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confidence-building measures have since been implemented, including the reduction of border forces and the shelving of border issues. China came one step closer to India in 2003 by allowing trade through Sikkim, whose merger with India in 1975 had been opposed by China.

China’s concession to India on Sikkim should be understood in terms of its wish to complete the delineation and demarcation process of its land border. China’s eagerness seems to reflect its desire to expand bilateral trade across land routes. However, India has reasons to be not as eager as China, such as the characteristics of its export items and its trade deficit with China, besides the domestic political cost possibly involved in the quick settlement of border disputes. Moreover, India’s effective control over the people in the eastern sector or Arunachal Pradesh is recognized by the international community, while Chinese control over the western sector is just the military occupation of no man’s land and thus lacks international recognition. This difference in position on the respective occupying territories in the disputed areas creates current political tension, and the reference to the imperial ‘line’ may spur domestic agitation. However, these two Asian regional powers have implemented measures for confidence-building over the past years and should achieve success in managing the relationship between competition and cooperation.

To Which Country Does the Ryukyu Islands Belong?  
An Analysis of Chinese Views

ISHII Akira

The Ryukyu Kingdom was traditionally a tribute state of the Ming Dynasty and later the Qing Dynasty; at the same time, it was a tribute state of Japan. However, by taking advantage of a weakened Qing Dynasty, Japan encouraged the Ryukyu Kingdom to break diplomatic ties with the Qing Dynasty and became Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. Thus, the Ryukyu Kingdom was absorbed into Japan; however, it is not to say that the Qing Dynasty accepted this matter.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the history in which the Ryukyu Islands was once
part of China had not been forgotten in the Republic of China (ROC). In addition, they became more assertive over the Ryukyu Islands, or “the lost territory,” insisting that the ROC should reclaim it from Japan.

This paper mainly discusses the ROC government’s attempts to reclaim the Ryukyu Islands and explores the ROC government’s position on the Ryukyu Islands dispute. In Chinese mainland the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949. PRC’s policy towards the Ryukyu Islands will also be discussed.

Moreover, the name Ryukyu indicates island isthmuses roughly between Kagoshima Prefecture in Japan and Taiwan. In contrast Okinawa is the name used by the Japanese side and indicates the area Okinawa Prefecture governs. The ROC has used the name Ryukyu. But the PRC first used the name Ryukyu but changed the name to Okinawa in mid-1950’s.

Regarding the ROC’s Ryukyu policy, during the Sino-Japanese War, a disagreement within the government broke out between the group accepting Japan’s possession of the Ryukyu Islands and the other group insisting the Ryukyu Islands should not belong to Japan because it was forced to be a Japanese colony.

The Discussion Group on International Affairs, which was established under the Supreme Council for National Defense, led by Jiang Kai-shek completed the document on November 10, 1943, stating the conditions of Japan’s unconditional surrender. It is written as follows: “the Ryukyu Islands belonged to the ROC. If and when the U.S. and Britain firmly maintain objection, it will be under international control and be a demilitarized zone.” This document, which was prepared for the U.S., Britain, and ROC summit in Cairo, indicates giving the maximum demand on its territory. Whether bringing forward this claim or not at the U.S. and Britain summit depended on Jiang Kai-shek’s judgment. In the end, he did not bring up the territory of the Ryukyu Islands at this summit with the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The reclamation of the Ryukyu Islands became intense in the ROC after winning the war against Japan. The National Consultative Council submitted a proposal for a peace treaty with Japan to the government, and it specified that the Ryukyu Islands be placed under the ROC’s trust territory. At that time, the U.S. made clear its intentions to put the Ryukyu Islands under sole trust territory.

The media in the ROC created a clamor for reclaiming the Ryukyu Islands however, the government had not officially demanded the Ryukyu Islands, and it
remained at the level of domestic discussion.

Then the ROC lost the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party, and the capital was moved to Taipei in December 1949. Taiwan did not raise the Ryukyu Islands dispute in the Japan-China Peace Treaty which had begun in February 1952 in Taipei. It held the opinion that the dispute over the Ryukyu Islands was between the U.S. and Japan.

Taiwan changed its position that the dispute over the Ryukyu Islands was between the U.S. and Japan when Amami Oshima was returned to Japan. Taiwan had no choice but to clarify its position because Taiwan had protested that Amami Oshima was a part of the Ryukyu Islands.

After that, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) strengthened its support of the Ryukyu Revolutionary Party (Ryukyu Geming Tongzhihui) which aimed at the Ryukyu Islands being independent. The leader was Tsugumasa Kiyuna (Chinese name, Cai Zhang). The Ryukyu Nationalisit Party (Ryukyu Guomindang) formed on November 30, 1958, with Kiyuna as its vice president.

However, the movement toward the independence of Ryukyu Islands was unsuccessful and lacked broad support. Jiang Kai-shek, too, had taken measures to strengthen economic and trade relationships and cross-cultural relations.

Meanwhile, the PRC had concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, and this treaty stipulated that a peace treaty with Japan be concluded under both parties’ agreement. The Soviet Union envisioned the Ryukyu Islands becoming a military base. The Soviet Union and the PRC strongly opposed U. S. control of the Ryukyu Islands. But the PRC never stated that the Ryukyu Islands should be restored to the PRC.

The PRC formulated its policy toward Japan freely after the Soviet Union resumed diplomatic relations with Japan. The PRC’s media released a comment on Japan by using the name Okinawa, taking the position that Okinawa clearly should be restored to Japan. Since the end of the 1950s, it had supported the Okinawan people’s struggle for the return of Okinawa to Japan in relation to the Japan - U. S. Security Treaty.

In the 1970s, the PRC formally announced to a delegation from Okinawa its support of Japan’s reclaiming of the Northern Territories. Back then, the PRC considered the Soviet Union as a major enemy.

Meanwhile, another territorial issue appeared in Taiwan at the end of the 1960s:
the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name, Diaoyudao). The PRC sees Diaoyudao as a “China’s sanctuary” and is taking the same position with Taiwan in principle on this dispute.

Is Sino-Japanese Reconciliation Possible?
A Case Study of Forced Chinese Laborers in the 1940s

Li Enmin

Serious war history issues have marred Sino-Japanese relations and public opinions since the 1980s. The Chinese grievances about wartime suffering and the lack of Japanese contrition became major sources of Chinese popular animosity toward Japan. Is Sino-Japanese reconciliation possible in the future? Based on findings of a case study on the Hanaoka Incident, this paper suggests that it is possible. It uses a wide selection of primary sources in Japanese and Chinese languages, including documents of NGO or NPO organizations, diplomatic archives and interviews with attorneys representing both the victims and the perpetrators of the incident.

During World War II, Japan forced a large number of Chinese commoners and war prisoners into slave labor in Japan. There were 986 forced Chinese laborers in Hanaoka in northeastern Japan, working on a river project run by Kajima-gumi, the wartime predecessor of Kajima Construction Corporation, the largest general contractor in Japan now. The forced laborers rioted in June 1945, protesting against their ruthless Japanese overseers, the cruel working conditions and the inadequacy of food. But the Japanese military police suppressed the rebellion and 113 laborers were killed. By the end of World War II, a total of 418 Chinese laborers in Hanaoka had allegedly died. This is known as the Hanaoka Incident.

In November 2000, Kajima and the Committee of the Sodality of Hanaoka Victims, which represents all survivors and the families of the perished laborers, succeeded in reaching a conciliation agreement at the Tokyo High Court, ending a five-year court battle over a lawsuit filed by 11 Chinese plaintiffs. According to the conciliation