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There is a long way to go until these disagreements among relevant countries can be radically resolved. Territorial disputes may be settled through the observation of international practices and through bilateral diplomatic negotiation. In recent years, concerning sea boundary issues, China and its neighboring countries put in a great deal of effort to achieve some success through diplomatic negotiations. Relevant countries can resolve these problems through consultation and peace negotiations. Moreover, relevant countries have discussed temporary agreements which can lay the foundation for a final settlement of the boundary question. It is possible for these countries to either cooperate or collide on the issue of the sea frontier and other unresolved difficulties. The methods, ways and measurements to settle the issue still need improvement, and it is hard to predict the time when it can be totally resolved. If the concerned countries follow the basic principles of the boundary issue, they can promote mutual trust to properly settle maritime boundary problems.

India's China Relations and Border Disputes

YOSHIDA Osamu

India's relations with China had long been dominated by border disputes. India's position that its border was clearly demarcated had not been the official view of the government until Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issued his directives on the border for his government following India's signing of the Agreement of Panchsheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence with China in 1954. Nehru told his Secretary General to withdraw old maps and print new ones "showing our northern and north eastern frontier without any reference to any 'line'" or any statement that "there is undemarcated territory."

The 1954 Agreement has been understood to be instrumental for India to barter India's recognition of China's claim to Tibet for the declaration of peaceful coexistence with China, thus illuminating the superiority of peaceful Asia over the Cold War-torn West. Contrary to this conventional view, Nehru saw the objective of the agreement as finalizing the frontier between the two countries. However, while the agreement specifies six passes and the Indus Valley as points of transaction in the

middle sector, there was no mention of the eastern and western sectors. Moreover, China didn't share Nehru's view and claimed in 1960 that the understanding at the time was that "no boundary question would be addressed during negotiations."

Nehru's attitude may be understood from other parts of his directives. The directives include those to extend India's control to the territories up to the boundary by setting up checkpoints along the border, by maintaining local border militias with their principle duties being construction or supporting cottage industries, or by encouraging border trade between India and Tibet. In other words, he attempted to demarcate the boundaries through the unilateral but manifested actions of effective control, as the frontier between the two was now opened to traffic. China, too, extended its tangible control over the frontier region, but they believed the border had to be decided eventually through bilateral agreements.

Differences in style of diplomacy between the two emerging Asian powers may have complicated the problem. Because India followed the British way of diplomacy, those unilateral but clearly manifested actions were to be understood as the beginning of the diplomatic process. And if China failed to respond in due course, India would claim that China acquiesced in India's unilateral demarcation. On the other hand, China ignored diplomatic issues for which they were ill-prepared and assigned priority to the effective control over territorial claims. Thus the two countries squandered the chance for defining their common border before the break out of military clashes.

Another factor behind Nehru's unilateral actions was how India and China defined the border. For China, it was the act to transform itself from a pre-modern East Asian empire to a sovereign territorial state, which was indispensable for being a modern state. China therefore assigned priority to the effective exercise of sovereignty, and holding discussions with its neighbours including India about the border was left for the future. For India, and for Nehru in particular, its territory and frontier were inherited from the British, and he might have been deeply influenced by the notion that even borders left 'undefined' by the British had to be treated as defined or demarcated.

From the end of the border war in 1962 to 1976 when they exchanged ambassadors once again, relations between India and China were antagonized. It was not until Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, the first for an Indian prime minister in 34 years, in 1988 that talks on the border started to produce results. A series of

confidence-building measures have since been implemented, including the reduction of border forces and the shelving of border issues. China came one step closer to India in 2003 by allowing trade through Sikkim, whose merger with India in 1975 had been opposed by China.

China's concession to India on Sikkim should be understood in terms of its wish to complete the delineation and demarcation process of its land border. China's eagerness seems to reflect its desire to expand bilateral trade across land routes. However, India has reasons to be not as eager as China, such as the characteristics of its export items and its trade deficit with China, besides the domestic political cost possibly involved in the quick settlement of border disputes. Moreover, India's effective control over the people in the eastern sector or Arunachal Pradesh is recognized by the international community, while Chinese control over the western sector is just the military occupation of no man's land and thus lacks international recognition. This difference in position on the respective occupying territories in the disputed areas creates current political tension, and the reference to the imperial 'line' may spur domestic agitation. However, these two Asian regional powers have implemented measures for confidence-building over the past years and should achieve success in managing the relationship between competition and cooperation.

To Which Country Does the Ryukyu Islands Belong? An Analysis of Chinese Views

ISHII Akira

The Ryukyu Kingdom was traditionally a tribute state of the Ming Dynasty and later the Qing Dynasty; at the same time, it was a tribute state of Japan. However, by taking advantage of a weakened Qing Dynasty, Japan encouraged the Ryukyu Kingdom to break diplomatic ties with the Qing Dynasty and became Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. Thus, the Ryukyu Kingdom was absorbed into Japan; however, it is not to say that the Qing Dynasty accepted this matter.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the history in which the Ryukyu Islands was once