



Title	Rethinking the Insulator State: Turkey ' s Border Security and the Syrian Civil War
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Citation	Eurasia Border Review, 7(1), 19-29
Issue Date	2016
DOI	10.14943/ebr.7.1.19
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/65077
Type	bulletin (article)
File Information	EBR7_1_002.pdf



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Rethinking the Insulator State: Turkey's Border Security and the Syrian Civil War

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Abstract

This article examines Turkey's border security after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war from the viewpoint of the concept of the insulator state. First, it aims to explore Turkey's border security policies with regard to the Syrian civil war. Turkey's attempts to overcome and solve the difficulties rooted of Syrian civil war have been vital to its own border security in recent years. Second purpose is to rethink the concept of the insulator state. This article attempts to sophisticate the concept of the insulator state, and applies it to the case of Turkey. In conclusion, this paper clarifies the change in the meaning of Turkey's border control policies.

Introduction

After the Syrian civil war occurred, controlling the Turkish borders became one of the most critical issues in international security. The objective of this control is not only to monitor the Turkish-Syrian border, but also to block the inflow of foreign fighters attempting to join Islamic State (IS).

Border security is an urgent issue for Turkey's national and societal security. However, it is very difficult for Turkey to secure its borders for two main reasons. First, during the 2000s, the Turkish government used globalization as a foreign policy tool. For example, Turkey worked out a visa-free policy with approximately seventy countries, including Syria (until 2011). Second, Middle Eastern borders were artificially drawn by the West. Hence, "formal" borders do not correspond to the "cognitive" borders based on ethnic groups and religious sectors. For instance, people in parts of the Antakya in Turkey and Syria's Aleppo region originally belong to the same regional community. In addition, Turkey and Syria share a 910-km border. It is impossible to regulate such a long border.

This article has two aims. First, it aims to explore Turkey's border security policies with regard to the Syrian civil war. Turkey's attempts to overcome and solve the above-mentioned difficulties are vital to its own border security. Second, it aims to rethink the concept of the insulator state. This article applies the concept of the insulator state and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to explain the Turkish border policies. Yet, the insulator state is still an unpolished concept. Therefore, this article attempts to sophisticate the concept of the insulator state, and applies it to the case of Turkey.

In the first part, this paper summarizes the current situation of the highly permeable Turkish

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border with Syria. In the second part, it provides an overview of the particularities of the concept of the insulator state and examines its problems. Understanding the current situation of Turkey's border security policy helps not only to show the limits of the Westphalian ideal border, but also to clarify the Asian or non-Western border reality.

The Situation Related to Turkish Borders

To understand the recent situation of Turkey's border security, we have to look at three dimensions of the threat related to Turkey's border with Syria. These are the Syrian refugee inflow, foreign fighter inflow, and Syrian refugee outflow to EU countries.

Historical Overview of the Turkish-Syrian Border

Historically, the Turkish-Syrian border has been problematic. First, the belonging of Alexandretta (Hatay) increased tension between these two countries. Both Arabic-speaking and Turkish-speaking people lived in Alexandretta. Since Alexandretta joined Turkey in 1939 following negotiations with France, Syrian government has been frustrated with this decision. Second, the Syrian government has criticized Turkey's dam construction in the Euphrates River as a part of the project of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) since the 1970s. It is because Turkey, located upstream of the Euphrates River, can manage the water supply of Syria, located downstream. These territorial disputes forced the Syrian government to support Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). This is the third issue. The Hafiz Assad government accepted Abdullah Ocalan and his followers in 1980, and introduced the Masum Korkmaz camp in Biqa Valley in Lebanon.¹ PKK became an influential organization through training in the Masum Korkmaz camp. The good relations between the Assad government and PKK continued to 1998. Until 1998, the Turkish-Syrian border had been a center of smuggling and illegal entry/exit. After Turkey and Syria signed the Adana agreement and Damascus's decision to expel Ocalan, the Turkey-Syrian border began to stabilize.

In the 2000s, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and the Bashar Assad government maintained good relations. For signing visa free traffic, the Turkish-Syrian border became a symbol of peace between both countries.² At the same time, the visa free agreement, of course, reduced the cutoff function of the border.

The Situation of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Ever since the Syrian civil war started, Turkey has been facing three border threats. First, after the first clash between the Assad regime and protesters influenced by the "Arab Spring" in

¹ Jordi Tejel, *Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 2009), 76.

² For Turkish-Syrian relations in the 2000s, please see Marwan Kaban, "Syria-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Co-operation" in *Turkey and Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 27–37.

March 2011, civilians began to flee from Syria to Turkey. As of December 2016, there are over 2,800,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey. Turkish responses toward the Syrian refugees are classified into three phases. The first phase is the open-door policy and temporary protection. In response to the sudden inflow of Syrian refugees, the Turkish government had built refugee camps. For the building of refugee camps, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) under the Prime Ministry has played a leading role. AFAD has provided 25 refugee camps around the Syrian borders. One of the biggest problems facing refugee camps is that Syrian refugees have tended to stay outside the camps. According to Kemal Kirişçi and Elizabeth Ferris, the percentage of those living in camps is less than approximately 10% of all Syrian refugees in Turkey.³

The second phase started in April 2014. The establishment of the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior changed the refugee situation. The DGMM's role is to implement "new regulations into force with the purpose of determining and implementing more efficient policies on migration."⁴ New regulation law has controlled Syrian refugees by means of registration.

The third phase relates to permanent residence in Turkey. Five years have passed since the Syrian civil war broke out. Yet, the Syrian internal situation has grown increasingly worse. The number of refugees who crossed over the border is nearly 5,000,000 including 2,800,000 in Turkey. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is over 6,000,000.⁵ In these circumstances, it is impossible for Syrian refugees to go back to Syria. Hence, the Turkish government should promote another project to protect refugees for a long period. One of the initiatives of the Turkish government has been to permit temporary work for registered Syrian refugees. This work permit was launched by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in January 2016. The number of refugees employed by each company cannot exceed 10% of the employed Turkish citizens. Nevertheless, the Turkish




Figure 1 : The Number of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

("Registered Syrian Refugees by Date" in "Syria Regional Refugee Response," *UNHCR*)

³ Kemal Kirişçi and Elizabeth Ferris, "Not Likely to Go Home: The Challenges of Integrating Syrian Refugees," *Turkey Project Policy Paper 7* (September 2015).

⁴ "About Us," *DGMM*. Accessed October 20, 2016: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/about-us_912_956

⁵ "Syrian Arab Republic," *UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)*. Accessed July 22, 2016: <http://www.unocha.org/syria>

government has taken the initial step toward permanent or long-term residency for Syrian refugees.

The Situation Related to the Inflow of Foreign Fighters

Since the emergence of the IS, Turkey has been used as a “jihadist highway,” a main transit route to Syria. Members of IS cells have arrived in Istanbul by plane, after which they transit to border cities like Gaziantep, Antakya, and Kilis by plane or bus. Why have jihadist fighters chosen Turkey? There are three reasons. First, the Turkish government has adopted a visa-free policy toward many countries. Hence, jihadist fighters, especially from Europe, can easily enter Turkey. Second, Turkey is one of the most popular tourist destinations, receiving more than 35 million tourists a year. A large number of European tourists travel to the resorts of Antalya for vacations. So, terrorist fighters can easily blend in with these tourist groups. Third, Turkey and Syria share a border approximately 910-km long. Originally, Turkish and Syrian people in the border areas would often cross the border for shopping or business, and signed a visa-free agreement in 2009 and opened the border. After the start of Syrian civil war, Turkey revoked the agreement and closed the border in November 2011 except for refugees. Yet, Turkey cannot manage the flow over the border of many people, including jihadist fighters.

Of course, the Turkish government has attempted to block the movement of foreign fighters. For example, the Turkish government has compiled a “no-entry list” since 2011. The numbers of suspected people in this list has increased (see Figure 2). In addition, the Turkish government has begun to cooperate with European countries, including France and the UK, after Hayat Boumeddiene, one of the suspects in the massacre at a Jewish supermarket in France, escaped to Syria through Turkey.

As a consequence of the tightening of regulations, currently (August 2016), very few foreign fighters seem to be using Istanbul Atatürk Airport.

Parts of the Turkish-Syrian border, especially in the Gaziantep and Kilis provinces, are also




Figure 2 : The Number of Foreign Fighters on the No-entry List since 2011

(Haldun Yalçinkaya, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Turkey: An Assessment at the First Year of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178,” *ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs* 31 (2015): 14; “Undercover Teams, Increased Surveillance and Hardened Borders: Turkey Cracks Down on Foreign Fighters,” *The Washington Post*, 6 March, 2016)

hotspots for the flow of jihadist fighters. In 2015, the Turkish government detained 913 foreign fighters.⁶ The majority were Chinese (324) followed by Russians (99). A total of 435 people was arrested when they entered Syria from Turkey. Meanwhile, 478 people were detained when they reentered Turkey.

The Situation Regarding Turkey and the European Border

Since the summer of 2015, Syrian refugees have begun to cross into EU countries. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has identified seven factors behind the movement of Syrian refugees to Europe.⁷ These are (i) loss of hope, (ii) high cost of living/deepening poverty, (iii) limited livelihood opportunities, (iv) aid shortfalls, (v) hurdles to renew legal residency in the host country, (vi) scant education opportunities, and (vii) feeling unsafe in Iraq. The main route of Syrian refugees was the so-called Balkan route, which is from Turkey to Germany through Greece and the Balkan countries. In the case of crossing the Aegean Sea by using rubber boats, the shortest route from Turkey to Greece is approximately 5.5 km. In 2015, immigrants who crossed the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece numbered about 900,000. This number is approximately 18 times more than the number in 2014 (see Figure 3). Meanwhile, 4,000 immigrants were left died from drowning in 2015.⁸ European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX),




Figure 3 : The Number of Illegal Immigrants from Turkey to Greece

(“Eastern Mediterranean Route,” *FRONTEX*)

⁶ “Most ISIL Members Detained on Turkish border Come from China,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, December 11, 2015.

⁷ “Seven Factors behind Movement of Syrian Refugees to Europe,” *UNHCR*. Accessed July 20, 2016: <http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2015/9/560523f26/seven-factors-behind-movement-syrian-refugees-europe.html>

⁸ “A Million Refugees and Migrants Flee to Europe in 2015,” *UNHCR*. Accessed July 20, 2016: <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5679451d6/million-refugees-migrants-flee-europe-2015.html>

which is the coordinator organization for EU external border security, could not prevent the inflow of a large number of illegal immigrants.

The sharp increase in illegal immigrants means that the external border regulation of the EU was broken. EU Council members have attempted to cooperate with Turkey for preventing the flow of immigrants between Turkey and the EU. Turkey and the EU held meetings about refugees/immigrants three times. In the last meeting held on March 18, 2016, Turkey and the EU presented a joint statement. According to the joint statement, the main points about illegal migrants are as follows:⁹

- all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey
- For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN vulnerability criteria
- Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU.

Basically, Turkey would accept almost all the refugees. On the other hand, Turkey won several privileges from the EU. These are (i) realizing visa liberalization by the end of June (provided Turkey can fulfill the requirements), (ii) receiving a total of 60 billion Euro for supporting Syrian refugees in Turkey by the end of 2018, and (iii) accelerating the EU accession process including opening negotiations on Chapter 33 (Financial and Budgetary Provisions).

On April 4, 2016, 202 irregular immigrants were forcibly returned to Turkey, and 78 Syrian refugees in Turkey were accepted in Germany and the Netherlands.

Insulator State and RSCT

Facing threats related to its borders, Turkey's decision makers have aimed to defend them. Defending the borders means to control, monitor, and shut out the irregular people, money, and goods. For an explanation of Turkey's current situation of border security policy, the concept of the insulator state may be an effective tool. The reason for choosing the insulator state is that this concept pays attention to the cutoff ability of a state. Territory is a promise of sovereign state. So border control has been an essential factor for sovereign state. Yet, many states cannot protect threats from outside in recent years.

The concept of the insulator state is one of the key elements in RSCT. The concept of RSCT was developed by Barry Buzan. The elements of this concept are classified into levels and sectors of

⁹ "EU-Turkey Statement, March 18, 2016," *Council of the European Union*, March 18, 2016. Accessed July 10, 2016: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/>

security. He emphasized the importance of the regional level for security studies. According to Buzan, the level of region is a gap in security studies. Security studies is based on classical realism and structural realism in international relations.¹⁰ Yet, classical realism considers a sovereign state as only an actor in world politics, and structural realism generally focuses on anarchy, which is a system of international relations. Hence, the level of region is not dealt with in realist circles. Also, Buzan and Ole Wæver point out that most security elements are inside each region: substantial security interactions, interstate fear, and alliance partners.¹¹

Next, what is the concept of a “security complex”? Buzan defines a “security complex” as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”¹² Based on the concept of the “security complex,” he and Wæver classify the security regions as East Asian RSC, South Asian RSC, Post-Soviet RSC, Middle Eastern RSC, European RSC, Horn proto-complex, West African proto-complex, Central Africa RSC, Southern African RSC, North American RSC, and South American RSC.

Within RSCT, Turkey is classified as an “insulator state,” which has the characteristics of geographical “in-betweenness” and faces difficult security issues from two regions.¹³ Generally, insulator states have not been strong enough to unify and solve problems arising from two regions. The insulator state seems to be relatively passive actors in regional politics.¹⁴ To sum up, the necessary conditions of an insulator state are geographical location, cutoff ability against a military threat, and a passive character.

For Turkey, Buzan and Wæver regard the traditional Kemalist approach, which mainly safeguards the status-quo, as well suited to the concept of the insulator state. Yet they add that Turkey has been an “active” insulator state since the end of the Cold War.¹⁵ Turkey began to get involved in Central Asia, the Balkan Peninsula, and the Middle East. In *Regions and Powers*, Buzan and Wæver concluded that Turkey was “still an insulator state” because of its strategic position and political will/capacity to connect with the different security regions together.¹⁶ For the relationship between Turkey and the EU, Buzan and Thomas Diez also suggested that Turkey should play the “active” insulator role as an alternative to becoming an EU member.¹⁷ According to Buzan’s definition, one of the characteristics of an insulator state is that it is passive; however, Buzan and Diez inconsistently

¹⁰ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (second edition)* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 187.

¹¹ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 41.

¹² Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 190.

¹³ Buzan and Wæver, *People, States, and Fear*, 41. Buzan and Wæver classify Afghanistan and Myanmar as insulator states.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 392.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 394.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 394–395.

¹⁷ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” *Survival* 41:1 (Spring 1999): 54. They did not support Turkey’s attempts to join the EU.

emphasize the active behavior of the insulator state. In addition, Andre Barrinha comments that the explanation provided by RSCT is unfit for the recent developments in Turkish foreign policy.¹⁸ Buzan and his co-authors confuse the concept of insulator for its cutoff ability. At first, they define the insulator state as a wall. Yet, through analysis, they assume the insulator state to be a valve. If the insulator state increases its power in the region, it can control the connectivity between regions. The aim of building connections between several regions is the establishment of a “security community,” which is a no-conflict zone. Of course, the cutoff of threats is the premise of building connections between regions.

We can also point out another important defect in the concept of the insulator state. The insulator state is usually expected to block military threats. However, threats are not only military in nature. In previous works, Buzan himself classified threats into five types: military, political, societal, economic, and ecological (environmental).¹⁹ A military threat is a traditional physical threat, especially against the state. The targets of political threats are national identity, organizing ideology, and state institutions. Hence, political threats attack both the conceptual and physical idea of the state. Societal threats include several types of threats for weakening the unity of the state from internal and external arenas. An economic threat is related to economic instability. The last type is the ecological threat, which is caused by natural disasters and human-induced accidents. The importance of ecological threats has been proven by the radioactive contamination triggered by Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Concerning border security, societal threats are as important as military threats.

Hence, this paper shows a more sophisticated concept of the insulator state. The characteristics of a sophisticated insulator state are (i) geographical location, (ii) blocking ability against multiple threats, and (iii) ability to establish connectivity between regions (see Table 1). Moreover, we can categorize the insulator state into strong insulator states and weak insulator states depending on their degree of abilities.

Table 1 : Classical and Sophisticated Insulator States

Types	Source of Insulator	Ability	Target of Threat
Classical Insulator	Geography	Shutoff	Military
Sophisticated Insulator	Geography	Shutoff Connectivity	Military, Political, Economic, Societal, and Environmental

Turkey as an Insulator State

As Buzan and Wæver explain, the end of the Cold War strengthened Turkey’s connective ability because of the opening of Central Asia and a series of Balkan wars. In this period, Turkey also

¹⁸ Andre Barrinha, “The Ambitious Insulator: Revisiting Turkey’s Position in Regional Security Complex Theory,” *Mediterranean Politics* 19:2 (2013): 166. Barrinha attempted to bring power classification (regional power and great power) to RSCT to explain Turkish foreign policy.

¹⁹ Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 116–134.

succeeded in achieving rapprochement with Israel and Syria in the Middle East. At the end of the 1990s, Turkey was approved as a candidate country of the EU at the Helsinki Summit.

With its increasing connective power, Turkey was able to reduce military threats from neighboring countries in the 1990s. This phenomenon had been strengthened since the JDP period. Ahmet Davutoglu played a leading role in the promotion of Turkey's "zero-problem" policy toward the neighboring regions and states. Furthermore, the JDP government accepted globalization as an opportunity for increasing trade as well as providing a safety net for lower-income citizens. The JDP also signed a "visa-free policy" with several states including Syria. During 2002 to 2010, Turkey appeared to be a regional hub for its proactive engagement with its neighbors.

The relationship between Turkey and the EU is slightly different from other RSCTs. As Diez points out, "EU membership would bring Turkey more fully into the European complex."²⁰ The ambitious attempts of Turkey's decision makers to join the EU have failed since 2005. Yet, for reducing the power of the military forces and for promoting democracy, negotiation with the EU is still an effective tool for Turkish decision makers. In line with EU requests for a negotiation process, border security remains a disputed area. Turkey's proactive engagement produced a problem with the EU in the area of border security. Border security is related to every aspect of the above-mentioned five sectors. Especially, military security and societal security are sensitive to border security. Since immigrants from Turkey's neighboring countries were aiming to reach EU countries, the EU has demanded that Turkey should control its borders.

Traditionally, the most vulnerable border in Turkey had been its eastern border that it shares with Iran and Iraq, and southeastern border with Syria. We have looked at the situation of the southeastern border above. How about the situation in the eastern border? Refugees and asylum seekers passed the eastern border to stay in Turkey. According to Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Yüксеker, the countries whose asylum seekers applied for a permit to stay in Turkey from 1996 to 2008 were from Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.²¹ In addition, from 1996 to 2006, the top five countries from which immigrants arrived into Turkey were Iraq (114,000), Pakistan (51,000), Afghanistan (38,000), Iran (25,000), and Bangladesh (20,000).²² In addition, after the Gulf War, many Kurdish refugees escaped from Iraq to Turkey, fearing attacks by the Saddam Hussein regime. Yet, for many immigrants, Turkey is not the final destination—the ultimate aim is Europe. For them, Turkey is a transit country to Europe. After negotiations began, the EU had demanded that Turkey stop immigrants from Turkey entering into Europe. The EU established the FRONTEX in 2004 for protecting its external borders (namely, the Schengen area).²³ Along with the northern African border, the Turkish-Greek

²⁰ Thomas Diez, "Insulator, Bridge, Regional Center?: Turkey and Regional Security Complexes" in *Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-first Century* ed. Ebru Canan-Sokullu (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 49.

²¹ Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Yüксеker, "Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Re-presentation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon," *Population, Space, and Place* 18:4 (2012): 444.

²² Ibid.

²³ For the establishment of FRONTEX, see Andrew Neal, "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47:2 (2009): 333–356.

Table 2 : Turkey as an Insulator State During the JDP Period

Term	Ability of Shutoff	Ability of Connectivity	Aim
2002-2011	Strong	Strong	Security Community
2011~	Weak	Weak	Safeguard National Security Control Inflow and Outflow of Immigrants

border was the most critical security point for FRONTEX. Border security between Turkish-Greece became one of the main areas of dispute for joining negotiations.

As a consequence, Turkey and the EU reached an agreement on cooperation in the field of migration with the activities of FRONTEX in February 2011.²⁴ Turkey had succeeded in building connections between neighboring regions, and it sought to cooperate with the EU for preventing the entry of illegal immigrants.

The Syrian civil war has deeply affected Turkey's insulator character. Before the start of the Syrian civil war, Turkey had been a strong insulator state because it could control the opening and closing of its borders. Yet, the Syrian civil war has caused Turkey to lose control of its borders. First of all, the Syrian civil war and the emergence of the IS caused a decline in Turkey's connective and cutoff abilities. Turkey's "zero problem" policy toward its neighbors was broken. Moreover, as mentioned above, the inflow of refugees and foreign fighters has reduced its ability of cutoff while increasing military and societal threats. Now, the Turkish-Syrian border has become a symbol of instability and vulnerability. IS and foreign fighter are "real" or physical threats for Turkey. And the presence of IS, foreign fighters, and refugees increase the insecurity of Turkish citizens. In other words, Turkish people are securitized as a result of Syrian civil war.

In addition, after the increase in irregular immigration to Europe, Turkey's traditional insulator role has gained prominent attention from the EU. Turkey is still not an EU member; however, Turkey has become the most important country for securing the EU's external border. As Figure 3 shows, after signing the deal between Turkey and the EU, the flow of illegal immigrants has sharply decreased. If Turkey breaks the agreement signed with EU in March 2016, many immigrants may probably attempt to enter Europe again. Hence, Turkey plays the role of a bulwark against immigrants.

Conclusion

This article examines Turkey's border security after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war from the viewpoint of the concept of the insulator state. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey had increased its ability to connect with neighboring countries. The Turkish government, especially the JDP government, had aimed to establish a security community or peace zone in the region.

²⁴ "Frontex and the RABIT Operation at the Greek-Turkish border," *FRONTEX*. Accessed July 13, 2016: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-130_en.htm

The Syrian civil war has drastically changed Turkey's role as an insulator. Put briefly, Turkey's attempt to establish a security community has failed. The inflow of refugees and foreign fighters has increased military and societal threats. Turkey literally began to put importance on its role as an insulator between the Middle East and Europe. Furthermore, for the EU, Turkey's role as insulator has become more and more important for its external border security because of the need to regulate refugees, immigrants, and jihadist fighters. In conclusion, the Syrian civil war weakened Turkey's border security. Meanwhile, Turkey's role in contributing to EU border security increased significantly. As in the Cold War period, Turkey's cutoff ability is essential for European/Western stability. The Turkish government has to balance its national security and the protection of the EU's external border.