



Title	バレエと政治：チャイコフスキー記念東京バレエ学校（1960-1964）と冷戦期のソ連の文化外交
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Japanese army to violate the border unintentionally. The Soviet Union regarded this action as a provocation.

Second, the Soviet Union's diplomatic attitude toward Manchukuo changed in the mid-1930s. From 1932 to 1935 the Soviet Union's attitude was moderate. For example, the Soviet Union agreed to receive consuls of Manchukuo and carried out negotiations with Manchukuo for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway until 1935. From these facts, it is thought that the Soviet Union gave Manchukuo "de facto" recognition. But the Soviet Union's intention was to indicate the limit of its modest attitude through the sale of the railway. The USSR was determined to make no further compromises. After the sale of the railway, the Soviet Union reduced its diplomatic relationship with Manchukuo by closing some of its consulates.

In 1932 Japan proposed to the USSR to establish the border committee. Japan stated that the representatives for the committee should be composed of three states, namely Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. At that time, the Soviet Union did not oppose this idea. After the Jinchanggou Incident which occurred in January 1936, Japan and the Soviet Union started negotiations for establishing a border committee. The Soviet Union never agreed with the plan by Japan on which states should compose the committee. On the contrary, the Soviet Union did not recognize Manchukuo as an independent state de jure because of the Japan–Manchukuo Protocol. The USSR stated that the committee should have a joint representative from Japan and Manchukuo. It was impossible for Japan to agree with this condition which ignored diplomatic premises.

I conclude that because of these factors, negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union broke down.

Ballet and Politics: The Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School (1960–1964) and the Soviet Union's Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War

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Through an examination of the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School, this article investigates the means by which the Ministry of Culture of the USSR disseminated Soviet ballet

around the world. One of the reasons for the establishment of the school was the first visit of the Bolshoi Ballet Company to Japan in 1957. Thanks to this tour, Japanese people could watch Soviet dance live, not merely in films. Few Japanese academic reports have taken into account the political dimension of the tour, which was one of the political activities planned by the Ministry of Culture of the USSR with regard to Japan. The theme ‘Classical Ballet and Politics’ has rarely been chosen as an object of study in Japan, and this article is one of the first to do so.

In the paper, I explain how the Ministry of Culture of the USSR used the ballet to promote friendly relationships between Russia and Japan. I also note that Japan was one of the most successful countries for the popularization of Soviet ballet.

In the first section, I briefly review the cultural diplomacy of the United States and USSR in Japan. It is well known that during the Cold War, culture was used as a weapon because national leaders wanted to avoid the use of nuclear weapons and to find an alternative in culture.

The Korean War (1950–1953) caused Japan to become one of these cultural “battle fields.” The United States wanted Japan to play the role of a barrier against the USSR. On other hand, the USSR sought to win Japan over to the Soviet side because Japan had inclined towards the United States after World War two. The USSR signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1956. In the 1950s significant numbers of cultural delegations from both countries were dispatched to Japan.

The second section discusses the first visit of the Bolshoi ballet to Japan in 1957 and its result. This section is divided into three parts. In the first part, I mention a few episodes which indicate that the Ministry of Culture of the USSR had hostile feelings towards the United States when preparing the Bolshoi Ballet tour to Japan. In the second part, I explain the high level of interest in Japan towards the Soviet ballet before the Bolshoi Ballet tour. I also explain the difference in the USSR’s preparation for the tour compared to its ballet tours to other countries. In the third part, I examine the results of the Bolshoi Ballet tour by comparing it with the New York City Ballet Japan tour held one year later.

In the third section, I analyze the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School as one of the first three ballet schools outside of Russia in which Soviet teachers were involved from the time of opening. The first three were the schools in China (established in 1954), Egypt (1958), and Japan (1960). The first two were governmental organizations but the Japanese one was not even an incorporated school. I describe the process of how the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School contributed to the popularization of Soviet ballet in Japan during the Cold War.

In the summer of 1961, diplomatic relations between Japan and Soviet Russia were strained. Each day, Japanese newspapers contained articles criticizing the Soviet Union’s behavior regarding territorial issues and Soviet nuclear tests. In contrast, over the same period, joint performances

by the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School and 11 Bolshoi dancers were a great success throughout Japan. The Bolshoi visit in 1957 had included only Tokyo and Osaka, but in this later tour, over the summer of 1961, the company gave 29 performances in 15 Japanese cities, spreading the fame of Soviet ballet throughout Japan.

Such an ambivalent situation was rare. In other countries, geopolitical relationships were capable of influencing, or even forcing the cancellation of, a given tour or the dispatch of ballet teachers.

In other words, the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School helped the Ministry of Culture of the USSR achieve its political ends. In the field of politics, Soviet Russia was in a sense defeated by the United States, but in the field of ballet, Russia was victorious.

Toward Emergence of Planet Politics on Climate Change: Interrogating Theoretical Premises Meeting Challenges of the *Anthropocene*

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Two research questions to ask are: (1) why are we unable to appropriately tackle climate change issues as an existential threat through an understanding of the world based on conventional theoretical premises of the discipline of Politics and International Relations? and (2) which approaches we should adopt? This article is based on a concept of the *Anthropocene* to answer these questions and to set a new framework called “planet politics” for a different political imagining of the world. Related to the adoption of the concept of the *Anthropocene*, the framework of planet politics includes messages wherein it addresses the issue of survival/extinction of both nature and humans. It does so not by separating them as if the two consist of completely different occurrences, but by viewing them as a sequence of events. This differs from approaches that focus solely on human affairs like those employed in existing arguments in political sciences such as local politics, comparative politics, international politics and global politics.

This article provides the following suggestions to answer the above agenda setting. While climate change was previously dealt with as a conventional environmental issue, sections 1 and 2 reframe climate change as an issue of multiple extinction of species. Section 3 confirms the significance of