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The Long Shadow of Borders: The Cases of Kashubian and Silesian in Poland

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Abstract

Poland was established as a nation-state in 1918. The state's administration embarked on the policy of ethnolinguistic homogenization in the interwar period, because one-third of the population was seen as ethnolinguistically non-Polish. The Polish borders and territory were dramatically altered as a result of World War II, and the country became a member of the Soviet bloc. The concomitant genocide and ethnic cleansing yielded an almost ethnolinguistically homogenous Poland. After the end of communism, the German minority, whose existence had been denied, was finally recognized. In preparation for accession into the European Union (EU), Poland worked out, as required, a system of minority rights protection. However, it did not cover contemporary Poland's largest minority, the Silesians. Additionally, the system was constructed in such a manner that the acknowledged linguistic difference of a similar group of Kashubs stopped short of recognizing them as a minority. It appears that in Poland the need for protecting minorities is felt to be an imposition of the West, or the old EU, which is not obliged to observe such provisions itself. In its de jure observance of minority rights provisions, de facto, the Polish state administration seems to endeavor to limit such provisions as much as possible, alongside the number of Polish citizens entitled to them. Hence, it may be proposed that the ongoing project of ethnolinguistic homogenization continues to be the ideological backbone of national statehood legitimation in today's Poland.

Introduction: On Borders and Languages

The Dichotomy of Languages versus Dialects

There is no linguistic definition of a "language," meaning a variety of "language in general" or a variety deemed to be a "language," that is, "one of many." Apart from such varieties known under the name of "languages," there are others, referred to as "dialects." The emergence of the dichotomy between languages and dialects, though apparently of Western origin, appears to be closely connected to the invention and subsequent spread of the technology of writing. Writing is not language per se, but a graphic representation of various salient elements of the spoken word that allows the reader to decode graphically recorded oral propositions with a high degree of fidelity.¹

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Prior to the rise of the written word, in the popular present-day Western take on this matter, all people spoke dialects. After writing was invented, those dialects that happened to be employed for recording messages with the use of graphic signs became elevated as “languages.” By the same token, the vast majority of dialects not utilized for the purpose of writing were downgraded as “unwritten” dialects, or as dialects “not endowed with a specific written form of their own.” The judgmental opposition pitting languages, which are “better” or “better developed,” against dialects, which are “worse” or “undeveloped,” is nowadays commonly expressed through the Western terms “dialect” and “language.” But it is assumed that such opposition did emerge time and again in unrelated cases and areas where writing appeared independently or was transplanted without much connection to its original source.²

As alluded to above, the invention of writing seems to be tied up with large hierarchical organizations of groups inhabiting specific territories.³ These territorialized organizations of (relatively) large human groups are known as “states.” If writing is connected to state-building, languages are also part and parcel of this process.⁴

Languages and Nationalism

At the turn of the nineteenth century, in the wake of the American and French revolutions, the idea emerged that for a state to be a legitimate polity, all its population must be organized as a nation, that is, a collectivity of citizens enjoying equality before law. In turn, this newly conceived nation became the sole font of legitimacy for the state’s government, replacing in this role – at least in Europe – God. The idea of nation and its polity, or nation-state, spread in the early nineteenth century to Latin America, where the Spanish colonial empire was replaced by nation-states. The populations of the colonies were transformed into nationally defined citizenries of their respective nation-states.⁵ At the same time, the religious difference that opposed Orthodox Christianity to Islam led to the carving of Christian Balkan nation-states out of the Ottoman Empire. To qualify as a citizen of these nation-states, one had to profess an appropriate religion.⁶

Similarly, in the middle of the nineteenth century, languages were elevated to the foundation of nation-state-building projects in Central Europe.⁷ Only those who spoke (and wrote), or were defined

¹ Henry Rodgers, *Writing Systems: A Linguistic Approach* (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2005), 2.

² *Ibid.*, 7.

³ Jeremy Black ed., *Atlas of World History: Mapping the Human Journey* (London: Dorling Kindersley Publishing, 2001), 32–33.

⁴ Martin Kuckenburg, *Pierwsze słowo. Narodziny mowy i pisma [The First Word: The Birth of Speech and Writing]* (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 2006), 131–139.

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 47–66.

⁶ Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920* (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 1977), 3–140.

⁷ Tomasz Kamusella, *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave

as speaking a national language could be recognized as members of a given nation-in-making. Next, a collectivity of speakers of the same language aspired to secure a territory contiguously inhabited by them as their prospective nation-state. The first two ideologically ethnolinguistic nation-states, the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire, were established in 1861 and 1871, respectively.⁸ These were followed by other national politics that were ethnolinguistic in character in Central Europe after World War I, which spread even further across the post-Soviet area following the breakup of the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁹ Elsewhere in the world, in the wake of decolonization (especially during the two decades after the 1960s), colonial populations were transformed into nations and simultaneously, transformed into independent polities defined as nation-states.¹⁰

Zones of Multilingual Contact into Ethnolinguistic Frontiers

Although prior to the rise of compulsory elementary education in the standard or national language, dialects differed from village to village and from region to region, the differences did not hinder mutual comprehensibility. Interlocking chains of such dialects form dialect continua. Incomprehensibility arose when speakers of dialects from two different dialect continua met.¹¹ But grassroots diglossia or polyglotism¹² or the use of a lingua franca (that is, Latin, German, or French in Central Europe) by leaders of respective communities or the literati easily bridged the gap of incomprehension.

However, the rise of ethnolinguistic nationalism as an ideology that legitimated statehood, required breaking the dialect continua into discrete areas apportioned to standard national languages.¹³ In turn, ethnolinguistic barriers coincided with the frontiers of the nation's postulated nation-state. After the founding of these ethnolinguistically defined nation-states, the coincidence was not perfect but "marred" by multilingual communities and individuals and ethnolinguistic minorities. The state did its best to make them monolingual.¹⁴ In Central Europe, the policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide associated

Macmillan, 2009).

⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 52–54.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 54–58; Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

¹⁰ Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962).

¹¹ Peter Trudgill, *A Glossary of Sociolinguistics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 35–36.

¹² József Liszka, "Das Tauschkind-System im Slowakischen Teil der Kleinen Tiefebene [The Children Exchange System in the Vicinity of Bratislava]," *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie*, 32 (1996): 58–72.

¹³ Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Tomasz Kamusella, "The Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State: The Case of Central Europe," in *Nationalisms Across the Globe: An Overview of Nationalisms of State-Endowed and Stateless Nations*, eds. W. Burszta, T. Kamusella, and S. Wojciechowski (Poznań, Poland: Wyższa Szkoła Nauk Humanistycznych i Dziennikarstwa, 2006), 57–92.

¹⁴ Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

with World War II and its aftermath allowed for the effective carrying out and enforcement of normative monolingualism in the national language with regard to entire nations enclosed within the boundaries of their nation-states.¹⁵

Between Germany and Poland

A traditional zone of multilingual communication, between Germanic and Slavic speakers, was turned, between 1918 and 1950, into a line of sharp linguistic discontinuity coinciding with the German-Polish frontier¹⁶ that until 1990 was the most notorious and disputed cleavage in Cold War Europe.¹⁷ For all practical purposes, after 1945, this border was sealed and became an impenetrable barrier isolating the increasingly monolingual nations, that is, the German-speaking Germans (of East Germany) and the Polish-speaking Poles, on their respective sides of the frontier. Between 1945 and 2007, when Poland (alongside other new European Union member states) joined the Schengen Area of borderless travel, three generations of Germans and Poles had already been born and come of age within view of one another across the frontier, but with no meaningful interaction, out of one another's earshot.

In communist Poland, the existence of minorities and communities speaking languages other than Polish (especially Germans) was denied in the official Polish-language literature.¹⁸ But the authorities did monitor minorities, forced them to assimilate or emigrate, or engaged in outright expulsions¹⁹ as in the case of the Jews after 1968–70, the Mazurs and the Roma in the 1970s, or the Silesians during the 1980s.²⁰ A preliminary discourse on these minorities unfolded tentatively only at the end of the communist period, during the second half of the 1980s.²¹

¹⁵ Tomasz Kamusella, "Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia 1950–89 and the Ennationalizing Policies of Poland and Germany," *Patterns of Prejudice*, 2 (1999): 51–73.

¹⁶ Piotr Eberhardt, *Polska i jej granice. Z historii polskiej geografii politycznej* [Poland and Its Borders: From the History of Polish Political Geography] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2004).

¹⁷ Tomasz Kamusella, "The Twentieth Anniversary of the German-Polish Border Treaty of 1990: International Treaties and the Imagining of Poland's Post-1945 Western Border," *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, No. 3–4 (2010): 120–143.

¹⁸ Józef Byczkowski, *Mniejszości narodowe w Europie 1945–1974 (Wybrane zagadnienia)* [National Minorities in Europe: Selected Aspects] (Opole: Instytut Śląski, 1976).

¹⁹ Adam Bartosz, *Nie bój się Cygana / Na Dara Rromesθar* [Don't Be Afraid of the Roma] (Sejny: Pogranicze, 1994): 183–198.; Jarosław Syrnyk, ed. *Aparat bezpieczeństwa Polski Ludowej wobec mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych oraz cudzoziemców. Studia* [The Security Forces of People's Poland Against the National and Ethnic Minorities, and Against Foreigners: Studies] (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej - Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2009).

²⁰ Tomasz Kamusella, "Ethnic Cleansing," 51–73; Andrzej Sakson, *Mazurzy – społeczność pogranicza* [The Mazurs: A Borderland Group] (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1990), 207–225; Dariusz Stola, *Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967–1968* [The Anti-Semitic Campaign in Poland, 1967–1968] (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2000).

²¹ Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Ojczyzna nie tylko Polaków. Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w latach 1918–1939* [The Fatherland not only of the Poles: National Minorities in Poland, 1918–1939] (Warsaw: Młodzieżowa Agencja

On both sides of the German-Polish border there were broad changes in the twentieth century, but different confessional configurations and the vagaries of earlier history had led to the emergence, in the zone of interaction between speakers of dialects from the Germanic and Slavic dialect continua, of the following ethnic groups with their own specific languages: the Lutheran Mazurs, the Catholic Kashubs, the Catholic and Lutheran Sorbs, and the Catholic Silesians. The Mazurs, originally living in Mazuria (today in northeastern Poland, from Działdowo to Olecko), disappeared as a group during the 1970s, due to their massive, largely forced, emigration to West Germany. The Sorbs live across the present-day Brandenburg-Saxon administrative border in eastern Germany, between Cottbus in the north and Bautzen in the south.

Of the four groups mentioned above, between the mid-nineteenth century and 1945, the Prussians and Germans collected statistical data on the vernaculars of the Kashubs, Mazurs, and Sorbs as the Kashubian, Mazurian, and Sorbian (Wendish) languages, respectively.²² Interestingly, in the same statistics, the Silesians' vernacular was classified as "Polish"²³ though most Silesians did not at that time see their speech or identity as Polish. Since its low-key introduction in 1849, Polish functioned as a language of instruction in the first three years of elementary school (until 1863) and as a language of religious songbooks in the areas inhabited by Slavophone and bilingual Silesians.²⁴

Hence, the authors decided to focus on the contrasting cases of the Kashubs and the Silesians, who survive as important regional / ethnic / ethnolinguistic / linguistic groups in today's Poland. The former, with Kashubian already recognized as a language in some cases in the nineteenth century, reside in Kashubia in northern Poland, or at the Baltic littoral, northwest, west, and southwest of the city port of Gdańsk, or in the swath of land from Władysławowo in the north to Brusy in the south. On the other hand, the Silesians live in the historical region of Upper Silesia, between the cities of Opole and Katowice, in the west and in the east, respectively. Concentrated efforts to standardize Silesian and to have it formally recognized as a language began only at the turn of the twenty-first century.

To Recognize or Not to Recognize?

In interwar Poland, in line with ethnolinguistically defined nationalism as adopted by the Polish

Wydawnicza, 1985).

²² Grzegorz Jasiński, *Mazurzy w drugiej połowie XIX wieku. Kształtowanie się świadomości narodowej* [*The Mazurs in the Second Half of the 19th Century: The Shaping of their National Identity*] (Olsztyn: Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego, 1994), 107–115; Friedrich Lorentz, *Geschichte der pomoranischen (kashubischen) Sprache* [*The History of the Pomeranian (Kashubian) Language*] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1925); Ernst Tschernik, *Die Entwicklung der Sorbischen Bevölkerung von 1832 bis 1945* [*The Development of the Sorbian Population from 1832-1945*] (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1954).

²³ Felix Triest, *Topographisches Handbuch von Oberschlesien* [*The Topographic Handbook of Silesia*] (Breslau: Korn, 1864).

²⁴ Tomasz Kamusella, *Schlonska mowa. Język, Górny Śląsk i nacjonalizm* [*The Silesian Language: Language, Upper Silesia and Nationalism*] Vol II (Zabrze: NOS, 2006).

national movement in the 1880s, the Kashubs and Silesians were claimed as Poles who had “forgotten” their “true Polish ethnic and historical origin.” On the other hand, Germany, subscribing to the same kind of nationalism but faced with the undeniable Slavophone or bilingual (Slavophone-Germaniophone) character of the two populations,²⁵ claimed them as Germans connected by a shared German culture that was postulated to trump language.²⁶

These antagonistic claims were simultaneously given credence and frustrated by the fact that after World War I, the area inhabited by the Kashubs was split among Germany, the Free City of Danzig, and Poland, and the Silesians’ homeland, among Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Poland. In the latter case, the Silesian population from the south of pre-1918 Germany’s Upper Silesia was also claimed as Czech by Prague.²⁷ Members of the same ethnic group were subjected to contradictory assimilation pressures that taught them to adapt to these by formally declaring whatever the authorities wanted. When they crossed the state-border (or the frontier changed to the same effect), they simply changed their declarations, thanks to their polyglotism. But among other Kashubs, a Kashub could remain and be seen as a proper Kashub, and the same was true of a Silesian in exclusively Silesian company. No switches of group allegiance were required, unlike in the company of the “indubitable” ethnic Germans or Poles.

This facility of adapting to the rapidly changing geopolitical situation proved to be invaluable when Kashubia and Upper Silesia found themselves under the successive sway of the twentieth century’s two totalitarianisms of Germany’s national socialism and of Soviet-style socialism between 1933 and 1989. This pragmatic approach allowed most of them to save their lives and livelihoods, following the 1945 westward shift of the German-Polish frontier to the Oder-Neisse line. Millions of Germans were expelled from the “former German territories” given to postwar Poland by the Kremlin; their place taken by millions of Poles similarly expelled from the eastern half of interwar Poland, which had been seized by the Soviet Union.²⁸

The vast majority of Kashubs and Silesians could and did evade expulsion. Likewise, they could not leave for postwar Germany because from Warsaw’s ideological vantage it would appear as allowing for the voluntary Germanization of Poles. In Poland’s communist economy of constant dearth, the possibility of leaving the “workers’ paradise” for capitalist West Germany became one of the most sought-after restricted “goods.” The grassroots and international pressure was such that Warsaw allowed for emigration of the most persistent. Between 1950 and 1991 there was a mass emigration of over

²⁵ James E. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

²⁶ Carsten Eichenberger, *Die Deutschen in Polen: Von der verleugneten Minderheit zur anerkannten Volksgruppe [Poland’s Germans: From Suppressed Minority to Recognized National Group]* (Augsburg: Bukowina-Institut, 1994), 36.

²⁷ Vilém Plaček, *Prajzáci. Aneb k osudům Hlučínska 1742–1960 [The Prussians: Or on the Fate of the Hlučín Region]* (Háj ve Slezsku: František Maj, 2007).

²⁸ Philipp Ther, *Deutsche und Polnische Vertriebene. Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen 1945–1956 [German and Polish Expellees: Society and Policies Directed at the Expellees in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany and in Poland, 1945–1956]* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998).

800,000 Silesians.²⁹

In Stalinist Poland (1947–1956), no linguistic, ethnic, or regional separateness of the Kashubs or Silesians was permitted or even publically considered. In 1956, the *Zrzeszenie Kaszubskie* [Kashubian Union] was registered. But its apparently explicit ethnolinguistic character was of no liking to the authorities. Hence, it became a more regionally oriented organization in 1964, the change sealed by its new name — *Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie* [Kashubian-Pomeranian Union]. Pomerania is a historic region, coterminous with the northwestern corner of modern-day Poland, not associated with any ethnic or linguistic group.³⁰

No similar organizations were established for the Silesians. They were unofficially considered as more German/ized than the Kashubs, and as such the Silesians required a more concentrated and relentless Polonization.³¹ Furthermore, Upper Silesia could be seen as the Silesians' ethnic or national homeland. Tellingly, two academic institutes were founded for the sake of Polonizing the Silesians (the *Instytut Śląski* [Silesian Institute] in Opole and the *Śląski Instytut Naukowy* [Silesian Scientific Institute] in Katowice], while only one was established in the case of the Kashubs (the *Instytut Bałtycki* [Baltic Institute] in Gdańsk). Therefore, a Kashub or Silesian had to be a Pole, but if an individual opposed this ascription from above for long enough, the authorities would let the person become a German and leave for West Germany. Declaring oneself a Kashub or Silesian was no option, as neither Warsaw nor Bonn was ready to accept such a simultaneously non-Polish and non-German choice of identification.

With regard to language, in communist Poland, Kashubian and Silesian were treated as dialects (*dialekt*), subdialects (*gwara*), or groups of subdialects (*gwarę*) of the Polish language. In the case of Silesian, most foreign scholars dealing with the linguistic dimension of Upper Silesia concurred, though some did see it as a language in its own right,³² while others saw it as a mixed, Germanic-Slavic, language or variety.³³ On the other hand, outside Poland, Kashubian was often classified as a Slavic language.³⁴

²⁹ Tomasz Kamusella, "Ethnic Cleansing:" 51–73.

³⁰ Józef Borzyszkowski, "A History of the Kashubs until the End of Communism," in *The Kashubs: Past and Present*, eds. Cezary Obracht-Prondzyński and Tomasz Wicherkiwicz (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 5–74.

³¹ Bernard Linek, "Odniemczanie" województwa śląskiego w latach 1945–1950 w świetle materiałów wojewódzkich [*The "De-Germanization" of Silesian Voivodeship in 1945–1950 in Light of the Voivodeship Archival Materials*] (Opole: Instytut Śląski, 1997).

³² Ewald Osers, "Silesian Idiom and Language," in *Slavonic Encyclopedia*, ed. Joseph S. Roucek (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 1149–1151.

³³ Norbert Reiter, *Die Polnisch-deutschen Sprachbeziehungen in Oberschlesien* [*The Polish-German Language Relations in Upper Silesia*] (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960).

³⁴ Among contemporary Polish linguists, Alfred Majewicz was the first to classify Kashubian as a language in its own right. Alfred Majewicz, "A New Kashubian Dictionary and the Problem of the Linguistic Status of Kashubian," *Collectanea Linguistica in Honorem Adami Heinz* (Cracow: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1986): 95–99; Timofej Florinskij, *Lektsii po slavianskomu iazykoznanii II* [*Lectures on Slavic Linguistics, Vol 2*] (Kiev: Imperatorskij Universitet sv. Vladimira, 1898), 548; Reinhold Trautmann, *Die Slavischen Völker und Sprachen. Eine Einführung in die Slavistik* [*The Slavic Nations and Languages: An Introduction to Slavic Philology*] (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1948), 110–113; James G. Williams, Martha L. Manheimer and Jay Elwood Daily, *Classified Library of Congress Subject Headings* (New York: Dekker, 1982), 182.

The age of totalitarianisms was over in 1989 in Poland, following the simultaneous fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet bloc. Poland, as with other post-communist states in Europe, became democratic and its economy was overhauled from a centrally planned into a free market one. Ascribing ethnic and linguistic identities from above, with no regard for the feelings and wishes of the populations concerned, would not do in this new Poland. Kashubian and Silesian activists, not altogether sure of how long this unexpected window of freedom might last, treaded carefully in the 1990s. But by the turn of the twenty-first century, they had come to the conclusion that it was safe for individuals and their groups to reassert their own identities whatever they might be. Warsaw awoke to the novel developments in the first decade of the twenty-first century, initially giving in to the knee-jerk reaction of the previous, national communist regimes, by denying the right of separate national or linguistic identity to the Kashubs and the Silesians alike. Recently, the authorities have been nuancing their position so as not to hurt the international image of Poland as a democratic country that duly observes and protects human and minority rights.

Distinguishing between National and Ethnic Minorities

Following the collapse of communism, the democratization and the systemic change that Poland underwent afterward entailed recognition and acceptance of the national minorities living in the country, including Germans. The recognition of the German minority, after half a century of its official non-existence, appeared to the Polish public as a “sudden re-emergence of crypto-Germans” or of “false Germans.” This recognition was tightly connected to the end of the Cold War in Europe. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (popularly known as the “4 + 2 Treaty,” 1990), in which the four wartime Allies returned full sovereignty to Germany, obliged the latter to contract a treaty with Poland on the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the legitimate frontier between these two states. In return, the German-Polish Border Treaty (1990) was followed by the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (1991).

The latter treaty officially recognized and guaranteed the rights of the German minority in Poland. It was the first-ever bilateral agreement contracted after World War II in Europe that guaranteed the rights of a minority. One explanation for the outbreak of this war maintains that it was triggered by the post-1918 minority treaties that allowed “home countries” to use such minorities as “fifth columns” in neighboring states with an eye towards territorial aggrandizement. Hence, after World War II, the question of minorities was first “settled” by the expulsion of minorities between 1945 and 1950. Afterward, the issue of minorities was “frozen” when the Cold War confrontation assumed central importance in European and global politics.

The subsequent “unfreezing” of border and minority tensions following the fall of communism and the breakups of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union required, simultaneously, the working out of a solution and prevention measures, as clearly exemplified by the outrage of the post-Yugoslav wars,

including acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide. French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur's 1993 Pact on Stability in Europe was an initiative of the recently renamed European Union to defuse potential tensions. To a degree the Balladur Plan and the Balladur pact system are the same thing. The Balladur Plan (officially known as the "Pact on Stability in Europe") was to push the post-Soviet and post-communist states to sign bilateral treaties, among others, on the inviolability of their mutual borders and protection of minorities. The signing of the treaties created a treaty system of security and guarantees, sometimes referred to as "Balladur Pact System." Two years later, 50 countries in Central and Eastern Europe signed the Pact. In its wake, most signed numerous bilateral treaties, modeled on the German-Polish Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, thus guaranteeing their mutual borders and protection for their respective minorities in the neighboring states.

The "Balladur Pact System" bears a close similarity to the minority treaties in interwar Europe. The treaties, devised and often imposed by the victorious Allies were binding for Germany and Austria and the then-new nation-states lying east of them, the Soviet Union's western border being the limit in the east. Likewise, the Balladur Pact System, conceived in the capitals of Western Europe, was to be implemented in Central and Eastern Europe only, its western edge constituted by Denmark, Germany, Austria, and Italy. Hence, some Western European states (especially France) are not compelled to recognize any minorities or grant them any rights.

The nature of the Balladur Pact System is such that by its state-oriented nature it guarantees the rights of minorities that enjoy their own "kin nation-states." Poland's German population has the possibility of formal or informal recourse to Germany in order to intercede on their behalf. The same is true of the Hungarians in Romania or the Belarusians in Poland. But for the Roma, Rusyns, or Gagauzes – with no kin national polity – recognition of stateless minorities, and observance of their rights, rest solely in the hands of the nation-states in whose territory they reside.

The implicit creation of two classes of minorities, those with kin states and stateless ones, was duly reflected in Polish legislation. Poland promulgated its first post-communist constitution in 1997. Article 35 introduced the legal categories of national and ethnic minorities. However, for all practical purposes, all the minorities recognized in the country, either with kin states or stateless, were treated as national minorities before 2005.³⁵ This was so because no legal distinction was provided for distinguishing between these two types of minorities.

The plan was to adopt a legally binding distinction on minority rights, but an act of this kind was not passed by the Polish Parliament until one year after Poland's accession into the European Union (2004). In a certain conjunction with the logic of the aforementioned Balladur Plan, in 1993, the European Union delineated the so-called Copenhagen Criteria to be met by any candidate state before it could join the EU. An integral part of the political criteria is respect for minorities.

³⁵ Sławomir Łodziński, *Równość i różnica. Mniejszości narodowe w porządku demokratycznym w Polsce po 1989 roku* [Equality and Difference: National Minorities in the Polish Democratic Order After 1989] (Warsaw: Scholar, 2005).

Brussels, as proof of fulfilling the minority section of the political criterion, wanted the candidate states to legislate acts on minorities. Poland did so in early 2005, when the Parliament promulgated an Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language.³⁶ The Act defines national minorities as those that identify with their kin nation-states. By the same token, ethnic minorities are those that do not have such kin national polities. In the definitions of both types of minorities, this Act emphasizes language as their most fundamental defining feature. This shows the continued political and legislative importance of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the constitutive and legitimizing principle of Polish statehood.

On the other hand, the inherent arbitrariness of minority rights protection as guaranteed by international law is visible in the fact that the Act includes, as its integral part, two lists: one of the national minorities and the other of the ethnic ones that Warsaw decided to recognize. These lists do not contain all the minorities in Polish territory; thus, they exclude – according to the first two post-communist censuses of 2002 and 2011 – Poland’s largest minority, the Silesians who number around 850,000. The Karaims, however, made it onto the list of ethnic minorities, though they number a mere 350 people. Blatant exclusions are mixed with phony over-inclusiveness.

The same is true of the Act’s approach to language as the defining feature for the identification of minorities. The provision for the protection of minority languages sounds rather awkward when in the context of Poland’s Tatars, who have not used Tatar as the language of their community since the fifteenth century. Another singularity is evident in the phrase “the regional language” in the Act’s title. It was a bow of the Polish Parliament to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, signed by Poland in 2003, in preparation for its ratification that was concluded in 2009. In line with this European Charter, the Polish Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language distinguishes between minority and regional languages, though the latter is mentioned only in the singular, while it is generally accepted that there is more than one minority language in Poland.

Article 3 of the Act defines “minority languages” as languages spoken by national and ethnic minorities. Article 19 opposes labeling them “regional language,” simultaneously stating that it is different from the state (national) language and is not a dialect of the state (national) language. Furthermore, speakers of the regional language are citizens who (as is implied rather obliquely) do not belong to any of the recognized national or ethnic minorities. Therefore, speakers of regional languages are deemed to be members of the Polish nation. Article 19 identifies Kashubian as the Act’s only “regional language.” This identification is reinforced by the 2009 ratification of an instrument that provided Poland with lists of languages to be protected in the country under the provisions of the European Charter. The languages, in line with the aforementioned Act, are divided into three groups: the languages of national minorities, the languages of ethnic minorities, and the group of regional languages that includes the sole specimen

³⁶ *Ustawa o Mniejszościach Narodowych i Etnicznych oraz o Języku Regionalnym [The Act on National and Ethnic Minorities, and on the Regional Language]* (2005). Accessed May 29, 2013: <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20050170141>

of Kashubian (Poland 2009).³⁷

Interestingly, the aforementioned current legal conceptualization of Kashubian as a regional language in Poland leads to the unexpected conclusion that the Polish nation has two official languages: the state and national language of Polish and the regional language of Kashubian. This is not an abnormal organization of ethnolinguistic relations in a polity, but a paradoxical and somewhat delegitimizing national statehood in Central Europe where the model of the ethnolinguistically defined nation-state has ruled supreme since 1918. This model requires that the nation-state be for one nation only and that its members speak a single national language. The normative drive of this ethnolinguistic principle of statehood creation and legitimation continues as exemplified by the Yugoslav case. Following the breakup of the country, its official Serbo-Croatian language had to be split, too, into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian, so that in turn, the newly founded nation-states of Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia could be seen as legitimate national polities by their own inhabitants and by other nation-states in Central Europe. Without their own specific national languages not shared with any other states or nations, the states would suffer diminished legitimacy in Central Europe.

Warsaw and the Kashubs: Recognizing the Language but Not the Ethnic Group

Toward the Standardization of Kashubian

To have an elaborated orthography with orthoepic, grammatical, and lexical norms of a given linguistic system is one of the crucial elements in the development of a written language. In this context, Kashubian has been unique, because since the mid-nineteenth century until the communist period, an orthography was developed for Kashubian.

During communism, this tradition was maintained. In 1952, the Gdańsk branch of the Związek Literatów Polskich (Association of Polish Writers) held a meeting on Kashubian orthography, and determined that its orthography should be close to the Polish one. Following this trend, in 1960, regional activist Aleksander Labuda published *Słowniczek kaszubski [A Small Kashubian Dictionary]* in Warsaw.³⁸

According to Popowska-Taborska,³⁹ Labuda intended to publish the dictionary as a Kashubian-Polish-Kashubian dictionary, but the authorities did not permit this title; however, this dictionary is de facto the first Kashubian-Polish differential dictionary, which includes neologisms. According to the author, its primary purpose was to help non-Kashubian teachers working in Kashubia as Polish language teachers understand local children speaking in Kashubian dialects. But the author's true intention was to

³⁷ Poland: Declaration Contained in the Instrument of Ratification (2009). Accessed May 29, 2013: conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?CL=ENG&NT=148&VL=1

³⁸ A different type of spelling, developed by two Warsaw scholars, Hanna Popowska-Taborska and Zuzanna Topolińska, was applied in this dictionary.

³⁹ This information is based on a personal communication with Prof. Popowska-Taborska.

underscore the lexical differences between Kashubian and Polish.

In 1967 the Polish Academy of Sciences began publishing *Słownik gwar kaszubskich na tle kultury ludowej* [*The Dictionary of the Kashubian Dialects Contextualized Against the Background of the Kashubian Folk Culture*, 1967–76], which consists of more than 60,000 entries, by a local priest named Bernard Sychta. Although Sychta aimed to collect as many lexical items as possible, and did not intend to differentiate Kashubian from Polish, this dictionary tapped the rich vocabulary and phraseology specific to Kashubian and soon became the most important reference book for Kashubian activists, including those who were trying to codify the language.

In 1974, on the initiative of local activists, writers, and scholars, a commission on the question of Kashubian orthography was established, and a year later, the commission published *Zasady pisowni kaszubskiej* [*Principles of Kashubian Orthography*, 1975]. This publication also illustrates grammatical forms from a normative perspective. Based on an orthographic system similar to Polish, numerous literary works appeared during the 1980s. In this context, it is worth mentioning Breza and Treder's *Gramatyka kaszubska. Zarys popularny* [*Kashubian Grammar: A Popular Outline*, 1981], which had a de facto normalizing effect and became a grammar handbook, contrary to the authors' declared intention. Soon, Labuda's *Słownik polsko-kaszubski* [*A Polish-Kashubian Dictionary*, 1981] and *Słowôrz kaszëbsko-polszczi* [*A Kashubian-Polish Dictionary*, 1982] with numerous neologisms were published.⁴⁰

The aforementioned works stimulated the Kashubian elite to elaborate their mother tongue into a polyvalent literary language. According to Obracht-Prondzyński,⁴¹ by 1990, 350 titles and one million copies had been published. Thus, it can be concluded that the late communist period prepared the ground for future discussions on a codified literary Kashubian. Afterward, there were several attempts to standardize the language, for instance, *Słownik polsko-kaszubski* [*A Polish-Kashubian Dictionary*, 1994] by Jan Trepczyk and *Wskôzë kaszëbszczégò pisënkù* [*A Guide to Kashubian Orthography*, 1997] and *Kaszëbszczi słowôrz normatiwny* [*A Kashubian Normative Dictionary*, 2005] by Eugeniusz Gołąbek. But these references were normative-oriented only.⁴²

Since 2006, when the new Kashubian Language Council was established, its members have been trying to codify a standard literary language.⁴³

⁴⁰ The first drafts of both dictionaries were prepared in 1975. Two reviewers (Breza and Treder) negatively evaluated the dictionaries and declined to publish them. One of the reasons was the dictionaries include too many neologisms and pseudo-archaic terms. In addition, the reviewers stated that there was no necessity to publish a Polish-Kashubian dictionary. Nevertheless, the dictionaries were published. This internal review was consulted in the personal archive of the Labuda family, located in Tłuczewo.

⁴¹ Cezary Obracht-Prondzyński, *The Kashubs Today: Culture-Language-Identity* (Gdańsk: Instytut Kaszubski, 2007).

⁴² According to Gołąbek, he had to publish a dictionary of "standardized" Kashubian against the opposition of other Kashubian activists (from an interview with Gołąbek conducted by the authors in 2012).

⁴³ In 2012 the Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie published *Wielki Słownik Polsko-kaszubski* [*A Great Polish-Kashubian Dictionary*] compiled by Gołąbek. The dictionary is intended as a stepping stone for standardizing Kashubian as a literary language, though the author himself did not foresee it as a normative dictionary.

Kashubian Publishing in the Communist Period

The first activity after World War II started in 1945 when the so-called *Zrzeszeńcy* [Unioners] published the newspaper *Zrzesz Kaszebska* [*The Kashubian Union*]. Even in the early 1950s during Stalinism, the Kashubian elite continued writing in Kashubian despite official Polonization. *Dziennik Bałtycki* [*The Baltic Daily*] started to publish *Rejsy* [*Cruises*], which included folklore texts in Kashubian. Furthermore, the Gdynia-based publisher Wydawnictwo Morskie (Maritime Publishing House) and even the publishing house in Warsaw, Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza (People's Publishing Cooperative) published books in Kashubian.

In 1956 when Stalinism ended, the *Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie* started its publishing activities. Although there was no financial support from the state, the *Zrzeszenie* actively published literary works in Kashubian. Their official journal *Biuletyn Zrzeszenia Kaszubsko-Pomorskiego* [*The Bulletin of the Kashubian-Pomeranian Union*], which was later renamed *Pomerania*, became the main medium for discussing regional, social, cultural, literary, linguistic, and other topics related to Kashubia. In 1980, its run reached 10,000 copies, and sensitive topics such as the separateness of Kashubian from the Polish language were discussed. Since the *Zrzeszenie Kaszubsko-Pomorskie* showed a clear anti-communist sentiment, the publication of its journal was suspended during the 1980s.

In the 1990s, when there was no longer any serious conflict with the Warsaw authorities, local activist Wojciech Kiedrowski became an important figure in Kashubian publishing. He continued supporting the development of Kashubian as well as the idea of codifying it as a fully-fledged literary language.

Religion and Language: Toward Kashubian Prestige

The existence of the holy texts in a given language can often be one of the main arguments justifying the codification of a literary language.⁴⁴ Traditionally, in Kashubia where most are Catholic, the official language of the Church has been Polish. Since Kashubian has been used in most cases as a language of unofficial communication, even local Kashubian activists did not try to use it in prayer. But in 1984, a local writer and Bishop Franciszek Grucza first tried to introduce a Holy Mass in Kashubian.⁴⁵ The Catholic Church in this region reacted neither negatively nor positively to this movement. But this event triggered a discussion among the Kashubs on the use of their language in church.

⁴⁴ John Edwards, *Language and Identity: Key Topics in Sociolinguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁴⁵ According to Kazimierz Kleina, Father Grucza had already given a sermon in Kashubian in 1979. See Eugeniusz Pryczkowski, *Kaszubski Kordecki. Życie i twórczość ks. prał. Franciszka Gruczy* [*A Kashubian Kordecki: Life and Work of Prelate Franciszek Gducza*](Banino: Wydawnictwo Rost, 2008).

The crucial moment in the Kashubs' religious life was the visit of Pope John Paul II to Kashubia in June 1987. In his address, the Pope stressed that the Kashubs should cultivate their cultural heritage and identity, including their language. After this event, Bishop Bogusław Głódowski introduced a Holy Mass said in Kashubian once a month in Gdańsk Cathedral. Under his influence, local activist Eugeniusz Gołąbek published a Kashubian translation of a part of the New Testament in 1992. In the same year, Bishop Grucza also published a fragment of the New Testament in Kashubian. In 1999, Gołąbek published his Kashubian translation of the Psalms, and in 2007, the prayer book *To je słowó Boże [This is God's Word]*. In addition, Bishop Adam Sikóra published a Kashubian translation of the four Gospels translated from the Greek original (2001–2010).

All these books were officially promulgated by the Catholic Church. As a result, the status of Kashubian became more prestigious. However, as of 2014, there are only a few churches where the Kashubian-language Mass is on offer.

Introducing Kashubian to Schools

During communism, it was impossible to introduce Kashubian into the educational system. In 1981, a regional education program was adopted, but the introduction of Kashubian to schools failed, because trained teachers, teaching materials, or curriculum were unavailable. In addition, Kashubian itself had not yet had a unified standard form. Despite this situation, in 1991, in an elementary school in Głodnica, for the first time ever Kashubian began to be offered as a subject.

In 2001, the Polish Ministry of National Education included Kashubian in the curriculum for middle school (*gimnazjum*). In 2006, students were given the option of taking one of their secondary-school-leaving examinations (*matura*) in Kashubian.

In 2001, Gdańsk University began to organize an irregular Kashubian-language course. In 2009, the university's Institute of Polish Philology established a regular course in Kashubian studies, including the language. In 2013, this course became an independent entity, renamed the Unit for Kashubian Ethnophilological Studies.

The Legal Status of the Kashubian Language

In 1991 when a new law on the system of education was adopted, the Kashubs' right to maintain their regional ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity was officially guaranteed. In 1999, the Law on the Polish Language provided the possibility of introducing an auxiliary language. However, the law lacks appropriate executive regulations and it does not contain any provisions for minority language usage in jurisdiction or state administration.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Tomasz Wicherkiewicz, *The Kashubian Language in Education in Poland* (Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Mercator-Education, 2004).

In 2003, Poland signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In 2005, the Polish Parliament adopted the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language. Thanks to this Act, Kashubian gained the status of a regional language. Today, bilingual – Polish and Kashubian – signage is in use in ten communes, where more than 20 per cent of the inhabitants are Kashubs. The Kashubs, however, do not have the status of an ethnic minority since most Kashubs do not desire such a status and consider themselves to be Poles.⁴⁷

In addition, the Law on Radio and Television Broadcasting (1992) obliges the public mass media to meet the needs of national and ethnic minorities. Thanks to this law, the sphere of the use of Kashubian has expanded, thanks to Gdańsk Radio's program *Tedë jo!* [*Then, Yes!*], *Radio Kaszëbë* [*Radio Kashubia*], and other local programs. Although this law was employed to this end, the Kashubs were not and are still not recognized as a minority, and Kashubian gained a modicum of formal recognition as a regional language only in 2005.

Research Institute of Kashubian Linguistic and Cultural Heritage

The idea of establishing a Kashubian research institute budded in the 1950s, but it was never realized during the communist years. For decades, the Museum of Kashubian-Pomeranian Literature and Music in Wejherowo has played this role as part of its activities. Only in 1996 did the Institute of Kashubian Linguistic and Cultural Heritage start operating in Gdańsk, and has been supported by several Polish ministries. It organizes conferences, and engages in educational and publishing activities.

To conclude, in breach of the national communist model of one nation - one language and other unfavorable political and financial circumstances, the Kashubs could survive and cultivate their linguistic activity before 1989, using the rhetoric of regionalism. But the lack of recognition for Kashubian as a language, and its absence in schools meant constant decline in the Kashubian linguistic heritage. In 1989, the Kashubs already knew what they should do to ameliorate the situation. Their goals are to codify, implement and elaborate the Kashubian language. Achieving a codified, unified literary language has been and will always be a significant problem for the Kashubs, because, first, there are many dialects in Kashubian that differ from one another significantly and, second, there are people who are apprehensive about local features that could be sidelined and ultimately lost. But, as Siatkowska⁴⁸ points out, Kashubian today is close to becoming a literary language with polyvalent functions.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See footnote 14. It is worth noticing, however, that the members of the *Kaszëbskô Jednotë* [*Kashubian Unity*] demand the official status as a minority for the Kashubs to protect and develop their linguistic and cultural heritage. Although there has been a long discussion on this issue, this idea lacks broader support among the Kashubs. It is because of this, according to Obracht-Prondzyński, *The Kashubs Today* (444), Warsaw did not accord the Kashubs the status of an ethnic group.

⁴⁸ Ewa Siatkowska, *Szkice z dziejów literackich języków słowiańskich* [*On the History of the Slavic Literary Languages*] (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, 2004).

⁴⁹ For instance, the translation of Adam Mickiewicz's epic poem *Pan Tadeusz* into Kashubian by Stanisław Janke

Warsaw and the Silesians: Neither Recognizing the Language nor the Ethnic Group

A new space of freedom opened after the end of communism in Poland and in the neighboring states. It has facilitated the emergence of voices, ideas, and groups whose existence and relevance may contradict the state's official ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism. However, democratizing changes removed from the state administration's hands totalitarian or authoritarian instruments that before 1989 had been customarily employed to suppress dissent and opposition.

Upper Silesia was the industrial lifeline of both interwar and communist Poland. The region's shape altered with full conformity to the state's requirements, but with little if any concern for the needs and wishes of Upper Silesia's inhabitants. The rapid de-industrialization of the region during the 1990s, causing vast unemployment, was cushioned only in its western half (województwo opolskie or Opole Province) by the rise of the recognized German minority. Beginning in 1993 (that is, after ratification in 1992 of the German-Polish Border Treaty and of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation), Germany began to grant Poland's German minority German citizenship and passports. This citizenship made them into European Union citizens, too, letting these new German passport holders undertake legal seasonal or permanent employment in Germany or elsewhere in the European Union.⁵⁰

This option was largely unavailable to the inhabitants in eastern Upper Silesia (województwo katowickie or Katowice Province, which was confusingly renamed województwo śląskie or Silesian Province in 1999). They felt they had been ignored by the Polish state and the mainstream political parties. In 1990, some of the disgruntled established the Ruch Autonomii Śląska (RAŚ, Silesian Autonomy Movement), the sobriquet "Silesian" used for various historical and political reasons, but actually standing for the historical region of Upper Silesia only. In 1996, RAŚ activists decided to add an ethnolinguistic component to their previously largely ethnicity-free regional-cum-autonomy program. To this end, they founded the Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej (ZLNŚ, Union of the Population of the Silesian Nationality). The hope was that as a recognized national minority, the Silesians would vote for their representatives who would then enter the Polish Parliament without the need for meeting the 5 per cent threshold, thanks to the exemption for national minority organizations.

But the state reacted with repeated refusals to register the ZLNŚ. The ensuing legal battle took Warsaw and the organization to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in 2004, and it continues to this day. After 2004, RAŚ, led by Jerzy Gorzelik, fell back on its original regional-cum-auton-

significantly contributed to improving the prestige of Kashubian as a literary language. See: Adam Mickiewicz, *Pón Tadeusz to je òstatny najachùnk na Lëtwie. Szlacheckò historiô z rokù 1811 i 1812 w dwanòsce knégach wiérszã* [Lord Thaddeus, or the Last Foray in Lithuania: A 1811 and 1812 Story on the Nobles in the Twelve Books of Verse] (Wejherowo: Muzeum Piśmiennictwa i Muzyki Kaszubsko-Pomorskiej and Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Maszoperia Literacka, 2010).

⁵⁰ Tomasz Kamusella, "Dual Citizenship in Opole Silesia in the Context of European Integration," *Facta Universitatis - Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology*, 10 (Niš: University of Niš, 2003): 699–716.

omy program: after the organization's victory in the 2010 local and regional elections, RAŚ allowed its representatives to enter the regional government of Silesian Province. Otherwise, RAŚ representatives have been represented in the province's numerous community (*gmina*) and county (*powiat*) self-governments since the late 1990s.

The ZLNŚ, when it turned out that recognition of the Silesians as a national or ethnic minority would be impossible in Poland in any foreseeable future, shifted its attention to the protection and development of the Silesian language. Meanwhile, the results of the first post-communist national census (2002) vindicated the ZLNŚ's principled stance, as the highly manipulated results showed that, with a population of 173,000, the Silesians, in numerical terms, are contemporary Poland's largest minority, albeit unrecognized.

In 2003, the ZLNŚ's leader, Andrzej Rocznik, founded the Ślōnsko Nacyjno Ôficyno / Narodowa Oficyna Ślōska (Silesian and Polish, respectively, for Silesian National Publishing House). It published the first-ever history of the Silesian nation and the nation's homeland of Upper Silesia written from a Silesian national perspective.⁵¹ The activities of the publishing house and the organization are closely related, as both are headed by the same person. In 2003, Rocznik, representing the Silesian language, participated in the founding of the Polish branch of the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL). Thanks to his endeavors, four years later in 2007, Silesian was granted the ISO 696-3 code szl, which amounts to international recognition of it as a language.

Hence, in 2007, Silesian reached a position similar to that which Kashubian had enjoyed before 2005, namely, recognition as a language abroad, but continued treatment as a dialect of the Polish language in Poland itself. As a sign of the growing importance of cyberspace, a grassroots initiative led to the 2008 launch of a Silesian-language Wikipedia, *Ślōnsko Wikipedyjo*. At present, it is the largest Silesian-language "book" (corpus of texts) available. In the same year, Rocznik and a linguist of the Polish language, Jolanta Tambor of the University of Silesia in Katowice organized, under the auspices of the Polish Senate and the Self-Government of Silesian Province, a conference on the standardization of the Silesian language. In 2009, this conference's legacy bore fruit in the form of a standardized spelling system for the Silesian language.

Most of the Silesian-language books (about fifty) published between 2003 and 2013, either in various pre-standard or standard orthographies, were brought out by the Ślōnsko Nacyjno Ôficyno. Another boost to the Silesian movement was given by the results of the 2011 national census. This time, free of manipulation, the census recorded 850,000 Silesians and 500,000 Silesian-speakers.⁵² In light of the

⁵¹ Dariusz Jerczyński, *Historia Narodu Ślōskiego: Prawdziwe dzieje Ziem Ślōskich od średniowiecza do progu trzeciego tysiąclecia* [*History of the Silesian Nation: The True History of the Silesian Lands from the Middle Ages to the Turn of the Third Millennium*] (Zabrze: NOŚ, 2003).

⁵² For all practical reasons, the majority of Silesians are bilingual in Silesian and Polish. (However, over 100,000 Silesians' command of Polish is so shaky they consider themselves to be monolingual in Silesian.) In the census, apart from their Silesian nationality, 431,000 persons declared Polish nationality, and 40,000 German nationality. The number of people declaring Silesian nationality as their only nationality amounted to 376,000. Even taking

data, the Silesians are indisputably Poland's largest minority and, likewise, the speakers of the Silesian language constitute Poland's second-largest speech community after the speakers of Polish.

It is difficult for the state administration to deny the will of so many of its citizens to be Silesians and to speak their own Silesian language without the state appearing ridiculous on the international arena. A sign of change in the position of the state administration is the successful 2011 registration of the Stowarzyszenie Osób Narodowości Śląskiej (SONŚ, Society of the People of the Silesian Nationality), achieved by a group led by Piotr Długosz, who is the RAŚ leader in Opole Province.⁵³ The new organization succeeded in having the collocation "Silesian nationality" included in its official name. This goal continues to elude the ZLNŚ, but SONŚ, in its statute, emphasized that the organization would not participate in any national elections. Because of this declaration, SONŚ closed for itself the opportunity to participate in Parliament, but on the other hand, it elicited from the state administration a tacit agreement to the existence of a "Silesian nationality." This may be seen as the first, long overdue, positive step toward the recognition of the Silesians as an ethnic minority in light of the Polish Constitution and of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language.

Because the state administration appears to have been less reluctant to relent in the matter of recognizing Silesian as a language, a group of MPs from Silesian Province have repeatedly, since, 2007 requested the Polish Parliament to recognize the Silesian language, preferably by including it, next to Kashubian, as a second regional language in the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language. Interestingly, in 2012, the Ministry of Administration and Digitization included Silesian as one of the traditional languages of modern-day Poland, in which parallel forms of the country's geographical names are to be recorded.⁵⁴

For the time being, the waiting game continues. The gradual reorientation of the organizational and ideological aims of RAŚ, SONŚ, and the ZLNŚ in the context of the domestic and international shame mobilization⁵⁵ applies increasing pressure on the Polish state administration to adopt a more flex-

this number as the "true" demographic size of the Silesians, they do remain Poland's largest minority nowadays. (Ludność według deklaracji narodowościowej oraz posiadania obywatelstwa polskiego w 2002 r. [The Population According to their Declared Nationality and in Respect of the Fact of Them Being Holders of Polish Citizenship in 2002] Accessed August 20, 2013: www.stat.gov.pl/gus/8185_PLK_HTML.htm)

⁵³ In late 2013, the Polish Supreme Court referred the registration of SONŚ to be reviewed by the district and regional law courts in Opole that had originally issued and upheld it. In 2014 both law courts revoked this registration. SONŚ is now appealing this decision. (cf Pustułka, Agata, "Ślązacy nielegalni, bo naród śląski nie istnieje. SONŚ wykreślony [The Silesians Are Illegal, Because the Silesian Nation Does Not Exist: SONŚ Is Crossed Out from the Registry]," *Dziennik Zachodni*, March 7 (2014). Accessed June 17, 2014: www.dziennikzachodni.pl/artykul/3357041,slazacy-nielegalni-bo-narod-slaski-nie-istnieje-sons-wykreslony-rejestracja-sons,id,t.html)

⁵⁴ Rozporządzenie Ministra Administracji i Cyfryzacji z dnia 14 lutego 2012 r. w sprawie Państwowego Rejestru Nazw Geograficznych [The Decision of the Minister of Administration and Digitization, Dated February 14, 2012, on the State Register of Geographical Names]. Accessed May 29, 2013: isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=W DU20120000309

⁵⁵ This is a term from the field of human rights protection, meaning that in the absence of appropriate legal instruments, or when a regime does not care about international law, shaming the regime through making its crimes

ible attitude toward the Silesians' demands. This may result in a compromise solution within a decade or so. In all probability, it will be a "Kashubian solution," that is, Warsaw agreeing to recognize Silesian as a regional language only. The recognition of the Silesians as an ethnic group is unlikely to follow any time soon. Unlike the Silesians, the vast majority of Kashubs declared themselves to be ethnic Poles in the 2002 census. Now, already with recognition of their language under their belt, 233,000 persons declared Kashubian nationality in the 2011 census.⁵⁶ So in the long run, Warsaw may need to recognize both the Kashubs and the Silesians as ethnic minorities, or face a deepening sociopolitical crisis and a delegitimation of its state authority, especially in Upper Silesia but also in Kashubia.

Earlier, the hope on the part of the state administration was that the number of Silesians would drop substantially from census to census, as happened in the Czech Republic, where their number plummeted fourfold from 44,000 in 1991 to 11,000 in 2011. As shown above, the opposite was true, as between 2002 and 2011 the number of Silesians recorded in the Polish censuses grew almost fivefold. Perhaps this unexpected development and the inclusion of the Czech Republic and Poland in the Schengen Area of borderless travel in 2007 gave a boost to Silesiandom in the former country, too, where the 2011 census registered 21,000 Silesians.⁵⁷

The disappearance of the border as a physical hindrance to free travel allows for the renewing of family and community links between the Polish and Czech sections of historical Upper Silesia and among the Silesians living across the state frontier. Since the 2009 standard orthography of the Silesian language is based on Polish-style spelling, it may not be accepted among Silesians in the Czech Republic. And if the resurfacing of the Silesians there proves to be permanent, they may loathe the efforts of the present-day codifiers of the Silesian language in Poland to subsume into it the very scant literary tradition of the Prussian and Lachian languages, connected respectively to the western and eastern ends of Czech (Upper) Silesia.

Last but not least, the prospective recognition of Silesian as a regional language may pose more paradoxes for the Polish state than its official espousal of Kashubian. Is Polish ethnolinguistic nationalism flexible enough to withstand, with no backlash or the danger of statehood delegitimation, the emergence of a Polish nation with its own three languages, the national Polish and the regional languages of Kashubian and Silesian? Should Warsaw decide to stick to the dogma of ethnolinguistic nationalism, the aforementioned dangers may become an unappealing reality. However, de-politicization and a certain de-ethnicization of language is not unthinkable, and it would allow Poland to become a more democratic

against humanity public, may make the regime improve its act; see Thomas Keenan, *Mobilizing Shame* (pp 435-449). *The South Atlantic Quarterly*. Vol 103, Nos 2/3, Spring/Summer (2004).

⁵⁶ Among them, 17,000 declared Kashubian as their only nationality. It is worth noting that 215,000 declared both Kashubian and Polish nationality. Furthermore, for all practical reasons, nearly all Kashubs speak Polish (*Łudność według deklaracji narodowościowej*).

⁵⁷ *Obyvatelstvo podle věku, podle národnosti, mateřského jazyka, náboženské víry, nejvyššího ukončeného vzdělání, státního občanství a podle pohlaví* [The Population According to Age, Nationality, Mother Tongue, Confession, Education, Citizenship and Gender]. Accessed May 29, 2013: [http://www.czso.cz/csu/2012edicniplan.nsf/t/A10032E9A7/\\$File/OBCR614.pdf](http://www.czso.cz/csu/2012edicniplan.nsf/t/A10032E9A7/$File/OBCR614.pdf)

and attractive polity in a united Europe, capable of espousing all its inhabitants, despite any linguistic, ethnic, or national differences. as the Polish Constitution proposes.

Conclusion: A Reluctant Retreat from the Dogma of the Normative Isomorphism of State Frontiers and Ethnolinguistic Borders?

Despite the post-1989 rhetoric of democratization and respect for minority rights, the nation-states of Central Europe cling to the exclusively ethnolinguistic model of nationality. The sole exception to this rule is post-Soviet Belarus where speaking the national language de facto is not the main marker of Belarusian nationality, similar to the case of official Irish in today's Ireland.⁵⁸ The turn toward ethnolinguistic particularisms has been visible in Central Europe since the beginning of the twenty-first century, as evidenced by the popular slogan of "Europe of fatherlands," and the rise of various ethnolinguistic nationalist parties and organizations across the region. The normative force of the ethnolinguistic model of statehood legitimation has been amply proved by the slow breakups of Yugoslavia and its Serbo-Croatian language.

The difficulty of abandoning or modifying this model of ethnolinguistically defined statehood, which nowadays is the norm in Central Europe, lies in the lack of a clear alternative as well as in the huge political, ideological, economic, and demographic investment that was extended to replace, during the twentieth century, the multiethnic and polyglot polities with monolingual ethnolinguistic ones in this region. In regard to the former difficulty, after the end of communism, many Central European states aspired to adopt "civic nationalism" in the course of democratization and systemic change. But there is no clear definition of civic nationalism. On the one hand, the rhetoric of French nationalism and statehood, on which many of Central Europe's nation-states are modeled, is civic, but its practice is strongly ethnolinguistic, or Frenchifying. On the other hand, a certain de-politicization of language and its disconnection from statehood, as practiced in Belarus, is unpalatable in the European Union because its members stereotypically perceive this country to be "Europe's last dictatorship."

The multisectoral investment in ethnolinguistically construed national statehood for almost 200 years constitutes a serious hurdle in changing from this model to something else. The first part of this huge investment, that of "patriotic agitation" or "national revival," prior to the Great War, saw the rise of political mass movements (as well as some tentatively ethnolinguistic nation-states), which questioned the prevailing political order in Central Europe. Another period was ushered in by World War I that destroyed the old political structures and old social certainties. The model of ethnolinguistic statehood was the sole legitimate and available one with which to replace the non-national *anciens régimes*. This novel Central Europe comprised of ethnolinguistic nation-states was partly destroyed and refashioned during the Second World War. Some of these changes were reverted, and with the exception of some border

⁵⁸ Loek Halman, Inge Sieben and Marga van Zundert, *Atlas of European Values: Trends and Traditions at the Turn of the Century* (Leiden: Brill and Tilburg: Tilburg University, 2012), 6–7.

changes and of the direct incorporations into the Soviet Union, the interwar Europe of ethnolinguistic nation-states was recreated after 1945.

This recreation was conducted under Soviet tutelage and connected to the wholesale Sovietization of Central Europe. It built on earlier developments that came from the West. The program of vast ethnic cleansing instituted and approved by the Western powers at the close of World War I saw the forced emigration and expulsions across the borders of the ethnolinguistic nation-states during the interwar period, undertaken in order to increase the degree of ethnolinguistic homogeneity in these national polities. The Allies put some paradoxical checks on the process in the form of the minority treaties regime that was imposed by the states of Central Europe. However, the system's standards were neither observed in Western Europe nor in the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

Another wave of ethnic cleansing in the elusive quest for “homogeneity” was initiated by the Western powers in 1938, acquiescing to Germany by the piecemeal partition of Czechoslovakia. Berlin and Moscow strongly reinforced the trend of deciding about Central Europe without referring to the opinion of those concerned, when in 1939/40 they occupied and divided the region, entailing agreed-upon mass expulsions and population exchanges. The horrors of the genocide of the Jews and the Roma in German-occupied Central Europe were compounded by unprecedented waves of expellees and refugees numbering in the millions.⁶⁰

The wartime horrors were condemned and it was promised that they would never be repeated, but one of its effects, or the unprecedented ethnolinguistic homogeneity of the postwar nation-states in Central Europe, was not abandoned. In the region's history textbooks, the pre-1918 period of “national revivals” and “national patriots” is remembered and cherished, but the way in which the ethnolinguistic “purity” of Central Europe's polities was achieved during the Second World War and in its immediate aftermath is rarely mentioned, let alone analyzed. But as much as the Kremlin's imposition of communism on generally anti-communist Central Europe might be disliked by the region's elites and populaces at large, the Soviet pledge to keep and deepen the freshly gained ethnolinguistic homogeneity of Central Europe's polities bought the imposed communist system much needed legitimacy.⁶¹

The national-communism of the communist years was over after the breakup of the system, the Soviet bloc, and the Soviet Union. But only by half, as while communism was gone, in the new democratic reality, nationalism – ethnolinguistically defined – remained the norm and basis of statehood legitimation, complete with the close political attachment to the principle of ethnolinguistic homogeneity, even when, as in the case of Poland, the post-communist Constitution openly disavows ethnolinguistic nationalism by defining the Polish nation purely in terms of citizenship. In reality, ethnolinguistic nationalism continues to delineate both the contours and contents of the Polish nation-state and its politics. De

⁵⁹ Philipp Ther, *Ciemna strona państwa narodowych. Czystki etniczne w nowoczesnej Europie* [*The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe*] (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2012), 110–169.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 170–265.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 266–380.

facto Poland is a nation-state for all Polish-speakers, construed as the Polish nation.⁶²

In our article, we took a look at the conflicting dynamics of Polish official civic nationalism and de facto ethnolinguistic nationalism by analyzing the cases of the Kashubs and the Silesians in today's Poland. The gap between this official and de facto kinds of nationalism is deepened and made more paradoxical by the new, undeclared, regime of minority rights protection that in the 1990s was imposed by the West on Central Europe's post-communist, post-Soviet, and post-Yugoslav states seeking membership in the Council of Europe, NATO, and the European Union. This regime, not of the Central European nation-states' making, does not oblige the "old members" of the aforementioned organizations in Western Europe to observe the same standard of minority rights protection. The Western European nation-states are largely free to decide on their own whether to give their minorities wide-ranging rights or to deny the very existence of these minorities and their languages.

Central Europe's nation-states are confronted with the rather unilateral imposition of the new minority rights regime and the sheer arbitrariness of observance of these rights in Western Europe. All this takes place in the context of the continuing potency of the principle of ethnolinguistic homogeneity as the normative basis of statehood legitimization in post-communist Central Europe. Most of the region's polities being modeled on the unitary ethnolinguistic French nation-state, officially "free" of any minorities, veer in the direction of the French example. Poland is no exception. The tyranny of ethnolinguistic homogeneity as the sole normative basis of statehood construction and legitimation continues in Poland and Central Europe.

Post-communist Poland does recognize the existence of minorities in its territory and in the first two censuses (2002 and 2011) after the end of communism, the population was asked about their nationality and language of everyday communication. The results were accepted with the exception of declarations of Kashubian nationality and language, and of Silesian nationality and language. This stance was modified in 2005, when in the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language, Kashubian was officially recognized as a language in its own right.

As an explanation of this non-acceptance of the census returns in regard to the Kashubs, the Silesians, and their respective languages, along with the unexpected subsequent recognition of Kashubian as a language, we propose the "principle of 1 per cent," or the "principle of statistical error." During communism, following the expulsions of Germans, Poland was officially presented as a nation-state without minorities or with a negligible number of them. Thus, it was presented as an ethnolinguistically homogeneous (*jednorodny*) polity. This view has continued to be officially espoused since 1989, too.

In the 2002 census, 471,000 respondents declared non-Polish nationality, so the number of ethnic non-Poles constituted around 1.2 per cent of Poland's population. This result was within the range of statistical error, which in this case is best represented by the number of people whose nationality was not established, that is, 775,000 (2 per cent).⁶³ The official reinterpretation of the census's returns disre-

⁶² Ibid., 381–415.

⁶³ Ludność według deklaracji.

garded declarations of Kashubian and Silesian nationality (173,000 and 5,000, respectively), the groups arbitrarily branded as a “regional group of the Polish nation” in the former case and as a “social group” in the latter. By deducting the numbers of declarations of Silesian and Kashubian nationality from the overall results, the number of declarations of non-Polish nationality was reduced by a third to 293,000, or 0.8 per cent of the state’s inhabitants, which is well below 1 per cent.

Declarations of language used at home, as recorded by the 2002 census, and afterward changed in the official reinterpretation tell the same “1 per cent” story, though on the face of it, a bit less forcefully. The self-declared speakers of other non-Polish national and ethnic languages amounted to 563,000 (1.5 per cent) in 2002 – more than 1 per cent of Poland’s population, but within the statistical error, as the number of people whose home language was not established was much higher at 772,000 (2 per cent). Declarations of Silesian (57,000) and then-yet-unrecognized Kashubian (53,000) were deducted from the total, reducing the number of non-Polish-speakers to 453,000 (1.2 per cent).

The 205,000 declarations of German (higher than the 153,000 declarations of German nationality) rather speak of the fear of Poland’s ethnic Germans of declaring their nationality. It was deemed safer by these 52,000 people to declare German to be their home language but to be of Polish nationality. Yet, on the other hand, it is well known that in Poland there is not a single locality – even the smallest of hamlets – where German would be the language of everyday use. It is preserved by those educated in Germany before 1945, and in a handful of families. Thus, we estimate that there are no more than 10,000 native speakers of this language in today’s Poland, amply proved by the fact that in Poland there is not a single German-medium minority school.⁶⁴

Bearing this datum in mind allows a deduction of 195,000 declarations of German from the number of non-Polish-speakers, thus pushing the overall number to 258,000 (0.7 per cent), which is below the 1 per cent threshold. This indicates that there may be demographic space left for recognizing the Kashubian language, as adding 53,000 Kashubian-speakers to the number of non-Polish-speakers would bring their number up to the level of declarations of non-Polish nationality (311,000, or 0.8 per cent), but still below the cap of 1 per cent. Warsaw was also convinced by the fact that only a negligible tenth of the Kashubian-speakers declared Kashubian nationality, meaning that the Kashubs, even when speaking their own language, meant to remain in the Polish nation’s fold. On the other hand, recognizing Kashubian as a regional language would give a bit more credence to Poland’s promulgation of the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages. In 2005, Kashubian was recognized as Poland’s sole regional language.

The game of numbers, intended to push down the share of non-Poles and non-Polish-speakers, though more difficult a decade on, was also played in the 2011 census and in the official “reinterpretation” (or manipulation) of its returns. A total of 1,468,000 people (3.9 per cent) declared non-Polish na-

⁶⁴ Ludność według języka używanego w kontaktach domowych i deklaracji narodowościowej w 2002 r. [The Population According to the Languages Used at Home and to their Declared Nationality in 2002]. Accessed August 20, 2013: www.stat.gov.pl/gus/8185_PLK_HTML.htm

tionality, and more than half of them – 847,000 (2.2 per cent) – Silesian nationality. Also, an unexpected 233,000 Kashubs (0.6 per cent), perhaps emboldened by the official recognition of their language six years earlier, declared Kashubian nationality, too. It goes without saying that Warsaw did not recognize these declarations of Silesian and Kashubian nationality, thus reducing the total number of declarations of non-Polish nationality to 388,000, or almost exactly to 1 per cent of Poland's population.⁶⁵

The number of non-Polish national declarations increased considerably because in this census it was allowed, for the first time ever, for a respondent to declare more than one nationality. This move perhaps limited by half the number of people whose nationality was not established, in comparison with the 2002 census, namely to 399,000, lowering the threshold of statistical error for this category of data to a dash more than 1 per cent. Hence, 918,000 people (2.4 per cent) declared joint Polish nationality with a non-Polish one. The number of declarations of exclusively non-Polish nationality amounted to 550,000 (1.4 per cent). From this number, in the reinterpretations of the results, exclusive declarations of Silesian nationality (376,000) and of Kashubian nationality (16,000) were deducted, yielding only 158,000 declarations (0.4 per cent) of exclusively non-Polish nationality.⁶⁶

It was a golden arrow that allowed for reducing the number of people declaring recognized non-Polish nationality by half in comparison with the results of the 2002 census, from 0.8 per cent to 0.4 per cent. Maybe we assume rather too much bad will on the part of the Polish authorities, but apart from permitting respondents to declare multiple nationalities, Warsaw did not concede to allowing them to declare that they had no nationality at all. Ideologically speaking, in an ethnolinguistic nation-state, it would be like accepting an a-national heresy. However, it is well known that nationality, or the fact of belonging to a nation, is a cultural trait, and is thus a construct dependent on the individual's will. Until the twentieth century in Europe, in censuses, it was unthinkable that a person would declare to be of no religion. Nowadays, religion being everyone's private matter in liberal democracies, no official would raise an eyebrow when a respondent declares to be an atheist. (In the 2011 census, 929,000 persons [2.4 per cent] declared themselves to be of no religion, and the religion of 627,000 [1.6 per cent] was not established at all.⁶⁷ Nations are no less a physical fiction than gods (obviously both phenomena are part and parcel of the social reality generated by human minds in conjunction with one another). In light of the Polish Constitution, equating the Polish nation with all the citizens of Poland, having no nationality is legally and politically possible – citizenship should suffice – but politically unacceptable.

In 2011, 949,000 respondents (2.5 per cent) declared that they spoke a non-Polish language at home. The number had almost doubled in comparison with the previous census, mostly on account of

⁶⁵ Lucyna Nowak, ed. *Ludność. Stan i struktura społeczno-demograficzna. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011* [*Population: Its State and Socio-Demographic Structure: The National Census of the Population and Accommodation*] (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2013). Accessed August 20, 2013: http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_14076_PLK_HTML.htm

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 99.

avoiding various “irregularities” (or manipulations) committed by the census commissioners when gathering data from respondents in 2002. This time, in the official reinterpretation of the returns, only declarations of speaking the Silesian language (529,000 or 1.4 per cent) were to be deducted from the tally, not those speaking the already-recognized Kashubian language (108,000 or 0.3 per cent). Hence, the official number of non-Polish-speakers in today’s Poland is 420,000 (1.1 per cent). Additionally, as the number of actual native speakers of German did not grow between 2002 and 2011, we propose to accept the more realistic estimate of 10,000 again, meaning that the 86,000 declarations of speaking this language were mostly of an ideological or ethnocultural character. This lowers the overall number of native speakers of non-Polish languages to 334,000 (0.9 per cent), or below 1 per cent, again.⁶⁸

Obviously, we have no knowledge of internal discussions on the census data on nationality and language behind closed doors at the meetings of the Polish government, or in the relevant ministries, departments, and other governmental institutions. Our divining of the whimsically dubbed “principle of 1 per cent” or the “principle of statistical error” from the published data and its official reinterpretations does not imply that some officials and decision-makers made a conscious decision to keep the numbers of declarations of non-Polish nationality and language below the 1 per cent threshold. This is a rather knee-jerk – and as such, largely unconscious – reaction aimed at preserving and deepening the ethnolinguistic “purity” of the Polish nation-state, by which numerous generations have been conditioned by school and via mass media since the founding of the Polish nation-state in 1918.

However, if the principle holds, there is basically no “demographic space” – as construed in line with the still-vibrant ideological tenets of ethnolinguistic nationalism – for recognizing either the Silesian language or Silesian as an ethnic or national minority. This would send the numbers of ethnic non-Poles and of speakers of non-Polish languages well above the 1 per cent barrier. Yet, in light of the 2005 recognition of Kashubian as a regional language, there may be some chance of a similar recognition for the Silesian language, if Warsaw takes a more relaxed stance on the census returns in regard to the non-Polish languages spoken in Poland. Although 949,000 respondents declared that they speak languages other than Polish at home, the vast majority of them do so in conjunction with Polish. Only 169,000 (0.4 per cent) declare that they speak exclusively non-Polish languages. However, what may be worrying for Warsaw is that most of the number is composed of 127,000 Silesians (0.3 per cent) speaking exclusively Silesian.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 96.