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**Culture and Group Processes**
"Intergroup Comparison and Intragroup Relationships: Group Processes in the Cultures of Individualism and Collectivism"

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"Intergroup Comparison and Intragroup Relationships: Group Processes in the Cultures of Individualism and Collectivism"

Groups are ubiquitous. As a distinctively “ultrasocial” animal (Campbell, 1983), we humans cannot live without groups. Throughout our ancestry history, we have created and utilized groups collectively for survival, reproduction, and for better living. While there are other social species who form and depend on groups for their survival, no other primate species is capable of creating and utilizing groups that are greater in size and complexity than are humans (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Dunbar, 1996). There also is a great diversity in human groups, ranging from families, clans, local communities, work and interest groups, hobby and religious groups, nations, and network communities. Groups are crucial “tools” for human adaptation.

Given the indispensability and ubiquity of social groups, however, there seems to have emerged variations across societies in how individuals relate to groups. In this chapter we deal with cross-cultural differences in group processes, or how people in different societies differentially relate to, that is, see, think about, and behave in, their groups. We will particularly focus on the differences in group processes between the cultures of individualism and collectivism, which have been the primary target of investigations in contemporary cultural psychology. First, we will review theory and research on individualism and collectivism, which assumed a simple distinction between cultures characterized by independence and autonomoy versus interdependence and group-centeredness, and then a challenge that the theory faced. Second, we will describe our own attempt to tackle this problem: a new theory to propose that people in individualistic cultures do not necessarily detach themselves from groups, but instead are involved in groups in a way that is different from people in collectivist cultures. We specifically propose that people in individualistic...
cultures are inter-group oriented, who identify themselves with the ingroup as an abstract social category, and look at the ingroup as a monolithic social category comprised of members who share similar attitudes in the comparative contest with outgroups. On the other hand, people in collectivistic cultures are intra-group oriented, who perceive the self to be connected with other ingroup members via relational ties, and the ingroup to be a bounded network of such ties. Third, we review empirical evidence in support of the theory. Finally, we will attempt to provide a new theoretical framework using a socio-ecological approach to integrate the traditional individualism-collectivism framework and the theory of cultural differences in group processes.

Individualism and Collectivism: A Brief History and Challenge

Traditional research on group processes in cultural and cross-cultural psychologies has primarily focused on how people in different societies differ in their level of group-centeredness, as contrasted with individual-centeredness. That is, most research is devoted to identifying and distinguishing between societies where individuals are fundamentally embedded in social groups, and societies where individuals are free from constraints by groups. Hofstede (1980) first empirically examined how different societies across the world distribute on this cultural dimension. Based on the work-value survey from more than 115,000 employees of an international firm from 53 countries and regions across the globe, Hofstede identified four principal cultural dimensions—power-distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Individualism, as contrasted with collectivism at the opposite pole of the dimension, has attracted the most attention and stimulated the greatest number of subsequent investigations (see Triandis, 1995 for a review). While both individualism and collectivism are now seen as multidimensional constructs, theorists largely agree that the principal distinction between the two lies in differences in the degree of
ingroup identity and loyalty (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Yamaguchi, 1994). The core theme of individualism is the conception of individuals as autonomous beings who are separate from groups, while the central theme of collectivism is the conception of individuals as parts of groups or collectives. Individuals in individualistic cultures are expected to show less ingroup loyalty, giving priority to personal goals over the goals of collectives. In contrast, individuals in collectivistic cultures either make no distinction between personal and collective goals, or if they do so, they subordinate their personal goals to collective goals (Triandis, 1995).

Among a number of countries and regions that exist across the globe, North America (the United States and Canada) and East Asia (such as Japan, China, and Korea) have been treated respectively as prototypic representatives of individualistic and collectivist cultures. As such, most empirical investigations into these constructs have compared samples from these two geographical areas. Numerous attempts have been made to uncover psychological and behavioral differences in such phenomena as self-concepts, emotions, social judgment, communication styles, sense of justice, etc., and these differences have been interpreted as manifestations of the differences in the levels of individualism and collectivism (see Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; U. Kim, Triandis, Kagitchbasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Smith & Bond, 1999 for reviews).

A challenge

After rigorous investigation flourished over twenty years, however, a stunning fact has been uncovered; people in so-called “individualistic cultures” are actually highly group-oriented. A groundbreaking meta-analytic paper by Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) has revealed that North Americans, while being confirmed to be more individualistic than people in almost any other parts of the world, are simultaneously very high on the collectivism dimension. Their level of collectivism (on some measures) was
higher than Japanese, did not differ significantly from Koreans, and was sometimes higher than Chinese, depending on the scale content used in the studies (see also Takano & Osaka, 1999).

There have been various reactions to this striking finding. Some insisted that cross-cultural differences in individualism vs. collectivism actually did not exist, or, at least, were not empirically warranted (Matsumoto, 1999; Takano & Osaka, 1999). Other researchers who were in favor of the theory pointed out a lack of validity of the reviewed findings, since the studies primarily relied on Likert scales, which are vulnerable to biases such as cross-cultural differences in response sets (C. Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995) and the reference group used when making judgments (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002), and thus one should not rely on the results.

There is, nonetheless, another possibility which was generally overlooked. Namely, while groups are universally important for all human beings, the type of psychological and behavioral processes that operate in group contexts may vary between cultures. In other words, there can be multiple kinds of group-orientation, in which group identification and behaviors might differ qualitatively rather than quantitatively between cultures. In the next section, we introduce our model of type of group-orientation, and how this differs between individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Yuki, 2003, 2011).

Cross-Cultural Differences in Psychological Underpinnings of Group Processes

Before going into the theory itself, however, we need to make explicit two critical assumptions to the theory. First, group processes are not uniform; there are qualitatively diverse ways for individuals to relate to groups. As will be discussed in detail, individuals can focus on similarities and differences between the self and groups, or on interpersonal relationships within a group. The second and more theoretically complex assumption is that
individualism does not prescribe social isolation, but is a kind of social orientation. It
prescribes how human beings, an ultra-social animal, ought to associate with each other, but
in a way that is different from individuals in the culture of collectivism. As stated earlier,
Oyserman et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis, which uncovered high collectivism among North
Americans, simultaneously confirmed that North Americans were highly individualistic, to
the degree that was higher than people in any other parts of the world. But how can
individualism, which prescribes independence from social contexts at least on surface,
coexist with a strong group orientation? The current chapter also attempts to solve this
question after showing how cultures vary in the type of predominant group processes

*Social identity theory and group process in individualistic cultures*

Social identity theory, along with self-categorization theory, has been accepted in
Western social psychology as the single comprehensive theory of psychological
underpinnings of an array of intergroup and group phenomena (Tajfel & Turner, 1986;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The basic tenet is that all group behaviors
ultimately derive from the phenomenon called depersonalization of self-representation. This
occurs when a cognitive representation of the self is defined in terms of membership in a
shared social category, and in effect there is no subjective distinction between the self and the
group as a whole. When social identity is made salient, individuals "come to perceive
themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique
personalities defined by their individual differences from others" (Turner, et al., 1987, p.50).
In other words, it is when cognitive representation of the self shifts from the personal self to
the collective self (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

This form of depersonalization occurs in a comparative context between the ingroup
and outgroup. That is, a categorization of the self as a group member is more likely to occur
when the perceived differences between the self and other ingroup members are smaller than
the differences between ingroup and outgroup members. In other words, an ingroup cannot be defined without an outgroup, and intergroup comparison is crucial. Because social identity necessitates the self to be defined at the ingroup level, the value of the self is derived from the value of the ingroup. This leads to the expectation that individuals will focus on intergroup status differences, and be motivated to achieve positive intergroup distinctiveness.

In this comparative context, features shared by ingroup members that distinguish them from the outgroup leads to the development of a group “prototype.” Perceptions of the self and other ingroup members are then assimilated to this ingroup prototype. Ingroup members are perceived as similar to one another, and the ingroup as a whole becomes perceived to be homogeneous (Hogg & Turner, 1987). Some later developments of social identity theory have focused on differences in prototypicality among group members, with relative prototypicality being associated with differential influence and marginalization within the group (Hogg, 2001). In any case, social identity implies a depersonalized perception of the ingroup, by viewing group members either as interchangeable, or as differing in terms of their prototype-based position in the group.

Intragroup relationships as the bases of group processes in collectivistic cultures

Yuki and colleagues have proposed that an alternative model is necessary to describe the predominant characteristics of group cognition and behaviors among people in collectivistic cultures (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Yuki, 2003, 2011). Social identity theory, which is widely accepted in Western social psychology, is a primarily intergroup-focused theory, meaning that it views intergroup comparison as a key source of ingroup identification. This model does not accurately capture predominant mechanisms underlying group behaviors in collectivistic cultures. The first discrepancy is that, in contrast to social identity theory, group behaviors among people in collectivistic cultures are intragroup rather than an intergroup phenomena. For instance, Confucianism, which has exerted a profound influence
on East Asian societies for more than two thousand years, focuses almost exclusively on intragroup, rather than intergroup, relationships (U. Kim & Lee, 1994; King & Bond, 1985).

In line with this, people in collectivistic cultures are found to have strong motivation to maintain harmonious and reciprocal intragroup relationships. For instance, research has shown that people in collectivistic cultures tend to prefer the principle of equality over equity in reward allocation within the ingroup (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; Hui, Triandis, & Yee, 1991; Y. Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Isaka, 1988; K. I. Kim, Park, & Suzuki, 1990; Leung & Bond, 1982; Leung & Park, 1986; Mann, Radford, & Kanagawa, 1985), to discern and understand other members' personal thoughts and feelings (Azuma, 1994; Choi, Kim, & Choi, 1993), and to prioritize animosity reduction in conflict resolution (Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 1987; Leung, Au, Fernandez-Dols, & Iwawaki, 1992; Leung & Lind, 1986; Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994). Also, in order to maintain social harmony within the ingroup, they must constantly pay attention to the structure of complex relationships between ingroup members, both horizontally and vertically, and understand where in the network they are located. For instance, anthropologists point out that East Asians are particularly attentive to ascribed status differences between ingroup members (Nakane, 1970). To act appropriately, individuals should begin social interactions by assessing the role relationship between oneself and others (Hwang, 1999).

In line with this argument, Abrams, Ando, and Hinkle (1998) found that both British and Japanese workers' intentions to quit their jobs were affected by level of identification with their company as a whole. Japanese workers' turnover intention, however, was also predicted by a subjective norm-- their perception of whether or not people who are close to them want them to continue working for the company. These results indicate that a relational factor is more influential in group loyalty of people in collectivistic than individualistic cultures.
Furthermore, there has been virtually no empirical support for the widely-held expectation that people in collectivistic cultures will be more ingroup-serving than people in individualistic cultures. Evidence rather suggests that discrimination against outgroups is actually more pronounced in individualistic cultures. We will discuss cross-cultural differences in intergroup discrimination more in detail later.

**Self-concept: Relational rather than collective.**

The second aspect that differs between the *inter*group-focused and *intra*group-focused models of group behaviors is how the self is purported to be represented cognitively in the minds of individuals. Since the early days of research on the self, theorists have hypothesized that the self involves multiple components (Cooley, 1902; Loevinger, 1976; Mead, 1934). The primary distinction is between the personal or individual self and the social or group self. More recent research has explored various implications of this view, and more attention has been given to multiple forms of the social self. Although different distinctions among types of social selves have been made (e.g., Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Deaux, 1993), the distinction most relevant to the present argument was made by Brewer and Gardner (1996) between the *collective* and the *relational* selves (see also E. S. Kashima & Hardie, 2000; Y. Kashima et al., 1995). The collective self is the self defined in terms of prototypical properties that are shared among depersonalized members of a common ingroup (Brewer, 1991). The relational self, on the other hand, is the self defined in terms of connections and role relationships with significant others (Cross & Madson, 1997; Gilligan, 1982; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; McGuire & McGuire, 1982). The relational self generally is associated with a psychological tendency to emphasize interpersonal relatedness, intimacy, and interdependence (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

Although collectivistic values focus on interpersonal relationships, the term *collectivism* is sometimes used as if it were equivalent to the concept of collective self as
defined by Brewer and Gardner (1996) and others. Other scholars, however, who apply more
indigenous theoretical perspectives, have defined the predominant form of the self among
people in collectivistic cultures more in terms of its relational aspect (Choi, et al., 1993;
Hamaguchi, 1977; Lebra, 1976; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Among many such terms, the
best known is interdependent self, proposed by Markus and Kitayama (1991). These authors
state that Asian cultures "are organized according to meanings and practices that promote the
fundamental connectedness among individuals within a significant relationship (e.g., family,
workplace, and classroom)" and that "the self is made meaningful primarily in reference to
those social relations of which the self is a participating part" (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto,
& Norasakkunkit, 1997, p.1247). Both jen, a concept of person in China, and jibun, a notion
of self in Japan, imply that the self is located in social relations (Hamaguchi, 1977; Hsu,
1981; Lebra, 1976). In the Confucian paradigm, individuals see themselves situated
symbolically in the web of a relational network through which they define themselves (King
& Bond, 1985) (see Brewer & Chen, 2007, for a more extensive argument on the confusion
between relational and collective selves in the traditional individualism-collectivism
literature).

Although this idea is often misunderstood, maintaining an "interdependent" self is
not only different from the self-representation at the category level (Turner, et al., 1987), but
also from the phenomenon known as “self-extension,” to include significant others as part of
the self (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Consistent with this view, research found that
emotional closeness and identity overlap with one’s friendship group was quite weak among
Japanese, as compared with Euro-Americans and Dutch (Uleman, Rhee, Bardoliwalla, &
Semin, 2000). Instead, people with an interdependent self believe that individuals, including
themselves, are distinct personalities who are mutually connected via stable and visible
relational ties (Chang & Koh, 1999; Hamaguchi, 1977; Ho & Chiu, 1994; Vignoles,
Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). In the words of Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett (1998), "[L]iving interdependently does not mean the loss of self, the fusion of self with other, or the absence of self-interests. What it does mean is that attention, cognition, affect, and motivation are organized with respect to relationship and norms" (p. 925). Although the self among people in collectivistic cultures are embedded in social relations, they are attributed with "the capacity to do right or wrong, and, ultimately, the individual alone is responsible for what he is" (King & Bond, 1985, p.31).

*Ingroup representation: Bounded network rather than homogenous entity.*

The prevalence of the relational self, rather than collective self, among people in collectivistic cultures does not imply that they downplay the ingroup as a meaningful social unit. In fact, they do impose boundaries between ingroups and outgroups (Gudykunst, 1988; Smith & Bond, 1999). The critical difference, nonetheless, is that those in collectivistic cultures do not depict individuals' perceptions of their ingroups as depersonalized entities, as social identity theory would predict, but as complex networks of interrelated individual members (Choi, et al., 1993; Hamaguchi, 1977; Ho, 1993; U. Kim & Lee, 1994; Lebra, 1976; Nakane, 1970). This relational view of groups was evident even in the teachings of Confucius, who conceptualized a family as a network consisting of three of the "Five Cardinal Relations": between father and son, elder brother and younger brother, and husband and wife. This relationship-based representation is also the basis for the conception of larger groups. Confucius considered the ideal society as a "massive and complicated role system" (King & Bond, 1985, p.30). Even today, people often use the metaphor of a family when they speak of other kinds of groups, in which vertical and horizontal roles are clearly differentiated (Chang, Lee, & Koh, 1996; Nakane, 1970).

The East Asian way of perceiving the ingroup as a network can be described in more theoretical terms, congruent with an alternative form of perceived group entitativity. The term
entitativity was coined by Donald Campbell (1958) to denote the degree to which a social collective is viewed as a single unit or entity. Among factors that determine entitativity, perceived similarity or homogeneity has attracted the greatest attention in subsequent research (e.g., Brewer & Harasty, 1996; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace, 1995). However, later theorization also focused on organization and structure, or dynamic properties, as alternative bases for entitativity, such as a hierarchical structure within the group, as a differentiation of roles and functions among the members, as a purposive integration of activity, and/or as clear differences in leadership, power, status, and responsibility (Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001). What can be predicted from the current argument is that the predominant basis of group entitativity may differ between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In line with this, Kurebayashi, Hoffman, Ryan, and Murayama’s (2012) cross-cultural study showed that trait similarity among group members predicted entitativity among Americans, whereas for Japanese shared goals and dynamic properties was more strongly associated with entitativity (see Haslam, Holland & Karasawa, this volume, for a more detailed review of culture and group entitativity.).

The contrast between the depersonalized and the network view of ingroups is also consistent with the distinction between common-identity and common-bond groups (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994). In common-identity groups, members are attached more strongly to the group per se than to fellow group members. In common-bond groups, members are attached to individual members of the group; their ingroup identification and their evaluation of individual members are closely correlated. Evidence suggests that attachment to and identification with the ingroup as a whole and to individual ingroup members are empirically independent from each other (Hogg, 1993; Karasawa, 1991; Prentice, et al., 1994). The common-identity group is similar to social identity theory's view of ingroups as undifferentiated and depersonalized, whereas the common-bond group may be consistent
with the view of ingroups by people in collectivistic cultures as composed of cognitively
differentiated members.

Empirical Evidence for Cross-Cultural Differences in Group Processes

The hypothesized cross-cultural differences in group processes--intergroup
comparison focus in individualistic cultures, and intragroup relationship orientation in
collectivistic cultures -- has a number of implications for various social psychological
phenomena pertaining to the issues of self and identity, attention and motivation, intragroup
behavior, and intergroup behavior. Evidence relevant to these implied differences is reviewed
in the following sections.

*Ingroup identities*

Traditionally, theorists on individualism and collectivism simply assumed that the
self-representations of people in individualistic cultures will consist primarily of idiocentric
traits and attributes, whereas members of collectivist cultures will incorporate more social
references, including allocentric, relational constructs and group memberships (Triandis,
1989). But comparative research on the spontaneous self-concept of respondents in different
cultures has not consistently supported this simple relationship between culture and content
of representations of the self (see Brewer & Chen, 2007 for an extensive review). Some
studies comparing self-descriptions of participants from individualistic and collectivist
societies (including Kenya, Malaysia, India, Japan, China, and Korea) and individualistic
societies (U.S., Britain, and Australia) have found support for the contention that collectivists
generate a larger proportion of social identity references (Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, &
Rettek, 1995; Ma & Schoeneman, 1997; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Trafimow, Triandis, &
Goto, 1991; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). On the other hand, some studies have found
that U.S. respondents used an equal, or sometimes even greater, proportion of social
descriptors in their spontaneous self-concepts than respondents from Japan, China, or Korea (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Cousins, 1989; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995).

The picture becomes drastically different when one incorporates the distinction between relationship-based and category-based social identities proposed by Brewer and Gardner (1996) and looks more closely at different types of responses obtained in these studies. In general, participants from collectivist cultures generate more references to social relationships and role identities in their spontaneous self-descriptions, but respondents in individualistic cultures are equal or greater in their references to social group or social category memberships. In a particularly comprehensive cross-cultural test, Watkins et al. (1998) obtained responses from a large number of university students from four different individualistic cultures (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Whites in South Africa) and five collectivist cultures (China, Ethiopia, Philippines, Turkey, and Blacks in South Africa). They classified self-descriptions obtained with the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) into four categories: idiocentric (e.g., personal qualities, traits, attitudes), allocentric (relational constructs such as sociable, good friend, etc.), small group memberships (e.g., family relationships), and large group memberships (e.g., I am a student, I am Chinese, etc.). The results showed that, while members of individualistic cultures and of collectivist cultures generated approximately the same proportion of idiocentric self-descriptions, the two groups differed in the type of social reference that appeared most frequently. Respondents from collectivistic countries tend to generate greater number of self-descriptions pertaining to allocentric or small group memberships, whereas those from individualistic countries generated more references to large group memberships.

In a more direct test of cultural differences in the meaning of ingroup in social identification processes identities, Yuki (2003) compared predictors of the strength of ingroup identity and loyalty between Japan and the United States. He asked both American
and Japanese university students to report how they perceived two kinds of ingroups of different sizes—their country and a small social group to which they belonged (such as sports teams or activity groups). One set of measures pertained to features of the ingroup as a social category, such as perceived intragroup homogeneity and perceived status differences between ingroup and outgroups. Another set of measures included perceived relational connections with the ingroup, such as knowledge about individual differences and relationships among group members and the sense of personal connectedness between the self and other group members. It was found that for Japanese, ingroup identification and loyalty were determined solely by the relational factors, with no significant correlation with the categorical factors. In contrast, Americans’ identity and loyalty were associated significantly with both the relational factors and the categorical factors.

Kashima, Hardie, Wakimoto, and Kashima (2011) tested the influence of social contexts that make social identities salient. They primed Australians and Asians in Australia with four contextual primes: individual, relational, collective, and control (nonsocial). The results showed that the relational context gave rise to increased social self-descriptions (relational and collective jointly) among Asians, whereas the collective context increased it among Australians. These patterns are consistent with Yuki and colleagues’ model of cultural difference in the meaning and cognitive representation of social selves.

Attention to group characteristics

The above results are consistent with the idea that people in individualistic and collectivistic cultures have different foci in group contexts. However, this conclusion is weakened by a reliance on Likert scales, since, as discussed earlier, they are vulnerable to various confounding factors (C. Chen, et al., 1995; Heine, et al., 2002). It is thus crucial to examine the hypothesized cultural differences through other methods, such as by assessing
on-line responses, or mental responses spontaneously produced as people behave in actual social settings (Kitayama, 2002).

Takemura, Yuki, and Ohtsubo (2010) compared spontaneous attention to intergroup status differences and intragroup relationships between Americans and Japanese. In a study represented ostensibly as an “impression formation study,” participants were asked to read three scenarios. Each scenario depicted a daily situation involving three groups, one of which was described as the participants’ ingroup. Every scenario included several pieces of information regarding status differences between the three groups (intergroup comparison information), as well as relationships between three ingroup members and their cooperativeness (intragroup relationship information). After a few filler questions, participants were asked to complete a surprise memory test. For each scenario, participants were asked to indicate whether information presented, either pertaining to intragroup relationship and intergroup comparisons, accurately described what had been written in the scenarios they had read previously. The results showed, as predicted, that compared to Japanese participants, memory performance among U.S. participants was biased toward intergroup status difference information over intragroup relationship information. Americans, who are more likely to hold a collective and depersonalized conceptualization of the self within the ingroup context, are more receptive to information pertaining to status differences between groups than are Japanese, whose relational social identity is more focused on the connections of distinct individuals within the group.

Intragroup behaviors

The distinction between the intergroup comparison and intragroup relational orientations has a number of implications for people’s behaviors in intragroup contexts. A volume of evidence supports Yuki and colleagues’ expectation that predominant patterns of group behaviors will differ between collectivists and individualists. For instance, a leadership
study showed that collectivist values were associated with perceived effectiveness of personalized, as opposed to depersonalized, leadership style (Hogg et al., 2005). In the following, we particularly focus on how this theoretical dimension affects the process underlying trust toward a stranger (See also Kwan & Hong, *this volume*, for an intensive review of research on culture and trust).

Trust has been a central psychological construct in the social sciences (Kramer, 1999; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Yamagishi, 2011). While definitions of trust vary greatly across different research traditions, what we deal with here pertains to an expectation of beneficent treatment from others in uncertain or risky situations (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009). More specifically, trust reflects a belief that others will act in a way that will benefit (or not harm) oneself, *before* one knows the outcome of other’s behaviors (Dasgupta, 1988). Trust is typically called for in situations where another person has the potential to gain at one’s expense, but can choose *not* to do so (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).

Of particular interest here is the role of trust in contexts where participants must decide whether or not to rely on others with whom they have little or no personal knowledge or history of an interpersonal relationship (Cook, 2001; Foddy, et al., 2009; Kramer, 1999; Ostrom, 1998; Tyler, 2001; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Although it is generally difficult to establish trust in strangers, such impersonal trust is essential for the creation and maintenance of many forms of economic exchange, organizations, and social and political institutions.

A common solution to the problem of trusting strangers is to rely on social distance: “trust neighbors, but not outsiders” (Macy & Skvoretz, 1998, p.651), or trusting ingroup while distrusting outgroup others. In contrast to the popular view that collectivists should be more trustful than individualists to the ingroup, however, evidence suggests that people from
individualist cultures and individuals with individualistic orientations often show greater ingroup bias in trust than people from collectivistic cultures and collectivistic individuals (e.g., Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002; Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006; Yamagishi et al., 2005). For instance, Buchan et al. (2002) found that, in an investment game involving indirect exchange situation, participants with individualistic cultural orientations increased their levels of trust in unknown others (in terms of amount of monetary investment) when shared identity of an arbitrary social category with the target person was made salient. Participants with a collectivist orientation, on the contrary, did not alter the level of trust whether or not a category identity was salient. Using a similar procedure in a subsequent study, Buchan, Croson, and Johnson (2006) compared trust behaviors between American and Chinese participants. They found that U.S. participants showed a clear ingroup bias in trust, whereas Chinese did not show such a tendency. Likewise, Yamagishi et al. (2005) found that sharing of group membership (e.g., same country, same university) was sufficient to generate higher trust in ingroup members for Australians, but not for Japanese.

These counterintuitive findings regarding the relationship between collectivist cultural values and group-based trust can be understood if one recognizes that there are two distinct bases for the trust for a stranger in the ingroup. The first is a shared social category, which gives a basis for a *depersonalized trust* (Brewer, 1981). When a shared social categorization is made salient and cognitive representations of fellow ingroup members and that of the self becomes overlapping, individuals, in line with social identity theory, are more likely to trust ingroup members to allocate resources fairly than selfishly (Foddy, et al., 2009), to conserve resources for the sake of ingroup (Brewer & Kramer, 1986), and to contribute more to the public good without knowing whether other ingroup members are also contributing their shares (Wit & Kerr, 2002). In the second basis for trust, individuals can trust others when they (believe that they) are directly or indirectly connected to each other
through interpersonal ties (Coleman, 1990). A shared network of interpersonal relationships provides a mechanism for extending personalized trust to unknown others who are part of the social network. If we incorporate the above discussion on the qualitative differences in group processes across cultures, it is possible that the former, category-based version of trust may be more predominant in individualistic cultures, whereas the latter, interpersonal connection-based version may be more predominant in collectivistic cultures.

Based on the above reasoning, Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, and Takemura (2005) conducted a series of experiments to test if the basis for trust toward strangers may differ between cultures, in accordance with the meaning of ingroups. They hypothesized that Americans’ trust toward a stranger would be based on categorical distinctions between ingroups and outgroups; they would trust someone who shares the same social category with the self, and show less trust those who do not share categories. By contrast, Japanese trust in a stranger would be determined by whether or the person is likely to share an indirect personal relationship with the self, regardless of category boundaries. Shared ingroup membership may provide one basis for inferring relational connections to an unknown other, but potential network ties across category boundaries should be equally likely to elicit trust. In other words, the researchers predicted that if it is likely that an unknown outgroup member shares an indirect interpersonal connection with the self (through a personal acquaintance), this cross-group relationship link should generate trust for an outgroup member in Japan but not in the U.S.

Results from two experiments, one vignette study using hypothetical scenarios and one laboratory study that involved real monetary stakes, supported the hypothesis. Across both studies, Americans’ trust was based on categorical distinctions; they trusted a stranger (someone they had not met before) in the ingroup more than strangers in outgroups. Presence or absence of an acquaintance in the outgroup did not affect the levels of trust. On the other
hand, trust for Japanese participants depended more on the likelihood that they had direct or indirect relationship links with the targets. In particular, the participants’ expectation that they might have indirect interpersonal connections (because they had an acquaintance in that group) affected outgroup trust for Japanese. Overall, evidence supports Yuki and colleagues’ general theoretical framework that the psychological underpinnings of intragroup behaviors differ between individualistic and collectivistic cultures.

*Intergroup discrimination*

Discrimination is found in all human societies (Sumner, 1906). Ingroup-outgroup discrimination refers to preferential treatments directed toward ingroup over outgroup members. The question here is whether differences in the predominant group processes between individualistic and collectivistic cultures will affect the type of intergroup behaviors that people in those cultures engage in.

Traditionally, the literature on individualism and collectivism simply assumed that the latter culture prescribes shaper ingroup-outgroup distinctions, and thus expected that people in collectivist cultures would show greater intergroup discrimination (Triandis, 1995). As Iyengar, Lepper, and Ross (1999) put it, “as the self-other boundary becomes less distinct, the distinction between ingroup members and outgroups members assumes greater significance…assimilating ingroup members to self may lead individuals to contrast ingroup and outgroup members more sharply, making them relatively more susceptible to different cognitive, perceptual, and motivational biases” (p. 279). This logic is congruent with that of social identity theory.

In fact, results from a number of comparative studies seem to be in line with the idea that collectivist values are associated with a greater ingroup-outgroup differentiation. For instance, an experiment on the effects of cultural cues on social behavior showed that a priming with Chinese (vs. American or culture-neutral) symbols made college students from
Hong Kong (who are expected to be biculturals) to be more cooperative in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with their friends. However, the priming did not affect these biculturals’ cooperative choices when they played the game with strangers (Wong & Hong, 2005). In other words, Chinese symbols, as compared to American symbols, lead to greater ingroup bias in cooperation. Second, a study on communication showed that Korean and Japanese students tend to think that communication with classmates is more intimate, smooth, and less difficult than communication with strangers. These differences were not found among American participants (Gudykunst, Yoon, & Nishida, 1987). Third, studies on distributive justice have shown that people from collectivist cultures tend to support the use of different reward allocation norms to ingroup (equality) and outgroup (equity). Such differentials are less evident among American participants (Leung & Bond, 1984; Mahler, Greenberg, & Hayashi, 1981). Finally, a comparative study on conflict resolution showed that culture and target interactively affect how individuals deal with interpersonal disputes. Hong Kong Chinese college students were, in comparison with their American counterparts, less likely to pursue a conflict with an ingroup disputant (close friend) but more likely to pursue a conflict with an outgroup disputant (stranger) (Leung, 1988). It must be noted, nonetheless, that any of these findings do not indicate that people in collectivistic cultures are motivated toward maximizing ingroup-outgroup differences (as predicted by social identity theory), but simply that they relate differently to ingroups and outgroups.

If one takes into consideration the present argument that there are cultural differences in predominant group processes, the psychological underpinnings behind intergroup discrimination should differ between cultures. That is, the source of intergroup discrimination and distinction among people in collectivistic cultures will not be based on the orientation toward active comparison and differentiation between groups, as social identity theory depicts, but instead will be a necessary consequence of their motivation for the
maintenance of harmonious and reciprocal relationships within the ingroup. Much evidence is available to support this expectation. First, research indicates that evaluative ingroup bias is greater in individualistic than in collectivistic cultures, particularly when the targets of evaluation are category-based ingroups and outgroups. For instance, Bond and Hewstone (1988) found that Chinese students in Hong Kong had less positive images of the ingroup than did British students. Heine and Lehman (1997) found that Japanese students rated their own universities less positively than did students from rival universities; this pattern was not found among Canadian students. Snibbe, Kitayama, Markus, and Suzuki (2003) found significantly less ingroup favoritism among Japanese football fans compared with their American counterparts, although the two groups did not differ in the magnitude of ingroup identification. Finally, Rose (1985) found that Americans had more positive views of their country than did Japanese.

Conversely, research indicates that not only people in individualistic cultures but also in collectivistic cultures engage in evaluative ingroup bias when the groups are defined in terms of relational connections (Endo, Heine, & Lehman, 2000). Even their self-critical attitudes have been interpreted as a strategy to maintain harmonious relationships with others (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Kitayama, et al., 1997). The importance of maintaining harmonious relationships in collectivistic cultures is further indicated by findings that relationship harmony is more strongly associated with subjective well-being in Hong Kong than in the U. S. (Kurman & Sriram, 1997; Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997).

Evidence reviewed thus far pertained to intergroup bias in evaluation, but behaviors in intergroup contexts are also expected to differ between cultures. In the literature on social identity theory, intergroup discrimination in allocation of rewards has been well documented in experimental research using the minimal intergroup paradigm (Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In the typical minimal group studies,
ingroups are defined as genuinely categorical, in the sense that they are determined based on arbitrary bases, such as by lottery, dot estimation tendency (overestimator vs. underestimator), and artistic preference, and, more importantly, there is no substantial interdependence among members. An implication from Yuki and colleagues’ theory is that ingroup bias based on such abstract categorical distinctions will be more pronounced among Westerners than Asians. In fact, Wetherell (1982) found that the magnitude of ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm was smaller among children with Polynesian compared to European cultural background; Polynesian children rather attempted to benefit both ingroup and outgroup members. In the study on trust by Buchan et al. (2006), which we cited earlier, half of the participants were asked to play the role of “responders” who were to decide whether they should return a portion of the money received (with trust) from the “senders,” who were either in the (minimal) ingroup or outgroup. The results showed that American participants exhibited significant ingroup bias, returning a greater amount of money to the ingroup than to outgroup senders, whereas Chinese showed the opposite tendency. Moreover, this cultural difference was explained by cultural orientation of individualism-collectivism. That is, the effect of culture ceased to be significant when individual difference in individualism-collectivism was statistically controlled, with individualists showing greater ingroup bias than collectivists within both countries.

Intergroup discrimination among collectivists is more a function of interdependence within a group. Congruent with this reasoning, a series of studies by Yamagishi and colleagues with Japanese participants (Jin, Yamagishi, & Kiyonari, 1996; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993) indicates that presence or absence of a structure of interdependence among ingroup members greatly affects whether participants engaged in ingroup bias. In the experiments, participants were asked to perform a reward allocation task between one ingroup and one outgroup member. In one condition, which is consistent with
the standard procedure of minimal group experiments (e.g., Tajfel, et al., 1971), participants were told that every participant, including themselves, was to perform the allocation task. In another condition, however, they were asked to draw a lottery, and were told that they were chosen to be the only participant within the ingroup who was to perform the reward allocation task. A critical difference between the two conditions is that whereas the former involves the structure of mutual fate control within a group, the latter did not have such structure of interdependence. The results indicate that the presence of intragroup interdependence is requisite for Japanese to privilege ingroups over outgroups. Together with the results of similar studies conducted in North America and Australia, which found a significant ingroup discrimination even when reciprocal interdependence within groups was eliminated (e.g., Perreault & Bourhis, 1998; Platow, Mcclintock, & Liebrand, 1990; but see also Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling, 2008), it seems fair to conclude that the motivational basis for intergroup discrimination differs between cultures: creating maximum positive intergroup distinctiveness in the culture of individualism, whereas maintaining reciprocal intragroup relationships in the culture of collectivism.

Individualism and Intergroup Comparison: A Socio-Ecological Account

Evidence reviewed thus far supports the claim by Yuki and colleagues (Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Yuki, 2003, 2011) that there are cross-cultural differences in the kinds, but not the levels, of predominant group orientations. Specifically, in so-called individualist societies such as North America, people are oriented toward intergroup comparison; they tend to define social groups in terms of shared features among group members, to have a depersonalized view of the self as a prototypical exemplar of the ingroup, and to be motivated to achieve higher intergroup status. On the other hand, in societies which have been traditionally viewed as collectivistic such as East Asia, individuals are oriented toward
intragroup relationships; they define groups in terms of shared and bounded interpersonal networks among group members, perceive the self as distinctive but constitutive part of the network, and are motivated to maintain harmonious and reciprocal relationships between the members. There is, however, one critical question remain unanswered: From where do these differences originate? Especially puzzling is why North Americans, who have been proved to be more individualistic than people in other parts of the world (Oyserman, et al., 2002), are simultaneously concerned about comparing between groups. In this final section, we attempt to answer this intriguing question by incorporating the socio-ecological perspective (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Oishi & Graham, 2010; Yuki & Schug, 2012).

There is one critical point that needs to be understood in order to make sense of why people in individualistic cultures are oriented toward intergroup comparisons; that is, individualism is not an isolation or alienation from the society, but is a form of social orientation. Evidence actually indicates that people living in more individualistic societies are more socially-oriented than those in less individualistic cultures. For instance, people in more individualistic states in the United States are found to have greater inclination for charitable giving and volunteerism (Kemmelmeier, Jambor, & Letner, 2006) and to have greater social capital (represented by such tendencies as higher interpersonal trust and more frequent engagement in social and political activities) (Allik & Realo, 2004).

The main goal of the socio-ecological perspective is to delineate how the mind and behavior of individuals are related to the natural and social habitats that surround them, such as climate, economic, political, educational, societal, and organizational reward systems, as well as more intermediate structures such as the characteristics of cities, towns, and neighborhoods, housing, and family and kin relationships. This approach actually has a long history in psychology (Barker, 1968; Berry, 1979), but is re-gaining popularity in various fields of social and cultural sciences (Henrich et al., 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Uskul,
Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). Although this approach may sound akin to that of ecological biologists who primarily study animals’ behaviors in relation to their natural habitats, the important distinction is that it also deals with the recursive process in which human mind and behavior affect and create social habitats (see Oishi & Graham, 2010, for an extensive review of this approach).

One socio-ecological factor that has recently received extensive focus is the level of interpersonal or intergroup mobility (Adams, 2005; J. Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009; Oishi, 2010; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Yuki & Schug, 2012). We particularly focus on a factor called relational mobility, defined as "the degree to which there is an availability of options in a given society or social context regarding interpersonal relationships, such as opportunities to acquire new, maintain current, and sever old relationships" (Yuki & Schug, 2012; Yuki et al., 2007). Societies low in relational mobility are those where people collectively create and maintain long-standing relationships and groups. Maintaining committed and long-standing relationship with specific others helps reduce social uncertainty such as risks of being cheated (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). Societies high in relational mobility, on the other hand, provide people with abundance of opportunities to meet strangers and create new relationships, in order for people to utilize opportunities (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). This concept, as well as other factors that may be closely tied to relational mobility, has proven useful in explaining various differences in psychological and behavioral tendencies between peoples in individualistic and collectivistic cultures, such as differences in the level of trust in strangers (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Yuki, et al., 2007), self-enhancement (Falk, Heine, Yuki, & Takemura, 2009), pursuit of uniqueness (Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008), self-disclosure (Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010), reward and punishment toward cooperators and defectors (Wang & Leung, 2010), and proneness to shame (Sznyder et al., 2012).
Of particular interest here is that studies have revealed that high relational mobility in a society leads to psychological tendencies that have been traditionally thought of as “individualistic.” For instance, Falk et al. (2009) showed that the difference in the level of self-enhancement between European Canadians and Japanese was mediated statistically by perceived level of relational mobility in the local environment. They argue that unrealistically high confidence about one’s own ability encourages one to approach someone that has high social status, which is only possible in societies high in relational mobility, such as North America. In societies with low relational mobility, on the other hand, such an unrealistic confidence would be rather socially detrimental, since it may disrupt harmony in long-standing relationships with people around them (Falk, et al., 2009). Similarly, Debies-Carl and Huggins (2009) have found that individuals living in urban areas, where people tend to have more opportunities to select interaction partners (Fischer, 1975), tend to have greater self-efficacy. Also, Akaeda (2010) reported that unconventional attitudes were found to be higher in more populated areas and residentially mobile (thus presumably relationally mobile) areas (see also Oishi, 2010).

Relational mobility and group processes

Now, how do different levels of relational mobility in a society lead to different types of group processes? High relational mobility societies afford individuals with greater freedom to choose which group(s) they should join. A necessary consequence from this freedom of choice is that individuals should attempt to join groups that have higher rather than lower status, because the membership in the former will generally provide them with larger resources. This leads individuals to monitor intergroup status differences, and attempt to associate with groups of higher status. Consistent with this idea, studies have found that people in more residentially mobile societies, as well as individuals with larger personal residential mobility, more opportunistically change their ingroup identity (i.e., depending on
the success or failure of the ingroup) than those who are in less residentially mobile societies and those who move less (Oishi, Ishii, & Lun, 2009).

Also, relative freedom of choice afforded by high relational mobility leads individuals to form groups around similarities and common interests, because these features should facilitate coordinated action and collective goal pursuit. Consistent with this idea, it has been shown that a reason why American friends are more similar with each other than Japanese friends is higher relational mobility in the former. Although people in both cultures prefer similar to dissimilar other as a friend, the opportunities to find and make friends with similar others are fewer in Japan, a society low in relational mobility (Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & Takemura, 2009).

On the other hand, in a society with low relational mobility, group memberships tend to be ascribed and predetermined. It is difficult for individuals to leave groups even if they find the groups to be either unsatisfactory (i.e. low status) or incompatible with their own attitudes and goals. It is therefore of critical importance for them to maintain harmonious and reciprocal relationships with fellow ingroup members, by recognizing and accommodating individual differences. Behind this is social groups being constructed so that members can monitor each other’s behavior, and high visibility of individual members may serve as a mechanism for inhibiting potential freeriding (Miller & Kanazawa, 2000; Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 1998). Congruent with this idea, cross-cultural experiments showed that Japanese became less cooperative and less trusting toward the ingroup when there was no system of ingroup monitoring and sanctioning, whereas Americans did not change their level of cooperation and trust as a function of the presence or absence of a monitoring and sanctioning system (Yamagishi, 1988a, 1988b) (see also Kwan & Hong, this volume).

Moreover, to be successful in a society with low relational mobility, individuals must also navigate friction between other ingroup members, requiring great attention to the
ingroup’s complex relational networks. Indirectly supporting this claim, an experiment conducted in Japan showed that participants who were better at judging good and bad relationships within ingroups possessed characteristics that were considered adaptive in stable interpersonal relations; such stability is characteristic of collectivistic societies (Yamagishi & Kosugi, 1999).

An implication from the above consideration is that what groups mean for individuals may differ between societies, depending on socio-ecological conditions. In societies with low relational mobility, groups are what individuals take for granted. They are afforded with specific groups and must live there for long time even if they personally do not prefer to. Such longevity of groups and social relationships, however, helps to reduce social uncertainty and serves as the foundation for effective and routinized social exchange and mutual cooperation. What individuals then seek is how to improve their lives in relation with given others and circumstances while avoiding risks of being ostracized.

In societies with high relational mobility, on the other hand, groups are what individuals opportunistically create and select in order to achieve their personal goals. Here is where the anomaly posed in Oyserman et al. (2002) is solved: why North Americans are high both on individualism and collectivism dimensions. That is, North American intergroup comparison orientation is an “individualists’ collectivism,” among those who are afforded with “freedom of choice” at the societal level. On the contrary, East Asian intragroup relationship orientation is a “collectivists' collectivism,” who have little choice and bounded in the existing ingroup. While groups have always been a universal “tool” for human adaptation, a great diversity has emerged with regard to its specific forms and how individuals relate to it, according to structure of society that they have collectively created.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed how predominant group processes differ between the cultures of individualism and collectivism. Also, we attempted to explain the source of this difference from the perspective of a socio-ecological approach. The socio-ecological perspective provides a novel explanation for why individualism that is prevalent in Western societies on the one hand is associated with depersonalized and symbolic collective identities and behaviors to seek for positive intergroup distinctiveness, which has been depicted by social identity theory, on the other. It suggests that high relational mobility, or the degree of freedom in choosing relational partners and social groups to which one belongs, provides incentives for individuals to promote oneself as an individual, as well as membership in a group with higher status and greater similarity. It is expected that an application of the socio-ecological perspective will enrich our understanding of the more fundamental bases for human group behaviors, and thus help to make it a genuinely social psychological theory of group processes.
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