Further objections to the U. S.-Japan solidarity policy were voiced by Mr. Michihiro Amaya, councillor of the M. I. T. I., (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry), who disclosed in a press interview that his Ministry was requesting that the U. S. Government to allow Japan to make two exceptions in economic sanctions policy towards the USSR—namely, that the oil and gas resources project begun on the continental shelf off Sakhalin be resumed, and that exports of large steel pipes to the USSR be continued3). These were two of the four projects that were suspended automatically by the Japanese Government’s decision not to grant an entry visa to V. Ivanov (See page 7.). In May the Ohira Government decided to resume the extension of credits and loans to the Soviet Union by the Export-Import Bank of Japan with regard to those contracts of goods which “do not help the USSR increase its military

strength\(^4\). In its explanation of this new policy, the Government excused itself by saying: "Due to the five-month suspension of credits by the Japanese Export-Import Bank, Soviet-Japanese trade relations have become greatly stagnated. The Government cannot overlook any longer the debilitating impact the condition will have upon trade and business, if allowed to continue, especially in the light of the mutually supplementary relations which have existed between the Japanese and Soviet economies"\(^5\).

Despite this trend of the Government's gradual softening of its previously exercised restrictions on Soviet-Japanese economic relations, the country was nevertheless surprised to learn that the Government had decided on May 22 to provide bank loans to the third-stage program for lumber resources development\(^6\), because this was a project that even Mr. Nagano and Michio Takeuchi, president of the Export-Import Bank, had abandoned on principle\(^7\). This project may be regarded as a new one or an old one, depending on how it is viewed. The Ohira Administration dared to consider it as an old one, ie., a continuation of the first and second stages previously initiated project. By way of rationalization, the Government explained: "If Japan shelves this third stage project, the Japanese investment in the first and second stages will be wasted"\(^8\). Interestingly, a new rationale, which questioned why only Japan was coerced to back up U. S. recriminations against the USSR when other Western countries could pursue their policies autonomously, surfaced at the same time. This rationale further encouraged the Government's green light to the third stage timber project\(^9\).

Of course, this rather haphazard, inconsistent trend of allowing exceptions one after another in economic fields did not escape the satiric notice of many observers. In the May 30 issue of the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, for example, the following jibe was made: "Although the Government has exercised its protests against the events in Afghanistan with this or that sanction or countermeasure, it may well turn out that at the end of this year we may see that business relations with the Soviet Union were conducted as well as usual without much interference"\(^10\).

It was also around this time that a heated debate took place on the question of whether the Japanese tendency to separate economics from politics in their postwar "merchantilistic" view of international relations was appropriate or not.

Defining Japan as a "special kind of state", Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa, the former

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5) loc. cit.
9) loc. cit.
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Foreign Minister and current Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Suzuki Cabinet, told an interviewer: “It must be seen that Japan can conduct nothing but a non-moral diplomacy, ie., a diplomacy without any value judgment except that which considers cost-benefits”11. Naohiro Amaya, councillor of the M. I. T. I., advocated similarly that Japan must become more “merchantilistic” state and avoid becoming engaged in what he termed “warrier diplomacy”. He warned, “Warrier diplomacy is not recommendable to Japan, because then it becomes necessary to arm sufficiently so that military strength is available, say if the Holmes Strait is ever threatened. Instead, it is advisable for Japan to become more merchantilistic, more like a successful merchant who exercises emotional and other restraints in order to increase benefits12”. Hideo Matsuoka, working formerly for the Mainichi Shim bun and currently a free lance, went one or two more steps further when he stated: “Because Japan is without natural resources, it must maintain peaceful and friendly relations with all countries in the world in order to secure these resources. Thus it is prudent for Japan to avoid becoming embroiled in international conflicts”. He concluded that he felt it was out of the question for Japan to join in the retaliatory actions against the Soviet Union which were being exercised by the U. S.13).

These views were later criticized sharply by Prof. Masamori Sase of the National Defense Academy, who pointed out that whether it is accepted or not, Japan cannot be considered to be a purely “merchantilistic state”. The fact that Japan ranks eighth in the world in military might underscores its position as both a “merchantile” and “warrier” state, he said. Secondly, Prof. Sase reminded that because of its destined diplomatic position, Japan cannot hope to be accepted or appreciated by other countries as a mere merchantile state. His last point stressed the priority of retaining the U. S. as a valued trading partner and of preventing the U. S. from becoming unhappy with Japan14).

The unexpected and sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira on June 12 interrupted this debate; however, the ensuing events served to highlight its dimensions. Mr. Masayoshi Ito, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, was appointed acting Prime Minister in charge of international affairs together with Foreign Minister Okita until July 17, when the new Cabinet was formulated. The most significant event of this brief transitory period was the meeting between President Carter and China’s Hua Guofeng, which was held in Tokyo on July 10 following the Government’s funeral services for

Mr. Ohira. Undoubtedly, the two leaders discussed the problem of the Soviet Union, so that the Soviets perceived this summit to have an “anti-Soviet orientation”\(^{15}\). It cannot be said that Ito and Okita discouraged these talks; they were, in fact, eager for the leaders to meet in Tokyo\(^{16}\).

Following these events, the new Prime Minister, Mr. Zenko Suzuki, made his basic foreign policy known in his first news conference on July 18. He stated that he would continue the policies of his predecessor, and that his selection of Mr. Ito as Foreign Minister, who was formerly Mr. Ohira’s Chief Cabinet Secretary and aide, was a concrete demonstration of this determination\(^{17}\). After defining the U. S.-Japan relationship as the pivotal point of Japan’s foreign policy, Suzuki stated: “Japan’s relation with its neighbor, the Soviet Union, are important; however, endeavors made only on the Japanese side are not sufficient. We expect the Soviets to initiate some action with reagards to Afghanistan and the Northern Territories if it really wants to improve its relations with us.”\(^{18}\)

Although Foreign Minister Ito repeated this line of contention, he also added that he deemd it necessary for Japan to keep an open line of communication with the Soviet Union despite the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan\(^{19}\). Out of caution, Mr. Ito did not stretch his statement beyond this. He did, however, grant an entry visa to Mr. Nicolai N. Soloviev, the chief of the Soviet Second Ministry of Far Eastern Affairs Department, which was interpreted as a gesture made by the new Government to break away from the former Prime Minister’s restrictions on person-to-person contacts between the two countries. During his stay in Tokyo, Mr. Soloviev strongly expressed the willingness of the Soviet Union to improve its relations with Japan\(^{20}\). However, Mr. Toshiaki Muto, the Director General of the European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, clearly under instructions from Mr. Ito, noted that: “The recent military buildup on the Japan-claimed islands off Hokkaido and the Soviet military invasion into Afghanistan are the major causes of the disharmo­ny between Tokyo and Mocow, and hence, the Soviet Union is considered to be responsible for the strained bilateral relation”\(^{21}\). Foreign Minister Ito later made it known that no entry visa would be issued to other Soviet officials, ie., to Mr. Vladimir M. Sushkov, the Vice Foreign Trade Minister, because the Government wished to continue its previous policy of not honoring personal exchanges or communication

\(^{15}\) Izvestiya, July 19, 1980.
\(^{16}\) The Yomiuri Shimbun, July 10, 1980.
\(^{18}\) loc. cit.
\(^{19}\) The Japan Times, July 18, 1980; The Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 1980; August 8, 1980.
\(^{21}\) loc. cit.
Tokyo-Moscow relations were further strained in August, when a disabled Soviet nuclear submarine was discovered in Japanese territorial waters without the advance permission of the Japanese Government. The Suzuki Government denounced the action as an "unfriendly act."23.

As of the writing of this report in August, 1980, we may conclude that, with the exception of the Japanese Government's hopeful pursuit of economic ties and dialogue with the Soviet Union, the general attitude and policies of the Suzuki Administration towards Moscow remain cool and reserved and similar to those of the preceding administration.

V. The General Soviet Attitude Towards the Ohira Administration in the Light of Traditional Soviet Views, Objectives, and Strategies

It is safe to say that the following represent the major Soviet perceptions and views towards Japan during the postwar period: (1) The Soviets have regarded Japan as a capitalist country which is dominated by conservative thinkers. They have observed that although Japan portends to follow an "all-dimensional" type of diplomacy, it has in actual practice faithfully embraced the U.S. perspective on foreign policy decisions. And, in addition, the Soviets have discredited the Japanese objective to keep an "equal distance" between Moscow and Beijing, by claiming that in fact the Government has moved closer to the latter; (2) The Soviets recognize Japan's relatively weak military position, that without its strategic ties with the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, the country is handicapped. However, they also have observed the nation's efforts to fortify itself militarily due to the decline of American might and increased pressure from the U.S.; (3) Japan's highly developed know-how and technology are not overlooked by the Soviets for the contribution they can make to the Soviet economy, particularly in the development of Siberia and the Far Eastern part of the USSR; (4) The Soviets view the persistent claims that the "Northern Territories" be returned to Japan as empty, as they consider the issue closed and, therefore, foresee no reason to reopen the question.

It goes without saying that from these basic perceptions and determinations stem almost automatically the Soviet objectives and strategies towards Japan: (1) First of all, the Soviets have persisted in trying to prevent Tokyo from aligning with other major powers such as the U.S. and China; (2) And, of course, they have worked to keep Japan from becoming more militarily solvent; (3) Another objective is to tap

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22) loc. cit.
Japan for credits and needed technology in their country; (4) And, finally, they have insisted on these objectives without having conceded on any territorial issue. Needless to say, there are several conflicts and contradictions in these Soviet objectives. For instance, if the Soviets want to pursue the first and the third objective, it is expected that they would in turn adopt a more compromising posture regarding the territorial conflicts between the two countries.

Against this background, we may ask which, if any, of these perspectives have changed, or what new perspectives have been added during the period covered in this report. In answer, it is clear that during the period in question, namely the half year from the Soviet invasion into Kabul (Dec., 1979) until around the formation of the Suzuki Cabinet (July, 1980) the Soviet Union has reacted defensively and uncompromisingly in the face of the Japanese protests against the Soviet conduct in international affairs such as the military advances into Afghanistan (December 1979); the “Miyanaga espionage case”; the case of the three fishermen who passed information to the Soviet patrol boat (January, 1980); the crash of a Soviet TU-16 Badger reconnaissance-attack plane into the Sea of Japan (June); the violation of the disabled nuclear power submarine in Japanese waters (August), and others. The Kremlin has responded to these issues and their recrimination with verbal criticism and bluffs and not much else. In the next section I will elaborate on the nature of the Soviet responses and its corresponding actions.

To begin with, the Kremlin generally considered the foreign policy of the Ohira Administration to be extraordinarily anti-Soviet. The Soviets particularly took notice of the policy changes in late January 1980, which they regarded as reflecting or more dangerous, anti-Soviet course. In this regard, they criticized severely Ohira’s key-note speech on January 25, 1980, in the Japanese Diet upon his return from Australia and New Zealand. In his article, entitled “Amending Policy”, in the January 20 issue of Pravda, Mr. Yu. Vdovin commented, “It is no longer being said, as it was a year ago, that the strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union is one of the goals of Japanese Diplomacy”1). Another criticism of Mr. Ohira’s speech was delivered on January 24 by Mr. V. Tsvetov, the Tokyo correspondent of the Moscow Broadcast Service, who pointed out that “Ohira’s speech failed to include his views on Japan-Soviet relation”2). In the February 9 issue of Izvestiya, Mr. Yu. Bandura sharply criticized the change in Ohira’s view of the Soviet Union from one which was previously defensive to one which became “aggressive”, “important”, and “dangerous” with a “potential threat to Japan”3).

Instead, Ohira was perceived as a pro-Chinese politician, because of his eagerness

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1) Pravda, January 20, 1980.
3) Izvestiya, February 9, 1980.
to improve Japan’s relations with the P. R. C. even as early as 1972, when as Foreign Minister he signed the Japan-China normalization treaty in Beijing. Also, the Prime Minister had returned to Beijing in 1979 as the first head of state since the conclusion of the treaty and at that time had extended an invitation to China’s Hua Guofeng to visit Tokyo (1980).

Even more importantly, Ohira was regarded as a more pro-Western, especially pro-U.S.-oriented leader than his predecessors. This belief was publicized by Mr. V. Kudryavtsev in the May 27 issue of Izvestiya in these terms: “No postwar government leader has formulated foreign policies with as much lack of independence and authority as Mr. Ohira”4). Mr. V. Tsvetov also argued: “Prime Minister Ohira has demonstrated Japan’s total solidarity with the U.S. adventurist policy. In Washington he declared that Japan is ready to cooperate with U. S. policy at any cost”5). Tsvetov then went on to list examples of Ohira’s complicity with U. S. policies: “The Japanese”, he said, “have joined in the U. S. provoked actions against Iran; pledged full support of President Carter’s position on the Afghan issue; built up an attitude of anti-Sovietism; meddled with the Olympics; and catered to U. S. demands for a large-scale military buildup”6).

VI. Criticism of the Pacific Ocean Basin Concept

No other criticism against Japan has, to my mind, so frequently appeared in official Soviet papers and medias during this period than that against Mr. Ohira’s “Pacific Ocean Basin Concept”1). It is, of course, understandable that the Soviets be overly concerned about the concept because it serves as a counterbalance to the Soviet designed “Asian Collective Security” concept, which is considered to be the cornerstone of Soviet Asian policies.

Historically, the “Pacific Basic Concept” was being considered even back in the early 1960’s2); however, it was Mr. Ohira who most enthusiastically promoted it in Japan3). While prime minister Ohira organized a special advisory group to study and

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4) Ibid., May 27, 1980.
5) FBIS (SOV), May 5, 1980, p. c 1.
6) FBIS (SOV), May 20, 1980, p. c 1.
1) The Soviets have been concerned over Japanese idea of “Pacific Ocean Community” for quite a long time. In his 290-hage book, Japan in the World Politics (1973), Dmitri V. Petrov, Soviet expert on Japan, mentioned this word 17 times! Iaponiya v mirovoï politike (Moscow: Igdatel’stvo Mezhdunarodnue otnosheniya, 1973).
3) S. N. Nikonov regards Ohira as the initiator of this concept, and Yu. Bandura writes that “in Japan this concept is connected with the name of Premier Ohira”. S. N. Nikonov, “O planakh sozdaniya novoi regional’noi organizatsii stran basseina Tikhogo okeana,” Problemy dal’ nogo bostoka (No. 2, 1980), p. 170; Bandura, op. cit., p. 64.
work on a "Pacific Basin Cooperation". He later appointed the chairman of this group, Mr. Saburo Okita, as his foreign minister. In his Diet session speech on January 25, Ohira stated: "I consider it my obligation to promote further friendly and cooperative relations with the U. S., Canada, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries in the Pacific region".

In this connection it is worthwhile to point out that in his general policy of following the policies of his predecessor, Prime Minister Suzuki has promoted in particular the continuation of the Pacific Basin Cooperation. Mr. Suzuki's determination was recently put into effect when he sent a delegation, including Professor Tsuneo Iida, the successor of Mr. Okita as chairman of the Cooperation, to an international seminar on Pacific Basin cooperation in Canberra in September 1980, as promised by Mr. Ohira.

We will now examine three major points which have unleashed the heavy criticism and hostile attitudes towards the Cooperation from the Soviet side.

The Soviets, first of all, object to the capitalistic connotations they interpret from "the Cooperation". Judging from their comments, it appears that although the term "open" is unoffensive, the Soviets find the term "free" and its implications in the free enterprise system unacceptable. The Soviets have openly criticized the use of the terms "open" and "free" in the final report on the "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" submitted on May 10, 1980 to Mr. Ohira by the Cooperation Study Group. The Report regards "free and open relations" (among nations in the Pacific region) as "the most basic principle of the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept". "Free and open interdependence in economic spheres", the Report continues, implies the "promotion of trade and capital transfer". From the Soviet point of view it is nothing but a contradiction or a "duality" for the authors of the Report to advocate both an "open and free" system at one and the same time. Yu. Bandura writes, for instance, in his article "The Pacific Ocean Community—Birth of Diplomatic Imperialism" in the Soviet periodical *International Affairs* (No. 5, 1980):

The attitude of Japan towards participation in the planned organization of socialist countries of the Asian-Pacific region shows a double-standard: On the one hand, planners repeatedly talk about the creation of an "open community"; but on the other hand, the explicit objective of this 'community' is the "freedom of trade and capital transfer", an ideal which is pursued primarily guarantee of by capitalist countries.

7) *loc. cit*.
8) Bandura, "‘Tikhookeanskoe soobshchestvo …,” p. 64.
Bandura interprets the Report's phrase "free international economic system" as a "capitalist system"\(^9\).

The second major brunt of the Soviet distrust of the "Community" stems from their strong fears that the "Community" will not allow for the participation of socialist governments. These fears have lingered despite the repeated assertion by the late Mr. Ohira that "there is no reason to decline the participation of any nation that wishes to join the Community"\(^10\). The Soviet doubts are well expressed by Mr. Bandura in the January 17 issue of *Izvestiya* when he criticizes the Community's Interim Report submitted to Mr. Ohira on November 30, 1979, by his appointed study group. He comments: "The authors of the concept leave no room for the participation of socialist countries in the Pacific Ocean Cooperation"\(^11\). Later in the year, Mr. Vladimir Tsvetov, the Tokyo correspondent for the Moscow Broadcast Service, echoes these words in his criticism of the Community's Final Report on June 8, 1980: "The plan to create a closed alliance in the Pacific basin does not envisage the participation of any socialist countries except China"\(^12\).

Thirdly, the Soviets have insisted that the establishment of a military alliance is of primary interest to the Community, despite the assurances from the Japanese side that the Community's interests are of a cultural and economic nature\(^13\). In another article entitled "Facts Versus Words" in the February 24 issue of *Izvestiya*, Mr. Bandura complained: "Tokyo spares no effort to explain that the concept (of the Pacific Community) being pushed through by Japan pursues neither political nor military goals. ... However, the facts indicate the opposite"\(^14\). The participation for the first time of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Rimpac-80, Pacific Ocean naval exercises, together with the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, from February to March, 1980, reinforced the Soviet suspicion that "there are military aspects in the Pacific Community design"\(^15\). V. Gorovnin in the February 28, 1980, issue of the *APN News* noted: "The participants in these military maneuvers are those countries which will play a central role in the Pacific Basin Community design envisaged tenuously by Japan"\(^16\). And he concluded, "Although Japan has defined this design to be of a purely economic and cultural nature, we see that the Pacific Ocean

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13) For instance, the late Premier Ohira clearly stated in the Lower House Budget Committee on February 5, 1980, that "we want to confine this idea of the Pacific Basin Cooperation only in economic and cultural spheres". *The Hokkaido Shim bun*, February 6, 1980. New Premier Suzuki also emphasized *cultural and economic* aspects. See footnote (5).
JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Cooperation has begun actual maneuvers in the military field\(^\text{17}\). In summary, the Soviets have regarded the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept advocated by Ohira and continued by Suzuki as “an attempt to knock together another anti-Communist military-political grouping of the ANZUS bloc and the Japanese-American security treaty”\(^{18}\), which also includes China, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Moscow Tass)\(^{19}\). They have gone so far as to envision the new Ohira doctrine as a “modernized conception of the ‘greater Asian coprosperity sphere’ which was promoted by the Japanese militarists during World war II”\(^{20}\).

VII. A Mixture of Sympathy, Bluff and Material Incentives

While bitterly criticizing the Japanese participation in and designs for the Pacific Basin Community and the increasing military potentials of Japan, the Soviets have not at the same time failed to show some conciliatory gestures. The well-known “carrot and stick” strategy is often used by the Soviets when faced with an international dilemma. At any rate let us turn now to examine more conciliatory side of the Soviet strategy towards Japan in the months after invasion into Afghanistan.

One example of Soviet sympathy towards Japan is found in their tendency to regard Japan as an innocent victim of preying countries like the U.S. and China, which allows the Soviets some space for manipulation. Often Moscow sees Japan in the position of being turned towards anti-Soviet and militaristic attitudes by overwhelming pressures from Washington and Beijing\(^{21}\).

In the article “Dangerous Metamorphoses” in the February 9 issue of Izvestiya, Yu. Bandura comments:

These metamorphoses can be explained quite simply: The independence of Japanese diplomacy, of which Tokyo is so fond of talking, is beginning to show cracks under growing U.S. pressure\(^{22}\).

Bandura views the “arm-twisting diplomacy” of former Prime Minister Ohira as the most important “instrument” of the White House\(^{23}\). Col. V. Tatarnikov in Krasnaya zvezda (March 25, 1980), also argued that the “buildup of the ‘Self-Defense Forces’ and anti-Soviet sentiments in Japan” is “being done under pressure from Washington”\(^{24}\).

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17) loc. cit.
18) Pravda, January 22, 1980.
20) loc. cit.
22) Izvestiya, February 9, 1980.
23) loc. cit.
More concretely speaking, the Soviets feel that the U. S. has been coercing Japan to do the following: to participate in joint military plans with the United States and NATO against the USSR\(^5\); (ii) to join the ‘RIMPAC-80’\(^6\); (iii) to turn Okinawa into a base for the transfer of American marines to the Persian Gulf region and other regions\(^7\); (iv) to prepare for a naval blockade of three straits (the La Perouse, Tsugaru and Tsushima straits) in the case of emergency\(^8\); (v) to take part in the ‘boycott’ of the Moscow Olympics\(^9\); (vi) to halt credits for the implementation of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation projects\(^10\), and so forth\(^11\).

According to the Soviets, Beijing has also exerted pressures on Tokyo to cooperate in adventurous anti-Soviet strategies\(^12\). Mr. V. Ganshi, a Soviet commentator of the Moscow Radio Broadcast, argued that it is Beijing’s pressure that has caused Tokyo to abandon its “equal distance” policy towards the USSR and the PRC. He noted in the May issue of *Izvestiya* on the eve of Premier Hua Guofeng’s visit to Tokyo that China has intensified its efforts “to draw Tokyo into the stream of its anti-Soviet, hegemonist policy and to push Japan away from more balanced approaches to relations with its neighbors”\(^13\).

The insinuation that the P. R. C. is exerting its own pressures on Tokyo was made directly in a June 7 Tass report following the Chinese leader Hua Guofeng’s visit to Tokyo. The report expressed, “The Chinese leader sought to use this opportunity to the utmost ... to urge Japan to increase the might of its armed forces and to develop an aggressive military alliance with the U. S.\(^14\). In a later article entitled “Where Beijing is dragging Japan?” in the June 20 issue of *Izvestiya*, writer M. Demchenko likewise reported Hua Guofeng’s complaint to Yasuhiro Nakasone, an influential member of the L. D. P., who was visiting Beijing in April 1980, that “Japan’s military spending is low”\(^15\).

Without doubt, the Soviets have become considered of the existence of an anti-

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6) *loc. cit.*
9) *loc. cit.*
10) *loc. cit.*
11) According to what the Soviets have been saying, the change in the leadership of the Japan Defense Agency from Enji Kubota to Kichizo Hosoda, was carried out by Premier Ohira, in conditions of “intensifying pressure from Washington, which is trying to involve Japan more extensively in its strategy in the Far East and in Asia as a whole.” *FBIS (SOV)*, February 6, 1980, p. C 2. *Izvestiya* says that the tour of Sunao Sonoda, the Ohira’s special envoy, to Near East countries, Pakistan and India in March 1980, was dictated also by the U. S.!! *Izvestiya*, March 19, 1980.
Soviet military bloc into, which Washington and Beijing have enticed Japan. Another quotation from the Moscow Tass report mentioned above serves to illuminate this view: "The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement is aimed at knocking together a reactionary anti-Soviet alliance and drawing Japan into its designs as well"\(^{16}\).

The Soviet use of the "stick" policy is best illustrated in the area of economic relations between the two countries. One particular area in which the "stick" strategy was exercised appeared in the area of bilateral fishing negotiations. The Japanese vulnerable and relatively weak position in this area soon became the attacking point of Soviet countermeasures and threats.

One of the first warnings of retaliation appeared in the February 16 issue of the Izvestiya, in which the commentator, Michael Demchenko, stated: "Any sanctions against the Soviet Union can ultimately lead to only one thing—destruction of the system of Soviet-Japanese relations"\(^{17}\). More specifically, Demchenko went on: "the system of Soviet-Japanese ties includes many spheres, among them fisheries"\(^{18}\). And he went on:

Japanese fishing circles are now concerned whether Japan's pursuit of the U.S. anti-Soviet course will influence the Soviet Union's attitude towards the (fishing-H. K.) question, since the application of 'sanctions' against the USSR is a weapon that cuts both ways\(^{19}\).

Soviet Ambassador D. Polyansky also indicated on February 10, 1980, that the Soviet Union could rightly impose restrictions on Japanese fishing operations within its 200-nautical-mile fishing zones if Japan followed through on its economic sanctions. He warned:

We have no intention to restrict Japanese fishing operations. But if Japan follows the lead of the U.S. in imposing economic sanctions, we will be forced to take appropriate counter steps\(^{20}\).

This warning, however, turned out to be a bluff; no actual retaliations in this area put into effect. Much to the contrary, the Soviets responded fairly and even with benevolence to Japanese salmon catch quota pronouncements.

In another curious action, Soviet Ambassador Polyansky, who had previously turned down all invitations to address Japanese journalists, agreed to discuss the Afghanistan events and Soviet-Japanese economic relations at a Japan National Press Club luncheon on March 5, 1980. The Ambassador embraced this occasion to describe

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18) loc. cit.
19) loc. cit.

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in vivid terms the difficulties imposed on his country by the Japanese economic
sanctions, particularly the suspension of the joint development projects in Siberia and
in the far eastern regions of the country.

Having expressed his country's determination to continue the projects without
the cooperation of other countries, including Japan, Polyansky, nevertheless, added: "I
hope that Japan will act on the matter according to its own interests without giving
ear to recommendations from other quarters (Washington). Japan must ultimately
decide the future course of bilateral relations between us, that is, whether to promote
friendly relations or not. "I myself”, he added hopefully, “am optimistic (in this
regard)"21).

Two days later, Vladimir Tsvetov of the Moscow Broadcast Service, speaking
in Japanese, expressed the view that the desires of Japanese business circles, in­
cluding those of Mr. Shigeo Nagano, to continue trade and economic relations with
the Soviet Union were quite reasonable. Here he was resorting to a favorite Soviet
technique known as *divide and rule*. Tsvetov then employed the similar strategy
of pointing out the rivalries and intrigues of Western countries: “Despite the U. S.
demands, France and West Germany have not taken economic actions against the
Soviet Union in connection with the situation in Afghanistan. Thus it will be a
matter of course that the orders which Japan has received thus far will all go to
West Europe”22).

As we have seen, the current low ebb in Soviet-Japanese relations is deeply
rooted in the Afghanistan event of December 1979 and in the issues and developments
which have reverberated from it. Although long strained by the “Northern Terri­
tories” question, the Soviet-Japanese ties have never before reached such a precarious
low point. The Middle East problem has awakened in the Japanese public an
increased awareness of the “threat from the North”.

Although it is expected that trade and economic relations between the two
countries will be resumed someday to normalcy, and perhaps even be expanded, there
is strong speculation that tense diplomatic relations will prevail at least into the early
'80's. The period between December 1979 and August 1980 has underscored the
great influence of Soviet-Japanese politico-diplomatic relations on the Northeastern
region of the globe as well as the need for a sensitive diplomacy in their preservation.