Some Aspects of Japanese Studies on Russian and Soviet History

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This paper does not aim at giving a bird’s-eye view of Japanese studies on Russian and Soviet history. For that purpose some survey articles have been already published in Western languages (English, Russian and German). Moreover, there are some academic journals, publishing works of Japanese scholars in European languages. Thus Japanese studies are not totally alien to foreign researchers in the same field. Therefore, limit the aim of this paper to the following three points: first, to describe some characteristics of Japanese studies on Russian and Soviet history, which seem from my own viewpoint to deserve special mention; secondly, to introduce in outline, the work of Yuzuru Taniuchi, one of the most outstanding historians in Japan; and thirdly, to touch on one of the most controversial issues in Soviet history, which has been hotly debated in Japan, the problem of the relationship between party, state, and society in the USSR.

I

In this section I will describe some characteristic features of Japanese studies on Russian and Soviet history in the 1960s and 1970s. But before proceeding to this task a few words about period preceding to the 1960s may be in order. Roughly speaking, prior to the end of 1950s no serious scholarly work on Russian and Soviet history existed in Japan. It is true that some scholars were interested in the Soviet Union and produced a small number of

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2 Japanese Slavic and East European Studies, Kyoto, 1980—; Acta Slavica Iaponica, (The Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo) 1983—; Annals of the Institute of Social Science (formerly Social Science Abstracts), (The Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo) 1953—(This one is not specifically oriented to Soviet or Slavic studies, but contains several articles in the field). In addition, Surabu Kenkyu (the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 1957—) also contains some articles written in Western languages, although most are written in Japanese.
scholarly works before World War II. But the pre-war Japanese government harshly oppressed any discussion of socialism or Marxism, and no academic freedom existed at the time. After Communist, and even Socialist, movements were totally suppressed, some governmental and even semi-governmental agencies were engaged in the analysis of the Soviet Union from the standpoint as a potential enemy. Most notable of them were the Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Research Institute of the Manchurian Railway Company. The studies done by these agencies were of practical, rather than academic, nature, although they were not entirely devoid of scholarly merits. There were also several former Marxist intellectuals in these agencies. However, the tradition of this sort of work was not inherited by post-war Japanese scholars.

After World War II, as a reaction to the pre-war authoritarian and strongly anti-communist regime, most Japan intellectuals leaned toward socialism and Marxism. The fact that only the Communist Party of Japan had consistently opposed the war was one of the factors that enhanced the influence of Marxism. So it was natural for many intellectuals to sympathize with the Soviet Union. The subsequent cold war contributed among the intellectuals the Manichean attitude, whether for or against socialism. The dark side of Stalin's Russia was scarcely known to Japanese. In this situation many intellectuals idealized the Soviet Union without using primary sources. (Incidentally, the amount of primary materials available in Japan was quite meager at that time.) To give only one example to illustrate the situation, Istoriia VKP (b), Kratkii Kurs (1938), translated into Japanese and published in Japan in several editions, had enormous influence among Japanese intellectuals.

Against this background the three events that occurred in the mid-50s gravely shocked left-oriented intellectuals: the 6th National Conference of the Communist Party of Japan (1955), the criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and the Hungarian uprising.\(^3\) After these events Japanese intellectuals gradually began to reconsider and reevaluate Soviet socialism, and some of them took the task of studying Russian and Soviet history from a new angle, based on primary materials. The spread of microfilms enabled researchers to use primary materials far more widely than before. It took, however, some time for these efforts to bear fruit. Therefore, it is around the year 1960 that serious study on Russian and Soviet history began in earnest in Japan.\(^4\)

\(^3\) Although the significance of the last two events requires no further explanation, the first event might need an explanation. At the 6th National Conference of the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ), the leadership of the CPJ repudiated its previous political line, aimed at bringing on a revolution by violence. It was a traumatic turnaround for those members of the CPJ who had been wholeheartedly committed to the previous line. Thus, some, if not many, Marxists began the painful process of reconsideration prior to the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

\(^4\) I am here describing only the main trend. There were, admittedly, some pioneer scholars, who began their work in the 1950s. But they were neither numerous nor influential at that time and can be viewed as an exception. Incidentally, it is a symbolical fact that the most active association in the field in Japan, Roshia-shi kenkyukai [Association for Studies on Russian History], was founded in 1956, the year of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and issued the first number of its journal in 1960.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Russian and Soviet studies in Japan steadily progressed both quantitatively and qualitatively. This progress is continuing well into the 1980s. The number of historians has increased, numbering now well over a hundred. Subjects tackled with and approaches adopted by historians have accordingly become more and more diverse. The diversity is indeed so great that it is difficult to characterize the present situation as a whole in a short survey. That is why I will concentrate below mainly on the 1960s and 1970s, touching on only some aspects of the 1980s that can be viewed as a continuation of the 1970s.

The first characteristic feature of Japanese studies on Russian and Soviet history in the 1960s and 1970s is that many historians were under the strong influence of Marxism. The same applies to most Japanese intellectuals, especially those who are engaged in the social sciences and humanities. But this fact should not be interpreted simplistically. As I noted above, many Japanese left-intellectuals began reconsidering socialism, Marxism, and the Soviet Union after the mid-1950s. Although those who totally discarded Marxism were not numerous, many have become more critical of the previous orthodox Marxism, imported from the USSR of the Stalin era. There appeared various schools of Marxism, or indeed various Marxisms, for example, Trotskyite, Maoist, market-socialist, Euro-Communist, the Uno-School, and so on. In addition, there were, and are, many non-Marxists, who have been nonetheless influenced by Marxism and are more or less pro-socialist, though not necessarily pro-Soviet Union. Their appraisal of the USSR is also diverse: some remain generally sympathetic to the country while having some reservations; others are more critical, committing themselves to what they think is “true socialism”; the third group is disenchanted by the socialist idea itself. The dominance of Marxism in the Japanese approach to Russian and Soviet history had both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, it gave them a special insight in understanding the ideas held by Russian revolutionaries. Unlike most historians in the West, whose intellectual environment is not rooted in Marxism, Japanese historians took Marxism as a point of departure, and therefore, had little difficulty in understanding the terminology and the concepts used by Soviet scholars. The endeavor to achieve socialist goals was held to be of vital importance and interest to the majority of historians, whether or not they thought that such ideals had been realized in the Soviet Union. Owing to the fact that Marxology in Japan has been well developed and that most social scientist, including even non-Marxism, know Marxist theory very well, their understanding of Marxism is very deep and sophisticated.

On the other hand, their commitment to the socialist ideal made it harder for them to have a detached view of Soviet history. Their discussion often tended to be loaded with moral judgements. (For example, in evaluating the question of continuity between Lenin and Stalin, many historians denounce Stalin but preserve high esteem for Lenin.) Moral judgements may not always be a hindrance to objective research, nor is their study necessarily tendentious. But it cannot be denied that their moral judgements have occasionally hampered their objectivity. It also limited their scope of view. In the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the influence of Marxism in Japan has been on the decline, and the

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5 The Uno-School is a unique school of Marxian economics, founded by Kozo Uno (1897-1977) of the University of Tokyo.
intellectual atmosphere has been changing. The viewpoint and approaches of the younger generation are often different from those prevalent in the 1960s. Some are critical not only of the Soviet Union under Stalin but also of Lenin, the Russian Revolution, and Marxism itself. Therefore, the influence of Marxism may cease to be a characteristic feature of Japanese studies on Russian and Soviet history in the future.

Second, the influence of American research conducted in the 1950s and 1960s had little influence on Japanese historians. Specifically, the totalitarian model, which exerted strong influence in other Western countries, was flatly rejected as a kind of "cold-war" anti-communist ideology. So the Japanese intellectual situation was greatly different from that in the United States. However, the situation is changing in both sides. On the one hand, in the United States the theory of totalitarianism is now under attack by young scholars, and on the other hand, the younger generation of scholars in Japan has recently begun assimilating various aspects of American research that have been neglected in the past. Thus the distance between Japanese and American scholars is now narrowing.

While the influence of American scholars was relatively weak, Japanese historians were not indifferent to studies conducted by other foreign researchers. In the first place, works by Soviet historians published after the criticism of Stalin attracted the attention of Japanese historians. To give a few examples, the names of M. Ia. Gefter, E. N. Burdzhalov, and V. P. Danilov are quite well known in Japan. In a sense, the works of innovative Soviet historians in the post-Stalin period and those of Japanese historians have some aspects in common, although there existed very few direct contacts between them. Secondly, British scholars, especially the late E. H. Carr and Alec Nove have exerted great influence, I may add also Isaac Deutscher, although he is not a British. One of the representative historians in Japan, Yuzuru Taniuchi, closely collaborated with E. H. Carr until the latter's death in 1982. Thus, Japanese historians have paid great attention to works both in the USSR and in the West. But Japanese works are not widely known among foreign scholars. Such a one-way relation is characteristic not only of this field but of Japanese social sciences in general. This states of affairs must be corrected by efforts of both Japanese and foreign scholars.

Third, the areas of research interests have been heavily skewed to economic history and history of social movements at the expense of such fields as political history, legal history, cultural history and so on. This can be explained by the dominance of Marxism in Japan, for Marxists regard the economic system as the basis of society. Japanese historians, however, do not simply reduce everything to superstructure founded on the economic system. They study the relationship between the economic, social, and political systems in a sophisticated way. Moreover, they try to analyze the relationship among various economic sectors structurally, whereas Soviet historians tend to analyze the same subject in a more simplistic way. For example, while Soviet historians stress the straight-line development of capitalism in modern (pre-revolutionary) Russia, Japanese scholars focus on structural

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6 The first Japanese-Soviet Conference of Historians took place only in 1973. Since then the conference is held periodically, but not on a large-scale. In addition, the opportunities for Japanese scholars to visit the USSR were very limited until the mid-70s, and remain far smaller than those for American scholars.
interdependence between capitalist sector and pre-modern agricultural system. The representatives of such historians are Shizuma Hinada and Haruki Wada.\(^7\) Also notable is Koichi Yasuda, who has been studying the problems of \textit{Mir} and related subjects in the Stolypin period.\(^8\)

History of social movements is another important area which has been extensively researched by Japanese historians. In this area, too, the Marxist orientation in a wider sense of the word has been dominant. Japanese historians tend to stress the significance of the various spontaneous mass movements, whereas Soviet historians stress the Bolshevik leadership. The \textit{narodniki} and the SR Party are more popular subjects than the Bolsheviks. (Incidentally, the Mensheviks and the liberals receive less attention in Japan than in the West. Perhaps this may be explained by the still strong left-wing orientation among Japanese historians, especially those engaged in the history of social moments.) Increasingly more attention has been paid to various peasant movements, workers movements (in most cases not organized by social democrats), and minority nationality movements. Many young scholars engaged in research on social movement are disciples of Haruki Wada and can be called the \textquote{Wada-School}\(^9\). Some of them are engaged in the history of the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Jews in Russia, using materials written in each nation's language.\(^{10}\)

In contrast to the two areas mentioned above, other areas have been relatively neglected. There are, of course, some remarkable exceptions. In the area of political history, Yuzuru Taniuchi is outstanding, as I will discuss his work later in this paper. In the area of legal history, Isamu Fujita and his disciples are noteworthy. They belong to a rather orthodox Marxist tradition, but nonetheless they are not dogmatists. (Incidentally, the fact that even those Marxists who can be regarded as rather orthodox are not necessarily dogmatists is

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\(^7\) Some of Hinada's articles are published in Russian and English: S. Hinada, \textit{\textquote{Russkii kapitalizm i otrabotochnaia sistema v sel'skom khoziaistve Rossii}}, \textit{Surabu Kenkyu}, No. 18 (1973); \textit{the Russian Peasant Commune: 'Mir'}, \textit{Japanese Slavic and East European Studies}, Vol. 4 (1983). Wada's articles on this subject have not been translated into Western languages, although he has published some articles on other subjects in English and Russian (see below note 9).

\(^8\) Yasuda has frequently visited the USSR and has been extensively used archival materials. This is noteworthy, for few Japanese scholars have had an opportunity to use archival materials extensively.


\(^10\) As far as I know, only one article in this area has been published in English: K. Nakai, \textit{Soviet Agricultural Policies in the Ukraine and the 1921–1922 Famine}, \textit{Harvard Ukrainian Studies}, Vol.6, No.1 (1982)
another evidence of the sophistication of Marxism in Japan.) History of ideas, especially of the thinkers in the 19th century, was actively studied in the 1960s, but now interest in this area has been declining. Diplomatic history and the history of culture are the most neglected areas in spite of the efforts of a few pioneer researchers. Finally, social history has been attracting attention of increasingly more historians especially in the 1980s, but it is only in the initial stage at present.

Fourth, Japanese researches are concentrated on a limited specific period of Russian history. This fact is not caused by any scholarly reason but is a mere reflexion of the scarcity of specialists. (I noted above that the number of historians has greatly increased, but the increase is only relative to the poor state of affairs in the 1950s. It remains very low in comparison with the United States.) Ancient and medieval history is most neglected although there is a small number of pioneers. Early modern history (prior to the emancipation of serfs in 1861) is an equally weak area.

Moreover, contemporary history (after World War II) is also a relatively neglected area. It is true that some economists have been engaged in the analysis of Soviet economy. The main center of economists is Hitotsubashi University, with Kazuo Nonomura and the late Minoru Oka at its heads. Also notable is Hiromasa Nakayama who belongs to the Uno-School (see above note 5). Moreover, some legal scientists have been studying contemporary Soviet law. Most notable among them is the Fujita-School mentioned above. But, in spite of the existence of these scholars, research on contemporary Soviet Union as a whole is weak. In Japan, analysis of the contemporary world tends to be seen as the task of journalists, not of scholars. So the situation described above is not peculiar to Soviet studies. If there is something unique to Soviet studies, it is not that scholars avoid analyzing contemporary situation, but that the level of knowledge of journalists on the Soviet Union is lower than that on the United States or on Western Europe. Hence there is a grave gap between journalistic works on the contemporary Soviet Union and scholarly works on Russian and Soviet history. Perhaps only one exception is Shigeki Hakamada, who has both a scholarly mind and a journalistic sense.

It is accurate to say, therefore, that Japanese studies on Russian and Soviet history have been overwhelmingly concentrated on the period from the mid-19th century to the 1930s. This period, in turn, can be divided into two sub-periods: the pre-revolutionary period (including the revolution itself) and the post-revolutionary days, i.e. the 1920s and 1930s.

In the 1960s, most historians concentrate on the pre-revolutionary period. This stemmed from their implicit assumption that the Russian Revolution of 1917 was an epoch-making event in the history of mankind and that task of historians was to analyze the

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12 Hakamada once lived in the USSR for five years and since then has often visited the country, hence his acute sense on everyday life and psychology of the Soviet people. This is noteworthy, for very few Japanese scholars have lived in the USSR as long as he.
causes and process of the Russian Revolution. Economic history of Tsarist Russia was thought to explain the preconditions of the revolution; and history of social movements was considered to account for subjective factors of the revolution. This assumption was later called the “Russian-Revolution-as-the-goal assumption.” Japanese historians in the 1960s were, of course, not entirely uncritical of the Soviet Union, but they were unanimous in regarding the Russian Revolution as an epoch-making and positive event that created a precondition of socialism.

Against this background, Yuzuru Taniuchi's work on the Soviet countryside, the first part of which was published in 1962, was somewhat isolated. It is true that other historians did pay due respects to this remarkable work, but the relationship between his work and the rest of works of the “Russian-Revolution-as the goal” type was unclear. It was only in the 1970s that historical studies of the Soviet period began in earnest in Japan. A series of events in the late 1960s (the rise of the “new left” student movement, Soviet invasion into Czechoslovakia in 1968, publication of Solzhenitsyn’s novels etc.) caused a change in the attitude of intellectuals towards the Soviet Union. In this situation the younger generation of scholars began to study the history of the post-revolutionary period with critical eyes. Taniuchi’s works and E. H. Carr's monumental History of Soviet Russia gave a great impetus to this new trend.13 Young historians, in most cases trained by Taniuchi, are now proceeding from the study of the 1920s to the analysis of the 1930s, i. e. the Stalin era. They, including myself, recently published a collection of essays in honor of the 60th birthday of Taniuchi (Tokyo: Iwanami Publishers, 1984), to which three scholars from abroad also contributed: the late E. H. Carr (who just before his death agreed to include in this collection one chapter of his last work, The Twilight of Comintern), R. W. Davies and V. P. Danilov. This attests to the respect and friendship accorded to Taniuchi by foreign scholars. It is now possible to state that studies of Soviet Russia in the 1930s are developing rapidly.

As I noted in the preceding section, there are several schools of note in Japan: the Wada-School, the Taniuchi-School, the Fujita-School, the Hitotsubashi-School, and so on. Since it is difficult to describe the essence of each school in detail in such a short survey, I limit myself here to introducing, in outline, the works of only one representative: Yuzuru Taniuchi.15

13 Five out of fourteen volumes of Carr's History have thus far been translated into Japanese.
14 In writing this section, I greatly owe to the following article: H. Okuda, “On Some Aspects of Recent Soviet Studies in Japan,” (a paper presented to the meeting of the Soviet-shi Kenkyukai [Study Group of Soviet History] with Professors Sheila Fitzpatrick and Jerry F. Hough as guests, held in Tokyo, August,19, 1983).
Although Taniuchi is a political scientist by profession and his two major books are entitled as "A Political History of the Soviet Union" and "The Emergence of the Stalinist Political Regime" respectively (italics added), his viewpoint is not that of political science in a narrow sense of the word (or in the sense generally used in the United States). He concentrates on the relationship between government  and peasantry, touching only casually on the problems of the top leadership and their power struggles. Nevertheless, his work is a political history in a unique and genuine sense, for he investigates the nature of the political system crucially manifested in the relationship between government and peasantry.

His first book *Sobieto Seiji-shi: Kenryoku to Nomini [A Political History of the Soviet Union: the Regime and the Peasantry]* mainly deals with the peasant commune (*mir*) and its meeting (*skhod*) in the mid-1920s. In it he demonstrates the tenacious vitality of the *mir* and the *skhod* against the weak party organization in the countryside. He also describes the efforts made by the party and the state to integrate the peasantry into the regime. These efforts were, however, largely unsuccessful, and the tension between the government and the peasantry remained. This situation, he suggests, was the historical background of the decision to collectivize agriculture "from above."

Taniuchi's second, and major book, *Sutarin Seiji Taisei no Seiritsu [The Emergence of Stalinist Political Regime]*, analyzes the process of collectivization itself. Therefore it can be said that the first book was an introduction to the second one. He also wrote a more concise book, *Gendai Shakaishugi no Shosatsu [Reflections on Contemporary Socialism]* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), intended for non-specialists, and this one discusses the historical significance of the collectivization of agriculture in relation to Soviet history as a whole and the politics of socialist countries in general. Thus, collectivization is viewed by Taniuchi as having very far-reaching significance.

While Moshe Lewin and, more recently, R. W. Davies dealt with the same subject from the viewpoint of economic history, Taniuchi's approach is one of political history in a unique sense mentioned above. He focused on the problem of administrative methods utilized in the process, and he points out the importance of the Ural-Siberian Method and the plenipotentiary (*upolnomochennye*) system. The Ural-Siberian method and the plenipotentiary system were closely interrelated in the sense that the latter was an indispensable tool to realize the former. Both had a coercive nature, being imposed from outside, or from above. But the Ural-Siberian Method had another aspect: it tried to pretend to be voluntary and, for that purpose, to utilize the *mir* and *skhod*. This fact had a paradoxical effect: not only did the Soviet government impose its will on the peasantry but the old traditions of the peasantry (or the so-called "Russian backwardness") penetrated into the

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16 The term "government" is used here widely, i.e., including the Communist Party apparatus. The relationship between party and government (or state) is very complex and will be discussed later in this paper.

17 Both Moshe Lewin's and R. W. Davies' books on the collectivization have been translated into Japanese (the latter partially), which attests to the intensive interest in this subject in Japan.

18 On the Ural-Siberian Method see his article mentioned above in note 15.
Soviet regime, though subtly and gradually. Hence, Soviet society thereafter should not be viewed as a modern society in a genuine sense but retained a pre-modern character.\(^{19}\)

In the process of the collectivization of agriculture, moreover, there occurred another important change. The plenipotentiaries dispatched from the city to the countryside were largely nominated and guided by party apparatus and yet they exerted a state power. This fact can be characterized as a complete fusion of the party and the state, or the etatization of the party.\(^{20}\) Taniuchi admits that the fusion of party and state had begun in the much earlier period, indeed shortly after the revolution. But he argues that the earlier fusion was of a limited nature throughout the 1920s and that only in the process of the collectivization of agriculture did the fusion reach completion not only in the central apparatus but also in the local administrative order in the vast countryside, where the overwhelming majority of the population lived. This was the origin of the party-state structure which even today characterizes the political system of socialist countries. Thus, Taniuchi's study of the collectivization of agriculture not only describes the process itself in a very detailed way but also provides a key to analyzing socialist political system in general. That is why I call his work a political history in a unique sense.

There are, however, some unsolved problems. First, as noted above, Taniuchi focuses on the administrative means utilized in the process of the collectivization, and touches only casually on the economic side of the process. To be sure, the economic side of the collectivization of agriculture has been well studied by Moshe Lewin and R. W. Davies in the West and V. P. Danilov and others in the USSR. But there remain several points that need further investigation. In Japan, Hiroshi Okuda is currently engaged in this problem. He wrote an excellent monograph on kustari industry\(^{21}\) and has published series of articles on the land system of kolkhoz.

Secondly, Taniuchi's work concentrates on the process of the "revolution from above" in 1929 and 1930 and does not directly deal with the 1930s,\(^{22}\) although it offers an important suggestion on the process of the 1930s. Most of his successors are now engaged in the study of the 1930s; for example, Hiroshi Arata, Norie Ishii, Hiroaki Kuromiya.\(^{23}\) Kengo

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\(^{19}\) Since Taniuchi's *magnum opus* is not yet completed and he is very cautious in drawing a general conclusion, he does not explicitly state the view described here. So this is my interpretation inferred from what he says.


\(^{22}\) Taniuchi's major work has not yet been completed, but he has announced that his fourth, and final, volume will deal with the first half of the year 1930 (up to the 16th Party Congress).

Nagatsuna, Hiroshi Oda,24 Hiroshi Okuda (see above note 21), Nobuo Shimotomai,25 Nobuaki Shiokawa (the author of this paper),26 Takeshi Tomita, Kenji Uchida and so on.

Thirdly, while Taniuchi stresses the significance of “what may be called the logic of the situation” or “social and political roots” of the “revolution from above,” as distinguished from “policy-making or power struggles among the political leaders,”27 he does not explicitly refer to the social basis, or support “from below”, of the “revolution from above.” In my opinion, to state that the “revolution from above” had a kind of support “from below” is not self-contradictory. Any dictator must have some sort of social basis. Whether it is an authentic and spontaneous support or a manipulated one is, of course, another matter. If we look closer into “the logic of the situation” or “social and political roots”, we will find the social basis of Stalinism. In other words, not only a political history but also a social history of Stalinism must be studied.28

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26 My own main subject is the labor problem in the 1920s and 1930s. I will soon publish two books (both in Japanese) on the subject. The first one, entitled Shakaiishugi Kokka to Rodosha Kaikyū [A ‘Socialist State’ and the Working Class] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1984), deals with the labor management on the plant-level in the first five-year plan period. (An English summary of this book is now under preparation.) The second one, entitled The Working Class under Stalinist System (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, due to appear in May 1985), deals with the social structure of the working class in the same period. Some portions of the latter work have been translated into English: N. Shiokawa, “Labor Turnover in the USSR, 1929–33: A Sectorial Analysis,” Annals of the Institute of Social Science (University of Tokyo), No.23 (1982); “The Collectivization of Agriculture and Otkhodnichestvo in the USSR, 1930,” Ibid., No.24 (1982–83).


28 This viewpoint, I believe, has some similarity to that of Sheila Fitzpatrick. In Japan, I myself and Hiroaki Kuromiya have paid a special attention to her works, although there are slight differences among us. See, for example, the following article: N. Shiokawa, “The Emergence of the ‘Stalinist System’ and the Working Class,” (a paper presented to the meeting referred to above in note 14).
Lastly, as noted above, Taniuchi argues that the fusion of party and state was completed in the process of the collectivization of agriculture and that the party-state structure which even today characterizes the political system of socialist countries emerged at that time. He admits that the fusion of party and state began in an earlier period but contends that it was completed only in the process of the "revolution from above." This is quite a stimulating and suggestive view, which has great influence on Japanese historians. At the same time, however, some objections have been raised, and modifications to this view have been made. I will discuss this problem in the following section.

Taniuchi’s view described above has an implicit assumption that the Russian Revolution and Lenin were not immediately responsible for the Stalinist party-state system. So he can be said to belong to the “discontinuity school,” although he admits a certain degree of continuity. In contrast to this, many Japanese scholars of the younger generation, specializing in the history of the Russian Revolution, tend to stress the centralized and authoritarian nature of the Bolshevik regime shortly after the revolution. So it is possible to classify them as the “continuity school” in the sense that they consider more important the element of continuity between Lenin’s Russia and the Stalinist System. Of course, there are differences of nuance among them, and they do not totally disregard the aspect of discontinuity. So the above statement is an oversimplification. But it cannot be denied that while some are inclined to stress the discontinuity (between Lenin and Stalin), others tend to underline the continuity.

Still other historians, notably represented by Norie Ishii, analyze the process of the new state-building in the period from October 1917 to the 8th Party Congress (March 1919) and conclude that a political system, to be called the “party-state system,” emerged in this period.

This section is a summary of my article published in: Y. Taniuchi and H. Arata (eds.), Sutarin Jidai no Kokka to Shakai [State and Society in the Stalin Era] (Tokyo: Bokutaku-sha, 1984) as a material for discussion. (The book also contains three comments on my article and my reply to them.) Since the aim of it was to provoke a lively discussion, it was written intentionally in a simplified and somewhat one sided fashion.

I admit that this statement is too simplistic to convey accurately the sophisticated view of Taniuchi. But in a very general sense, I think that such summarization is justified.


For a discussion on the similar problem in the United States, see Stephen F. Cohen, “Bolshevism and Stalinism,” in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: Norton, 1977). It is important, however, to note that neither “continuity school” nor “discontinuity school” in Japan are identical to those in the United States.
According to them, the fusion of party and state was a natural product that resulted from Bolsheviks' taking power, and should not be seen as a temporary regression from their original ideal. This view is in a clear contrast to Taniuchi's.

In historical studies we are often faced with the problem of continuity and discontinuity. There are always both elements. It is important to specify precisely in what aspects continuity is prevalent and in what aspects discontinuity is dominant. In order to avoid a fruitless debate, it is necessary to use relevant concepts. In this case, I would argue that we must analyze not only the relationship of party and state but also their relationship with society. If we consider only the relationship between party and state, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the fusion of party and state, or the "party-state system," emerged in the process of new state-building and was consolidated in the early NEP period, when the Mensheviks and the SR Party were finally crushed and the one-party system was established. This is an aspect where continuity predominates.

But when we turn to the relationship between the "party-state system" and society, we find a clear difference, or discontinuity, between the 1920s and 1930s. While in the 1920s the "party-state system" tolerated a relative independence of society, in the 1930s the "party-state system" endeavored to destroy the independence of society. In other words, while in the NEP period there was a relative social pluralism (there was no political pluralism, however), in the process of the "revolution from above" social pluralism was almost totally suppressed. This is an aspect where discontinuity dominates. Therefore

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33 It is important to note that while they stress the action of taking power they do not attach much importance on Lenin's theory, for example, that propounded in What Is To Be Done? They do not think that everything flowed from Lenin's theory or that the pre-revolutionary Bolshevik tradition and the post-revolutionary political system were directly linked, as some theorists of totalitarianism school think. They pay much closer attention to the nature of the social movements which led to the revolution and advocate a structural analysis of the revolution. Social movements in the Russian Revolution were not single or unified but very diverse with each social group having its own distinct aspirations. But the hegemony exerted by the Bolshevik party gradually imposed a unity and centralized order upon them, hence the centralized and authoritarian nature of the post-revolutionary regime. It was the result of the "logic of the situation," not a direct product of Lenin's theory.

34 The one-party system has a strong affinity with the party-state system, but they are not identical. On the one hand, the one-party system in non-communist countries does not originate the party-state system. On the other hand, the so-called "hegemonic party system" in some of the East European countries gives rise to the party-state system through the fusion of the hegemonic party and the state. (The term "hegemonic party system" was coined by Jerzy Wiatr and developed by Giovanni Sartori.)


36 The total suppression of social pluralism should not be interpreted as meaning the actual extinction of various interests, opinions, life-styles etc. in society. These varieties never cease to exist under any oppressive regime. The suppression of social pluralism only means
the historical significance of the “revolution from above” lies not in the fact that the fusion of party and state was completed at that time but in the fact that the “party-state system” suppressed the social pluralism which had hitherto been tolerated.

Of course, the concept of continuity-discontinuity is a relative one. There is no perfect discontinuity or complete continuity in history. In this case, the antipathy to the relative pluralism in the NEP society was held by some enthusiastic party activists already in the 1920s. This fact set the background to the coming “revolution from above.” In addition, after the turmoil of the “revolution from above” receded, some elements of continuity revived. These points are mitigating factors to the basic discontinuity in the relationship between the “party-state system” and society.

On the other hand, although the “party-state system” was already established in the early period of state-building, its internal structure and modus operandi were liable to further change. Centralization rapidly progressed after the Right Opposition was defeated. Concomitantly, the room for expressing various views was drastically reduced in the 1930s. This is a counterbalancing factor to the basic continuity in the existence of the “party-state system.” In any case, the problem of continuity and discontinuity can be discussed more fully only when we take into account not only the relationship of party and state but also their relationship with society. This viewpoint, I believe, does not contradict Taniuchi’s but supplements and widens it.

Since my own major subject of research are the problem of labor in the 1920s and 1930s, I will briefly illustrate the above viewpoint by the example of the trade unions. While there arose various trade unions and factory committees in 1917, after the October Revolution centralization gradually progressed. Factory committees were declared to become primary organs of trade unions, and local unions were integrated into national ones, organized on the principle of industrial unionism. These changes took place under the hegemony of the Bolsheviks. Shortly after the introduction of the NEP, the remaining Menshevik-led unions were finally disbanded by violence. Moreover, centralization within the Bolshevik party progressed. Workers’ Opposition, which had exerted fairly strong influence in the Metalworkers’ Union, was defeated and ordered to dissolve in 1921–22. D. B. Riazanov, an independent-minded unionist, was prohibited from participating in the trade union movement. Personnel management in the trade unions by party apparatus was enhanced through the nomenklatura system in the early NEP period. The Article 153 of the Labor Code of 1922 stipulated that any organizations, not registered to inter-union organizations (the top of which was VTsSPS), could not represent themselves as trade unions and could not claim the rights of trade unions. The Article 157 stipulated that any committees, not recognized by trade unions, could not lay claim to the rights of factory committees. These stipulations did not leave any room for non-Bolshevik unions to act legally as trade unions. Thus, the that the public expression of these varieties was officially banned. The totalitarianism theory is erroneous in disregarding the actual existence of heterogeneities in society and in failing to recognize the possibility of change in the degree to which these heterogeneities are asserted.

monopoly of leadership in trade union movement by the Bolsheviks was established in the early NEP period. As far as this point is concerned, continuity has been dominant up to even today.

But this is not the whole story. There is another side of the coin. Although the leadership in the trade union movement was monopolized by the Bolsheviks, in the NEP period trade unions were relatively independent from industrial managers. They could assert their interests when they bargained with managers, though admittedly in a limited scope. Most characteristic of such a position of the trade unions was the collective bargaining system. In the process of the "revolution from above," however, the trade unions were deprived of their relative independence. Their main task was no longer to protect the interest of the working masses but to mobilize them for industrialization.

Moreover, in 1933, the Commissariat of Labor was abolished and its functions were transferred to the trade unions, which meant the etatization of the trade unions. Of course, conflict and contradiction did not entirely disappeared but lost a channel of public expression. Dissatisfied workers could not express their view through trade unions, and instead had recourse to such measures as sabotage, absenteeism, labor turnover, lowering the quality of work and so on. In this respect, a great difference, or discontinuity, can be discerned between the trade unions in the 1920s and those in the 1930s. The foregoing argument shows, if in a simplified fashion, both aspects of continuity and discontinuity in the relationship among party, trade unions, and working masses. This relationship is analogous to that between party, state, and society.

The problem of the relationship between party, state, and, society is very important not only concerning the 1920s and 1930s but also concerning later years. Indeed it is a key problem in analyzing the politics of socialist countries. The above discussion shows, in outline, how this problem has been dealt with in Japan. It also shows, I believe, that Japanese historians in the field have made a considerable contribution not only in one or other specific subjects but also in the understanding of Soviet history as a whole.

As I noted at the outset, this paper does not claim to give a bird's-eye view. There are many other remarkable studies that are not mentioned here owing to the limitation of space. I hope some day they will be introduced to foreign scholars. Japanese studies on Russian and

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38 I dealt with these matters in more detail in my article: "NEP no Donyu to Rodo Kumiai [The Introduction of the NEP and the Trade Unions]," Rekishigaku Kenkyu, No.443 (April, 1977).
39 The collective agreement system in the USSR is discussed in my article, "Soren ni okeru Dantai Kyoyaku Seido oyobi sono Henyo [Soviet Industrial Relations and the Collective Agreement System in the 1920s and 1930s]," Surabu Kenkyu, No.31 (January, 1984) (in Japanese but with a short summary in English).
40 This process is dealt with in detal in Shimotomai's monograph referred to above in note 25. But his argument seems to me a bit simplistic, although I largely agree with his main conclusion.
42 For these problems see my two books referred to above in note 26.
Soviet history have been developing for these twenty-five years fairly rapidly in spite of various bad conditions (paucity of financial aids, very limited chance of visiting the Soviet Union, difficulty for young talented graduate students to get a job in a university, and so on). Their works should be more widely known among foreign scholars and be subjected to their criticism.