



Title	Imagining Japan in Moscow and Sakhalin, and Imagining Russia in Tokyo and Hokkaido : Contrasting identities and images of Other in the center and periphery.
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Citation	北海道大学. 博士(教育学) 甲第13626号
Issue Date	2019-03-25
DOI	10.14943/doctoral.k13626
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/74661
Type	theses (doctoral)
File Information	Georgy_Buntilov.pdf



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Doctoral Thesis

**Imagining Japan in Moscow and Sakhalin, and Imagining
Russia in Tokyo and Hokkaido:**

**Contrasting identities and images of Other in the center
and periphery.**

モスクワ及びサハリンから見た日本と東京及び北海道
から見たロシア:

中心と周辺地域における「他者」に対する日本及びロ
シアのアイデンティティとイメージの対比。

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February 25, 2018

Abstract

This thesis is a comparative analysis of newspaper articles that discusses two sets of images: images of Japan as seen in Russian federal and Sakhalin newspapers, and images of Russia as seen in Japanese national newspapers and *Hokkaidō Shimbun*. The project employs qualitative and quantitative content analysis to investigate imagery associated with Russia and Japan in printed media, as well as discourses on national identity in Russia and Japan. This research approaches Russo-Japanese relations from two angles: border studies through analysis of media in Hokkaido and Sakhalin, and the center-periphery paradigm through analysis of national and federal media.

Using an identity model based on the phenomenological concepts of Self and Other, as well as the notion of antagonism, this research analyzes national identity discourses and images of the antagonized Other-nation in the center and periphery on each side of the border. These images are discussed in a set of case studies based on the topics of newspaper reportage mentioning Other-nation in Russia and Japan. Reportage on the following aspects of Russo-Japanese relations is analyzed in the case studies:

1. Exchange between Russian and Japanese citizens carried out by government and non-government actors;
2. The territorial dispute and exchange between Japan and the disputed islands;
3. History of Russo-Japanese relations and war history;
4. General images of Russian people in Japan and images of Japanese people in Russia as reported in national and local media.

The purpose of this research is to clarify through the analysis of news coverage how the relationships between Self and multiple Others on national and local levels affect the formation of local identities and images of national and regional Others in Russia and Japan.

Japanese Abstract

本論文は、日本とロシアの中心および周辺地域の報道における日本とロシアのイメージを議論する新聞記事の比較分析である。本プロジェクトでは、新聞における「自国」と「他国」のイメージと、ロシアと日本の国民アイデンティティを議論する談話を調査するために、定性的・定量的な内容分析を用いる。日ロ関係は2つの中枢パラダイムからアプローチする：

1. 北海道とサハリンを対象とした国境研究
2. メディア分析

本研究は、現象論的な概念「自」(Self)と「他」(Other)に基づくアイデンティティモデルと「アンタゴニズム」という基礎的な用語を用い、国境をへだてた両国の中心および周辺地域の「他国」のイメージと国民アイデンティティの議論を分析する。すなわち、ロシアと日本の間の関係(国家レベル)、モスクワとサハリン、あるいは東京と北海道の関係(中心／周辺レベル)、サハリンと北海道の関係(地域的レベル)のアンタゴニズムの立場から見た日ロ関係とアイデンティティの分析である。本論文では、「アンタゴニズム」とは必ずしも対立を意味するわけではなく、緊張やある種の不安定、曖昧さを示唆する。他国に対するアンタゴニズムとは、違いに関する議論を通して自国が独自のアイデンティティを構築することであると主張する。

日ロ関係のアスペクトにより「他国」のイメージを示す新聞記事をケーススタディで分析する。本論文は下記のケーススタディに分けられている：

1. 政府機関と非政府機関が実施したロシアと日本の市民の交流
2. 北方領土問題と北方領土に関する交流
3. 日ロ関係の歴史と軍事史
4. 日本の新聞におけるロシア人とロシアの新聞における日本人のイメージ

本論文の目的は、ロシアと日本のケーススタディを通して、中心と周辺地域での「自」と「他」の見方における重要な相違を明らかにすることである。

Note on Transliteration and Spelling

Russian proper names are spelled as they are referred to in English language sources (e.g. Primorsky Krai, Nikolayevsk). Romanization of Russian text in notes uses the ALA-LC system with the following exceptions:

я is spelled as *ya*: *Yaponiya*, not *Iaponiia*.

ю is spelled as *yu*: *yug*, not *iug*.

Diacritic signs for *ya*, *yu* and *ts* are not preserved.

Japanese personal names follow traditional order with the exception of authors who have published in English. Diacritic signs for names commonly known, such as Tokyo or Hokkaido, are not preserved unless the word is part of a different proper name, e.g. *Hokkaidō Shimbun*.

Names of Japanese and Russian authors who have published in English are spelled in accordance with their published works.

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Introduction

Approaching Russo-Japanese Relations through Analysis of Printed Media

This thesis is a comparative analysis of printed media that discusses two sets of images: images of Japan as seen from Moscow and Sakhalin, and images of Russia as seen from Tokyo and Hokkaido. This project employs content analysis of news articles in national and regional newspapers in Russia and Japan, with additional analysis of books and other cultural products (such as movies) where applicable. The main newspaper topic categories analyzed in this thesis are contemporary Russo-Japanese relations, exchange between Russia and Japan, the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dispute, and history of Japan–Russia relations. The research is presented in the form of case studies built on analysis of news articles dedicated to a particular subject, and explores the differences in reportage on the above topics between central and peripheral regions of Russia and Japan via comparisons of news coverage between Moscow, Tokyo, Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya Oblast. Russian, English and Japanese sources are used in theoretical and analytical chapters. Information obtained through interviews with newspaper editors and members of Japan–Russia exchange organizations is used to complement newspaper survey data.

Japan–Russia relations in the 21st century are facing several challenges, particularly the ongoing territorial dispute and the lack of a signed peace treaty. Since the territorial issue is primarily geopolitical, the situation in the regions in close proximity to the disputed territories – Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido – and the portrayal of Russia, Japan and Russo-Japanese relations in the local media of these regions are often left out of discussion in the national media and among the general public. The involvement of Sakhalin¹ and

¹ Unless indicated otherwise, “Sakhalin” in this thesis refers to the entire Sakhalinskaya Oblast as an administrative unit in Russia, which includes Sakhalin island, the undisputed Northern Kuriles and the disputed

Hokkaido in the dispute, as well as their role as a link between Russia and Japan, has been explored in academic literature: for instance, Williams (2007) assesses the role of regional governments in Sakhalin–Hokkaido interaction, and discusses how transnational connections between Hokkaido and Sakhalin have affected the reality of the territorial dispute.² Analysis of interregional connections between Hokkaido and Sakhalin and their coverage in national and regional news is pivotal to the main argument of this thesis, and one of the case studies (presented in Chapter 2) analyzes exchange activities between Russia and Japan through Hokkaido and Sakhalin and their coverage in national and regional news in both countries.

National and Regional Identities as Products of Antagonisms

Another main aspect of this research is analysis of multiple identities and visions of Russia and Japan in different regions. Due to the large distance between Moscow and the Russian Far East, the idea of Russian identity, as well as images of Japan and the Japanese, is different between Moscow and Sakhalin. Since Sakhalin is close to the Japanese border, images of Japan and the Japanese are affected by direct contacts across the border. The same applies to images of Russia in Tokyo and Hokkaido: the local Hokkaido press may portray Russia and the Russians in a different manner due to the close proximity of Sakhalin and the disputed islands, and due to more prominent Japan–Russia interactions in the area. This thesis attempts to answer the following questions: how does identity construction and vision of other nations differ between center and peripheral regions within one nation, and how does the close proximity of another nation influence it?

The terms “Self” and “Other” are employed to discuss national and regional identities

Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories.

² Brad Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido–Sakhalin Relations* (London: Routledge, 2007).

in Russia and Japan. These Hegelian terms have developed usage in various fields, including philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis, politics, international relations and culture studies. Some works on Russo-Japanese relations have used these terms to define identity. For instance, Bukh describes Russia as one of Japan's "Others", which influences construction of Japanese "Self" and Japan's foreign policy.³ Another example comes from the field of *nihonjinron*:⁴ Lebra (2004) uses the terms "Self" and "Other" to define the supposedly unique model of logical thinking of the Japanese people.⁵ The identity model based on the concept of the "Self" surrounded by "Others" is applicable to various kinds of individual and collective identities. This thesis establishes a theoretical framework to address identity formation on multiple levels, particularly national (Russian/Japanese) and regional (Hokkaido/Sakhalin) identities. A pivotal point in this regard is that Self-identity is both suppressed and reinforced by its relationship with Other. To describe this relationship, the term "antagonism" is employed. This term was originally introduced by Argentinian political analyst Ernesto Laclau in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*,⁶ where political identity is defined as a product of an antagonism between social forces. The concept of antagonism is used here to describe formation of Self-identity through Self-propagated discourse of difference from Other. There are three main antagonisms analyzed: national (Russia–Japan), center–periphery (Moscow–Sakhalin, Tokyo–Hokkaido) and regional (Sakhalin–Hokkaido).

³ Alexander Bukh, *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's 'Other'* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

⁴ *Nihonjinron* is a genre of literature dedicated to explaining Japan or the Japanese's supposed cultural uniqueness. The genre encompasses works in various fields, ranging from philosophical essays on the relationship between environment and culture to theories explaining Japan's economic success in the late 20th century. A vast majority of such texts focus on Japanese identity, mentality, behavior, or Japanese culture and "Japaneseness" in general.

⁵ Takie Sugiyama Lebra, *The Japanese Self in Cultural Logic* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004).

⁶ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001), 125.

The idea of identity as an antagonism can be extended towards analysis of national identity discourses. National identity has a discursive foundation that is produced by Self-identity in response to the presence of Other. In addition to analysis of news articles, this thesis provides a historical inquiry into national identity discourses in Russia and Japan. Russian and Japanese intellectuals, with their vastly different historical and cultural heritage, have dwelled upon similar issues pertaining to modernization of the state and adoption or rejection of foreign ideas and ways of life. There are several themes in Russian and Japanese discourses on national identity that share a significant overlap, particularly themes of national uniqueness and a “special path”, deterministic worldviews, imperial cosmopolitanism/messianism and criticism of “Western” philosophical systems and concepts. This thesis elucidates the shared aspects of these narratives and philosophical inquiries in Russia and Japan and puts them into a historical context. Establishing a link between the realms of ideas in Russia and Japan is important in understanding national identity, which plays a significant role in shaping the image of the antagonized Other.

Hokkaido and Sakhalin as Border Regions Connecting Russia and Japan

Apart from discourses on national identity, there are other historical ties between Russia and Japan. Hokkaido and Sakhalin connections can also be approached from the viewpoint of border studies, particularly the shifting Russo-Japanese border and the disputed Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories. As the border between Russia and Japan was fluctuating until the end of World War 2, the local media in the neighboring regions on both sides of the border are likely to have distinctive views of their neighbor, influenced by local history, politics and interactions over the border. In recent years Japan–Russia border studies have seen more development in academic literature. This research builds on such projects as

*Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*⁷ and *Japan's Border Issues*,⁸ and discusses how the identities created through the history of shifting borders reflect in news coverage related to Russia and Japan in Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Sakhalin and Hokkaido are particularly important regions in this regard, since Hokkaido became home for many returnees from the former Karafuto prefecture in southern Sakhalin after World War 2.

Research Aims and Goals

Extensive research has been done on the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan as an international issue, as well as the history of Sakhalin⁹ and the situation on the Russo-Japanese border: Saveliev, for instance, published an article on Japanese emigration to the Russian Far East,¹⁰ and Morris-Suzuki wrote on Karafuto identity.¹¹ However, comparative studies of media in Hokkaido and Sakhalin, as well as comparisons of central and regional media in Russia and Japan, are not presented as widely in academic literature. While the media do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the general public, such comparisons are essential to understand the current state of affairs in the regions, and opinions and attitudes which may or may not be removed from the center's geopolitical ambitions. The originality of this research, therefore, is in the combination of source material in three languages to create a new set of case studies. International availability is another reason for working with

⁷ Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton, ed., *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border: Karafuto/Sakhalin* (London; New York: Routledge, 2015).

⁸ Akihiro Iwashita, *Japan's Border Issues: Pitfalls and Prospects* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016).

⁹ John J. Stephan, *Sakhalin: A History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

¹⁰ Igor R. Saveliev, "Japanese across the Sea: Features of Japanese Emigration to the Russian Far East, 1875 and 1916," *Amerasia Journal* 23, no. 3 (1997), 103-122.

¹¹ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Northern Lights: The Making and Unmaking of Karafuto Identity," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 3 (August 2001), 645-671.

three languages, as being able to work with both Russian and Japanese sources while writing the main work in English helps bring international attention to the data from both sides of the border.

To accomplish this objective, a set of case studies is presented illustrating how the perception of Other in the case of Japan–Russia relations is affected by 1) the center–periphery paradigm within domestic borders, and 2) direct interactions across the fluctuating border. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the political center and peripheral (border) regions in the context of media representations of Other. The ultimate goal is to clarify the important distinctions between views of national Self and Other in the center and periphery on both theoretical and empirical grounds via the case studies of Russia and Japan.

Research Method

This research uses content analysis to reveal and discuss themes and images of Russia in Japanese newspapers and images of Japan in Russian newspapers in central (Moscow/Tokyo) and peripheral (Sakhalin/Hokkaido) regions. Such a study meets the criteria for content analysis outlined by Riffe: 1) data accessibility is limited to documentary evidence; 2) the structure of communication and its use of language are critical; 3) the volume of material is too large to examine individually. A common criticism of quantitative analysis as is over-reliance on the frequency of different symbols' appearance (which results in problems being selected for research "simply because they are quantifiable, with emphasis on precision at the cost of problem significance")¹² and the possible discrepancy between manifest and latent meaning, as the manifest meaning of a symbol (word or phrase) may

¹² Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, and Frederick Fico, *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014), 28.

change over time and introduce inconsistency when the researcher analyzes older sources with the more current manifest meaning in mind.¹³ The main limitations of qualitative analysis, meanwhile, are potential proneness to subjectivity and the impossibility of including a large number of sources. Quantitative analysis may be prone to subjectivity as well, since the variables, the material, the period covered in the study, the categories, the samples and the units of analysis may be selected according to subjective perspectives.¹⁴ For the reasons above, this research employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

The quantitative part of the analysis comprises longitudinal observations across a large number of articles in different newspapers. The qualitative aspect is employed in examining individual articles for relevance, discrepancies between manifest and latent meaning, and images and themes related to Other. The sections of analysis present case studies that illustrate how topic selection, attitudes, representation of history, political views and other aspects of the perception of Other differ between the political center and the border area in Russia and Japan. The following aspects of the Self–Other relationship are analyzed: 1) the center–periphery paradigm within domestic borders, and 2) direct interactions across the fluctuating border. Two sets of images are examined: images of Japan as seen from Moscow and Sakhalin, and images of Russia as seen from Tokyo and Hokkaido. The additional questions to be answered are: 1) How does close proximity to Other affect its representation in printed media? 2) Which topics dealing with Other appear in central and peripheral media, and what does this difference suggest?

Articles from the following newspapers are analyzed:

1) Japanese national: *Asahi Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, *Mainichi Shimbun*.

¹³ Ibid., 28-31.

¹⁴ Kevin Williams, *Understanding Media Theory* (London: Arnold, 2003), 158.

2) Hokkaido regional: *Hokkaidō Shimbun*.

3) Russian federal: *Kommersant*, *Izvestiya*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*.

4) Sakhalin regional: *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, *Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Segodnya*, *Gubernskie Vedomosti*.

The data was collected as follows: newspaper databases were searched using relevant keywords (such as Russo-Japanese, Tokyo/Moscow, Hokkaido/Sakhalin, etc.) over a time period pertaining to selected events significant to Russia–Japan relations. The results were examined individually to confirm their relevance to the study. The articles were categorized in a table by date, title, topic, mentions of Other and the context in which Other was mentioned, and the articles on topics relevant to a case study were highlighted separately. The following 3 categories were used:

1. *Not about Other*: if Other is mentioned only in passing, and the topic of the article is not related to Other in any significant manner. Example: statistics comparing different countries that include Other.

2. *Partial mentions*: if the article itself is not about Other, but there are 3 or more sentences or a paragraph dedicated to Other specifically. Example: a trivia section of an otherwise unrelated article that mentions a scandal taking place in Russia/Japan, or an article about the personal lives of political leaders. This category also applies to any series of articles (listed as one entry in the database) that has an item that would otherwise fall into the “About Other” category. In some cases, despite repeated mentions of Other, the article would not belong in this category, for example, an article on an international event that mentions Other only in the context of the event taking place there. However, if an article on the same topic contained detailed descriptions of Other (local weather, points of interest etc.), it was included in this or the next category.

3. *About Other*: if the topic of the article is related to Other. Example: A report on a recent invention or discovery made by Japanese scientists, or an obituary notice for a Japanese or Russian politician.

Although some independent criteria (such as number of sentences) were used for determining the article category and relevance, the final decision to assign a category was made by the author. Therefore, the difference between the categories, particularly between “About Other” and “Partial mentions”, is somewhat arbitrary. For this reason, and due to the low number of Japan-related articles in Russian newspapers in general, both “Partial mentions” and “About Japan” categories were treated as relevant to this study, which allowed for a more detailed profile of Japan mentions in Russian newspapers.

Before analyzing news coverage in national and regional newspapers, it is necessary to clarify the current state of newspapers as a medium of mass communication in Russia and Japan. Usage of print newspapers has declined globally over the last several years, which is particularly noticeable when comparing the amount of coverage retrieved from Russian and Japanese newspaper databases. However, despite increasing Internet news consumption, Japan retains a strong propensity to consume printed media, including newspapers. The circulation of the printed press in Japan is quite high by global standards. The morning edition of *Hokkaidō Shimbun* averaged over 1.2 million copies in 2005, and is still over 1 million copies as 2016. Even though it is a regional newspaper, its circulation is almost as large as *The New York Times*, and larger than some federal newspapers in Russia. The national paper *Yomiuri Shimbun* had over 10 million copies circulation in 2010, and is one of the biggest selling newspapers in the world. By contrast, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, a newspaper owned by the Russian government and often considered to be the official mouthpiece of the Kremlin had only 166.5 thousand copies of the daily edition, and 3.5 million of the weekly edition in 2010. With circulation differences taken into consideration, this study compares

both the absolute numbers of articles and the relative percentage of topic-specific reportage in each newspaper.

During the early stages of this research, several hypotheses were investigated. It was confirmed that the level of Russia-related reportage is significantly higher in Japan than the level of Japan-related reportage in Russia in both absolute and relative terms. This is both because the level of reportage is considerably high in Japan in general, and because the Japanese press is interested in Russia; by contrast, the figures revealed that Russian newspapers were less interested in Japan in general, and even less interested in specific issues such as the territorial dispute. Another hypothesis was related to regional specifics of news coverage: it was confirmed in a sample study that regional newspapers are prone to be interested in practical aspects of Russo-Japanese relations that affect the daily life of ordinary people, while national newspapers tend to ignore those issues and focus on the broader aspects of interacting with national Other. These observations illustrate the “close/distant neighbor” paradigm, which suggests a relationship between the size of a community and the extent to which it is “imagined” or “real”: for instance, an article on the territorial dispute in a Hokkaido newspaper is more likely to discuss such issues as fishing in the disputed waters rather than focus entirely on the possibility of a “return” of the disputed territory, which is characteristic on national newspapers. Likewise, a war history article in a Hokkaido newspaper would likely discuss Karafuto repatriations rather than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, which are frequently covered in national newspapers.

Thesis Structure

Database inquiries revealed several prominent Other-related themes in Russian and Japanese news coverage. The analytical chapters in this thesis are built upon themes encountered in news articles mentioning Other. The full structure of the thesis is as follows.

Chapter 1 defines the Self–Other dichotomy and applies it to national and regional identities by characterizing them as products of antagonisms between Self-identity and multiple Other-identities. It also defines Sakhalin and Hokkaido as antagonisms between the national center and the periphery, and discusses Hokkaido and Sakhalin’s position within their respective national Self. Finally, it introduces the Sakhalin–Hokkaido zone between Russia and Japan and its significance in Russo-Japanese relations. It explains the proximity of Hokkaido and Sakhalin on natural, cultural and historical levels, which makes these locations suitable for a center–periphery comparison of Russian and Japanese media. Each of the remaining chapters presents a set of case studies associated with a range of related themes.

Chapter 2 focuses on newspaper coverage of international exchange events that involve interaction between Russia and Japan. It discusses the current state of Russia–Japan exchange in business and education, as well as other forms of exchange such as sister city relations. The discussed themes were selected to cover interactions on a range of levels: official (government) level, official exchange with non-government actors, non-government exchange through organizations, and individual exchange. The above range of interactions is also characterized by varying levels of formality. One of the case studies in this chapter is dedicated to media portrayal of Russia and Japan during the G8 summit in 2006 (St. Petersburg) and 2008 (Toyako). The G8 summit is an example of government level exchange with relatively low formality, which creates an opportunity for the newsmakers to speculate and discuss imagery of Other. The remaining sections discuss media coverage of exchange events between Russia and Japan on both national and local level. A separate section is dedicated to business exchange, which analyzes the impact of Russia’s 2015 drift net fishing ban in Japan. This chapter makes use of fieldwork data collected in Wakkanai and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Chapter 3 is a case study based on newspaper articles, academic and popular literature

covering the dispute over the sovereignty of the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories. This chapter is primarily driven by quantitative content analysis, putting greater emphasis on quantifiable data, such as the number of articles on a specific topic published in a specific time frame. The chapter examines the history of the territorial dispute, and analyzes reportage dedicated to or mentioning the dispute in Russian and Japanese national and local newspapers. A separate section is dedicated to exchange between Japan and the disputed islands. This section incorporates data obtained during fieldwork in Nemuro, where the author interviewed the editor of the local branch of *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and the head of the exchange center responsible for communication with the islands through Nemuro.

Chapter 4 employs qualitative content analysis to discuss themes associated with history and war memory in Russia and Japan. While relying on data from newspapers, this chapter focuses on analysis of individual articles and themes. It is split into five case studies dedicated to specific events or themes: 1) early contacts between Russia and Japan before the Shimoda treaty, 2) the legacy of the Russo-Japanese War in Russia and Japan and 3) World War 2 anniversary commemoration in Russia and Japan. Two more case studies focus on World War 2 related themes prominent in Japan: the history of Karafuto prefecture and Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union (Siberian Internment).

The final chapter discusses general imagery associated with Russia and Japan, as well as stereotyped images as seen in Russian and Japanese news coverage. The main sections discuss portrayals of Japan and the Japanese in Russian news coverage, and portrayals of Russia and the Russians in Japanese newspapers. The last section analyzes and compares national identity discourses in Russia and Japan as seen in the works of Russian and Japanese intellectuals of the 19th and 20th century, and traces their development from inclusive national discourses towards images of a “homogeneous” nation. The section bridges contemporary news reportage on Other with broader discourses on national identity in Russia and Japan.

Chapter 1. National and Regional Self–Other Antagonisms and Identities:

The Case of Russia and Japan

1.1. Self and Other in National and Regional Layers of Identity

This research discusses themes related to Russia and Japan found in Russian and Japanese national and regional newspapers. Bilateral relations and their role in national and regional identity can be described using a model of identity based on the dichotomy of Self and Other. In a practical sense, Self is an image that people attribute to themselves, while Other is an image that is juxtaposed against Self through a discourse of difference. It could be argued that there are many layers of Self, and an individual's identity is comprised of a multitude of Selves which are manifested situationally.¹⁵ Other plays an important role in establishing and reinforcing Self, as the awareness of Other's presence solidifies Self-identification through perceived difference from Other.

The phenomenological concepts of "Self" and "Other" (or, more commonly, "the Self" and "the Other") have been used to describe various forms of identity in a wide variety of fields, including philosophy, psychology and psychoanalysis, politics, international relations, feminism and culture studies. The original dichotomy of "the Self" and "the Other" was introduced by Hegel in his 1807 work "Phenomenology of Spirit".¹⁶ The basic premise of Hegel's argument is that self-consciousness is "mediated" by the presence of "the Other", and, therefore, embodies the awareness of "the Other"'s awareness of "the Self". This puts "the Other" at the core of Self-identity, which is defined through the presence of "the Other".

¹⁵ Examples of such situational identities are Self as a citizen of a particular country, gender-defined Self, Self as a parent, Self as a member of a sports club; Self as a fan of a particular music band, Self as a supporter of certain political views etc. There are multiple layers of Self to be expressed in a particular situation.

¹⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, trans. Arnold V. Miller, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 107-108.

The exact usage of the terms (presence or absence of quotation marks and capitalization) varies among authors and is further complicated by the fact that many works were originally written in languages other than English. There are cases when presence or absence of capitalization is needed to distinguish between the different aspects of Other, such as the Lacanian *A* – *Autre* (Other, or the big Other) and *a* – *autre* (other, or the little Other):

The little other is the other who is not really other, but a reflection and projection of the EGO... He is simultaneously the COUNTERPART and the SPECULAR IMAGE... The big Other designates radical alterity, an other-ness which transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be assimilated through identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity with language and the law, and hence the big Other is inscribed in the order of the symbolic... The Other is thus both another subject, in his radical alterity and unassimilable uniqueness, and also the symbolic order which mediates the relationship with that other subject. However, the meaning of “the Other as another subject” is strictly secondary to the meaning of “the Other as symbolic order”... It is thus only possible to speak of the Other as a subject in a secondary sense, in the sense that a subject may occupy this position and thereby “embody” the Other for another subject.¹⁷

The Hegelian model of identity is applicable not only to individuals, but also to various forms of collective identity, including social groups, political movements and nations. Sociologists of the 20th century expanded upon Hegel’s model and added another aspect of Self-identity called the “social Self”, which described the relationship between individual and group identities. G. H. Mead, for instance, argued that an individual’s mind is the individual importation of the social process, and language is a product of social interaction.¹⁸ Mead defines self as a product of a social act, where mind rises out of the social act of communication. The postulate of Mead’s theory is the “I” and the “Me” dialectic, where the “Me” is the social self (an organized set of attitudes of others that an individual assumes and

¹⁷ Dylan Evans, *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1996), 133. For the purpose of clarity, when used in the context of Russian and Japanese national identities (meaning the big Other), the terms Self and Other will be capitalized and used without quotation marks.

¹⁸ George Herbert Mead and Charles W Morris, *Mind, Self & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 191-192.

internalizes), and “I” is the response to the “Me” (the individual’s response to attitudes of others). In a way, the “I” and the “Me” correspond to Freud’s “ego” and “censor”, or “superego”, since “I” is often disciplined by the “Me” and held back from breaking the law assumed by the community.¹⁹ The social self can be described as a pluralistic field of selves which recreates itself with each new situation through the mechanism of role-playing.²⁰

The idea of Other as an integral part of identity is also developed in psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan, who connects it with language and the symbolic order and argues that “the Other” is the locus where speech is constituted. The relation between political thinking and Lacanian psychoanalysis is explored by Ernesto Laclau in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (2001). In this work, Laclau discusses the discursive nature of such concepts as political identity, class and social self-understanding. Laclau defines identity as a product of an antagonism (limit of social objectivity) between social classes or political powers. A common example of an antagonism would be political struggle between peasants and landowners, two social classes with their distinct collective identities. In Laclau’s vision, such antagonisms occur due to the obstacles these social classes pose for each other in becoming what they aspire to be. In the example mentioned above, social presence of the landowner class restricted the peasants from becoming peasants as they imagined it.²¹ On the other hand, this antagonistic relationship not only suppresses self-realization (and therefore identities) of both groups, but also reinforces their self-awareness and urges them to construct their identities as a result of that struggle. It is important to point out that antagonism in Laclau’s terms does

¹⁹ Greg Marc Nielsen, *The Norms of Answerability: Social Theory between Bakhtin and Habermas* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 135.

²⁰ Steve Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 16.

²¹ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001), 124-125.

not mean direct opposition: the subjects in an antagonistic relationship do not necessarily have to be complete opposites of each other or have essentially different traits. To describe the relationship between the subjects of an antagonism, the term “contingency” is employed, which emphasizes ambiguity, indeterminacy and some degree of inter-dependence between the subjects rather than direct opposition. Multiple layers of identity can be created through a discourse of difference: regional (territory), cultural (affinity with a culture), ethnic (cultural practices, ethnicity), gender, religious identity and many others.

In cultural anthropology, antagonisms may be used to define culture or its particular properties, such as mentality. In *Istoricheskaya ètnologiya* [*Historical Ethnology*] (1997), Svetlana Lourie argues that mentality (referred to as an “ethnic picture of the world”) is a multi-layered structure. The core layer, which she refers to as “the central zone of culture”, comprises several “ethnic constants”, which are defined as mechanisms that neutralize psychological danger of the environment and allow the members of an ethnic group to act. Lourie emphasizes the importance of the following ethnic constants: 1) localization of the source of evil, the enemy; 2) localization of the source of good, self-image of the nation; 3) a set of strategies which will ensure that good defeats evil.²² In this model, the core of culture itself is an antagonism between a particular ethnic group and its environment, including other ethnic groups it could possibly encounter.

The points made above allow for discussion of not only political and cultural, but also national identities, which contain both political and cultural aspects. As Smith (1991) points out, “national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture.”²³

²² Svetlana Lourie, *Istoricheskaya ètnologiya* (Moscow: Akademicheskii Prospekt, 2004), 52.

²³ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 17.

This is complemented by the idea that a nation can be seen as an “imagined community”, whose members may not know each other personally but have a feeling of affinity, a shared collective sense of belonging to a certain nation.²⁴ Smith also makes an important distinction between the model of Western national identity and national identity in Eastern Europe and Asia: in the Western model of national identity, the role of historical memories, myths, symbols and tradition is emphasized, while the non-Western model places emphasis on the community of birth and native culture.²⁵ In this regard, it could be said that national identity draws on other collective identities,²⁶ and the importance of different aspects of Self and Other in defining national identity varies across different communities.

It is also possible to look at national identity as an antagonism, a response to tension and contingency invoked by the presence of multiple Others, which is further solidified and shared between the members of the community. Following the previously discussed model of Self-Other identity, it is possible to argue that national identity is formed – or, at least, deeply influenced – by the nation’s awareness of and interaction with Other-nations. In the presence of Other-nations, Self-nation is urged to define itself through its representative elements. Seeing Other as a potential threat, Self-nation produces a discursive Self-identity in response. It is important to point out that the awareness of Other’s presence is crucial to shaping this national discourse. There needs to be an image of Other to invoke reflections on Self, and discourses on national identity are essentially discourses on national difference.

When Self comes in contact with Other (or is merely aware of Other’s presence), a two-way stereotyping process takes place. The need to draw a border encourages propagation

²⁴ Benedict R. O. G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

²⁵ Smith, *National Identity*, 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

of simplified, exaggerated ideas of what “we” and “they” are. The myth is perpetuated in a descriptive form to promote a somewhat solidified image of “us” as a model to follow. These stereotypical images of Self can be accompanied by narratives that attempt to explain the origins of national traits and define the nation’s position in relation to other nations, or in the world as a whole. These narratives are often embraced or manipulated by the nation state to influence external and internal policy, as well as public opinion on matters important to the state. It can be said with a degree of certainty that national identity has long operated within a discourse of its own in Russia and Japan, reflecting the challenges of Westernization (invoking an antagonism against “The West” as Other) and colonialism (that resulted in “othering” of the native inhabitants of newly colonized lands with later attempts to incorporate them into a broader national body, thus negating their regional identities, but also reinforcing them at the same time).

Conceptually, much like a collective identity of a social group can be broken up into overlapping layers of different individual identities, national identity can be divided into various regional sub-identities that share a significant overlap but have a certain degree of variation among them. This variation is the additional layer of identity that defines an individual from a particular area against a broader national identity. In a broad sense, “regional” identity is a layer of identity associated with being a member of a community in a particular region within the national borders; in the context of this thesis, “regions” are selected administrative units in Russia and Japan: Federal City of Moscow, Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Tokyo-to and Hokkaido prefecture. There are deeper layers of identity below these: for instance, within Hokkaido there are sub-regional identities associated with different cities or areas: for instance, Sapporo, Nemuro, Hakodate or Kushiro have their own distinctions within the broader Hokkaido identity, and antagonistic relationships are also implied inside

these subdivisions.²⁷ The term “local” can also be used to define these identities. Seaton (2016) defines “local” as a level located anywhere between the nation and the family.²⁸ In a sense, it is the identity of a smaller imagined community within the bigger imagined community of the nation.




Figure 1.1. Example spectrum of select collective identities

In the context of this analysis, “regional” has a narrower meaning than “local”, and is a particular instance of “local”. If “local” is a spectrum with “national” and “family” at the extremes, “regional” would be closer to “national” rather than “family”. The closer to the “family” extreme, the more likely is a layer of identity to be supported by a “real”, rather than “imagined”, community: for instance, people living in the same district of one city are more likely to know each other and interact directly in comparison to people living in the same city who do not live close to each other. Thus, on the scale of “realness”, “regional” is closer to “imagined” than other “local” identities. The main focus of this research is on the “national” and “regional” levels, which present national antagonism (Russia and Japan), center–periphery antagonism (Moscow and Sakhalin, Tokyo and Hokkaido) and border antagonism (Sakhalin and Hokkaido).

The model in figure 1.1 outlines collective identities with the primary focus on

²⁷ These identity distinctions go deeper up to the family level, where it is the most “real”. A practical example of such localized identity and antagonism would be street gangs: they are more “real” than “imagined” communities, and their identities are defined through rivalry against each other.

²⁸ Philip A. Seaton, *Local History and War Memories in Hokkaido* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 9-11.

administrative division. An alternative approach to understanding collective identities is to delineate identity groups based on their community affiliations, which may or may not correspond to a specific administrative unit, such as the city or region. Such communities may transcend regional or national boundaries. Associations of indigenous people existed before regional and national boundaries were established by modern states. In the case of Russia and Japan, there are the collective identities of indigenous populations that once existed on Sakhalin, Hokkaido and the Kurile islands. The indigenous communities have undergone massive transformations through colonization, assimilation, forced migration, changing borders and state policies. The Hokkaido–Sakhalin–Kurile identity has a transnational character and is therefore located farther than nation on the “imagined” scale. However, indigenous collective identities can also be situated anywhere between family and nation, and have their own subdivisions as well. The appropriate term for such identities would be “community”. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasize that the identities outlined through administrative divisions are also “communities” loosely based on an affiliation with a certain administrative unit.

An indigenous identity can be defined through a series of antagonisms between the indigenous Self and multiple non-indigenous Others. While the main focus of this research is on national and regional antagonisms in Russia and Japan, some aspects of indigenous antagonisms in Hokkaido and Sakhalin are discussed in sections 1.3-1.5, as well as chapter 3.

1.2. Sakhalin and Hokkaido as Center–Periphery Antagonisms

The “center–periphery” (or “core–periphery”) dichotomy is a spatial metaphor that describes the structural relationship between the metropolitan “center” and a less developed “periphery”, either within a particular country (as in this research), or as applied to the relationship between capitalist and developing societies. It is also encountered in sociology,

particularly studies of economic underdevelopment and dependency.²⁹ Wilson (2011)

describes the developmental contradictions between the center and the periphery:

Each developed nation consists of a center and a periphery. Power, wealth and employment are concentrated in the center. For example, Britain, London and the southeast; France the Paris region, Italy the center/north. By contrast, the periphery is dependent and underdeveloped with a warped economic structure which leads to high levels of total or seasonal unemployment. In Britain, it comprises the Celtic countries (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), much of northern England and the holiday colony of southwest England. The periphery provides semi processed materials which are worked up by the industries of the center, thus helping to maintain high levels of employment at the center. It is a tourist zone. It is also an important source of manpower, as the size of the Irish community in England or the continuing outward migration from Wales and Scotland illustrates.³⁰

Hokkaido and Sakhalin are Japan's and Russia's peripheries respectively. Hokkaido's "otherness" not only resides in its role within Japan as a tourist region and a major producer of agricultural products, but is also visible through its history as a former settler colony, which marks Hokkaido as a distinctly peripheral region of Japan. In the case of Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Sakhalin's mere distance from Moscow, its history as a penal colony, as well as its position within Russia as a remote host for multiple Russian oil and gas projects, also defines Sakhalin as a peripheral region of Russia.³¹

Regional distinction as a periphery plays a definitive role in shaping Self-identity as regional identity is deeply influenced by antagonistic relationships with Other-regions, particularly the antagonism between the national center and the periphery. People of Sakhalinskaya Oblast, for instance, are likely to have a distinguishable regional identity that is both challenged and supported by the broader "Russian" identity coming from the political

²⁹ Wilson O. Simon, "Centre-periphery Relationship in the Understanding of Development of Internal Colonies," *International Journal of Economic Development Research and Investment* 2, no. 1 (April 2011), 147-148.

³⁰ Ibid., 150.

³¹ Hokkaido and Sakhalin's "otherness" as peripheral regions is discussed in more detail in sections 1.3 and 1.4.

center, Moscow. The same could be said about the antagonistic nature of Hokkaido identity that contrasts with a broader Japanese identity being “broadcast” from Tokyo. It is therefore possible to approach identity from two reference points: one situated between the two nations (defined by national antagonism), and one between the center and the periphery of one nation (regional antagonism). In the context of national and regional antagonisms, Russia is Japan’s national Other (and vice versa), while Moscow is Sakhalin’s regional Other and Tokyo is Hokkaido’s regional Other. Images of Russia as Japan’s Other and images of Japan as Russia’s Other can be analyzed and contrasted between the center and the periphery standpoints, which is not only because of the geographical and cultural proximity of Sakhalin and Hokkaido, but also because of the potential differences in the vision of the Other-nation within the regions of the Self-nation. Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido are prominent examples of Self–Other antagonisms between the center and the periphery within one nation, and between nations.

The relationships between Moscow, Tokyo, Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya Oblast can be characterized in terms of geographical and cultural proximity. Table 1.1 shows geographical distances between regional and national Self and Other.

Table 1.1. Linear distances between Moscow, Tokyo, Sapporo and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk

Cities	Distances
Moscow – Tokyo	7479 km
Moscow – Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	6643 km
Tokyo – Sapporo	832 km
Sapporo – Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	448 km

Source: “Distance Calculator between World Cities,” Distance Calculator: Free Tool with Map, <https://www.entfernungsrechner.net/en/> (accessed October 2, 2018).

The distance between Moscow and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk is almost as large as the distance between Moscow and Tokyo, making Sakhalin a “distant periphery”. Seen from Moscow, Japan is a “distant neighbor”; for Japan, however, Russia is a “close neighbor”

because of Sakhalin's proximity. The linear distance between Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Sapporo is about 446 km, which is comparable to the distance between Tokyo and Kobe (424 km). However, even within this proximity there is certain gradation: from the buffer zone in Wakkanai and Nemuro located next to the Russian border to the southern areas of Hokkaido where Russian presence is hardly noticeable. An important exception to this gradation is Japanese port towns, such as Otaru³² or Nagasaki,³³ where a Russian presence has historically been prominent. This presence has affected the imagery associated with Russia and Russians in Japan, particularly in Hokkaido, which is discussed in Chapter 5.

Another characteristic trait of Hokkaido shared with Sakhalin is its natural environment. It has been suggested that Hokkaido belongs to an ecological zone that is different from Honshu. The Tsugaru Straits located between Honshu and Hokkaido acts as a natural border for animal species, which is also known as the Blakiston Line.³⁴ Since Sakhalin belongs to the same zone, it can be argued that from the ecological point of view Hokkaido shares more in common with Sakhalin than Tokyo.

Another way to approach the relationships between different regions in Russia and Japan is to analyze their cultural proximity. "Cultural proximity" can have a variety of definitions; for instance, the idea of "culturally close" or "culturally distant" regions can be based on whether there is a dependency relationship, and whether Self and Other have a significant identity overlap. The majority of the Sakhalin population has Russian citizenship,

³² One of the most significant effects of Russian presence in Otaru was the 1999 "Otaru public bath case", which caused various public bathhouses and entertainment establishments across Japan to deny entry to all foreigners. The influence of the Otaru case on Russia-related imagery is discussed in Chapter 5. For more on the Otaru case and discrimination of non-Japanese in Japan, see Arudou Debito, *Japanese Only: The Otaru Hot Springs Case and Racial Discrimination in Japan* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006).

³³ For more on Russian presence in Nagasaki, see Amir A. Khisamutdinov, *Russkii Nagasaki, ili Poslednii prichal v Inase* (Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dal'nevostochnogo Universiteta, 2009).

³⁴ Louis Frédéric and Kâthe Roth, *Japan Encyclopedia* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 186.

which makes Sakhalin part of Russian national Self, and thus “culturally close” to Moscow and the rest of Russia. The same can be said about the relationship between Hokkaido and the rest of Japan. Moscow and Tokyo, on the other hand, do not share an identity overlap, and are therefore “culturally distant”.

The idea of “cultural proximity” described above relies on such factors as national identity. Another way to understand cultural proximity is to examine similarities in local history, customs, lifestyle, and demographics. Such comparison would reveal noticeable cultural proximity between Sakhalin and Hokkaido. Both regions were settler societies established relatively recently within their respective nation’s history. Their temporal difference from the national center is evident in a variety of ways. For instance, Sakhalin’s oldest churches (including those destroyed after the revolution) were constructed at the end of the 19th-early 20th centuries, as opposed to churches and monasteries in the Moscow area that date back to the 13th-15th centuries and are considered objects of cultural heritage in Russia. The same parallel can be drawn between Hokkaido and “mainland” Japan: the lack of historical continuity between Hokkaido and Honshu makes it difficult to define Hokkaido as “inherent” Japanese territory. “Japanese” history is considerably shorter in Hokkaido than in “core” regions of Japan such as Kyoto or Nara. This nuance creates a premise for politicizing history: Seaton (2017) gives an example of a Jōmon period artifact discovered in Hakodate that was designated a National Treasure in 2007, even though there was no entity recognizable as “Japan” in the area of the discovery 3500 years ago.³⁵ Hokkaido’s architectural landscape in general is considerably “younger” than that of Tokyo or Kyoto, with most development taking place in and after the 19th century. Hokkaido Jingū, which

³⁵ Philip Seaton, “Japanese Empire in Hokkaido,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, ed. David Ludden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.76, <http://asianhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-76> (accessed October 2, 2018).

enshrines the three deities associated with reclamation of Hokkaido (*kaitaku sanjin*), was founded after the Meiji Restoration.³⁶ In this regard, it could be said that Hokkaido is similar to Sakhalin in its character of “explored and developed” territory and temporal “remoteness” from the rest of the country. It must be noted, however, that the approach to Hokkaido and Sakhalin history employed in this study does not center on the appearance and expansion of Russian or Japanese culture in the area; instead, the pivotal argument is that there was indigenous culture long before the area was “discovered” by Russians or Japanese, and the temporal difference discussed above is the product of interaction between the settlers and the indigenous culture. As discussed in Chapter 4, this standpoint differs from official positions expressed by Russian and Japanese governments, who claim these territories as inherently Russian or Japanese.

The geographical and ecological factors mentioned above provide the background for cultural proximity. Both Sakhalin and Hokkaido are islands. Sakhalin is the largest island in Russia, and Sakhalinskaya Oblast is the only federal subject (administrative area) of Russia consisting entirely of islands. Likewise, Hokkaido is one of the two prefectures (the other being Okinawa) that does not have a land border with another prefecture in Japan. Life on islands implies a connection with the sea that manifests itself through various aspects of life, including traditional occupations, trade, transport and perception of distance, weather and natural disasters. In many of these aspects Sakhalin is closer to Japan, particularly Hokkaido, than Moscow. Moscow does not have direct access to the sea and does not depend on it, earthquakes and maritime disasters are not common in the Moscow area, and, unlike Hokkaido and the rest of Japan, the Moscow region does not have a centuries-long tradition of fishing and sea trade, which contributed to the formation of “port cultures” peculiar to

³⁶ Several Hokkaido shrines founded in the 14th century, such as the Hakodate Hachiman shrine and Ōta Jinja in Setana, present notable exceptions.

Sakhalin and Vladivostok. When viewed from this angle, Sakhalin is more “culturally proximate” to Japan and Hokkaido than to Moscow.

Sakhalin’s ethnic composition also plays a role in its regional distinction from Moscow and brings it closer to other countries in Asia. Sakhalin and Hokkaido developed as multi-ethnic, multicultural spaces of cohabitation that go back in time far earlier than the cosmopolitanism of capital cities such as Moscow and Tokyo, where cosmopolitanism is formed through continuous economic migration. It could be said that Sakhalin and Hokkaido have longer histories of intercultural communication, whose nature is different from the cosmopolitanism of capital cities. Peripheral multiculturalism developed from interaction with indigenous peoples, shifting borders and forced migrations. For instance, according to the 2010 census, there are about 25,000 ethnic Koreans (5% of the total population) living in Sakhalinskaya Oblast, making Sakhalinskaya Oblast the region with the largest percentage of ethnic Koreans in Russia.³⁷ Koreans migrated to Sakhalin (Karafuto) mainly as mining laborers when Korea was under Japanese colonial rule, in the same way that Korean workers were recruited in the rest of the Japanese Empire, including Hokkaido, where by 1928 13% of mine workers were Korean.³⁸ After World War 2 many Sakhalin Koreans could not depart to Japan or Korea and had to stay on Sakhalin for 40 years. It is reasonable to expect the more recent exchange between Sakhalin and South Korea to contribute to Sakhalin regional identity as some Sakhalin Koreans have relocated to South Korea, while others have gone there at least once to visit their relatives. In her 2015 work *Korean diaspora of Sakhalin* Yulia Din provides a detailed study of history of Sakhalin Koreans within Japan and the Soviet Union, and examines various contemporary aspects of the Korean diaspora in Sakhalin, such

³⁷ “Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniya po sub-ektam Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rosstat, accessed September 16, 2018, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/per-itog/tab7.xls.

³⁸ Ann B. Irish, *Hokkaido: A History of Ethnic Transition and Development on Japan’s Northern Island* (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co., 2009), 218.

as repatriation to South Korea and self-identification. Sakhalin Korean identity is split into several layers between the three generations of Sakhalin Koreans, and there are various divergences within each generation: for instance, self-identification of the second generation (who were born and grew up in Korean families as native speakers of both Russian and Korean) is split between people who consider themselves Koreans living away from home, people who consider themselves Russians, and people who do not put emphasis on either “Koreanness” or “Russianness”, but who speak both languages and follow traditions of both cultures.³⁹ The multi-layered Sakhalin Korean identity is another aspect of Sakhalin that distinctly marks its “otherness” from Moscow and the rest of Russia.

Close ties at institutional and societal levels via numerous channels of contact between Sakhalin and Hokkaido are defined by geographical proximity and the historical link that reshapes the idea of cultural distance between the regions. The national border between Russia and Japan has changed several times, and different parts of Sakhalin have belonged to Russian and Japanese national Self at different moments in the last two centuries. These factors need to be taken into consideration when marking Sakhalin–Hokkaido as “culturally distant” because the nature of this “distance” is different from that between Moscow and Tokyo. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss these nuances in the context of national and regional newspaper surveys conducted during this research.

The peculiar quality of Sakhalin and Hokkaido’s proximity possesses particular value for Russia–Japan case studies. Russia and Japan are often described as “neighbors”; however, a distinction needs to be made between close neighbors that have been living next to each other for centuries and cultures that forged their borders relatively recently through war and conquest. Sharing a history of colonialism, Sakhalin and Hokkaido are the regions that have

³⁹ Yulia I. Din, *Koreiskaya diaspora Sakhalina: Problema repatriatsii i integratsiya v sovetskoe i rossiiskoe obshchestvo* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalinskaya oblastnaya tipografiya, 2015), 219.

created Russia and Japan's "unnatural", "modern" borders. For Japan, there is generally no significant linguistic or cultural affinity with Russia (in contrast to that between Japan and China or Korea). On the other hand, there is some cultural proximity, particularly on Sakhalin, that was made possible when the island was under joint Russian and Japanese sovereignty in 1855-1875. Citizens of both nations were allowed to live on Sakhalin without clearly defined borders, which facilitated intercultural exchange between Russian, Japanese, Chinese, Korean and indigenous people in this region. Geographical proximity to Hokkaido and shifting borders make the historical profile of Sakhalin distinct from other areas where significant exchange between Russia, Japan and other nations also took place in the 19th and early 20th century, such as the Amur region.⁴⁰

With the considerations made above, it would be meaningful to describe "cultural proximity" as a relative concept within particular contexts of discussion. Sakhalin can be described as "culturally close" to Moscow within a Russia-Japan comparison, but it can also be "culturally close" to Hokkaido within a local comparison. Adapting such an approach allows for flexibility in the analysis of Self-Other relations within national and regional borders, where these relations may overlap or intersect. It also emphasizes the ambiguity (contingency) of these relations as a product of a Self-Other antagonism.

It is important to point out that Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido are positioned differently (even as peripheries) within their respective nations. A simple fact sheet reveals differences in population, contribution to national economy and distance of these regions from the national center.

⁴⁰ For more on Russo-Japanese interaction in Priamurye, see Igor R. Saveliev, "Borders, Borderlands and Migration in Sakhalin and the Priamur Region: A Comparative Study," in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border: Karafuto/Sakhalin*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 42-60.

Table 1.2. A comparison fact sheet of Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido

Aspect of comparison	Sakhalinskaya Oblast	Hokkaido
Population	497,973 0.3% of total national population of 142,849,472 (2010)	5,506,419 4.2% of total national population of 128,057,352 (2010)
Population density	5.59/km ²	66.4/km ²
% in national GDP per capita	0.5% (2009)	3.548% (2007)

With the above facts taken into account, it is clear that the economic and demographic significance of Sakhalinskaya Oblast within Russia is quite different from that of Hokkaido within Japan. It could be said that Hokkaido for Japan is a more “connected” periphery, while Sakhalin for Russia is a remote periphery with some strategic importance. Recognition of these distinct peripheral statuses is important in understanding the difference in Other-related themes that appear in central and regional media.

Apart from the center–periphery antagonism with their respective national centers, Sakhalin and Hokkaido are engaged in a regional (border) antagonism between each other, which is reinforced by geographical and cultural proximity as discussed previously. Therefore, three types of regional relations can be analyzed as antagonisms: national, center–periphery and region/border.




Figure 1.2. Types of antagonisms involving Moscow, Tokyo, Sakhalin and Hokkaido

To summarize, the following pairs of Self–Other relationships are analyzed in this study:

1) Moscow–Sakhalinskaya Oblast. Culturally close, geographically distant. National Self, regional Other, “distant” periphery.

2) Tokyo–Hokkaido. Culturally close, relatively close geographically, relatively distant ecologically. National Self, regional Other, “close” periphery.

3) Moscow–Tokyo. Culturally and geographically distant. National Other.

4) Sakhalin–Hokkaido. Geographically and ecologically close, ambiguous cultural proximity (“close neighbor”). National Other, border regions.

5) Moscow–Hokkaido and Tokyo–Sakhalin. Peripheries of national Other. These links are analyzed as parts of regional Selves of Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

In figure 1.2, pairs 1 and 2 represent center–periphery antagonisms, pair 3 represents a national antagonism, and pair 4 represents a regional antagonism. Pair 5 represents a subset of the national antagonism that is linked with Other’s peripheral region. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 focus on the center–periphery antagonisms in Hokkaido and Sakhalin, while section 1.5 focuses on the regional Sakhalin–Hokkaido antagonism.

1.3. Hokkaido Self: Hokkaido Within Japan, Interaction with Russia

Part of the value of a regional study with Hokkaido and Sakhalin as focal points lies in understanding the peculiarities of these regions’ relationship with their respective national centers. This relationship is characterized by mutual antagonization and the corresponding construction of regional identity. The regional identity of Hokkaido revolves around the antagonism against inner Japan and the discourse of both real and imagined difference that is produced by this antagonism. The Ainu, Hokkaido’s indigenous people, add another dimension to the regional antagonism between Hokkaido and Tokyo, as well as an internal antagonism within Hokkaido. These two antagonisms will be discussed below.

The history of the island currently known as Hokkaido⁴¹ lacks continuity with the rest of Japan before its incorporation into Japanese national Self as “Hokkaido”. Hokkaido history follows a different periodization than that of Honshu. Unlike “mainland” Japan, where the Jōmon culture was superseded by the Yayoi culture of rice cultivation, Hokkaido Jōmon continued to develop for centuries without rice cultivation or farming. Post-Jōmon periodization of history in Hokkaido consists of the Epi-Jōmon, Satsumon and Ainu periods.⁴² Prehistoric people of northern Hokkaido represented a branch of the heterogeneous Okhotsk culture, which converged with the Satsumon culture coming from northern Honshu to form the Ainu culture in Hokkaido. Archaeology has long been the basis of knowledge and periodization of history in Hokkaido; some argue, however, that such an approach to history has been detrimental to understanding the history of non-state societies that the indigenous populations represented. Kato (2014) points out that such a perception of history helped perpetuate the image of Hokkaido as “unspoilt land”, which in turn helped justify colonization and assimilation practices.⁴³ The history of Hokkaido appears “Japanized” to the extent that non-agricultural, non-stratified societies are described from the point of view of the Japanese state formation. However, Hokkaido has a rich cultural history stemming from the culture of indigenous people that had inhabited the land from ancient times. Indigenous and *wajin* (Yamato people, the dominant ethnic group in Japan) cultures

⁴¹ The Ainu domain (which included Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands) is known in the Ainu language as *Ainu Mosir*, “the land of human beings”, which is contrasted against *Kamuy Mosir*, “the land of spirits”. Before the establishment of the Development Commission (*kaitakushi*) in 1869, the island was known in Japanese as *Ezochi* (“the Ezo region”). The word Hokkaido, composed of characters “north”, “sea” and “road”, is a modified version of a placename suggested to the Meiji government by Matsuura Takeshirō, a Japanese explorer of *Ezochi*. It is therefore possible to argue that even the name Hokkaido is an imperial construct.

⁴² Philip A. Seaton, “Grand Narratives of Empire and Development,” in *Local History and War Memory in Hokkaido*, ed. Philip A. Seaton (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 37-38.

⁴³ Hirofumi Kato, “Indigenous Heritage and Community-based Archaeology,” in *Indigenous Heritage and Tourism: Theories and Practices on Utilizing the Ainu Heritage*, ed. Mayumi Okada and Hirofumi Kato (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Center for Ainu and Indigenous Studies, 2014), 28.

met in Ainu Mosir / Ezo [Hokkaido] in the 14th-18th centuries, and it is only from the 19th century that large-scale Japanese cultural sites, such as shrines, can be seen. It can be said that Hokkaido is home to historical heritage built by the indigenous culture, which converged with and was eventually dominated by the settler culture that arrived from Honshu and other parts of Japan.

It could also be argued that Hokkaido belonged to a different “cultural space” before it was appropriated as part of the Japanese state. That space existed long before nation states emerged, and it did not have clear inner boundaries, which made it possible for its populations to migrate freely. Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kuriles and northern Honshu existed as one cultural “zone”, which the Ainu inhabited before being discovered by Russians, Chinese or Japanese. Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kuriles were loosely affiliated rather than politically or culturally integrated; however, it was inhabited by indigenous populations long before nations started imposing their views on boundaries. Vysokov (2008) describes Sakhalin and the Kuriles as a “contact zone” and “a meeting place for members of various ethnic groups”.⁴⁴ This is another aspect of history shared with Hokkaido, where ethnic groups from the north and the south converged. The official website of the Ainu Association of Hokkaido maintains that the traditional settlement area of the Ainu (*Ainumoshiri*, or *Aynu Mosir*) from approximately the 17th to the 19th centuries included Hokkaido, the Kurile islands, northern Honshu and the southern part of Sakhalin. There were also contacts between the Ainu from the Kuriles and the indigenous populations of Kamchatka, between the Sakhalin Ainu and the populations of the Amur basin, and between the Hokkaido Ainu and the Yamato people.⁴⁵ The National Museum of Ethnology (Minpaku) provides a similar

⁴⁴ Mikhail Vysokov, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril'skikh ostrovov: s drevneishikh vremën do nachala XXI stoletiya* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalinskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 2008), 549.

⁴⁵ “The beginning of history”, Ainu Association of Hokkaido, accessed September 17, 2018, <https://www.ainu-assn.or.jp/english/begin.html>.

description.⁴⁶

Before its colonization, Hokkaido was effectively a foreign land for Japan. Howell (1994) argues that demarkation of an “ethnic boundary” between the Ainu and the Japanese was a critical element in determining political boundaries of the early modern Japanese state.⁴⁷ “Japanization” of Hokkaido was a gradual process that affected many traits of its “otherness”, which were erased or altered to facilitate its integration into Japan proper. The natural landscape was transformed and migrants from inner Japan populated the area. Hokkaido’s landscape made a considerable impact on lifestyles of early Japanese settlements, where farming and stockbreeding played an important role in domestic agriculture. Rice cultivation – deemed as the essence of “Japaneseness” by the state – was then gradually introduced in Hokkaido. A study by Blaxell (2009) describes the process of integrating Other into national Self using rice cultivation as an example: “...transformed from other to self by the practices of space, the colony exports the identity of the center back to its origins and the imperial transaction is complete; a transaction begun with Nakayama Kyūzō’s transformation of rural space in Hokkaidō into rice cultivation space, from foreign to domestic.”⁴⁸ Imprinting Japanese modernity was a way of appropriating the land as “Japanese”.

Unlike Sakhalin and the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories, Hokkaido has never been the subject of a territorial dispute between Japan and another nation. Hokkaido is frequently referred to as an integral part of the Japanese nation and Japanese history, a domestic region whose appropriation remained unquestioned for a long time. With regard to

⁴⁶ “Aynu (Ainu) Mosir”, The National Museum of Ethnology (Minpaku), accessed September 17, 2018, <http://www.minpaku.ac.jp/english/museum/exhibition/main/aynu/11>.

⁴⁷ David L. Howell, “Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State,” *Past & Present*, no. 142 (February 1994), 69.

⁴⁸ Vivian Blaxell, “Designs of Power: The ‘Japanization’ of Urban and Rural Space in Colonial Hokkaidō,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 35, no. 2-09 (August 31, 2009), 14.

Japan's territorial integrity and Hokkaido, Seaton (2016) notes that there are two competing narratives of the Japanese empire. The first narrative largely excludes Hokkaido from Japanese imperial history and considers colonization of Taiwan from 1895 the beginning of Japanese empire. Hokkaido is portrayed as an inherent part of Japan that was “developed” rather than a foreign land that was colonized. In the Meiji period, the difference between Hokkaido and inner Japan was commonly described using such dichotomies as nature/culture and wild/tamed. Hokkaido was perceived as a brutal wilderness that contrasted with the cultivated, domesticated landscape of *naichi*.⁴⁹ A special administrative unit (*kaitakushi*) was established in Hokkaido to accelerate its integration into Japanese proper. The spirit of “pioneering” played the central role in the “development” (*kaitaku*) imperial narrative that accompanied its colonization. The local identity of Hokkaido (*dosanko*) born out of the official narrative was recognized well enough to be featured in an official government brochure, highlighting Hokkaido people's inclusiveness, open-mindedness and greater tolerance of difference in comparison to other prefectural populations in Japan.⁵⁰ Thus, it can be said that the cultural aspect of Hokkaido's “otherness” has received official recognition.

The first narrative is common in Japanese academia and mainstream media, and is also the official position of Japanese government. However, embracing this narrative enables politicians, historians and the media to mark Hokkaido as “inherent” Japanese land since the Edo period, which erases its colonial past and indigenous history of Hokkaido's indigenous people. Siddle (1996) provides a critique of the first narrative by disputing the assumption that Hokkaido was already Japanese land by the time large-scale colonization took place in

⁴⁹ Michele M. Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 62.

⁵⁰ Seaton, “Grand Narratives of Empire and Development,” 55.

the Meiji period.⁵¹ The current positioning of the Ainu as “citizens of Japan” without also labeling them as a colonized minority community further demonstrates the Japanese government’s treatment of Hokkaido colonization as a natural extension of the Japanese archipelago.⁵²

The second narrative emphasizes Hokkaido’s role in Japanese empire building, and argues that Hokkaido was not only a colony, but also a site for the development of imperial ideology.⁵³ Some argue that Hokkaido’s colonization was obfuscated in an attempt to construct a monolithic national identity, which also led to the decline of the culture of its indigenous people. Although Hokkaido had been a sphere of geopolitical interest for the Japanese since the 16th century, the island was officially incorporated into Japan proper during the Meiji restoration, a period that marked the Japanese Empire’s emergence as a modern nation state. Mason (2012) argues that the colonization of Hokkaido, along with discriminatory policies against the Ainu, was an integral part of creating the imagined community of the modern Japanese nation, as well as a model for later Japanese colonization of Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. Hokkaido was a colonial project that, along with the acquisition of land and natural resources, attempted to erase the Ainu presence from Hokkaido’s history, and to internalize the new land as a domestic region of Japan.⁵⁴ Howell (2005) argues that the Tokugawa shogunate linked “Japanese” identity with territoriality, which played an important role in shaping Japan’s boundaries as a modern state, as well as

⁵¹ Richard Siddle, *Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 1996), 51.

⁵² Mark K. Watson, ann-elise lewallen, and Mark J. Hudson, “Beyond Ainu Studies: An Introduction,” in *Beyond Ainu Studies: Changing Academic and Public Perspectives*, ed. Mark J. Hudson, ann-elise lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 2.

⁵³ Seaton, “Grand Narratives of Empire and Development,” 26.

⁵⁴ Michele M. Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

influencing the treatment of the Ainu within the state. Unlike China and Russia, Japan did not become a multiethnic empire, where the indigenous people would be subject to the sovereignty of the state in the same manner as the core population.⁵⁵ Thus, “othering” of the Ainu was crucial in formation of the “Japanese” discursive Self-identity. Much like the indigenous people of Sakhalin and Priamurye were treated by Russian and Soviet authorities, the Ainu were seen as a backward tribal people stuck in pre-modern times, and such vision facilitated the efforts of the Japanese imperial government to “civilize” the island through assimilation policies. This colonization profile presents another similarity between Hokkaido and Sakhalin as “othered” peripheral regions.

Apart from the official government narrative and the critical counter-narrative, it is also important to consider the indigenous population of Hokkaido as a separate presence worthy of its own discourse and narrative. Howell (2014) places the study of Ainu history within Japanese scholarship into its own historical context and points out that Ainu history is constrained to a small subfield within Japanese national history, which is caused by both the lack of sources in languages other than Japanese, and the history of Ainu-related issues being deeply institutionalized in Japan. Howell argues that the development of independent Ainu history would benefit from studies by historians working outside Japan, writing in languages other than Japanese and engaging with other literatures, places and disciplines.⁵⁶

It could be argued, therefore, that there is an internal antagonism within Hokkaido that engages the indigenous population. Indeed, lewallen (2016) describes how Ainu women engage in a Self-making process of “becoming Ainu” through performing traditional Ainu

⁵⁵ David L. Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2005), 198.

⁵⁶ David L. Howell, “Is Ainu History Japanese History?” in *Beyond Ainu Studies: Changing Academic and Public Perspectives*, ed. Mark J. Hudson, ann-elise lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 113-115.

activities at spaces of cultural visualization (such as embroidery workshops); the Self-crafting is a conscious choice of an individual regardless of whether they have Ainu ancestry or not.⁵⁷ This identity creation by Self-identifying in the presence of non-Ainu Others (such as *wajin* Japanese) is the result of an antagonism that encourages a discursive Self-identity to emerge. This antagonism is outside the scope of this research (as it focuses on national and regional antagonisms); however, the presence of the Ainu identity is discussed in the context of Hokkaido's "otherness" within Japan, and in the context of shared aspects of history with Sakhalin.

The largest proportion of Japan's Ainu population resides in Hokkaido, which is also home to influential Ainu organizations, such as the Ainu Association of Hokkaido. As of 2018, the Ainu remain the only ethnic minority in Japan officially recognized by the Japanese government as indigenous people. Hokkaido is the center of Ainu activism, and Ainu rights remain one of the major ethnic issues in Japan to this day. Attempts by official institutions and non-government organizations to promote Ainu culture and traditional arts, particularly in the tourism industry, have contributed to the image of Hokkaido as the main location of knowledge and merchandise related to the Ainu, which made it a popular destination for visitors from both Japan and abroad. In addition, Hokkaido's natural landscape made it famous for seasonal festivals and vacation resorts, attracting tourists from all over the world. Nevertheless, the landscape of Hokkaido is sparsely populated, and the population density of the island remains the lowest among all Japanese prefectures, at 1/5 of the national average as of 2010.⁵⁸ Although Hokkaido accounts for over 20% of Japan's land area, only 4% of the country's population live on the island. Much like the rest of Japan, Hokkaido is suffering

⁵⁷ ann-elise lewallen, *The Fabric of Indigeneity: Ainu Identity, Gender, and Settler Colonialism in Japan* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016), 1-2.

⁵⁸ "Geography of Hokkaido," Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, accessed September 17, 2018, <http://www.mlit.go.jp/hkb/en/geography.html>.

from depopulation; however, it is one of the regions where depopulation is the most acute.⁵⁹ Although this alone does not create significant cultural differences between Hokkaido and inner Japan, it is reasonable to assume that life in smaller semi-isolated communities promotes different lifestyles and attitudes as opposed to life in a densely populated urban area such as Tokyo or Osaka.

Hokkaido's "otherness" remains visible through linguistic cues as well. Such words as *dōnai/dōgai* (official terms for "within/outside Hokkaido"), or *dosanko* (person born and raised in Hokkaido) are perhaps the most immediately evident manifestations of the Hokkaido antagonism. In the pre-war period, the term *naichi* (inner lands) was used to distinguish between the main lands of the Japanese empire (which included Hokkaido) and its external colonies, which were referred to as *gaichi* (external lands). Although Hokkaido has never been *gaichi*, nowadays it is possible (particularly among the older generation) to hear the word *naichi* being used colloquially to refer to Japanese territory outside Hokkaido. Colloquial usage of *naichi* in Hokkaido and Okinawa has been documented in dictionaries.⁶⁰

Another distinct trait of Hokkaido is the nature of its interaction with Russia. With the Shimoda treaty, Russian vessels gained access to the ports of Nagasaki, Shimoda and Hakodate. Although notable exchange happened in Nagasaki, including the first Russian settlement at the foot of Mt. Inasa,⁶¹ it was Hokkaido that became home for the first Russian consulate and the first Russian Orthodox Church in Japan⁶² before its importance was lost to

⁵⁹ Peter Matanle, Anthony Rausch, and Shrinking Regions Research Group, *Japan's Shrinking Regions in the 21st Century* (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2011), 94-95, 101.

⁶⁰ Hida Yoshifumi and Takami Mozume, *Nihon daijirin* (Tokyo: Ōzoransha, 1998), 1862.

⁶¹ Amir A. Khisamutdinov, *Russkii Nagasaki, ili Posledniĭ prichal v Inase* (Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dal'nevostochnogo Universiteta, 2009).

⁶² "Tōkyō no daishukyō, zen'nihon no fushukyō Daniiru," The Orthodox Church in Japan, accessed September 17, 2018, <http://www.orthodoxjapan.jp/daishukyou.html>.

the national capital. Nevertheless, Hokkaido's special significance for Russo-Japanese interaction remains to this day, particularly due to its subnational ties with Sakhalin.⁶³ Unlike Moscow–Tokyo relations, Hokkaido interacts with Russia directly and locally due to the proximity of Sakhalin and the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories. Local businesses and public spaces, such as airports or museums, attempt to take this factor into account. As a result, a Russian visitor to Hokkaido is more likely to encounter signs, labels, brochures and instructions in their native language than elsewhere in Japan.⁶⁴ Hokkaido's regional Self in regard to interaction with Russia received further development after World War 2, when the majority of Japanese residents of Sakhalin (Karafuto) relocated to Hokkaido, bringing their bits of knowledge of Russian language and culture, as well as their own images of the Russians.

The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan affects life in Hokkaido directly because the disputed islands are deemed to belong to the Nemuro subprefecture of Hokkaido; local affairs and image of Russia in Nemuro are influenced by such issues as fishing in the disputed waters and exchange with the disputed islands. As a result, local press in Hokkaido is likely to focus more on such aspects of Russo-Japanese relations than national newspapers. Hokkaido is also a strategic location for Japanese military for defense against Russia, which is why Hokkaido hosts the largest of the five armies of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.

In conclusion, the following points should be made:

1. Hokkaido's regional identity is built upon an antagonism against inner Japan.
2. Hokkaido's difference from inner Japan manifests in many areas of life, including ethnic, linguistic, archaeological, demographic, historical, cultural and landscape differences.

⁶³ Brad Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido–Sakhalin Relations* (London: Routledge, 2007), 6-7.

⁶⁴ This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

3. Hokkaido's proximity to Sakhalin and the disputed islands creates a field of more "real" (as opposed to "imagined") interactions with Russia, which highlights the special role of Hokkaido in Russo-Japanese relations. Regional identity is also affected by these interactions.

4. Hokkaido's regional antagonism is further complicated by the presence of an internal antagonism which engages the indigenous population.

1.4. Sakhalin Self: Sakhalin within Russia and Japan–Sakhalin Relations

Based on the notions of cultural proximity defined in section 1.2, it can be said that contemporary Sakhalin is a layer of Russian national Self. It is evident, however, that Sakhalin's "Russianness" is a relatively recent development. Indigenous peoples of Sakhalin – the Ainu, the Oroki and the Nivkhi – inhabited the island long before modern nation states (yet to be created as nations) claimed any rights to it, much like Hokkaido / Ainu Mosir was inhabited by the Ainu before being integrated into Japanese proper. Sakhalin is mentioned in Chinese chronicles since the 13th century, interactions between the Sakhalin Ainu and the Chinese in the 15th century involved regular tributary visits, and Chinese records of the mid-18th century include Ainu and Nivkhi households registered under the Qing administrative umbrella.⁶⁵ It could be argued that up until the mid-19th century China considered Sakhalin (at least nominally) to be under its jurisdiction. However, as China did not have any significant military presence on Sakhalin, these claims did not stop Russia and Japan's continuous attempts to colonize the island. From the mid-19th century there was an intense Russo-Japanese competition to incorporate Sakhalin into the Russian or Japanese national body. This competition has contributed to the sense of regional exceptionality that developed

⁶⁵ Brett L. Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 133.

on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, which manifests in promotion of a distinct local memory that honors early explorers of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, such as Vladimir Atlasov.⁶⁶ It can be said that two kinds of cultural interaction took place on Sakhalin during its colonization: one between the colonizer cultures and the indigenous peoples, and one between the Russian and Japanese nations. Lines of contact between different ethnic groups were created naturally through migration, while national borders were negotiated by governments; particularly in the 19th century this created discrepancies between the official borders and the actual distribution of the populations.

Colonization can “distort” or erase the indigenous Other in the long term through assimilation and discriminatory policies, as well as through state-imposed identity discourses. In a critique of American colonialism, Jody A. Byrd (2011) provides the following description of the state’s attempts to dissolve and merge the indigenous Other through creating a deferred image of Other through a discourse of difference:

...As a system dependent upon difference and differentiation to enact the governmentality of biopolitics, the deferred “Indian” that transits U.S. empire over continents and oceans is recycled and reproduced so that empire might cohere and consolidate subject and object, self and other, within those transits.⁶⁷

Vysokov points out the consequences of Russian colonization of Sakhalin and the Kuriles: gradual loss of traditional indigenous lifestyles and degradation of local traditions, depopulation of indigenous peoples and disruption of balanced ecosystems that were in place for thousands of years. Mass learning of the Russian language by the local population

⁶⁶ Paul Richardson, “Russia’s ‘Last Barren Islands’: The Southern Kurils and the Territorialization of Regional Memory,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border: Karafuto/Sakhalin*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 161-163. A similar “cult” of Japanese explorers, such as Mamiya Rinzo, and early Japanese settlers (*tondenhei*) can be observed in Hokkaido: see Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*, 31-55.

⁶⁷ Jody A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 221.

resulted in the decline of indigenous languages, while the education system and state policy contributed to the erasure of traditional practices, which led to a loss of “ethnic peculiarity that distinguishes one people from another”.⁶⁸ An important comment needs to be made here regarding different causes of cultural extinction: depopulation, followed by cultural extinction, may occur due to such factors as famine or disease, in which case it is not “forced” directly by the state; other factors include voluntary or forced migration and assimilation practices. In this regard, the depopulation of the Kurile Ainu, which had occurred before the influence of nation states, is different from that of the Sakhalin Ainu, who were subject to forced relocation multiple times.

The state made several attempts to “protect” the indigenous population by relocating their homes for easier administrative control; this resulted in further decline of traditional lifestyles as the people were relocated too far away from the sea. Another attempt was made in the 1990s, when local businesses based on traditional occupations, such as fishing, were encouraged; ultimately those businesses were unsuccessful, as they were in a disadvantageous position to already established larger local industries.⁶⁹ All of the factors mentioned above influenced the local Sakhalin identity and the identities of indigenous peoples.

To improve their living conditions and integrate in the new society, the locals in the colonized areas were encouraged or even forced to make changes to their lifestyles that were previously irrelevant, such as learning a new language, or changing occupation. This leads to distortion of the pre-colonial cultural Selves, which are “washed out” further through other processes, such as migration. The integration of a colonized territory into the national body,

⁶⁸ Vysokov, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril'skikh ostrovov*, 560.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 555-560.

therefore, occurs through 1) creation of an antagonism involving the colonizers' Self and the indigenous Other and 2) eventual modification or erasure of indigenous Other's identity to ease its integration into the national Self. Such a model of colonization through "othering" is by no means unique to Russia or Japan; it is a model that applies to many early modern colonizations, such as European colonialism in Africa.⁷⁰ In the case of contemporary Sakhalin, the result of the process described above is a local Sakhalin identity whose characteristics were partially superseded by a broader Russian identity.

Soviet state policies targeting indigenous people in Sakhalin, Siberia and other regions of the USSR populated by indigenous ethnic groups made a massive impact on these groups' identities. For indigenous populations of Siberia and the Far East, a separate government body, the Committee of the North,⁷¹ was created in 1924 and functioned until 1935. The committee developed state policies of economic, medical and educational assistance for indigenous peoples, and controlled their local implementation. Recognized Soviet anthropologists specializing in northern peoples, such as Vladimir Bogoraz and Lev Stenberg, were employed at the committee. In the 1920s and 1930s, the idea of a "cultural base" (kul'tbaza) was conceived as a series of administrative, judicial, educational, medical, recreational and other facilities meant to be used by the indigenous people. One of such bases was created in 1930 on Sakhalin, targeting Sakhalin ethnic minorities: the Evenks, the Oroks and the Nivkhi.⁷²

Within the Russian Empire the indigenous people of Sakhalin were perceived as

⁷⁰ Alison Jones and Domoka Lucinda Manda, "Violence and 'Othering' in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa. Case Study: Banda's Malaŵi," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 18, no. 2 (December 2006): 197-213.

⁷¹ *Komitet sodeĭstviya narodnostyam severnykh okrain* (Committee for the Assistance to the Smaller Peoples of the Lesser Nationalities of the North).

⁷² For more on Soviet state policies targeting indigenous people in Sakhalin, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Henkyō kara nagameru* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 2000), 114-134.

pagan, backward, underdeveloped people, while in the Soviet Union they were also seen as an opportunity to cultivate the new Soviet nation. For both regimes Sakhalin was a peripheral region, and the indigenous people in Sakhalin went through a course of self-contradicting (but sometimes voluntary and self-initiated) identity transformations under the guidance of the state. According to Grant, whose work analyzes Soviet state policies aimed at the Nivkhi people, there were two dominant perceptions of Siberia and indigenous peoples in that period: one of timeless traditionality and general cultural backwardness, and another as an inspirational example of acceleration towards modernity and socialism.⁷³ Grant suggests that one of the main principles in the Soviet policy towards indigenous peoples was the notion of culture as an object which could be altered, destroyed, rebuilt or exchanged if deemed necessary, which resulted in the vision of indigenous peoples, including Nivkhi, as a blank slate for inscribing the new Soviet identity. Grant characterizes the state policy towards the Nivkhi as a series of guided identity transformations that included negation of the past and at times complete reversals of the policies conducted by previous national authorities.⁷⁴ From the example above it is clear that Sakhalin's regional Self within the Soviet Union was subject to intense guided change.

It would be incorrect to assume, however, that Sakhalin's regional Self was merely a product of state policy as numerous transformations occurred in Sakhalin independently and due to external factors. Migration and shifting borders are particularly important in Sakhalin history due to the suddenness and the magnitudes of the shifts that occurred, causing repeated "repatriations" of its inhabitants to either side of the border.⁷⁵ These cycles of migration and

⁷³ Bruce Grant, *In the Soviet House of Culture: A Century of Perestroikas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 80-85.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 156-159.

⁷⁵ For forced relocation in 1875 and second repatriation of the Karafuto Ainu in 1945, see Seaton, "Memories Beyond Borders: Karafuto Sites of Memory in Hokkaido," in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 127. For experiences of Sakhalin returnees in Korea, see Mooam Hyun and Svetlana

repatriation affected both the migrants and the indigenous people living in the area, whose lives and identities were influenced by Russian and Japanese colonialism in fundamental ways. Sakhalin, as a peripheral region for both Russia and Japan, developed as a land of immigrants. In the 19th and 20th centuries there were several major waves of migration to Sakhalin; some of those, especially before 1875, were largely voluntary, while the Russian migration after 1869 consisted primarily of prisoners. After the Russo-Japanese war, Sakhalin received a wave of Japanese immigrants, and after 1945, as Sakhalin was reclaimed by the Soviet Union, most Japanese residents (and those who were deemed Japanese by the Soviet authorities) were forced to “return” to Japan, largely to Hokkaido.

Since Sakhalin was subject to both Russian and Japanese colonization at different points in time, it is also reasonable to point out that there were multiple colonization processes involved in the creation of Sakhalin identity, which distinguishes Sakhalin’s colonial profile from that of Hokkaido. Another factor that contributed to a distinctive Sakhalin identity is multiculturalism, which developed through generations of migration and intercultural exchange. As cultural identity is closely tied to self-awareness of groups and individuals, it varies and evolves in a manner impossible to predict or quantify, and it is unfeasible to trace the development of specific “Sakhalin identities” as they vary immensely within the region. However, it is possible to look at a broader regional identity on Sakhalin and isolate the historical periods during which the most intensive identity transformations took place, which affected all its social groups. These transformations coincide with major political, economic and social changes in the region, and can be traced from the commonly established periodization of Sakhalin history. Several relevant periods can be singled out

Paichadze, “Multi-layered Identities of Returnees in Their ‘Historical Homeland’: Returnees from Sakhalin,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 195. For identities, language use and educational issues among Sakhalin repatriates who moved to Japan in the 1990s, see Svetlana Paichadze, “Language, Identity and Educational Issues of ‘Repatriates’ from Sakhalin,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 212-232.

from Stephan's (1971) history of Sakhalin.⁷⁶

1. Before colonization – periods of Chinese influence, European, Russian and Japanese exploration;
2. Sakhalin under joint Russo-Japanese control (1855-1875);
3. Sakhalin under Imperial Russia (1875-1905);
4. Period of transition of turbulence (1905-1925);⁷⁷
5. Karafuto and Soviet Sakhalin (1925-1945);
6. Postwar Sakhalin (1945-).

During most of these periods (2-6) major changes occurred in Sakhalin's ethnic and cultural composition. As those transformations happened, Sakhalin's "otherness" as seen by its colonizers was also reshaped, which in turn affected Sakhalin's regional Self. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's turn towards a market economy resulted in another major shift in state policy towards Sakhalin. Similar to the rest of Russia, shock therapy, privatization and economic crisis affected Sakhalin's local economy and demographics. The turmoil was exacerbated by a cultural vacuum that appeared upon the dissolution of the Soviet identity. Sakhalin's value within Russia changed again when it received international attention due to its vast natural resources. Sakhalin's energy resources have been an important issue in Russo-Japanese relations throughout the 20th century, and the contemporary period is characterized by a stronger emphasis on Sakhalin's energy deposits. In recent years, construction of pipelines and energy development are frequent Sakhalin-related topics in Russian news. Therefore, 7) Sakhalin after Perestroika and 8) Contemporary

⁷⁶ Periodization based on Table of Contents in Stephan, *Sakhalin*. The periods characterized by tributary relations were merged into one entry.

⁷⁷ In 1905 the southern half of Sakhalin became Japanese territory following the Portsmouth agreement. In 1907, the Karafuto prefecture was established in southern Sakhalin. In 1920 the northern half of Sakhalin was occupied by Japan until official relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were established in 1925. For details, see the chronology of Russo-Japanese treaties in table 3.1 (Chapter 3).

Sakhalin could be added to the list of relevant periods.

Another aspect to Sakhalin's "otherness" is its relationship not only with Hokkaido, but also with Japan as a whole, which has affected both the perception of Sakhalin within Japan and Sakhalin's regional Self-identity. Japanese visions of Sakhalin can be discussed in the context of visiting the graves of relatives who perished in the war, as well as homecoming visits by former Karafuto residents. These topics, along with the internment of Japanese POWs, were discussed during political negotiations between Japan and the USSR in the 1950s and 1960s. The issue of unrepatriated Koreans on Sakhalin (discussed in section 1.2) was the topic of negotiations between the USSR and Japan as the USSR did not have diplomatic relations with South Korea at that time. Japan played a role in repatriation of Koreans that started on Sakhalin in the 1980s, by offering funding and transit rights. However, after living on Sakhalin for 40 years, the vast majority of Koreans of all generations decided to stay on Sakhalin, thus preserving the unique regional identity of Sakhalin Koreans. Apart from the above-mentioned ethnic diaspora of Sakhalin Koreans, Sakhalin's Self-identity and its "otherness" in Russia can be discussed in the context of "Japanese" period of its history, and to this day preservation of Sakhalin's historical heritage of Karafuto remains a topic of debate.

1.5. The Sakhalin–Hokkaido Zone between Russia and Japan

As discussed previously, there are geographical, ecological and cultural indicators suggesting commonality between Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kuriles. This section discusses the historical aspect of this commonality and analyzes the circumstances under which state boundaries shifted in different historical periods. Before discussing historical circumstances, however, it is important to define the approach to history in the region. Periodizations of history in Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kuriles as produced by museums or official state

bodies tend to include a side effect of bringing the area into national history from a much earlier age than would have been plausible. For instance, the usage of such terms as “Jōmon” in Hokkaido periodization creates an association with the rest of Japan, contributing to the impression that Hokkaido is an inherent, rather than recently acquired, Japanese territory. This is exacerbated by the institutional equation of Japanese history with national history in Japan, which makes everywhere that is now part of Japan is subject to inclusion within Japanese national history.⁷⁸ One way to overcome this limitation is to treat Japanese/Russian history as history of the cultural and political entity that is Japan/Russia rather than history of what is now the Japanese/Russian state. In this regard, it would also be feasible to treat the area that includes Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kuriles, as one Sakhalin–Hokkaido cultural zone, which corresponds with the traditional settlement area of the indigenous populations. Between 1855 and 1945, this zone was in a state of flux due to Russia and Japan’s encroachment and shifting state boundaries.

The proximity of the Sakhalin–Hokkaido zone to both Russian and Japanese property made it a target for exploration and colonization by both nations. As discussed in the previous section, territorial claims and appropriation efforts from both sides have affected Sakhalin’s modern regional Self to a considerable extent. An important difference between Sakhalin and Hokkaido colonization needs to be clarified, however: since there were two nations competing in their attempts to colonize Sakhalin from the north and the south, Sakhalin has had at least two major processes involved in the distortion and transformation of local Self, unlike Hokkaido, which was under the sphere of influence of only one nation. Furthermore, the presence of national Other, particularly during the early stages of colonization when there were no clear state boundaries in the area, provoke mutual influence in both colonization

⁷⁸ Howell, “Is Ainu History Japanese History?” in *Beyond Ainu Studies*, 101.

processes. In practical terms this means that the colonization of Sakhalin by both Russia and Japan occurred in the context of being aware of national Other's presence. For instance, Japan's attempts to tighten control over areas north of Hokkaido became systematic only in the 1780s, after a number of events that made Japan more aware of Russia's presence. One such event was the "warning of Benyovszky": in 1771, during his escape from exile in Kamchatka, Hungarian-born Count de Benyovszky left a note for the Dutch embassy in Nagasaki detailing the alleged Russian plans to attack Japan. The warning mentioned a Russian fortress on an unspecified Kurile island close to Kamchatka, that would be used as a platform for invading Matsumae and other areas starting the following year. While the warning was entirely unsubstantiated and the note's credibility was doubted by both the Dutch and the Japanese, it became a turning point when the Japanese government started taking measures to improve state security.⁷⁹ Japanese colonization of both Hokkaido and Sakhalin was stimulated by the perceived Russian threat. The main difference between Japanese colonization of Hokkaido and Sakhalin is that the presence of the adversary on Sakhalin was "real", as opposed to Hokkaido, where Russia did not have "real" presence. Nevertheless, colonization of Hokkaido took place in the context of potential Russian military advances from the north, and one category of early Japanese settler in Hokkaido, the *tondenhei*, were not only agricultural workers, but also soldiers that were supposed to deter the Russian threat.⁸⁰

The "relative direction" of Sakhalin colonization from both sides is also significant. Russia was advancing from the north, while Japan started from the south. Eventually this created the north-south division in the region that remains somewhat visible to this day

⁷⁹ Vysokov, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril'skikh ostrovov*, 310-311.

⁸⁰ With their relatively small percentage in the overall migration to Hokkaido, the *tondenhei* played a significant role in shaping the ideological landscape of Hokkaido's "development". See Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*, 40.

despite the fact that there are no political obstacles for exchange between the north and the south. There is a visible population density difference between northern and southern Sakhalin. Part of the explanation for this difference lies in natural factors: northern Sakhalin is considered a part of the Extreme North, while southern Sakhalin has a warmer climate. The north-south division is a general characteristic of Sakhalin. The convergence of the Okhotsk culture coming from the Amur basin and the Satsumon culture coming from Hokkaido can be considered an example of north-south interaction in prehistoric times. The 19th century counterpart of this interaction is colonization coming from both sides that resulted in political division between north and south. This division caused a relatively rare situation, when the southern part's economy had to be restructured for the socialist system after World War 2. Despite the “reunification” of Sakhalin as one political entity, the division persisted for years after the war and manifested in administrative concerns from both the northern and the southern sides when the capital city for the united Sakhalinskaya Oblast had to be designated.⁸¹

From the mid-19th century the ambiguity of state boundaries in the Sakhalin–Hokkaido zone became a problematic topic for all parties involved. A long series of transformations followed, during which national borders in the area shifted north or south several times until settling at its current (disputed) position in the postwar period.⁸² The territorial dispute remains a major obstacle to concluding a peace treaty and formalizing bilateral relations between the two nations, but its local consequences are also significant. As Hokkaido and Sakhalin are border regions subject to multiple cross-border interactions, the dispute has had an effect on their interregional relations, and vice versa. Ziykov and

⁸¹ Vysokov, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril'skikh ostrovov*, 454-458.

⁸² This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Sevastianov (2015) argue that transborder relations have developed to such an extent that the barriers between domestic and international environments have become permeable, and “the policies of nation-states have been increasingly overlapping with those of neighboring nations and organizations”; in addition, “subnational regions have begun to receive impetus for economic and cultural development from neighboring countries”.⁸³ Interaction between regional governments (which represents the “close neighbor” aspect of Self–Other interaction often left out of discussion in national media) can be an important factor to induce change in international relations, and local transnational exchange and cooperation can become a catalyst for bridging the regions together and reducing political tension between nations, particularly in the case of Hokkaido and Sakhalin relations for Russia and Japan.⁸⁴

The peculiarity of the peripheral “profile” of Sakhalin as a distant regional “Other” discussed in section 1.4 could be one of the reasons for the stance the Russian federal center has taken regarding the disputed territories, which renounces Japanese claims to Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories as unsubstantiated by history and geography. The Soviet and Russian position regarding the dispute is based on the idea that the USSR had prevented Japan’s advances northward rather than invaded Japanese territory. However, declassified military documents on the Soviet strategic operation in Manchuria have revealed that in 1945 the Soviets were preparing to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido.⁸⁵ Had this plan been carried out, Hokkaido would have become part of the Russian Far East together with Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Although the offensive operation was not carried out, the existence of such plans allow broader discussion on the situation on the Soviet-Japanese border in

⁸³ Alexander A. Zyikov and Sergei V. Sevastianov, “Transborder Relations,” in *Introduction to Border Studies*, ed. Sergei Sevastianov, Jussi P. Laine, and Anton A. Kireev (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 2015), 118.

⁸⁴ Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute*, 98-99.

⁸⁵ David M. Glantz, *The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm* (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 401.

1945. The idea of Japan expanding into Russia and being repelled is perhaps oversimplified; instead, it could be argued that during World War 2 there was a border in the Hokkaido–Sakhalin zone that was open for a massive change in either direction.

The legacy of war is another link between Sakhalin and Hokkaido. With the abolition of Karafuto prefecture in south Sakhalin after World War 2, two thirds of the former Karafuto residents settled in Hokkaido, where the memory of Karafuto consolidated in the postwar period as Sakhalin was inaccessible for the Japanese. In recent years, a notable part of international exchange between Hokkaido and Sakhalin has included visits made to Sakhalin by Japanese tourists and former Karafuto residents,⁸⁶ and the subject Karafuto frequently appears in Hokkaido media. Hokkaido can also be considered a “proxy site of memory” for the Karafuto/Sakhalin experience for the Japanese as it hosts Karafuto-related monuments and other sites of memory.⁸⁷ Within collective memory of Sakhalin and Hokkaido there are spaces of shared significance for both Russians and Japanese. For instance, the place where the Karafuto shrine once was is now home to a Russian war memorial complex,⁸⁸ which makes it a site of memory for both Russian and Japanese people, who visit the same location for different memorial activities. In 1993, a memorial in Korsakov (Ōdomari/Ōtomari) was erected to honor the memory of citizens who perished in the war. The memorial was a joint project between Russia and Japan, funded by the Japanese side, and has plates in both Russian and Japanese languages.⁸⁹ It could be argued, therefore, that Sakhalin hosts “shared”

⁸⁶ Japanese tourists accounted for roughly 90.5% of all foreign visitors to Sakhalin in 1998-2011; according to a 2012 interview with a Sakhalin tour operator, 80% of the Japanese visitors came to Sakhalin for homecoming visits. Masatoshi Miyashita, “Homecoming Visits to Karafuto,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton, 141.

⁸⁷ Seaton, “Memories Beyond Borders,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 120.

⁸⁸ Sergey Fedorchuk, *Chuzhaya pamyat'* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Institut razvitiya obrazovaniya Sakhalinskoï oblasti, 2013), 19-24.

⁸⁹ “Pamyatniki i pamyatnye mesta Korsakovskogo raiona: Putevoditel’,” Central District Library of Korsakov, accessed September 17, 2018, <http://sakh-korsakov.ru/files/?6894>, 64.

sites of memory, which bring it closer to Japan and Hokkaido.⁹⁰

In the light of the arguments made above, it can be theorized that 1) Sakhalin and Hokkaido have distinct regional Selves that contrast against the broader national Self; 2) regional Selves of Sakhalin and Hokkaido have some commonality as the regions used to belong to the same geographical, ecological and cultural zone, and have a relatively similar history of inclusion into the national Self; 3) the commonality between Hokkaido and Sakhalin has facilitated the creation of deep Russo-Japanese ties on various institutional and societal levels between the two regions.

By applying the Self–Other model of identity and the idea of local identity as a product of multiple antagonisms to analysis of news coverage it is possible to examine the relationships between national and local identities and the imagery of Self and Other produced by these relationships as seen in national and local news coverage. The theoretical foundations of the Self–Other dichotomy and antagonisms outlined in this chapter are used in the remainder of the chapters in combination with qualitative and quantitative content analysis to discuss a range of prominent Other-related themes that are characteristic of Russian and Japanese news coverage.

⁹⁰ For discussion of memorial services conducted by Japanese individuals during Karafuto homecoming visits, see Miyashita, “Homecoming Visits to Karafuto,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 149-152.

Chapter 2. Reporting Russia–Japan Exchange: Points of Contact as Seen in National and Regional News

2.1. State and Characteristics of Russia–Japan Exchange

Russia's eastward territorial expansion that started in the late 16th century with the conquest of Siberia and continued throughout the 19th and 20th centuries towards the Far East, resulted in a significant portion of contemporary Russian territory being located in Asia. Prior to the major political reforms in the 1980s, the state policy of the Soviet Union considered relations with Asian countries a secondary priority in comparison to Soviet-Europe relations. However, since the 1970s, and particularly after the loosening of the Cold War tension, Russia has cooperated more actively in Asia, particularly in an effort to develop the economy of Siberia and the Far East.⁹¹

Normalization of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and the 1970s opened up opportunities for cooperation. Hasegawa (1998) points out that in the first half of the 1970s the international environment changed considerably: 1) the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the United States, 2) following its ideological split with the USSR and the improvement of relations with the US and Japan, China presented a security concern for the Soviets, 3) Japan was becoming a global economic power, and the Soviet Union could no longer view it as a vassal state of the United States.⁹² Exchange and trade between the Soviet Union and Japan accelerated in the 1970s, with Japan complementing the Soviet economy with technology and financial resources, while the Soviet side exported

⁹¹ Ha Yong-Chool, "Engaging Russia for Peace in Northeast Asia," in *Engaging Russia in Asia Pacific*, ed. Watanabe Kōji (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 23.

⁹² Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace 1697-1985*, Vol. 1 of *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, International and Area Studies, 1998), 142-143.

natural resources such as oil, gas and wood to Japan. The first large-scale business cooperation projects between the Soviet Union and Japan were the joint energy projects in the 1970s, such as the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration Project established in 1975.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, exchange between Russia and Japan received more development, particularly during the 1990s. Watanabe (1999) outlines three key factors that helped improve Russo-Japanese relations in that period: 1) the Soviet Union no longer posing a military threat to Japan, 2) perceived stabilization of Russia's domestic political and economic situation in the late 1990s compared to early 1990s, and 3) personal rapport established between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto.⁹³ This chapter analyzes contemporary international exchange where Russia and Japan are involved as organizers or participants. International exchange can occur in a variety of settings; some of the more known forms of international exchange are business cooperation and cultural exchange.

Broadly speaking, Russia–Japan exchange is any interaction involving the governments (national and local), as well as citizens of Russia and Japan as participants. There are two defining characteristics of exchange: the actors and the kind of exchange activities. The interactions between actors may be grouped as follows:

Official exchange: Interaction between national governments that does not involve non-government participants. This exchange can take place on a national or local (prefectural, municipal) level. Examples include an official visit by the Prime Minister of Japan to Russia, or a meeting between governors of Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya Oblast.

Official–non-government exchange: Interactions between governments or

⁹³ Watanabe Kōji, “Engaging Russia – a Japanese Perspective,” in *Engaging Russia in Asia Pacific*, ed. Watanabe Kōji (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 67-68.

government-affiliated entities that also involve non-government participants. Again, this can be on a national or local level. Examples include the activities of organizations such as the MOFA-affiliated Japan–Russia Youth Exchange Center (JREX) on the national level, and various projects carried out by regional entities (e.g. Wakkanai city hall) on the local level.

Non-government exchange: Interactions between legally registered non-government actors, such as companies and NPOs. Examples include Mitsubishi’s participation in the Sakhalin-II oil and gas development project on Sakhalin and various associations of Russia–Japan culture exchange that have legal status of NPOs in its country of jurisdiction. Exchange carried out by educational institutions, such as universities and language schools, also falls into this category.

Individual exchange: Interactions between individuals and organizations without the status of a company or NPO. All informal associations are included in this category. Such associations can organize exchange in a specific region of Russia or Japan, or they can be Internet-only entities, such as a blog, a social media page or a forum.

During this research at least 30 organizations have been identified in Japan that conduct exchange with Russia. They include local governments, companies and non-profit organizations (see Appendix 3). Non-profit organizations comprise the majority of such entities, with many having received the status of a Public Interest Incorporated Association (*kōeki shadan hōjin*) under the new series of laws enacted in 2008, or the NPO status under the NPO law of 1998.⁹⁴ The exchange activities of these organizations can be classified

⁹⁴ The public sector in Japan consists of multiple types of non-profit organizations: in addition to Incorporated Associations (*shadan hōjin*) and Incorporated Foundations (*zaidan hōjin*) established before 1998 and NPOs established under the 1998 NPO law, there are General Incorporated Associations (*ippan shadan hōjin*) and General Incorporated Foundations (*ippan zaidan hōjin*) introduced after the 2008 reforms, which can acquire the status of Public Interest (*kōeki*) Foundations or Associations after receiving approval from a specialized governmental body. The Public Interest status gives such organizations tax benefits similar to those of a regular NPO. The exact type of a non-profit organization is not always relevant in the context of this analysis; therefore, unless indicated otherwise, “NPO” will be used in this chapter as a general term for non-profit organizations in Japan. For more information on Japanese NPOs and the NPO law, see Robert Pekkanen, *Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,

according to the following criteria:

Formality: Formal exchange encompasses meetings between representatives from both sides to sign an agreement or establish a legislative framework. This kind of exchange is usually conducted by government bodies. Informal exchange, on the other hand, is focused on interaction between Russian and Japanese citizens as opposed to administrative entities.

Regional, national or transnational focus: The exchange can take place in a specific location, but it may or may not be tied to the location of primary actors in the exchange. For instance, a Russia–Japan summit in Khabarovsk organized by national governments is national-level exchange, but interaction between sister cities on Hokkaido and Sakhalin is local-level exchange. In other words, national exchange is exchange between representatives of Russia and Japan as countries, whereas regional exchange is exchange between representatives of specific regions in Russia and Japan. Transnational exchange is similar to national exchange in that it involves representatives of Russia and Japan as countries or nations, but it also involves other actors. As a result, interaction between Russia and Japan is not the main focus of such exchange. An example of formal transnational exchange would be a UN Security Council session, the Olympic games or the G8 summit, and an international students' association that includes Russian and Japanese students among others is an example of informal transnational exchange.

Type and purpose of exchange activity: Government bodies generally engage in formal exchange for decision making purposes, and the types of exchange activities by non-government actors generally correspond to the types of activities carried out by other civil society groups in Japan. Pekkanen (2006) provides the following types of Japanese non-profit organizations: education and research, health, social services, culture and recreation,

2006), 47-84; for the 2008 reforms, see Akihiro Ogawa, "Civil Society: Past, Present, and Future," in *Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan*, ed. Jeff Kingston (New York: Routledge, 2014), 52-63.

environment, development and housing, civil and advocacy, philanthropic, international, business and unions, and other.⁹⁵

This categorization can be adapted to Russia–Japan exchange with the only addition that all groups engaging in Russia–Japan exchange are international by definition. The majority of organizations in this chapter’s article survey fall into “culture and recreation” and “education and research” categories. However, there are also notable organizations of other types, such as the Orthodox Church in Japan, which conducts religious exchange, and the All-Japan Association of Forced Detainees, that organizes symposiums on Russia’s war responsibility. Organizations engaging in Russia–Japan exchange can be found in several Japanese prefectures, but the majority are concentrated in Tokyo and Hokkaido. Tokyo-based organizations, such as the two mentioned above, engage mostly in national-level exchange, whereas Hokkaido-based organizations primarily conduct local-level exchange, such as events involving sister relations between cities in Hokkaido and Sakhalin or the Russian Far East, or youth sport exchange between the aforementioned cities.

The classification provided in this section is used to discuss Russia–Japan exchange on several levels: the 2006 St. Petersburg and 2008 Toyako G8 summits are used as examples of Russian and Japanese state representatives interacting in a transnational setting on an informal level; cultural exchange and tourism are discussed in the context of non-government, official–non-government and individual exchange with varying levels of formality; finally, business exchange is discussed in the context of non-government exchange on the formal level. To allow more discussion of relevant aspects of Russia–Japan exchange on different levels, the qualitative and quantitative data used in this chapter is based on several newspaper article surveys across different time periods. The G8 summits surveys

⁹⁵ Pekkanen, *Japan’s Dual Civil Society*, 11.

focus on the periods before, during and after the summits in summer 2006 and 2008, whereas the cultural and business exchange sections are based on article surveys of the first four months of 2015 for Japanese newspapers and the entire year 2015 for Russian newspapers. The year 2015 was selected because it was a relatively recent period when Russia–Japan relations were in a fairly stable situation with no major incidents or events. By contrast, during 2016 there were important negotiations regarding the territorial dispute, and 2014 was dominated by news of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the beginning of a military conflict in eastern parts of Ukraine.

Certain aspects of Russia–Japan relations are likely to appear in relevant news coverage regardless of the main topic being investigated. For instance, the territorial dispute is an essential part of Russia–Japan relations, and it can both create major obstacles and provide strong motivation for further exchange. Certain historical issues, such as the history of Japan’s participation in World War 2, are also considerably prominent in exchange-related news. These topics are discussed in more detail in separate chapters. Exceptions are made for cases where such issues are particularly relevant in the specific context of analyzed exchange: in the case of the G8 summits, for instance, the islands dispute was brought up as a potential topic to be discussed in the summits, and Japanese and Russian approaches to the topic (as seen from news coverage) were notably different. In general, however, the discussion focuses primarily on themes related to Russia–Japan exchange rather than the quantitative sampling during the analyzed periods. For topic distribution in different periods of coverage, see Appendix 2.

2.2. The G8 Summits in News Coverage: a “Global” Event from National and Local Perspectives

The Group of Seven/Group of Eight Summit is an annual intergovernmental forum

attended by leaders of seven (or eight) member states. The forum originated with a 1975 summit in France attended by representatives from Germany, Italy, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, making it the first summit of the format that was initially referred to as Group of Six (G6).⁹⁶ It was renamed to G7 in 1976, when Canada became a permanent member of the group. In 1997 Russia joined the group, and until 2014 it was referred to as the G8 Summit. The 2006 G8 summit took place in St. Petersburg. Russia's membership was suspended after the March 2014 events in Ukraine, and the forum returned to the G7 format with the planned June 2014 summit relocated from Sochi to Brussels.⁹⁷ Although other members of the forum considered resuming Russia's membership in the group, in 2017 the Russian government announced its decision to leave the group permanently.⁹⁸ The subsequent summits after Russia's suspension were hosted by Germany (2015), Japan (2016) and Italy (2017), and the June 2018 summit took place in La Malbaie, Quebec, Canada.

The G7/8 summit presents a peculiar example of exchange due to its unique format and the relatively high level of informality that is otherwise uncommon in transnational exchange. Unlike other transnational exchange groups such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, the G7/8 summits are not governed by a designated organization,

⁹⁶ Prior to the initial G6 format predecessor meetings took place, such as the March 1973 meeting between French, West German, UK and US finance ministers in the Group of Four (G4) format. The origins of the G7/8 format are examined in Hugo Dobson, "Global Governance and the Group of Seven/Eight," in *Global Governance and Japan: The Institutional Architecture*, ed. Glenn D. Hook and Hugo Dobson (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 23-39.

⁹⁷ Bruno Waterfield, Peter Dominiczak in The Hague and David Blair, "G8 suspends Russia for annexation of Crimea," *The Telegraph*, March 24, 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8-suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-Crimea.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

⁹⁸ Tom Batchelor, "Russia announces plan to permanently leave G8 group of industrialised nations after suspension for Crimea annexation," *The Independent*, January 13, 2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/russia-g8-kremlin-crimea-ukraine-vladimir-putin-g7-g20-a7525836.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

and instead work an informal gathering of national leaders to discuss global issues and establish agendas, which may or may not lead to new policies and creation of new institutions to implement those policies within the member states. However, there are no legislative mechanisms to enforce the decisions (if any) made at the summits. As the G7/8 is not an international organization or global institution, interaction between national leaders within the context of the summits is less restricted than official exchange occurring through such organizations. Therefore, the G7/8 summits can be characterized as a form of relatively informal official exchange with a transnational focus.

The G7/8 summits are frequently criticized due to the apparent high expenses of their organization, with the immediate results of the meetings being ambiguous and the meaningful assessment of them delayed for several years. The period of the G8 summit was also used as a platform by various groups in the host countries to protest against the summit or raise awareness of unrelated issues. The relationship between the summit and the media (which in turn influences public perception) presents additional interest as the media have the tendency to focus on describing the venue, the leaders' personalities, the protesting groups mentioned above or various trivia rather than the content of the summits themselves.⁹⁹ As Dobson (2007) points out, "most reports tend to focus upon certain media-friendly issues, such as Africa and environmental issues rather than multilateral trade negotiations and education, the minority of violent protest rather than the majority of peaceful protest, and the position of leaders in the final summit photo or the lavishness of the summit venue and proceedings rather than the substance of the declarations and communiqués."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ For instance, a significant proportion of Japanese newspaper coverage mentioning Russia during the 2008 Toyako summit was dedicated to local movements in Hokkaido promoting awareness of the territorial dispute. See diagrams in Appendix 2 for topic distribution during the summit period in different newspapers.

¹⁰⁰ Hugo Dobson, *The Group of 7/8* (London: Routledge, 2007), 86.



Figure 2.1. G8 leaders at a working dinner, July 16, 2006

Source: "Summit photos," G7 Information Centre website, accessed December 20, 2018, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/photos/summits/summit_photos_2006.html.

The interest of media agencies to provide more competitive coverage with the limited availability of information is a major factor shaping the nature of G7/8 summit news coverage. As with other major international events such as the Olympics, the summits are widely anticipated but disappear from the coverage soon afterwards. In the absence of noteworthy occurrences during the summit itself the newspapers may resort to critiques of the event, or discuss summit-related topics that would not be newsworthy otherwise, such as the nation leaders' culinary preferences. Such coverage is likely to contain more descriptive images of Other as opposed to a more formal event such as a resolution at the UN Security Council. The 2006 St. Petersburg summit and the 2008 Toyako summit present particular interest in the context of this research. Russia and Japan as host countries for the summit present an opportunity for the Russian and Japanese press to discuss an international event in

both the Self- and the Other-nation. In addition, high levels of anticipation and perceived lack of immediate achievements during the summit create a shift from reporting the event itself to discursive and descriptive coverage. Such coverage contains discussions on topics pertaining to Russian and Japanese culture, as well as speculation regarding Russo-Japanese relations in general and analysis of direct interaction between Dmitry Medvedev and Junichiro Koizumi during the summits. In such circumstances any incident happening during the summit becomes newsworthy, more so if it is related to Self-country's national interests. The incidents covered in such reportage may be exaggerated, particularly when fueled with vivid imagery of the antagonized Other.

2006 St. Petersburg Summit: Japan's Diplomatic Attempts during Russia's Debut in G8

From the history of each country's participation in the G7/8 summits it is clear that Russia and Japan had significantly different motives to participate in the 2006/2008 summits, and held vastly different expectations regarding their outcomes. Exchange with Japan, which was not among Russia's top priorities even outside of the G7/8 summits, had no major significance for Russia during the 2006 St. Petersburg summit. The 2006 summit was the debut of the nation in the G7/8 format meetings. Adequate organization of the summit, particularly the selection of topics where Russia's participation would be meaningful, as well as making the summit accessible for the media, was of more critical importance. Dmitry Peskov, who was responsible for media organization during the summit, pointed out in an interview that Russia had been learning from other G7 host countries, particularly in regards to media coverage, which influenced the decision to build the media center for the 2006 St. Petersburg summit in close proximity to the summit's location.¹⁰¹ Another factor that altered

¹⁰¹ *RIA Novosti*, "Otkrylsya press-tsentr G8 dlya zhurnalistov, osveshchayushchikh sammit," July 14, 2006, <https://ria.ru/politics/20060714/51334184.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

the course of the summit and the reportage significantly was North Korea's ballistic missile tests conducted the week before the summit, which became a major focus of attention both as a topic to be discussed at the summit and as an international event that required extensive media coverage. Japan's interaction with Russia during the summit was undoubtedly affected by North Korea's actions.

The 2006 St. Petersburg summit was the first (and, as of 2018, the only) G8 summit hosted in Russia, and has been described as successful with regard to both its commitments and Russia's competence as the host country.¹⁰² Despite having lower performance scores in comparison to other members of the group and having been unable to join the World Trade Organization as predicted previously, the debut was largely a success for Russia, which was noted in both Russian and Japanese newspapers. In addition to the previously mentioned North Korean factor, reported exchange between Russia and Japan during the St. Petersburg summit was largely determined by Russia's selection of topics for the summit. According to an interview with Koizumi in one of the Russian national newspapers,¹⁰³ in addition to the topics proposed by Russia, Japan's agenda in the G8 summit had several objectives Japan was hoping to achieve. Koizumi mentioned the importance of discussing such issues as abductions of foreign citizens by the North Korean government and the ballistic missile program. The interviewer also asked Koizumi whether the territorial dispute had major influence on Russia–Japan business relations. In response Koizumi quoted the Russian president during his visit to Japan in 2005, who said that the absence of a peace treaty was hindering the development of business ties. In accordance with the “common route” (*obshchiĭ*

¹⁰² John J. Kirton, *A Summit of Significant Success: The G8 at St. Petersburg* (G8 Research Group: Toronto, 2006), www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2006stpetersburg/kirton_perf_060719.pdf (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹⁰³ *Kommersant*, “Dzyunitiro Koidzumi: ya nameren ser'ëzno obsudit' territorial'nyu problemu,” July 13, 2006.

kurs) towards signing a peace treaty through the resolution of the territorial dispute that the leaders had agreed upon previously, Koizumi expressed his intention to have a serious discussion of the problem with Putin during a bilateral meeting. Although that response was the only mention of the dispute by Koizumi in the entire interview, it was put into the headline of the article. The quote taken out of the above context creates an impression of a strong position Koizumi had wanted to express explicitly rather than an elicited response to a provocative question.

Even though the meeting between Putin and Koizumi did take place, Japan did not raise the territorial question during the summit itself despite strong pressure on Koizumi from Japanese media. The media saw the upcoming St. Petersburg summit as an opportunity for Japan to promote its national interests and advance the territorial negotiations. In addition, several weeks before the summit the mayor of Nemuro Fujiwara Hiroshi announced his support for the “two islands first” approach to resolving the dispute, which provoked further discussions, including criticism of the national government’s rigid position of demanding the return of all four islands and lack of progress in resolving the dispute. The atmosphere was aggravated further by a fishing incident in the disputed waters during the days of the summit.¹⁰⁴

In the context of the G8 summit these local discussions created an atmosphere of anticipation leading to the summit week. The lack of satisfaction with the national government’s commitment to resolving the dispute expressed by the Hokkaido local population, together with the media’s inclination to focus on social movements and incidents as opposed to the summit, itself further solidified the territorial topic as one of the key themes of coverage during the G8 summit for Japanese media. For instance, three days before the summit,

¹⁰⁴ Reportage on the fishing incident is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Hokkaidō Shimbun reported “local anger and disappointment” in Hokkaido with regard to lack of progress in resolving the dispute, demanding that Koizumi attain remarkable success to “counteract” the lack of achievements in the dispute during the summit.¹⁰⁵ As a result, the islands were mentioned frequently in the G8 summit-related articles in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* even though Japan did not bring the topic to discussion during the summit outside Putin–Koizumi negotiations.

With the amount of attention to Koizumi’s diplomatic efforts in the 2006 summit it is reasonable to expect the media to have an inclination towards reporting news significant to Japan’s political interests. There was a small incident during the summit that was largely ignored by Russian newspapers. During a press conference held at the International Media Center after the summit, a reporter asked Koizumi about his opinion on the time frame during which the territorial dispute may be resolved. However, as a Russian–Japanese interpreter was absent at the moment, separate Russian–English and English–Japanese interpreters attempted to address the situation. Nevertheless, the content of the question was not transmitted to Koizumi, and no answer was given. A Russian government official present at the venue wondered why Koizumi did not answer the question. For those who watched the event remotely in Japan, the situation appeared more confusing because, as the report indicates, NHK’s Japan-based broadcast of the event had the question correctly translated in Japanese.¹⁰⁶ Out of all newspapers in the survey this story was only reported in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, which illustrates the newspaper’s investment into the territorial problem during the summit or otherwise.

With regard to deepening ties between Russia and Japan, however, the reportage was less specific, particularly on the Russian side. For instance, an Aoyama Gakuen professor

¹⁰⁵ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “[Ryōdo] Shinten wo... Iratatsu Nemuro *15nichi ni nichiro shunō kaidan * Fujiwara shichō [2tōron] mo... Seifu ugokazu,” July 12, 2006.

¹⁰⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Samitto heimaku* tsūyaku no misu de ichibu shitsumon datsuraku* Koizumi shushō kaiken,” July 18, 2006.

Hakamada Shigeki (brother of a Russian politician Irina Hakamada), who was among the international experts interviewed before the summit, mentioned the Japanese side's concerns over military cooperation between Russia and China, the need to develop the potential in energy exchange between Russia and Japan and the importance of securing Russia's partnership with Western countries in order to prevent another Cold War from happening after leadership changes.¹⁰⁷ The expert mentioned that Koizumi "will also discuss the question of the Northern Territories", although no further details were given.

To summarize, the 2006 G6 summit was Russia's debut as a Group of Eight member, which influenced the choice and prioritization of topics discussed at the summit and covered in the media. As a result, there was little emphasis from the Russian side on exchange with Japan during the summit. Japan, however, saw the summit in Russia as an attempt to pursue the nation's diplomatic interests, which was partially successful (with regard to attaining Russia's support for action against North Korea). With noticeable pressure from general public and the media, particularly in Hokkaido, attempts were made by the Japanese to make progress in the territorial dispute. These attempts were unsuccessful; however, the Japanese side made another attempt to focus on the topic during the 2008 Toyako summit.

The 2008 Toyako Summit as an International and "Local" Event in Hokkaido

The 2006 St. Petersburg summit, being Russia's first participation in the Group of Eight as a host country, was seen by the media, researchers and general public in Russia as moderately successful. The Toyako summit, on the other hand, had more critical assessments in Japan. Part of the reason for the lukewarm reception is the high level of expectations that were not met in the absence of a major breakthrough. It could be argued that in the case of the 2006 summit the

¹⁰⁷ *Izvestiya*, "O chëm poïdët rech v Peterburge?" July 11, 2006.

expectations were lower due to the novelty of Russia being the host country, which shifted the perspective of domestic coverage from critiques of the summit proceedings towards assessments of Russia's performance and competence as a host. In the case of the Toyako summit, the novelty factor was no longer prominent, and the disappointment was stronger as a result. In addition, competing media agencies tend to portray global events such as the G8 summit in a critical fashion. As Seaton puts it, "the constant need to be ahead of the competition on tomorrow's news makes media coverage anticipatory rather than reflective regarding events fixed in the global calendar: events...are extensively hyped in advance but quickly forgotten. The anticipation often sets unrealistic expectations, and media coverage can be merciless if the event fails to meet expectations."¹⁰⁸

The Toyako summit was different from the St. Petersburg summit in several ways. One of the main differences that affected press coverage of both summits was the location of the International Media Center, where the journalists were covering the event. The press center in the St. Petersburg summit was built within walking distance to the summit location. In the case of the Toyako summit, however, the press center was in Rusutsu, about 27 kilometers away from the Windsor Hotel where the summit took place.¹⁰⁹ The distant location of the press center may have contributed to the anticipative nature of news coverage.

It is important to discuss the relationship between the G8 summit and citizen activist groups and NGOs, who may use the summit as a platform to pursue their interests, which would be difficult to do independently. A characteristic trait of the Toyako summit was the presence of local alternative summits in Hokkaido held by various citizens' groups and NGOs. One of

¹⁰⁸ Philip Seaton, "The G8 Summit as 'Local Event' in the Hokkaido Media," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 6, no. 11 (November 2008), <http://apjif.org/-Philip-Seaton/2972/article.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹⁰⁹ "Location and Access," Hokkaido Toyako Summit, accessed February 12, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/press/traffic.html>.

such alternative events was the Indigenous Peoples Summit, which can be seen as a “grassroots” initiative to raise awareness and address concerns of indigenous peoples in Hokkaido and the rest of the world. The summit resulted in a series of appeals to the Japanese government, the G8 leaders and communities of indigenous peoples over the world.¹¹⁰ Another alternative event tied to the Toyako G8 summit was the “Peace, Reconciliation & Civil Society” Symposium in Sapporo, which focused on the legacy of Japanese imperialism and strengthening peace in East Asia. As Zablonksi and Seaton (2008) point out, the idea for a symposium focusing on promotion of peace in East Asia had been discussed previously; however, like many other “grassroots” initiatives, there were concerns regarding logistical and financial difficulties to be undertaken by the organizing parties.¹¹¹ Using a large international event such as the G8 summit as a “springboard” for such grassroots initiatives was a key factor to mobilize and generate cooperation in civil society.

Even with this background taken into account Russia–Japan exchange during the summit was focused on familiar topics, namely North Korea (the abductions issue) and the territorial dispute. The 2008 summit was seen by local communities in Hokkaido as an unprecedented opportunity to raise awareness of the territorial issue as it was the first time a Russian leader visited Hokkaido since the end of the war.¹¹² On the national level, the summit

¹¹⁰ With regard to addressing the G8 nations, one of the main documents of the summit, the Nibutani declaration, calls the governments of Russia, Canada and the United States to respect the demands of the indigenous peoples in their countries, and to pressure New Zealand and Australia to adopt the UN declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. For more on the Indigenous Peoples Summit see ann-elise lewallen, “Indigenous at last! Ainu Grassroots Organizing and the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 6, no. 11 (November 2008) <http://apjif.org/-ann-elise-lewallen/2971/article.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹¹¹ Lukasz Zablonksi and Philip Seaton, “The Hokkaido Summit as a Springboard for Grassroots Initiatives: The ‘Peace, Reconciliation & Civil Society’ Symposium,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 6, no. 11 (November 2008) <http://apjif.org/-Lukasz-Zablonksi/2973/article.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹¹² Philip Seaton, “The G8 Summit as ‘Local Event’ in the Hokkaido Media,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 6, no. 11 (November 2008), <http://apjif.org/-Philip-Seaton/2972/article.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

was another chance to pursue Japan's political interests concerning Russia, and to learn from the previously unsuccessful attempt of advancing negotiations during the 2006 summit. Although ultimately Japan did not raise the islands question during the Toyako summit outside of bilateral negotiations with Russia, the presence of the agenda was certainly noticeable throughout the event. One of the indirect, but particularly visible gestures made by Japan to express its stance on the matter was the inclusion of all of the disputed islands in official maps of Japan for the Toyako summit, which triggered a response from both the official representatives and the media on both sides.




Figure 2.2. Related meetings map that includes the disputed islands as part of Japan
Source: "Hokkaido Toyako Summit – Related Meetings," Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed February 12, 2018, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/info/map.html>.

The incident was reported on both sides, but the assessment of it is quite different, and the newspapers quote and respond to each other's publications. The "dialog" between the newspapers started with an extensive report on July 2nd by a Russian state newspaper that the

official map for the G8 summit (that was accessible on the summit's website at the time) would include all of the disputed islands within Japan. The report includes interviews with various experts and political representatives on both sides, and marks the Japanese side's actions as inappropriate as the Russian representatives marking such countries as Abkhazia or Transnistria as parts of Russia.¹¹³ *Mainichi Shimbun* quotes the above article, and reports its title as "Bachigaina chizu" ("inappropriate map").¹¹⁴ However, this translation of the heading is inaccurate. The expression "Karte mesto!" ("Card to stay!") is used by players in card games when the opponent makes a mistake that is advantageous to the player, to let the opponent know they cannot take their card back from the table. The title of the article is "Karte ne mesto!" ("Card cannot stay!"), which is an ironic assessment of the situation, as well as a play on words since the word *karta* can mean both "map" and "playing card" in Russian. In *Mainichi Shimbun*'s coverage the humorous subtleties of the original heading were lost, and the literal translation appeared more hostile than it was originally. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* mentions the map incident twice and quotes the author of the original article in the Russian newspaper without translating the title, however it also notes the extensive length of the article and caustic remarks from Russian representatives asking whether Russia should "bring a large quantity of correct maps to the summit."¹¹⁵ Coverage of the 2008 G8 summit in Sakhalin newspapers did not mention the issue.

Sakhalin newspapers paid more attention to the 2008 event in comparison to the 2006 summit, particularly the territorial problem, which was again discussed in the context of the

¹¹³ *Izvestiya*, "Karte ne mesto!" July 2, 2008.

¹¹⁴ *Mainichi Shimbun*, "Roshia: Ro-shi, hoppōyontō 'waga ryōdo' Hokkaidō tōyako samitto HP no nihhonchizu ni gekido," July 4, 2008.

¹¹⁵ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Hoppōryōdo no hyōki Roshia kami ga hihan," July 3, 2008. The incident was not mentioned in *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*. On the Russian side it was ignored by the state-affiliated *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*.

summit.¹¹⁶ There are also reports on medical exchange between Sakhalin and Hokkaido, as in the week before the summit a little boy from Sakhalin was taken to a Hokkaido hospital after a serious injury. It is mentioned that the bilateral talks between Russia and Japan began with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressing his gratitude to the Japanese government for assistance in treating the boy.¹¹⁷ This detail is not mentioned in coverage of the summit in Russian national newspapers.

As can be seen from above, during the G8 summit various groups in Hokkaido took the initiative to raise awareness of their demands and concerns. With regard to exchange with Russia, those demands shared some overlap with Japanese national policy, as the Toyako summit was seen as an opportunity for Japan to bring attention of its G8 partners to the territorial dispute. Both summits can be viewed as a vehicle for the media and citizens' groups in Japan to elicit action from the Japanese government towards resolving the dispute. While Japan did not raise the territorial question in the context of the summit, the "local" factor of the dispute, as well as the map incident, provided some context for both national and local media to discuss and criticize the summit and the official stance of each side on the matter, which created an atmosphere of anticipation followed by disappointment.

2.3. Regional Factors in Russian and Japanese News Coverage of Cultural Exchange

Cultural exchange between Russia and Japan is carried out on national, local and individual level. The majority of cultural exchange activities involve interaction between ordinary citizens of Russia and Japan (as opposed to official contacts between governments)

¹¹⁶ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Bol'shaya vos'm ë rka i territorial'nyï vopros," July 1, 2008.

¹¹⁷ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Kur'er," July 11, 2008.

with a high degree of informality. This type of exchange includes tourism, mutual homestays, unofficial friendly visits, as well as art, music and film festivals, cooking and tasting traditional food or experiencing traditional activities associated with one's culture, such as the Japanese tea ceremony or folk dance.

Cultural exchange is organized by a variety of government and non-government actors, however one of the most prominent variations of such exchange is conducted through a network of sister relations between Russian and Japanese cities. Sister city relations became common in the postwar period, and initial ties between cities developed on the grounds of common traits, such as name similarities, historical connections or economic profile. The funding for inter-city exchange comes primarily from municipal budgets of the cities involved, and the exchange projects operate on the regional level. A study of a Soviet-American sister cities project has confirmed that sister city relations are an effective tool in breaking down hostile feelings (maintained at a distance) through face-to-face interactions.¹¹⁸ Indeed, as an opportunity to engage Other directly, such projects allow the creation of a more "personalized" view of Other, which not only dissolves stereotypes, but also establishes contacts on a personal level.

The table of Russia–Japan sister cities on the Japanese Embassy in Russia website indicates that the overwhelming majority of sister-city relations between Russia and Japan are established between cities in Hokkaido and the Russian Far East, with Sakhalinskaya Oblast, Primorsky Krai and Siberia (Novosibirsk, Irkutsk) being the most prominent regions.¹¹⁹ This is indicative of the overall state of cultural, as well as economic and business exchange between Russia and Japan: regular exchange and business ties tend to gravitate towards

¹¹⁸ George Lindsay Park, "An Ethnographic Tale of Sister City Experience: Spokane and Makhachkala" (PhD diss., Gonzaga University, 1991), 134.

¹¹⁹ "Goroda-pobratimy," Embassy of Japan in Russia, accessed February 3, 2018, <http://www.ru.emb-japan.go.jp/RELATIONSHIP/TWINCITIES/>.

Siberia and the Far East, while exchange with other regions of Russia is more circumstantial. Table 2.1 lists all sister city relations established between cities in Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido.

Table 2.1. Sister cities in Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya oblast

Cities in Hokkaido	Cities in Sakhalinskaya Oblast	Sister ties since
Asahikawa	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	Nov 10, 1967
Kitami	Poronaysk	Aug 13, 1972
Wakkanai	Nevelsk	Sep 8, 1972
	Korsakov	Jul 2, 1991
	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	Sep 9, 2001
Kushiro	Kholmsk	Aug 27, 1975
Sarufutsu village	Ozersky	Dec 25, 1990
Monbetsu	Korsakov	Jan 1, 1991
Nayoro	Dolinsk	Mar 25, 1991
Teshio	Tomari	Jul 28, 1992
Nemuro	Severo-Kurilsk	Jan 27, 1994
Hakodate	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	Sep 27, 1997

Source: “Goroda-pobratimy,” Embassy of Japan in Russia, accessed February 3, 2018, <http://www.ru.emb-japan.go.jp/RELATIONSHIP/TWINCITIES/>.

As can be seen from table 2.1, there are two main periods of relationship building through sister cities in Hokkaido and Sakhalin: 1967-1975 and 1990 onwards. The 1967-1975 wave can be explained by the joint energy projects that were established following the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The prevalence of Siberia and the Far East on the Russian side and Hokkaido on the Japanese side in Russo-Japanese exchange can also be explained by physical proximity: for instance, Wakkanai and Korsakov are much easier to connect directly than Moscow and Tokyo (which also have had sister city relations since 1991). However, distance is not the only factor in establishing cultural connections, and sister city relations in particular. National government policy that facilitates creation of cultural ties, proper resource management, sub-alliances between local

institutions, groups, organizations and the business sector, citizen involvement and strong regional leadership are among the factors contributing to successful formation of sister city ties, which are potentially more important than physical distance between the cities.¹²⁰

The conditions preceding creation of sister city ties are notably different in Russia and Japan. In the 1990s, cities located along the Sea of Japan coastline and in Hokkaido attempted to develop global intercultural connections in response to the perceived “backwardness” compared to the rest of Japan, and pursued strategies to integrate themselves into the Northeast Asian region.¹²¹ The center–periphery relationship between Hokkaido and Tokyo, as well as Japan’s international relations with its neighbors, are pivotal to understanding these developments. Japan’s peripheral regions such as Hokkaido and Niigata sought more autonomy from Tokyo in their international affairs and attempted to take the lead in international exchange with Japan’s partners located close to those regions, particularly Russia and China. Normalization of bilateral relations through resolution of the territorial dispute is one of the main items on Japan’s agenda when dealing with Russia on both national and local level. It was therefore sensible for Japan to establish sister city ties with Russian cities in relatively close proximity to Hokkaido, particularly to connect Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya oblast that currently administers the disputed islands. The disputed territories are deemed by Japan to be part of the Nemuro subprefecture, which became the main entry point of exchange with the disputed islands.

On the Russian side, exchange with Japan through business and sister-city ties between regions is heavily influenced by state policy. Unlike Japan, there is no urge to foster local exchange programs in the hope of winning the other party’s disposition towards

¹²⁰ Jacobus Christiaan de Villiers, “Success Factors and the City-to-city Partnership Management Process – from Strategy to Alliance Capability,” *Habitat International* 33, no. 2 (April 2009), 149-156.

¹²¹ Gilbert Rozman, “Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way out via Regionalism and Decentralization,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 25, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 3-31.

resolving the dispute. However, as with Japan, the center–periphery relationship plays a major role in shaping an environment conducive to internationalization and cultural exchange in Russia. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian regions received a certain degree of autonomy from Moscow. Regional elites in Russia have been consolidating their power and autonomy from the antagonized national center. However, since the late 1990s and early 2000s the state policy in Russia has been gravitating steadily towards creation of a more unitary form of government in an attempt to consolidate the nation and secure its sovereignty over all its regions. As a result, development of international ties in Russian cities is hindered by Moscow’s efforts to gain more control over the regions. Some argue that Russian regions and Russia as a whole would benefit greatly from decentralization and a more defined relationship between the center and periphery without damaging its structural integrity as a nation.¹²² At present, however, the development of international ties on the regional level in Russia is hindered by the state policy.

In addition to the above factors, cultural proximity plays an important role in exchange and selection of partners for establishing sister-city ties. It is commonly suggested that there are many landscape and cultural similarities between Sakhalin and Hokkaido cities. A Wakkanai city hall worker mentioned that Russian guests from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Nevelsk and Korsakov often point out the similarities in the landscape and overall city layout between Wakkanai and their hometowns, which corresponded with his own impression of Sakhalin as an island sharing many traits in common with Hokkaido.¹²³

Cultural proximity and, by extension, the likelihood of establishing sister-city ties is also influenced by historical connections between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Many of

¹²² Martin Nicholson, *Towards a Russia of the Regions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).

¹²³ Interview with Mitani Masashi, chief inspector (*shusa*) of the Sakhalin section at the Wakkanai city hall. Conducted by the author at the Wakkanai city hall on September 11, 2017.

Hokkaido's sister cities on Sakhalin (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Nevelsk, Korsakov, Poronaysk, Kholmsk, Dolinsk, Uglegorsk and others) were parts of Japan's Karafuto Prefecture before the end of the war. When asked what made Hokkaido–Sakhalin ties in Wakkanai sustainable, the representative of the Wakkanai Association of Economic Cooperation between Russia and Japan suggested that cities on Sakhalin and Hokkaido share the “port town” culture and have a special connection due to the natural and historical ties between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, particularly its southern part.¹²⁴



Figure 2.3. Sister cities: Street signs in Wakkanai (left) and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (right)
Source: Photo by author.

Hokkaidō Shimbun and national newspapers report exchange with Russia in different ways, which reflects the nature of the exchange taking place in different regions of Russia

¹²⁴ Interview with Itō Hiroshi, office chief (*jimu kyokuchō*) of the Wakkanai Association of Economic Cooperation between Russia and Japan. Conducted by the author at the Wakkanai Russo-Japanese Friendship Hall on September 12, 2017.

and Japan. In general, Japanese national newspapers tend to omit the regional component of exchange and report exchange events as “exchange with Russia” (national level) rather than interaction with a particular Russian region. An example of this tendency is a report mentioning an art collaboration with Russian painters without specifying the region of Russia the painters came from.¹²⁵ This pattern is indicative of all Japanese national newspapers in the survey. In the majority of cases when the region of Russia is mentioned in the national newspapers it is exchange with Siberia and the Far East (including Sakhalinskaya oblast).

Some exceptions do exist, however. The circumstantial character of Japan’s exchange with Russian regions other than Siberia and the Far East can be best illustrated with the following example: a delegation from the Russian republic of Tatarstan visited Japan to investigate similarities between traditional Japanese and Tatar iron smelting techniques. The delegation was inspired by the similarities between the “Tatar” ethnonym and the *tatara* furnace used in Japan for iron and steel smelting.¹²⁶ In this case, cultural similarities and the pronunciation of an ethnonym that sounded similar to a Japanese cultural term created an occasion for exchange that was akin to that of early sister-city ties. This exchange may eventually result in establishing partnerships between Tatarstan and Shimane prefecture, as there is mutual interest based on potential historical ties and possible community involvement, including inter-university exchange agreements.

In Japanese national newspapers, Russia is more likely to be featured in transnational exchange, i.e. as one of several actors in cultural exchange with Japan involving multiple parties. Russia is likely to be mentioned in articles on international students, or foreigners in Japan in general. Specific exchange projects also mention Russia in a group rather than the

¹²⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, “Taunte chō/Okayama ken,” April 10, 2015.

¹²⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “[Tatara seitetsu wagakuni to ruiji] Ro Tatarusutan shisatsu-dan * Un’nan de shisetsu kengaku = Shimane,” February 4, 2015.

main participant: for instance, an *Asahi Shimbun* article on February 6 mentions Russia among several other countries from where young people came to help revitalize an old rehabilitation center in Yamaguchi prefecture.¹²⁷ Exchange with Russia is prioritized and/or “regionalized” in national newspapers only in areas with prominent cultural ties, where Russia’s presence is particularly significant.

Another characteristic trait of national newspapers in both Russia and Japan is a stronger emphasis on exchange through art exhibitions and culture festivals as opposed to direct exchange between individuals. In Japanese national newspapers, there are more mentions of Russian writers and composers, Russian food, books and movies about Russia, Russian music and ballet, as well as art galleries and culture festivals as opposed to sister city exchange projects. Russian newspapers also tend to focus on passive knowledge about Japan rather than direct exchange. As a result, Russian newspaper articles are more likely to be dedicated to Japanese poetry or descriptions of Japanese cities, or mention Japan in passing in interviews with celebrities who have visited it.

This “descriptive” character of coverage persists to some extent in regional newspapers, but there is a visible focus on direct interaction between the regions, which results in coverage of local events involving individual exchange. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* is particularly interested in exchange between Hokkaido and specific regions of Russia, mainly Siberia and Sakhalinskaya Oblast. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* is the only Japanese newspaper to have a branch office in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. As a result, Sakhalin-based events are also featured more prominently in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* than other newspapers.

The primary actors in Sakhalin–Hokkaido exchange are the cities themselves, with most exchange happening through sister city relations. Exchange between Wakkanai and its

¹²⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, “Tasaina nakama, kyoten o isshin hagi no ‘Kawakami suginokomura’, ninaite ga kōtai/ Yamaguchi ken,” February 6, 2015.

sister cities on Sakhalin is particularly noteworthy as Wakkanai is the northernmost city of Japan, the closest to Sakhalin and with some of the most (relatively) intensive exchange taking place. Wakkanai is the only city in Japan to have a city hall department dedicated specifically to exchange with Sakhalin. Wakkanai has several projects operated by the city hall that carry out exchange between Wakkanai and its sister cities: Nevelsk, Korsakov and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Activities include mutual homestays for high school students and training Russian specialists (*kenshūsei*) at Wakkanai's chamber of commerce. There is also a ferry route that operates between Wakkanai and Korsakov.



Figure 2.4. View from Cape Soya with Sakhalin visible in the distance

Source: Philip Seaton, used with permission.

According to Mitani Masashi, chief inspector (*shusa*) of the Sakhalin section at the Wakkanai City Hall, there is considerable mutual exchange between Sakhalin cities and Wakkanai, but the purpose of visits is different for each side.¹²⁸ The majority of visitors from Sakhalin see Hokkaido as an opportunity to extend their daily lives by shopping in Japan.

¹²⁸ Interview with Mitani Masashi at the Wakkanai City Hall.

There is a special shopping district in Wakkanai selling electronics, food, clothing and other items that targets Russian visitors from Sakhalin and has signs in the Russian language. Another popular shopping route for visitors from Sakhalin is going to Sapporo by plane and returning to Sakhalin by ferry from Wakkanai. For the Japanese visitors to Sakhalin, however, taking the ferry constitutes a more personal experience. Some of the Japanese visitors to Sakhalin are descendants of people born on Sakhalin when it was under Japanese rule, or people interested in that period. Miyashita (2015) states that in recent years 3000 to 4000 Japanese citizens have visited Sakhalin annually, which constitutes about 90% of the total number of foreign tourists in Sakhalin in 1998-2011.¹²⁹ The number of Wakkanai citizens going to Sakhalin is low; most are from elsewhere in Hokkaido or from other regions in Japan, particularly Honshu. Such visitors go to Sakhalin to see the place where their parents were born, or seek novelty in visiting Russia by ferry and exploring a place that has historical connections with Japan.

As expected, Wakkanai's potential for exchange with Russia through Sakhalin is acknowledged in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*. The newspaper mentions further attempts to internationalize Hokkaido through connections with Russia, utilizing resources from other prefectures to promote tourism. Russia has a 72-hour visa exemption system in its ports, which makes the port cities in Sakhalinskaya oblast a viable target for short-term tours. An NPO from Nagoya was reported to be planning a new tourist route starting in Wakkanai and using the Wakkanai ferry to access Sakhalin.¹³⁰ The tour took place in June 2015 with 36 participants.¹³¹ The route was not continued in the following years, but the same NPO is still

¹²⁹ Masatoshi Miyashita, "Homecoming visits to Karafuto," in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton, 141-157.

¹³⁰ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Wakkanai to Saharin kokkyō kankō o saguru* 6 gatsu monitā tsuā," April 12, 2015.

¹³¹ "Kokkyō kankō monitā tsuā Wakkanai-hen (2015.6.15-16)," Wakkanai City, accessed September

offering various tours to Sakhalin using airline routes.¹³²

On the Russian side, exchange between Sakhalin and Hokkaido is covered primarily in Sakhalin newspapers with little to no mention in national newspapers. The yearly individual youth exchange between Sakhalin and Hokkaido is carried out using the ferry route between Wakkanai and Korsakov. The vessel transporting the youths is referred to informally as the “Ship of Friendship”. This type of exchange between Japan and Sakhalinskaya Oblast has become common and somewhat routinized in recent years, which has made it a less newsworthy topic for local newspapers in Sakhalin.¹³³ The local newspaper *Gubernskie Vedomosti* covered the 17th exchange event since 1999 that was scheduled to begin in Sakhalinskaya Oblast in August 2015, but the report is only one paragraph long.¹³⁴ Among the articles matching the scan criteria, the “Ship of Friendship” is mentioned only twice in the entire year, the second time in passing. No significant coverage of other Sakhalin–Hokkaido exchange events was observed in Sakhalin newspapers.

Another important actor in Russia–Japan exchange in Hokkaido is Nemuro city, which is Hokkaido’s main hub of interaction with the disputed islands. However, before the regular visa-free exchanges between Nemuro and the disputed islands began in the 1990s, Nemuro’s involvement with Russia was dominated by interaction with Soviet sailors that regularly stopped at its harbor. The influence of that period can be felt throughout the city, where rusted signs in the Russian language can be seen occasionally. There is an information center for Russian sailors in Nemuro that has been operational since 1970s and offers advice

13, 2018, <http://www.city.wakkanai.hokkaido.jp/sangyo/saharin/katsudou/2015/20150615.html>.

¹³² “Saharin hokui 50-do kokkyō kikō,” Japan Center for Borderlands Studies, accessed September 13, 2018, http://borderlands.or.jp/event/images/2017sakharin_north50.pdf.

¹³³ Interview with the chief editor of *Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Segodnya* Sergey Tarakanov at the office of the newspaper. Conducted by the author in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on February 7, 2017.

¹³⁴ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Tochek soprikosnoveniya mnogo,” May 25, 2015.

to both the visitors and the receiving side, as well as doing translations between Russian and Japanese. The Nemuro Committee on Safety Measures for International Exchange (*kokusai kōryū anzen taiyaku kyōgi-kai*) publishes brochures for Japanese citizens of Nemuro and Russian visitors, with a Russian–Japanese phrasebook, information on laws and daily life in Japan, as well as various rules and recommendations. Russian influence in Nemuro can be felt through mundane aspects of life: the central supermarket and even the taxis have instructions in Russian. Cities with such elaborate catering to Russian speakers are quite rare elsewhere in Japan.¹³⁵ This aspect of exchange, however, is no longer reflected in the news as much as the visa-free exchange with the disputed islands.



Figure 2.5. “Suzuki” department store in Nemuro with a Russian nameplate
 Source: Photo by author.

There are several main trends that can be observed in the coverage of cultural

¹³⁵ Japanese port cities such as Wakkanai or Niigata also have a history of frequent interactions with Russian sailors, which resulted in similar “Russian presence”.

exchange in Russian and Japanese newspapers. In the absence of stronger interregional ties outside those connecting Hokkaido and the Russian Far East, Japanese national newspapers cover events that do not feature individual exchange (such as festivals), and tend to portray Russia as one of the actors in transnational exchange. Exchange on both sides is influenced by state policy and availability of resources, which in turn affects the content of coverage. Connections between Sakhalin and Hokkaido that developed out of geographical and cultural proximity and are supported by sister-city relations allow for more direct interaction between individuals, which manifests in various projects funded by the cities. However, the interaction is still limited in the presence of a territorial dispute, as well as due to economic and demographical differences between the regions. As pointed out by the chief editor of *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, the general public in Sakhalinskaya oblast is quite familiar with Japan and interested in Japanese culture, but the potential for direct exchange with Japan is limited by the size of Sakhalin's population and different living standards.¹³⁶ The editor also mentioned that regional newspapers tend to focus on international affairs only if the exchange has significant impact on region and life of its citizens. An additional factor in limiting newspaper coverage of cultural exchange is the size of Sakhalin newspapers, which do not have enough specialists with Japanese proficiency or experience in international relations.

2.4. Reporting Russia–Japan Business Cooperation: Joint Development of the Russian Far East and the Local Impact of the Drift Net Fishing Ban

In 2013 Russia's trade with Japan amounted to \$33.2 billion, with \$19.6 billion export and \$13.6 billion import volume. Russia is 14th on the list of major Japanese economic

¹³⁶ Interview with the chief editor of *Sovetsky Sakhalin* Vladimir Sorochan. Conducted by the author at the "Lada" hotel in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on February 7, 2017.

partners, whereas Japan is Russia's 8th biggest trade partner.¹³⁷ The majority of Russian exports to Japan consists of oil and natural gas, as well as agricultural and marine products. As a result, economic exchange and business cooperation between Russia and Japan is concentrated around fishing and Russia's oil and gas industry. Following the spring 2014 events that resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia and a military conflict in eastern parts of Ukraine, Russia's business ties with American and European partners were affected by economic sanctions. Japan also imposed sanctions on Russia and discontinued various projects in investment cooperation, joint space exploration and military cooperation.¹³⁸ The territorial problem creates further obstacles to establishing business connections between Russia and Japan, particularly in the areas surrounding the disputed islands. Nevertheless, additional business ties between Russia and Japan emerged in the following years, particularly after Abe's visit to Russia in May 2016 and Putin's visit to Japan in December 2016, during which some basic agreements on economic cooperation on the disputed islands were established.¹³⁹

Similar to cultural exchange, many of Russia–Japan business projects concentrate on Hokkaido on the Japanese side and in the Far East (particularly Primorsky Krai and Sakhalinskaya Oblast) on the Russian side. Some of the largest forms of Russia–Japan business cooperation are the Sakhalin-I and Sakhalin-II energy projects, where a sizeable proportion of shares are owned by Japanese companies. The collaborative Sakhalin shelf exploration in the 1970s was the first large-scale energy cooperation project between Japan and the Soviet Union, and both sides have benefitted from it in a number of ways: the Soviet

¹³⁷ "Dvustoronnie èkonomicheskie svyazi," Embassy of Russia in Japan, accessed February 3, 2018, https://tokyo.mid.ru/ru_RU/dvustoronnie-ekonomiceskie-svazi.

¹³⁸ TASS, "Japan halts consultations on easing visa regime with Russia," March 18, 2014, <http://www.tass.com/russia/724091> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹³⁹ Economic cooperation with the disputed islands is discussed separately in Chapter 3.

Union acquired new technologies for the development of oil and natural gas, while Japan developed a new energy partnership that reduced its dependence on the Middle East.¹⁴⁰

Sakhalin-I and Sakhalin-II are the present day developments in the Sakhalin oil sphere, and some of the largest scale projects involving foreign investments in Russia.

Being an official Russian government newspaper, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* has the largest number of business and economy related articles mentioning Japan. It is also the only federal newspaper to mention Sakhalin business cooperation projects with Japan through Hokkaido. The Russian gas monopoly Gazprom is a major actor in many of these projects. While formally a private joint stock company, Gazprom is majorly owned by the Russian government and is heavily involved in Russian external policy. Regulation of gas prices and access to pipelines by Gazprom can sometimes be interpreted as a form of political pressure on Russia's partners, or as acts of Russian diplomacy.¹⁴¹ As a result, Gazprom-supported projects are of both national and local significance, which explains their appearance in the state-owned *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* and local Sakhalin newspapers. On the national level, they can help the struggling Russian economy find new business partners outside Europe and the US, and from the local perspective they may contribute to regional development and improve interregional business ties.

As of early 2000s, Russia has not been successful in devising an effective policy that would incorporate a concept of Russia as an integral part of the Asia Pacific region.¹⁴² The increasing interest from Russia in Japanese investments in the Far East is indicative of a recent policy change in Russia that occurred in response to multiple changes in the

¹⁴⁰ Tadashi Sugimoto, "The Foundation of Japan–Russia Energy Cooperation: The History of the Ups and Downs of the Sakhalin Project," *The Northeast Asian Economic Review* 1, no. 2 (December 2013), 27-41.

¹⁴¹ Kevin Rosner, *Gazprom and the Russian State* (London: GMB Publishing Limited, 2006).

¹⁴² Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian–Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 140.

international business environment, including the global financial crisis and European and American sanctions following the events in Ukraine. Russia has been attempting to develop Siberia and the Far East as attractive regions for international investments, as well as to erase the generally negative reputation of the Russian investment climate.¹⁴³ However, Japan is only one of the potential investors in the Far East. Analysis of news coverage in Russian federal newspapers indicates that China is a more prominent business partner even in articles mentioning Japan in the context of business cooperation.

The profile of coverage in Sakhalin newspapers follows the general pattern of regional coverage in focusing on events of local significance. As a result, the Hokkaido–Sakhalin component is presented much stronger in Sakhalin newspapers. *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, being the regional analog of a government-owned newspaper, focuses primarily on official exchange, discussing plans of Sakhalin energy export to Japan, Sakhalin–Hokkaido cooperation and Japanese investments into Sakhalin and the disputed islands. In this regard *Gubernskie Vedomosti* acts as a regional analog of the state-owned *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, as the same pattern can be observed with regard to its emphasis on “official” coverage in comparison to the other Sakhalin newspapers.

While Hokkaido’s involvement in joint developments in the Russian Far East receives much coverage in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, the supposedly inter-government projects receive less attention from national Japanese newspapers. For instance, only *Hokkaidō Shimbun* dedicated a separate article¹⁴⁴ to the visit of Rosneft’s CEO Igor Sechin to Japan in April 2015. Rosneft is one of the largest oil trading companies in Russia and is also involved with the Sakhalin energy projects in Japan. By contrast, the national newspapers mention Russia in the context

¹⁴³ Evgeny Kanaev, “Developing Russia’s Far East and Siberia: The Interplay of National, Regional and Global Implications,” in *International Cooperation in the Development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia*, ed. Jing Huang and Alexander Korolev (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 19-37.

¹⁴⁴ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Ōte shōsha kanbu-ra to CEO tonai de kaidan* rosunefuchi,” April 15, 2015.

of business exchange with other countries; even when the oil and gas industry is concerned, they primarily discuss Russia's gas export to Europe rather than Japan, or mention Russia in passing. This transnational focus of national newspapers is similar to that observed in the cultural exchange section. The same applies to all Russian federal newspapers with the exception of *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, which reports exchange on both national and transnational levels due to Gazprom's involvement.

Trade in cars and automotive parts constitutes a large proportion of Russian imports from Japan. Japanese cars are particularly popular in the Far East, where used cars are brought from Japan for resale locally and in other regions of Russia. Vladivostok has the biggest market for used Japanese cars in the Russian Far East. In recent years car imports have declined due to prices rising significantly in Russia following the devaluation of the national currency in 2014. However, the market for Japanese cars in Russia continues to grow as more Japanese firms are establishing automobile plants in Russia to produce their cars locally.¹⁴⁵ The demand for new cars remains low, as even used Japanese cars become more expensive due to the sharp devaluation of the rouble.¹⁴⁶ The Russian press pays close attention to mergers, trade agreements and profit reports involving Japanese automobile companies such as Nissan, Toyota or Honda. In the Japanese press, the market for used Japanese cars in the Far East is commented on in *Mainichi Shimbun*, which also dedicated a series of articles titled *Yūkō no tsubasa* ("Wings of friendship") to exchange between Niigata and the Russian Far East, particularly Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Apart from Russian car imports, the articles cover the prospect of starting regular flights between Niigata and

¹⁴⁵ Prime Economic Information Agency, "Prodazhy yaponskikh avtomobilei v Rossii vyrosli na 7% v 2014 godu," May 6, 2015, https://1prime.ru/industry_and_energy/20150506/809609547.html (accessed December 20, 2018).

¹⁴⁶ Russia Beyond, "Russian Far East is still attached to Japanese cars," August 31, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/business/2016/08/31/russian-far-east-is-still-attached-to-japanese-cars_625665 (accessed December 20, 2018).

Khabarovsk using the Russian Sukhoi Superjet vessel and a meeting between Russian and Japanese regional representatives in Khabarovsk to encourage mutual understanding.¹⁴⁷

A large proportion of articles in Russian federal newspapers mentioning Japan is dedicated to various economic forums that took place in Russia where Japan participated as one of the members. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* in particular has a lengthy series of articles on the Russia–Japan forum that took place in Tokyo in late May 2015. The forum was organized by *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* and *Mainichi Shimbun*, which explains the extensive reportage. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* has a large amount of coverage of business exchange where the Russian state is the primary actor, which is characterized by its emphasis on agreements on the national level.

While the economic forums can be treated as part of Russia’s effort to attract foreign investments, developing Siberia and the Far East remains a major challenge. Although Japanese investors recognize the investment potential and the size of the market as the main attracting factor,¹⁴⁸ Russia’s internal policy gives control of regional development to federal government and companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft (and therefore taking the authority away from the regions in favor of Moscow). One of the main problems the Russian side faces in attaining Japanese investments in the Far East and Sakhalin in particular is the perceived lack of trustworthiness as the region is deemed to have an unstable commercial environment. Williams (2007) mentions changing and contradictory business-related laws, the lack of clear division between the federal and regional governments, a confiscatory tax regime and poor

¹⁴⁷ *Mainichi Shimbun*, “Yūkō no tsubasa: Nīgata to Kyokutō Roshia/ ue chātā-bin kara teikiben fukkatsu e sōgo kōryū no kappatsu-ka o/ Nīgata,” January 13, 2015.
Mainichi Shimbun, “Yūkō no tsubasa: Nīgata to Kyokutō Roshia/ naka hosoru shimin kōryū ni kiki-kan tagai o rikai suru kikai/ Nīgata,” January 14, 2015.
Mainichi Shimbun, “Yūkō no tsubasa: Nīgata to Kyokutō Roshia/ shimo chūko-sha ni kawaru bijinesu kensanhin no tenji, hanbai/ Nīgata,” January 15, 2015.

¹⁴⁸ Nina Ershova, “Investment Climate in Russia and Challenges for Foreign Business: The Case of Japanese Companies,” *Jornal of Eurasian Studies* 8 (2017), 154.

reputation as some of the major factors preventing business relations from flourishing in the Far East, which has also hindered transnational business ties between Hokkaido and Sakhalin.¹⁴⁹ Another factor inhibiting Japanese investments in Sakhalin and Russia as a whole is the lack of a peace treaty, which together with government endorsement is seen by many Japanese businesses as a precondition for undertaking any large projects involving Russia. Although Japan's business community (*zaikai*) was the major promoter of improved relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, the calls for economic cooperation diminished in the 1990s as Japan made structural adjustments to its economy to overcome the oil crisis, and Japan's dependence on joint projects, particularly in Siberia, became less critical.¹⁵⁰

The other primary sphere of business interaction between Russia and Japan is fishing, and import and export of marine products in general. Sakhalin–Hokkaido connections play a major role in this exchange as Japan imports a large proportion of seafood through Hokkaido. Much of Hokkaido's seafood produce comes from Russia's exclusive economic zone, and local economies in Hokkaido's northernmost parts (particularly Nemuro and Kushiro) have long been dependent on fishing in border areas and economic ties with Russia through Sakhalin and the disputed islands.¹⁵¹

Drift net fishing is one of the main methods of fishing in Hokkaido. The proposed ban on drift net fishing in the Russian Far East, which was subsequently introduced by the Russian government in summer 2015 and became effective from January 2016, was a

¹⁴⁹ Brad Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute: Hokkaido–Sakhalin relations* (London: Routledge, 2007), 165.

¹⁵⁰ Kimie Hara, *Japanese–Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 215.

¹⁵¹ Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, *Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 108.

noteworthy event for Japanese media as it was seen as a threat to the local economy. Drift net fishing presents concerns to ecologists due to its harm to the environment, and organizations such as WWF Russia have been lobbying for bans of drift netting in the country.¹⁵² Japanese vessels have been allowed to perform drift net fishing within 200 nautical miles of the eastern coasts of Russia (such as the Kamchatka peninsula and the Kuriles) since 1985, when an agreement regarding drift net fishing was signed between Japan and the USSR. The new bill, however, prohibited drift net fishing by both Russian and international vessels within 200 nautical miles. Although some sources claim the ban to be a political countermeasure in response to Japanese sanctions imposed on Russia after the events in Ukraine, statements made by analysts, ecology activists and Russian officials suggest that the ban was not politically motivated, and the impact from the ban would be felt not only by Japanese, but also by Russian businesses.¹⁵³

The government, media and public circles in Japan have expressed strong criticism regarding Russia's new bill. Japanese officials have spoken out repeatedly against the measure: for instance, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga referred to the adoption of the new bill as "regrettable" and called the situation "not promising".¹⁵⁴ On the local level the ban elicited an even stronger response. Nemuro has long been the center of Japanese drift net fishing, and local fishermen described the upcoming ban in such terms as "a matter of life

¹⁵² *The Moscow Times*, "Russia's Ban on Drift Net Fishing Good for the Environment, Bad for Japan," July 8, 2015, <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-ban-on-drift-net-fishing-good-for-the-environment-bad-for-japan-48000>.

¹⁵³ Alastair Wanklyn, "No politics behind Russia drift net ban: experts," *The Japan Times*, July 5, 2015, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/05/national/politics-diplomacy/politics-behind-russia-drift-net-ban-experts> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹⁵⁴ TASS, "Japan says ban on drift-net fishing not linked to Russia's counter-sanctions," June 25, 2015, <http://tass.com/economy/803775> (accessed October 2, 2018).

and death” (*shikatsu mondai*)¹⁵⁵ and “a sense of impending crisis” (*kikikan*).¹⁵⁶ All Japanese newspapers published reports on the new Russian bill when it was in its early discussion stage (during the first four months of 2015), however *Hokkaidō Shimbun* has 15 articles on the ban alone out of 17 articles on fishing, whereas the national newspapers each have only one article on the ban, which consists of a brief report. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* has articles of varying length discussing different aspects of the new legislation, including the schedule of the bill’s adoption, a report on the drift net fishing limits in the wake of the ban, the Sakhalinskaya Oblast governor’s opposition to the bill and comments from Nemuro fishermen. Drift net fishing is an example of a “local” issue affecting Hokkaido directly, which explains the high frequency of mentions in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* in comparison with national newspapers.

Among the relevant articles in Russian newspapers mentioning Japan and exchange or cooperation there was no discussion of the drift netting ban, even in articles that mention Hokkaido. While the ban itself is not mentioned explicitly in articles about Japan, the Japanese side’s interest in the fishing industry is suggested in articles of other categories. For instance, there is an interview with Yuri Alekseev, head of Russian Federal Security Bureau’s coast guard department. The interview touches upon illegal fishing incidents, some of which involve Japanese vessels, and recent changes in international legislation (including mutual agreements with Japan, China and South Korea) concerning illegal fishing, however it does not mention the drift net ban.¹⁵⁷ In Sakhalin newspapers, export of marine products to Japan is also mentioned when discussing administrative issues that limit the availability of fish

¹⁵⁵ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Roshia 200-kairi-nai, hōan shingi e* nagashi mōgyo kinshi ‘shikatsumondai’* aseru Dōtō no gyogyō-sha* seiritsunara ryōkoku-kan ni mizo/Ro, kōshō kado-ka mo,” February 19, 2015.

¹⁵⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Roshia de nagashi mōgyo kinshi hōan* jimoto no kiki-kan tsutaeru* Nemuro shigikai, kokkai giin ni,” April 21, 2015.

¹⁵⁷ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Granitsa na plavu,” May 28, 2015.

products to Sakhalin consumers. Japan is mentioned in the context of Russian fishermen who export marine products overseas, which requires certification that often takes a long time and affects the seller's profit and the quality of exported products. Since the documents issued by the Russian side are not used in Japan, China or South Korea, this measure is criticized as redundant.¹⁵⁸

Japan's (particularly Hokkaido's) interest in the fishing industry is also mentioned frequently in articles reporting official visits, as it is brought up by the Japanese side. For instance, the newly appointed consul of Japan in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Akira Imamura mentioned the fishing industry among other priorities in Hokkaido–Sakhalin economic cooperation.¹⁵⁹

Rossiyskaya Gazeta's interview with the Sakhalin governor on May 13 in the wake of the upcoming Russia–Japan forum also mentions fishing as one of the priority areas of Sakhalin–Hokkaido interaction.¹⁶⁰ Overall, however, it is clear that the Japanese side's interest in fishing in Russia's exclusive economic zone is not the main focus of Japan–Russia exchange reportage in Russian national and Sakhalin regional newspapers.

Business exchange between Russia and Japan concentrates around fishing and the oil and gas industry, but these two spheres are approached differently in both countries. Russia is significantly more interested in the latter than the former. The newly introduced drift net fishing ban in Russia raised serious concerns in Japan, which manifests in national and regional news coverage; however, the volume and the nature of coverage is different between *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and national newspapers. The reportage in national newspapers consists

¹⁵⁸ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Men'she bar'ero v – dostupnee ryba,” December 1, 2015.

¹⁵⁹ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Akira Imamura: Obeshchayu polyubit' zimnyuyu rybalku,” June 6, 2015.

¹⁶⁰ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Dva ostrova: do vstrechi v Tokio,” May 13, 2015.

of a concise summary of the new legislation and its impact on Japan, whereas *Hokkaidō Shimbun*'s coverage pays more attention to details of the proposed bill, as well as discussing its potential impact on the Hokkaido economy, featuring comments by officials and local fishermen. Russian newspapers, on the other hand, do not mention the Japanese reaction to the ban in the context of cooperation and exchange, however both national and Sakhalin newspapers acknowledge to some extent Japanese and Hokkaido's involvement in the fishing industry. From the above analysis it can be observed that there are two levels of reaction (national and local) to the drift net fishing ban on the Japanese side. Lack of interest and cooperation from the Russian side is also apparent, and the exchange potential in the area of fishing could be expanded. Recent estimates suggest that illegal and unreported seafood imports have been affected by low demand and purchasing capability in the Far East's domestic market, which stimulates the illegal import of seafood to Japan in large volumes. As of 2015, an estimated 24–36% of wild caught seafood imports to Japan were of illegal and unreported origin valued between \$1.6 billion and \$2.4 billion.¹⁶¹

In the area of oil and gas cooperation, however, there is significant interest from the Russian side in attracting investors from Asian countries to develop projects in Siberia and the Far East, which have also been the main areas of business interaction between Russia and Japan. In this regard, Russia–Japan business ties have been recovering after the imposition of sanctions in 2014.¹⁶² However, Japan is seen as only one of the many potential partners and

¹⁶¹ Ganapathiraju Pramod, Tony J. Pitcher and Gopikrishna Mantha, "Estimates of Illegal and Unreported Seafood Imports to Japan," *Marine Policy* 8 (2017), 49.

¹⁶² According to a 2016 TASS report, there has been an increasing number of Japanese investments into Russian businesses, as well as major partnerships, such as Rosneft and the Marubeni general trading company's joint venture to build a liquid gas factory in the Russian Far East. According to a 2018 report, over 60 projects out of 150 envisioned by the 2016 plan are being implemented as of December 2018. TASS, "Rossiisko-yaponskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniya. Dos'e," May 5, 2016, <https://tass.ru/info/3260618> (accessed December 20, 2018). TASS, "Russian–Japanese economic cooperation fruitful in all areas, says minister," December 18, 2018, <http://tass.com/economy/1036670> (accessed December 20, 2018).

is overshadowed by China. Nevertheless, Sakhalin–Hokkaido ties are strongly represented, particularly in regional newspapers. There is considerable difference between coverage in private and in government-owned newspapers in Russia on both federal and local level, which manifests in the different amount of reports on official exchange, such as economic forums and trade agreements as opposed to specific business projects organized in the Russian Far East.

2.5. Conclusions

Russia–Japan exchange can be categorized into three categories: official exchange, official–non-government exchange and non-government exchange. The G8 summits are an example of official exchange with a high level of informality. Russia and Japan had significantly different motives to participate in both summits, and both tried to use the summits to advance their national interests. Japan’s participation in both summits was influenced by pressure from domestic activists and media groups, which used the summits as a platform to raise awareness to domestic issues and prompt the Japanese government to make more steps towards the resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia, which were ultimately unsuccessful. The anticipative character of G8 summit news coverage accentuated the lack of progress during the Toyako summit in Japanese newspapers, while Russia’s debut summit in St. Petersburg had a somewhat warmer reception in the Russian newspapers. The G8 summit coverage accentuates the same aspects of Russia–Japan relations that are prominent in news coverage in other periods. In this regard, the summits survey provides a sampling of typical topics surrounding Russia–Japan interaction, which do not seem to change significantly in a transnational setting.

Cultural and business exchanges between Russia and Japan appear to be closely related, and concentrate primarily in Siberia and the Far East (including Sakhalinskaya

Oblast) on the Russian side, and Hokkaido on the Japanese side, which can be explained by several factors, including physical and cultural proximity, availability of resources, specifics of local governments and the presence of a territorial issue. Much of cultural exchange occurs through sister city relations. National newspapers appear to favor coverage of cultural exchange on transnational level involving additional participants other than Russia and Japan, while local newspapers have more prominent coverage of direct exchange between regions.

The main areas of business exchange between Russia and Japan are fishing and the oil and gas projects on Sakhalin. Both of these aspects are important for Japan, however the Russian side is less interested in fishing than Japan. Japan's reaction to the drift net fishing ban in Russia (which was seen as catastrophic for Hokkaido) was largely ignored by Russian newspapers. Involvement of a state gas monopoly in various oil and gas projects on Sakhalin, on the other hand, correlates with attention from both national and local newspapers in Russia.

From the analysis of news coverage it is quite evident that there are certain themes that are bound to appear in media coverage mentioning Russia and Japan regardless of the subject matter. These themes have a profound impact on many instances of Russia–Japan interaction. Many exchange activities involving Russian and Japanese citizens are based on such themes: for instance, conferences on war history, joint searches for the remains of war dead on Sakhalin, exchange with the disputed islands, campaigns related to Siberian internment etc. are firmly grounded in the history of Russo-Japanese relations.

Chapter 3. Reporting the Northern Territories Dispute in Russia and Japan: National and Local Aspects of News Coverage

3.1. The Territorial Dispute in Academic Literature and News Coverage

This chapter discusses and compares Japanese and Russian newspaper coverage of events and affairs related to the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dispute. As of January 2019, the dispute over the sovereignty of the Iturup/Etorofu, Shikotan, Kunashir/Kunashiri islands and the Habomai island group remains the major obstacle to concluding a peace treaty and formalizing bilateral relations between the two nations, and is one of the most widely reported topics concerning Russia in Japanese newspapers. The disputed islands, particularly in Japanese news coverage, are mentioned in a broad range of news categories, from history of Russo-Japanese relations and war history to internal politics, cultural exchange, transport, medicine and cinema. As a result, coverage of the dispute can be analyzed across multiple time periods and in a variety of contexts as it is deeply intertwined with coverage on the majority of other aspects of Russia–Japan interaction.

This characteristic of the dispute has also allowed for a wide range of discussion in academic literature and is analyzed from several perspectives:

1) Historical: Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (1998) analyzes the history of the dispute before and after the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, up to the end of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. Mikhail Vysokov (2008) has published a detailed history of Sakhalin and the disputed islands.

2) International: Kimie Hara (2009) proposes a potential resolution of the dispute based on the approach inspired by the case of the Åland Islands, which were subject of a dispute between Finland and Sweden and received autonomous status in 1921. Alexander Bukh (2010) approaches Japan's foreign policy from a national identity standpoint. James D. J. Brown (2015) discusses recent developments in the dispute and evaluates the prospects of a

potential resolution (2016).

3) Local: Paul Richardson (2015) discusses regional exceptionalism and local activism on Sakhalin. Hokkaido-based scholar Akihiro Iwashita (2016) touches upon the local situation in Nemuro. Brad Williams (2007) argues that local exchange and cooperation between Sakhalin and Hokkaido can become a catalyst for bridging the regions together and reducing political tension between the nations.

In addition, the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dispute has been discussed along with other territorial disputes involving Japan,¹⁶³ particularly the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with China and the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute with South Korea. Media presence of these disputes is particularly noteworthy: as Iwashita points out, the amount of national Japanese news on the Senkakus and Takeshima far outweighs that of the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories, despite the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories amounting to 99% of the disputed territories in Japan.¹⁶⁴

The role of the islands in Russia's conception of national identity is a noteworthy aspect of the dispute. Richardson (2018) identifies three elite coalitions that compete in defining Russia's national identity in the context of the dispute: liberal institutionalists, territorial imperialists and pragmatic patriots. Richardson argues that debate over the islands' future was not primarily about their material resources or even strategic value. It was instead related to the "heightened symbolism for the self-image of the nation, for the values that should be embodied by the state, and for the unequal power relations between center and periphery".¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Except the cases when it is necessary to distinguish between different territorial disputes, hereafter the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dispute between Russia and Japan will be referred to as "the dispute", and Etorofu/Iturup, Kunashiri/Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai will be referred to as "the disputed islands".

¹⁶⁴ Akihiro Iwashita, *Japan's Border Issues: Pitfalls and Prospects* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 24.

¹⁶⁵ Paul Richardson, *The Edge of the Nation: The Southern Kurils and the Search for Russia's*



Figure 3.1. A map of Japanese territories (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Source: *Japanese Territory*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/territory/index.html> (accessed March 2, 2018).

Despite remaining unresolved for more than 73 years, the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dispute is the only territorial dispute in Japan that has had a history of treaties signed by both disputing parties. The chronology in table 1 lists treaties and events from 1855 to 1956 that involved Sakhalin and the disputed islands.

National Identity (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018), 163.

Table 3.1. Chronology of Russo-Japanese treaties and the territorial dispute, 1855-1956

Year	Treaty/event	Result
1855	Treaty of Shimoda	Border between Russia and Japan demarcated between Etorofu/Iturup on the Japanese side and Uruppu/Urup on the Russian side, Sakhalin remains undivided between Russia and Japan.
1875	Treaty of St. Petersburg	Japan renounces all claims to Sakhalin in exchange for 18 islands: from Shumshu in the north to Uruppu/Urup in the south, including Northern and Southern (disputed) Kuriles.
1905	Treaty of Portsmouth	Southern Sakhalin ceded to Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese war.
1920	Nikolayevsk incident ¹⁶⁶	Served as grounds for Japanese occupation of northern Sakhalin; however, it was not formally annexed by Japan.
1925	The Soviet–Japanese Basic Convention	Normalized the situation in northern Sakhalin, which remained Soviet territory.
1945	The Yalta Agreement	The Soviet Union agrees to join the war against Japan in exchange for South Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. Soviet troops took possession of the entire Kurile archipelago, including the now disputed islands. The majority of Japanese citizens left the islands throughout the late 1940s, settling in Hokkaido.
1951	Treaty of San Francisco (not ratified by the Soviet Union)	Japan renounces claims to South Sakhalin and “the Kurile Islands”; however, the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty, and it was not clear who would be the beneficiary of Japan’s renunciation; in addition, Japan subsequently argued that the currently disputed islands are not part of the Kuriles, and therefore not covered by the treaty.
1956	The Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration	End of the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union. This declaration is the basis of the current official Russian position of “handing over” Shikotan island and the Habomai island group to Japan in the event that a peace treaty is signed.

¹⁶⁶ Japanese intervention in the Far East began with a dispatch of Japanese military forces to Vladivostok in February 1918. Foreign support for anti-Soviet movements in Russia resulted in the creation of a buffer state, the Far Eastern Republic, which existed from 1920 to 1922 and governed areas of the Trans-Baikal region and the Far East, including northern Sakhalin. Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, the closest city to the strait of Tartary separating Sakhalin from Russian mainland, was de facto under the control of Japanese army from 1918. In March 1920, after an armed conflict between the Japanese army and the guerrillas, the Japanese population of Nikolayevsk was executed along with most of the Russian population. The Japanese side used the incident as an excuse to occupy northern Sakhalin and delay diplomatic recognition of the USSR until 1925.

Article 2(c) of the San Francisco treaty states that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905”. As the San Francisco treaty did not list the names of the islands, the term “Kurile Islands” was not defined precisely in the document. This nuance is used by the Japanese side to claim that the disputed islands are not part of “the Kurile Islands”, and are therefore not covered by Article 2(c). In addition, the treaty contains a note that it does not diminish or prejudice Japan’s interest (in favor of the Soviet Union) in “South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the Island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941.”¹⁶⁷ The fact that Kuriles, Habomai islands and Shikotan are listed separately seems to imply that Habomai and Shikotan are not in the Kuriles, and then could be “handed back” or “transferred” following a peace treaty. With that taken into account, the Russian side seems to be adhering to the San-Francisco treaty despite not being a signatory.

The Japanese side refers to the 1875 treaty of St. Petersburg as the only agreement between Russia and Japan that defined precisely the status of the disputed islands. The Russian stance is that the disputed islands are part of “the Kurile Islands”. The Russian side appeals to the 1956 declaration as the legal basis of any subsequent negotiations concerning the status of the islands. Article 9 of the Joint Declaration states that the Soviet Union “agrees to hand over to Japan the Habomai and the Shikotan Islands, provided that the actual changing over to Japan of these islands will be carried out after the conclusion of a peace treaty.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ “Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,” US Department of State (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1951), Chapter II, Article 2 (c).

¹⁶⁸ “Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan,” “The World and Japan” Database, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19561019.D1E.html> (accessed March 26, 2018).

The 1956 declaration allowed the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan and marked the beginning of territorial negotiations. Although the negotiations did not result in resolving the dispute, Soviet-Japanese relations improved from the 1960s to mid-1970s. The 1970s also saw the first massive Soviet-Japanese energy projects, such as the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration Project, which began in 1975. It had stalled by the end of the 1970s but was eventually resumed as the Sakhalin-I project in the mid-1990s. However, from 1975 onwards relations started to deteriorate. The Sino-Japanese peace treaty of 1978 was particularly detrimental, as the Soviet Union repeatedly warned after 1975 that it would jeopardize Soviet-Japanese relations.¹⁶⁹ From the late 1970s to 1985 no particular contacts regarding the dispute took place between the two nations.

From 1985 through the 1990s there were multiple contacts and turning points, during which a resolution of the dispute in Japan's favor seemed realistic. The shift in tone occurred after changes in the Soviet government, particularly after Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, which was followed by replacement of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze. Togo (2011)¹⁷⁰ refers to this period as the "five lost windows of opportunity", which represent the following years:

1) 1985-1987 (Mikhail Gorbachev's first period) – a possible visit by Gorbachev to Japan was erased from Japan's agenda. Togo attributes it to the inert politics in both the

¹⁶⁹ The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was a drastic blow to Soviet foreign policy in Asia. Moscow protested against the treaty because it contained the so-called "anti-hegemony" clause, which was directed against Soviet hegemonism and expansionism. In addition, the rapprochement of Japan (supported by the US) and China in the wake of ideological split between China and the Soviet Union, as well as the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations, made a significant impact on the Soviet Union's international policy and diplomacy in Asia. For more on the significance of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty on Soviet-Japanese relations, see Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Brezhnev and Andropov* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 140-176.

¹⁷⁰ Kazuhiko Togo, "The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Lost Windows of Opportunity," *Japan Forum* 23, no. 1 (March 2011), 123-145.

Soviet Union and Japan, which were still affected by Cold War rigidity;

2) 1987-1991 (Mikhail Gorbachev's second period) – although a peace treaty working group was established in 1987 and Gorbachev visited Japan in 1991, the Japanese side was not flexible enough for a favorable outcome of the negotiations;

3) 1991-1993 (Boris Yeltsin's first period) – multiple failures (according to Togo) in the policymaking process on the Japanese side resulted in lack of a realistic policy approach towards Russia;

4) 1993-1999 (Boris Yeltsin's second period) – although the Japanese side corrected previous policy issues and proposed a more flexible approach to the dispute, it was ultimately unsuccessful due to a number of factors, including internal economic problems in Russia, the resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, deterioration of Yeltsin's health, and information leaks on the proposal, which provoked a reaction among the Japanese public;

5) 1999-2001 (Vladimir Putin's first period) – although the Japanese side was wary of previous failures and approached the negotiations with caution, ultimately a resolution was not achieved due to domestic circumstances, particularly due to a split in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the new approach to the dispute.

From 2001 onwards, the negotiations entered another period of stagnation. The economic situation in Russia improved considerably through the 2000s, and Putin's government began leaning towards a more authoritarian system, which resulted in less flexibility in territorial negotiations with Japan. Several meetings between Russian and Japanese leaders and ministers took place in the 2000s, however those did not amount to any significant progress in the dispute. The current decade started with deterioration of Russo-Japanese relations following Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to the disputed islands in 2010, and a subsequent announcement that Russia would deploy weapons in the area.

The March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear crisis put Japan in a vulnerable position with regard to its relations with Russia. Japan's energy industry depends heavily on imports from countries in the Middle East, and would benefit from increasing imports of oil and natural gas from Russia via Sakhalin. The territorial issue could be discussed in the context of joint development projects, where Russia has the advantage. In addition, following the March 2014 events that resulted in Russia's annexation of Crimea and war in south-eastern regions of Ukraine, the national rhetoric in Russia shifted further towards nationalism, and territorial concessions became even less negotiable than before. Japan's decision to impose sanctions on Russia with regard to the Ukraine crisis did not help the situation.¹⁷¹

On the other hand, the Japanese side has been trying to restart the negotiations. After winning the elections in Japan in 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Russia in 2013 to attempt to open up potential for cooperation on the disputed islands. Although the 2014 crisis slowed down its progress, the attempt resulted in a series of mutual visits, ultimately leading to a series of agreements on economic cooperation on the disputed islands in May and December 2016. Two bilateral summits – Abe's visit to Sochi in May 2016 and Putin's visit to Yamaguchi in December 2016 – raised expectations within the Japanese public regarding progress in resolving the dispute, and attracted media attention both domestically and internationally. By contrast, actors in Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido – including politicians, local activists and the press – treated the visits in a more practical and cautious way. Many of the numerous concerns, worries, emotions and expectations of people in Sakhalin and Hokkaido before, during and after the visits were significant enough to be

¹⁷¹ Tokyo's sanctions were notably weaker than those of other G7 members, and despite giving rhetorical support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, the Abe administration made clear its intention to resume rapprochement with Russia. See James D. J. Brown, "The Moment of Truth for Prime Minister Abe's Russia policy," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 16, no. 10 (5) (May 2018), 3.

reported in local media.

During the mutual visits, a plan of economic cooperation (joint operations in fishing, aquafarming, tourism and other businesses) in the disputed areas was proposed, but there was no significant progress towards concluding a peace treaty and resolving the territorial dispute. The implications of those visits and their potential role in resolving the dispute have been discussed in the press.¹⁷² However, the reception of the visits in the border regions of Russia and Japan directly related to the dispute – Sakhalinskaya Oblast and Hokkaido – have received less attention than the visits themselves. The circumstances in the border regions are often under-reported because the territorial dispute is seen as an international rather than a local issue. As a result, voices in both Sakhalin and Hokkaido have struggled to reach the international arena despite being discussed in academic publications. As Iwashita (2016) points out, “the Northern Territories issue is not just one of state-to-state negotiations, but one that requires attention to be paid to the commitments of various regional actors. The originality of ideas, the efforts needed to make them a reality, and the significance of their ambitions all require extensive evaluation.”¹⁷³

The development of the situation surrounding the dispute in the 2000s has contributed to the character of mentions of the dispute in newspaper coverage, particularly with regard to official stances of Russia and Japan on the matter. The official position of the Japanese government is that the Soviet Union occupied the islands in 1945 and incorporated them into its territories without any legal grounds.¹⁷⁴ The official Russian position (as expressed by the

¹⁷² James D. J. Brown, “Abe woos Putin with strategic intent in mind: Japan’s proposals on Northern Territories connected to balance of power in Northeast Asia,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 29, 2017, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/James-D.J.-Brown/Abe-woos-Putin-with-strategic-intent-in-mind> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹⁷³ Akihiro Iwashita, *Japan’s Border Issues: Pitfalls and Prospects* (Oxon; New York, Routledge, 2016), 122.

¹⁷⁴ “Basic Understanding of the Northern Territories Issue,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed March 1, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html> (accessed October

Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov) is that the sovereignty of the islands is not to be disputed because they were incorporated into the Soviet Union legally as the result of the war.¹⁷⁵ These two standpoints influence the discourse on the dispute and the islands in the press, affecting the intensity of coverage, the portrayal of Self and Other on both sides, and the choice of vocabulary used to refer to the dispute and the islands.

The Russian Foreign Affairs Minister has repeatedly stated that Russia is ready to transfer the smaller islands of Shikotan and the Habomai group to Japan,¹⁷⁶ in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, which states that the transfer of the smaller islands would take place after signing the peace treaty. In Japan, however, resolving the dispute on such conditions has long been considered a major political compromise with reputational consequences for the politicians supporting it.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, an alternative to the current “return all four islands” policy of the Japanese and Hokkaido governments has been created that was based on the 1956 declaration. In this position, the transfer of the smaller islands and some other concessions from the Russian side would be agreed upon, and then the other islands would be subject to further negotiations. This approach is commonly referred to as the “Two plus alpha” proposal.¹⁷⁸

2, 2018).

¹⁷⁵ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Lavrov: Suverenitet Rossii nad Kurilami obsuzhdeniyam ne podlezhit,” January 18, 2012, <https://www.rg.ru/2012/01/18/suv-site-anons.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

¹⁷⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Nihon to no heiwa jōyaku ‘fuyō’* Saharin shūgi-ra* daitōryō ni shokan,” December 10, 2016.

¹⁷⁷ Despite the fact that Japan signed the 1956 declaration, the “four islands at once” framework has been prevalent among Japanese government and media circles since the 1960s. For more on the “four islands at once” position, see Akihiro Iwashita, *Japan’s Border Issues: Pitfalls and Prospects* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 61-62.

¹⁷⁸ Gregory Clark, “A ‘new approach’ for the Russian territorial dispute?” *Japan Times*, May 11, 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/05/11/commentary/japan-commentary/new-approach-russian-territorial-dispute> (accessed October 2, 2018).

3.2. Local and National Perspectives on the Territorial Dispute

The dispute operates quite differently at the national (diplomatic) and local (daily life) levels in both Russia and Japan. There is considerable exchange on the local level between Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya Oblast (which currently administers the disputed islands), from visa-free exchange and joint environmental projects to fishing and trade agreements. To the residents of Hokkaido and Sakhalin, the dispute is a daily reality rather than an abstract international problem. Furthermore, life in border areas contributes to the formation of distinct regional identities. Opinions and attitudes regarding the dispute in these regions are more likely to be influenced by personal experiences and practical concerns than national agendas. Regional news coverage is more likely to include such nuances than coverage of the dispute in national newspapers. By contrast, on the national level more attention is paid to the political aspect of the dispute as seen from Moscow and Tokyo. As a result, national newspapers in both Russia and Japan are more likely to emphasize less “local” aspects of the dispute, such as awareness, strategic importance and official negotiations. It could be said that there is a clash of broader national identities and local sub-identities that results in antagonization of regional Other in the media: for instance, the public in Sakhalin scrutinizes the Russian President’s every statement during negotiations, making sure that he does not “sell” the Kuriles to Japan. This suspicion towards the national government (national Self) from the local government and public (regional Self) manifests not only in the media, but in local activism as well (see Richardson, 2015).

The territorial dispute, therefore, exists on a variety of levels, and its media reportage is linked with geopolitical interests of both nations, domestic circumstances, local views on the issue, and the history of negotiations. The 2016 mutual visits were a turning point in the modern history of the dispute, opening up the possibility of economic cooperation on the

islands. The visits (particularly Putin's in December) were widely anticipated in Japan, and produced significant media coverage.

The remainder of this chapter analyzes coverage of the territorial dispute in Japanese and Russian newspapers in the context of these visits, as well as discussing news reportage mentioning the dispute or the islands over a broader range of time periods in various contexts, including history and exchange. Although the main focus of analysis is the mutual visits in 2016, several data samplings from 2006 through 2015 are compared and contrasted against the 2016 visits and each other to offer a more complete perspective on national and regional concerns regarding the dispute, which are characterized by antagonization of a regional Other. The chapter focuses on the following aspects of the dispute and the respective news coverage in Russia and Japan:

- 1) Views on the history of the dispute presented in national and local newspapers;
- 2) The role of Nemuro in exchange with the disputed islands;
- 3) Coverage of the 2016 mutual visits in national and local newspapers;
- 4) Public opinion, social activities and individual voices in Hokkaido and

Sakhalinskaya Oblast during the 2016 mutual visits.

3.3. Stolen Territories or a Precious Prize of War? Different Histories of the Disputed Islands in Hokkaido and Sakhalin

When the territorial dispute is brought up in the press, both Russian and Japanese sides are likely to provide historical references in attempts to justify their nation's territorial claims. The plausibility of such historical arguments is not enough to warrant legal territorial agreements; however, they are often used to persuade the public that the disputed territories are an "inherent" part of Russia or Japan, even though the idea of "inherent" does not apply

to either.¹⁷⁹ Lee (2001) provides an analysis of the historical and legal aspects of the dispute, pointing out issues in the argumentation of both sides, which put the “inherent” arguments under question:

1. The evidence produced by the Russian side is not primarily related to the disputed Kurile Islands, but rather relates to the Kurile Archipelago in general;
2. Although it appears that Japanese arguments for claiming sovereignty over the Kurile Islands are more chronologically organized than Russia’s, it is apparent that these arguments are not fully supported by subsequent historical events within the context of the Shogunate’s *sakoku* policy at the relevant times;
3. Japan cannot establish its claim to sovereignty over the Kurile Islands before the year 1855 because its evidence, compared to that of Russia, is very marginal, in particular with reference to the exercise of functions of state and governmental authority by acts normally indicative of sovereignty;
4. As to the period before the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855, neither Russia nor Japan has produced evidence of probative value in respect of related states’ activities with direct bearing on the possession of the Kurile Islands;
5. Neither Russia nor Japan has proved its claim to established sovereignty before 1855 by means of prior discovery and occupation;
6. Accordingly, neither’s expansion at the material times before 1855 can, in a legal sense, shed light on the issue of sovereignty;
7. After defining precisely the boundary in the Kurile Archipelago by the Treaty of Shimoda, Japan, but not Russia, manifested and exercised functions of state and governmental authority by acts normally indicative of sovereignty over the Kurile

¹⁷⁹ For more on the concept of “inherent” as a discursive device in territorial disputes, see Akihiro Iwashita, *Japan’s Border Issues: Pitfalls and Prospects* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 24-25.

Islands.¹⁸⁰

Furthermore, the idea of the disputed island being “indigenous” or “inherent” to either Russia or Japan becomes contradictory considering the fact that there was an indigenous population present on Sakhalin, the Northern Kuriles and the disputed islands before they were discovered and mapped by Russians and Japanese. As Russian and Japanese presence on the islands was established through continuous encroachment on the indigenous population’s homeland, the islands’ history is discussed within the framework of Russia or Japan’s national history, which retroactively places Russia or Japan’s claims to the islands back to the earliest days of Ainu habitation on the islands.¹⁸¹

The “inherent” arguments are the positions of the respective governments, and one of the key means of disseminating these official views is via government sites, such as museums. News agencies report the position as that of the government and may endorse it as their own position as well. As a result, such phrases as “our Kuriles/Northern Territories” or “inherent Russian/Japanese land” are frequently seen in museum brochures and news articles.

¹⁸⁰ Seokwoo Lee, Shelagh Furness, and Clive H. Schofield, “Towards a framework for the resolution of the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands,” *International Boundary & Territory Briefings* 3, no. 6 (2001), 72.

¹⁸¹ Philip A. Seaton and Svetlana Paichadze, *Introduction* in Paichadze and Seaton, *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 8.



Figure 3.2. Brochures at the former Hokkaido Government building (*Aka Renga*)
Source: Photo by author.

War legacy and history in general are prominent Other-related topics in both Japanese and Russian newspapers, and history of the disputed islands is only one of several historical settings featuring Other.¹⁸² However, since it is the Japanese side that lost territory at the end of the war, the Japanese media discuss the territorial problem more often and provide more intensive coverage of affairs involving the disputed islands. The dispute is also featured more prominently in museums in Japan, from sections and brochures at various museums to separate museums and memorial complexes dedicated solely to the dispute and the islands.

The loss of the islands has become ingrained into Japanese national identity, particularly in Hokkaido, where most of the displaced islanders settled after the war. Similar to the returnees from South Sakhalin (Karafuto), who also settled in Hokkaido, they visit Sakhalinskaya Oblast in homecoming visits, and have formal associations in Japan.¹⁸³

¹⁸² This section focuses on news articles discussing history of the territorial dispute. The other historical topics discussed in Russian and Japanese newspapers are analyzed in Chapter 4.

¹⁸³ For more on Japanese homecoming visits to Sakhalin, see Masatoshi Miyashita, “Homecoming

However, as Japan renounced all claims to South Sakhalin after the war, the loss of Karafuto is associated more with nostalgic feelings and grief rather than political actions towards “reversal” of the territorial change. The narrative of territorial loss and associated memories are irrelevant to the Russian side. As a result, the media and the general public in Russia do not have a strong incentive to discuss resolutions of the dispute in Japan’s favor, or the dispute in general.

The repatriation that followed the Japanese loss of the Northern Territories can be linked to other postwar repatriations. Watt’s (2009) work analyzes the transformations of postwar Japan’s identity and discusses the experiences of repatriates (*hikiagesha*) from Japan’s former colonies in the broader context of the emerging Cold War.¹⁸⁴ The author’s main argument is that the concept of *hikiagesha* was a discursive response to the identity challenges following the collapse of the empire. With this idea taken into consideration, the Northern Territories dispute could be analyzed as an identity discourse triggered by the damage to Japan’s territorial identity after the war. The intensive news coverage of the Northern Territories in Japan, therefore, could be seen as a supporting device to this discourse.¹⁸⁵

With regard to the dispute’s long history, historical topics are often used as filler material in the absence of other noteworthy news concerning the dispute or the islands. For instance, *Hokkaidō Shimbun* ran a lengthy series of articles on the history of the territorial

visits to Karafuto,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton, 141-157.

¹⁸⁴ Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Asia Center, 2009).

¹⁸⁵ It is important to point out that there are distinctive regional features to every repatriation, so a direct comparison may be difficult. For instance, Bull (2015) discusses the collective identity of Karafuto repatriates and assesses the role of repatriate leaders in postwar Hokkaido. See Jonathan Bull, “Occupation-era Hokkaido and the Emergence of the Karafuto Repatriate,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 63-79.

dispute and negotiations called *Shōgen Hoppōryōdo kōshō* (Testimony of the Northern Territories negotiations) during Abe’s visit to Russia in May 2016. This practice can be observed in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and other Japanese newspapers during other periods, such as the G8 summits. Another historical topic related to the disputed islands is exchange between the islands and the rest of Japan, particularly their economic ties with Hakodate during the Edo period, which were discussed in another series of articles before Putin’s visit to Japan in December 2016.¹⁸⁶ The influence of Nemuro’s priorities on local reportage can be seen here: part of the reason this topic is brought up is that fishing is pivotal to the Nemuro economy, and there are Japanese holders of fishing licenses issued during the prewar period, which permitted them to fish in the now disputed areas.¹⁸⁷

The Sakhalin newspapers also write on a range of historical topics, but their main focus is particularly on the role of Sakhalin and the Kuriles in World War 2. The war history topic is prominent in Sakhalin coverage, and war legacy appears in other categories of news coverage, such as public activities or interviews with officials on matters other than war history. While not necessarily a unique Sakhalin phenomenon, and taking into account that Abe’s visit to Japan in May 2016 was close to Victory Day celebrations on May 9, it can still be said that war memories are a strong part of the collective identity of Sakhalin. This aspect of Sakhalin identity is reflected in surveys and news coverage, particularly whenever the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories are mentioned. The islands are widely regarded as a fair territorial gain of World War 2, and any resolution of the dispute involving territorial concessions is deemed undesirable and even insulting to residents of both Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The strategic importance of the islands is also mentioned often. For instance, in

¹⁸⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “<Hakodate to Hoppōryōdo kōryū no kiseki >-jō*’Hakodate-shi Etorofu-chō*’ Kahei ga kōro, ryōba kaitaku* hokuyō shiryōkan ni kokkyō hyōchū,” December 14, 2016.

¹⁸⁷ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Michi hokan no ‘gyogyō genbo’ dōritsu monjokan ni ikan e,” December 15, 2016.

Gubernskie Vedomosti there is an interview with a writer who had recently published a compilation of fictional stories set in Karafuto. The author expresses the following sentiment regarding the period:

We received a rich heritage in 1945. But I am consoled by the fact that the Japanese hadn't made the islands their home when they had the time, particularly due to natural conditions. They only built military bases, and it didn't go beyond that. By the way, if the Kuriles became Japanese, Russia would lose access to the Pacific Ocean. That is with regard to the talks on giving the islands to our neighbors.¹⁸⁸

The above statement regarding Japanese military bases is factually incorrect: while it is true that the islands were less developed than other regions of the Japanese Empire, by the end of the war the villages on the islands had a working infrastructure with roads, salmon hatcheries, post offices, police stations, schools, and temples. Museums such as the *Hoppokan* have a vast collection of data on prewar life on the islands, and Russian academic sources also acknowledge development of agriculture and industries on the Southern Kuriles.¹⁸⁹ This interview highlights a noticeable trend in Russian media to see the Japanese as invaders of the “inherent” Russian land whenever the Kurile islands are mentioned.

This vision of history seems prevalent across government and media circles on Sakhalin. According to the chief editor of *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, any discussions on the Russian side regarding potential territorial concessions to Japan are coming from either ignorance or the irresponsibility of those not familiar with the local situation, and Russia's hypothetical cession of the Kuriles is comparable to removal of part of a person's body.¹⁹⁰ *Gubernskie Vedomosti* published an article on the history of the newspaper, in which the author takes pride in the fact that *Gubernskie Vedomosti* has always had a firm and consistent viewpoint

¹⁸⁸ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Uroven' mastera,” April 27, 2016.

¹⁸⁹ Mikhail Vysokov, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril'skikh ostrovov*, 432-435.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with the chief editor of *Sovetsky Sakhalin* Vladimir Sorochan. Conducted by the author at the “Lada” hotel in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on February 7, 2017.

on the territorial issue.¹⁹¹ Sakhalin and the Kuriles are generally referred to as parts of a broader Sakhalin region, which became Russian territory in the 19th century.¹⁹²

Such statements also seem uniform across the multi-ethnic society of Sakhalin. Victoria Bya, the chief editor of a local Korean language newspaper *Se Koryo Shinmun* (a weekly Korean language newspaper for Sakhalin Koreans) confirmed that the readers of her newspaper are likely to be extremely opposed to any territorial concessions in Japan's favor because of Japan's role in the history of Sakhalin Koreans.¹⁹³ According to Victoria Bya, there are two main Japan-related themes discussed in the Korean newspaper: exchange between Sakhalin and Japan, and Japan's responsibility for the fate of Sakhalin Koreans. The main readership of the newspaper is comprised of first- and second-generation Sakhalin Koreans: those born outside Sakhalin, and their children born on Sakhalin. Both generations tend to view the Japanese as former invaders and are generally opposed to any territorial transfers to Japan.

This approach to the dispute is also consistent with local activism in Sakhalinskaya Oblast, which also receives local media coverage, such as the letter sent by Sakhalin representatives to Putin before his visit to Yamaguchi in December 2016. However, there are also cases when the activists themselves write columns for Sakhalin newspapers. For instance, 10 years before the May and December visits, Sergey Ponomarev authored an article on history of Sakhalinskaya Oblast (in regard to when its anniversary should be celebrated), comparing Sakhalinskaya oblast in 1909 and 1947. The article mentions that

¹⁹¹ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, "Sluzhit' chitatel'ny," December 21, 2016.

¹⁹² *Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Segodnya*, "70 let so dnya obrazovaniya Yuzhno-Sakhalinska," December 27, 2016.

¹⁹³ Interview with the chief editor of *Se Koryo Shinmun* Victoria Bya. Conducted by the author at the office of the newspaper on February 6, 2017. For discussion of Korean experiences in Karafuto and Sakhalin, see Yulia I. Din, "Dreams of Returning to Homeland: Koreans in Karafuto and Sakhalin," in Paichadze and Seaton, *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, 177-194.

Sakhalin and the Kuriles were administered by the Japanese from two centers: Sakhalin from Toyohara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), the capital of Karafuto, and the Kuriles – from the Chishima province. As Ponomarev argues, “Strengthening the centralization of the country in the wartime, the Japanese government in 1942 announced Karafuto’s reunification with Japan”, which also “entailed renaming all the geographical locations from their Ainu and Russian names to new Japanese names”.¹⁹⁴ This argumentation suggests that Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the islands were originally Russian, and were incorporated into Japan proper only during World War 2.

With regard to the dispute itself, Ponomarev is reiterating a widely accepted standpoint in Russia that the acquisition of the Kuriles by the Soviet Union occurred in accordance with all international agreements, and is therefore undisputable: “For all those who, due to their ‘forgetfulness’, state that the Soviet Union allegedly included the Kuriles (and southern Sakhalin) into its territory unilaterally, I shall emphasize that the decree was issued by the USSR only after the victor countries in their mutual agreement had excluded this territory from Japan”. The choice of vocabulary by the government representative strongly suggests that discussion of alternative viewpoints on the issue is not encouraged. This argumentation goes back to Russia’s official position that there is “no dispute” from the Russian perspective. Ponomarev’s stance is a typical position of a territorial imperativist (in Richardson’s terms). Territorial imperativists see themselves as the last guardians of Russia’s territorial integrity, the “true Russian patriots” protecting Russia’s lands from treacherous bureaucrats, politicians and oligarchs.¹⁹⁵

The position expressed by Ponomarev reflects that of some Russian academic sources.

¹⁹⁴ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Kogda u nas Den’ Rozhdeniya?” July 7, 2006.

¹⁹⁵ Richardson, *At the Edge of the Nation*, 71.

A notable example is Senchenko's *History of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands: on the problem of Russo-Japanese relations in 17th-20th centuries*, which was originally Senchenko's 1966 doctoral thesis and then republished as a book in 2005 with an additional chapter on Russo-Japanese relations (that was originally prohibited from publication in 1966). The main premise of the work is that Japan has never had any "exclusive rights" to Sakhalin and the Kuriles and that Russian explorers arrived on Sakhalin and the Kuriles before the Japanese. Territorial claims made by the Japanese establishment are dismissed as "groundless".¹⁹⁶

The republication of Senchenko's work triggered a critical response in Russian academic circles. Elizariiev (2007), a professor at Sakhalin State University and deputy of Sakhalin city assembly, has produced a detailed critique of Senchenko's work, where he points out the author's neglect to reference important historical sources and the overall selective use of sources that "distorts" the history of Sakhalin and the disputed islands.¹⁹⁷ Supported by a vast array of historical documents, the general standpoint of Elizariiev's work is that Senchenko's thesis was a product of its time, when academic publications were influenced by political factors; however, in republishing such a work he sees a "harsh perversion of historical truth" and accuses the author of intentional distortion and even falsification of historical evidence, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. The problem of significance of prior discovery, exploration and exploitation of the islands by either Russians or Japanese.
2. Edits done to the shape of the Sakhalin island on old Russian maps, where it was replaced by the shape of contemporary Sakhalin.
3. Conflation of the terms "Southern Kuriles" and "Kurile islands", which allowed for

¹⁹⁶ Ivan Senchenko, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril'skikh ostrovov: k probleme russko-yaponskikh otnoshenii v 17-20 vekakh* (Moscow: Èkslibris-Press, 2005), 921-922, 947.

¹⁹⁷ Vitaliy Elizariiev, *Podlinnaya istoriya Kuril'skikh ostrovov i Sakhalina 17-20 vv* (Moscow: Alrogitm, 2007), 11.

the manipulation of Russia's "alleged rights" to the entire Kurile chain, including the disputed islands.

4. Distortion of the history of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands by removal of various then-available sources (such as travel notes of Russian 17th and 19th century seafarers) issued under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

5. Superficial analysis of a number of issues, including Russia and Japan's economic development of the islands, history of Sakhalin as a penal colony, history of the relations between the Japanese and the Ainu, exchange and trade relations between indigenous peoples of Priamurye, Sakhalin and Kamchatka with Russia, China and Japan, documentary evidence from Japanese expeditions to the islands, official documents from Laxmann's embassy and others.¹⁹⁸

The above discussion suggests that there is a discrepancy between present-day academic research (Elizariev expresses his concern that Senchenko's republished work had been quickly embraced as an "encyclopedia" of Sakhalin history) and the official widely accepted and reiterated standpoint largely reflected in Soviet academic sources, which seems to be embraced by both the state and the news media. The "forgetfulness" expressed by Ponomarev in his criticism of contemporary discussions of the dispute, therefore, may refer not only to Japanese territorial claims, but also to recent academic publications in Russia such as Elizariev's, which are often excluded from mainstream media reportage. News coverage in Russia tends to reiterate the official government statements and references to the Soviet past, as well as conservative historians.

There is also noticeable tension between regional and national authorities with regard to the territorial dispute, which contributes to Sakhalin's regional identity and fuels the

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 16-17.

antagonization of national center. As Richardson puts it, there is “inherent anxiety in the region’s relationship with Moscow, which has served to accelerate and magnify a sense of isolation and distinctiveness from the rest of Russia”.¹⁹⁹ The term “anxiety” describes the contingent nature of Sakhalin–Moscow relations and suggests an identity-defining antagonism. Therefore, the territorial dispute in itself is a characteristic trait of Sakhalin Self that sets it apart from the rest of Russia.

3.4. Cultural and Business Exchange with the Disputed Islands

Overview of Exchange Activities in Nemuro

Nemuro has been the central hub of all activities concerning the Northern Territories since the beginning of the dispute, and the majority of organizations engaged in exchange with the disputed islands, as well as museums and memorials, are located in Nemuro or nearby. The *Hoppokan* museum and observatory are located at Cape Nosappu, and host expositions dedicated to the dispute and general information on the islands: natural resources, maps, ancient and modern history with photographs, personalities (such as Ishisuke Ando, mayor of Nemuro who actively campaigned for the “return” of all islands at once),²⁰⁰ life on the islands before the war and current exchange, and an observation deck to look at the islands through binoculars. The main purpose of the facilities appears to be informing the visitors (particularly from other regions of Japan) about the islands issue, including prewar and interwar life on the islands.

The main organization engaged in cultural exchange with the disputed islands in

¹⁹⁹ Richardson, *At the Edge of the Nation*, 166.

²⁰⁰ Akihiro Iwashita, *Japan’s Border Issues: Pitfalls and Prospects* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 61.

Nemuro is the Exchange Center with the Northern Four Islands (NIHORO).²⁰¹ It is located relatively far from the city center (~3.8km from the city hall) in the middle of a large field. The center operates the visa-free exchange program for inhabitants of the disputed islands, which resembles a package tour with homestays and cultural experiences (*bunka taiken*)²⁰² in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan. According to the brochure, the purpose of the facility is to “contribute to developing communication with the inhabitants of the northern four islands, as well as increase awareness and understanding of the Northern Territories problem in and outside Japan”.²⁰³ The center contains a set of facilities, including museum exhibitions (such as rooms decorated in traditional Japanese or Russian style), a movie theater, a library, a kitchen, and a playground for children. The building also serves as a training facility for newly arrived guests to help them become acquainted with Japan and Japanese culture, as well as Japan’s stance in the territorial dispute. The locations to be visited by the islanders are decided in advance, and the guests are generally not allowed to roam Nemuro city freely.

²⁰¹ NIHORO stands for “connecting Japan (NI) and Russia (RO) through Hokkaido (HO)”.

²⁰² The author has worked as an interpreter at two of such events: one taught the visitors how to play taiko drums, another was a visit to Sapporo Manga Anime Gakuin college, where the participants learned how to perform anime voiceovers (*afureko*).

²⁰³ Hokkaido Center of Exchange with the Four Northern Islands (NIHORO), *Shinseki nichiro no eichi de yontō henkan* (Nemuro: NIHORO, 2016).



Figure 3.3. The NIHORO exchange center in Nemuro

Source: “Hoppōyontō kōryū sentā (ni ho ro),” Nemuro Subprefectural Bureau, accessed March 20, 2018, <http://www.nemuro.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ss/srk/kanko/nmrgsdb/7history/7h-nihoro.htm>.

The staff at the exchange center emphasized that the exchange with the disputed islands should be treated separately from Russia–Japan exchange.²⁰⁴ According to the staff, “exchange with Russia” is a more general concept, and such exchange is carried out the same way exchange is carried out between Japan and other countries. The disputed islands are a special case, however, and the center should not be considered a Russia–Japan exchange organization. These comments appear to be in line with Japan’s official stance on the dispute.

Although there is a dedicated facility for exchange with the disputed territories, any other exchange with the islands outside of the visa-free program is strongly discouraged in Japan. As the disputed islands are deemed Japanese territory, any contact with the islands under Russian jurisdiction is subject to scrutiny and criticism. Nemuro organizations, including the Exchange Center with the Northern Four Islands, have warnings advising Japanese citizens not to visit the islands. While the Russian side does allow visits to the disputed areas, it is assumed that the Japanese visitors would be complying with Russian

²⁰⁴ Interview with the head (*kanchou*), Sada Shōzō, and the chief supervision inspector (*kanri shusa*), Nakazawa Aijiyo. Conducted by the author at the Exchange Center with the Northern Four Islands in Nemuro on October 25, 2017.

legislation by visiting those islands under a Russian visa, which is deemed unacceptable by the Japanese government. Such warnings may motivate Japanese businessmen operating outside the official framework to establish their contacts with the islands covertly, by going to Sakhalin first and using their Russian visas in secret to access the islands.²⁰⁵




Figure 3.4. A warning at the *Hoppokan* advising Japanese citizens not to visit the disputed islands

Source: Photo by author.

Exchange with the Disputed Islands in National and Local Newspapers

Hokkaido's significance in Russia–Japan interaction is amplified by the presence of a territorial problem, and exchange with the disputed islands attracts significant attention from both national and local media in Japan. Coverage of Northern Territories-related affairs is

²⁰⁵ Interview with Auichu Ryō, chief editor of the Nemuro branch of *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, conducted at the branch's office in Nemuro on October 24, 2017.

present in all Japanese newspapers, and articles around February 7 (the Northern Territories day in Japan) are particularly common in all newspapers, whereas articles on other days are less common in national newspapers. In general, *Hokkaidō Shimbun* has more articles on the Northern Territories and is the only newspaper that writes on a variety of Northern Territories-related topics consistently, with the islands being the main focus of coverage for its Nemuro branch. Reporters visit the islands to cover exchange events: for instance, in 2016 a new airplane route was established in Nakashibetsu airport for the elderly to visit the graves of their relatives located on the islands, which was covered by the newspaper.²⁰⁶

Russian newspapers, on the other hand, seldom mention the territorial dispute in the context of exchange and cooperation, and when the islands are mentioned (usually together with Sakhalin), the dispute itself is generally omitted. A typical example of such reportage is coverage of an upcoming youth forum on the islands organized by *Rosmolodezh*, a federal agency on youth-related affairs. The forum is described as having an international focus, particularly on Russia's "neighbor countries in the East", and it is planned to invite guests from China and Japan. Although it is suggested that Japanese guests will be invited to the disputed islands, the territorial dispute is not mentioned in the article.²⁰⁷

The two examples above are characteristic of the overall trends regarding coverage of the disputed islands in Russia and Japan. Russian newspapers are more likely to report exchange events where the Russian side is the host. The disputed islands are treated as part of Sakhalinskaya Oblast, and the dispute is generally not mentioned unless there is direct relation, such as an official visit or agreement on economic cooperation. The Japanese side, however, reports a wide variety of news concerning the islands and exchange with them,

²⁰⁶ Interview with Auichu Ryō, chief editor of the Nemuro branch of *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, conducted at the branch's office in Nemuro on October 24, 2017.

²⁰⁷ *Izvestiya*, "Rosmolodēzh provedēt forum na Kurilakh," 29 April, 2015.

from official visits and cultural exchange programs to nature documentaries and weather reports. The islands are also mentioned in articles on tourism to neighboring areas, particularly Nemuro.

Japan's attention to exchange with the disputed islands can also be seen in popular culture and, subsequently, in reportage of cultural events, particularly in the absence of newsworthy progress in negotiations. For instance, during 2015 there was reportage on Nemuro music bands dedicating their songs to the Northern Territories,²⁰⁸ and articles dedicated to an animated film *Giovanni's Island* that depicts cultural exchange between Japanese and Soviet citizens on Shikotan island in the first years after the war.²⁰⁹ Similarly, there are efforts to promote the dispute within Japan using cultural products: an idea is discussed to use pop idols to increase awareness of the territorial issue among young Japanese.²¹⁰ According to Hokkaido governor Takahashi Harumi, a version of *Giovanni's Island* with Russian subtitles is "important to make Russian citizens understand the Northern Territories problem", and the government intends to use *Giovanni's Island* to increase awareness of the dispute.²¹¹

Although the visa-free exchange program has been operational since 1992 and news reportage on it has become routinized on both sides, certain episodes of exchange become noteworthy to receive multiple follow-ups, particularly local level incidents that produce more coverage than the exchange events themselves. An example of such coverage would be

²⁰⁸ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Shimin bando 28-nichi CD hatsubai* Nemuro jazu zenkoku ni hibike* yume jitsugen yukari no 11-kyoku," 26 January, 2015.

²⁰⁹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "'Joban'ni no shima' Roshigo jimaku-ban kansei* chiji, katsuyō motomeru", January 10, 2015.

²¹⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, "(Uchi-ra bunka-bu) Nemuro Nishi kōkō Hoppōryōdo kenkyūkai Nemuro-shi moto tōmin 3-sei-ra, tōshindai no hasshin/ Hokkaidō = teisei ari," March 10, 2015.

²¹¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "'Joban'ni no shima' Roshigo jimaku-ban kansei* chiji, katsuyō motomeru," February 10, 2015.

an incident that unfolded a week after Abe's visit to Russia in May 2016. A Japanese delegation from Hokkaido was supposed to visit the disputed islands on May 16 as part of an exchange agreement with Russia to conduct a memorial service. According to the Russian side, the Japanese were denied entry because the delegation filled in the names of the islands according to Japanese pronunciation rather than how they are spelled on the Russian map, which is required by Russian law. The Japanese side, however, reported that the visit was canceled due to bad weather. Both versions of the narrative were mentioned in the Russian and Japanese press, which resulted in comments from news agencies and government officials from both sides. The initial "bad weather" report in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* on May 17²¹² received six follow-up articles, and a May 20 article presents the following conclusion: "Regardless of which version is true, it appears that Russia and Japan are not coming to mutual understanding."²¹³ In Sakhalin newspapers, however, the incident was mentioned only once in *Sovetsky Sakhalin* in a brief side note on May 20, with background to previous visa-free exchanges between Hokkaido and Sakhalinskaya Oblast and cancellations of such visits due to poor weather conditions in the previous years.²¹⁴

With much of the exchange with the disputed islands happening through Nemuro, it is reasonable to expect Nemuro's local concerns to be echoed in the newspapers. Fishing in the disputed waters is one of the most important business exchange concerns for Nemuro locals. The sea around the disputed islands offers better opportunities for fishing and seaweed harvesting, but in the absence of access to the islands the Japanese have to stay close to Nemuro. The main concern of Nemuro fishermen, therefore, is whether or not they will be

²¹² *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Akutenkō de nyū iki dekizu* bizanashi dai 1-jin," May 17, 2016.

²¹³ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "< Shasetsu > 'hoppō' jiyū hōmon* genten o daiji ni shite koso", May 20, 2016.

²¹⁴ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Ne tak pishetsya, po-drugomu slyshitsya," May 20, 2016.

able to go to the islands for fishing. The fishermen who communicate with the Russian side avoid mentioning the “return” of the islands in order not to provoke the Russian side.²¹⁵

Nemuro’s fishing concerns tend to be some of the most frequent dispute-related topics in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*. These concerns are voiced more prominently during official visits, and the new agreements regarding economic cooperation in 2016 were discussed from the point of view of Nemuro fishermen, who did not seem to see much benefit in it. This focus on local concerns applies to other coverage of official level exchange. Another notable example of a local incident overshadowing “official” coverage took place during the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg. The largest number of Russia-related articles in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* during this period is on a fishing incident in Hokkaido that occurred in the context of the territorial dispute: during the fishing season, fishermen of Nemuro could not receive permission to enter the disputed waters due to a delay on the Russian side. The fishermen intended to harvest seaweed, and a one-month delay on the Russian side was critical for the fishermen, who missed the season. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* discussed the problem at length, citing fishermen’s complaints, the economic implications such as the impact on prices of local produce, and the apologies from the Russian official who visited Nemuro and learned more about kelp harvesting from the Japanese.²¹⁶ By contrast, during the same period the national newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* discusses such events as demonstrations for the “return” of the disputed islands in Nemuro,²¹⁷ visa-free exchange agreements²¹⁸ and other incidents, such as when a

²¹⁵ Interview with Auichu Ryō, chief editor of the Nemuro branch of *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, conducted at the branch’s office in Nemuro on October 24, 2017.

²¹⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Kaigara-jima konbu-ryō* okure ni ‘mōshiwakenai’* Roshia kyokuchō* Nemuro shichō ni shazai,” July 7, 2006.

²¹⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Hoppōryōdo no chika-sa jikkan Nemuro de 1000-nin uōkingu = Hokkaidō,” July 24, 2006.

²¹⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Hoppōryōdo ‘dankai-teki henkan-ron’ ni chōson zen gaishō ga kugen Nemuro de shinpopojiumu = Hokkaidō,” July 11, 2006.

Japanese fishing vessel was detained near Sakhalin on suspicion of unauthorized fishing in the disputed waters.²¹⁹ Although both newspapers focus on events in Nemuro, *Hokkaidō Shimbun* dedicates a significant portion of coverage to the permission issue, while *Yomiuri Shimbun* focuses on issues of national security and the dispute in general. This difference between national and regional coverage has a practical explanation: for Tokyo, the islands dispute is a matter of foreign policy, while for Hokkaido it is a regional problem that affects daily life of its inhabitants. In other words, *Hokkaidō Shimbun* discusses Nemuro's concerns from the perspective of regional Self, whereas *Yomiuri Shimbun* approaches Nemuro as regional Other.

3.5. Local Reception of the May and December 2016 Summits in Sakhalin and Hokkaido

The year 2016 was particularly important for the territorial dispute and exchange involving Russia, Japan and the disputed islands. The conditions preceding the 2016 mutual visits, particularly Putin's visit to Japan in December, were more favorable than in the previous years: Abe is reported to have developed a relationship of trust with Putin, and relatively weak economic ties between Russia and Japan provided room for discussing potential Japanese investments into the Russian economy, which had been suffering from European and American sanctions over Crimea and war in south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Abe's visit to Russia in May drove the Japanese public's attention to the otherwise bogged-down territorial negotiations, as Abe was quoted as having the sense of "moving toward a breakthrough in the stalled peace treaty negotiations".²²⁰ As a result, there was a major

²¹⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Shōyōmaru' no 5-nin, Habomai gyokō ni modoru 'mu kyoka sōgyō shite inai'= hokkaidō," July 16, 2006.

²²⁰ *Japan Times*, "Abe meets Putin, agrees to 'new approach' in bid to resolve festering territorial dispute," May 17, 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/07/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-meets->

difference between the two visits in the amount of mentions of the dispute and the islands in news reportage, with Putin's visit having significantly more coverage of the dispute. During Putin's visit, the dispute was brought up twice as often in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, while in the national Japanese newspapers there was four to six times more coverage featuring the islands and the dispute in comparison to Abe's visit.

Table 3.2. Articles in Japanese newspapers mentioning the disputed islands during mutual visits

Japanese newspapers	Abe's visit on May 7, 2016 + two weeks before and after (April 22 to May 20)	Putin's visit on December 15-16 + two weeks before and after (December 2-22)
<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	23 articles	129 articles
<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	19 articles	125 articles
<i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>	34 articles	134 articles
<i>Hokkaidō Shimbun</i>	103 articles	212 articles

Putin's visit was seen in Japan as a chance to demonstrate the previously announced new approach to bilateral relations and an opportunity to make progress on the dispute. Several articles state that Russia and Japan have "different ways of thinking", and that the Japanese way must be communicated to Putin during his visit: for instance, an article published two weeks before the visit quotes Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida's intention "to tell Putin directly about Japan's way of thinking."²²¹ Another explanation for the increased amount of coverage is the practicalities and cost of covering the two summits. Even though *Hokkaidō Shimbun* has correspondents stationed in Russia, the December summit took place in Japan, and there were more resources available to *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and other newspapers to cover the summit than were available for the May summit in Sochi.

[putin-advance-bilateral-talks-isle-row-peace-treaty/](#).

²²¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Gaishō ga Roshia ni shuppatsu* kyō Pūchin-shi to kaidan," December 2, 2016.

In the Russian newspapers, the increase in the amount of dispute-related coverage during Putin’s visit was also observed (only in national newspapers), however it was not as major as in the Japanese newspapers. The overall number of mentions remains consistently low throughout both visits. Table 3.3 presents the total figures for all Russian newspapers.

Table 3.3. Articles in Russian newspapers mentioning the disputed islands during mutual visits

Russian newspapers	Abe’s visit on May 7, 2016 + two weeks before and after (April 22 to May 20)	Putin’s visit on December 15-16 + two weeks before and after (December 2-22)
<i>Rossiyskaya Gazeta</i>	8 articles	10 articles
<i>Izvestiya</i>	3 articles	6 articles
<i>Kommersant</i>	2 articles	6 articles
<i>Komsomolskaya Pravda</i>	4 articles	11 articles
<i>Sovetsky Sakhalin</i>	15 articles	10 articles
<i>Gubernskie Vedomosti</i>	8 articles	4 articles
<i>Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Segodnya</i>	1 article	2 articles

While the difference in the raw number of mentions between Russian and Japanese newspapers can be partially attributed to the factors discussed in the first chapter (smaller size of the newspapers in Russia, presence of *Hokkaidō Shimbun* branches in Russia, lack of Japan-focused reporters in Sakhalin newspapers), the prominence of the dispute within the coverage is different. Even with the size factor taken into account the Sakhalin newspapers do not have much coverage of the dispute. One potential reason for the relative lack of coverage is the general attitude towards the dispute in Russia: the general public is satisfied with the status quo, which was summarized by Putin in the expression: “there is no territorial dispute in Russia.”²²²

Thematic distribution of articles mentioning the dispute in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and

²²² *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “<Takujōshiki>Mittsu no kokoro,” December 17, 2016.

Sakhalin newspapers also differed significantly between the visits. Newspaper articles were classified into the following categories according to the primary subject matter of the article:

1) Negotiations and official visits between Russia and Japan (national): coverage of mutual visits, agreements, official statements, trivia (for example, descriptions of the venues and other details about the negotiations not directly related to their content).

2) Exchange on the local level: coverage of Japanese-Russian exchanges among non-governmental actors (primarily local residents) related to Sakhalin or the disputed islands.

3) Exchange between Russia and Japan (other): coverage of exchange that does not involve Sakhalin or the disputed islands.

4) International relations general: coverage of various events and visits not directly related to Russo-Japanese relations and the dispute.

5) History and archaeology: articles on war history, history of the territorial dispute and negotiations, archaeological discoveries, excavation of war dead remains etc.

6) Domestic affairs: stories that involve no official interaction on the international level, such as local industries, agriculture, tourism development, budget allocations.

7) Japan/Russia general: coverage of various events in Japan (in Russian newspapers) or Russia (in Japanese newspapers) that do not involve Russo-Japanese interaction or have a direct relation with the dispute.

8) Public relations and individual voices: articles covering events related specifically to the dispute and measures to raise public awareness; opinion polls and interviews.

9) Other news: articles on topics that do not belong in any previous category, such as natural events, accidents, crime, animal sightings etc.

The most prominent categories in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* during both Abe and Putin's visits are coverage of the negotiations and public relations/individual voices. During Putin's visit, the total amount of coverage mentioning the dispute doubled primarily due to the

increase of coverage in those two categories, as well as an increase in articles covering local affairs. The total figures for *Hokkaidō Shimbun* for Abe and Putin’s visit are presented in figures 3.5 and 3.6.



Figure 3.5: *Hokkaidō Shimbun* articles mentioning the islands during Abe’s visit to Sochi




Figure 3.6. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* articles mentioning the islands during Putin’s visit to Yamaguchi

Unlike Japanese newspapers, there was no increase in coverage of the dispute in Sakhalin newspapers during Putin’s visit in December (22 articles as opposed to 26 during the April-May period), however there were more articles discussing the negotiations in the December period. Japan’s anticipation of potential progress in the dispute received attention

from the Sakhalin public, which is reflected in news reportage during Putin’s visit, despite international relations seldom being covered in Sakhalin newspapers otherwise. Nevertheless, the most prominent category of coverage in Sakhalin newspapers during both visits is domestic affairs involving the disputed islands, such as budgets, transportation and agriculture.




Figure 3.7. Sakhalin newspapers mentioning the islands during Abe’s visit to Sochi




Figure 3.8. Sakhalin newspapers mentioning the islands during Putin’s visit to Yamaguchi

Abe’s visit was covered in one article in *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, while Putin’s visit was covered in three articles. One article discusses the proposed economic cooperation program,

and comes to the conclusion that Japan needs gas from Russia rather than the islands.²²³ The other two articles are dedicated to the first day of the visit, before the negotiations. The first article²²⁴ consists primarily of various trivia, such as a description of the hotel where Putin stayed, and Abe's suggestion to Putin to visit a hot spring. There is also a comment about local right-wing activists in Nagato petitioning Putin to "return" the islands. The second article²²⁵ is dedicated entirely to a small incident that occurred during the arrival of the Russian delegation. A Russian resident of Nagato wanted to offer Putin a handmade kimono, but was unable to present it as a personal gift due to formal obstacles, and had to submit it as a gift from the Nagato administration. The event is narrated from the personal perspective of a journalist from the federal newspaper *Kommersant*, who attended the press conference and witnessed the incident in person. The article states that, unlike the Japanese press, the author was more impressed by the dramatic gift giving event rather than the announcement of economic cooperation on the disputed islands. Although written by a federal correspondent, the article seems to fit the policy of Sakhalin newspapers, where a small local incident or a dramatic event is more newsworthy than international negotiations.

In the coverage of official negotiations there is a noticeable difference in the vocabulary employed by the Russian and Japanese officials and media. In Japanese newspapers, the islands are referred to as being "de facto administered" (*jijitsujō kankatsu*) by Russia. When discussing the potential resolutions, the Japanese side generally uses such terms as "return" or "reversal" (*henkan*), which implies that the islands originally belonged to Japan. In the Russian newspapers, however, the word "return" is never in official statements.

²²³ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Yaponii ot Rossii prezhdē vsego nuzhny ne ostrova, a gaz," December 16, 2016.

²²⁴ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Pereshli na goryachee," December 16, 2016.

²²⁵ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Podarochnyĭ nabor," December 16, 2016.

Terms such as “handing over” or “transfer” (*peredacha*) are used instead, which do not assume Japan’s original claim to the islands, and could be read as Russia’s voluntary gesture to give the islands away. The premise of these nuances is similar to that of Korean cultural assets acquired by Japan during the colonial period, that Japan offered to “transfer” to South Korea, while the receiving end raised questions regarding the use of the term “transfer” (*o-watashi*) instead of “return.”²²⁶

3.6. Local Perspectives on International Relations: Reporting Social Activities, Individual Voices and Public Opinion on the Dispute in Hokkaido and Sakhalin

The territorial dispute is both a national and a local concern in Hokkaido, and the public is frequently reminded about it by the government and the media. Billboards demanding the “return” of the islands can be seen across the prefecture, and there are public events organized by the government and private organizations to raise public awareness. Perhaps one of the most visible activities is the Northern Territories booth at the Sapporo Snow Festival, which allows Japan to make its case to foreign visitors to the festival every year. Other examples of such events that receive news coverage include a “Northern Territories marathon”,²²⁷ photo galleries depicting nature or prewar life on the islands, and organizations such as the Chishima–Habomai Islanders League (Chishima Renmei, an association of former residents) conducting panel discussions on various matters (such as Abe’s “new approach” to resolving the dispute) and promoting Northern Territories-related educational activities, including visits to schools by former residents of the islands. In the

²²⁶ “Press Conference by Prime Minister Naoto Kan,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, accessed March 1, 2018, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201008/10kaiken.html>.

²²⁷ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Ryōdomondai hashitte kangaete* 8-gatsu 21-nichi kaisai* Nosappu Misaki marason uketsuke kaishi,” May 18, 2016.

wake of Putin's visit to Japan in December 2016 there were several public activities as well, such as exhibitions and a 60-person rally in Nemuro.²²⁸



Figure 3.9. A slogan on Hokkaido government building (January 2019)

Source: Photo by author.

The slogan reads: “Continuous Dialog / With Connecting Enthusiasm / Return of the Four Islands.”

As discussed previously, Nemuro is the main location of coverage related to the dispute as the islands are deemed by Japan to belong in the Nemuro subprefecture. According to the chief editor of the Nemuro branch of *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, Aiuchi Ryō, the massive speculation on the upcoming December visit by Putin in Japanese media resulted in unrealistic expectations and “anxiety” (*fuan*) among Nemuro citizens.²²⁹ However, the only

²²⁸ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Dō naru Hoppōryōdo > tebata ya kanban dōmin ichigan* Nemuro shinkō-kyoku gaitō keihatsu,” December 2, 2016.

²²⁹ Interview with Aiuchi Ryō, chief editor of the Nemuro branch of *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, conducted at the branch's office in Nemuro on October 24, 2017.

realistic outcome of the summit was the agreement on economic cooperation, which was limited to specific areas such as garbage disposal, did not result in practical benefits in aspects critical to Nemuro (such as fishing), and did not have a clearly defined framework to carry out the exchange. The contrast between the expectations and the perceived lack of immediate progress towards resolving the dispute created a situation similar to that during the St. Petersburg G8 summit, when the locals in Nemuro expressed disappointment over lack of achievements during an official visit to Russia.

Reportage of social activities and individual voices is prominent during both Abe and Putin's visits, however coverage during Putin's visit dedicated significantly more space to such events and voices. Public activities and concerns expressed by the locals became the most represented category of coverage in December, surpassing coverage of the negotiations themselves in the amount of references to the disputed islands.²³⁰

A large proportion of the articles in this category represent readers' voices, such as letters from former residents of the islands. Many of these letters are concerned with "expectations" (*kitai*) regarding potential progress in the dispute, which rose in the wake of Putin's visit, or express "anxiety" (*fuan*) regarding the changes the Russia–Japan summit might bring in Nemuro's daily life. One of the main concerns brought up with regard to the dispute is the pressure associated with the old age of the former residents – some have given up on the possible "return" of the islands and simply wish to have easier access to them for visiting the graves of their relatives. Voices from the Russian side were also included: for instance, an article published after Abe's visit provides comments from several current residents of the islands stating that they were against the "return" of the islands to Japan but

²³⁰ A daily breakdown of *Hokkaidō Shimbun* reportage by topic during the 2016 mutual visits is presented in Appendix 4.

welcomed economic cooperation.²³¹

Multiple reports from Nemuro in December indicate disappointment over the lack of progress in the dispute and maintain a pessimistic view regarding the Putin's upcoming visit. The concerns expressed in Nemuro reports in the wake of the December visit are similar to those in April and May. The former residents are pessimistic about the prospect of returning to their old homes during their lifetime, while the fishermen are frustrated with the decline of the fishing industry and view the dispute from the perspective of extending the permitted fishing area, hoping it would help the local economy recover. Local economic issues are a separate concern with regard to Russia–Japan economic cooperation announced during Putin's visit, as it is seen as unlikely to result in any territorial gains for Japan, and its benefits for Nemuro economy are questioned. The issue is complicated by the fact that the development will happen under Russian control, which, according to locals, “will not change anything”, as the fishermen would still have to pay for permission to fish and harvest seaweed in the disputed areas.²³²

Local residents in both Sakhalin and Hokkaido attempted to communicate their requests and concerns to their national leaders. Similar to the G8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006, a representative from the Nemuro government visited the Prime Minister's cabinet to share Nemuro's priorities in Russia–Japan relations: the territorial dispute and salmon and trout fishing, for which Russia had recently introduced a drift net fishing ban.²³³ During Putin's visit, a letter from former residents of the disputed islands written in Russian was

²³¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Henkan arienai” roshiajin tōmin* keizai kyōryoku wa kangei,” May 8, 2016.

²³² *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Dō naru Hoppōryōdo > Nemuro no keiei-sha iyoku*’onkei doko made’ fuan mo* Nemuro,” December 17, 2016.

²³³ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Nichiro shunō kaidan de no ryōdo kōshō zenshin yōsei* Nemuro kan’nai 1 ichi 4 chō,” April 28, 2016. The drift net fishing ban and its impact on Nemuro is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

handed over to Putin by representatives of Chishima Renmei, and the occasion received detailed coverage in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*.²³⁴ On the Russian side, a letter (reported only in a brief note in *Sovetsky Sakhalin* on December 9) was written and signed by Sakhalin scholars, government officials and public activists, urging Putin to conduct the negotiations on the “principle of unshakable Russian sovereignty over the islands.”²³⁵ As *Hokkaidō Shimbun* reports on December 10, in that letter the Sakhalin activists called the idea of signing a peace treaty with Japan “selfish” and the territorial claims “unfounded.”²³⁶ One of the people who participated in preparation of this letter is Sergey Ponomarev, a member of Sakhalin Oblast дума who has played an important role in local activism regarding the dispute, including protests and petitions that took place on Sakhalin in anticipation of Putin’s visit to Japan in 2005.²³⁷

The percentage of negative responses towards a resolution in Japan’s favor has remained consistently high on Sakhalin throughout the years: in a 1995 survey conducted on Sakhalin, about 85% of the respondents “believed that the islands are Russian territory and should not be returned to Japan”; according to a 1998 survey, only 3% of Sakhalin respondents believed that the best method for resolving the dispute would be “the simultaneous return of the four islands”, and a 2001 survey by a local Sakhalin newspaper revealed that almost 78% of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk residents argued that the Japanese had no

²³⁴ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< 16-nichiro kōshō > shima e no omoi kōsaku* kaiketsu e 'zenshin wo'* Chishima renmei Riji-chō-ra kaiken,” December 16, 2016.

²³⁵ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Novosti odnim abzatsem,” December 9, 2016.

²³⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Nihon to no heiwa jōyaku 'fuyō'* Saharin shūgi-ra* daitōryō ni shokan,” December 10, 2016.

²³⁷ Paul Richardson, “Russia’s ‘Last Barren Islands’: the Southern Kurils and the Territorialization of Regional Memory,” in *Voices from the Shifting Russo-Japanese Border*, ed. Svetlana Paichadze and Philip A. Seaton (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 163-170.

legal right to claim all of the islands.²³⁸ A similar picture can be seen in nationwide surveys: according to the Levada Center, 78% of Russian citizens are against the “transfer” of all the disputed islands to Japan, and 71% are against the “transfer” of Shikotan and Habomai, which would be conceivable under the terms of the 1956 Joint Declaration.²³⁹ Richardson (2015) also points out that the percentage of negative responses is higher among residents of Sakhalinskaya Oblast in comparison to nationwide surveys.²⁴⁰ In this context, the prospect for all the islands being “returned” in line with the consistent demands made by both the local Hokkaido and national Japanese governments seems optimistic to say the least.



Figure 3.10. A rally organized in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on November 18, 2015
Source: RIA Sakhalin–Kurily, “Sakhalintsy vyshli na piket protiv deĭstviĭ Yaponii,” November 18, 2015, <https://skr.su/news/253435> (accessed October 2, 2018). The rally was organized to protest against the Japanese consulate’s decision to use a map that includes the disputed islands as Japanese territory. The slogans are “Hands off our Kuriles” (left), “Sakhalin and the Kuriles are our motherland” (right).

²³⁸ Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute*, 131.

²³⁹ *Vedomosti*, “Opros: Rossiyanam vazhnee Kurily, chem mirnyĭ dogovor s Yaponiei,” August 5, 2016, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2016/08/05/651879-opros-rossiyanam-vazhnee-Kurili>.

²⁴⁰ Richardson, “Russia’s ‘Last Barren Islands,’” 163.

With the intense activity in Japan associated with Putin's visit to Yamaguchi in December, the media and the Hokkaido public were also being made aware of the challenges stemming from public perception of the issue in Russia. On December 4 *Hokkaidō Shimbun* published the results of a survey conducted by Sakhalin University, which revealed that 70% of the students perceived of the islands as native Russian territory.²⁴¹ The students are quoted as being "friendly towards Japan", but they are also reported to "have a strong stance on the territorial dispute". Although economic cooperation was generally welcomed, the Russian residents are overwhelmingly "against the return."²⁴² Another major obstacle to the "return" of the islands is that the Russians currently living there consider the islands their home.²⁴³

The Russia–Japan summits were followed by feedback from the population. Although Abe claimed to "have been able to make a steady big leap forward" during the negotiations, later reports stated that no progress was made on the dispute, and that Abe had "lost" to Putin. Nemuro locals were disappointed with the continuous lack of progress in the dispute, and were also more concerned about local economy and fishing rather than economic cooperation.²⁴⁴ A nationwide survey held after the visit revealed that 77% of the population did not have high expectations regarding the resolution of the dispute after Putin's visit.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Saharin kokuritsudaisei no 7-wari*Hoppōryōdo wa Roshia-ryō'," December 4, 2016.

²⁴² Although the general media and public consensus on the dispute appears to be fairly uniform within Russia, these figures must be approached with caution. There appears to be a tendency among academic and government officials in Russia and Japan to make broad generalizations regarding public opinion of the residents of the disputed islands. Williams points out that survey results are considerably varied between different islands and times of the year, and the reports made by Russian and Japanese journalists seem to contradict each other. See Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute*, 132-134.

²⁴³ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Shikotan tōmin henkan ni hantai," December 15, 2016.

²⁴⁴ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "< Dō naru Hoppōryōdo > nichiro shunō kaidan kara ichiya*‘nattokuikanai’‘gyogyō taiō ni chūmoku’ * Nemuro Rausu ni rakutan to kitai," December 17, 2016.

²⁴⁵ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "Zenkoku seronchōsa *hoppōryōdomondai no shinten*‘kitai sezu’ dōnai sita 77-pāsento," December 19, 2016.

According to a Kyodo News poll, about 54% of the Japanese respondents viewed the outcome of the December summit negatively, while about 39% had a positive judgment.²⁴⁶ *Sovetsky Sakhalin* provides the same figures, and quotes another poll, according to which 60% of the Japanese are still hoping for a favorable resolution of the dispute.²⁴⁷ No similar Russia- or Sakhalin-based poll was mentioned in either newspaper. That could suggest a poll was not deemed necessary since the uniform attitude towards the dispute on Sakhalin was unlikely to change as there were no significant changes to the status quo.

3.7. Conclusions

Comparing national reports on the territorial dispute with local newspaper reportage in Hokkaido and Sakhalin allows us to look at the territorial dispute from a considerably different angle that contrasts with the views expressed during official negotiations and in the national press in both countries. The reported topics of exchange, border issues, war history and various concerns voiced by Hokkaido and Sakhalin people make it seem as if there are two versions of the dispute: one as an international policy issue, and one as a local phenomenon that is deeply intertwined with the lives of people to whom the dispute is a tangible reality rather than a topic in international politics. Understanding the local situation and listening to the local voices is a crucial part in sustaining a constructive dialog between the two nations. It provides a critical ground for evaluating the needs and capacities of the regions involved in exchange, and helps to respond to those needs better. Given that a political resolution has not been achieved yet, addressing local concerns becomes a viable

²⁴⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimibun*, “Nichiro kaidan ‘hyōka sezu’ 54%*kajino kaikin 7-wari hantai* zenkoku seronchōsa* naikaku shiji-ritsu 5-pointo teika,” December 19, 2016.

²⁴⁷ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Kakoe budushchee ozhidaet Kuril’skie ostrova? Regionalnye aspekty bol’shoi politiki,” December 20, 2016.

way to improve quality of life in the regions involved in the dispute.

The mutual visits that took place in 2016 received considerable attention in both Sakhalin and Hokkaido, but ultimately the views on a potential political resolution remain pessimistic in Hokkaido, while the Sakhalin media presented no significant changes to its support for the status quo. Economic cooperation is welcomed in both Sakhalin and Hokkaido (more so on Sakhalin); however, both sides do not appear to expect the cooperation to result in any territorial gains for Japan. In addition, the Hokkaido side has a number of concerns over the economic benefits of such cooperation as the stagnating Hokkaido economy might not be able to support it and would rather benefit from the relaxation of regulations in the disputed waters. Local concerns on both sides appear to be the same across different time periods; however, in Japan it is particularly the periods of mutual visits when these concerns are pronounced more prominently in news coverage.

Both Sakhalin and Hokkaido are heavily invested in local affairs, and discussion of the disputed islands is often featured in the context of local development, such as tourism, transport infrastructure or budgets. Reportage on the dispute itself, as well as many other points of Russo-Japanese interaction, such as the visa-free exchange, is becoming repetitive and routinized, particularly on Sakhalin, where Russia–Japan exchange is no longer seen as newsworthy. Both sides are more prone to reporting incidents that occurred during the exchange rather than cover the exchange itself. The major difference between *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and Sakhalin newspapers in the amount of coverage featuring the dispute and the islands is explained by the news-making capabilities of the newspapers and the primary focus of Sakhalin newspapers on reporting local issues.

To remind the public of the official stance in the dispute, both sides regularly publish historical articles mentioning the disputed islands, particularly when there is little volume of other coverage related to the dispute. The official stance also influences the choice of

vocabulary used to describe the dispute on both sides. In Sakhalin newspapers, historical articles mention the dispute in the context of World War 2 or the history of Sakhalinskaya Oblast. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* primarily discusses history of the islands in two contexts: 1) history of territorial negotiations, and 2) interaction between Hokkaido and the islands that took place before the war. In addition to articles on historical topics, both national and local newspapers in Japan seek usage of cultural products (animation, music) to increase awareness of the dispute in both Russia and Japan.

Discrepancies between the official, common public and media positions are significant enough to affect the reality of the dispute. The local population on Hokkaido is more concerned with domestic affairs associated with the dispute than seeking a political resolution. The aging former residents of the disputed islands, seeing that a political solution may not arrive during their lifetimes, would rather gain limited access to the disputed areas to visit the graves of their relatives. The local fishermen in Hokkaido are cautious about economic cooperation because they would still need permission to fish and harvest seaweed in the disputed waters. The Sakhalin public is concerned with protecting the legacy of World War 2 and the strategic importance of the islands. There is also strong opposition among the Sakhalin public and media to any territorial concessions to Japan that has remained consistent throughout the years. All these factors explain why the territorial dispute saw few substantial changes after the mutual visits in May and December 2016, and any future change in the status quo will face strong opposition from the Sakhalin side.

Chapter 4. Different Histories, Different News: History and War History in Russian and Japanese News

4.1. History as a Theme in Other-Related Reportage

This chapter analyzes and discusses portrayals of Self and Other found in Russian and Japanese newspaper coverage on topics pertaining to history of the two nations and their relations. Historical events involving interaction between Russia and Japan, including mutual discovery, negotiations, incidents and wars, are past forms of exchange with Other that generate news articles today. Depending on the availability of sources, the extent of the event's temporal remoteness from current times, the political situation in the state and the stance of the narrating newspapers, coverage of history-related topics involving interaction with Other can vary immensely not only between Russia and Japan, but also between different regions within Russia and Japan, which may have distinct local memories of specific historical events involving Other that took place in those regions. It is necessary to make a distinction between academic history and collective memory, which in the case of historical references in newspapers may be conflated. James V. Wertsch (2002) outlines the main components of history and collective memory, which are summarized in table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Key elements of history and collective memory by Wertsch

History	Collective Memory
“Objective”	“Subjective”
Distanced from any particular perspective	Single committed perspective
Reflects no particular social framework	Reflects a particular group’s social framework
Critical, reflective stance	Unself-conscious
Recognizes ambiguity	Impatient with ambiguity about motives and the interpretation of events
Focus on transformation	Focus on stable, unchanging group essence
Focus on historicity	Details of “pastness” of events
Differentiates the past from the present	Links the past with the present
Views past events as taking place “then and not now”	Ahistorical, antihistorical
Historical voice	Commemorative voice
Museum as form	Museum as temple
Disagreement, change, and controversy as part of ongoing historical interpretation	Unquestionable heroic narratives

Source: James V. Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 44, quoted in Paul Holtom, “From Königsberg to Kaliningrad: A Journey through the Politics of History and Memory,” in *Border changes in 20th century Europe: Selected Case Studies*, ed. Eero V. Medijainen (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2010), 274.

Historical references are commonplace in Other-related news coverage. History is presented and discussed in a variety of contexts – from historical anecdotes and curiosities to international affairs and cultural exchange to transport and medicine. Due to the temporal remoteness of historical events, discussions of history can appear in news articles across a wide range of time periods. Historical topics are more prone to appear in newspapers during specific times of the year (typically important anniversaries), however in many cases such articles are also found throughout the year. As history is omnipresent in the majority of Other-related topics, it is feasible to analyze historical aspects of interaction with Other in a wide variety of coverage types and themes.

Temporal remoteness of the events discussed in historical articles allows the newspapers to move beyond their primary role of transmitting news. News consumption, particularly in Japan, where reading newspapers is still deeply integrated into the daily

routine of many citizens, creates a market for authors to provide historical education and possibly entertainment. Analysis of historical articles in Japanese newspapers suggests a propensity towards a “narrative”, “storytelling” format of historical news reportage, which is published in lengthy series of articles that may be published in a book format,²⁴⁸ thus the newspaper can also become a history textbook.

War history in particular is a recurrent theme in Other-related news coverage as warfare is one of the most intense forms of interaction with Other, which creates room for antagonization on individual, regional and national levels. Images of Self and Other are forged in conflicts, with narratives and memories long outlasting the conflicts themselves. These narratives and memories diverge quite significantly in Russia and Japan. While it is difficult to outline a single narrative because local and individual accounts are different, there are distinct common historical and war narratives in Russia and Japan involving imagery of Other, which are reflected in news coverage.

This chapter encompasses five case studies that discuss imagery of Other in news coverage based on the following themes:

1. Discovering Other: Reporting contacts between Russians and Japanese before the Shimoda treaty.

Before the 1855 Shimoda treaty established official relations between Russia and Japan, contacts between Russians and Japanese were less frequent and more episodic in nature. Temporal remoteness of these contacts, as well as relative scarcity of sources available on the subject makes such contacts an attractive topic for educational news reportage. In addition, Ezo (from 1869, Hokkaido) played an important role in several of

²⁴⁸ This feature is particularly characteristic of *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, which has published several books based on their article series, including a book on Hokkaido’s role in wars in 2015. See Hokkaidō Shimbunsha, *Sengo 70 nen Hokkaidō to sensō* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō Shimbunsha, 2015).

those early interactions, which gives them a distinct “local” value. Analysis of newspaper coverage discussing early contacts helps trace the development of the vision of Russia and Japan as Other, as well as providing a source of relatively positive imagery of Other as opposed to wartime imagery.

2. Remembering the Russo-Japanese war: Analyzing the legacy of the Russo-Japanese war in Russian and Japanese news coverage.

The first major military conflict between Russia and Japan was the first major source of Other-related imagery for both sides that would persist across generations, however it also had massive consequences that redefined Russia and Japan’s Self: Russia’s humiliating defeat was a factor that contributed to its economic and ideological collapse and the revolution that followed, while Japan’s first major victory over another empire secured Japan’s place among world powers in the eyes of European and Japanese leaders.

3. The legacy of World War 2: war anniversary commemorations in Russian and Japanese news.

No volume would be enough to discuss thoroughly the entire range of political, social, cultural and identity transformation processes that followed the end of World War 2 in both Japan and the USSR. However, with regard to imagery concerning Japan and the USSR, several consistent trends can be identified from the analysis of newspaper articles about war that mention Other. In addition, Russian and Japanese newspapers differ in their discussion of various events and aspects of the war in their news coverage. Two of these aspects, the period of Japanese Karafuto (1905-1945) and internment of Japanese soldiers in Siberia after the war, are particularly important for Japanese collective memory, are analyzed in separate sub-case studies.

4. Sakhalin under Japanese rule: remembering Karafuto in Sakhalin and Hokkaido newspapers.

From the end of the Russo-Japanese War to the end of World War 2 the southern half of Sakhalin (Karafuto) was part of the Japanese empire. After the war, most residents of Karafuto were repatriated to Japan, many of whom settled in Hokkaido. Karafutonian identity is an example of a distinct local Japanese sub-identity that has a particular set of images of Russia involving memories of a lost homeland that is now part of Other. On the Russian side, similar associations can be made with the “Japanese period” of Sakhalin history. Shifting borders in the region have contributed to formation of multi-faceted identities, and news coverage of the Karafuto legacy echoes those identities on each side of the border.

5. Prisoners or detainees: Russian and Japanese perspectives on Japanese Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union.

During 1945-1956, hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers, officers and civilians were detained in the USSR and sent to forced labor camps in Siberia. Memories of former internees (some of whom decided to stay in Russia) played an integral role in shaping Japan’s Self and antagonism of Russia as Other as the former POWs’ accounts of their life in Siberia were a major source of information about and imagery of Russia in early postwar Japan. Analysis of academic literature and news coverage on Siberian internment in Russia and Japan helps identify some of the key imagery associated with Other that are still circulating in present day media.

4.2. Discovering Other: Stories of Contacts between Russians and Japanese Before and After the Shimoda Treaty

Before the 1855 Shimoda treaty formalized the relations between the two countries, contacts between Russian and Japanese people were rare, and historical data on those contacts is limited. It is probable that the earliest record of the supposed contact between Russians and Japanese dates back to the early 17th century. A Catholic Japanese man named

Nikolay, who traveled to Rus with a Spanish Augustinian monk Nicolas Melo, could have been the first Japanese to interact with Russians.²⁴⁹ If this account is to be believed, it was the only interaction between Russian and Japanese people that took place before the Edo period. By the time the Russians advanced in Siberia and the Far East enough to make regular exchange with Japan a possibility, the bakufu had adopted the *sakoku* policy, under which trade and relations between Japan and foreign countries was limited.²⁵⁰

While the *sakoku* policy made contacts with the Russians less likely to produce meaningful exchange, several contacts took place nevertheless. Russia–Japan exchange began through Ainu Mosir / Ezo almost a century before the end of the *sakoku* policy. While such exchange was not systematic, several visits by Russian officials to Japan through Ainu Mosir / Ezo, as well as episodes of cultural exchange took place before the Shimoda treaty formalized the relations between Russia and Japan. Temporal remoteness and episodic nature of such contacts make them ideal candidates for the “storytelling” format of presenting history, which in turn makes early contacts an attractive topic for articles on the history of Russo-Japanese relations. Such articles present an excellent opportunity to attract readership and extend on the newspaper’s main purpose of transmitting news. Historical articles also

²⁴⁹ Catholic sources claim that Nikolay (Japanese name unknown) moved with his family to Manila, the Philippines, in his youth, where he took monastic vows and joined the Augustinian order. In 1596 Melo was elected representative of the local Augustinian congregation, and left for Rome with Nikolay to attend the order’s chapter. However, for reasons unclear, the course of Melo’s voyage changed, and the embassy arrived in Persia, where Melo stayed at the court of the Persian shāh Abbās the Great. In 1600 Melo and Nikolay visited Moscow as part of the shāh’s diplomatic mission in Europe to forge an alliance against the Osman Empire. Due to a conflict between Melo and the English advisors of the shāh, as well as the difficult political situation in Russia, Melo and Nikolay were arrested and eventually executed – Nikolay in 1611 and Melo in 1614. For a detailed study of the account of Nikolay, see Yoshihide Nakamura, “Yaponets v Moskovii. Vozmozhnyi istochnik legendy o Belovod’e?” in Volume 50 of *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoï literatury*, ed. Dmitry Bulanin (St. Petersburg: Russian Academy of Sciences and Institute of Russian Literature, 1996), 400-403.

²⁵⁰ There are two ways to approach Japan’s history during the *sakoku* policy. From a Europe-oriented standpoint, Japan was a “closed country” conducting a self-isolation policy. Indeed, Japan restricted foreign trade severely, with most trade taking place with Holland, China, Korea (via Nagasaki and Tsushima) and the Ainu in the Matsumae domain. However, when looking from the perspective of Ezo (Hokkaido), which was effectively foreign territory for Japan at the time, it appears that Japan was heavily invested in colonization efforts. For an analysis of both approaches see Seaton, “Grand Narratives of Empire and Development,” 27.

provide practical benefits, as the material for them can be prepared in advance, as opposed to material for articles reporting recent events that require research, writing and typesetting to be done as soon as possible.

Early contacts between Russians and Japanese are characterized by the strong roles of individual personalities and events as opposed to the more “mass” exchange that took place after official relations were established. Table 4.2 provides a brief overview of documented Russo-Japanese contacts before the Shimoda treaty.

Table 4.2. Russo-Japanese contacts before the Shimoda treaty

Main individuals	Years and events	Consequences
Dembei (Japanese castaway) Vladimir Atlasov (Russian Cossack)	1697 – Dembei shipwrecked near Kamchatka peninsula. 1701-1702 – Dembei released from captivity by Atlasov. 1702 – Dembei receives an audience with the Russian Emperor. 1705 – Japanese language school founded in St. Petersburg.	Japanese language school founded in St. Petersburg (the school moved to Irkutsk in 1739 and operated until 1816).
Ivan Kozyrevsky and Danila Antsiferov (Russian Cossacks)	1711, 1712, 1713 – expeditions to Shumshu and Paramushir islands.	<i>Opisanie Aponskogo gosudarstva</i> (“Description of the Apon state”) published in 1726.
Martin Spanberg (Danish naval lieutenant in Russian service)	1738 – first Russian naval visit to Honshu. 1739 – second visit to Honshu, Japan and the Kurile islands appear on Russian maps.	Russian coins were delivered to Edo, and Russia became known by the name “Oroshia” in Japan. Trade exchange between Russian and Japanese sailors.
Pavel Lebedev-Lastochkin (Russian merchant)	1778-1779 – Expedition to Japan and the Kurile islands.	Lastochkin’s ship was destroyed by a typhoon, but the crew survived and reported their findings on the possibility of Russia–Japan trade to St. Petersburg.
Daikokuya Kodayu (Japanese castaway) Adam and Erik Laxmann (Russian explorers)	1783 – Kodayu shipwrecked. 1789 – Erik Laxmann introduced to castaways. 1791 – Kodayu leaves Russia. 1792-1793 – Adam Laxmann’s expedition to Hokkaido returns the castaways to Japan.	First large-scale embassy to Japan. Russia earned trade concessions from the bakufu.
Nikolay Rezanov (Russian diplomat)	1804-1805 – Embassy to Nagasaki following Laxmann’s visit (unsuccessful).	After a nearly 6 months wait, Rezanov was told to leave. No official trade relations were established between Russia and Japan.

Sources: Vasily Divin, *Russkie moreplavaniya na Tikhom okeane v XVIII veke* (Moscow: Mysl’, 1971), 120-168, 294-322; Mikhail Vysokov, *Istoriya Sakhalina i Kuril’skikh ostrovov: S drevneishikh vremën do nachala XXI stoletiya* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalinskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 2015); Nakamura Shintarō, *Nihonjin to roshiajin: monogatari nichiro jinbutsu oraishi* (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1978).

As mentioned previously, the greater emphasis on the role of individuals and specific events create a favorable ground for more “storytelling” news articles. An example of this format is a series of articles in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* that started in February 2015. On February 24, a new weekly special “Connecting Bridges between Russia and Japan” (*nichiro no kakehashi*) was announced, which would focus on the history of Russia–Japan relations and exchange.²⁵¹ Subsequent articles with several subtitles, such as “the tale of Russia–Japan friendship” (*yūjō no monogatari*), focused on the story of Daikokuya Kōdayū, a Japanese castaway who was stranded with his crew near the Aleutian islands and eventually reached Irkutsk, where they were discovered by a Finnish-Swedish-born Russian scholar and explorer Erik (Kirill) Laxmann. The castaways were escorted to St. Petersburg in 1789, where they were granted an audience with the Russian empress and assisted in updating maps of Japan. A total of 19 articles mentioning Kōdayū were published in 2015, one being a reader’s response to the series, praising the choice of an interesting topic. The reader concludes that despite several problems in Russo-Japanese relations, namely the territorial dispute and fishing issues, Russia is still a “neighboring country” (*ringoku*), particularly because it is so close to Hokkaido, and wishes for more opportunities for friendship and exchange with Russians on the local level.²⁵²

The remaining articles in the series are dedicated to Daikokuya Kōdayū’s journey back to Japan, which was made possible through Laxmann’s efforts. Returning the castaways, who had already spent more than 10 years in Russia, back to Japan was one of the reasons leading to a Russian expedition to Hokkaido. The expedition was carried out in 1792–1793 by Erik Laxmann’s son, Adam Laxmann. The crew spent one winter at the harbor of

²⁵¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Mekuru waku hajimeru* raigetsu sutāto shin shimen,” February 24, 2015.

²⁵² *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “<Dokusha no koe> Kyōmibukai Kōdayū no shōgai,” June 18, 2015.

Nemuro and later visited Hakodate, from where they were escorted to Matsumae.

In Japan, Laxmann's visit is recognized as one of the most important events in the history of Russia–Japan relations, and Japan's international development as a whole. It is also one of the better documented encounters, as Kōdayū's journey and Laxmann's embassy were thoroughly described in Katsuragawa Hoshū's *Hokusa bunryaku* (written in 1794, first published in 1937),²⁵³ one of the earliest Japanese accounts of Russia. *Oroshiakoku suimutan* (written in 1784 or 1795)²⁵⁴ is another document of the time dedicated to Laxmann's embassy, which inspired Inoue Yasushi's historical novel of the same name. The novel is mentioned in the reader's response to *Hokkaidō Shimbun*'s series on Kōdayū, adding that Inoue was a Hokkaido native born in Asahikawa. The novel is also known because of a 1992 Japanese-Soviet historical adventure film *Dreams of Russia*, which is based on it.

²⁵³ Katsuragawa Hoshū, *Kratkie vesti o skitaniyakh v severnykh vodakh* ("Khokusa monryaku"), trans. Vladimir Konstantinov, ed. Vladislav Goreglyad (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

²⁵⁴ Nikolay Konrad, ed., *Orosiakoku suimudan (Sny o Rossii). Izdanie teksta, perevod, vstupitel'naya stat'ya i kommentarii V. M. Konstantinova* (Moscow: Nauka, 1961).




Figure 4.1. *Orosha funenozu*, a painting depicting Erik Laxmann's ship.
 Source: "Rakkusuman no Nemuro taikō," Nemuro City website, accessed December 20, 2018,
<https://www.city.nemuro.hokkaido.jp/lifeinfo/kakuka/kyoikuiinkai/kyoikushiryokan/siryoukann/rekishinitsuite/rakusuman/index.html>.

The Nemuro History and Nature museum has a section on Laxmann's visit, describing the vessel and the daily lives of the crew in Japan. It is suggested that the Japanese first learned ice skating from the Russians in Nemuro, as the section contains reports of the Russians "attaching strange objects to their shoes" to slide over ice. It is also suggested that the Japanese learned of the habit of drinking black tea from the Russians during Laxmann's visit. The above points are presented in a way to portray Nemuro as "the birthplace" of some foreign-imported habits and traditions in Japan. Although there are several other pre-Meiji records of Russia–Japan interactions in other regions (such as the failed Nagasaki mission by a Russian diplomat Nikolay Rezanov in 1804 and a series of incidents that followed), the above example illustrates that some of the earliest formal and informal exchange between Russia and Japan took place in Ainu Mosir / Ezo.

National newspapers also have articles on Kōdayū in 2015. The reports focus

primarily on the Daikokuya Kōdayū Memorial museum (located in Kōdayū’s hometown Suzuka, Mie prefecture), which celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2015.²⁵⁵ A special exhibition dedicated to Inoue’s novel was opened at the museum to celebrate the anniversary.²⁵⁶ *Asahi Shimbun* also has an article dedicated to the memorial of Koichi (a member of Kōdayū’s crew who passed away from disease soon after returning to Japan) that was erected in Nemuro in 1992.²⁵⁷ In general, however, articles mentioning Kōdayū in national newspapers tend to focus on news and contemporary events rather than historical “storytelling”.

Unlike their Japanese counterparts, newspapers in Russia do not seem to have adapted early Russo-Japanese contacts as “storytelling” news material. Mentions of individuals involved in those early contacts, treaties and embassies are scarce and only used for historical references in otherwise unrelated articles. For instance, Evfimy Putyatin, the Russian side signatory of the Shimoda treaty, is mentioned in an article dedicated to the territorial dispute, in a small paragraph on gifts that Abe and Putin exchanged upon Putin’s visit in December 2016: Abe offered Putin a picture of Putyatin’s embassy that resulted in the signing of the Shimoda Treaty.²⁵⁸ Another example of such references is an article in a Sakhalin newspaper dedicated to the territorial dispute: the author references the Japanese animated film *Bakumatsu no Supashībo* (Russian title: “Difficult friendship”) dedicated to Putyatin’s visit to Japan, in a comment on a recent statement by a Japanese official, who emphasized both the

²⁵⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, “Tokubetsu-ten: Inoue yasushi ‘oroshiyakokusuimutan’ Kōdayū kinen-kan 10-shūnen/ Mie,” November 21, 2015.

²⁵⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, “‘Kōdayū’ kaita sakka no kiseki ‘oroshiyakokusuimutan’ no sekai-ten/ Mie ken,” October 24, 2015.

²⁵⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, “(Kita no rekishi ugoita shunkan komonjo o meguru) Koichi no shi ‘woroshajin kookugai mawari no zu’ gōdaichidō/ hokkaidō,” October 24, 2015.

²⁵⁸ *Izvestiya*, “Vladimir Putin predlozhil prekratit’ ‘istoricheskiĭ ping-pong’,” December 19, 2016.

need to return the Northern Territories and the advantages Russia would get from “friendship” with Japan. The author of the article ironically labels that proposition “an even more difficult friendship than that depicted in the animated film.”²⁵⁹

The 1855 Treaty of Shimoda opened Nagasaki, Shimoda and Hakodate ports for trade with Russia, and established formal relations between Russia and the Tokugawa Shogunate, which facilitated various forms of Russia–Japan exchange. For instance, there was considerable Russian cultural influence in Inasa, a village near Nagasaki where Russian sailors and officers lived while their vessels wintered in Japan. Russian presence in Inasa led to creation of a “Russian Village” and motivated Japanese people to start businesses in Russia.²⁶⁰ Nagasaki was also home to one of the first Russian consulates in Japan. However, it was Hakodate where the first Russian consulate and the first Russian church were built before Hakodate’s importance was superseded by Tokyo.

Hakodate’s importance as a cradle of early Russo-Japanese relations is evident through the history of Orthodox Christianity in Japan. St. Nicholas (Nikolay) of Japan, who worked in Hakodate for eight years from 1861 before moving to Tokyo in 1869, played an important role in establishing and propagating Orthodox faith in Japan. He supervised the Japanese translation of the New Testament, half of the Epistle to the Romans, as well as various other epistles, prayers and Orthodox rites. He also taught Russian at a school organized at his own home. Nikolay christened Pavel (Takuma) Sawabe, a former samurai from Shikoku who originally intended to kill Nikolay for spreading Christianity in Japan, but was persuaded by Nikolay to learn more about the Orthodox faith and became his student. Eventually Sawabe’s acquaintances, Sakai Tokurei and Urano Daizō, joined him to study

²⁵⁹ *Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Segodnya*, “Takie raznye daty,” March 10, 2010.

²⁶⁰ See Amir A. Khisamutdinov, *Russkii Nagasaki, ili Posledniĭ prichal v Inase* (Vladivostok: Vladivostok University Press, 2009).

Christian faith, and were later christened as Ioann Sakai and Yakov Urano. Together with Nikolay, the three Japanese Orthodox priests from Hakodate laid the foundation for the Russian Orthodox church in Japan.²⁶¹

The importance of early contacts with Russia through Hokkaido reflects in news coverage, with *Hokkaidō Shimbun* coverage containing more detailed depictions of the contacts in comparison with national newspapers, which tend to focus on the more practical, contemporary aspects of those contacts – exchange events, museum exhibits and photo galleries. Russian newspapers seldom mention early Russo-Japanese contacts, and generally employ such references in connection to contemporary politics and Russo-Japanese relations.

4.3. Remembering the Russo-Japanese War: The 100th Anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War in Russian and Japanese News Coverage

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the first large-scale military conflict between Russia and Japan. Given the historical circumstances of the conflict, particularly the massive inner transformations in the Russian Empire in its aftermath, as well as the two global conflicts that took place afterwards, it is perhaps not surprising that the legacy of the Russo-Japanese War was largely overshadowed by the legacies of World War 1, the October Revolution and World War 2. In the context of war memory it would also be fair to say that the Russo-Japanese War is farther on the periphery of Russian and Japanese collective identity while World War 2 is more central. Nevertheless, this war was important from the national identity perspective and served as a rich source of Other-related imagery for both Russia and Japan. The memory of the Russo-Japanese War in Japan is influenced heavily by

²⁶¹ Eleonora Sablina, *Istoriya yaponskoï pravoslavnoi tserkvi i ee osnovatel' arkhiepiskop Nikolai* (Moscow: AIRO-XXI; St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 2006), 37-45.

the historical novel “Clouds above the Hill” (*Saka no Ue no Kumo*) by Shiba Ryōtarō,²⁶² which was first serialized in a newspaper and was later adapted into a special NHK drama series that ran in 2009-2011. The so-called “Shiba view of history” (*Shiba shikan*) attracts much attention in academic and literary circles within Japan. Its strong influence suggests a discussion of ways in which popular culture may affect official narratives and politics. The relationship between national memory and local identities is discussed in a 2017 article by Hirano, Saaler and Säbel. The article analyzes local identities in Matsuyama, Tsushima and Maizuru as examples of local narratives constructed to fit within the framework of national history.²⁶³ Tsushima, where the important naval battle took place, and Matsuyama, where the Russian POW camp was located, are important places of memory in the context of Russo-Japanese War. It is argued that the politics exercised by local governments through museums and commemoration activities in Tsushima and Matsuyama present examples of “nationalization” of local memory, where local historical narratives are integrated into the broader national narrative.²⁶⁴ This is markedly different from Hokkaido, where, as discussed in section 1.3, the national narrative is contested by local narratives.

In Russia, the memory of the Russo-Japanese War is engraved in memorials, particularly in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok,²⁶⁵ as well as songs and works of poetry. The war has been depicted throughout the 20th century in a vast array of musical, literary and visual works. Earlier examples include novels by Vlas Doroshevich (*East and War*, 1905)

²⁶² For a detailed analysis of Shiba’s novel, see Naoko Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 273-280.

²⁶³ Tatsushi Hirano, Sven Saaler and Stefan Säbel, “Recent Developments in the Representation of National Memory and Local Identities: The Politics of Memory in Tsushima, Matsuyama, and Maizuru,” *Japanstudien* 20, no. 1 (2009), 247-277.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 256, 262.

²⁶⁵ There are memorials dedicated to the “Varyag” battle cruiser in South Korea (Incheon), where the battle of Chemulpo took place in 1904, and Scotland (Lendalfoot), where the cruiser was dismantled in 1920.

Aleksandr Kuprin (*Junior Captain Rybnikov*, 1906) and Pyotr Krasnov (*God Voiny* (*Year of the War*), 1905, and *Pogrom*, 1907), as well as Ilya Shatrov's 1907 waltz *On the Hills of Manchuria* (1907). Soviet period works include Alexey Novikov-Priboy's *Tsushima* (1932), Aleksandr Stepanov's *Port-Arthur* (1940-1942), a 1946 film *Kreyser "Varyag"* and several novels in the 1970s and 1980s by Valentin Pikul. *The Diamond Chariot* by Boris Akunin is an example of a recent (2002) critically acclaimed novel set during the time of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in Japan in 1878 and 1879. Following the surge of interest in the topic among historians after the collapse of the Soviet Union, several documentaries about the war were made in Russia in the 2000s, such as *Malen'kaya Pobedonosnaya Voina* (*A Little Victorious War*)²⁶⁶ of 2004, and *Russko-Yaponskaya Voina: Mif o Porazhenii* (*The Russo-Japanese War: the Myth of Defeat*) of 2009.

Nevertheless, compared to World War 2, the Russo-Japanese War is relatively understudied. According to Kowner (2006), over the course of the 20th century historiography of the Russo-Japanese War has transitioned from sensation to amnesia to recent surge in recollections.²⁶⁷ The "amnesia" during most of the 20th century was caused by several factors. Russia and Japan were seen as "Other" in the West, which further diminished the perceived significance of the war in European and American historiography. In postwar Japan and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, suppression and denial of the imperial past after major defeats have also played a role in the loss of significance of the war. It was only in the 1980s in Japan and in the 1990s in Russia that the Russo-Japanese War became an attractive topic for historical analysis. The analysis followed the resurgence of national

²⁶⁶ The title is a reference to a phrase ascribed to imperial Russian minister Vyacheslav Pleve, who claimed that a small and successful war campaign was necessary to contain the revolution in Russia. The phrase has since been used ironically to highlight excessive confidence or underestimation of the adversary.

²⁶⁷ Rotem Kowner, "Between a colonial clash and World War Zero: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in a Global Perspective," in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 2.

consciousness in historical inquiries into one's identity in both Russia and Japan.²⁶⁸

The Russo-Japanese War had lasting consequences for Russia, Japan and the world, particularly in East Asia. For Japan, the war was an opportunity to project a new Self-image onto itself and other nations. Japan was recognized by its own leaders and by leaders of other imperialist nations as a first class power (*ittōkoku*) and a great nation (*taikoku*). The new expectations about Japan's position on the world arena were accompanied by a rise in imperialism and nationalism, impact on national identity, and political and social transformation.²⁶⁹ Russia, on the other hand, lost its colonial momentum in East Asia and could not recover it until the the 1930s. In addition, Russia's ongoing political and fiscal crisis was exacerbated by ongoing war. With the United States as a mediator in peace negotiations, Russia was able to escape indemnity payments, but lost control of the Liaotung Peninsula, gave up its privileged status in northern Korea and nearly all of Manchuria and ceded the southern half of the Sakhalin island to Japan.²⁷⁰ The loss in the war turned Russia's foreign policy towards Europe and made it focus on minimizing the risk of an internal revolution.²⁷¹ In terms of more global consequences of the war, Korean sovereignty was jeopardized,²⁷² and China became fragmented further, losing dominance in areas in Manchuria and

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 3-4.

²⁶⁹ Rotem Kowner, "The War as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History," in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 42-43.

²⁷⁰ Jonathan Frankel, "The War and the Fate of the Tsarist Autocracy," in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 64-65.

²⁷¹ Peter Berton, "From Enemies to Allies: the War and Russo-Japanese Relations," in *The impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 78-79.

²⁷² There is a view that Japan's annexation of Korea was the outcome of Japan's failure in adopting protectorate policies towards Korea, which would have been an otherwise feasible alternative. In comparison to Western empires, Japanese imperial expansion provided a unique historical opportunity for alternative empire-building based on regionally divided legal units with transnational and interregional legal coordination. For more, see Asano Toyomi, "Regionalism or Imperialism: Japan's Options Toward a Protected Korea after the Russo-Japanese War, 1905-10," in *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration and Social Movements*, ed. Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary and Shinnosuke Takahashi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 21.

Mongolia, which fell under Russian and Japanese influence.²⁷³

The year 2004 marked the centennial anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War, which presented an opportunity for the media in both Russia and Japan to remind the public of its legacy. While Russian coverage on the subject is scarce, each of the analyzed Japanese newspapers produced over 100 articles mentioning the war in 2004. The statistics of mentions of the war in Japanese newspapers are reproduced in table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Statistics of the Russo-Japanese War mentions in Japanese newspapers for 2004.

Newspaper	Articles mentioning the war	Article titles mentioning the war
<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	186	34
<i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>	228	33
<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	218	40
<i>Hokkaidō Shimbun</i>	114	25

Reportage on the Russo-Japanese War in both Russian and Japanese newspapers generally falls into the following categories according to the main subject matter:

1. Commemoration events.
2. Academic and educational events, such as lectures, museum exhibits or symposiums.
3. Material artifacts from the war times, such as letters, diaries or photographs.
4. Specific events of the war, such as the siege of Port Arthur or the Battle of the Sea of Japan (Tsushima).
5. Individuals that played an important role in the war on either side of the conflict.
6. Articles dedicated to the war in general, such as historical commentaries and retrospectives.

While coverage of commemoration, academic/educational events and material

²⁷³ Ibid., 86.

artifacts constitutes actual news reportage, the rest of the article categories can be described as narrative (events of the war, personalities) or discursive (commentaries). Noting that the centenary of the war received relatively slow-going commentary in the Japanese press, Shimazu argues that there is little potency left in the Russo-Japanese War as either political, military or cultural symbol in contemporary Japanese society.²⁷⁴ At the same time, however, the centenary of the war attracted Japanese conservatives, who attempted to re-conceptualize the war to remind the Japanese of their national pride, using the relatively uncontroversial attitude to the Russo-Japanese War in Japan compared to World War 2. Shimazu analyzes a series of articles in the conservative *Sankei Shimbun*, which constituted a comprehensive historical inquiry using a vast array of sources in an attempt to re-evaluate the legacy of the war.²⁷⁵

Discursive articles on the war are of particular interest in the light of the above argument. For the war anniversary, *Yomiuri Shimbun* ran a 16-article historical commentary “The Russo-Japanese War living in the present” (*gendai ni ikiru nichiro sensō*), which focused on a variety of topics pertaining to the Russo-Japanese War’s importance for contemporary Japan. Among the several themes that appear in those articles is the influence of Japan’s victory over Russia on other Asian nations under colonial influence. For instance, the article on December 25 focuses on how the Russo-Japanese War inspired the national liberation movement in Vietnam.²⁷⁶

The official viewpoint in Japan is that the Russo-Japanese War was a stimulus for other nations to liberate themselves from Western influence. Indeed, Japan was seen as a

²⁷⁴ Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 272.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 267-268.

²⁷⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “[Gendai ni ikiru nichiro sensō] Nihon no shōri, dokuritsu no kibō ni Betonamu seinen, kokorozashi daki ryūgaku,” December 25, 2004.

prescriptive model for politically independent Egypt, and the Islamic world saw the war as a role model for struggle against Western colonization and an inspiration for Islamic reforms and revival.²⁷⁷ One of the most recent reiterations of this view on Japan's role in the war can be found in Abe's speech on the 70th anniversary of World War 2, which contains a commentary on the Russo-Japanese war:

More than one hundred years ago, vast colonies possessed mainly by the Western powers stretched out across the world. With their overwhelming supremacy in technology, waves of colonial rule surged toward Asia in the 19th century. There is no doubt that the resultant sense of crisis drove Japan forward to achieve modernization. Japan built a constitutional government earlier than any other nation in Asia. The country preserved its independence throughout. The Japan–Russia War gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa.²⁷⁸

Abe's statement represents the official position of the Japanese government on the war for the foreseeable future. However, the discourse on the role of the Russo-Japanese war in the liberation of Asian and African nations does not seem to concern the Russian newspapers. Neither Sakhalin nor national newspapers commented on the above passage from Abe's speech in 2015. Instead, articles mentioning Abe in Russian national newspapers in late August are dedicated to constitutional reform in Japan²⁷⁹ and friendship with China.²⁸⁰ Sakhalin newspapers did not have any mentions of Abe in August 2015.

For the centenary of the war in 2004, the Russian newspapers focused primarily on specific events, locations or personalities related to the war. Among the personalities described in national newspaper articles are Admiral Kolchak, Admiral Rozhdestvensky

²⁷⁷ Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 4.

²⁷⁸ "Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, August 14, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html (accessed October 2, 2018).

²⁷⁹ *Kommersant*, "Yaponskuyu armiyu speshno razoruzhayut," August 31, 2015.

²⁸⁰ *Kommersant*, "Druzhiba dvukh ploshchadei," August 31, 2015.

(whose great-grandson worked in Japan as of 2004, which made the title of the article),²⁸¹ and Admiral Kuznetsov. Apart from reportage on commemoration events (reported mostly in Sakhalin newspapers), various trivia and historical anecdotes (such as the Japanese learning to ski for the first time in preparation for the war, which was put into the title of the article),²⁸² both national and Sakhalin newspapers acknowledge that the war is “under-researched” and “under-appreciated” in Russia.²⁸³

One theme that received coverage in Russia is the treatment of Russian POWs in Japanese POW camps. The Russo-Japanese War is generally viewed as a war with mostly “humane” treatment of POWs. The Japanese state in particular deemed exemplary treatment of POWs as an opportunity to appear “civilized” in the eyes of Western nations. Despite the ongoing discourse that treated Russians as “half-yellow” and “barbaric”, at times the Russian POWs were treated almost as tourists, with the local government organizing school visits²⁸⁴ and a bicycle race for non-officer-class POWs in Matsuyama as a result of a “humanitarian nationalism” policy that evolved from discourses on justifying the war with Russia.²⁸⁵

²⁸¹ *Izvestiya*, “Prapravnik admirala Rozhdestvenskogo seichas rabotaet v Yaponii,” February 7, 2004.

²⁸² *Izvestiya*, “Yapontsy v pervye vstali na lyzhy, gotovyas’ k voine s Rossiei,” February 9, 2004.

²⁸³ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Na oshibkakh uchatsya,” February 10, 2004; *Izvestiya*, “Ne malen’kaya, ne pobedonosnaya,” February 7, 2004.

²⁸⁴ Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 192.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 171.



Figure 4.2. Russian POWs taking a stroll through Ōkaidō (Minatomachi), Matsuyama in 1905

Source: “Shashin tenji 1905-2005 Shashin wa kataru: 100-nenmae no horyo to Matsuyama,” Ritsumeikan University, accessed December 20, 2018, <http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/~miyawaki/index/index-j.html/pow/1905.htm>.

The above contrasts with the Russian treatment of Japanese POWs as the Russian administration was not desperately concerned with being recognized as “civilized”. Treatment of Japanese POWs in Russia was characterized by a discriminatory attitude towards lower ranks. The Russian administration was not preoccupied with the race of the POWs, however only the high ranks enjoyed relative freedom and better living conditions, as the officers were considered a race apart. The Japanese also segregated Russian POWs by ranks, however the more pressing issues with Russian POWs was their ethnic and cultural diversity that perplexed their captors: the Japanese authorities soon realized the need to house Polish, Jewish and Tatar POWs separately from ethnic Russians.²⁸⁶

In July 2006 the Japanese military offered the Russian embassy a collection of

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 186, 190, 195.

photographs depicting the life of Russian POWs in Japan. The point about Japan trying to appear “civilized” through treatment of the POWs is echoed in an article reporting the occasion, which notes that previously published photos of Russian POWs were “carefully picked prim collective portraits”, whereas the newly discovered photographs were “genuine reportage of the camp’s life”. The article describes the life of the POWs in great detail and quotes from Japanese memoirs: “They were cheerful, of tall stature and sang loudly while working”. The article describes treatment of POWs in the Russo-Japanese war as relatively “humane” on both sides, contrasting them to the atrocities of World War 2 on both sides: in Japan, one in every 10 POWs died in camps, and in the USSR 53,000 out of 600,000 Japanese POWs died, according to data from Tokyo.²⁸⁷

Discourses before and during the war contained distinctively negative images of Other: the Japanese views on Russia were heavily dominated by Anglo-Saxon imagery,²⁸⁸ while the Russians considered Japan an “exotic” underdeveloped nation, underestimating its military prowess up to the point that the war was initially met with optimism in Russia.²⁸⁹ From the above comparison, however, it can be deduced that the Russo-Japanese War has also generated a set of positive images of Other on both sides.

4.4. World War 2 Anniversary Commemorations in Russian and Japanese News

With regard to imagery concerning Self and Other (on both national and local levels), several consistent trends can be identified from the analysis of newspaper articles about war that mention Other. Russian and Japanese newspapers differ in their discussion of various

²⁸⁷ *Izvestiya*, “Oni byli vesēlye, roslye i gromko peli vo vremya raboty,” July 6, 2006.

²⁸⁸ Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War*, 167.

²⁸⁹ Jonathan Frankel, “The War and the Fate of the Tsarist Autocracy,” in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Rotem Kowner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 59-60.

events and emphasize different aspects of the war in their news coverage. Two of these aspects, which are particularly important for Japanese collective memory – the legacy of Karafuto and Siberian internment – are analyzed in separate sections of this chapter. This section analyses representation of World War 2 in Russian and Japanese national and local news coverage, as well as imagery associated with Russia and Japan as participants in the war in national and local perspectives.²⁹⁰

In Russian newspapers, much of World War 2 history related coverage tends to concentrate in late April-early May and August-September, correlating with yearly Victory Day celebrations. Russian state newspapers appear to focus on perceptions of World War 2 and particular events significant to the overall outcome of the war. For instance, in an April 20 interview the head of the State Archive of Russia, Sergey Mironenko, states that for American citizens Pearl Harbor and war with Japan is a more important aspect of the war, which creates a tendency among Americans to see the US as the main victor in the war.²⁹¹ Another article dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Yalta conference states that Stalin had “achieved the return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles in exchange for participating in the war against Japan.”²⁹² A February article²⁹³ discusses how Harry Dexter White, an American economist and an influential actor in America’s international financial affairs during the 1930s and 1940s, had “distracted” Japan from war with the USSR by “luring” them to attack

²⁹⁰ Local perspective on war history is particularly worth analyzing in Hokkaido, which until today remains an important military region for Japan and hosts the Northern Army, the largest of the five armies of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. As Seaton (2016) notes, war memories in Hokkaido are distinctively more “local” in comparison with such regions as Okinawa or Hiroshima, which have become integrated into national consciousness and are widely associated with World War 2 in Japan and abroad.

²⁹¹ *Kommersant*, “Razoblachenie fal’sifikatora i izgotovlennoi im falshivki neizbezhno,” April 20, 2015.

²⁹² *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “70 let Yaltinskoï konferentsii: Dlya Ruzvel’ta pokrasili vannuyu v tsvet morya, a Stalina nazvali Dyadyushka Dzho,” February 6, 2015.

²⁹³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “Taïnyi agent Kremlya spas Germaniyu ot uchasti <kartofel’nogo polya>,” February 19, 2015.

Pearl Harbor.²⁹⁴ In the article White is referred to as a “Russian spy”.

Another noteworthy article was published on August 11 and details Stalin's unrealized plan to invade Hokkaido, discussing whether the atomic bombing had helped Japan avoid the Soviet invasion in the north. The article disputes the claim that Stalin abandoned the operation after seeing the demonstration of American military power in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Instead, it argues, the decision was made after Stalin's correspondence with Truman, who rejected Stalin's proposition. In addition, occupation of Hokkaido was beyond the agreements achieved in Yalta, and thus could jeopardize the Soviet claim to the Kuriles. The article concludes that Stalin's decision was based on military and tactical considerations, as well as continuous cooperation with, rather than fear of, the Americans.²⁹⁵ As Glantz (2006) points out, Stalin was preparing to occupy the half of Hokkaido to the north of a line extending from Kushiro to Rumoi and the southern part of the Kurile Islands to Simushir (Shinshiri) inclusively. Among reasons for the abortion of the Hokkaido operation, Glantz mentions intense Allied pressure, the impending Japanese surrender and operational difficulties in Sakhalin.²⁹⁶ Barshay (2013) provides similar arguments, including Truman's categorical rejection of the idea.²⁹⁷ Hasegawa (2005) analyzes the correspondence that took place between Stalin and Truman before and after the decision to abandon the Hokkaido

²⁹⁴ This viewpoint is maintained by Steil (2013), who cites the head of the American desk of the NKVD Intelligence Directorate, Vitali Pavlov, who supposedly used White to provoke Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. See Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 53-59. This is disputed in a review of Steil's book by a historian, Eric Rauchway, who claims the supporting evidence is fabricated. See Eric Rauchway, “Whitewashing History,” in *Finance and Development* 50, no. 1 (March 2013), 53-54.

²⁹⁵ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “Spasla li yadernaya bomba Yaponiyu ot sovetskoi okkupatsii?” August 11, 2015.

²⁹⁶ David M. Glantz, *The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: “August Storm”* (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 304, 401.

²⁹⁷ Andrew E. Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945-56* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 21-22.

operation was made, and links it with the decision to send Japanese POWs to Siberian labor camps.²⁹⁸

Russia's recent shift towards cooperation with China (particularly after European countries and the US imposed sanctions on Russia following the events in Ukraine) led not only to joint business projects, but also to attempts to find commonality in both countries' histories. In the majority of war history articles mentioning Japan in 2015, China is a primary actor cooperating with the Soviet Union, whereas Japan is mentioned either in passing or together with Nazi Germany.²⁹⁹ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* in particular published a series of articles on Soviet–Chinese cooperation during the war, where Japan is referred to as an aggressor conducting “a full-scale war of aggression against China.”³⁰⁰ The series includes comments made by officials in Russia and China in the wake of the Victory Day celebrations. A full article is dedicated to a commentary by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yu. The commentary condemns Japanese militarism alongside German Nazism, and examines China's role in defeating militaristic Japan.³⁰¹ Russia and China are generally portrayed as nations who have suffered from an aggressor but won the war because of the courage of their people. This then becomes the pivotal contact point between the two countries as both victims of aggression and defenders of world peace.

This trend is commented on in Japanese newspapers: a *Mainichi Shimbun* article discusses Wang Yu's speech at the UN Security council, drawing attention to the phrase “there are still those unwilling to admit the truth, who attempt to misrepresent the past crimes

²⁹⁸ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 274.

²⁹⁹ *Kommersant*, “My ne obrecheny na vzaimnuyu vrazhdebnost'” 27 April, 2015.

³⁰⁰ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Kitaï – Rossiya: vmeste o pobede,” 8 May, 2015.

³⁰¹ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Vместе за мир,” August 28, 2015.

of aggression”, and the report suggests that the minister was referring to Abe’s regime even though Japan is not mentioned explicitly in the sentence.³⁰² The article also mentions “anti-Japan” commemoration events that take place alongside the “anti-fascist” events in Russia and China.

The commentary on Soviet–Chinese friendship during World War 2 and the statements made by Russian and Chinese representatives are noteworthy in the context of ideological and military conflicts that took place between Russia and China in the late 20th century. It is necessary to point out that Soviet–Chinese relations had a massive ideological split in the 1950s-1960s, which was aggravated by Chinese claims with regard to the territories acquired by Russia during the rule of the Qing dynasty in China. In 1969 a battle between Soviet and Chinese troops took place in the area of Damanskii/Zhenbao island in the Ussuri river. In a chronological review of Soviet–Chinese relations, Wilson (2004) describes this period of Soviet–Chinese relations as a major factor contributing to China’s policy shift towards the United States, and cites multiple sources that claim the Soviets were considering a preemptive nuclear strike against China.³⁰³ The bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union began recovering only in the 1980s. This period of Soviet–Chinese relations is not referred to in detail in the newspapers, possibly because it would distort the otherwise untainted image of the Russia–China partnership against Japan.

Another war-associated topic is celebrations of Victory Day on May 9, which is one of the biggest annual holidays in Russia and receives major media attention. The presence or absence of representatives from other states during the Victory Parade often creates room for political speculation. On April 28 *Kommersant* published an article discussing Abe’s decline

³⁰² *Mainichi Shimbun*, “Chūgoku: 'shinryaku gomakasu mono iru' gaishō, Nihon nentō ni -- Anpori,” February 24, 2015.

³⁰³ Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian–Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 19.

of the invitation to the May 9 parade in Moscow, after consultations with Barack Obama during Abe's visit to the US.³⁰⁴ Abe was not the only national leader to decline the invitation: it was already known by that time that German Chancellor Angela Merkel had also declined the invitation, supposedly due to tensions over the Ukraine crisis.³⁰⁵ *Kommersant* discusses recent changes in Japanese internal and external policy introduced by Abe, such as his attempts to revise the Constitution. Abe's stance regarding Japanese war responsibility is also discussed in the article. According to *Kommersant*, Abe "made it clear" that he was not going to use his speech at the US Congress as an opportunity to express a formal apology to the nations that had suffered from Japanese aggression. The sub-heading of the section discussing these aspects is "Farewell to pacifism". Such commentary is in line with the vision of Japan as a former aggressor expressed by Russian and Chinese state representatives in other war anniversary articles.

The tone is noticeable different in Japanese newspapers: for instance, a *Hokkaidō Shimbun* article on February 17 discusses peaceful coexistence with Russia and China and moving away from an "anti-Japanese" (*hannichi*) stance towards "kindness" (*yasashisa*) and "intimacy" (*shitashimi*).³⁰⁶ Another article on April 18 explains the events of the war to children and features such expressions as "not doing it again" (*nido to shinai*) and "pray for peace" (*heiwa wo chikau*).³⁰⁷ An article on January 12 narrates the history of the 7th division of the Imperial Army, which was formed in Sapporo and participated in the Russo-Japanese

³⁰⁴ *Kommersant*, "Yaponiya postoit v storone ot parada Pobedy," April 28, 2015.

³⁰⁵ *The Moscow Times*, "Japan's Abe Is Latest Leader to Decline Invite to Moscow's Victory Day Parade," April 28, 2015, <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/japans-abe-is-latest-leader-to-decline-invite-to-moscows-victory-day-parade-46147> (accessed October 2, 2018).

³⁰⁶ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "< 'Sengo 70-nen' no mukō e > kuroko kazuo* tatemae to shite no 'han'nichi'* yasashi-sa to shitashimi jikkan," February 17, 2015.

³⁰⁷ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "< Dōshin kodomo shinbun shūkan manabun > sensō nipponhei-tachi wa*'nidoto shinai' heiwa o chikau," April 18, 2015.

War, the Siberian intervention and several Soviet-Japanese border conflicts.³⁰⁸ Articles with the subheading “Talking with history” (*rekishi to kataru*) discuss Germany’s war responsibility³⁰⁹ and the potential for integration in Asia similar to postwar integration in Europe.³¹⁰ National newspapers also focus on war responsibility in Germany, particularly the Holocaust.

As can be seen from the above comparisons, China features prominently in articles mentioning Japan in Russian newspapers. China is linked with Russia on the grounds of having a common history of being a victim of fascism/militarism in the war, while no emphasis is given to conflicts between China and the USSR that took place after World War 2. Instead, China’s importance as a partner collaborating with the USSR against Japan is emphasized. In such articles Japan is presented as a former aggressor, and there are statements raising concerns about new developments in Japanese internal and external policy and fabrication of history.

This contrasts with Japan’s official stance on the war expressed in Abe’s war anniversary speech in August 2015, which was criticized by China’s official Xinhua news agency and South Korean President Park Geun-hye, as well as Tomiichi Murayama, the former Japanese Prime Minister who made a significant official war apology in 1995. Thomas Berger, a historian at Boston University, argued that Abe’s speech could be interpreted as an attempt to downplay Japan’s war responsibility, making it a victim of circumstances that were otherwise beyond control, a “historical tsunami for which no one

³⁰⁸ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Sengo 70-nen hokkaidō to sensō > dainanashidan Asahikawa no ishizue* hoppō bōei kyoten ni,” January 12, 2015.

³⁰⁹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Rekishi to kataru > kagai sekinin to mukiau Doitsu no sengo 70-nen* 2* shimin kōryū tsūji shinrai jōsei,” February 26, 2015.

³¹⁰ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Rekishi to kataru > sengo 70-nen* Hokudai kōkyō seisaku daigakuin kyōju endō ken-san* Ōshūtōgō shitatakana wakai,” March 6, 2015.

should be blamed.”³¹¹ Abe’s speech portrays Japan as a savior of the world from Western colonial influence (during the Russo-Japanese War), whose struggling economy (pressured by Western colonial powers) prompted it to challenge the world order:

...Japan's sense of isolation deepened and it attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. Its domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts. In this way, Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world. With the Manchurian Incident, followed by the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan gradually transformed itself into a challenger to the new international order that the international community sought to establish after tremendous sacrifices. Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war.³¹²

The above passage demonstrates complete incompatibility with the vision of Japan in World War 2 in Russia and China. In order to resist Japanese government ideological maneuvers that the Russian and Chinese governments see as revision of history, the officials and the media in Russia (and, according to the Russian reports discussed above, the Chinese officials as well) appear to be willing to downplay Russia and China’s own ideological confrontation and military conflicts that put them on the brink of war 70 years ago.

4.5. Sakhalin under Japanese Rule: Remembering Karafuto in Sakhalin and Hokkaido Newspapers

With the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth ending the Russo-Japanese War, the southern half of Sakhalin (Karafuto) was ceded to Japan, while the northern half remained under Russian jurisdiction.³¹³ A Japanese settler colony was established in southern Sakhalin from 1905 to

³¹¹ Jonathan Soble, “Shinzo Abe Echoes Japan’s Past World War II Apologies but Adds None,” *The New York Times*, August 14, 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/world/asia/shinzo-abe-japan-premier-world-war-ii-apology.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

³¹² “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, August 14, 2015, accessed October 2, 2018, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html.

³¹³ The Russo-Japanese border has changed multiple times in the region:

1) Before the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg both Russia and Japan had claims to the entire Sakhalin

1943, which was integrated as a prefecture of Japan from 1943 to 1945. Memories of Karafuto constitute an integral part of Japanese collective war memory, particularly in Hokkaido, where most returnees settled after the end of the war.

Former Karafuto residents have a distinct identity with memories associated with loss of one's homeland. As Morris-Suzuki (2016) states, these identities emerged from distinct colonial memories of "islander spirit" (*tōminsei*), which were embodied in monuments, parks and shrines in Karafuto.³¹⁴ While still under Japanese jurisdiction, Karafuto was portrayed in national consciousness as a chance to construct an utopian "new Japan" as a colony abroad.³¹⁵

After World War 2, when the USSR took over Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, most Karafuto residents were deported to Japan, and many settled in Hokkaido, where it became part of the local memory and consciousness. Japan's historical connection with Sakhalin can be felt strongly in Hokkaido cities, such as Wakkanai, which is the main location of sorrow and nostalgia for the times when southern Sakhalin was under Japanese rule. Wakkanai Park, for instance, hosts some of the most important places of memory related to Karafuto

island;

2) From 1875 until the Russo-Japanese War the entirety of Sakhalin island was under Russian jurisdiction;

3) After the Russo-Japanese War the southern half of Sakhalin was under Japanese jurisdiction;

4) In 1920 the northern part of Sakhalin was occupied by Japan and returned to the USSR in 1925;

5) After the end of World War 2 the entirety of Sakhalin island became part of the USSR. Depending on the periods outlined above, the Japanese term "Karafuto" may refer either to Sakhalin as a whole, or only to its southern part – this section focuses on the latter.

For a more complete overview of the shifting Russo-Japanese border, see table 3.1.

³¹⁴ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Colonialism and Migration: From the Landscapes of Toyohara," in *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements*, ed. Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary and Shinnosuke Takahashi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 117.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 106-107.

history.³¹⁶

In Russian academic literature, the “Japanese period” of Sakhalin history is relatively under-researched, particularly in comparison with the history of northern Sakhalin. Lisitsyna (2006) mentions several factors that have affected Karafuto research in Russia: political turmoil that followed the Russo-Japanese War, political power changes in Russia in 1917 and Sakhalin’s special status as a border territory.³¹⁷ Perhaps this explains the distinctly descriptive character of Russian literature dedicated to Karafuto, such as testimonies of Russians who remained in Karafuto after it became Japanese³¹⁸ or a survey of Japanese defense constructions that can still be found in contemporary Sakhalin.³¹⁹

Japanese newspapers publish extensively on the Karafuto legacy and the lives of the returnees in Japan, as well as their homecoming visits to Sakhalin. The series *Sengo 70 nen Hokkaidō to sensō* (70 years after the war: Hokkaido and the war) was published in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* in the year of the 70th war anniversary and was also released as a book under the same title.³²⁰ The series is dedicated to the roles of various Hokkaido locations and individuals in World War 2, and relies heavily on testimonies and interviews. The series encompasses a variety of topics, and a significant proportion of articles are dedicated to Karafuto war memory, including such aspects as reunions of families separated by the border change,³²¹

³¹⁶ Seaton, “Memories Beyond Borders,” 121.

³¹⁷ Elena Lisitsyna, *Istoriya Karafuto glazami sakhalinskikh i yaponskikh issledovatelei* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalin State University, 2006), 3.

³¹⁸ Sergey Fedorchuk, *Russkie na Karafuto* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Institut razvitiya obrazovaniya Sakhalinskoï oblasti, 2015).

³¹⁹ Igor Samarin, *Stal’i beton Karafuto* (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalinskoye knizhnoye izdatel’svo, 2007).

³²⁰ Hokkaidō Shimbunsha, *Sengo 70 nen: Hokkaidō to sensō* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō Shimbunsha, 2015).

³²¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Sengo 70-nen hokkaidō to sensō > Karafuto zanryū hōjin no 3 shimai* keishi to namida no shotaimen* ani Kume ichi-san*‘yume no yō’,” April 17, 2015.

commemoration events³²² and interviews with Korean residents of Karafuto who stayed on Sakhalin.³²³

The reportage mentioning Karafuto in Sakhalin newspapers focuses less on the former residents of the island and more on Karafuto as a period in Sakhalin history, which is expressed in interviews and coverage of various local events. A distinctive feature of all Karafuto coverage in Sakhalin newspapers is that all newsworthy occurrences are primarily related to individuals and events in Sakhalinskaya Oblast. In the same year *Sovetsky Sakhalin* discussed the commemoration event for Soviet and Japanese war dead in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk that was visited by the Japanese consul,³²⁴ an upcoming international conference on war history³²⁵ and a symposium on preservation of the historical and cultural legacy of Karafuto,³²⁶ which features an interview with a Sakhalin historian, Igor Samarin, whose work includes documentation of Karafuto remains on Sakhalin. Coverage mentioning Karafuto is dominated by historical inquiries done by Sakhalin researchers, and interviews often focus on a specific individual's passion for the "Japanese period" of Sakhalin history. Words such as *zagadka* (puzzle)³²⁷ are used by such individuals to describe their passion for the "mystery" of Karafuto, which motivates them to search for and collect Karafuto-related items.

The "Japanese period" is present in contemporary Sakhalin through various material artifacts, such as railroads,³²⁸ the Sakhalin history museum hosted in the former Karafuto

³²² *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "< Sengo 70-nen hokkaidō to sensō > Karafuto de konka ireisai* Toyohara-kai," May 17, 2015.

³²³ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, "< Sengo 70-nen hokkaidō to sensō > 195* dai 11-shō minzoku* Saharin zanryū Chōsen hito hikisaka reta kizuna (ue (2 no 2))* Soren shihai-go mo jūrōdō," August 9, 2015.

³²⁴ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Smotret' v budushchee, pomnit' o proshlom," August 18, 2015.

³²⁵ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Uroki voīny – urok miru," September 2, 2015.

³²⁶ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, "Primer, dostoinyi podrazhaniya," November 24, 2015.

³²⁷ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, "Vsë nachalos' s yaponskoī gorki," May 7, 2009.

³²⁸ As of 2008, most Japanese-built railroads have been redesigned to follow Russian rail size

government building and various other architectural and cultural curiosities that are still seen as bits of “Otherness” by local residents and the media. Unlike the more “personal” character of Karafuto-related reportage in *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, which focuses on individual accounts and interviews depicting life in Karafuto and the suffering associated with forced relocation and loss of one’s homeland, Karafuto mentions in Sakhalin newspapers are more “detached”. They discuss Karafuto as a historical period that attracts certain interest, but is also remote and somewhat alien for Sakhalin residents.

The “detached” character of such reportage presents an antagonism within Self, to which Self’s history as part of Other is a point of contention and contingency. It can be observed in readers’ responses as well: for instance, one of *Sovetsky Sakhalin*’s readers expresses his concerns about the local government’s request for Japanese assistance with restoration of Karafuto monuments.³²⁹ The reader criticizes the mercantile interests of the Sakhalin government: it does not preserve Soviet historical monuments, but gives priority to Karafuto monuments because it might be profitable through attracting Japanese investment and tourists. It is notable that the reader’s complaint about Karafuto monuments is listed among other concerns, such as the new redesign of the city hall building, lack of care for trees in the city center of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and some higher officials’ lack of taste in clothing, which suggests that for Sovetsky Sakhalin these issues are of a similar level of significance.

From the above observations it can be concluded that Karafuto, as a contingent period in Sakhalin history for its Russian residents, is manifested in two series of images: one presents Karafuto as a remote, “mysterious” period of local history that is a subject of

guidelines: *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Magistral’ novogo veka,” December 30, 2008.

³²⁹ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Ya ne ponimayu...” July 8, 2008.

academic and personal research, and the other is expressed in practical concerns that connect with the daily life of Sakhalin citizens: monuments, commemoration events, the museum and exchange. The individual's role is also significantly different between Japanese and Russian reportage: *Hokkaidō Shimbun* includes testimonies of former residents of Sakhalin, while the Sakhalin newspapers focus on interviews with historians, writers and hobbyists collecting historical artifacts.

4.6. Prisoners or Detainees: Russian and Japanese Perspectives on the Siberian Internment

Among the many themes associated with Russia and World War 2 in Japan, the Siberian Internment is one of the most remembered. After the war, about 600,000 Japanese servicemen and civilians served in Soviet labor camps in 1945-1956.³³⁰ The lasting memories of life in the camps served as a rich source of imagery on the Soviet Union that disseminated throughout Japan in the postwar period when the detainees returned home. To this day, the Siberian internment is preserved in Japan through personal testimonies of former internees. In recent years, efforts have been made in Japan to promote academic study of the subject. In late 2010, on the initiative of Professor Emeritus at Seikei University Tomita Takeshi, the Internment Research Association (Yokuryū Kenkyūkai) was organized for scholarly analysis of the Siberian Internment.³³¹ Recent English language academic publications are also available: for instance, an English version of Oguma Eiji's 2015

³³⁰ Some Japanese sources claim different figures: according to a Sankei Shimbun report in 2009, 760,000 Japanese citizens were detained in the Soviet Union. *Sankei Shimbun*, "Shiberia yokuryū, Ro ni 76 man ninbun no shiryō gunji kōbunsho-kan de kado hakken," July 24, 2009, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090726100909/http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/europe/090724/erp0907240115000-n1.htm> (accessed October 2, 2018).

³³¹ Andrew E. Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945–1956* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2013), 197.

monograph was published in 2018. The monograph is a sociological analysis of prewar, wartime and postwar Japanese experience as seen through the eyes of a former internee. The material for analysis is based on interviews with Oguma's own father, who spent three years in a POW camp in Chita in Eastern Siberia.³³²

When examined in a global context, forced migration, captivity and repatriation of Japanese citizens was more than a bilateral affair between Japan and the USSR: it was a multidimensional encounter between Japan, the Soviet Union and the US during the formative postwar decade. The transnational flow of images and ideas that accompanied the journey of Japanese soldiers from Japan to Manchuria to the Soviet POW camps and back to Japan played a crucial role in how Japan remembered its past and imagined its future in the new global order. The internees themselves became intermediaries in and victims of ideological confrontation between the US and the USSR, and played a vital part in forging anti-communist discourses in Japan.³³³

The abrupt decision to send over 600,000 Japanese soldiers, generals and civilians to labor camps was made as the Soviet authorities abandoned their plan to occupy Hokkaido. Hasegawa's 2005 work analyzes the strained communication between Soviet and American leaders in August 1945 regarding the planned occupation of Japan by the allied forces and the fate of Hokkaido and the Kuriles.³³⁴ Stalin's original plan was to "return" all of the Kurile islands, which he deemed inherent Russian territory, and to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido, which, unlike the Kuriles, he referred to as "Japan proper". In his response to

³³² Eiji Oguma, *Return from Siberia: A Japanese Life in War and Peace, 1925-2015* (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2018).

³³³ Sherzod Muminov, "The 'Siberian Internment' and the Transnational History of the Early Cold War Japan," in *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements*, ed. Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary and Shinnosuke Takahashi (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 72-73.

³³⁴ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 268-269.

Stalin's message, Truman firmly rejected the idea of the Soviet occupation of Hokkaido. The point regarding the Kuriles was not rejected as the Americans were concerned that the USSR could occupy Korea beyond the 38th parallel and not cooperate in Manchuria in response. In the following days, the Soviet authorities suspended the preparations to invade Hokkaido and focused their effort on the Kuriles instead. With the Hokkaido operation abandoned, Stalin was seeking other sources of labor for reconstruction and development of the Far East. Ultimately he decided to violate the Postdam declaration by using POWs for hard labor. Japanese POWs were sent to Siberian camps despite Soviet Marshall Lavrenty Beria's previous instruction not to send the Japanese to Soviet territory.³³⁵

Analysis of the Siberian Internment presents an opportunity to compare war narratives in Russia and Japan from a variety of perspectives. News reportage on both sides creates contrast between a nation that was victorious and a nation that was defeated; on the other hand, the captors were on the side that otherwise saw itself as the victim in the war, while the victims of the Siberian Internment were from the side that was seen as the aggressor in the war. In this context of changing roles, some parallels can be seen between the media's vision of Japan's role in World War 2 and Russia's role in the Siberian Internment: in both cases Self executes actions that cause suffering in Other, and attempts to address the issue of responsibility for those actions.

While well known in Japan, until recently the Siberian Internment was relatively under-researched in Russia. After the Soviet documents on Japanese POWs were declassified in the 1980s, research on the Siberian Internment started gaining traction. Some of the first efforts to study the Siberian Internment were made in the late 1980s-early 1990s. Notable authors include Russian Academy of Sciences scholar Aleksey Kirichenko, who maintained

³³⁵ Ibid., 273-274.

contact with the National Council for the Compensation of Siberian Internees (Zenkoku Yokuryūsha Hoshō Kyōgikai, founded 1979), as well as Vladivostok-based researcher Elena Bondarenko and military lawyer Vladimir Galitsky, who published archival data on the internees' daily routine and more accurate statistics. Among the first comprehensive studies of the Siberian Internment in Russia was Sergey Kuznetsov's 1997 work, which is based on Russian, Japanese and American archive data (including declassified military information), correspondence with hundreds of former internees and interviews with members of former internee associations.³³⁶ There have been several other academic publications on Siberian Internment in Russia in recent years.³³⁷ However, similar to other topics not related to “defense” or the “return” of Soviet territories in the war, the Siberian Internment is not covered frequently in Russian news reportage. In the context of war history, the Russian newspapers appear more inclined to emphasize Japan's role as an aggressor in the war rather than portray it in a victim's position.

The reportage in Japanese newspapers tends to concentrate on the following themes:

1. General information on the Siberian Internment.
2. Details of the detainees' labor and life conditions.
3. Return of deceased detainees' remains to Japan.
4. Visits to Japan by former detainees who decided to stay in Russia.
5. Public lectures on the Siberian Internment given by former detainees.

National newspapers in Japan tend to prefer the more general topics,³³⁸ including the

³³⁶ Sergey Kuznetsov, *Yapontsy v sibirskom plenu (1945-1956)* (Irkutsk: Tsentr mezhdunarodnykh issledovaniĭ IGU, 1997), 4.

³³⁷ Evgeny Bondarenko, *Inostrannye voenoplennyye na Dal'nem Vostoke Rossii (1914-1956 gg.)* (Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dal'nevostochnogo Universiteta, 2002); Elena Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki Vtoroi Mirovoi Voyny: maloizvestnye stranitsy rossiĭsko-yaponskikh otosheniĭ* (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniya, 2005).

³³⁸ In some cases information on the Siberian Internment is presented together with information on other Japanese POWs: for instance, one article discusses Japanese POWs in the USSR and North Korea. *Yomiuri*

return of detainees' remains to Japan³³⁹ and disclosure of previously classified information on the detainees by the Russian side.³⁴⁰ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, on the other hand, seems to favor personal accounts of the detainees, detailing the harsh living conditions and their longing for home and freedom. An article on March 1, 2015, reports an event at a community center in Rishiri dedicated to war and Karafuto history, where three former detainees recalled their experiences.³⁴¹ Another article on April 24 reports on a series of public lectures (*renzoku kōenkai*) on the Siberian Internment given by former detainees³⁴². The third lecture in the series scheduled took place on April 25, with the presenter who spent three years in Irkutsk.

While scarce, newspaper coverage of the Siberian Internment in Russia has noteworthy differences. The term “internment” is seldom mentioned in relation to Japanese POWs and generally no linguistic distinction is made between Japanese and other POWs in the Soviet Union. Kuznetsov mentions the tendency to conflate the terms “internment” (*internirovanie*) and “captivity” (*plen*) in the Russian press, and notes that the Japanese side insists on calling Japanese POWs in Siberia “internees”.³⁴³ The “Internment of the Japanese in Siberia” is mentioned as the subject of research by a Japanese student in Sakhalin.³⁴⁴ At

Shimbun, “‘Shasetsu' Soren yokuryū-shi meibo Kitachōsen de no higeki o kaimei shitai,” April 3, 2015.

³³⁹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, “Shiberia yokuryū: ‘otōsan, okaerinasai’ yokuryū-chū shibō no Kyōgoku Satō-san no ikotsu, 70-nen-buri kazoku no gen ni/ hokkaidō,” February 4, 2015; *Asahi Shimbun*, “Tsuretekaeru... Yakusoku hatasu Shiberia yokuryū-sha no ikotsu, furusato Shōbara e sen'yū-kai ga hashiwatashi/ Hiroshima ken,” February 20, 2015.

³⁴⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Shiberia yokuryū shin shiryō kyūso ren 700-satsu fumei-sha jōhō tasū nipponseifu 4 tsuki kara chōsa,” January 4, 2015.

³⁴¹ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “‘Shokuryō naku kaeru mo tabeta’* 3-shi ga sensō, yokuryū taiken kataru* Rishiri,” March 1, 2015.

³⁴² *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Shiberia yokuryū jidai ni* taiken-sha ga kataru kai Sapporo de asu 3-kai-me* Teine no Tatebe-san kikaku* higeki mitsumetai,” April 24, 2015.

³⁴³ Kuznetsov, *Yapontsy v sibirskom plenu*, 30.

³⁴⁴ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Ostrov ikh mechty,” August 1, 2015.

the same time, the word “internment” is frequently used in reference to forced relocation of Japanese Americans in the US during World War 2,³⁴⁵ as well as Korean forced labor in Sakhalin.³⁴⁶

The above linguistic nuance is commented on in a 2005 interview with Anatoly Koshkin, a conservative Russian historian and political commentator who has written articles and books critiquing Japan’s official stance regarding its participation in wars and the territorial dispute. The interview was published in the government-affiliated *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Koshkin argues that the term “internment” cannot be used for Japanese POWs because at the time of their capture they were military, rather than civilian, subjects, while “internment” applies only to civilians. Koshkin also claims that the current view on the POWs in Japan stems from the idea that the Kwantung army soldiers and officers surrendered to the Soviets not because they were defeated, but because they were following the Japanese Emperor’s orders, and thus were ordinary citizens taken to labor camps by force.³⁴⁷

The interview mentions the “All-Japan Association of Forced Detainees”. Several associations of former detainees in Japan have existed throughout the years,³⁴⁸ the most recent iteration being the General Incorporated Foundation Association of Forced Detainees³⁴⁹ established in 1989. The objectives of the organization include organization of symposiums on Russia’s war responsibility and campaigns for Russia’s official apologies and

³⁴⁵ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Skelet v shkafu,” December 23, 2008.

³⁴⁶ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Nezazhivayushchaya rana,” December 20, 2005.

³⁴⁷ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Ten’ Tsusimy dlinoyu v vek,” September 2, 2005.

³⁴⁸ Barshay mentions the Northern Association (Sakuhoku Kai, founded 1953 and disbanded in 2005) and the National Council for the Compensation of Siberian Internees (Zenkoku Yokuryūsha Hosho Kyōgikai, founded in 1989 and disbanded in 2010). See Andrew E. Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945-56* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 22-23.

³⁴⁹ “(Ichi zai) Zen'yokukyō' ni tsuite,” National Association of Forced Detainees, <https://zaidan-zenyokukyo-com.ssl-xserver.jp/about.html> (accessed October 2, 2018).

compensation for the detainees. On the grounds of the above argument, Koshkin dismisses the claims from Japanese POWs for compensation and refers to the association of forced detainees as “an association of Kwantung Army veterans”.

Both Russian and Japanese newspapers dedicate articles to the former internees that stayed in the Soviet Union. A visit to Japan by such internees creates a newsworthy occurrence for Japanese newspapers. For instance, in 2006 *Yomiuri Shimbun* dedicated seven articles to the story of Nakagawa Yoshiteru, a former internee who decided to stay in Russia. Nakagawa’s visit to his hometown in Hokkaido was discussed in detail in both *Hokkaidō Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, including the former internee’s appeal to his deceased mother to forgive him for choosing to stay in Russia.³⁵⁰ By contrast, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* has one article on Nakagawa in 2006, which discusses his life in Russia and includes an interview, in which Nakagawa admits he has “become Russified” and considers Russia his homeland, up to the point of forgetting the Japanese language, celebrating Victory Day as his personal holiday and cheering for Russian teams in sports games.³⁵¹ His visit to Japan is mentioned briefly, particularly the paperwork Nakagawa had to endure in order to prove that he was indeed a former internee. As Nakagawa was originally deemed to have perished in the aftermath of the war, he also had a chance to visit his own grave in Japan. The article also contains a remark from Nakagawa that waging war against the Soviets was one of the things he did earlier in life that he considers “stupid”, such as attempting suicide (seppuku), after which he was rescued by a Soviet nurse. At the end of the interview Nakagawa expresses his hope that no nation ever fights Russia in war again.

Another noteworthy news story regarding the Siberian Internment was published in

³⁵⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Okāsan yurushitekudasai Roshia zanryū hōjin Nakagawa-san, ryōshin no bozen de namida = hokkaidō,” July 6, 2006.

³⁵¹ *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Samurai Sasha,” June 4, 2015.

Komsomolskaya Pravda in 2015, in an interview with Elena Katasonova, a staff researcher at the Center of Japanese Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. The compensation issue is mentioned again, with the note that the Soviet Union did not provide the documents required for the former internees to be recognized legally by the Japanese government, which contributed to their status in Japan, caused discrimination against the POWs and contributed to the dissemination of negative images of the Soviet Union.³⁵² Katasonova's comments, while acknowledging the negative experiences suffered by the POWs, also highlights the positive aspects of their life in the Soviet Union, particularly the caring attitude of the local population that shared food and clothes with them, and love affairs between the POWs and local women.³⁵³ Responsibility for the suffering of the POWs is partially shifted to the Japanese state, which, according to a recently discovered document in the Russian archives, offered the POWs to Moscow as free workforce in a perceived attempt to save Emperor Hirohito from the Tokyo trial. The article ends with a remark that the attitude towards Russia and the Soviet Union in Japan was warmer when less effort to help the POWs were made by the Russian side, suggesting that cooperation in this matter has worsened the image of Russia among Japanese general public. Regarding recent negative imagery of Russia, a Japanese musical dedicated to the Siberian Internment is mentioned, which depicts the death of Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, who receives a poisonous injection

³⁵² The Russian government did eventually issue the required documents but the returnees' appeal was rejected by the Japanese court. See "Commission on Human Rights: Fifty-sixth session, Summary Record of the 48th Meeting; Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 13 April 2000, at 9 p.m." Economic and Social Council, United Nations, last modified November 7, 2000, [https://web.archive.org/web/20151001142344/http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/AllSymbols/252DFB6FB197D3C4802568DC0056A92C/\\$File/G0015686.doc?OpenElement](https://web.archive.org/web/20151001142344/http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/AllSymbols/252DFB6FB197D3C4802568DC0056A92C/$File/G0015686.doc?OpenElement) (accessed October 2, 2018).

³⁵³ Katasonova's comment on the positive aspects of POWs' lives in Siberia allows one to draw some parallels with contemporary Japanese portrayals of Russian POWs in the Russo-Japanese War. These portrayals also contain themes of wounded soldiers treated kindly and romance between the POWs and local women. See *The Japan Times*, "Civility shown to Russo-Japanese War POWs lives on as Matsuyama's legacy," August 22, 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/22/national/history/civility-shown-russo-japanese-war-pows-lives-matsuyamas-legacy/> (accessed December 20, 2018).

from a Soviet nurse. The interviewee notes that it did not happen (Konoe was never taken POW in the Soviet Union)³⁵⁴ and expresses her regrets that the “Siberian captivity” (*plen*) is used as a setting to create dramatically negative images of Russia.³⁵⁵

The treatment of the internment/POW situation (as expressed in Katasonova’s comment on inevitable suffering caused by conditions beyond the Soviets’ control) has some similarities to the treatment of Japan’s role in World War 2 as expressed in Abe’s 2015 war anniversary speech. While acknowledging Self’s role as the aggressor (captor), atrocities of war (or cold, forced labor and famine in the case of the Siberian Internment) are discussed as inevitable: it is cold in Siberia (especially for the Japanese, who were “unaccustomed” to the natural conditions of Siberia), and food and clothing were scarce because the decision to take Japanese soldiers was made unexpectedly. Much like Japan’s role in helping colonized nations in their quest for liberation, the positive aspects of the internees’ lives in Siberia are emphasized: they had warm interactions with the local population, local doctors nursed them back to life after grave illnesses, and some of the internees went to the cinema for the first time in their lives during their captivity. This contrast between the aggressor’s and the victim’s roles in the war adds to understanding of Self’s managing of responsibility for actions conducted against Other.

4.7. Conclusions

From analysis of historical news coverage it is possible to identify several trends

³⁵⁴ Konoe Fumimaro’s son Fumitaka died in the Soviet Union, however. Not much is known about the circumstances of his life and death in the USSR other than the attempts by the Soviets to recruit him as a spy. See *The Japan Times*, “Soviets tried to get Konoe’s son to spy,” July 25, 2000, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2000/07/25/national/soviets-tried-to-get-konoes-son-to-spy/> (accessed October 2, 2018).

³⁵⁵ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “Tokio v 1945-m predlagal Moskve ispolzovat’ yaponsev kak besplatnuyu rabochuyu silu: Poslednie plenniki Vtoroi Mirovoi,” August 31, 2015.

characteristic of national and local news articles in Russia and Japan. Historical topics present an opportunity to extend upon the newspaper's main function of delivering news and attract readership by employing a more "storytelling" format of news reportage, which is suitable for discussing events that are relatively "remote" to the reader, such as the story of first Russo-Japanese contacts. However, the same style of narration is also used in Sakhalin newspapers to discuss the history of Karafuto, which can be seen as a contested aspect of Self that was part of the antagonized Other. The main interest in the Karafuto period is expressed by Sakhalin researchers and collectors, while ordinary newspaper readers see its legacy in more "practical" aspects associated with their daily life, such as museum visits, monuments and tourism. Together with the relative novelty of Karafuto research in Russia, this contrasts with the much more "personalized" nature of the accounts reported in Japanese newspapers, which are concerned with the lives of the former residents, their homecoming visits and the reception of remains of those who died on Sakhalin.

The Russo-Japanese war is assessed differently in Japanese and Russian newspapers. For the Japanese newspapers the 100th war anniversary was an opportunity to reevaluate its legacy and bring some of its lessons to the current generation. The Russian newspapers focused primarily on commemoration and specific individuals, events and locations, with most of such articles focusing on the "storytelling" style, which suggests that the Russo-Japanese War is about as remote for the Russian public as Japanese rule on Sakhalin.

The year 2015, which marked the 70th anniversary of World War 2, had significantly different war-related coverage in Russian and Japanese newspapers. Russian news reportage is characterized by the presence of a strong patriotic war narrative as a defending nation that was victorious in the war. Following the events preceding the anniversary, particularly international tension over the situation in Ukraine, Russia started "looking East" in both business ties and war commemoration. As a result, much of the war-related coverage

mentioning Japan is dedicated to Russia's friendship and cooperation with China against Japan as a common aggressor. Russia and China seem to be willing to forget the military conflicts that happened between them in the late 20th century in order to resist Japan's perceived attempts to rewrite history. Japan's assessment of its role in World War 2 (as expressed in Abe's 2015 war anniversary speech) is the opposite of that expressed in Russian newspapers with support from the Chinese side. It must be noted that conflicting views on historical events exist not only between border regions of nations that have fought against each other in their relatively recent history, but also between border regions of nations that have coexisted peacefully for centuries. Even peaceful border regions may develop conflicting historical narratives that are constructed from the viewpoint of national history on each side of the border.³⁵⁶

The point of contention switches sides when the Siberian Internment is discussed in the Russian and Japanese press. The Japanese side focuses on individual accounts of the former detainees, while the Russian articles put emphasis on the positive aspects of the POWs' lives in the Soviet Union. In the Russian press, the responsibility for the suffering of the POWs is shifted partially onto the Japanese government. The Russian newspapers seldom employ the term "Siberian Internment"; they do not make a distinction between Japanese and other POWs, while the word "internment" is used to describe the issues experienced by Sakhalin Koreans and American Japanese during World War 2. The term POWs is preferred to "internment" by some Russian academics (whose voices are reiterated in the media) to emphasize the military affiliation of the internees.

The above comparison between the historical events allows us to make distinctions

³⁵⁶ For a European example of conflicting historical narratives between border regions, see Martin Klatt, "Re-enacting a Region – Why is it so Difficult to Revise Border Changes?" in *Border Changes in 20th Century Europe: Selected Case Studies*, ed. Eero Medijainen and Olaf Mertelsmann (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2010), 30.

between media reportage of Self assuming different roles: Self as an aggressor/captor, and Self as a defender/victim. In the former case, attempts are made to either contest or understate the suffering of Other, in the latter case the narrative of suffering is disseminated through personal accounts and becomes a source of negative imagery of Other.

Chapter 5. Imagining Self and Other: National Identity Discourses and Visions of Russia and Japan in News Coverage

5.1. Images of National Self and Other, and Their Historical Roots in Russia and Japan

As outlined in the first chapter, the main premise of this research is that Self and Other are in an interdependent relationship – antagonism – which affects formation of Self-identity. Self-identity is constructed through a discourse of perceived difference from Other, particularly in the case of social identities, such as regional or national identity. This discourse is accompanied by imagery of Other – the adversary, the alien, or just the visitor who is not Self. This chapter discusses two sets of images – images of national Other in contemporary national and local media, and images of Self as products of Self-nation’s intellectual history found in discourses on “Japaneseness” and “Russianness”.

Discourses on national Self-identity have existed for centuries in Russia and Japan. It is possible to encounter numerous accounts of what (supposedly) constitutes a representative member of the Russian and Japanese nations. For Japan, perhaps the most well-known example of a national identity discourse is *nihonjinron*, a genre of publications that appeared in the postwar period onward, which includes such authors as Watsuji Tetsurō, Ruth Benedict, Chie Nakane, Takeo Doi and Takie Sugiyama Lebra, and their critics Harumi Befu, Yoshio Sugimoto, Peter Dale and others. For Russia, one of the most notable examples of national identity discourse is the debate between the intellectual groups known as Slavophiles (Aleksey Khomyakov, Ivan Kireevsky and others) and Westernizers (Pyotr Chaadaev, Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolay Ogarev and others).

Although discussions on “Russianness” and “Japaneseness” can be traced back even

earlier, Russian and Japanese discourses on national identity generally experienced intensive initial development as Russia and Japan were emerging as nation states, with further transformations along with the state. The Self–Other antagonism and the imagery of Self and Other created through the discourse of difference can evolve over time to reflect changes in the environment (such as national borders) or the character of the relationship with Other. Discourses on national difference can also be embraced and manipulated by individuals or state actors to create and disseminate narratives that support their political goals. Multiple discourses and narratives can coexist at the same time, and the state (or particular groups/individuals) may prefer different imagery of national Self and Other depending on their needs at a specific point in time.

Over the course of their national history, Russia and Japan have developed and embraced various sets of Self-imagery that reflected their perceived role in the world at the time. Analysis of such imagery provides context for understanding the development of Russian and Japanese identities during imperial expansion, as well as evolution of those identities after the empire's collapse or during a national crisis. In addition, tracing the historical origins of Self- and Other-related imagery in contemporary news articles facilitates a more complete understanding of the constant evolution of Self-identity and its antagonistic relationship with Other.

Ideological development of the empire in Russia and Japan can be contrasted against other expanding empires, where exceptionalism was based on the feeling of racial superiority and served as an ideological basis for slavery and exploitation of indigenous peoples. For instance, one of the basic ideological problems discussed by liberal critics of British imperialism was racial segregation as it was developed in the southern United States and later institutionalized in the Southern African context. Early 20th century British sociology tended to use cultural and environmental factors in deterministic arguments on race, which were

based on a Eurocentric view of history and the implicit assumption of the inherent superiority of the Western civilization.³⁵⁷ During imperial expansion, Russia and Japan developed multi-racial imagery of national Self that was based on inclusiveness rather than racial or cultural superiority. It could be argued that Russian and Japanese discourses on a more “accepting” racialized empire developed in response to the presence of other racist empires, which were antagonized as “the Western civilization” in both Russia and Japan. After the collapse of the empire, however, the inclusive ideas of the nation lost traction, and the former parts of the empire (particularly in the case of Japan) were contrasted against the more “solid”, “homogenized” image of national Self. In this context, similar narratives developed throughout the course of Russian and Japanese intellectual history become the ground for comparison. The chapter’s main objectives are therefore as follows:

1. To identify typical characteristics of Self-image attributed to national identity in Russia and Japan and to analyze common trends in their historical development;
2. To present common imagery attributed to Other in national and regional news coverage in Russia and Japan, and to relate it with analysis of Other-related imagery in academic literature;
3. To find discrepancies among the images of national Other and regional Other via the center–periphery comparison between Russian federal and Sakhalin newspapers, as well as Japanese national newspapers and *Hokkaidō Shimbun*.

The chapter’s argument is based on three main aspects of Self–Other interactions:

Looking at Other: analysis of stereotypical imagery related to Other in Russia and Japan in contemporary news articles. News coverage from 2014 through 2017 (Russia) and 2015 through 2017 (Japan) is analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively to determine how

³⁵⁷ Paul B. Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 70-91, 97.

Russians are portrayed in Japanese national and regional news, and how Japanese are portrayed in Russian federal and regional news. The goal of this section is to reconstruct two sets of images from the analysis of news coverage: “Japanese” as seen in Russian news, and “Russian” as seen in Japanese news, with an additional regional sub-set of images specific to Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

Constructing Self: formation of Self-imagery and its transformations throughout the 19th and 20th century in Russia and Japan is discussed through qualitative analysis of 19th and 20th century texts written by philosophers and anthropologists. Narratives found in discourses on “Japaneseness” and “Russianness” are compared between Russia and Japan, and with other narratives found in competing discourses in Russia and Japan.

Incorporating Other: inclusive nationalism in Russia and Japan through antagonization of “the West” and integration of non-Western Other is analyzed. The idea of a messianic mission allegedly undertaken by the nation is encountered in Russian and Japanese texts of the mid- to late 19th century, when both states were imperial powers interested in acquiring new territories. A reverse trend to “homogenize” the national image emerges as the nations face an identity vacuum following a colonial crisis.

5.2. Looking at Other: National and Local News Portrayal of the Antagonism

Japan and the Japanese in Russian Federal and Sakhalin News Headlines

As outlined in the introduction, the Self–Other antagonism creates a set of simplified, exaggerated images of Self and Other that are used as a reference point in delineating Self-identity. These descriptions are deeply rooted in the stereotypes that have dominated the Western view of Japan from early contacts in the 16th century through the Meiji period, through World War 2 and until today. Stereotyped imagery of Japan has accumulated throughout several centuries of limited contact by Western countries with the Japanese.

A detailed study of such stereotypes has been done by Littlewood (1996).³⁵⁸

Littlewood describes the problem of categorization that the Western travelers encountered when trying to position Japan in their world view. On the one hand, Japan displayed a variety of traits supposedly pertaining to a civilized nation (as imagined by these early travelers) – its people were remarkably polite and there was a noticeable emphasis on honor, bravery and aesthetics in the society; on the other hand, it was a distant, non-Christian land with customs and habits that looked bizarre and appalling to the Western eye, such as men and women bathing together at public bathhouses, and the peculiar clothes and facial features added to the impression of a strange, alien world. In an attempt to understand this seeming contradiction, the Western travelers produced various images of the Japanese, which Littlewood puts into four categories: aliens (strange people whose habits seemed to be the polar opposite of the West, and made the travelers wonder whether they were human beings at all), aesthetes (a country of beautiful landscapes and ceremonies, a fairyland, or a “toy world”), butterflies (a place with highly saturated, shameless sexuality, tempting pleasures and obedient, sensual women) and samurai (a culture of sadistic, sly and fierce warriors). With some variation, these images would dominate the West’s impression of Japan depending on political circumstances – for example, the fourth category was widespread during World War 2, while the second became more prominent in the 1950s, as Japan was starting to gain traction as a picturesque tourist destination.

While all these images are stereotypes produced in specific circumstances of limited exposure and lack of information, they are not entirely false or meaningless. Stereotyping is an important cognitive process that helps us categorize and make sense of the objects and phenomena of this world. Stereotypes are often created in limited, but real conditions: the

³⁵⁸ Ian Littlewood, *The Idea of Japan: Western Images, Western Myths* (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1996).

sadistic image, for instance, was heavily influenced by Japanese treatment of Allied POWs during World War 2.³⁵⁹ However, these are also persistent, exaggerated and partial representations distorted by political and cultural bias of the observer, and they obscure the other realities of culture with their oversimplified and unchallenged statements that are easy to consume and accept. Stereotyping made it easier to create distance between Self and Other and de-humanize the Japanese (and refer to them as either sub- or super-humans, via comparisons to animals or gods), particularly in the context of war, violence and sex. This imagery was particularly prominent in the American public consciousness during and in the immediate aftermath of World War 2, when the images of “monkey men” were spread by American war propaganda. As Dower (2000) notes, “the very notion of democratizing Japan represented a stunning revision of the propaganda Americans had imbibed during the war, when the media had routinely depicted all Japanese as children, savages, sadists, madmen, or robots.” During the Allied occupation of Japan it took the American policymakers a significant effort to reverse such imagery and promote a more “humane” vision of the Japanese among the American audiences.³⁶⁰

The imagery described by Littlewood and Dower is closely tied to antagonization of Other. Many stereotypical perceptions of Other are characterized by stark contrast to the discoverer’s (or the occupant’s) home culture, and take the form of binary oppositions. The idea of Japan as imagined in the stereotypes discussed above generally fits into the larger framework of Said’s Orientalism, which juxtaposes the rational West and the erratic, spiritual East; however, even as an “oriental” culture, Japan exhibits features that make it appear a

³⁵⁹ The treatment of Russian POWs in Japan was markedly different, however. See Chapter 4 for discussion.

³⁶⁰ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 213-214.

mixture of Eastern and Western features, and cause a contradiction.³⁶¹ That may be the reason Japan has been particularly disturbing to the Western mind, and inspired more grotesque imagery aimed at embracing this perceived cultural anomaly.

Globalization, the widespread use of the Internet, as well as the increasing interest in Japanese pop culture worldwide have made a considerable impact on the stereotypes related to Japan, and it is difficult to argue that all of the imagery discussed by Littlewood over 20 years ago is still relevant today. However, the tendency to see Japan and the Japanese as “strange”, “alien” or “exotic” merely transitioned from one medium to another, and “weird Japan” is one of the topics that routinely appears not only in Internet jokes, but also in the news. In the case of Russia and Russian news, long-existing and inert stereotypes have created a vision of an “ideal Japan” in Russian mass consciousness. This generalized image can be divided into several main components:

1. Japan as a technological wonder: “the country of Sony and Toyota”;
2. Japanese people are hard-working, well-disciplined and well-educated;
3. Japanese people have a deep respect for Japanese culture and traditions;³⁶²
4. Images of “geisha and samurai”: Japanese women wear kimono and practice ikebana, and both men and women are skilled martial artists.

According to Kulanov and Stonogina (2003),³⁶³ the above are essential components

³⁶¹ The idea that Japan has elements of both “the West” and “the East” is similar to arguments made by Russian intellectuals about Russia, such as Slavophilia and Eurasianism. In classical Eurasianism in particular, Russia is portrayed as a “bridge” between Europe and Asia with a messianic mission – for more, see Mark Bassin, “Eurasianism ‘Classical’ and ‘Neo’: The Lines of Continuity,” in *Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, ed. Mochizuki Tetsuo (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Slavic Research Centre: 2008), 279-294.

³⁶² This is frequently combined with the “technological wonder” aspect to form the image of Japan as an example of a civilization that has modernized without losing the “core” of its culture: modernized but autochthonous.

³⁶³ Aleksandr Kulanov and Yulia Stonogina, “Obraz Yaponii: pravda i vymysel,” *Novyi Zhurnal / The New Review*, no. 231 (2003), <http://magazines.russ.ru/nj/2003/231/kulanov-pr.html> (accessed August 10, 2018).

of a stereotypical “general” vision of Japan widespread throughout contemporary Russia. In addition to “soft modeling”³⁶⁴ of national Self-image through exchange programs and influence on the individual level conducted by Japan, the image of Japan in contemporary Russia is largely created by the Russians themselves. Mikhaylova (2014) argues that the massive (over 7000 km) distance between Russian and Japanese centers of political and cultural life causes Other-nation to appear as an “imaginary phantom” in national consciousness, and stereotyped imagery replaces reality.³⁶⁵

The above point reflects the more “imagined” side of the Self–Other antagonism on the national level. However, it also invites discussion of Other-related imagery in the regions bordering with Other-nations, where the vision of Other in national consciousness is supplemented by local experiences of interactions across the border. A less “abstract” and more “personalized” Russian image of the Japanese can be reconstructed from limited direct contacts. A study by Vassilieva and Akaha (2008) analyzes mutual perceptions of Russian and Japanese people using survey data collected in communities in Sapporo, Niigata and Wakkanai, where Russian residents had regular contacts with Japanese residents. The results of the surveys allow us to see another aspect of the Japanese image as seen by the Russians: apart from the “hard-working” and “well behaved”, the Japanese were described as “kind”, “caring”, “warm”, “hospitable”, “happy” and “cheerful”, but also “formal”, “superficial” and

³⁶⁴ This term is used by Vasily Molodyakov to describe Japan’s indirect attempts to influence its image abroad through exploiting foreigners’ interest in Japan and creating the “right” impression – for instance, by planning a hospitable reception of another nation’s officials and exposing them to pre-selected aspects of Japanese life. This approach is juxtaposed to “hard modeling”, which involves influencing the image of Japan through manipulating mass media and open propaganda of Japanese cultural values and ways of life. According to Molodyakov, the “hard” method was used by British colonial power, the USSR, and is currently being used by the US. See Vasily Molodyakov, “Modelirovanie obraza Yaponii,” in *Yaponiya: perevorachivaya stranitsu*, ed. Boris Ramzes (Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1998).

³⁶⁵ Yulia Mikhaylova, *Yaponiya i Rossiya: natsional’naya identichnost’ skvoz’ prizmu obrazov [Japan and Russia: Constructing Identity – Imagi(ni)ng the Other]* (St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie, 2014), 6-7.

“distant”.³⁶⁶

The blend of individual experiences with national images creates another variation of Other-related imagery that sets it apart from “general” national Other-related imagery. It is reasonable to suggest that Russian federal newspapers will have the “general” image dominate Japan-related news, whereas local newspapers in the regions where contacts with the Japanese are not extraordinary will have a set of images closer to the results of the above-mentioned survey. A search for “Japanese person/Japanese people” (*yaponets/yapontsy*) in Russian news headlines revealed several topics associated with the Japanese, which are presented in table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Topic distribution in Russian federal newspaper articles in 2014-2017 containing the word “Japanese person/people” in the headline

Subject matter	Number of articles
Cultural products (books, movies)	1
Economics and business	5
Territorial dispute	3
Japan internal policy	1
Science and technology	6
Politics and international relations	3
“Exotic” news: strange incidents, unusual festivals	4
History and war history	3
Other news	2
Total	28

Despite the low total number of articles, the above figures indicate the presence of a “general” image of Japan in Russian federal newspapers. The majority of news articles with “Japanese people” in the headline are dedicated to Japanese technical inventions such as

³⁶⁶ Anna Vassilieva and Akaha Tsuneko, “Images in Tinted Mirrors: Japanese–Russian Perceptions In Provincial Japan,” in *Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images*, ed. Yulia Mikhailova and M. William Steele (Folkestone England: Global Oriental, 2008), 161-163.

advancements in space technology,³⁶⁷ and business affairs involving Japanese companies,³⁶⁸ where the term “Japanese” represents those companies.³⁶⁹ A smaller group of articles is dedicated to Japan-related curiosities that the readers might consider strange or amusing – for instance, one report is on a Japanese man staying for two months in an airport transit zone in Moscow, refusing to leave Russia.³⁷⁰

A similar set of images can be found by searching for “Japanese culture” in the article body. There appears to be a strong emphasis on non-specific “Japanese culture” presented the same way as “American culture” or “Jewish culture” through galleries and culture centers attached to libraries and embassies.³⁷¹ When it comes to descriptions of Japanese people, the common vision of the Japanese as hard-working and well-disciplined is prominent: for instance, Japanese workers’ dedication to their own company was praised in a report on the Sharp company requesting its employees to purchase their products.³⁷² The news is supplemented by a comment from a business expert, who mentions various other aspects of Japanese corporate culture, including lifetime employment,³⁷³ collective thinking, and group responsibility.

³⁶⁷ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “Yapontsy otpravilis’ v kosmos ubirat’ musor,” December 19, 2016.

³⁶⁸ *Kommersant*, “Sollers’ teryaet upravlenie yapontsami,” December 12, 2015.

³⁶⁹ This linguistic device, used in such expressions as “the Japanese want the islands”, is a simplified form of reference to collective Other. It has a wide range of applications and can refer to any group of people representing national Other – Japanese tourists, a Japanese company, the Japanese government, or Japan as a whole depending on the context.

³⁷⁰ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “Yaponets dva mesyatsa zhivët v tranzitnoï zone <Sheremet’evo>,” August 3, 2015.

³⁷¹ *Izvestiya*, “Tsentr slavyanskikh kul’tur poyavitsya v Moskve,” August 10, 2016.

³⁷² *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, “Pod’yëmnyï kran,” November 19, 2015.

³⁷³ While lifetime employment is a concept stereotypically associated with Japan, a study published in 2010 estimates lifetime employment in Japan to amount to only about 20% of the total employment. It also varies considerably by gender, firm size and education level. See Hiroshi Ono, “Lifetime Employment in Japan: Concepts and Measurements,” *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies* 24, no. 1 (March 2010): 32-33.

A similar “generic” image of Japanese culture was summarized in an interview with Evgeny Afanasiev, then Russian ambassador in Japan:

I am most impressed that many centuries of traditions are preserved here with such awe and honor. For example, on holidays that originated in the ancient times, the Japanese put on traditional clothing regardless of their age or social status. What makes me feel especially good is that the young generation is actively participating in it, learning customs from their ancestors. It is also remarkable how popular national art is in Japan. It is not easy to attend a traditional theatrical or music performance. The tickets are sold out very quickly.³⁷⁴

The above description of Japanese culture by a Russian official fits the “general” impression found in the rest of news articles in federal newspapers. Another subset of images can be found in news on unusual festivals, incidents, inventions or people in Japan. This “exotic” component can be mixed together with otherwise “ordinary” news. For instance, reportage covering Japanese art galleries and festivals includes an article on a new Moscow exposition of *shunga*, an erotic variation of ukiyo-e prints.³⁷⁵ The article exploits the “strange/exotic” and “traditional” stereotyped imagery of Japan, and takes the chance to explain some other “funny” Japanese traditions associated with sexuality, such as stories of shape-shifting tanuki.

A similar headline search in Sakhalin newspapers produces a different result. The 2014-2017 search in Sakhalin newspapers revealed several themes, which are summarized in table 5.2.

³⁷⁴ *Izvestiya*, “Posol RF v Yaponii: v kuril’skom voprose nado zapastis’ terpeniem,” February 14, 2017.

³⁷⁵ *Izvestiya*, “‘Vesennie kartinki’ cherez zamochnuyu skvazhinu,” February 17, 2014.

Table 5.2. Topic distribution in Sakhalin newspaper articles in 2014-2017 containing the word “Japanese person/people” in the headline

Subject matter	Number of articles
Cultural products (books, movies)	2
Economics and business	3
Territorial dispute	3
History and war history	4
Total	13

While the absence of some categories can be explained by the size and the capabilities of the newspapers, the context of the reference to “Japanese” has notable differences. The “general” image of Japan and the Japanese is featured in articles on the territorial dispute and some articles on business exchange with Sakhalin, where the Japanese government or companies are referred to as “the Japanese side”.³⁷⁶ Another common trait of Sakhalin and federal newspapers is that both have reportage on the World War 2 legacy in Sakhalinskaya Oblast: for instance, there is a two-article report in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* about an archaeological expedition to Matua island, which hosted a large Japanese military settlement during the war,³⁷⁷ while *Sovetsky Sakhalin* has several articles dedicated to southern Sakhalin under Japanese rule.³⁷⁸ In these articles, “the Japanese” is a “general”, “imagined” collective form of reference to antagonized Other.

In other articles, however, the image of “the Japanese” is constructed from accounts related to specific Japanese individuals. For instance, the collective term “Japanese” can mean the city of Asahikawa represented by its vice-mayor, who was interviewed regarding

³⁷⁶ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Yapontsy nauchat kuril’chan vyrashivat’ klubniku v teplitsakh,” October 31, 2017.

³⁷⁷ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, “Chto ostavili yapontsy na samom zagadochnom ostrove Kuril’skogo arhipelaga: Podzemnyi gorod v 54 étazha i sekretnye laboratorii,” July 5-6, 2016.

³⁷⁸ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Yuzhnyi Sakhalin pod vlast’yu yapontsev,” June 20, 2014; *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Èkzotika dlya yapontsev,” July 29, 2014; *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Russkie i yapontsy,” August 7, 2014.

Sakhalin–Hokkaido cooperation through sister city relations.³⁷⁹ The more concrete Japanese image manifests through news dedicated to specific Japanese individuals: for instance, an article on Chekhov’s popularity in Japan focuses on a *Hokkaidō Shimbun* journalist who authored several publications related to Sakhalin, as well as Japanese researchers, translators and poets who visited Sakhalin together with the journalist.³⁸⁰ The resulting image behind “the Japanese” in such articles is therefore markedly different from the image behind “the Japanese” in articles on international politics or war history.

The role of “the Japanese” in Sakhalin newspaper articles also differs significantly in comparison to national news. Most Sakhalin news articles (except the ones on the territorial dispute) are dedicated to specific events of exchange or cooperation between Sakhalin and Japan. For instance, a report in January 2014 mentions Japanese volunteers, who donated money to build a memorial for a Sakhalin-born sumo wrestler, Taihō Kōki, in Poronaysk.³⁸¹ The article features a brief note on Taihō Kōki, as well as comments from a sculptor from Ogata, Akita prefecture, where Taihō Kōki’s widow currently resides. Another brief report comments on the Chekhov Center, whose performance won the grand prize at an international festival in Sapporo. The article contains comments from the members of the jury (referred to collectively as “the Japanese” in the title), who gave their personal impressions of the performance, where some scenes, particularly the appearance of angels on stage, reminded them of the traditions of Noh theatre.³⁸²

The above observations allow us to infer several points. First, there is a notable

³⁷⁹ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Yapontsy gotovy rastit’ mango i ryzhikh korov na Sakhaline,” June 10, 2014.

³⁸⁰ *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “Yapontsy Chekhovym interesuyutsya. Literaturnye paralleli,” August 8, 2017.

³⁸¹ *Gubernskie Vedomosti*, “Yapontsy sobirayut den’gi na pamyatnik Taihō Koki v Poronayske,” January 11, 2014.

³⁸² *Sovetsky Sakhalin*, “‘Prekrasnoe Dal’ è ko’ porazilo yapontsev,” December 18, 2015.

discrepancy between personalized and abstract accounts of Japan in Russian newspapers. Sakhalin newspapers have a higher proportion of “personalized” images that involve specific locations or individuals, whereas federal newspapers portray a more “abstract” Japan represented by well-recognized Japanese companies, or the Japanese government. Secondly, as the image of Japan is more “real” in Sakhalin newspapers, there is less emphasis on stereotypical descriptive imagery, which is otherwise abundant in federal news coverage. Finally, in the matters related to history and the territorial dispute, both federal and Sakhalin newspapers present “the Japanese (side)” as a collective Other-image. In this regard, the “imagined”– “real” spectrum of Other-related imagery reflects in news coverage based on the nature and frequency of contact with Other.

Russian People in Japanese National and Hokkaido News Headlines

Stereotyped imagery of Other can be created under one or several specific precedents, after which the antagonized Other-image solidifies and disperses through various channels, such as mass media. The “general” image of Russia as Other-nation has been explored in previous chapters. However, the image of Russia in Japan is influenced heavily by “othering” on the individual or small group level. Russian and Japanese people are exposed to each other at these levels through a variety of exchange mechanisms (see Chapter 2). There is a variety of typical images of Russian people in Japan. An exchange student in Sapporo, a sailor from a fishing vessel anchoring in Wakkanai, a visa-free exchange visitor from the disputed islands in Nemuro – interaction with Russian people of different backgrounds ought to produce images that may overlap but also diverge in significant ways. Thus, the “Russian image” in Japan has a number of distinct “local” flavors.

As subjects of limited region-specific exposure, Russians seldom make headlines in Japanese news. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* has twice as many headings featuring Russians compared

to any national newspaper. The total number of articles in 2015-2017 containing the word “Russian person/people” in the heading for each newspaper is shown in table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Number of headlines containing the word “Russian person/people” in Japanese newspapers in 2015-2017

Newspaper	Number of articles
<i>Hokkaidō Shimbun</i>	66
<i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>	33
<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	35
<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	34
Total	168

As discussed above, there is great variation in visions of Russians in Japan. Some overlapping traits of “Russianness” can be identified, however. A mutual Russian-Japanese perception study by Vassilieva and Akaha (2008) identified that the Japanese in Sapporo, Niigata and Wakkanai found their Russians interlocutors “eloquent”, “intelligent”, “artistic” and “good at Japanese language”; on the other hand, the Russians appeared loud, blunt, straightforward and inappropriate, possibly due to cultural differences.³⁸³ A significant feature of the Russians noted by the Japanese was their physical characteristics, which was noted by the majority of Japanese subjects in the study, whereas few comments were made by the Russians on the physical features of the Japanese.³⁸⁴ The authors of the study outline three main factors affecting mutual perceptions: the degree of direct interaction, cultural beliefs and stereotypes, and projection of national images onto individual images. A 2014 work by Kimura³⁸⁵ provides a review of several other surveys, including statistics collected

³⁸³ Anna Vassilieva and Akaha Tsuneo, “Images in Tinted Mirrors: Japanese–Russian Perceptions in Provincial Japan”, in Yulia Mikhailova and M. William Steele, *Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images* (Folkestone England: Global Oriental, 2008), 167.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 164.

³⁸⁵ Takashi Kimura, “Perspektivy izmeneniya obraza Rossii v Yaponii,” in *Japan and Russia: Constructing Identity: Imagi(ni)ng the Other*, ed. Yulia Mikhaylova (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Centre for Oriental Studies Publishers, 2004).

by the Japanese government in 2011-2013,³⁸⁶ as well as studies conducted by Tanabe Shunsuke in 2008, Sasaoka Nobuya in 2011 and Kobayashi Masao in 2012.³⁸⁷ Kobayashi's work in particular builds on regional "otherness" among members of the local community, which is catalyzed further by the presence of foreigners.

An incident involving Russian sailors that affected general foreigner stereotypes in Japan occurred in 1999, when several sailors entered hot springs in Otaru without following proper bathroom etiquette. As a result of that visit the hot springs suffered from a decline in Japanese visitors, and eventually the administration of several public bathhouses in Otaru banned all non-Japanese from entering the hot springs. The decision to permit or deny entry was made based on the person's physical appearance regardless of other factors, such as nationality, history of one's life in Japan or knowledge of Japanese public bath etiquette. "Foreign" looking individuals with Japanese citizenship would also be denied entry, while Chinese were allowed initially and expelled after their citizenship was disclosed to the administration. The Otaru case was strongly grounded in racial discrimination against Caucasians. The typical image associated with the word *gaikokujin* (foreigner) in Japan is an English-speaking Caucasian, despite the number of Caucasians of Japan being far outweighed by Asian foreigners.³⁸⁸

Apart from the evident discrimination, the incident described above reveals a number

³⁸⁶ From 2011 to 2013 the percentage of Japanese citizens feeling "affinity" with Russia rose from 13.4% to 22.5%, while the percentage of Japanese not feeling "affinity" with Russia fell from 82.9% to 74.8%. In 1991 the figures were 25.3% for "affinity" and 69.6% for "no affinity". The author highlights the importance of these figures in shaping the attitude towards Russia among the young generation of Japanese.

³⁸⁷ Tanabe's work is an age group-based study of sympathies/antipathies towards 20 countries, including Russia. Sasaoka's work adds political inclination of the individual as a factor in attitude formation to Other-nation, e.g. left-leaning Japanese are less likely to feel "affinity" with Russia. Kobayashi's work is a regional study focused on Wakkanai and former Shinminato city in Toyama prefecture.

³⁸⁸ The Otaru public bath case and discrimination of foreigners in Japan are discussed in Arudou Debito, *Japanese Only: The Otaru Hot Springs Case and Racial Discrimination in Japan* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006).

of stereotyped perceptions of national Self embodied in the idea of what “the Japanese” should be, and antagonized collective Other embodied by foreigners:

1. Conflating nationality and race based on the assumption that Japan is a monoethnic country, and any other race, such as Caucasian, is intrinsically “foreign” to Japan;³⁸⁹
2. Extrapolating the behavior of a specific group of individuals to all Russians;
3. Assumption that all Russians are Caucasians;
4. Merging stereotyped images of Russians with a broader “white foreigner” stereotype;

5. Ambiguous perception of other Asian ethnicities with regard to their “foreignness” in Japan in cases when the individual’s appearance does not make it easy to identify them as non-Japanese and their citizenship is not disclosed.

The Otaru case created a precedent for many other “Japanese only” establishments across the country to follow, including bars, restaurants and karaoke parlors. This form of discrimination against non-Japanese continues to this day in various, sometimes milder, forms: some venues refuse all Caucasians, while others accept Caucasians if they are accompanied by a Japanese or have sufficient Japanese language ability. Other establishments have adopted usage of signs such as “members only” to protect themselves from being accused of discrimination while continuing the same discriminatory practices.

The Otaru incident is one of the well-known case studies dealing with a controversial issue; however, there are also other measures introduced locally to prevent similar incidents from happening. For instance, local governments in cities with a frequent Russian presence

³⁸⁹ This claim is particularly problematic as there is an indigenous population in Japan that is racially distinct from the stereotypical “Japanese” image. Embracing it would mark the Ainu who have Japanese citizenship as non-Japanese, which is against the official government narrative, while rejecting it would inevitably put the stereotypical image of “the Japanese” under question. Moreover, the widespread impression of Japan as a monoethnic country started gaining traction in the postwar period; before that, however, there was a narrative of the Japanese Empire as a multi-ethnic nation. See section 5.3 and 5.4 for discussion of these narratives.

have been trying to minimize the occurrence of incidents involving Russians by improving mutual awareness and understanding. Nemuro is notable in this regard: apart from near-complete “russification” of the city via supermarket labels, advertisements, shop fronts and even taxis, it is home to the Exchange Center with the Northern Four Islands (NI HO RO). The center is situated in an isolated location about 4 kilometers away from the city center and serves as a training facility for newly arrived guests from the disputed islands to help them learn how to behave while in Japan, among other purposes such as giving background information on the territorial dispute.

Another example of adaptation measures in Nemuro is the brochure issued by the Committee on Safety Measures for International Exchange (*kokusai kōryū anzen taiyaku kyōgi-kai*).³⁹⁰ The brochure targets both Russian and Japanese residents of Nemuro and contains a Russian-Japanese phrasebook, information on laws and daily life in Japan, as well as various rules and recommendations. The recommendations, particularly their elaborate Russian translations, expose the legacy of the incidents that occurred in previous years.³⁹¹ Examples include:

1. Do not enter someone else’s home and the surrounding territory without the owner’s permission;
2. Do not take items near other people’s homes without their permission;
3. Do not steal cars or take away car parts without permission, even from junkyards;

³⁹⁰ According to NIHORO staff, when the regular visa-free exchanges started in 1992, there were incidents involving the Russian guests. Nemuro citizens, who were previously not exposed to foreign visitors, experienced “anxiety” about the exchanges, which motivated the administration to open a new section at the city hall and build a dedicated exchange center. Interview with the chief supervision inspector (*kanri shusa*), Nakazawa Aijiyo. Conducted by the author at the Exchange Center with the Northern Four Islands in Nemuro on 25 October 2017.

³⁹¹ Nemuro Committee on Safety Measures for International Exchange, *NEMURO* (Nemuro: Nemuro kokusai kōryū anzen taisaku kyōgikai: 2014), 2-3.

4. Do not order food at the restaurant if you do not have Japanese currency.³⁹²

Kimura notes that limited contacts between the Russians and the Japanese in specific regions of Japan have led to misunderstandings and subsequent stereotype formation not only about Russians, but foreigners in general. For instance, Russian sailors that visit smaller Japanese port cities – Wakkanai, Nemuro, and Otaru in Hokkaido, Niigata and others – have made an impact on the overall “Russian” image in Japan. The intimidating appearance (particularly suntanned faces) of the sailors created additional tension, and there is little verbal exchange between the sailors and the local population. Bicycle theft is one of the most common crimes in Japan, however the rumors that the bicycles were stolen specifically by the Russians were strong in the previous years.³⁹³

The tendency to specify the nationality of the criminal in news reports is linked with another tendency to exaggerate the proportion of foreigners committing crimes in Japan. Official crime statistics include such violations as visa overstays (which represent the majority of crimes committed by foreigners in Japan) in total number of crimes together with theft and violent crimes. In addition, the media and the general public are suspicious of foreigners as potential criminals: according to a 2017 report, at least 80% of respondents believed fake rumors of rampant crime conducted by foreigners in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. When asked who they thought had committed the crimes, the respondents mentioned Chinese (63%), Koreans (24.9%) and people from South-East Asia (22.7%).³⁹⁴

³⁹² The Japanese version of the same recommendation states “Do not dine and dash” (*musen inshoku wo shinai koto*).

³⁹³ Takashi Kimura, “Perspektivy izmeneniya obraza Rossii v Yaponii” in *Japan and Russia: Constructing Identity: Imagi(ni)ng the Other*, ed. Yulia Mikhaylova (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Centre for Oriental Studies Publishers, 2004), 234-235.

³⁹⁴ *The Mainichi*, “80% believed fake rumors of crime by foreigners in Japan after quake: poll,” March 13, 2017, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170313/p2a/00m/0na/010000c> (accessed October 2, 2018).

The imagery discussed above certainly reflects in news coverage throughout Japan. A keyword search for *roshiajin* (Russian person/people) reveals a trend to include Russian citizenship in crime reports. Apart from a near identical percentage of news on exchange with Russia (except Sakhalin and the disputed islands)³⁹⁵ that mentions Russians in headings, nearly half of *Asahi Shimbun* and *Mainichi Shimbun* newspaper articles for 2014-2017 featuring the word “Russian person/people” in the title are dedicated to crime. The crimes are committed by Russian citizens both on long and short term stay in Japan. Many such crimes are related to unauthorized trade or fishing, and most people involved in such crimes are *sen'in* or *norikumiin* (sailors and crew members).³⁹⁶ In 2016 and 2017 this newsmaking trend was influenced by Japanese court’s reevaluation of a 1997 case involving a Russian citizen. Andrey Novosyolov, a Russian sailor from Primorsky Krai, allegedly agreed to bring a handgun on his boat to Otaru in 1997 to sell it to a Pakistani man. Novosyolov was arrested in Otaru and sentenced to two years in prison. However, in 2016 Sapporo District Court granted Novosyolov a retrial due to the original criminal case being staged as “an undercover operation”,³⁹⁷ and in March 2017 Novosyolov pleaded not guilty.³⁹⁸ Despite the retrial being held in Hokkaido, the reevaluation of Novosyolov’s case after 20 years attracted attention

³⁹⁵ Some parties involved (particularly the NIHORO center, as discussed in Chapter 3) do not consider exchange with the disputed islands exchange with Russia and demand that it should be treated separately. However, as the disputed islands are part of Sakhalinskaya Oblast according to Russian administrative division and the exchange involves Russian citizens, it can also be counted by other parties as exchange with Russia. The distinction in the graphs is preserved as it allows to differentiate the amounts of reportage dedicated to the exchange with Russia, Sakhalin and the islands specifically among different newspapers.

³⁹⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, “Roshiajin norikumiin o kiso/ Toyamaken,” December 2, 2017.

³⁹⁷ According to a 2004 ruling, undercover investigations in Japan should be allowed only if the targeted person “is suspected of committing a crime if given an opportunity”; in Novosyolov’s case, however, the police themselves solicited him to bring a handgun to Japan, and the prosecutors covered up the fact that they were conducting an undercover operation, which prevented the accused from receiving a fair trial. *The Japan Times*, “Japan court grants retrial to convicted Russian following ‘unfair’ undercover probe,” March 3, 2016, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/03/national/crime-legal/japan-court-grants-retrial-convicted-russian-following-unfair-undercover-probe/#.WBC5B8krax9> (accessed August 20, 2018).

³⁹⁸ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Roshiajin dansei saishin muzai hanketsu (yōshi),” March 8, 2017.

nationwide, and all Japanese newspapers had extensive coverage of the case's progress.




Figure 5.1. *Asahi Shimbun* and *Mainichi Shimbun* headlines in 2015-2017 containing the word “Russian person/people”

However, even with this case taken into account, the conclusion regarding the media's propensity to include Russian nationality in criminal reports and crime-related news is not affected significantly. *Asahi Shimbun* reported an arrest of a Russian exchange student for illegal possession of psychedelic drugs.³⁹⁹ In *Yomiuri Shimbun*, other than sports and accidents, the "Russian" headlines were dominated by criminals. In addition to sailors violating fishing regulations in the Exclusive Economic Zone,⁴⁰⁰ Russian citizens were arrested for various kinds of theft (cars, car parts, smuggling, jewelry)⁴⁰¹ and drunk driving.⁴⁰² In general, the percentage of crime-related reports is high across all Japanese newspapers. This is noteworthy considering that crimes committed by Russians in Japan amount to lowest numbers of all crimes committed by foreigners in Japan.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, "Kuchi no naka ni mayaku ka, shoji yōgi de taiho Ritsumeidai roshiajin ryūgakusei/ Kyōtofu," June 20, 2017.

⁴⁰⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, "EEZ de kani-ryō yōgi roshiajin-senchō o taiho = Hokkaidō," March 3, 2016.

⁴⁰¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Settō no roshiajin yūzai = Shimane," December 26, 2017.

⁴⁰² *Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Shukiobiuntan yōgi de roshiajin o taiho = Kumamoto," June 26, 2017.

⁴⁰³ According to a report by National Police Agency, crimes committed by Russians represented 0% and 2.3% of all robberies, 1.8% and 1.2% of all larceny crimes, and 3.9% and 1.6% of all trespassing and theft crimes committed by foreigners in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The above categories are the only three categories of crimes where Russia is represented. The total number of criminal offenses for Russian nationals was much lower for Vietnamese (20.4% of all crimes), Chinese (27.8%, including Taiwan and Hong Kong), Brazilians (15.3%), Koreans (5.7%) and Filipinos (5.8%). Russia was not represented as a discrete category and was included in the "Other" category (15.3%). Therefore the overall number of crimes committed by Russians was less than the number of crimes committed by Mongolians (0.8%) and Nigerians (0.7%) that were represented as discrete categories. According to the same report, the number of crimes committed by Russians, as well as the number of crimes committed by foreigners in general, has been declining steadily since 2005. "Rainichi gaikokujin hanzai no kenkyō jōkyō (heisei 27 nen)," National Police Agency, https://www.npa.go.jp/sosikihanzai/kokusaisousa/kokusai/H27_rainichi.pdf (accessed October 2, 2018).



Figure 5.2. *Yomiuri Shimbun* headlines in 2015-2017 containing the word “Russian person/people”

The news on Russian citizens breaking Japanese law come from all prefectures, many from Hokkaido, where fishing-related incidents tend to receive coverage. However, *Hokkaidō Shimbun* has the lowest percentage of crime-related reportage featuring Russian people in the headlines. The rest of the headlines are represented by the local set of topics associated with Russians in Hokkaido – interaction with Sakhalin, visa-free exchange with the disputed islands, war history and domestic affairs such as the local economy (Wakkanai port lamenting the disappearance of Russian people in the city after the crab fishing ban)⁴⁰⁴ and affairs at local governments (a Russian exchange student employed by Wakkanai city administration).⁴⁰⁵ If counted together, cultural, economic and business exchange with

⁴⁰⁴ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “Kani mitsuryō bōshi kyōtei hakkō kara hantoshi* wakkanaiminato roshiajin kieta* nyūkō gekigen sen'yō sūpā tameiki* keizai kōka ‘10-bun'no 1’,” June 2, 2015.

⁴⁰⁵ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Hito 2017 > Katerīna Mārūkowa-san* Wakkanai-shi no hijōkin shokuin to natta roshiajin ryūgakusei,” June 14, 2017.

mainland Russia, Sakhalin and the disputed islands make up the biggest category of articles in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* whose headlines are dominated by Russian individuals.




Figure 5.3. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* headlines in 2015-2017 containing the word “Russian person/people”

The portrayal of Russian individuals in such articles is more positive in comparison to crime articles. A reader’s voice notes how a young Russian woman from the disputed islands, a fluent speaker of Japanese and all-around Japan connoisseur (described as *tarento*), is moved to tears by *Giovanni’s Island*.⁴⁰⁶ The reader, while reaffirming his strong desire to “return” the disputed islands, expresses hope the “return” does not inflict as much suffering on the Russian inhabitants as it did on the Japanese.⁴⁰⁷

The above example is characteristic of a trend in *Hokkaidō Shimbun* to have a wider

⁴⁰⁶ *Giovanni’s Island* is an animated film set on Shikotan island shortly after World War 2. See Chapter 3 for more discussion of this film.

⁴⁰⁷ *Hokkaidō Shimbun*, “< Dokusha no koe > roshiajin tarento no namida,” November 23, 2015.

representation of roles the Russian visitors or residents take in local life through news headlines. While none of the newspapers reduce the portrayal of Russians to only criminals, it is certain that a quick look through an issue of *Hokkaidō Shimbun* is more likely to yield a headline mentioning a Russian person in a positive light, or at least making a contribution to the life of the local community than a national newspaper. Much like “national” (abstract) and “local” (specific, personalized) images of the Japanese seem to coexist in Russian news, there appears to be a set of more particular, personalized images of Russians in Hokkaido news contrasting against nationwide images of Russians in Japan.

This also allows us to conclude that images of the antagonized Other in news reportage, despite being inert and slow to change (the “drunk Russian sailors” reportage is a widely represented category in all newspapers), can evolve through direct interaction with Other in the local environment.

5.3. Constructing Self: Historical Antecedents of National Self-Imagery in Russia and Japan

Images of Other discussed in the previous section are constructed through a discourse of difference. Today, this difference is observed directly between Russia and Japan. Historically, however, particularly before territorial questions gained traction, Russia and Japan were preoccupied with a common Other – the European civilization. On the one hand, until the latter half of the 19th century, Russia and Japan had considerably different histories of interaction with the “othered” Western Europe: Japan had largely limited Western contact until the Meiji period, while Russia was not removed from Western politics; and by the time Japan was “reopened” precipitating more involved American and European contact, Russia had already taken part in the Napoleonic Wars, as well as lost the Crimean War. Moreover, Russia had already undertaken westernization to some degree with the efforts of Peter the

Great and Catherine the Great in the 18th century, and by the mid-19th century had already received extensive Western influence.

On the other hand, both nations have had nativist schools that shared similar arguments and rhetorics. Some earlier discussions on “Japaneseness” can be traced back to the Edo period, particularly by such figures as Kada no Azumamaro, Kamo no Mabuchi and Motoori Norinaga. Japanese nativist thought was represented by the school of National Learning (*kokugaku*), which started as a scholarly investigation into the philology of Japanese classical literature and extended through a range of topics associated with pre-Confucian Japan. The primary subjects of *kokugaku* study, namely the classical literary works *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*, can be seen as the roots of the Japanese quest for national identity. Japanese thinkers were preoccupied with such themes as westernization, forgotten wisdom of the past (in case of Japan, pre-Buddhist and pre-Confucian past) and religion. Nosco (1990) has conducted an extensive analysis of Japanese 18th century nativism, isolating its 17th century antecedents and connecting its themes to resurging nostalgic interest in Japanese history in the 1980s.⁴⁰⁸ Norinaga and others were preoccupied with the “ancient Way” (*kodō*) of the past, which they attempted to reconstruct via reentering the past through their investigations and reanimating the dormant “true heart” (*magokoro*), which would lead them to understanding of what was “purely” Japanese about Japan through its primordially distant past.⁴⁰⁹

Kokugaku investigations attempted to shift the focus of Japanese scholarship of the time from then-dominant studies of Neo-Confucianism, Buddhism and classical Chinese texts to studies of Shinto and classical Japanese poetry, which were seen by these scholars as “real”

⁴⁰⁸ Peter Nosco, *Remembering Paradise: Nativism and Nostalgia in Eighteenth-century Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990).

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, xii.

Japanese. Norinaga's works, for instance, employ the term *karagokoro* ("Chinese heart") to contrast with the "true heart" Japanese way of thinking, which needed to be "purified" of foreign ways.⁴¹⁰ It could also be said that *kokugaku* arose out a perceived need to recuperate and defend the Japanese canon against Neo-Confucian criticisms.

The *kokugaku* inquiries were a product of the historical circumstances of late Tokugawa Japan. The arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry's "black ships" in Japanese harbors and the signing of Kanagawa treaty that opened the ports of Hakodate and Shimoda to United States trade led to increased concern about Japanese sovereignty. A large proportion of the populace was disconcerted with the Tokugawa bakufu's inability to resist foreign invasion. It was debated whether Japan should return to the traditional ways of life (*fukko*) or appeal to the Emperor's supreme authority (*osei*). The discussions led to adoption of a policy that was summarised in the expression: "Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians" (*sonnō jōi*), which developed into a widespread anti-foreign and legitimist sentiment inspired by writings of *kokugaku* investigators and samurai scholars of Mito. "Expel the barbarians" was the starting point of Japanese nationalism in the late Tokugawa period. It also merged with aspirations of the ruling class to maintain their social privileges, which caused the common people to become estranged, and triggered a break within Japanese society that later led to social unrest. It is argued that for the Japanese ruling class, the term "national consciousness" meant above all defending the traditional socio-political order from Christianity and industrialism.⁴¹¹ This political transition represents a shift in the paradigm of Japanese national antagonism, where "Chinese heart" was substituted with (Western) "barbarians", although the core of the antagonism – political tension and cultural investigations into Self in

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 175-177.

⁴¹¹ Masao Maruyama and Ivan Moris, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 139.

response to an external threat from Other – remained the same.

A somewhat similar set of ideas emerged in the 19th century in Russian public space. Discussions on “Russianness” were inspired by the spirit of the time: formation of nation-states, colonialism and romantic nationalism. Unlike Japan, Russia was not removed from European politics. The Napoleonic wars ended with a failed French invasion of Russia in 1812, and by that time the question of self-identification had become an important issue for young Russian intelligentsia.⁴¹²

The intense debate on what Russia was and should be was started with a provocative discussion of Russia’s perceived civilizational backwardness, which also emphasized Russia’s peculiarity in contrast to Europe. In the first of his *Philosophical Letters* (written in 1829, published in 1834 in the *Telescope* periodical), Pyotr Chaadaev sets up the question of Russian identity: “We may be said to be an exception among peoples.”⁴¹³ “...We have never moved in concert with the other peoples. We do not belong to any of the great families of the human race; we are neither of the West nor of the East, and we have not the traditions of either.”⁴¹⁴ In his letter, Chaadaev juxtaposes Russia and the Western civilization (the term used interchangeably with “Europe” at the time) and argues that all countries in Western Europe, despite their divergent traditions and histories, share a common legacy, while Russia lacks “a certain assurance, a certain method in our thinking, a certain logic.” He believes, however, that Russia, as a special civilization situated neither in the East nor in the West, “resting one elbow against China and the other on Germany” encompasses two fundamental

⁴¹² The longing for national identity can even be found in linguistic cues: the French invasion was and still is referred to in Russian as *Otechestvennaya voïna*, which is usually translated as the Patriotic War. The adjective *otchestvennaya* comes from the noun *otchestvo* (Fatherland) and signifies this war’s importance to Russian history and patriotism.

⁴¹³ Pyotr Chaadaev, “Letters on the Philosophy of History,” in *Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology*, ed. Mark Raeff (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 164.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid*, 162.

principles – reason and imagination – and has a mission to reunite the history of the entire globe in its civilization, “to teach some great lesson to the world.”⁴¹⁵

Chaadaev’s letter sparked the discussion known as the philosophical debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers over the necessity, the areas and the extent of Western European influence on Russian culture.⁴¹⁶ Unlike Chaadaev, who can be considered a Westernizer, Slavophiles argued for a different path that was unique to Russia. While these two standpoints seem incompatible in their approach to modernization, the vision of Russia in the Self–Other paradigm did not differ substantially between Slavophiles and Westernizers, as neither questioned Russia’s extraneousness to Western Europe. McDaniel (1996) argues that both camps “rest their case on the uniqueness of Russia”.⁴¹⁷ There is also a view that the idea of the Russian nation discussed by Slavophiles was not shaped in opposition to Europe, but instead was a reaction to the feeling of cultural backwardness experienced by the Russian intelligentsia, who intended to overcome it by assuming Russia’s messianic role in the world civilization.⁴¹⁸ This is a valid criticism of the common standpoint that the Slavophile movement was a product of Russia–Europe opposition. With the theoretical foundations of this thesis taken into account, it is possible to argue that the Slavophiles–Westernizers debate was a product of a national antagonism. Hence, Europe was indeed “Othered” by the Slavophiles, but the nature of their relationship was more complex than direct opposition as it includes elements of borrowing and adaptation.

“Otherness” of Europe was a common idea among Slavophiles. Aleksey Khomyakov,

⁴¹⁵ Ibid, 164-166.

⁴¹⁶ Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 91.

⁴¹⁷ Tim McDaniel, *The Agony of the Russian Idea* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 1996), 13.

⁴¹⁸ Susanna Rabow-Edling, *Slavophile Thought and the Politics of Cultural Nationalism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 16-19.

who is considered one of the founders of the Slavophile school of thought, claims that Russia was completely alien to the Western world until Peter the Great's reforms, during which Russia embraced Western traditions and industries while losing many of its autochthonous traditions and cultural practices. Khomyakov puts emphasis on the advantage that Russia supposedly had over the West in spiritual life, being untainted by individualism, having strong family ties and being able to uncover the mystical "truths" inaccessible to the Western civilization. Khomyakov's article represents a different approach to Russian identity and argues for national self-reflection by turning to Russia's earlier, pre-Petrine history.⁴¹⁹

Antagonization of the West was an integral part of Russian national discourse. The term "West" in this context is an embodiment of the antagonized Other that challenges and reinforces Self-identity formation. Slavophiles were preoccupied with preserving and reconstructing the "real" (as opposed to "Europeanized") Russia, in a similar way Japanese *kokugaku* scholars were rediscovering "true" Japan by attempting to free themselves from Chinese influence. China and Chinese studies (*kangaku*)⁴²⁰ were a similar target for Japanese nativist scholarship as Western Europe and Westernizers were for Slavophiles. Hence, it can be said that *kokugaku* and Slavophilia emerged as an expression of the political and cultural antagonism, as a form of resistance to perceived attempts by domestic forces to impose "foreign" standards on Russian and Japanese people.

5.4. Incorporating Other: Social Self as a Basis for Inclusive Nationalism in Russia and Japan

In an expanding empire, discourses on national Self seek political, cultural and

⁴¹⁹ Aleksey Khomyakov, *O starom i novom. Stat'i i ocherki* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1988), 54-56.

⁴²⁰ Nosco, *Remembering Paradise*, 9.

philosophical reasons to include weaker multiple Others into the national body. Inclusive nationalism in the form of messianism thrived in Russia and Japan with colonial expansion (characterized by simultaneous antagonization of “the West”) and declined during national crises and loss of territories, after which discourses on national homogeneity gained momentum instead. Russian messianism can be traced back to the Byzantine legacy (“Moscow is the third Rome”) and eschatological worldview of Orthodox Christianity, through which an idea was developed that Russia’s purpose was to teach the world a lesson through her own suffering, which would eventually result in unification of nations under the auspices of the Russian Empire. Along with discussions on Russian uniqueness, these messianic appeals constitute the body of thought known as “the Russian Idea”. In regard to Japanese inclusive nationalism, a viewpoint exists that, before the postwar discourse of “homogenous” Japan became predominant, Japanese thought from the Meiji until the postwar period was represented by the so-called mixed race theory, which encompassed various ethnicities (including Koreans and Taiwanese) as “Japanese” to provide a philosophical justification of Japan’s rule over its colonies, and embraced an assimilation model akin to the American concept of the “melting pot”.⁴²¹

Both Russian and Japanese discourses utilize concepts transcendent to the individual that allude to unity through social interaction. Let us consider Watsuji Tetsurō’s model of social self. In *Ethics*, Watsuji develops the model of selfhood (*ningen*), which is constituted by notions derived from Confucian and Buddhist modes of thought, such as *communal existence* (*kyōdō sonzai*) and *betweenness* (*aidagara*). A thorough study of Watsuji’s model of *ningen* was conducted by Odin (1996). In Watsuji’s view, a human being (*ningen*) is constituted by Self (*ji*) and Other (*ta*), which comprise the essential wholeness of an

⁴²¹ Eiji Oguma, *A Genealogy of “Japanese” Self-Images* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002), 325.

individual-society relationship, unlike European concepts, such as of *homo* or *mensh*.⁴²²

Watsuji notes that the concept of individual in the West is created by rejecting society and the social self, while in the East people become social selves by rejecting their individuality.⁴²³

Watsuji's critique of Western individualism is comparable to that of Russian philosophers, particularly Khomyakov and Kireevsky, who saw individualism as the bane of Western civilization. However, another common trait of their philosophies is appraisal of the social nature of self, which the West presumably neglected. A key concept in Khomyakov's philosophy is *sobornost'*, a state of free, organic, spiritual unity of people based on their common Christian love for the same absolute values, a unity in a multitude of people.⁴²⁴ *Sobornost'* is based on collectivism and cooperation as opposed to individualism and competition. Both Khomyakov's *sobornost'* and Watsuji's *aidagara* signify a transcendent entity that arises from communal existence, a unity achievable only through the spiritual confluence of Self and Other.

To further investigate parallels between the social nature of self in the works of Slavophiles and philosophers of the Kyoto school, it is necessary to consider Nishida's concept of *pure experience* (*junsui keiken*) introduced in a 1911 work *A Study of Good* (*Zen no kenkyū*). *Pure experience* is a notion of religious experience that transcends the traditional dichotomies such as subject and object, body and mind, and time and space. It is defined as a stream of consciousness that does not contain any cognitive perception of dualism, and self is

⁴²² Steve Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 55.

⁴²³ Robert N. St. Clair, "The Phenomenology of Self Across Cultures," *Intercultural Communication Studies* 13, no. 3 (2004), 9.

⁴²⁴ Aleksey Khomyakov, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniĭ. Tom 2* (Moscow: Universitetskaya Tipografiya, 1886), 326.

a sequence of appearing and disappearing moments of this experience.⁴²⁵ Kireevsky's philosophy contains a similar notion of religious experience achieved through transcending the limits of an individual with religious intuition. In Kireevsky's view, the "internal completeness" of human spirit is the key to uncovering the mystery of existence. To attain this "highest spiritual vision", one has to "understand the thought through their feeling" and to "level up their thinking to sympathetic agreement with faith", because faith is the "all-encompassing living focus of intellectual power". This kind of mystical "high thinking" is what Kireevsky saw as reason, or rationality (*razumnost'*), which he contrasted against Western "rationalness" (*rassudochnost'*), where "logical, empirical cognition has subjected internal consciousness", which resulted in the "decay" of Western culture.⁴²⁶ While *rassudochnost'* is applicable in the natural sciences, it creates a limited vision of the world and does not allow people to attain the "essence" of things. The complete, "live" cognition that includes ethical, aesthetic and other moments subjected to the Orthodox Christian faith is the definitive characteristic of the Orthodox Slavonic world, as opposed to the rationalized Western Europe.

Such ideas of mystical cognition were by no means unique to Russia or Japan, however. Some argue that Nishida's ideas on *pure experience* were influenced by the Chicago school of American pragmatism, particularly by such authors as William James and Josiah Royce.⁴²⁷ Nishida's social self has an overlap with Feuerbach's I-Thou dialectic. St. Clair notes that in Nishida's 1932 work *I and Thou (Ware to Nanji)*, the social self (*shakaiteki jiko*) emerges from the dialectics of *I and Thou*: "In the fringe of consciousness surrounding this

⁴²⁵ Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism*, 20.

⁴²⁶ Ivan Kireevsky, *O kharaktere prosveshcheniya Evropy i ego otnoshenii k prosveshcheniyu Rossii* (Moscow, Sovremennik, 1984), 238.

⁴²⁷ Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism*, 325.

egoless state, there are I-thou relationships that engage the social self, relations with *I (ware)* and *thou (nanji)*, *self (jiko)* and *the other (ta)*, and *the individual (kobutsu)* and *the environment (kankyō)*”.⁴²⁸

To elucidate the relationship between inclusive nationalism and the social concepts discussed above, it is important to analyze some Darwinian underpinnings of early cosmopolitan theories in Russia and Japan. Danilevsky’s concept of cultural-historical type is another kind of a transcending social unity that represents a cultural union of people. Unlike Khomyakov’s *sobornost’*, this unity is based on common history and language rather than spirituality. Each unity follows an evolutionary path and goes through the stages of youth, adulthood, and old age, the last being the end of that type. While other cultures were about to degenerate in their blind struggle for existence, the Slavic world would be a Messiah among them. Danilevsky’s utopian dream was to see Russia create a Slavic federation with a capital city in Constantinople.⁴²⁹ In his rejection of the idea of world civilization, Danilevsky compared civilizations to living organisms while the human race to him was an abstract idea. His position was that humanity and nation are in a relationship akin to that of genus and species.⁴³⁰

On the Japanese side, the use of biological and morphological metaphors to define the unity of people or a nation was prominent in the ideas of another important member of the Kyoto school, Tanabe Hajime. Tanabe’s logic of species (or logic of the specific) develops a model of thought resting upon a triadic dialectic of the *genus (rui)*, the universal), the *species (shu)*, the particular), and the *individual (ko)*. Much like Danilevsky, who believed that all

⁴²⁸ St. Clair, “The Phenomenology of Self Across Cultures,” 13.

⁴²⁹ Nikolay Danilevsky, *Rossiia i Evropa*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Institut Russkoy Tsivilizatsii, 2011), 475-521.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 146.

individual and social interests should be subjected to the formation of a cultural-historical type,⁴³¹ Heisig (1995) suggests that Tanabe's view of the species (the nation) acts as a sociocultural substratum, which subjects the individual's will to the needs of the ethnic group.⁴³² The notion of species overcomes the dichotomy of the universal and the particular by negative mediation of an individual's free will. As Ozaki (1998) notes, "the species-like substrative being, in its function of negative mediation, is necessary for an individual subject to arise in accordance with the universal genus."⁴³³ Tanabe's logic of species is claimed to be an example of a theory that supports a cosmopolitan model of state and can be used to legitimize the imperialist endeavors of the Japanese government as an attempt to achieve cosmopolitan freedom.⁴³⁴ It must be said, however, that other interpretations of Tanabe exist, such as that of Sakai Naoki, who stresses the importance of choice in belonging to the nation-state in Tanabe's vision of species, which allows for further discussion.⁴³⁵

After World War 2, as Japan lost its colonies and the population subsequently became less diverse, the discourse on Japanese identity shifted from a cosmopolitan to a more "homogenized" idea of Japanese nation. The notion of social self is a particular interest in postwar *nihonjinron* works, as it is used to illustrate Japanese national uniqueness, the complete opposite of cosmopolitanism. The Japanese are argued to be group-centered

⁴³¹ Ibid., 129.

⁴³² James W. Heisig, "Tanabe's Logic of the Specific and the Critique of the Global Village," *The Eastern Buddhist* 28, no. 2 (1995), 198-224.

⁴³³ Ozaki Makoto, "On Tanabe's Logic of Species," *Paideia: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy* (Boston, Mass., August 10-15, 1998), <https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Comp/CompOzak.htm> (accessed October 2, 2018).

⁴³⁴ John N. Kim, "The Temporality of Empire: The Imperial Cosmopolitanism of Miki Kiyoshi and Tanabe Hajime," in *Pan-Asianism in modern Japanese history: Colonialism, regionalism and borders*, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (London: Routledge, 2007), 166.

⁴³⁵ Graham Parkes, "Heidegger and Japanese Fascism: An Unsubstantiated Connection," in *Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School*, ed. Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and James M. Wirth (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2011), 260.

because of the interpersonal dynamics of family structure (Nakane), which is supported by a fundamental human drive of dependency (Doi).⁴³⁶ Doi introduces the concept of *amae* (dependency), which he presents as a uniquely Japanese need to engage in a dependent relationship reminiscent of that between a child and its mother. The model of social self is employed by Doi in the psychiatric description of *amae* as “the desire to deny the fact of separation that is an inevitable part of human existence, and to obliterate the pain that this separation involves”.⁴³⁷ The psychological function of *amae* is manifested in Japanese group consciousness (*shūdan-ishiki*); hence, self in Doi’s terms is a nexus of dependency relationships.⁴³⁸

Doi and Nakane’s works are built upon by Lebra (1976), who singles out social relativism as the ethos of the Japanese nation: the Japanese, in her view, are extremely concerned about social interaction and relationships with other people (*hito*). Lebra links the Japanese words *jibun* and *hito* to the social terms Ego (the central actor in a social relationship) and Alter (the social object of the Ego). There are similarities between Lebra’s notion of social preoccupation and Watsuji’s concept of *ningen*, which also defines the nature of a human being as a two-fold construct (*ji* and *ta*, or Self and Other) and places emphasis on communal existence. Similar to Watsuji, who maintains that Self resides in *betweenness* with the Other (an “empty self”), Lebra defines this ambiguity and refers to it as “social preoccupation”.⁴³⁹

Similar transformations occurred in the Russian national identity discourse as the

⁴³⁶ Robert N. St. Clair, “The Phenomenology of Self Across Cultures,” 19.

⁴³⁷ Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1985), 167.

⁴³⁸ Steve Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism*, 353.

⁴³⁹ Takie Sugiyama Lebra, *Japanese Patterns of Behavior* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), 2.

country was going through a political crisis that led to less cosmopolitan views of the Russian nation. The year 1881 marked another important change in Russian history: czar Alexander II was assassinated by members of a group *Narodnaya Volya* (Will of the People), a radical socialist organization that, like *Pochvenniki*, supported closer relations between intelligentsia and the common folk. The new emperor, Alexander III, was a reactionary ruler who reversed many of the previous progressive reforms of his predecessor, and introduced stronger censorship. Simultaneously, a reactionary standpoint emerged among the Russian intelligentsia. Vladimir Solovyov, a prominent 19th century philosopher who had commented on both Slavophiles and Westernizers, gave a lecture in French entitled “The Russian Idea” in 1887 (published in Russian in 1888) in an attempt to outline the meaning of Russia’s existence in world history and explain it to the Western European audience.

Solovyov took an opposite standpoint from that of Danilevsky: he believed in the world civilization and compared it to a living organism, whose organs were represented by different nations.⁴⁴⁰ In Solovyov’s view, the entire human race is a social organism (“subnational unity”, which he claims is an irrefutable religious truth), and each nation has “an organic function” that is predetermined by God. It was, therefore, only natural for each nation to have a distinct historical mission, much like a function given to different parts of the body. Ultimately, all nations would be reunited under a grand principle, which Solovyov saw in ecumenic church (*Vselenskaya Tserkov*). Although Solovyov condemned nationalism and deemed it as detrimental to a nation as egoism is to an individual, he supported ecumenic unification of all nations. In his view, this unification of Christian “truth” supports the existence of nations and their rights and freedoms as opposed to nationalism that divides and

⁴⁴⁰ Vladimir Solovyov, *Spor o Spravedlivosti* (Moscow: ÈKSMO-Press; Kharkiv: Folio, 1999), 623.

pits nations against each other.⁴⁴¹

This paradoxical self-reflection that opposes aggressive nationalism but at the same time reinforces the idea of Russian specificity and its messianic mission to reunite the world is a testament to the confusion that was taking place in the discourse situated around the term “the Russian Idea” in the 19th century. National identity discourse in Russia went from the feeling of inferiority to the West to religious and philosophical self-reflections on national uniqueness to aggressive nationalism, and then took a step backwards to rethink Russia’s meaning in world history in a philosophical sense. Japanese self-reflections followed a largely similar pattern: from discussions on the “true heart” of the Japanese to cosmopolitan ideas of the Great Japanese Empire, which subsided in the postwar period, when discourses on Japanese uniqueness took a more “homogenized” turn.

5.5. Evolution of National Self- and Other-Imagery: from Intellectual History to News Coverage

National identity’s discursive basis evolves and adapts to historical circumstances through different narratives. External threat in the form of westernization was one such circumstance. In both Russia and Japan, there were heated debates over the areas and the extent to which Western influence should be embraced, and there were groups who condemned westernization and argued for a “revival” through returning to values and practices derived from the country’s earlier history.

Nativist discourses, such as *kokugaku* and early Slavophilia, and discourses on national uniqueness tend to emerge at the time when the nation’s sovereignty faces a potential threat. The discourse on Japanese national uniqueness emerged possibly from the

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 631-632.

need for the consolidation of Japan as a nation endangered by the sense of social disintegration attributed to Western influence in the Taisho period.⁴⁴² More integrative nationalism appears as the thinkers embrace the idea of superiority of their nation to justify the colonial endeavors of the state. Placed at the opposite ends of the offense–defense spectrum, both nativism and imperialism are the result of a national antagonism between Self-nation and Other-nation(s), and aim to protect and reinforce Self’s identity facing an external threat. To achieve this goal, an effort is made to argue for Self’s uniqueness through deterministic positions. Apart from historical and geographical determinism, Russian and Japanese thinkers have used transcending social categories to emphasize the importance of communal existence, which supposedly made their nation unique and/or superior to Other.

It is important to note that all narratives discussed in this section were products of their time and historical circumstances, usually among many alternatives. *Kokugaku* and early Slavophilia, for instance, developed in the context of a protest response rather than a state-embraced ideology, and were criticized by their contemporary opponents. As Smith (1991) notes, it is difficult to trace a direct link between the intellectuals engaged in a national discourse and nationalism, and it is likely that such discourses develop in response to challenges posed by the clash of the traditional and the modern, in their specific context.⁴⁴³ It is remarkable nevertheless that intellectuals of Russia and Japan, despite their vastly different historical, cultural and geopolitical circumstances, have developed comparable narratives of imperialism and national uniqueness. This suggests that there is mutual influence between discourse on national identity and state policy, particularly in regard to the colonization of other nations by colonial powers.

⁴⁴² Alexander Bukh, *Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan’s ‘Other’* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 17.

⁴⁴³ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 95-96.

The antagonism between Russia and Japan is unlike that of those nations with Western Europe. The ontological discussion of national Self-definition is no longer as prominent as it was in the 19th and 20th centuries, and philosophical inquiries into the distant past have evolved into political arguments, as well as face-to-face interactions between leaders and ordinary members of both nations on a variety of levels. As a result, the more “abstract” set of images of Other based on political and cultural discussions is prominent in regions with less direct contacts, while the more “practical” images of Other appear as a result of daily interactions. The generic “dreamy” image of Japan in Russia has no strong connection with the reality of Japan. On the other hand, the image of drunk Russian sailors stealing car parts is a realistic occurrence in Japan. In this regard, it can be said that construction of Other-image in Russia happens primarily through consumption of cultural products and pre-existing widespread stereotyped images, while in Japan the stereotyped images, which were indeed products of real interactions with Russian people, have spread marginal groups’ behaviors towards a wider set of images on the national level. In Hokkaido, however, this wide set of images is dissolved through active interaction with Russians of all backgrounds and their participation in local communities.

Conclusions

This thesis has approached Russian and Japanese national and regional identities, as well as visions of Russia and Japan in both countries via content analysis of newspaper articles. Using the framework of antagonism and the dichotomy of Self and Other, it has also assembled imagery related to Russia and Japan in both countries and discussed this imagery's role in the formation of national and regional Self-identity. The theoretical framework built in the first chapter is suitable for analyzing international and inter-regional relations. The original notion of antagonism has been extended to include antagonisms on the regional and national levels, and has been connected with supporting ideas on national identity as a form of collective identity and nation as an imagined community. By analyzing national and regional news articles on a range of topics, Russo-Japanese relations can be evaluated from multiple angles: local history, international relations, border studies, central-periphery relations and inter-regional exchange. Investigation of Self- and Other-related imagery in national and regional newspapers has revealed multiple differences in the patterns of news coverage in Russia and Japan, as well as different approaches to Russo-Japanese interaction in Hokkaido and Sakhalin as opposed to Tokyo and Moscow.

The practical findings presented in this thesis explain the persistence of various issues in Russo-Japanese relations and suggest a different approach to addressing them. Russia and Japan have a strong potential for cooperation in several fields, which is suppressed by political inertia on both sides and lack of interest on the Russian side. Hokkaido and Sakhalin present particular value in bridging Russia and Japan together through joint projects. In the absence of a political solution for the territorial dispute, inter-regional connections could be explored to improve the quality of life of Russian and Japanese citizens in the border areas of Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

General Conclusions

Analysis of national and local news coverage has demonstrated that regardless of the primary subject matter – be it a meeting between officials, a local exchange program, or a war history issue – a particular set of themes is bound to appear in news coverage featuring Other. These themes are so deeply intertwined that a news article dedicated to one theme is quite likely to bring up others: for instance, a search for articles on Russia–Japan business relations is likely to display articles referencing war history or the territorial dispute. This is particularly prominent in Japanese newspapers, which tend to discuss a wide variety of Russia-related topics in their coverage. Russo-Japanese relations and interaction revolve around these themes, and all of them are likely to appear in most contexts featuring Russia and Japan. This tendency is significantly less prominent in Russian newspapers.

There is a major difference in the amount of Other-related news coverage produced by Russian and Japanese newspapers, which are observed on both national and regional levels. As discussed in Chapter 1, this difference can be explained by several factors, particularly the relative size of the newspapers, state of printed press in Russia and Japan and lack of journalists specialized in Japan on the Russian side. However, even with these factors taken into account it is evident that the Russian press expresses much less interest towards Japan than the Japanese press expresses towards Russia. The difference manifests itself in both the amount and the character of news coverage.

Another prominent tendency observed in newspaper coverage is the difference between its operation on the national and regional levels. National reportage works at the political level, while local reportage operates at the level of activism and direct interaction. This difference is primarily seen in matters that have local significance, such as the territorial dispute.

Case Study-Specific Conclusions

As pointed out in Chapter 2, many exchange activities involving Russian and Japanese citizens are based on a mixture of themes: conferences on war history, joint searches for the remains of war dead on Sakhalin, exchange with the disputed islands, visits to Sakhalin by Karafuto returnees, campaigns related to Russia's or Japan's war responsibility are all deeply rooted in Russo-Japanese history, particularly the connections between Sakhalin and Hokkaido through shifting borders.

With regard to the territorial dispute over the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories, newspaper and interview data analysis has revealed that there are viewpoints in Sakhalin and Hokkaido that diverge significantly from the official national views on the issue. It could be said that there are two territorial disputes over the islands: one as an international issue between Russia and Japan, and one as a local issue that affects the daily lives of citizens in Sakhalin and Hokkaido. The latter is more heavily grounded in local affairs rather than geopolitics. Both Sakhalin and Hokkaido have expressed strong feelings regarding the issue, but many of the voices heard from Hokkaido are more "practical" rather than nationalistic. For instance, the local fishermen are interested in the dispute from the perspective of fishing and harvesting seaweed in the disputed areas, whereas the aging former residents of the disputed islands would like to gain access to the disputed areas to visit the graves of their relatives. The Sakhalin public, on the other hand, emphasizes the islands' importance as a legacy of World War 2 and their strategic significance for Russia. The territorial dispute saw few substantial developments in recent years, and is likely to maintain the status quo, as Sakhalin's multi-ethnic society has consistently expressed strong opposition to any territorial concessions to Japan throughout the years.

Analysis of articles on topics pertaining to Russia and Japan's history revealed several

trends characteristic of national and local news articles in Russia and Japan. Newspapers employ a more “storytelling” style of reportage for reporting history, and historical topics allow the newspapers to transcend their main role of delivering news. Temporal “remoteness” of some historical topics (such as early contacts between Russia and Japan) present an opportunity for “narrative” articles, which educate or entertain the reader. At the same time, this style can be used to discuss topics that are not deemed particularly relevant. In this way Sakhalin newspapers discuss the history of Karafuto, which can be seen as a contested aspect of Self that was part of the antagonized Other. The “Japanese period” of Sakhalin’s history attracts Sakhalin researchers and collectors, while ordinary newspaper readers see the Karafuto legacy in museum visits, monuments and tourism. On the other hand, Japanese newspapers have much more “personalized” Karafuto articles dedicated to its former residents, their homecoming visits to Sakhalin and searches for the Japanese war dead on Sakhalin.

The 70th anniversary of World War 2 received significantly different coverage in Russia and Japan. Russian news reportage presents a strong patriotic war narrative as a defending nation that was victorious in the war. Much of the war-related coverage in Russian newspapers in 2015 mentioned China as Russia’s military and business partner, and highlights Russia and China’s shared victimhood in the war, while ignoring the military conflicts that happened between Russia and China in the late 20th century. On the other hand, Japan’s assessment of its role in World War 2, as expressed in Abe’s 2015 war anniversary speech, portrays Japan as a victim of unfortunate circumstances rather than an aggressor, and treats the Russo-Japanese War as a liberation movement (spearheaded by Japan) among smaller nations against the West’s oppression. In this regard, the viewpoints expressed in Russian and Japanese media are fully incompatible. This comparison allows us to discuss media reportage of Self assuming different roles: Self as an aggressor/captor, and Self as a

defender/victim. When Self is a former aggressor, the suffering of Other is contested or understated, as seen in reportage of the World War 2 anniversary in Japanese news and the Siberian Internment in Russian news. When Self is a former victim, a narrative of suffering is disseminated through personal accounts and becomes a source of negative imagery of Other, as seen in Japanese news articles on Siberian Internment and Russian news articles on World War 2 and the Russo-Japanese War.

As discussed in the last chapter, the formation of national identity in Russia and Japan was accompanied by similar discourses that followed similar development over time, transforming into inclusive nationalism during the nation's advancement as a colonial empire and receding to a more "homogenized" image of a nation after a colonial crisis. It can be said that the discursive foundation of national identity adapts to historical circumstances through production of different narratives. Russia and Japan had to face "the West" as a potential adversary, and developed similar discourses over the extent of Westernization to be adopted by the state. Facing the challenge of Westernization, both Russia and Japan have developed nativist discourses that argued for return to the "historical roots" of Russian/Japanese culture in an attempt to consolidate the nation against Western influence. However, as the nation becomes a colonial empire, national identity discourses argue for expanding national Self through including identities from colonized territories. This can be seen through the history of colonization of both Hokkaido and Sakhalin. Both of the above types of discourses are created in response to a national antagonism between the Self-nation and Other-nation(s) and are meant to reinforce Self's identity in the presence of Other. There is also mutual influence between discourse on national identity and state policy, particularly in regard to the colonization of other nations by colonial powers.

National identity discourses in Russia and Japan are comparable because they share the same antagonized Other – the Western civilization. The antagonistic relationship between

Russia and Japan is unlike the antagonism between Russia/Japan and Western Europe. Although the need to define national Self is no longer as prominent as it was in the 19th and 20th centuries, the same ideas of Russia or Japan's perceived cultural uniqueness have found their way into political arguments and stereotyped images of Self and Other. In the central regions, these images are more "abstract" and based on political and cultural discussions, which are often dominated by old stereotypes. On the other hand, the border regions have more "realistic" images based on direct experience of interaction with Other. These "practical" images, as can be seen in the case of drunk Russian sailors in Hokkaido ports, can disseminate through media channels and affect Other-related imagery outside of the original region. In this way, it becomes a stereotype much like the "generic" imagery in national centers based on politics and cultural inquiries.

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Newspaper databases


- Intergum (mass media in Russia and the CIS) <http://www.integrumworld.com/>
- Hokkaidō Shimbun Database <https://t21.nikkei.co.jp/doshin/>
- Yomidas Rekishikan (*Yomiuri Shimbun*) <https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/database/>
- Kikuzo II Visual (*Asahi Shimbun*) <https://database.asahi.com/>
- Maisaku (*Mainichi Shimbun*) <http://mainichi.jp/contents/edu/maisaku/>

Appendix 1. Newspaper Database Queries


Period of query	Keywords in Japanese	Keywords in Russian
January 1, 2015 – May 31, 2015 (for Japanese newspapers) January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2015 (for Russian newspapers)	日ロ (Japan–Russia) 日露 (Japan–Russia)	Русско-японский (Russo-Japanese) Япония (Japan)
July 1, 2006 – July 31, 2006 (G8 summit in St. Petersburg)	ロシア (Russia)	Япония (Japan)
June 23, 2008 – July 31, 2008 (G8 summit in Toyako)	ロシア (Russia)	Япония (Japan)
April 22, 2016 – May 20, 2016 (Abe’s visit to Sochi)	北方領土 (Northern Territories) 領土問題 (Territorial issue)	Terrиториальная проблема (territorial issue) Terrиториальный спор (territorial dispute) Курилы (the Kuriles) Курильские острова (Kurile islands)
December 2, 2016 – December 22, 2016 (Putin’s visit to Nagato)	北方領土 (Northern Territories) 領土問題 (Territorial issue)	Terrиториальная проблема (territorial issue) Terrиториальный спор (territorial dispute) Курилы (the Kuriles) Курильские острова (Kurile islands)
January 1, 2016 – May 31, 2016	日ロ (Japan–Russia) 日露 (Japan–Russia)	Русско-японский (Russo-Japanese) Япония (Japan)
November 3, 2014 – November 3, 2015 (<i>Hokkaidō Shimbun</i> only)	サハリン (Sakhalin) 樺太 (Karafuto)	
January 1, 2004 – December 31, 2005	日露戦争 (Russo-Japanese War)	Русско-японская война (Russo-Japanese War)
January 1, 2014 – December 31, 2017 (for Russian newspapers) – headlines only January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2017 (for Russian newspapers) – headlines only	ロシア人 (Russian person/people)	Японец (Japanese person) Японцы (Japanese people)

Appendix 2. Topic Distribution in Coverage of 2006 and 2008 G8 Summits


***Yomiuri Shimbun* articles mentioning Russia
July 1-31, 2006**




***Hokkaidō Shimbun* articles mentioning Russia
July 1-31, 2006**



Sakhalin newspaper articles mentioning Japan June 23 – July 23, 2008



Rossiyskaya Gazeta articles mentioning Japan June 23 – July 23, 2008




Appendix 3. List of Russia–Japan Exchange Organizations

Title	Type of organization	Founded	Headquarters	Activities/purpose
Japan–Russia Friendship Association (JRFA) 一般社団法人日本 J C ロシア友好の会 http://japan-russia.jp/	NPO	1991	Tokyo	Established as a Japan–Soviet exchange organization, specializes in private cultural, economic and social exchange between Japan and the former Soviet countries.
Japan–Sakhalin Association 日本サハリン協会 http://sakhalin-kyoukai.com/ Formed from Japan–Sakhalin Fellowship Association (日本サハリン同胞交流協会)	NPO	2013	Tokyo	Hokkaido–Sakhalin visits, repatriations of Japanese who stayed on Sakhalin, dissemination of knowledge on the history and culture of Karafuto.
Association of Sakhalin Japanese サハリン日本人会	NGO	1990	Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	Repatriations of Japanese who stayed on Sakhalin (partner organization of Japan–Sakhalin Association).
Russian Culture Festival http://www.russian-festival.net	NPO	2006	Tokyo	Annual festival dedicated to Russian culture (art/music), also runs a blog about Russian art and cultural events.
Association of Russo-Japanese Exchange History Studies of Hakodate 函館日ロ交流史研究会 http://hakodate-russia.com/	NPO	1993	Hakodate	The association aims to strengthen mutual economic and academic cultural exchange by conducting research on Japan and Russia, especially Hakodate and the Russian Far East region.
Legal national representative organization of forced detainees 一般財団法人 全国強制抑留者協会 https://zaidan-zenyokukyo-com.ssl-xserver.jp	NPO	1989	Tokyo	An association that organizes symposiums on Russia's war responsibility and campaigns for Russia's official apologies and compensation for Siberian internment of Japanese troops.
Association of Russo-Japanese exchange 日ロ交流協会 http://www.nichiro.org	NPO	1965	Tokyo	A large organization that hosts cultural exchange events, friendly get-togethers, visits to Russia by the Japanese, lectures and tours, language courses etc. Has its own periodical.
Japan–Russia Youth Exchange Center 日露青年交流センター http://www.jrex.or.jp	Government-funded, associated with MOFA	1999	Tokyo	Youth groups exchange between Russia and Japan, helps young Japanese language teachers go to Russia, offers scholarships to promising Russian and Japanese students.
Japan–Russia Exchange Association 日本ロシア学生交流会 http://www.nichiro.info	NPO	1989	Tokyo/Osaka	Originally founded by Japanese students interested in visiting USSR. Organizes homestay exchanges for Russian and Japanese students. Opened a Kansai branch in 2011.
Russian Pirozhki http://www.rosianotomo.com	Website	~2001	Moscow	A website maintained by Japanese students in Russia. All-in-one stop for everything about Russia, with news, bulletin boards etc.

Title	Type of organization	Founded	Headquarters	Activities/purpose
Kansai Russo-Japanese Exchange and History Study Center 関西日露交流史研究センター http://kansainichiro.blog.fc2.com	Blog	2015	Osaka	Covers cultural exchange events in Russia and Japan, as well as publishes on history of Russo-Japanese exchange from the Edo period onwards.
Hokkaido Association of Japan–Russia Cooperation NPO 法人 北海道日本ロシア協会 http://www.do-nichiro.org	NPO	1972	Sapporo	Organizes cultural exchange with Sakhalin (homestay, traditional culture experiences), offers Russian language courses, holds meetings between Hokkaido and sister cities on Sakhalin.
Association for the Inter-Regional Study Between Japan–Russia and Hokkaido–Russian Far East http://www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokutouken/sono2/index.html	NPO	1997	Sapporo	An association of academics, entrepreneurs, students and general population interested in Russo-Japanese relations. Publishes a “Vostok” periodical on its website.
Niigata–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok Sister City Association 新潟・ハバロフスク・ウラジオストク友好市民委員会 http://www008.upp.so-net.ne.jp/akitomo_uda/index.htm	City-funded	1981	Niigata	Homestays and cultural exchange events with Niigata’s sister cities.
Association for Return of the Northern Territories 北方領土復帰期成同盟 http://www.hoppou-d.or.jp/cms/cgi-bin/index.pl?page=index	NGO (Public Interest Incorporated Organization)	1963	Sapporo	Main visa-free exchange organization that facilitates mutual visits between Hokkaido and the disputed islands. Campaigns for resolution of the territorial dispute.
Russo-Japanese Center of Cultural Exchange 日ロ文化交流センター http://www2c.airnet.ne.jp/jarucul/index.HTML	NGO	1978 (NGO since 1999)	Ebina (Kanagawa)	Art, academic and tourism exchange.
Orthodox Church in Japan http://www.orthodoxjapan.jp	Autonomous church	1861	Tokyo/Hakodate	Religion-related exchange, seminars etc.
Hokkaido International Exchange and Cooperation Center (HIECC) 北海道国際交流・協力総合センター http://www.hiecc.or.jp/index.asp	NGO (Public Interest Incorporated Organization)	1978 (NGO since 2011)	Sapporo	Coordination of international exchange and cooperation within Hokkaido.
Kushiro International Exchange Plaza くしろ国際交流プラザ http://www.city.kushiro.lg.jp/machi/kouryuu/kaigai/cat00000345.html	City-funded	~1989	Kushiro	Translations, exchange with Kushiro’s sister cities, which include Kholmsk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.
Office of Japan–Russia Relations at Tohoku University http://www.insc.tohoku.ac.jp/cms/japan-russia/	University-funded	~2011	Sendai	Academic exchange, university fairs, management of Tohoku University offices in Russia
Hokkaido Government http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp	Prefectural government	-	Sapporo	Economic, cultural, sports exchange with Sakhalin and the Russian Far East.

Title	Type of organization	Founded	Headquarters	Activities/purpose
Nayoro City http://www.city.nayoro.hokkaido.jp/	City-funded	1991	Nayoro	Exchange with Dolinsk, a sister city in south Sakhalin.
Nemuro City http://www.city.nemuro.hokkaido.jp	City-funded	1989	Nemuro	Sister relations with Severo-Kurilsk, visa-free exchanges with the disputed islands.
Hakodate City http://www.city.hakodate.hokkaido.jp/soshiki/hkd-intl/	City-funded	-	Hakodate	Japanese language courses, support for non-Japanese residents (with Russian language support)
Rumoi City http://www.e-rumoi.jp/seisaku/sei_00087.html	City-funded	1972	Rumoi	Sister relations with Ulan-Ude, collects signatures to petition for the return of the disputed islands.
Wakkanai City Russia-Japan Friendship Association 稚内市日ロ友好会館 http://www.city.wakkanai.hokkaido.jp/sangyo/saharin/yyuukoukaikan/	City-funded	1980	Wakkanai	Translations, support for Russia-Japan exchange in business, Wakkanai-Sakhalin ferry, sister city relations with Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Nevelsk and Korsakov.
Japan-Russia Friendship Association (JRFA) 日露友好親善協会 http://nichiro-yuko.net	NPO	2013	Hitachinaka (Ibaraki)	Academic exchange with Russia, research on Russia, medical and business exchange, research on territorial dispute and international affairs. Website has information on territorial dispute.
Aichi Russo-Japanese Friendship Association 一般社団法人 日ロ友好愛知の会 http://nichiroaichi.org	NPO	2001	Nagoya	Cultural exchange with Krasnoyarsk, Russian salon,
Japan-Russia Student Conference (JRSC) 日ロ学生会議 http://jrsecontact.wixsite.com/jrsc	NPO	1988	Tokyo	Student exchange between Tokyo, Moscow, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Topics: society, culture, politics, economics.
Arkaim Japan-Russia Friendship Association アークタイム日露友好協会 http://www.arkaim.or.jp/	NPO (General Incorporated Association)	2011	Tokyo	Charity events and donations to help rebuild the areas affected by the 2011 earthquake.
YAR Project 日ロ青年 Project ヤール https://www.facebook.com/YarProject/ https://twitter.com/yarprojekt	Social media project	~2015	Tokyo	A Russo-Japanese friendship association organized by Waseda University students.

Appendix 4. *Hokkaidō Shimbun* Coverage during Mutual Visits in 2016 **(Daily Breakdown)**



Hokkaidō Shimbun articles mentioning the territorial dispute in December 2016

