Mega Sports Events and Regional Development
— The Case of Preparation for the PyeongChang Olympics —

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Key words
Local autonomy, uneven development, the burden of hosting

Abstract
This article presents empirical research through sociological investigation into the bidding for and hosting of mega sports events in East Asia. Despite issues with the increasing burden on host cities due to the expanding scale of the Olympics, three consecutive Games are to be held in East Asia. Why would multiple cities in East Asia want to take on the burden of hosting the Olympics? There are many case studies of research into mega sports events in North America and Europe, but little research has been conducted to date regarding the event hosting process in Asia. In order to fill this gap, this article will illustrate how mega sports events such as the Olympics have been positioned in East Asia as opportunities for regional development. The example of the preparations for the PyeongChang Olympics will be analysed to elucidate the structural difficulties in regional development through hosting mega sports events.

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1. Introduction

In recent years, the cost of hosting the Olympic Games has increased in conjunction with the expanding scale of the Games\(^{(1)}\). This trend has led to a perception that fewer cities wish to host the Games, and in response, the ‘Olympic Agenda 2020’ was approved at the 127th International Olympic Committee (IOC) Session (held in December 2014 in Monte Carlo, Monaco). Among the 40 recommendations of this reform plan, particular attention was paid to the IOC allowing dispersed hosting of preliminary or actual Games competitions. The aim of this initiative is to reduce the burden on host cities caused by the necessity of constructing many venue facilities. The Agenda does this by removing the requirement of, in principle, holding all events within the host city, promoting the maximum use of existing facilities and the use of temporary and demountable venues, and permitting the holding of events outside the host city.

At the same time as the IOC has recognized that the burden of hosting the Olympics has become too high for one city, another significant phenomenon has occurred in the hosting of the Games – the next three Olympics will all be held in East Asia. The XXIII Olympic Winter Games will be hosted in 2018 by Pyeongchang, Republic of Korea, the Games of the XXXII Olympiad in 2020 by Tokyo, Japan, and the XXIV Olympic Winter Games in 2022 by Beijing, China. Why, despite the difficulties posed by the increasing cost burden, are the cities of East Asia hosting the Olympics one after another? A critical point is that the cities of East Asia are taking on the hosting of the Olympics by their own initiative. For example, local residents were significantly in favour of bidding for the XXIII Olympic Winter Games (hereafter referred to as the ‘PyeongChang Olympics’\(^{(2)}\)). This article will elucidate why South Korean society was so enthusiastic about hosting the Olympics, and then analyse the difficulties which have occurred – despite the initial enthusiasm – during the actual preparation phase for hosting the Games, difficulties which are related with dispersed hosting.

This article is comprised of three sections. Firstly, by reviewing Japanese and Korean research in the sociology of sports, it illustrates how mega sports events have been positioned in East Asian cities as opportunities for regional development. Secondly, it covers the historical trends (and background to them) regarding the holding of mega sports events in Korea. Thirdly, it focuses on the preparations for the PyeongChang Olympics\(^{(3)}\), and particularly the upheaval in 2014 and 2015 caused by the central government’s venue relocation proposals. While the government’s proposals were aimed at reducing the cost burden on host cities, the way they met fierce resistance from local governments brings to light the structural difficulties in regional development that arise through hosting the Olympics.

The data used in this article was principally collected during the authors’ participant observations in Gangwon-do, focusing on the districts hosting the PyeongChang Olympics
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(25-31 August 2010, 17-23 February 2011, 4-10 February 2015, 6-10 September 2015 and 26 February-2 March 2017). The analysis is based on the above primary source materials, as well as secondary source materials in the form of newspaper articles, magazine articles, and statistical data.

2. Literature Review

What benefits do mega sports events such as the Olympics bring to local communities? This question is frequently asked in a variety of academic disciplines, including sports research in the social sciences. From economics and marketing perspectives, the impact of mega sports events on local communities is conceived as ‘the function of mega sports events’, and measured using numerical values such as economic indicators (Harada 2002). By contrast, the approaches taken in the sociology of sports have advocated including a time axis in analysis, focusing on impacts which cannot be captured by numerical values, and also focusing on negative aspects of mega sports events (Ishizaka and Matsubayashi 2013). That is to say, the approaches taken in the sociology of sports have been critical of the short time frame and limited scope used to evaluate the merits of mega sports events.

Should mega sports events be positioned as transitory occurrences, or should they be positioned over a broader time scale in the context of local communities? Should they be analysed using numerical values, or should the focus be on the impacts which cannot be captured by them? Should the positive aspects be emphasised, or more attention paid to the negative aspects? Despite these differences in approach, all such research has in common the positioning of mega sports events as factors external to local communities. That is to say, such research takes the approach of evaluating how local communities have changed in response to external factors in the shape of mega sports events.

In contrast, another stream of research positions mega sports events not as external factors, but in terms of urban space. For example, the Japanese sociologist Takashi Machimura posits that

In order to perceive the relationship between cities and mega events in a more multi-layered and nuanced manner, it cannot be said that focusing only on the process of holding the actual event is anywhere near sufficient. This is because in the background to the cities which have actually hosted the Olympics or international expositions are many more cities and regions which have expressed (or tried to express) dreams and the pursuit of profit through such events. (Machimura 2007, 8)

Attempting to understand the relationship between local communities and mega events as deeply as to include events which were not ultimately held, creates a clear point of
difference with research focusing on the impact of mega sports events. An illustrative example is how Ohnuma (2006) describes the relationship between cities and mega sports events by positioning the hosting of the XI Olympic Winter Games in 1972 and the 2002 FIFA World Cup in the context of Sapporo City’s urban planning and strategy. Through detailed analysis grounded in Sapporo City’s urban planning, he elucidates the specific process by which mega sports events and urban planning are promoted as one.

The approach of research such as by Machimura and Ohnuma looks past the question of ‘what do mega sports events bring to local communities’ to focus on ‘why do local communities want to host mega sports events?’ They share the same concern, of focusing on issues regarding regional development which are manifested through mega sports events.

A key term in these discussions is ‘development’ – but what does this word in fact mean? Machimura analysed post-war Japanese development as an implicitly social process with two differing facets – ‘development policies’ and ‘development movements’. To date, development has only been understood in terms of ‘development policies’, which reorganise society in the service of the reshaping of the land by a state strengthening its linkage with capital. However, he depicts post-war Japanese development as practices involving the connection of ‘development movements’ – which are local collective actions in which people attempt to pursue ‘wealth’ which has become overlaid with enlightenment despite the poverty-stricken setting – with ‘development policies’. Although Machimura’s understanding is distilled from the distinctive example of post-war Japanese development, his perspective of treating development as ‘the process of mobilisation and subjectification’ (Machimura 2011, 431) – in which mobilisation occurs through development policies and subjectification through development movements – gives us hints at how to analyse mega sports events. Thus, it is necessary to analyse not only mobilisation – which is frequently depicted as a passive stance towards external factors – but at the same time also the process of subjectification through active engagement by people with mega sports events.

The key point here is not indicators such as the economic effects and legacy brought about by mega sports events, but rather the specific and particular contexts of the local communities and people who chose – or had to choose – to host mega sports events.

3. Historical Trends Regarding Mega Sports Events in Korea

This section will elucidate, based on an overview of the region in focus and an outline of the history of mega sports events in Korea, the context in which the provincial government of Gangwon-do had no choice but to bid for the Olympics. Before doing so, it is illustrative to survey the two-layer system of local government in Korea: the provincial level and the underlying municipal level. Municipal-level local government is in charge of functions which are intimately connected with the daily lives of local residents. By contrast, provincial governments handle higher-level functions which municipal governments cannot, such as
those which must be handled from a perspective covering a broader geographical area than one municipality as well as managing relationships between the central government and municipal-level local government. Both provincial and municipal governments are independent local authorities, but have a mutually-cooperative relationship (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations [CLAIR] 2015, 21-22).

The PyeongChang Olympics are to be held in the Korean province of Gangwon-do. Covering an area of approximately 16,900 km$^2$ and with a population of approximately 1,560,000, Gangwon-do is divided by the Taebaek Mountains into the Yeongseo region in the west and the Yeongdong region in the east. Yeongseo contains major cities such as the provincial capital Chuncheon-shi and the most populous city Wonju-shi, which border the greater Seoul metropolitan area to the west. However, the Olympics are being held away from these cities, in an area straddling Yeongseo and Yeongdong, centred on the Daegwallyeong Pass through the Taebaek Mountains (Figure 1).

In Korea, it is often said that Gangwon-do has been left behind in terms of regional development. The PyeongChang Olympics are to be held in regions which have suffered...
from significantly delayed development, even compared to the rest of Gangwon-do. For example, the total population of the three municipalities where the Olympic events are to be held, Pyeongchang-gun and Jeongseon-gun counties, and the city of Gangneung-shi, is less than 300,000 combined.

As previously stated, the increasing cost burden of hosting the Olympics has become a global issue. Given this trend, how could a region which had been left behind in terms of regional development possibly host the Olympics? Table 1 provides details of the selection for and hosting of the mega sports events which have been held in Korea. Under the administration of President Doo-hwan Chun, Korea successfully bid in the first half of the 1980s to host the Asian Games and the summer Olympic Games in its capital, Seoul. However, a gap of over 10 years followed before the successful candidacy for hosting mega sports events in the mid-1990s, notably by Korea’s number two city, Busan. Furthermore, the co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup marked a turning point, after which the stage of mega sports events in Korea shifted from the two largest cities to smaller provincial cities, marking a new phase in the bidding for and hosting of mega sports events. As the areas which can host winter sporting events are limited by the natural environment and climatic conditions, the shift to the provinces is particularly evident if the focus is limited to summer events. From this, we can discern how the role of local governments as subjects of bidding and hosting has increased in importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major International Events</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year Selected as Host</th>
<th>Date of Event</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 19th Asian Games</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>29 September - 5 October 1986</td>
<td>27 countries / 4,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 24th Olympic Summer Games</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>17 September - 2 October 1988</td>
<td>150 countries / 6,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 9th Winter Universiade</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>21 January - 2 February 1994</td>
<td>28 countries / 1,500 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2nd East Asian Games</td>
<td>Busan</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10 - 19 May 1994</td>
<td>9 countries / 2,100 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 14th Asian Games</td>
<td>Busan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>29 September - 14 October 2002</td>
<td>43 countries / 11,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 12th FIFA World Cup</td>
<td>Seoul / Incheon / Suwon / Daegu / Gwangju / Ulsan / Busan / Gumi / Pyeongchang / Jeju</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>31 May - 30 June 2002</td>
<td>32 countries / 17,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 22nd Summer Universiade</td>
<td>Gangneung</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>21 - 31 August 2000</td>
<td>174 countries / 6,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 12th FIFA U-17 World Cup</td>
<td>Gangneung / Suwon / Ansan / Gwangju / Ulsan / Changwon / Gumi / Jeju</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16 August - 9 September 2007</td>
<td>24 countries / 1,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 17th IAAF World Championships in Athletics</td>
<td>Gwangju</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>27 August - 4 September 2007</td>
<td>213 countries / Approx. 6,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 17th Asian Games</td>
<td>Incheon</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>19 September - 4 October 2014</td>
<td>45 countries / Approx. 25,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2013 World Rowing Championships</td>
<td>Changwon</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3 - 14 August 2013</td>
<td>69 countries / Approx. 2,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 20th Summer Universiade</td>
<td>Gwangju</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 - 14 July 2015</td>
<td>170 countries / Approx. 52,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 6th Military World Games</td>
<td>Kayseri</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9 - 15 October 2010</td>
<td>110 countries / Approx. 8,700 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 23rd Olympic Winter Games</td>
<td>Pyeongchang / Gangneung / Jeongseon</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12 - 25 February 2011</td>
<td>99 countries / Approx. 25,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 32nd ISU World Short Track Championship</td>
<td>Changwon</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>25 January - 2 February 2012</td>
<td>270 countries / Approx. 12,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 19th FINA World Aquatics Championships</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10 - 11 July 2013</td>
<td>280 countries / Approx. 15,000 Athletes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the key points when analysing the changing subjects of bidding for and hosting of mega sports events is uneven growth and regional development in Korea. This section will provide an overview of these two points with reference to Lee (2011) and Shin (2009, 2012). After Korea was impoverished under colonial rule and the Korean War in the early 1950s, regional development was conducted under the subsequent military dictatorship through concentrated investment over a short period of time. As a result, the rapid economic growth called ‘The Miracle on the Han River’ was achieved, but it also entailed capital-focused
growth strategies which created unequal growth between regions. In response, policies to curb the growth of the capital and enhance growth in the regions were enacted from the 1960s and onward. However, due to systematic structural issues, the situation has never been ameliorated.

Even though uneven development between the regions in Korea had become an issue, an effective solution was not forthcoming. To address this problem, the administration of President Moo-hyun Roh, who took office in 2003, enacted the full-scale Policy of Regional Balanced Development. Recognising the limits of central government-led regional development, the key plank of this policy was to explore options for systems of development under the leadership of local governments, i.e. systems of development which were no longer driven by central government.

However, after Myung-bak Lee assumed the Presidency in 2008, a major change of direction in the Policy of Regional Balanced Development became inevitable. The National Balanced Development Law – which had been passed in 2004 under Moo-hyun Roh – was comprehensively revised in 2009, and a new Policy of Regional Balanced Development was promoted in its place. To summarise the new direction, the emphasis of the Policy shifted from 'balance and distribution' to 'growth and competitiveness', thus transitioning to regional policy which – founded on neo-liberal principles – placed more importance on economic efficiency (Lee 2011; Shin 2012). As can be seen in Table 1, the rapid growth in the hosting of mega sports events by local governments began at almost the same time as the transition in Policy of Regional Balanced Development. It can therefore be inferred that the Policy transition at least may have provided encouragement for the hosting of mega sports events by local governments. In other words, it can be inferred that local governments have chosen mega sports events as a tool to achieve ‘growth and competitiveness’.

However, financial losses, lack of legacy usage of facilities and the failures of standalone bidding and planning by local governments and consequent funding from central government have begun to be raised in recent years as key issues regarding mega sports events in Korea. In his research, sociologist Hee-Joon Chung encapsulated the prevalent approach with the phrase “don’t talk about it, bid for it” (Chung and Kim 2014, 84); in other words, it can be understood that the fierce competition between local governments for the bidding for and hosting of mega sports events is not only an issue for local governments, but has escalated into an issue for all of Korea.

4. Bidding and Preparation for the PyeongChang Olympics

As Korean local governments were required to take the lead in development initiatives, the bidding for the PyeongChang Olympics can also be positioned within this context. That is, the PyeongChang Olympics is to be held in an area which has been left behind in terms of regional development – even compared with the rest of Gangwon-do, which is
itself considered to have lagged behind developmentally compared with the rest of Korea – as a tool for increasing regional development. By what process, then, have the bidding and preparation for the PyeongChang Olympics been conducted?

Pyeongchang bid unsuccessfully for the 2010 and 2014 Olympic Winter Games, but succeeded on its third attempt at being awarded the 2018 event. After announcing its Olympic bid at the closing ceremony of the 1999 Asian Winter Games, 11 years were required for Pyeongchang to be selected as an Olympic host city.

Bo-Hyeon Park, a Korean sociologist, conducted extensive analysis of the process by which the provincial government of Gangwon-do bid to host the Olympics (Park 2010, 2013). He determined that its highest priority was to create a political and economic environment in which external capital (and particularly central government funding) could flow in to enable investment in the transport networks and urban infrastructure which the provincial government of Gangwon-do could not afford to complete on its own. Given how Gangwon-do had been left behind in terms of development, bidding for the Olympics became the most rational and effective method to ensure urban development while gaining domestic consensus for the project. The provincial government of Gangwon-do continued to lobby for central government funding after being awarded the hosting of the Olympics (Park 2015); if bidding for and hosting the Olympics is indeed a method of breaking away from Korea’s pattern of uneven development, reliance on central government budgets is seen as justified.

However, the central government’s venue relocation proposals caused turmoil in 2014 and 2015 to the preparations for the PyeongChang Olympics. The central government’s proposals were certainly not baseless; rather, it was in keeping with the IOC’s reform plan to reduce the burden on host cities by promoting the maximum use of existing facilities and the use of temporary and demountable venues, and by permitting the holding of events outside the host city. That is to say, rather than the relocation proposals themselves causing upheaval, it would be appropriate to consider that the specific and particular circumstances of the PyeongChang Olympics were the source of the upheaval. The following part will explore the turmoil regarding the relocation of Olympic venues.

(1) Opening and Closing Ceremony Venue

The opening and closing ceremonies were initially planned to be held at the Alpensia\(^{(11)}\) Ski Jumping Centre (constructed in 2009) by expanding the number of spectator seats. However, on 4 July 2012, one year after the hosting of the Olympics was awarded, the PyeongChang Organizing Committee for the 2018 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (POCOG) announced the plan to build an Olympic Town complex, including the opening and closing ceremony venue, at the Gwon Training Ground in the village of Hoenggye-ri, approximately 2km from the then-planned site. Reasons given included issues with event operation such as difficulty with site access, issues with ensuring sufficient time for ski jumping athletes to train, and issues with spectator comfort due to exposure to extreme cold and snowstorms. However, the opening and closing ceremony venue being moved from Alpensia, where
Olympic venues were to be clustered, to an athletics ground close to where residents live and work meant a significantly-increased impact on local residents. According to reporting in the local Kang Won Domin Ilbo newspaper, local residents were completely blindsided by the announcement. Residents' concerns carried in the media included "after 50,000-seat temporary facilities are installed and removed, there would likely be issues about the disposal of left-over waste" and "if an appropriate usage after the Olympics have finished is not identified for the Olympic Town, it is crystal clear that it will become a major liability for the community. Legacy use plans must be put in place" (Shin 2012).

However, two years later, it was reported in August 2014 that some parts of the central government were working on a proposal to construct the opening and closing ceremony venue, not in Pyeongchang, but in Gangneung, where the skating, curling and ice hockey events will be held. Construction in Pyeongchang necessitated starting from scratch, incurring high costs, and severe cold weather is typical in Pyeongchang around the time the Olympics are to be held. By contrast, refurbishment and expansion of the existing athletics stadium in Gangneung would be less costly, entail fewer concerns about the climate, and provide convenient transport access to other competition venues.

In fact, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism made a proposal to build the opening and closing ceremony venue in Gangneung to the city government of Gangneung-shi at the end of September, but it was opposed by the POCOG and the provincial government of Gangwon-do. In October, this proposal was reported extensively in the media, igniting fierce opposition from the residents of Pyeongchang (see, e.g., Shin [2012]; H. Lee [2014]; Y. Park [2014]). Local organisations such as the Conference 2018 Pyeongchang-gun County Commission, the municipal government of Pyeongchang-gun, and the 'Pyeongchang-gun Prosperous Society’ Chamber of Commerce held emergency response meetings, and it was resolved that if their demands for the opening and closing ceremonies to be held in Pyeongchang were not met, they would work against all Olympic-related activities. Furthermore, Pyeongchang residents went so far as beginning to loudly fight to return Olympic events to Pyeongchang.

Ultimately, as the result of negotiations between the provincial government of Gangwon-do, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and POCOG, it was announced on October 14 that the proposal to construct the opening and closing ceremony venue in Gangneung was being scrapped, and that a new venue would be built in Pyeongchang at the Gowon Training Ground in Hoenggye-ri, as per the previous plan (E. Park 2014; I. Lee 2014).

(2) Snowboard and Freestyle Skiing Venues

In February 2015, a TV news scoop revealed that the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was considering changing the venue for the snowboard and freestyle skiing events from Bokwang Phoenix Park\textsuperscript{120} in Pyeongchang to High1 Resort in Jeongseon-gun County (Kwon 2015). The reasons given were that the cost of the refurbishments required for the Bokwang Phoenix Park to host the Olympics had risen to 2-3 times the initial estimates, and
that, in addition, the Phoenix Park management had requested several tens of billions of won (equivalent to over 9 million U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the time) in competition venue usage fees and subsidies to cover operating losses. In response to the venue relocation proposal for the snowboard and freestyle skiing events – the second after the opening and closing ceremonies – Pyeongchang-gun Prosperous Society voiced its objection and demanded the urgent confirmation of the venue as the Bokwang Phoenix Park. In response to the proposal by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, a conference to discuss the issue of the venue relocation was held in March 2015 including POCOG, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the provincial government of Gangwon-do, the IOC and the International Ski Federation, but the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism announced immediately before the conference that it would withdraw the relocation proposal, and the proposal was ultimately scrapped.

In the above examples, venue relocation proposals by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism caused upheaval on multiple occasions. Given the structural aspects of how the provincial government of Gangwon-do relied on central government financial support for the bidding and preparations for the PyeongChang Olympics, it is natural for the central government to make new proposals to reduce its financial burden. On that note, it is worth considering why the host venue locality Pyeongchang-gun – a lower level of local government than the provincial government of Gangwon-do – objected so strenuously amid the upheaval. The Olympics are to ultimately be hosted at the level of Gangwon-do province, and the municipalities (Pyeongchang-gun, Jeongseon-gun and Gangneung-shi) were only host sites\(^{(13)}\). Because all of the venue relocation proposals were to locations within Gangwon-do province, they should not have become major issues. However, the strong objections from the host venue localities clearly show that, while the hosting of the PyeongChang Olympics is a tool for increasing regional development for the provincial government of Gangwon-do, it has quite a different significance for the municipal governments of the host sites.

5. Failure of Development – The ‘Transitory Olympics’ –

To begin with the conclusion, while the PyeongChang Olympics may be an effective tool for increasing regional development for the provincial government of Gangwon-do (the level at which the Olympics are to be hosted), for the municipal governments (Pyeongchang-gun, Jeongseon-gun and Gangneung-shi) which are the host sites, the Olympics may fail to deliver the anticipated benefits of development.

Table 2 includes a list of the venues of events in the PyeongChang Olympics. Of the seven venues in Pyeongchang-gun, five are refurbished existing facilities, and two are new facilities. Among the seven venues, two facilities, namely Yongpyong Resort and Bokwang Phoenix Park, are privately owned. In addition to the event venues, an Olympic Town including the stadium for the opening and closing ceremonies is planned to be newly constructed. By
contrast, four of the five venues in Gangneung-shi have been newly constructed. In this way, many sports event venues have been clustered in Pyeongchang-gun and Gangneung-shi due to hosting the Olympics, but the onus for maintenance and utilisation after the Olympics have ended is on the local governments themselves.14

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Built</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Size of Facilities (One of the largest)</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Stadium</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>PyeongChang Olympic Stadium (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>One Level Underground ~ Seven Floors Aboveground</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpine Skiing</td>
<td>Downhill</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Jeongseon Alpine Centre (Jeongseon)</td>
<td>L=2,852m, V=825m</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Super-G</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Jeongseon Alpine Centre (Jeongseon)</td>
<td>L=2,217m, V=630m</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Giant Slalom</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Yongpyong Alpine Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=1,191m, V=410m</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slalom</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Yongpyong Alpine Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=583m, V=210m</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Country Skiing / Nordic Combined</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Cross-Country Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=3.75km/3.3km/ 25km/2km, B=8m</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ski Jumping / Nordic Combined</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Ski Jumping Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>LH=125m, NH=98m</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biathlon</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Biathlon Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=4km, B=8m</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luge /Bobsleigh / Skeleton</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Olympic Sliding Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=1,376.38m</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freestyle Skiing</td>
<td>Moguls</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Bokwang Snow Park (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=235m (± 35m), V=110m (±30m)</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerials</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Bokwang Snow Park (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=141m, V=50m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ski Cross</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Bokwang Snow Park (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=1050m (± 150m), V=250m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ski-Halfpipe</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Bokwang Snow Park (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=150m, W=22m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ski Slopestyle</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Bokwang Snow Park (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>V=150m, W=30m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowboard</td>
<td>Parallel Giant Slalom</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Ski Jumping Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=700m, V=200m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Snowboard Cross</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Ski Jumping Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=1050m (± 150m), V=250m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Halfpipe</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Ski Jumping Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>L=150m, W=22m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slopestyle</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Alpensia Ski Jumping Centre (Pyeongchang)</td>
<td>V=150m, W=30m</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Speed Skating</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Gangneung Oval (Gangneung)</td>
<td>400m Double Track</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure Skating / Short Track Speed Skating</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Gangneung Ice Arena (Gangneung)</td>
<td>60 × 30m Two Ice Rinks</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ice Hockey I</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Gangneung Hockey Centre (Gangneung)</td>
<td>60 × 30m One Ice Rink</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ice Hockey II</td>
<td>New Construction</td>
<td>Kwandong Hockey Centre (Catholic Kwandong University in Gangneung)</td>
<td>60 × 30m One Ice Rink</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Curling</td>
<td>Additional Construction</td>
<td>Gangneung Curling Centre</td>
<td>Four Sheets</td>
<td>3,500</td>
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</table>


The following section describes the issues faced by the various municipalities and the opinions held by related parties. In Pyeongchang-gun, difficulties are forecast in the maintenance of newly-constructed venues. In other words, the demolition of facilities after the Olympics is being considered as a financially-realistic option. After the XVIII Olympic Winter Games in Nagano, Japan in 1998, the substantial losses incurred in maintenance of
the luge and bobsleigh venue became a major issue, and similar issues are anticipated in Pyeongchang. In addition, while not being an event venue, the 40,000-seat stadium for the opening and closing ceremonies constructed in Pyeongchang is planned to be maintained only at a 15,000-seat capacity after the Olympics, with the remaining 25,000 seats currently scheduled to be removed. Which of the facilities in the Olympic Town are to be retained and which are to be demolished was under consideration as of February 2015. In addition, the construction contractor for the athletes’ village in Pyeongchang-gun had not been determined as of February 2015, and construction of temporary facilities had become a possibility. In the end, Yongpyong Resort indicated its willingness to construct the athletes’ village (on condition of a reduction/exemption from local tax), and construction began in September 2015 with sale of individual apartments beginning in November that year.\(^{15}\)

However, the fact that consideration had to be given to constructing the athletes’ village as temporary facilities demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining facilities in Pyeongchang-gun. Ultimately, Pyeongchang-gun has a population of approximately 40,000, and within it, the Daegwallyeong-myeon area where Olympic facilities are clustered has a population of only approximately 5,000. With such a small population base, the maintenance of large-scale facilities constructed for the Olympics is difficult. The necessity of demolishing Olympic facilities demonstrates a failure of development. Regardless of the necessity of hosting a transitory Olympics (i.e. given the difficulties in maintaining facilities after the Olympics, one in which Olympic facilities would not remain permanently despite the high cost involved), the highest priority for the municipal government of Pyeongchang-gun was to host a successful Olympics in Pyeongchang-gun. In fact, it became apparent through the authors’ interviews with its officials that the municipality had not conducted PR initiatives towards residents of Pyeongchang-gun. Rather, officials and local residents conducted external PR for the PyeongChang Olympics \(^{16}\) by participating together in events held in other regions of Korea.

By contrast, a different approach to development has been taken in Gangneung-shi. While many venues there had to be newly constructed, the basic approach was – even while working on the premise that approximately half of the spectator seats would be removed – to retain Olympic facilities after the Olympics. In addition, the decision was made for the athletes’ village in Gangneung-shi to be constructed by the Korea Land & Housing Corporation, and it is planned to be sold as individual apartments after the Olympics.\(^{17}\) Part of the reason for this different approach is that Gangneung-shi is a city with a larger population than Pyeongchang-gun, in the order of 200,000 people.

In addition, as it is hosting the Olympics bearing the name of another municipality, the municipal government of Gangneung-shi has put considerable effort into PR initiatives towards residents. In other words, because the municipal government of Gangneung-shi must construct and then maintain four new venues in order to host the Games, it is critical for local residents to be convinced of the value in hosting the PyeongChang Olympics in Gangneung-shi. In Gangneung-shi, which in the sense that its name will not remain as host
city has to host a transitory Olympics (i.e. Olympic symbols will not remain permanently), local residents recognising the value in hosting the Olympics and other issues related to the hosting (such as construction of new railroads and venue facilities and venue maintenance after the Games\textsuperscript{(18)} are of even greater importance than the hosting of the Olympics itself.

Taking a broader view, because by Korean standards both Pyeongchang-gun and Gangneung-shi have been left behind in terms of regional development, hosting the Olympics should have been an effective method of development. Despite this apparent point of commonality, why did the two municipalities have to take such different approaches regarding Olympic facilities? The obvious answer is the afore-mentioned difference in population size of Pyeongchang-gun and Gangneung-shi, but this article will take a more nuanced view, focusing on the differing centres of activity during the Olympics and in usual times.

The centre of activity during the Games in Pyeongchang-gun is Alpensia, but at a local level it is usually the town of Pyeongchang-eup, the seat of the municipal government of Pyeongchang-gun. On a broader level it is the city of Chuncheon-shi, the seat of the provincial government of Gangwon-do, Wonju-shi, the largest city in Gangwon-do, or Seoul, the national capital. That is to say, Alpensia is only the centre of activity during the period of the Olympics, and the Olympic facilities must be incorporated into the existing hierarchy of Seoul, Chuncheon-shi, Wonju-shi, and Pyeongchang-eup after the games have concluded.

A critical aspect to consider here is transport infrastructure. The PyeongChang Olympics is being held across two regions with different existing centres of activity – the Yeongseo region in the west and the Yeongdong region in the east – and the transport infrastructure between the two host regions is underdeveloped. For example, while South Korea as a whole has a highly-developed railway network, there is no rail line between the Yeongseo region and the Yeongdong region (while there is a line from Seoul to Gangneung in the Yeongdong region, it takes a large detour to the south, the dotted line on the map below). The road infrastructure is also underdeveloped, and the bus network is sparse. Since the bidding phase, POCOG has maintained that it will be possible during the Olympics to reach any venue from the central area of Alpensia in Pyeongchang-gun within 30 minutes. However, when researched on the Internet in August 2015 (NAVER Map), the closest venues to Alpensia (in the Gangneung Coastal Cluster) required 46 minutes by car (the fastest means of transport in this area), and the farthest venues (at the Jeongseon Alpine Centre) took approximately 1 hour and 34 minutes. In other words, the transport infrastructure to link two venue areas between which there was previously little demand for connectivity had to be developed for the Olympics.

What was even more unfortunate for Pyeongchang-gun is that (due to the region’s topography) the station on the new KTX Ganggyeong railway line built to improve access to Alpensia from Wonju-shi and Seoul (the red line on the map below) was built not at Hoenggye, the closest point to Alpensia, but at Jinbu, approximately 13 km towards Seoul. In other words, while the infrastructure to be built for the Olympics was installed in areas
where there was little previous demand, neither the road nor rail infrastructure was of the form necessary to incorporate the Olympic facilities clustered around Alpensia into the hierarchy prevalent in usual times. Thus, hosting the Olympics may not lead to effective regional development. On the other hand, while Gangneung-shi is separated from the centre of activity during the Olympics itself (Alpensia), the new KTX high-speed line (the black line below) is expected to directly connect the central station of Gangneung-shi via Wonju-shi to Seoul in around 90 minutes (compared to approximately five hours by the current line, or around 2 hours 30 minutes by highway bus). Because the transport infrastructure built for the Olympics improves connectivity with centres of activity in usual times (Seoul and Wonju-shi), the Olympic facilities in Gangneung-shi are positioned into the hierarchy prevalent in usual times. Thus, hosting the Olympics may well lead to effective regional development (Figure 2).

![Figure 2](image-url)

6. Conclusion – Uneven Development Imposed on Municipalities –

As the scale of mega sports events increases, difficulties with the post-event maintenance of venues constructed for them are occurring wherever in the world mega sports events are held in one city. Given this background, and with the cities of East Asia hosting the
Olympics one after another, this article has analysed how the Olympics are being positioned as a tool for increasing regional development.

This article has elucidated that regional development through the Olympics is not always a desirable form of regional development for the host area. Whether or not the Olympics lead to effective regional development depends on factors distinct to the host area such as population size and geography. If dispersed hosting of the Olympics continues to occur in the future, host cities may be fragmented into areas in which regional development through hosting of the Olympics is effective or ineffective. It can be considered that the PyeongChang Olympics, which the provincial government of Gangwon-do bid for as a tool for regional development, are currently creating a new form of imbalance in the municipalities which will be hosting the events. This article has identified the difference in centres of activity between during the hosting of mega sports events and usual times as generating a new form of uneven development.

This article has elucidated how the cities of East Asia – despite taking on the hosting of the Olympics by their own initiative in pursuit of regional development – run into significant difficulties during the preparation phase. The IOC has provided Olympic host cities with a prescription of dispersed hosting and the use of existing facilities, with the aim of reducing the burden on host cities. However, there is surely still room for discussion about whether or not this prescription can enable regional development suited to the scale of the host city.

Notes

(1) The extent of expansion of the Olympic Games is particularly notable in the case of the Olympic Winter Games. Over the last 20 years, the number of gold medals has increased steadily from 61 (at the XVII Olympic Winter Games, held in Lillehammer, Norway, in 1994) to 99 (at the XXII Olympic Winter Games, held in Sochi, Russia, in 2014). On 8 June 2015, the IOC approved the addition of big air snowboarding, the Alpine skiing nation team event, mass-start speed skating and mixed doubles curling to the event roster of the PyeongChang Olympics, and removed only the snowboard parallel slalom. The total number of gold medals awarded at the PyeongChang Olympics is planned to reach 102.

(2) According to the results of a nationwide opinion survey released in December 2009 regarding the bid for the PyeongChang Olympics, 91.4% of respondents supported the bid. Among residents of the three municipalities where the Olympic events are to be held (Pyeongchang-gun, Gangneung-shi and Jeongseon-gun), support was even higher at 93%. This telephone survey was conducted by opinion survey firm TNS KOREA, and interviewed 1,000 adults around Korea (Lee 2009).

(3) The XXIII Olympic Winter Games are commonly called the ‘PyeongChang Olympics’, but the Games are being hosted at the level of the provincial government of Gangwon-do, and the Olympic events are to be held in three municipalities (Pyeongchang-gun and Jeongseon-gun counties and the city of Gangneung-shi) located in the province of Gangwon-do.

(4) In Sapporo City, which was considering a bid for the XXV Olympic Winter Games to be held in 2026 (or for a subsequent Games), the grounding of bids for mega sports events in their relationship with urban planning was highlighted by the statement ‘I believe that the city of Sapporo could be renewed by
hosting [Olympic Winter Games] again’ from then-mayor Fumio Ueda, demonstrating the desire to bid (from the Hokkaido Shimbun, 31 August 2014).

(5) The table was created referring to the document “Bidding and Hosting of Major International Events” (Jang 2013) from The South Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism website. Events other than sports (such as international summits) were removed from the list, and the FINA World Aquatics Championships (planned to be held in 2019), the hosting of which was awarded on 19 July 2013, was added.

(6) The background to this policy included external factors such as decentralisation and privatization (deregulation), which were policy trends worldwide in the 1990s, and internal factors such as the ‘Rebuilding Korea’ initiative under the administration of President Dae-Jung Kim, the catalyst for which was the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98 (Shin 2012).

(7) According to the article ‘South Korea – More than one trillion won in losses across five international sports events such as Formula One’ (Lee et al. 2013), none of the five international sports events held by local governments since 2010 had broken even financially, and it was reported that the total accumulated losses had exceeded one trillion won (equivalent to over 950 million U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the time). The international sports events discussed in the article and not included on the list prepared by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism were the Formula One Korean Grand Prix (held from 2010-2013), the World University Equine Championships (2010) held in Sangju, the 13th IAAF World Championships in Athletics (2011) held in Daegu, the Asian Indoor & Martial Arts Games (2013) held in Incheon and the World Rowing Championships (2013) held in Chungju.

(8) According to the article ‘How many more international events will leave only debts?’ in the Huffington Post Korea on 24 September 2014, a vicious circle is continuing in which, despite local governments accumulating large debts from hosting mega sports events and the facilities constructed for those mega sports events not being utilised, bidding for new mega sports events is continuing. For example, despite running a loss of 243 billion won (equivalent to approximately 228.4 million U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the time) through the hosting of the IAAF World Championships in 2011, the city government of Daegu-shi planned to invest 10 billion won (equivalent to approximately 9.4 million U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the time) in bidding for mega sports events in 2016 (Huh 2014).

(9) According to the above Huffington Post Korea article, the provincial government of Jeollanam-do initially bid to host the Korean Grand Prix without consulting the central government, but still received an injection of 100.1 billion won (equivalent to approximately 89.1 million U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the time) of funding from the central government after failing to attract private-sector investment. In addition, for the hosting of the 2014 Asian Games, the city government of Incheon-shi decided ‘due to the public opinion of residents’ to build new stadiums rather than refurbish and expand the existing stadiums, but ultimately received 117.6 billion won (equivalent to approximately 112.9 million U.S. dollars at the exchange rate of the time) of support from the central government after also failing to attract private-sector investment. Also, in the case where documents promising central government financial support were forged and submitted to the International Swimming Federation (FINA) when bidding for the FINA World Aquatics Championships (planned to be held in Gwangju-shi in 2019), the central government ultimately withdrew its financial support plan.

(10) The South Korean sports sociologist Hee-Joon Chung (2009) approaches these issues from this grounding in Korean sports culture.

(11) The Alpensia Resort ski field is owned by the Gangwon-do Tourism Organization. Construction began in October 2006, during the second bid to host the Olympics. Despite that bid failing in July 2007, construction went ahead, with part of the Alpensia Resort opening in July 2009, and the full resort
opening in June 2010.

(12) Ski field owned by the Bokwang Group, opened in 1995.


(14) According to information obtained in interviews with the Public Affairs Team, Overall Support Division, Winter Olympics Support Bureau, Gangneung City on 9 September 2015, the land for the figure skating and short track speed skating venue is owned by the provincial government of Gangwon-do and the facilities are owned by the city government of Gangneung-shi. After the Olympics, the latter plans to buy the land, and take charge of maintenance and utilization. Divided ownership of land and facilities would likely make utilization after the Games even more of a vexed issue.

(15) From interviews with the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games Promotion Team of the county government of Pyeongchang-gun on 9 February 2015. The descriptions of developments since that date are based on the following internet articles (Kang 2015; Choi 2015; Suh 2015).

(16) From interviews with the county government of Pyeongchang-gun on 9 February 2015.

(17) According to information obtained in interviews with Gangneung City on 9 September 2015, individual sale of apartments of sizes in particularly high demand was planned to begin before the Olympics.

(18) According to information obtained in interviews with Gangneung City on 6 February 2015, venues were planned to be used after the Olympics as multi-purpose cultural centres, leisure facilities, and training facilities for national representative athletes. It was ascertained in interviews on 9 September 2015 that venues may be retained so that Gangneung could be established as a centre for skating events.

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メガ・スポーツイベントと地域開発
— 平昌オリンピックの準備過程を事例として —

松井理恵・申恩真

【要旨】 本稿は、東アジアにおけるメガ・スポーツイベントの開催過程を社会学的に探究する実証的研究である。現在、オリンピックは規模拡大に伴う開催都市の負担増という問題を抱えている。にもかかわらず、オリンピックの東アジア開催が続く。なぜ東アジアの都市は、大きな負担がかかるオリンピックをみずから進んで引き受けるのか。メガ・スポーツイベント研究は、北米およびヨーロッパの事例研究が多く、アジアの事例に関しては研究蓄積が不足している状況である。本稿はこのギャップを埋めるために、東アジアでオリンピックを始めとするメガ・スポーツイベントが、地域開発の契機として位置づけられてきたことを明らかにする。最後に、平昌オリンピックの準備過程を事例として分析し、メガ・スポーツイベントを契機とした地域開発が抱える構造的な困難を明らかにする。

【キーワード】地方自治、不均衡発展、開催の負担