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Competing National Identities and Democratization in Ukraine: The Fifth and Sixth Cycles in Post-Soviet Ukrainian History

Taras Kuzio

In the last century, Ukraine has experienced six cycles of national revival and democratization followed on each occasion by a conservative Russophile counter revolution against Ukrainian national identity and democracy. The cycle had not run its course in 1991 when the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) was banned and the party had by then shrunk to a small coterie of “imperial communists” who supported the August 1991 putsch in Moscow. Although only 5 percent of its Soviet-era 3.5 million members re-joined the re-legalized KPU after 1993, a more serious threat to Ukrainian national identity and democratization emerged eight years later in the Party of Regions. The bases of support for the KPU and Party of Regions are the Donbass and Crimea which were the strongholds of the Russophile, conservative wing of the Soviet-era KPU.

This article is divided into four sections. The first provides a framework to understand contemporary Ukrainian history through competing cycles of Ukrainian national revival and Russophile counter-revolution. Three cycles in the 1920s, 1960s and the first two decades of Ukrainian independence have combined Ukrainian national revival with democratization and political and economic liberalization. Three cycles in the 1930s to early 1950s, 1970s to mid-1980s and since 2010 have combined Russophile counter-revolution with anti-democratic policies and political and economic stagnation. The second discusses within a comparative context Ukrainian national and Russophile national identities promoted during Ukraine’s fifth and sixth cycles respectfully by Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. The third analyses the fractured national democratic politics during Ukraine’s fifth cycle, and the fourth analyses Soviet authoritarian culture and the counter-revolution in Ukraine’s sixth historic cycle.

A Framework for Understanding Ukraine through Historic Cycles

From the 1920s until the early 1930s, Ukraine experienced the first cycle of indigenization and Ukrainization that facilitated a national revival in culture, language and the arts. Ukrainian peasants moving to growing towns were becoming the new Ukrainian-speaking working class. National communists defended Ukraine’s Ukrainization program and sovereignty and Ukrainization was accompanied by political and economic liberalization in the Soviet New Economic Policy (NEP). If the Stalinist counter-revolution had not taken place
in the 1930s eastern Ukraine’s urban centers would have become Ukrainian speaking by the end of the 1930s.

From the early 1930s until the mid-1950s, Ukraine experienced a second cycle under Stalinism that undertook a counter-revolution against Ukrainian national identity. The teaching of history returned to the glorification of Imperial Russia. The Stalinist counter-revolution began with the Holodomor [extermination by famine] that led to the deaths of millions of Ukrainians in 1933. Tim Snyder calculated that 5.5 million people died from famine in the USSR, of whom 3.5 were Ukrainian and 1 million were Kazakhs. Snyder drew two different conclusions to President Yanukovych and the Russian leadership. Firstly, he describes the Holodomor, but not the Kazakh (famine), as genocide. Secondly, the famine did not spread throughout the USSR and Russians represented a small percentage of the victims. Russia does not have monuments to the 1933 famine in either the Kuban, where famine was severe, or in Moscow. Snyder writes that Ukrainians and Poles living in Ukraine represented the majority of the victims in the Great Terror.

In the mid-1950s, Ukraine experienced its third cycle following the death of Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech revealed the horrors of Stalinist crimes. De-Stalinization was followed by political and economic liberalization. Ukrainian cultural and political elites supported the de-Stalinization campaign and promoted demands for changes to the way Ukrainian history is written, the rehabilitation of repressed Ukrainian cultural figures, support for the Ukrainian language and greater republican economic sovereignty.

Petro Shelest, who headed the republican KPU from 1963 until 1972, gave tacit encouragement to the de-Stalinization process and moderate program of Ukrainization, advising Ukrainian writers they should defend the Ukrainian language. Shelest, who came from Kharkiv—the center of Ukrainian national communism in the 1920s—encouraged and distributed to local Communist Party branches in Soviet Ukraine the influential report Internationalism or Russification prepared by Ivan Dziuba, Ukraine’s future Minister of Culture.

Russophile counter-revolution retained its supporters within the KGB and two large conservative branches of the Communist Party in Dnipropetrovsk and Donets’k. In 1972, Ukraine’s fourth cycle began with a Russophile counter-revolution that removed Shelest and replaced him with Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi who ruled Ukraine for the next 17 years. The Shcherbyts’kyi era deepened the russification of Ukraine and led to cultural stagnation and political repression. In the mid-1960s and especially early 1970s, Ukraine was engulfed by large scale arrests of Ukrainian dissidents and cultural figures.

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2 Ivan Dziuba was a fierce critic of Minister of Education Dmytro Tabachnyk. See I. Dziuba, “Prokysli ‘shchi’ vid Tabachnyka,” Den’, July 2, 6 and 9, 2010 [www.day.kiev.ua/301498]; [www.day.kiev.ua/301787]; [www.day.kiev.ua/302008].
The 1972 arrests were the most extensive in the USSR since the Stalin era and were described by the samvydav (samizdat) journal Український Вісник [Ukrainian Herald] as the “Ukrainian Pogrom.” Further arrests of opposition leaders took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By the late 1970s, the human rights organization Amnesty International estimated that there were in the Soviet Union 10,000 political prisoners of whom 40 percent were Ukrainians, double their proportion in the Soviet population. Proportionally fewer Russians were political prisoners than their share of the population. With 40 members, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group became the largest Helsinki Group established in the Soviet republics, double the size of the Moscow Helsinki Group. In western Ukraine, the underground Uniate (Byzantine) Catholic Church became the largest catacomb church in the world.

The Soviet authorities imposed the highest sentences on dissidents in Ukraine while Ukrainian political prisoners continued to die in the Gulag up until the mid-1980s. Leading Ukrainian dissidents Oleksiy Tykhyy, Vasyl’ Stus, Yurii Lytvyn and Valerii Marchenko died in the Gulag in 1984–1986. The greatest repression was reserved for Ukrainian nationalists convicted in the late 1940s and early 1950s for armed resistance to Soviet rule; they were usually sentenced to 25 years, released (if they survived the Gulag) and then often executed or re-sentenced for additional prison terms. Soviet executions of Ukrainian nationalists continued until 1987, only four years before the USSR disintegrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>KPU First Secretaries and Ukrainian Presidents</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Mykola Skrypnyk, Mykola Khvyl’ovyi</td>
<td>1920s – early 1930s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russophile</td>
<td>Joseph Stalin, Stanislav Kosior, Nikita Khrushchev</td>
<td>Early 1930s – 1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Mykola Pidhornyi, Petro Shelest</td>
<td>Mid-1950s – 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Russophile</td>
<td>Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi</td>
<td>1972–1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko</td>
<td>1990–2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Russophile</td>
<td>Viktor Yanukovych</td>
<td>2010–</td>
</tr>
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The fifth cycle of contemporary Ukrainian history began in the late 1980s during Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika [restructuring] and glasnost’ [openness]. In 1989, Shcherbyts’kyi was replaced by another KPU conservative but the tide was turning and the Communist Party in Soviet Ukraine was beginning to split into Russophile “imperial communists,” “sovereign (i.e. national) communists” and a democratic platform within the Komsomol [Communist youth league]. In addition, Rukh [Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika] held its inaugural congress in 1989 and reconstituted itself as the Democratic Bloc in the March 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, winning a quarter of the seats.
During the fifth cycle Ukraine in the 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century Ukraine experienced a prolonged period of nation-building. Kravchuk and Kuchma pursued moderate Ukrainophile policies while Yushchenko adopted a more nationalistic tone. The two exceptions where Ukrainization had limited influence were regional strongholds of the KPU and Party of Regions in Donets’k and the Crimea. Ukraine’s “quadruple transition” produced a growth of Ukrainian national identity and patriotism supporting democratization and political and economic liberalization. The fifth cycle therefore replicated the first and third cycles in the 1920s and 1960s in combining the growth of Ukrainian national identity with democratization and liberalization.

Shulman provided a framework for understanding Ukrainian politics as one of competition between “ethnic Ukrainian” and “eastern Slavic” national identities which is demonstrated by the two main candidates in the 2004 presidential elections—Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Kuchma sought to combine elements of both identities while prioritizing Ukrainophile policies but his successors, Yushchenko and Yanukovych, over-turned these consensus politics and prioritized Ukrainian and neo-Soviet nationalist identities respectively. Shulman found weaker support for liberal democracy within the “eastern Slavic” identity and believed that the stronger the “eastern Slavic” identity the lower the support for democratic and market economic reforms. Eastern Ukrainian Party of Regions and KPU voters prioritize stability and the economics over democracy and are more authoritarian than Ukrainians who vote for the nationalist Svoboda [Freedom] political party. Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli found that Ukrainians with an atomized identity, such as in the Donbass and Crimea, were least supportive of democracy and more inclined to support a return to the Soviet past. “Eastern Slavic” identity is rooted in patrimonial paternalism that is more strongly entrenched in eastern Ukraine.

The sixth cycle of contemporary Ukrainian history began with the election of Yanukovych in 2010 and has led to Russophile counter revolutionary policies that have undermined the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution. A return

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to Russophile and neo-Soviet nationality policies is a reflection of Donets’k and Crimea exhibiting the greatest degree of allegiance to Soviet political culture in Ukraine. President Yanukovych and the Party of Regions have inherited the conservative-Russophile wing of the Soviet Communist Party in Ukraine and represent the biggest threat to Ukrainian democratic and national rights since the fourth cycle when the USSR and Soviet Ukraine were ruled by Leonid Bezhnev and Shcherbyts’kyi. The Russophile counter-revolution of 2010–2011 is similar to the Russophile counter-revolution of 1971–72. Then and today state policies undermine the growth of the Ukrainian language, culture and national history, curtail political liberalization and unleash political repression. Shcherbyts’kyi had no need to be concerned about future elections because Communist leaders remained in power until they died or were replaced by other Communist leaders. Criminal charges were launched against opposition leader and former Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko in a return to political repression last seen prior to the coming to power of Gorbachev a quarter of a century ago. By imprisoning opposition leaders, and infringing numerous constitutional articles and legislation, Yanukovych is acting as though he never intends to leave office.

Ukrainophile nationality policies and liberalization have been historically pursued by eastern Ukrainians (Shelest and Kuchma) as well as western Ukrainians (Kravchuk and Yushchenko) and they are therefore not exclusively the preserve of political leaders from the western region of the country. Yanukovych’s 2010 election represents a fundamental shift in Ukrainian politics because it brought to power for the first time in Ukraine’s history regional elites from Donets’k who are opposed to or are ambivalent to the Ukrainophile national identity policies pursued by Ukraine’s first three presidents. Soviet Ukraine was ruled by elites from Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs’k but never from Donets’k.

Yanukovych is reversing Ukrainophile nationality policies in six areas:

1. *Elevating the Russian Language:* Yanukovych’s election programs in 2004 and 2010, and the Party of Regions program’s in 2006 and 2007, called for Russian to become a second state language. In July 2012 Ukraine adopted a new language law that de facto made Russian a second official language. If the Party of Regions and KPU are able to establish a constitutional majority they could change the constitution to elevate Russian to

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a second state language which would be a goal pursued by Yanukovych if he wins a second term in office in the 2015 elections.  

2. **Downplaying Soviet Crimes against Humanity:** Nearly two thirds of Ukrainians view the 1933 Holodomor that led to the deaths of over four million Ukrainians as “genocide,” a view promoted by Ukraine’s first three presidents. In 2003, on the seventieth anniversary of the artificial famine, President Kuchma launched an international campaign to gather support for the Holodomor to be recognized as “genocide.” The campaign was overseen by then Deputy Prime Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk responsible for the humanitarian affairs in the 2002–2004 Yanukovych government. A year earlier Donets’k Governor Yanukovych had written a preface to a book commemorating Soviet and Ukrainian security agencies in Donets’k oblast where he praised the Cheka and NKVD. The Party of Regions and KPU did not vote for the November 2006 law that recognized the Holodomor as “genocide.” After coming to power Yanukovych moved away from the position of Ukraine’s first three presidents that the Holodomor was genocide committed by the Soviet regime against Ukrainians, moving closer to the Russian position that the 1933 famine affected all Soviet peoples. On February 25, 2010, the day of Yanukovych’s inauguration as president, the section on the presidential website on the famine was removed. Annual commemorations of the Holodomor held with state support since 1998 on the last Saturday of November have not been supported by the Yanukovych administration since 2010. Yanukovych’s policies have focused on the positive aspects of life in the Soviet Union, highlighting the Great Patriotic War of the 1940s while marginalizing Stalinist crimes in the 1930s. The revival of the cult of Joseph Stalin has not received state support in Ukraine to the same extent as in Belarus and Russia; nevertheless, monuments to Stalin were unveiled by the KPU in 2010 in Zaporizhzhia and Odesa. Ukrainian nationalists who beheaded the Zaporizhzhia Stalin monument in December 2010 were charged with “terrorism” after it was blown up a few days later by unknown assailants. David Marples writing about Belarus says, “The Lukashenka presidency has defined the modern state based on Soviet myths and respect—if not glorification—for the ‘achievements’ of Stalin as a ruler.” He adds, “It has fostered a single interpretation of the Soviet years that not only continues the glorification of the Great Patriotic War, but also manifestly ignores


the Stalinist repressions, including the NKVD massacre of prisoners at Kurapaty on the outskirts of Minsk, where mass graves were uncovered in the late 1980s.”

3. **Reinstituting Soviet Myths of the Great Patriotic War:** Mythologizing about the Great Patriotic War has replaced an inclusive concept of World War II. In May 2011, for the first time in independent Ukraine the Soviet red flag was allowed to be used in celebrations of victory in the Great Patriotic War. Reinstituting Soviet historical myths has been accompanied by a return to Soviet denunciations of Ukrainian nationalists in the 1940s as “Nazi collaborators.”

4. **Marginalizing the Orange Revolution:** Yanukovych’s fraudulent second round election in November 2004 was defeated by the Orange Revolution which pressured the Supreme Court to overrule his election and issue a resolution that outlined the requirement to hold a re-run second round. In the manner of the Russian and Belarusian leaders, Yanukovych and the Party of Regions view the Orange Revolution as an American conspiracy designed to install their “puppet” Yushchenko into power. The Orange Revolution has been downgraded in school textbooks by Minister of Education Tabachnyk, Minister of Education in 2010–2012.

5. **Returning to Soviet-style Anti-Nationalism:** The Party of Regions have resumed Soviet-era denunciations of Ukrainian nationalism and Minister of Education Tabachnyk has equated Ukrainian nationalism with “fascism.” Our Ukraine was depicted as “Nashists,” a play on *Nasha Ukraina* that resembled “Nazis.” Ukrainian nationalists and “orange” political forces are viewed as one and the same by the Party of Regions and the KPU.

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6. Reviving Soviet-style Anti-Americanism: Pro-Western, “orange” political forces are often viewed as American satraps and Yanukovych’s 2004 election campaign was the first in post-Soviet Ukraine that was accompanied by anti-Americanism. Yanukovych is the first of four Ukrainian presidents to oppose Ukrainian membership of NATO and this was enshrined in the July 2010 new foreign policy law defining Ukraine as a “non-bloc” country. Yanukovych has backed the Russian leadership’s plans for a new European security architecture that would replace NATO with the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as the main security institution.

Ukrainian Democratic and Russophile Authoritarian Leaders in the Fifth and Sixth Cycles

Yushchenko was a loyal government servant during seven of Kuchma’s ten years in office, first as chairman of the National Bank (1994–1999) and second as prime minister (1999–2001). His path was therefore no different to many other senior Our Ukraine leaders whose businesses had successfully grown during Kuchma’s presidency or who had held senior government positions. In post-Soviet countries, reformers have served in different governments during the 1990s before becoming disillusioned and then joining the opposition. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili served as Minister of Justice in 2000–2001 under President Eduard Shevardnadze but resigned and established Georgia’s largest opposition movement that came to power following the November 2003 Rose Revolution. Saakashvili voluntarily resigned while Yushchenko was forced out of office in an April 2001 parliamentary vote of no confidence.

Yushchenko’s background and career path made him an unlikely ally of opposition hardliners such as Tymoshenko with whom he always had a difficult relationship and Yushchenko became a temporary revolutionary during the Orange Revolution. “His is a bloodless form of politics, the rationale approach of a former central banker not given to blazing rhetoric,” preferring dialogue over protest. Our Ukraine’s multi-vector strategy of dialogue with the Kuchma regime and street protesters against the same regime merely reflected the divisions that had always existed in the national-democratic camp. One wing of the national democrats supported cooperation with opposition hardliners and backed “orange” coalitions after the 2006 and 2007 elections, such as former Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) member and leader of the People’s Self-Defense movement Lutsenko, former Foreign Minister and Rukh leader Borys Tarasiuk and former Defense Minister and Civic Initiative leader Anatolii Hrytsenko. Another wing of national democrats supported negotiating coalitions with the authorities and became supporters of grand coalitions be-

21 Peter Baker, “Popular Figure in Ukraine Has A Middle Way: Enigmatic Ex-Premier Pursues Compromise at a Tense Time,” The Washington Post (September 18, 2002).
between Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions after the 2006 and 2007 elections, such as former Prime Minister Yurii Yekhanurov, former Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Plisuhch and pragmatic businessmen such as Petro Poroshenko. In August 2006, 30 out of 79 Our Ukraine deputies voted for Yanukovych’s candidacy for Prime Minister and many of these businessmen deputies defected to President Yanukovych. Petro Poroshenko, for example, agreed to become Minister of Economics in Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov’s 2010–2012 government.

Opposition hardliners never courted dialogue with the Kuchma regime and sought his impeachment and removal from office during the 2000–2001 Kuchmagate crisis brought on by the discovery of the decapitated body of journalist Heorhii Gongadze in November 2000, two months after Gongadze was kidnapped by police officers. The Kuchmagate scandal surfaced when a tape recording made illicitly by presidential guard Mykola Mel’nychenko was released in late November 2000 that included Kuchma ordering his police chief to organize violent actions against Gongadze.

In 2001–2004, Yushchenko repeatedly called for a Polish-style round-table and supported EU brokered round-table negotiations in December 2004 from which Tymoshenko was excluded. During the Orange Revolution these divisions manifested themselves between opposition hardliners Tymoshenko and Pora [It’s Time] NGO who argued for the forcible takeover of power by occupying the presidential administration. Opposition softliners Yushchenko, Parliamentary Chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn, Plisuhch and Poroshenko supported round-table negotiations. The negotiations led to Kuchma and regime softliners indirectly supporting Yushchenko in the re-run second round of the elections on December 26, 2004, and constitutional reforms introduced in 2006.

Shevardnadze and Kuchma were granted immunity during the Rose and Orange revolutions respectively, in the latter case in an informal manner by Yushchenko at the round-table negotiations. In Ukraine the immunity deal led to a lack of criminal charges against Kuchma and senior officials during his presidency. In contrast, Mason points out, “Arresting officials of the old regime and their cronies has been a hallmark of Saakashvili’s tenure.” The unwillingness to prosecute those involved in organizing the 2004 election fraud in Ukraine was followed by President Yushchenko signing a memorandum with Yanukovych in September 2005 to secure backing from the Party of Regions for Yekhanurov’s candidacy for prime minister. The memorandum amnestyed officials involved in election fraud. These two steps facilitated the ability of the Party of Regions to rejuvenate itself as a political force and win three pluralities in the 2006, 2007 and 2012 elections.

Issues that divided the “orange” coalition after Yushchenko came to power rested over dealing with past abuses of office during Kuchma’s decade

22 See Steven Pifer, “Ukraine’s Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Problems of Post
in power, whether to punish the organizers of journalist Gongadze’s murder and election fraud in 2004 and finding those behind Yushchenko’s poisoning in September 2004. By the end of Yushchenko’s term in office the prosecutor-general’s office had been unable to find the organizers of Gongadze’s murder (only three policemen were imprisoned for being accomplices to the murder) or Yushchenko’s poisoning.

Another factor that divided the opposition was the question of whether there should be widespread nationalization and re-privatization of enterprises. Our Ukraine, led in 2005–2006 by pragmatist Yekhanurov, agreed with the Party of Regions’ opposition to policies of re-nationalization while the Bloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko (BYuT) supported such policies. If re-privatization was to be conducted it remained unclear who would draw up lists of businesses, how re-privatization could be undertaken through Ukraine’s highly corrupt judicial system and the manner in which political corruption could be prevented from influencing parliamentary votes.

Dealing with war crimes in the case of Serbia, or crimes against humanity and political repression in the case of Ukraine, is a test of the political will of the president and the ability of the law enforcement authorities to prosecute. In Serbia and Ukraine, law enforcement failed the test due to a highly corrupt judicial system, an ineffectual prosecutor-general’s office and the absence of political will. Investigation into the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was undertaken more thoroughly than into Yushchenko’s 2004 poisoning which has never been resolved. Senior officials, such as Serhii Kivalov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission, and Andrii Kliuiev, head of Yanukovych’s shadow election campaign, who were both involved in election fraud in the 2004 elections, were re-elected in the 2006 and 2007 elections within the Party of Regions which became a safe haven for discredited Kuchma-era officials. Kivalov received an award from President Yushchenko in 2007 for his services to the Central Election Commission.

**Fractured National Democratic Opposition in Ukraine’s Fifth Cycle**

Democratic oppositions in post-communist states have traditionally been divided into moderates and radicals and these two wings have sometimes cooperated but invariably are at odds with each other. In September 2005, the removal of the Tymoshenko government led to the disintegration of the “orange” coalition and its division over the following eighteen months. The unity of the “orange” camp had always been tenuous because it was brought together by what it opposed and not what it stood for. The SPU had supported anti-regime

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protests in 2000–2003, collaborated in 2003–2004 with the KPU and pro-regime centrist parties over constitutional reforms, and supported Yushchenko in the two second rounds of the 2004 elections. After Yushchenko was elected the SPU joined two “orange” governments in 2005–2006 before defecting to Prime Minister Yanukovych’s 2006–2007 government. In “orange” governments the SPU often acted as though it was in opposition by blocking reformist policies and European integration.26 Since the 2007 elections the SPU has become a marginal political force because “orange” voters deserted it in protest over its betrayal of the “orange” coalition following the 2006 elections.

In Georgia the Rose Revolution democratic coalition united moderate and radical parties in the National Movement-Democratic Front (EM-DP) led by parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze and President Saakashvili which merged into the United National Movement (ENM). The Georgian opposition remained weak and fractured within the New Rights-Industrialists and Democratic Front factions in parliament. Burjanadze eventually broke with Saakashvili but his popularity remained high and he won a second term in the 2008 pre-term elections. The ENM lost the 2012 elections to the Georgian Dream bloc of his main rival, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. President Yushchenko obtained only five percent of the vote and got a fifth place in the 2010 elections, a far worse election result compared to President Kravchuk who also only served one term but entered the second round of the 1994 elections where he was defeated with 44 percent of the vote.

A major difference between Georgia and Ukraine was the type of leader who came to power. The radical wing of the Rose Revolution won the Georgian presidency in January 2004 and this would have been the equivalent of Tymoshenko winning the 2004 elections in Ukraine. Saakashvili’s victory introduced three factors into post-revolutionary Georgia that were absent in Ukraine. Firstly, it brought to power an “extremely motivated, extremely impatient” group of younger politicians. Nodia points to Saakashvili’s “massive energy” in pushing forward reforms as well as the young average age of of 28–30 among government officials compared to 60 in Prime Minister Azarov’s first government. Civil society activity declined following the Rose Revolution because “half” of the civil society network, according to Nodia, moved into government. A drawback was that Saakashvili has “modernizing authoritarian instincts,” although this is a political culture that is to be found in most Ukrainian and Eurasian politicians.27 Secondly, Saakashvili has self-confi-

27 Interview with Ghia Nodia by Robert Parsons in RFE/RL Features, June 15, 2005.
dence, a vision and political will which are three traits Yushchenko has never possessed.28

Thirdly, Saakashvili defines himself in opposition to his predecessor, Shevardnadze, whereas Kuchma is only a negative “Other” for Tymoshenko but not Yushchenko. The lack of any criminal charges against senior members of the 1994–2004 Kuchma regime, coupled with feuding among “orange” leaders, led to widespread disillusionment among Yushchenko’s voters and their defection from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko, as clearly seen in the 2006 and 2007 election results when BYuT won double the number of votes received by Our Ukraine.29 Our Ukraine came third in the 2006 and 2007 elections with 14 percent on both occasions, ten percent less than it received in the 2002 elections. BYuT increased its support from seven percent in 2002 to second place in the 2006 and 2007 elections with 22 and 31 percent respectively. Our Ukraine declined in popularity throughout Yushchenko’s presidency and after he left office became a marginalized political force receiving only one percent in the 2012 elections. The Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms (UDAR) led by Vitalii Klychko incorporated many former senior Our Ukraine leaders and received the same third place and 14 percent in the 2012 elections as Our Ukraine had received in 2006 and 2007.30

The drift of “orange” voters towards Tymoshenko was insufficient for her to win the 2010 elections where she obtained three million fewer votes than Yushchenko in December 2004. Yushchenko indirectly supported Yanukovych when he called upon Ukrainians to vote against both candidates in the second round, a call that hurt Tymoshenko not Yanukovych. Many of the five million young Ukrainian voters who supported Arsenii Yatseniuk and Serhii Tihipko in 2010 did not vote for Tymoshenko in the second round of the 2010 elections. Nevertheless, Tymoshenko remained a significant threat to Yanukovych as seen in the 2007 and 2012 elections when BYuT received only three percent fewer votes than the Party of Regions and in the 2010 elections when Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko by barely three percent.

Democratic breakthroughs in Slovakia and Croatia and democratic revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine did not destroy the ancien régime and this only took place in Georgia where pro-Shevardnadze forces were routed. In Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine the ancien régime retained a counter-revolutionary

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29 Compare and contrast the detailed surveys conducted in Ukraine by the IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) in April and November 2005. These and subsequent surveys on Ukraine are available at [www.ifes.org/countries/Ukraine.aspx], accessed February 25, 2013.

support base that enabled it to return to power either as a reformed political force (Croatia) or as an unreformed political force (Serbia and Ukraine). Vladimír Mečiar’s People’s Party—Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and its nationalist allies continued to command the support of 30 percent of Slovaks in the 2002 elections on the eve of the country joining NATO and the EU but by the end of that decade had become a marginalized political force. In Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia counter-revolutionary forces were anti-democratic whereas in Ukraine these political forces pursued counter-revolutionary nationality and democratic policies.

Democratic opposition coalitions have often disintegrated, as in Ukraine in 2005 and 2008–2009, thereby permitting the return to power of counter-revolutionary ancien régime parties in subsequent elections. The HZDS won the 1994 and 1998 elections in Slovakia but in 2002 it received fewer votes than the left or center-right. With its nationalist allies, the HZDS won 40.5, 36.1 and 29.8 percent of the vote in three Slovak elections. By the 2002 elections, Slovakia had achieved a democratic breakthrough over populist-nationalist forces that could no longer derail the democratic system and block the country’s membership of NATO and the EU. The HZDS was the largest party in Slovakia until the 2002 elections but lost its seats in the 2010 elections. In Croatia, softliners in the HDZ supported its transformation into a center-right conservative party. A similar process was pursued by reformers in the Franco regime’s National Movement (Spanish Phalanx of the Assemblies of the National-Syndicalist Offensive) who established the center-right Popular Party led by Jose Maria Aznar. In Croatia the HDZ returned to power in 2003 after defeating the center-left coalition that had been elected four years earlier but its return to power did not derail Croatia’s democratic progress and path to membership of NATO and the EU. The coming to power of Party of Regions leader Yanukovych in 2010 ended Ukraine’s goal of NATO membership and froze Ukraine’s integration into the EU.

In Georgia there is less likelihood of the return of political forces loyal to Shevardnadze and Ivanishvili’s populist Georgian Dream bloc claims to support NATO and EU membership. At the same time, evidence of Ivanishvili’s authoritarianism is growing as leading members of the Saakashvili regime are increasingly arrested and, in policies similar to those since 2010 Ukraine, “selective use of justice” is used against them.31

Soviet Authoritarian Political Culture and Counter-Revolution in Ukraine’s Sixth Cycle

Democratic freedoms, such as support for civil society, media freedom, and free elections, were positive outcomes of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and

have become threatened by Yanukovych counter-revolution.\textsuperscript{32} The democratic environment in Georgia and Ukraine improved following their democratic revolutions and both countries held free elections and facilitated media freedom. The Interior Ministries in both countries, which previously had ties to organized crime and had been involved in extra-judicial violence against regime opponents and journalists, were reformed. Georgia was given credit for enhancing local government capability, undertaking a determined struggle against corruption, and improving the protection of human rights. Transparency International and the World Bank gave Georgia under Saakashvili high marks for its battle against corruption and improving the business environment.

In Ukraine, Freedom House registered a vastly improved media environment with the ending of censorship, greater transparency in government and state activities and policies and a free election environment. Nevertheless, problem areas continued to exist in both countries. No structural reforms of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) took place under Yushchenko which enabled the Yanukovych administration to quickly return the organization to its Soviet KGB roots and adopt tactics employed by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Belarusian Committee for State Security (KGB).\textsuperscript{33} The judiciary in Georgia and Ukraine continued to be subject to political interference. Political parties in Georgia and Ukraine remain weak and tied to personalities, rather than to ideologies, which is a common problem throughout Eurasia.

Democratization has proceeded faster in post-communist states which have introduced parliamentary systems that are commonly found in central-eastern Europe and the three Baltic states. Abuse of office, election fraud and corruption has tended to occur around the executive in post-communist states. Of the eleven CIS states, ten have super presidential systems with emasculated parliaments with the exception of the parliamentary systems in Ukraine and Moldova. Georgia, a non-CIS member, adopted a parliamentary system in 2011. In September 2010, the Yanukovych administration’s counter-revolutionary policies pressured the Constitutional Court to annul the 2004 constitutional reforms and return Ukraine to the 1996 presidential constitution. These policies threatened Ukraine’s young democracy and turned Ukraine’s parliament into a rubber stamp institution.

Since 2010, Ukraine is regressing across a full range of political, economic, national and foreign policy issues that were supported in Ukraine’s fifth cycle by the country’s first three presidents. Initial optimism of Yanukovych’s 2010 election representing the coming to power of a different, re-born democratic leader compared to the Yanukovych who orchestrated mass election fraud

\textsuperscript{32} Nations in Transit annual surveys are available at [www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=17].

in 2004 has not been borne out.\(^{34}\) These developments cast doubt on Adrian Karatnycky’s claim that “In the last twenty years, Soviet identity and regionalism have withered in Ukraine’s East, Center, and West.”\(^{35}\) In 2011, only a year after Yanukovych was elected president, Ukraine was downgraded by the New York human rights think tank Freedom House from “Free” to “partly free.” Ukraine’s 2010 local and 2012 parliamentary elections were condemned by Western governments and international organizations as a regression on democratic elections held under Yushchenko.\(^{36}\)

In Serbia and Ukraine the *ancien régime* has shown itself to be more entrenched. In Serbia two pillars of the Milošević regime, the Socialist and Radical parties, continue to command popular support and the Radical Party won the December 2003 and January 2007 elections while its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, was on trial in The Hague for war crimes. In Ukraine, the Party of Regions and Yanukovych have received three pluralities and won one presidential election.

The failure of “orange” forces to establish a parliamentary coalition following the 2006 elections facilitated the rejuvenation of the Party of Regions and a return of Yanukovych as prime minister of the Anti-Crisis parliamentary coalition. A threat to democracy continues to exist from the counter-revolutionary *ancien régime* in Serbia and Ukraine because *ancien régime* parties have been supported by a large group of voters and they are more united than fractured democratic opposition parties. At the same time, Serbia and Ukraine differ in two ways. The Serbians do not have a divided national identity and large numbers of national minorities. Kosovo with its large Albanian minority became an independent state with the support of Europe and the US. Georgia’s national minority problem was forcibly resolved by Russia in the early 1990s when it supported frozen conflicts and in 2008 when it invaded Georgia and recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Serbia also has an EU membership perspective which gives external support to democratic forces. The EU is offering Ukraine an Association Agreement (within which there is a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement [DCFTA]) but “enlargement-light” does not have the same ability to influence a country’s domestic policies as full EU membership. Ukraine’s European integration is frozen because of the “selective use of justice” against Tymoshenko, Lutsenko and other opposition leaders. Although the Association Agreement was initialed by both sides on March 30, 2012 (signaling a technical end to negotiations), the signing of the agreement by the European Council and its recommendation for ratification by the European Parliament and EU member parliaments are frozen. Yanukovych’s policies have ended Ukraine’s goal of

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35 Ibid.
36 OSCE report on Ukraine’s elections can be found here: [www.osce.org/odihr/96675], accessed February 25, 2013.
NATO membership while the imprisonment of political opponents has frozen relations with the EU.

The Party of Regions is the only former pro-Kuchma party to have survived the post-Kuchma presidency and it remains the most powerful political force in Ukraine. There are eight explanations for the electoral success of the Party of Regions.

1. **Persistence of Neo-Soviet Political Culture:** Surveys of national identity in Ukraine have pointed to Soviet identity being stronger in the Donbass (Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts) and the Crimean autonomous republic, two strongholds of the Party of Regions. In 2007, the Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies think tank surveyed national identities in Ukraine and found that Donets’k possesses the highest Soviet identity of all Ukraine’s regions, with 37.1 percent of the region’s population identifying their “cultural traditions” as Soviet (another 25.8 percent chose Ukrainian and 22.5 percent Russian). Crimea came a close second with 32.2 percent of the Crimean population declaring they possessed a Soviet identity (with another 30 percent Russian and 19 percent Ukrainian). In western Ukraine, a region never part of the Russian empire and only annexed by the USSR during World War II, allegiance to Soviet culture was far lower at only 5.9 percent in Chernivtsi and between 0.3–1.5 percent in the three oblasts of Galicia (L’viv, Ivano-Frankivs’k, and Ternopil’). Affinity with Soviet political culture is reflected in Donets’k and Luhans’k possessing 430 streets named after Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin and sixty-seven streets named after the local separatist and Donbass communist leader Fedor Artem.

2. **Authoritarian Monopolist:** The Party of Regions is an authoritarian and monopolist party that emerged from working class Donets’k and the region’s violent transition in the 1990s. The greatest willingness to use violence in Ukrainian politics has come from the Party of Regions. 23 percent of Party of Regions voters and 36 percent of KPU voters believe authoritarianism is better than democracy in certain cases compared to 20 percent for the nationalist Svoboda and only 16 percent for Batkivshchina voters.

3. **More Disciplined Than Democratic Forces:** In parliament the only defections have been from the opposition to coalitions supporting eastern Ukraini-
Table 2. Democratic Views of Ukrainian Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which do you agree with?</th>
<th>Party of Regions</th>
<th>Fatherland/Front for Change</th>
<th>UDAR</th>
<th>KPU</th>
<th>Svoboda</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Ukraine average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is best suited for Ukraine</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In certain cases, an authoritarian regime is better than a democratic one</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is unimportant if there is a democratic regime or not in Ukraine</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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an presidents Kuchma (1994–2004) and Yanukovych (since 2010). Their greater access to financial resources plays an important role, but so also does Communist era discipline that exists in eastern Ukraine but not in western Ukraine where political parties are fractured.

4. **Co-Opted and United Centrists**: The Party of Regions began as a merger of five parties and has since 2001 absorbed another four political parties (New Generation of Ukraine, New Democratic, Republican Party, and Strong Ukraine) and co-opted six more political parties (Christian Democratic Party, People’s Party, Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, United Center, Leonid Chernovets’kyi bloc, and the KPU). The Party of Regions is therefore a large coalition of interests and groups. A total of fifteen political parties, including all five parties in President Kuchma’s For a United Ukraine bloc in the 2002 elections, have merged with, or been co-opted by, the Party of Regions.40

5. **Monopoly of Power in Russophone Ukraine**: There are no competitive elections in eastern Ukraine where the Party of Regions holds a monopoly of power after absorbing other centrist parties, such as Tihipko’s Strong Ukraine political party. The KPU is a Party of Regions satellite and voters flow between both parties. The KPU more than doubled its support in the 2012 elections from 5 to 14 percent after some of its voters returned from the Party of Regions. The KPU and the Party of Regions each contribute to the continued influence of neo-Soviet political culture within Ukraine’s political system. The KPU’s vote declined from 20 percent in the 2002

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40 *Ukrains’ka Pravda*, September 7 and 10; and *Kyiv Post*, September 20, 2012.
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elections to less than 5 percent in the 2006 and 2007 elections, in great part because its supporters switched their allegiance to the Party of Regions. The KPU has twice entered governments dominated by the Party of Regions in 2006–2007 and from 2010. This situation is notably different from Kuchma who successfully defeated the KPU in the late 1990s.

6. Ukraine’s Only Political Machine: The Party of Regions is Ukraine’s only political machine. The closest equivalent on the opposition side was Tymoshenko by virtue of her charisma, self-confidence and determination. In the 2007 elections BYuT became the only national democratic political force to win votes in Russophone Ukraine. Most national democratic parties are led from the top down and rely on charismatic leaders for their popularity. Election mistakes and failures do not lead to leadership changes and leaders see parties as their personal fiefdoms.

There would be no Batkivshchina and Front for Change political parties without Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk respectively. The Party of Regions is not the preserve of its leaders and has elected three leaders—Azarov (2001 and since 2010), Volodymyr Semynozhenko (2001–2003) and Yanukovych (2003–2010). The Party of Regions and the KPU can rely on a stable third of the electorate who will vote for them. Western Ukrainian voters withdraw their support if they feel leaders (e.g. Yushchenko) or parties (e.g. Our Ukraine) have betrayed them. Secondly, surveys show that nearly as many Ukrainians believe political stability and the economy are as important as democracy and voters who hold these views and are more likely to vote for the Party of Regions and the KPU (see Table 2).

7. Economic Nationalism: The Party of Regions is analogous to Unified Russia and the KPU is the equivalent of the virtual opposition Just Russia political party. The Party of Regions and Unified Russia share anti-Western, statist and economic nationalist political cultures. At the same time, Ukraine’s regional and linguistic diversity means the country is vastly different to Russia. Ukraine’s regional diversity works against any political force dominating the country, and this factor prevented Kuchma, Yushchenko and Yanukovych from receiving landslide victories in 1994, 2004 and 2010 respectfully. Ukraine’s regional diversity prevents the Party of Regions from monopolizing power throughout Ukraine.

8. Available Financial Resources: The majority of Ukraine’s business elites have either supported the Party of Regions from the onset in 2001 through the Donets’k clan or they have been absorbed and co-opted since then. This

41 Ukrain's'ka Pravda, August 6, 2012.
has led the OSCE and other international organizations to condemn the growing influence of oligarchs and big business in the 2012 elections for not providing a level playing field for all political competitors. In addition, the Kuchma regime did not establish a ruling party of power and permitted political pluralism within eastern Ukraine while the Yanukovych administration has co-opted other centrist political parties and is blocking financial support from big business to the opposition. With all Ukrainian political parties funded by big business the withdrawal of their financial support dramatically reduces the effectiveness of democratic parties.

**Conclusions**

In the last century Ukraine has undergone six cycles of Ukrainophile and Russophile policies that have impacted on nationality policies, liberalization and democratization. Competition between Yushchenko’s and Yanukovych’s Ukrainian and Russophile national identities in the fifth and sixth cycles have deepened the country’s regional divisions and distracted Ukrainian elites from implementing reforms and achieving foreign policy goals. Ukraine will remain an immobile and dysfunctional state until politicians can compromise on the country’s divisions over nationality questions. A counter-revolution against Ukrainophile nationality policies and democratic gains from the Orange Revolution has been launched since 2010 during the sixth cycle of Ukrainian history. President Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, Ukraine’s most powerful political force and the country’s only political machine, do not show they intend to relinquish power.

The Soviet legacy has left a deep-seated Soviet and Eurasian political culture in eastern Ukraine. Threats to Ukrainian national identity, language and culture and the crushing of Ukrainian democracy have come from eastern Ukrainian leaders during the second, fourth and sixth cycles of Ukrainian history. At the same time, liberalizing, democratizing and Ukrainophile leaders, such as Shelest and Kuchma, have also emerged from eastern Ukraine. Breaking out of this vicious historic cycle will be difficult and can only be undertaken by a national compromise between eastern and western Ukrainians without which Ukraine would be faced by continued in-fighting that would prevent the attainment of domestic and foreign policy goals. An alternative to national compromise, as supported by Ukrainian intellectuals such as Yuri Andruk-

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hovych, would be to divide Ukraine.\textsuperscript{46} The 2015 presidential elections will be an important hurdle in Ukraine’s development because they will be more bitterly fought than the elections held in 2004 which nearly tore the country apart.

\textsuperscript{46} See interviews with Yurii Andrukhovych by Oksana Klymonchuk in UNIAN, July 22, 2010 [unian.net/ukr/print/387844], accessed February 25, 2013; and by Taťiana Servetnyk, “Janukowycz jak Putin,” Rzeczpospolita (August 1, 2010) [www_rp_pl_artykul_516695.html], accessed February 25, 2013