In the mid-1930s, small scale incidents occurred at the border zone between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. To avoid expanding a dangerous situation, Japan and the Soviet Union tried to establish a border committee and conducted negotiations on many occasions. But these efforts reached no valid conclusion. In June 1937 at the Ganchaz Island Incident, the use of military power by the Japanese army gave Japan an advantage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Following this experience, within the Japanese military clique, a new policy gained power. They advocated the following idea: border disputes should be resolved by military power rather than by diplomatic negotiation. It is thought that this policy led to the Battle of Khasan and the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

Previous studies regard the middle of the 1930s as a precursive stage to the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. However, these studies only introduce some small incidents. Contrary to these studies, this paper considers that this period was the critical moment for the worsening of the Japan-Soviet relationship. Focusing on the reason why border disputes increased, I examine what factors blocked negotiations for the border setting committee. Although primary sources on the border dispute of the 1930s are scarce, I use official publications by Japan and the USSR and try to shed light on the facts of the border disputes.

First, there existed asymmetry of information on the definition of the border. The land border of China’s north east area where many disputes occurred was “demarcated” in some treaties in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. But comparing these treaties, borders and landmarks were not set precisely. In particular, the “Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking” that was signed in 1861 to demarcate the border that runs from Lake Khanka to the Tumen River included a different interpretation. There is considerable variation between the Chinese text of this article and the Russian one. In addition, Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union did not publish consistent maps related to this article.

The Soviet Union repeatedly requested Japan not violate the border. But, because of the above article, it was very difficult for Japan to recognize the precise border. This situation caused the
Japanese army to violate the border unintentionally. The Soviet Union regarded this action as a provocation.

Second, the Soviet Union’s diplomatic attitude toward Manchukuo changed in the mid-1930s. From 1932 to 1935 the Soviet Union’s attitude was moderate. For example, the Soviet Union agreed to receive consuls of Manchukuo and carried out negotiations with Manchukuo for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway until 1935. From these facts, it is thought that the Soviet Union gave Manchukuo “de facto” recognition. But the Soviet Union’s intention was to indicate the limit of its modest attitude through the sale of the railway. The USSR was determined to make no further compromises. After the sale of the railway, the Soviet Union reduced its diplomatic relationship with Manchukuo by closing some of its consulates.

In 1932 Japan proposed to the USSR to establish the border committee. Japan stated that the representatives for the committee should be composed of three states, namely Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. At that time, the Soviet Union did not oppose this idea. After the Jinchanggou Incident which occurred in January 1936, Japan and the Soviet Union started negotiations for establishing a border committee. The Soviet Union never agreed with the plan by Japan on which states should compose the committee. On the contrary, the Soviet Union did not recognize Manchukuo as an independent state de jure because of the Japan–Manchukuo Protocol. The USSR stated that the committee should have a joint representative from Japan and Manchukuo. It was impossible for Japan to agree with this condition which ignored diplomatic premises.

I conclude that because of these factors, negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union broke down.

Ballet and Politics: The Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School (1960–1964) and the Soviet Union’s Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War

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Through an examination of the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School, this article investigates the means by which the Ministry of Culture of the USSR disseminated Soviet ballet