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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>BERTON, Peter</td>
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<td>Citation</td>
<td>Acta Slavica Iaponica, 7: 121-144</td>
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<td>Issue Date</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>Doc URL</td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/2115/7991">http://hdl.handle.net/2115/7991</a></td>
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THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S VIEW OF GORBACHEV’S PERESTROIKA

Peter Berton

“It is regrettable that except for some, most Japanese people think pessimistically about socialism.”

Chairman Miyamoto Kenji on the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Communist Party, July 15, 1987

I. INTRODUCTION

How does the Japanese Communist Party view the Gorbachev revolution? What does it think of the domestic reforms known by now all over the world as Perestroika (or restructuring)? What does it think of the campaign for openness (glasnost) and democratization? What does it think of New Thinking (novoe myshlenie) or New Political Thinking (novoe politicheskoe myshlenie), particularly as it affects the foreign policies of the Soviet Union?

A. Some Key Factors Affecting the JCP Response

The JCP view of the Gorbachev reforms, Perestroika, glasnost, and the “New Thinking” is primarily conditioned by the following factors:

1. the JCP has continued to be for the past thirty years a dictatorially-run organization, albeit with a Eurocommunist facade;

2. the Party’s policies are very much those of its 80-year old Stalinist leader Miyamoto Kenji, who must presumably worry what is going to happen to his own cult of personality once he joins Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Chernenko;

3. Japanese intellectuals’ fascination with Marxism as a theory of society, though diminishing, remains potent. Thus, the left-wing of the Japanese Socialist Party is actually more orthodox Marxist than the JCP;

4. the JCP is isolated on the Japanese political scene, and has to compete with the JSP and the Democratic Socialists who have much stronger influence over organized labor;

5. the Party has to live down certain historical legacies:

A. as the consequence of his direct involvement in a prewar Communist lynching of a police infiltrator, Miyamoto is handicapped by his image of a party leader who is also a convicted murderer;

B. the Party’s espousal of violence and attempted acts of sabotage during the Korean war—the image of the Party as a radical group outside the pale of democratic Japan;

C. the Communist world’s various acts of aggression and violence (Soviet suppression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese so-called Cultural Revolution, the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner and North Korean bombings, and Cambodian genocide—all negative inputs into the Japanese public’s image of the JCP;

D. generally poor or disastrous performances of centrally-planned economies (especially when compared to Japan’s booming economic growth over the past three or four decades),
tarnishing the image of socialism as an economic system; and
6. the importance of the anti-nuclear issue to the JCP, playing on the nuclear allergy and fears of the Japanese people.

To understand the JCP's reaction to the Soviet reforms, it is important to realize that its relationship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), especially over the past two decades, has been a stormy one. It is thus necessary to start with some background about the recent relationship between these two Communist parties, paying particular attention to the issues that have caused dissension.

B. A Brief Survey of Pre-Gorbachev JCP-CPSU Relations

Before Japan's defeat in World War II, the Japanese Communist Party was an illegal organization, a violent but loyal child of the Comintern. In the immediate postwar period of the American Occupation, the reborn and legalized JCP essentially pursued what became known in the 1970s as a Eurocommunist line. (Hence, in one of my publications I refer to the JCP as Euro-Nippo-Communism.2) In January 1950, however, the Cominform brusquely attacked the Party's peaceful, pragmatic accommodating strategy (one can argue the only reasonable tactic under an American Occupation), and the JCP embarked on a radical, violent course during the period of the Korean War (1950-1953), with disastrous results for the Party on the Japanese political scene. (The JCP contingent in the National Diet went from thirty-five lawmakers to zero.)

Since the late 1950s, however, under the leadership of the present Chairman of the Central Committee and de facto führer, Miyamoto, the Party has returned to a qualified support of the Japanese parliamentary system. It also began to sound more and more nationalist to counter the image at home that it was not an indigenous party. The Sino-Soviet dispute, which erupted at that time, pushed the JCP further toward an independent position. At first, the Party sided with the more radical Chinese, which meant that relations with the CPSU suffered. In fact, in 1964, relations between the Japanese and the Soviet parties broke down on account of Soviet support of two Japanese Communist leaders who voted for the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in contravention of the Party's policy and were expelled from the JCP. This Soviet support of the miniscule pro-Moscow elements among former JCP members who went on to organize a rival Japanese Communist Party—Voice of Japan (but an "anti-Party group" to the JCP) and the Soviet refusal to recognize the JCP as the sole party representing the Communist movement in Japan was the core issue in the break between the two parties. With the advent of the Cultural Revolution in China, relations were also broken with the Chinese Communist Party because of unreasonable demands by Mao Tse-tung. The JCP of necessity began to pursue an independent course in the international Communist movement.

Since the 1964 break, relations between the Japanese and Soviet parties have gone through two stages.3 First, from 1964 to 1979, relations fluctuated from none at all to mutual attempts at reconciliation, culminating in the Miyamoto-Brezhnev summit in December 1979, which normalized relations between the two parties.4 In the second stage, since 1980, the Japanese Party has continuously been taking potshots at Moscow, first in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (which the JCP condemned), later in connection with the repression in Poland, which the Japanese Party has blamed on Moscow, and in September 1983 for the shooting down of the Korean airliner. There has also been an acrimonious exchange over the Soviet domination of the editorial policies of the international Communist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (known better in the West as the World Marxist Review).5 And the JCP continues to champion Japan's territorial claims against the
Soviet Union, claiming the entire Kurile Island chain, whereas the other Japanese political parties as well as the Japanese government claim only the southernmost two islands adjacent to Hokkaido.

In April 1984, several negotiations in both Tokyo and Moscow between the JCP and CPSU Central Committee delegations led to a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit in Moscow in December 1984 which was devoted exclusively to the anti-nuclear issue (the Soviets did not want to hear Miyamoto’s ravings about their foreign policy and the territorial issue). The joint statement mentioned "the need and possibility of the immediate prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons," declared 1985 to be the year of antinuclear and peace struggle, and appealed to the Communist parties and peoples of the world in general to organize a kind of anti-nuclear international united front.6)

This fits in nicely with the most recent focus of the JCP’s international policy—"the struggle for preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons." The JCP began to stress the anti-nuclear issue after the disastrous national election in December 1983 and a near isolation of the JCP in the Japanese political arena. But even in June 1983, the Central Committee issued a statement entitled "We Denounce Nakasone’s Remarks Fanning ‘Globalization’ of the Nuclear Arms Buildup, and Urgently Demand that the United States and the Soviet Union Achieve a True Nuclear Weapons Zero." Based on this statement, letters were sent to Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov.7) In January 1984, party leader Miyamoto announced that he sent personal letters to the two leaders calling for a total abolition of nuclear weapons.8)

In August 1984, the JCP used the anti-nuclear movement under its control to issue the Tokyo Declaration, calling for the mobilization of public opinion through national and international campaigns to collect signatures, later formalized as "An Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Abolish Nuclear Weapons," with goals of sixty million signatures in Japan and an equal number of signatures outside Japan.9)

But in spite of the Miyamoto-Chernenko statement, the JCP continued to stress the differences between the two parties even on the nuclear issue. When the JCP called for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons, they drew a distinction between their position and Soviet policy, which, according to the Japanese, changed after the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971 and of late has moved away from total prohibition to a variety of half-measures, such as the nuclear freeze.10) The JCP has also criticized Soviet foreign policy as having adopted the doctrine of “equilibrium of military strength” and having moved away from advocating a simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.11) This enables the JCP to advocate a maximum anti-nuclear program—politically astute in nuclear-allergic Japan—and at the same time to oppose “any manifestation of imperialism, hegemonism or interventionism,” which allows the Party to distance itself from the Soviet position and stress its own independence.

II. THE JCP’S INITIAL REACTION TO GORBACHEV’S REFORMS

What was the initial reaction of the JCP to Gorbachev’s announcement of Perestroika? Before answering this question it might be interesting to see what Akahata had to say when Chernenko’s death was announced and Gorbachev was appointed as the new General Secretary. One has to recall, however, that Chernenko died only three months after his summit meeting with Miyamoto. Hence, Chernenko’s passing was a big blow to the JCP. Presidium Chairman Fuwa Tetsuzo and Chief of the Secretariat Kaneko Mitsuhiro attended Chernenko’s funeral in March 1985 and met with the new General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev.
When Chernenko's death was announced on March 11, 1985, Miyamoto was quoted as having referred to his summit with Chernenko and the JCP-CPSU Joint Statement on Nuclear Weapons and lavishly praising the departed Soviet leader: "In the history of the CPSU Chernenko will be remembered as the greatest fighter for peace since Lenin." Although Gorbachev was not mentioned by name, the newly-appointed General Secretary was expected to "indefatigably implement Comrade Chernenko's global great ambitions." 12)

It is likewise significant that Akahata practically ignored the extremely important CPSU Central Committee Plenum of April 23, 1985, when the Perestroika reforms were outlined. There was a brief factual note in the International column, with an emphasis on personnel changes, but no comment. This was in sharp contrast to the other Japanese newspapers, which ran enthusiastic extensive coverage and editorials.

The first Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva in November 1985 did not receive positive coverage in the JCP press and was also criticized at the Seventeenth Party Congress which happened to be convened at the same time. It was only when Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 in January 1986, that the JCP came out with a positive appraisal of the new Soviet leader. The proposal for a total elimination of nuclear weapons coincided with the JCP's long-held positions on the subject.

Also in January 1986, Miyamoto and Fuwa paid a courtesy call on the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, on the occasion of the latter's official visit to Japan. The following month, Secretariat Chief Kaneko represented the JCP and addressed the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress in Moscow.

### III. THE FIRST FUWA-GORBACHEV SUMMIT, AUGUST 1986

The 1984 JCP-CPSU Joint Statement had called for regular consultations at the highest level. The change in Soviet leadership that almost immediately followed the two parties' summit in Moscow created greater priorities for the new General Secretary than meeting with the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party. Nonetheless, by the summer of 1986, after many JCP requests, Gorbachev agreed to a summit meeting with the Japanese comrades. Miyamoto decided to forgo foreign travel, partly because of age—he was approaching eighty and was reported to have a heart condition—and possibly because he wanted the JCP to be represented by the Number Two, but much younger Presidium Chairman Fuwa who is about the same age as Gorbachev. Furthermore, Fuwa had met Gorbachev twice: at Chernenko's funeral and prior to that at the funeral of the Italian Party Chief Enrico Berlinguer.

The Japanese arrived in Moscow on August 4, but were informed that Gorbachev had a cold and were shunted on a sightseeing tour of Leningrad. Upon their return to Moscow a few days later, they were again told that the General Secretary was still unwell and a meeting was arranged with the Number Two man, Yegor Ligachev, who was appropriately responsible for ideological work. Yet on August 11, without prior warning, Gorbachev suddenly showed up and met with the Japanese delegation.

The meeting began with Fuwa's inquiry about Gorbachev's illness and the possibility of his visiting Japan. The General Secretary said that he would be happy to visit Japan, but that the Japanese side still had "to make some preparations" for his visit. The two sides exchanged views on the implementation of the 1984 joint communique on the abolition of nuclear weapons and the Japanese delegation was briefed on the U. S. -U. S. S. R. negotiations, including the summit talks. 13) While it was expected that Gorbachev might use the opportunity of this meeting with the Japanese to say something about the extension of the moratorium on
nuclear tests which had been in effect for over a year and expired on August 6, the anniversary of the American atom bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviet announcement was made after the departure of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{14}

The first Gorbachev summit with the Japanese Communists lacked in substance and there was no joint communiqué issued after the talks. Nonetheless, the very fact that Gorbachev found the time in his busy schedule to meet the JCP delegation shows the importance that the new Soviet leader attaches to Japan.

IV. THE JCP CRITICIZES PERESTROIKA’S INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

A. The Sixty-fifth Anniversary of the JCP

In July 1987, the JCP celebrated its sixty-fifth anniversary, and shortly thereafter it published the “Sixty-Five Year History of the Japanese Communist Party,” an updated version of the Party’s sixty-year history.

On the Soviet Union, the new history made the point that the mistakes of present-day Soviet “Big Powerism” and “Hegemonism” date back to the Stalin period. And while the origin of these mistakes clearly rests with Stalin, to this day the Soviet leaders have not overcome this mistake. (This is fully developed in Fuwa’s \textit{Stalin and Big Powerism}.\textsuperscript{15}) As for the Gorbachev regime, the JCP was expressing [high] expectation of Perestroika, but was also very intently watching whether Perestroika would be extended to the Soviet foreign policy line.\textsuperscript{16}

B. Kikunami’s Appraisal of Perestroika

Kikunami Hiroshi is a member of the JCP Presidium and a veteran official in charge of international affairs. He was a member of all recent Party delegations to Moscow (including the 1984, 1986, and 1988 JCP-CPSU summits), and last year headed a special JCP Central Committee Perestroika observation team invited by the CPSU Central Committee. The author or co-author of several books on socialism, Kikunami published a popular book on “Capitalism or Socialism?” in August 1987, a book that was in its fifth printing by December of that year.\textsuperscript{17}

In his latest book, Kikunami observed that Soviet reforms had just begun and it was impossible to predict how they would develop. Gorbachev himself admitted that Perestroika was a long-term enterprise. It was an extremely difficult task to rebuild a “completed big structure,” and there was no conclusive evidence whether Perestroika would result in overall reforms, including those in the field of foreign policy. But, as Kikunami continued, it is undeniable that these reforms are a new trend in socialism and are a manifestation of the rationality of socialism. It is important, however, that the present socialist countries, which are said not to have freedom or democracy, have faced the objective reality that they themselves have to develop democracy. Socialism is making democracy inevitable. It is extremely important for an objective development of Soviet society that the Soviet Union is instituting democracy.\textsuperscript{18}

Kikunami went on to say that it is also important to criticize firmly and fight against definite errors made by present day socialism. However, socialism will go through this process and will inevitably move forward. Perestroika is clearly an expression of this. The French Communist leader Georges Marchais took exactly the same line at the Twenty-sixth PCF Congress in 1987 when he said that Perestroika is “proof of socialism’s superiority.”\textsuperscript{19}
C. The JCP Message on the Seventieth Anniversary of the October Revolution

The JCP sent a congratulatory message to the Soviet Party on the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The message was very frank, and on occasion one wondered if it was a congratulatory message. Here are some excerpts:

There is a record of many trials and errors, failures and mistakes made on the road to socialism in the world. The ongoing self-examination shows that the Soviet Union is no exception. During the decades since the war, in some socialist countries great power chauvinist and hegemonist errors have appeared, having nothing in common with the principles of scientific socialism [JCP euphemism for Marxism-Leninism. P. B.], and violating the right of other nations to self-determination and trampling on the independence of the vanguard party of other countries. These errors and mistakes have caused serious disunity and splits in the communist movements in the world, placing major difficulties and obstacles in the way of the struggle of the people for national independence, peace, and social progress.

These errors continue to have a negative influence on the struggle for the progressive transformation of Japanese politics. They are relevant to our present problems which must be overcome quickly given the current serious situation, with the Communist movement in the world unable to deal with world problems in a united fashion.

We strongly hope that Perestroika, now being carried out in the U.S.S.R. will achieve important successes in resolving the problems of domestic policy and prove to be important in promoting full implementation of the line of foreign policy initiated by Lenin.20)

It seems that the focus of the JCP criticism is on Soviet violation of the principle of self-determination in foreign policy (Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, etc.) and interference in the affairs of nonruling Communist parties, which negatively affects the activities of the Japanese Party.

D. Perestroika at the Eighteenth JCP Congress

At the Eighteenth Party Congress, held a few weeks later in late November 1987, Chairman Miyamoto in his introductory speech started out his remarks on Perestroika somewhat patronizingly. He lauded Gorbachev’s efforts, but warned that the mistakes of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan must be corrected:

Regarding Perestroika (restructuring) introduced under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev since the 27th CPSU Congress, I have said on several occasions that we will follow the process with goodwill and high expectation, and have expressed the hope that this [program] will be implemented especially in its international aspects. In the history of the Soviet Union, excluding when Lenin was alive, this could be the first time for the task of self-examination and restructuring in the spirit of socialism to be taken up seriously. If a correct advance is made successfully, the role of socialism will extensively be given full play. Respect for the independence of every party has already been repeatedly emphasized. Though the era of the Comintern and the Cominform has long since passed, it is pointed out that old habits were not at once discarded. If the argument on "limited sovereignty" put forward at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia is re-examined, and withdrawal from Afghanistan is realized, it will naturally have a significant effect for recovery of the prestige of socialism as contributor to the victory of science and reason.21)

He then referred to Soviet and Chinese interference in JCP affairs:

In the international area, however, our party had to face hegemonist interference car-
ried out in the name of socialism, something that has nothing in common with the principles of socialism... In the mid-sixties, the Khrushchev leadership interfered in the JCP and other parties on the issue of nuclear tests; with the outbreak of the "Cultural Revolution" in 1966, Chinese interference began; in 1968 troops of five nations invaded Czechoslovakia; in 1979 the Soviet Union began military intervention in Afghanistan.\(^{22}\)

Miyamoto also regretted that the Soviet Union for a long time dominated the international Communist movement, hiding under the banner of "proletarian internationalism," and he brought up the dictatorial manner of editing the organ of the [Soviet-led] Communist movement, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*.

Proletarian internationalism thus came to be interpreted as unqualified support of the Soviet Union. This glorification of the Soviet Union prevailed as the dominant view for a long time...

...Internationally, independence, equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs have come to be accepted more strongly as the norms in both principle and practice. At the same time, *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (World Marxist Review) maintained the editorial policy of rejecting opinions that differed from CPSU views, often calling them "anti-Sovietism." As these conditions continued, in December 1981 our party went so far as to demand the cessation of this international publication. Given that the original aim of the international review was to provide opportunities for exchanges of information and opinions among Communist parties, its editorial policy of virtually deifying one particular party was contrary to the development of the world Communist movement and hampered its normal development.\(^{23}\)

E. Chairman Miyamoto's 1988 New Year Interview

In the traditional New Year interview with the Editor-in-Chief of *Akahata*, Miyamoto covered ten questions, among them two of direct relevance to the topic of this article:

3. JCP-CPSU Joint Statement Clarifies both the Purpose and Way Toward the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; and

6. How to See Perestroika in the Soviet Union.

In his reference to the 1984 JCP-CPSU Joint Statement, Miyamoto recalled that a Japanese "bourgeois" newspaper ridiculed the JCP demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons as a "demand by a present-day Don Quixote." He pointed to the INF Treaty and bragged that "those who said the elimination of nuclear weapons is only a dream are those who did not understand that the power of the people can be displayed under certain circumstances."

On Perestroika, Miyamoto said that he had read Gorbachev's book, characterized the latter as seeming "to be very eager to reconstruct the Soviet system in the spirit of Leninism" and wished him well.

Miyamoto asserted that the singing of the INF Treaty, as well as Gorbachev's statement made in January 1986, that all nuclear weapons should be abolished by the year 2000, was a manifestation of the spirit of Perestroika in the field of international politics, though Gorbachev has made only a superficial and non-critical mention about the Soviets' military invasions of other countries.\(^{24}\)

F. Miyamoto's Lecture at the Japan Press Club

In February 1988, Miyamoto gave a lecture at the Japan Press Club on the topic, "How I See the Course of the World and Japan."\(^{25}\) In it he discussed Perestroika at some length,
noted Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan as well as the Cultural Revolution, but ended on a posi­tive evaluation of Gorbachev’s reforms.

Miyamoto began his lecture by observing that capitalism has a three hundred year old history and socialism only seventy. He portrayed Gorbachev’s Perestroika as a return to the original intent of socialism. He said that he had read Gorbachev’s book on Perestroika, noting approvingly the Soviet leader’s emphasis on “Socialist Democracy,” the fight against “bureaucratism,” and glasnost. But as important as domestic reforms were, Miyamoto said that he and his JCP colleagues were paying particular attention to the manner in which the Soviet leadership was going to handle international problems, such as the military interventions in Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. He admitted that throughout socialism’s seventy year history there were many instances of betrayal of the original intent of socialism, including China’s so-called Cultural Revolution. Miyamoto stressed that Gorbachev did not take the position that socialism was infallible and that no mistakes were made. But he went on to argue that as long as there was the spirit of trying to return to socialism’s original intent, there was the possibility of reform. And he cited Gorbachev’s efforts as one of the proofs of this possibility.

G. Akahata Editorial on Perestroika and Stalin

On April 27, 1988, Akahata published an editorial entitled “We Hope for a Further Advance in Perestroika and Criticism of Stalin.”26) The editorial began with the JCP wishing the Soviets well in their pursuit of Perestroika. But most of the editorial dealt with the fact that an important part of Perestroika was the renunciation of Stalinism. The editorial made the point that Stalin did make some contributions to world socialism (such as the victory over Fascism), but that this did not excuse his errors. The editorial also criticized in passing the Brezhnev Doctrine.

V. JCP-CPSU TALKS AND LETTERS

A. The Second Fuwa-Gorbachev Summit

The second Fuwa-Gorbachev meeting got embroiled in controversy. The JCP-CPSU summit was preceded by two preliminary meetings in Tokyo in mid-March 1988 and in Moscow in mid-April. During the second of these preliminary meetings, the JCP announced in Tokyo that Fuwa would meet with Gorbachev on May 4. But since Doi Takako, the Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was scheduled to meet with Gorbachev on May 6, the Japanese press accused the JCP of trying to “wedge in” and have Fuwa meet with Gorbachev ahead of Doi. Akahata in an editorial on April 26, entitled “Superficial Comments on the Forthcoming Fuwa-Gorbachev Talks,” denied this and claimed that the CPSU had agreed in January to hold the Fuwa-Gorbachev talks in May or June.27)

At a press conference before leaving for Moscow, Fuwa was asked whether the forthcoming talks had any connection with the visit of the Socialist delegation headed by Doi. He denied it. On the northern territory issue, Fuwa said that while the JCP is aiming at the return of all the Kurile islands to Japan through the signing of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty, it is striving for the moment to sign an intermediate treaty under which the Habomai and Shikotan islands would be returned to Japan. Asked about his impression of Perestroika, Fuwa affirmed that the JCP is “greatly in favor of the effort [of the Soviet Union] to go back to the original intention of socialism and the spirit of Lenin.” He hoped that since the Soviet Union had “committed particularly serious errors in the sphere of international relations, a thorough
Perestroika would be conducted in this, as well as in other, fields.\footnote{28}

The JCP-CPSU talks were held in accordance with the 1984 agreement on the anti-nuclear issue and were supposed to be restricted to that issue. The JCP’s agenda was, however, much broader. First and foremost, the Party wanted to prevent CPSU ties with the Japanese Socialists, arguing that since 1980 the JSP has moved sharply rightward, has refused to include the Communists in any future coalition, and has accepted the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the Japanese Self-Defense forces. The JCP also wanted the Soviet Party’s support for the “Hiroshima-Nagasaki Appeal,” and would have liked to raise the territorial issue.

The JCP-CPSU meeting took place on May 4, as scheduled, and it started out with a meeting of both delegations, and then, in a departure from previous meetings, it continued as a tete-a-tete between Gorbachev and Fuwa. (Gorbachev also used the same formula with the Japanese Socialists and met separately with Doi.)

At the conclusion of the one-day talks, Fuwa held a press conference the following day, May 5, in Moscow, while the Soviet version was distributed through the TASS press agency. There are considerable differences in the two stories. Fuwa was trying to inflate the importance of the talks, though he mentioned areas of disagreement between the two parties. The TASS account, on the other hand, was lavish in its praise of Gorbachev, but was very selective in that it avoided all areas of disagreement.

Fuwa reported that the talks covered (1) U.S.-Soviet negotiations, (2) problems in international anti-nuclear peace struggles, (3) problems of peace in the Asia-Pacific region, (4) the situation in and around Japan, (5) “the glorification of the Japanese Socialist Party outside of Japan and how to rectify it,” and (6) the territorial question between Japan and the Soviet Union. On the anti-nuclear struggles, Fuwa said that General Secretary Gorbachev promised to strengthen cooperation... including active participation of Soviet social organizations in the second “Peace Wave.”\footnote{29} On the JSP issue, Gorbachev was apparently not prepared but promised to study carefully the JCP explanations and documentation and to answer by letter. On the territorial issue, Fuwa admitted that it was not an issue that could be dealt with lightly in a short time and he proposed continued consultation and that Gorbachev had agreed to this.\footnote{30}

Pravda reported Fuwa’s visit on its front page, although the photograph was carried over to the second page. (In contrast, both the story and the accompanying photograph on the Doi visit was front page news.)\footnote{31} The TASS release on the Fuwa visit was about thousand words long. In typical pre-glasnost style, it was all upbeat, praised Gorbachev’s initiatives, took some swipes at U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region, and did not touch on any of the disagreements or unpleasant topics.

On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev expressed his satisfaction with the regular ties that were established between the two parties; his readiness to discuss in a spirit of goodwill and openness any problems (with the use of the “capital of understanding” that had been accumulated); and his willingness to meet again in the future and to develop relations on the basis of equality, respect, and mutual non-interference. He also promised solidarity with the JCP campaign of collecting signatures under the Hiroshima and Nagasaki appeal, and announced the intention of Soviet public organizations to take an active part in the second “Peace Wave.”

TASS reported that major issues of international significance were discussed in the five-hour conversation. Greatest attention was given to problems of eliminating nuclear weapons and building a nuclear-free world. Since the last meeting of the CPSU and the JCP at the top
level, the world had witnessed major changes, favorable on the whole for the solution of the historic task of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

The interlocutors highly assessed the diverse significance of the INF Treaty signed in Washington. The idea was expressed that the twenty-first century will be for capitalism, as a social system, a real test of its ability to exist and develop in conditions of demilitarization.

The Soviet release noted that special attention had been devoted to the problems of the Asia-Pacific region. This significance had been confirmed by the ideas and proposals expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech and in the interview with the newspaper Merdeka. Ever more facts are being accumulated which are evidence of the interest in these constructive initiatives on the part of many states of the region. The U.S. response was a build-up of pressure, its military presence there counter to the obvious tendencies of most of the states of the Asia-Pacific region towards businesslike cooperation, interaction and peaceful settlement of pressing problems, vital for every country and the region as a whole. A militaristic approach is in conflict with the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the growing realization among public and in many political circles there of the responsibility for the destiny of the whole world, especially in connection with the growing role of the Asia-Pacific region in the development of civilization. 32)

B. The JCP Publishes the June 1988 CPSU Letter and Its Response

The Nineteenth CPSU All-Union Conference, which was held at the end of June, attracted world-wide attention, including, of course, the Japanese Communist Party. The JCP reaction was not positive. While admitting that “how Perestroika is to be promoted in the Soviet Union is a matter for the people of the Soviet Union to decide,” an article in early July declared that two international themes dealt with at the Conference can never be passed over: 33)

1. the interrelationship between the interests of the role of mankind and of the working class, and
2. the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

On the first point, it was noted that the CPSU leadership had reached the conclusion that “common human values have a priority in our age, this being the core of the new political thinking,” and that it was a serious error to regard the interests of mankind and those of the working class as being contradictory or incompatible. “According to scientific socialism, the interests of the working class are inseparable from those of the whole of mankind.”

On the Afghanistan issue, the Akahata article alleged that no fundamental analysis was made at the Conference, that it was not clear whether this invasion was included in “certain errors and miscalculations in the past” of Soviet foreign policy.

The article concluded that the Conference failed in this respect and that this indicated that “Perestroika is far from being introduced into the area of foreign policy.”

A little over a month after the Fuwa-Gorbachev talks, on June 14, 1988, the CPSU Central Committee sent the promised letter to the JCP CC, amplifying its position with regards to its ties with the Japanese Socialist Party. 34) The Soviets said that they have gained the impression that the JCP now regards the nature of CPSU relations with the Japanese Socialist Party as the most important point of disagreement with the Soviet Party. Therefore, they must state again “the principled position of the CPSU, which defines relations with the social-democrats as a whole and with the Socialist Party of Japan in particular.”

Essentially, the Soviet argument is that the international workers’ movement exerts more and more influence on the course of the historical process, and that a sizable mass of working
people is following the social-democratic current. The present era demands united efforts of the entire working class to save the planet from the nuclear weapons threat. And as a result, the Soviet Union establishes its relations with the Socialist Party of Japan and other social forces working in the interest of peace and disarmament. The Soviets also quoted from the 1984 Joint JCP-CPSU Statement to the effect that what is needed to conduct a decisive struggle against the nuclear threat is “vigorou actions of the peace and democratic forces, representing the widest range of people, free from all discriminations of political, ideological, religious and other motives.” They also rejected the JCP position that Soviet relations with the Japanese Socialists represent “interference in the internal affairs of democratic forces” and an obstacle to the intensification of joint actions between the CPSU and the JCP.

The JCP response was more than four times the length of the CPSU letter and was rather intemperate in tone. By supporting the Japanese Socialists, the Soviets have embraced reformism at the expense of revolution; they have abandoned the working class. The JCP even manages to suggest that the Soviets do not understand the nature of the strategic threat which the U.S.-Japan alliance poses to the Soviet Union itself. “The realities of Asia indicate that the Japan-U.S. military alliance is the keystone to U.S. domination over Asia and its anti-U.S. S. R. strategy. Your attitude...leads us to question the depth of your understanding of the core of the situation in Japan and Asia.” [emphasis added]

VI. THE JCP’S THEORETICAL POSITION: A CHALLENGE TO SOVIET GLASNOST

It has been said that the Soviet Union has openness (glasnost or democratization), but no Perestroika, and that China has Perestroika, but no democratization. The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union’s openness is also very selective. A glaring example of this is the Soviet treatment of the JCP statements, pronouncements, and other Party documents and materials. Let us look at two instances where the Soviets solicited materials from the JCP, but in the end refused to publish them. These two JCP contributions, along with a lengthy analysis of the “New Thinking” by Vice-Chairman Fuwa, add up to a theoretical rationale for the JCP critique of the Soviet new line, especially in foreign affairs.

A. Tachiki's Rejected Response to Questions Posed by the Editor of “International Affairs”

In November 1987, the Soviet monthly Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn’ [“International Life,” in the English edition called International Affairs], co-published by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet “Znanie” [Knowledge] Association sent out a questionnaire to a number of prominent persons on the nature of present-day capitalism and imperialism. Among those asked to contribute was Tachiki Hiroshi, Chairman of the JCP’s International Commission. The questionnaire was comprised of the following four questions:

1. Question 1: Can we expect that the law of an integral world in which universal human values hold a major, preferential position will be able to restrict the scope of the destructive effects of the egocentric, narrowly class-oriented law of the capitalist system? What is your opinion?

2. Question 2: Can capitalism get rid of militarism? Speaking in economic terms, can capitalism work and make progress without militarism? What do you think about this?

3. Question 3: What is your opinion as to whether the capitalist system can exist without neo-colonialism, one of its means of survival? Can the system work without a non-equivalent exchange of materials with the “Third World,” an exchange that may bring about
unexpectedly serious conditions?

*Question 4:* Can capitalism adapt itself to the condition of denuclearization and demilitarization, to the conditions of a new, just economic order, and to conditions of earnest competition between the spiritual values of the two worlds? What do you think about this?

Tachiki's reply to the first, and most important, question should be summarized in greater detail, while the others can be dealt with briefly.30)

Tachiki started out his answer to the first question by saying that he wanted to answer it not only from a theoretical point of view, but also on the basis of the JCP's practical experiences. Throughout his contribution, he repeatedly stressed the importance of the struggle of the Japanese Communists in combatting the resurgence of Japanese militarism.

Tachiki understood the first question to be whether the "law of an integral world" can hold down the destructive effects of the fundamentals of capitalism/imperialism: i.e., whether we can prevent a nuclear catastrophe. The short answer is that we are not in favor of a view that the "law of an integral world" can resolve the problems of mankind, including the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe.

Tachiki then went on to talk about "The Initiative for Accomplishing the Task for Mankind," which, in his view, was the December 1984 joint JCP-CPSU statement on nuclear weapons. The two Communist parties took a great and powerful forward step ahead of everyone else to accomplish this task for mankind.

In the section on "Laws of Capitalist Countries and Laws of Socialist Countries," he took issue with the "law of an integral world" as being inadequate, and if taken literally, misleading.

As classes still exist and the class struggle is fought between them—we think you will not totally deny this—we do not yet live in a world where the states, nations, and classes act under one and the same law.

It is about three hundred years since capitalist society came into being on this planet, and about ninety years since capitalism reached its highest stage, that of imperialism, and seventy years since the first socialist state came into being. Yet capitalism/imperialism is still a major power carrying great weight in the world. Socialist countries represent only a quarter of the world in area, a third in population, and some forty percent in industrial production. From the viewpoint of scientific socialism and historical materialism, we cannot yet talk about a super-social "law of an integral world"...

These facts demonstrate that while objectively the world of today has a common task of setting itself free from the threat of nuclear war that could annihilate the whole of mankind, different social systems exist that are dominated by opposing laws; in other words, the time has not yet come when the world is ruled by one integral law.

The answer to the second question, "Can Capitalism Free Itself from Militarism?" is No. Quoting liberally from Lenin, Tachiki concluded that "The world will not be able to 'free' itself completely from militarism until it abolishes capitalism, the class and systemic basis on which the phenomenon of militarism grows. Imperialism without nuclear weapons is possible, but imperialism without militarism is not."

The answer to the third question, "Can Capitalism Exist Without Neo-Colonialism?" is also No. Neither the United States nor Japan nor any other developed country intends to participate in the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which is the only instrument for ending neo-colonialism.

In his answer to the fourth question, "Can Capitalism Adapt Itself to the Conditions of Denuclearization and Demilitarization, to the Conditions of a New Economic Order?" Tachiki
observed that a “world without violence” is unrealizable while the capitalist system persists. And while “a world without nuclear weapons” is possible, demilitarization is not and neither is participation in the NIEO. “Sincere comparison between the spiritual values of the two worlds” is taken to be synonymous with “peaceful co-existence” between countries with different social systems. Compared with the days of Lenin, the importance of peaceful coexistence is ever-increasing under the present menace of nuclear catastrophe. But Tachiki hastened to warn the Soviets not to get too close to the Americans and Japanese Socialists by emphasizing that “to make light of the people’s struggle in the capitalist world and glorify the governments or anti-Communist splitist opposition parties has nothing to do with peaceful coexistence.”

Tachiki’s answers were forwarded through the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo on February 12, 1988. A few months later, in response to Tachiki’s inquiry as to why his contribution was not yet published, the editorial department of *International Affairs* responded on June 30 through the Akahata branch in Moscow that there were changes in personnel (the Editor-in-Chief had been replaced) and that the JCP’s had been the only answer received. Tachiki followed with a letter of inquiry to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and on August 1 he received, again through the Moscow branch office of Akahata, a “final reply.” This time the excuse was that Tachiki’s contribution was “unfit” for publication in *International Affairs*, since it “was already unilaterally published in Japan.” The Japanese pointed out, however, that the Soviets knew in February that Tachiki’s contribution would be published in Akahata, and if prior publication was a problem, the Soviet editors could have either asked that the piece not be published in Japan prior to its publication in the Soviet journal, or could have rejected it then and there.

**B. Rejection by “World Marxist Review” of an Article on Afghanistan by Presidium Chairman Murakami**

At the meeting of representatives of Communist and Workers’ Parties on the work of the *World Marxist Review* in April 1988, the editorial office approached the Japanese delegate, Chairman of the International Commission, Tachiki, with a request that the JCP contribute an article to the journal. The task fell to Presidium Chairman/ Murakami Hiromu, who duly prepared an article on Afghanistan and sent it off to Prague on July 25.

Murakami noted that the Afghan invasion left a deep division in the world Communist movement and deep scars, and that there was attempt to justify and “absolutize” the policy of the party of the invading country. There was also double hegemonism: infringement upon the right of the Afghan people to self-determination and an attempt to impose this erroneous position on other parties in the world Communist movement.

Perestroika is said to be aimed at self-examination and restructuring of the country in the spirit of socialism, he continued. The Soviet leadership, however, is only repeating its previous assessment of the Afghan problem and has not expressed its readiness to review it. It is said that there must be no exception, no taboo in the application of Perestroika. The Soviet leadership is praising the agreement on withdrawal, saying that it was the outcome of “New Thinking,” but it still tries to justify the sending and long-term stationing of their troops there. This attempt at justification is supported by the underlying idea of the “infallibility” of the Soviet Union, an idea that has long persisted in the Soviet Union and in the world Communist movement.

Murakami closed his article by reminding the Soviets that Lenin supported the national right of a people for self-determination and that the government of Soviet Russia returned the
territory that had been annexed by Tsarist Russia from Afghanistan. Since the Soviets now preach going back to Lenin and not leaving a blank in history, they must re-examine the Afghan question. As for the world Communist movement, it must break free of the idea of the "infallibility of the Soviet Union."

On September 14, the Editorial Board of the *World Marxist Review* wrote to the author and officially rejected the article. The JCP Secretariat made this public on September 24, while the *Akahata* Commentary Edition published the full text of the rejected article on October 3, 1988. 38)

C. Vice-Chairman Fuwa's Thesis "Is 'New Thinking' Leninist?"

Perhaps the most detailed theoretical critique of Gorbachev's "New Political Thinking" is the lengthy, 15-chapter, thesis by Fuwa Tetsuzo, now Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, entitled "Is 'New Thinking' Leninist?—In the Light of Original Socialist Foreign Policies," which appeared in the weekly *Akahata* Commentary Edition of September 26, 1988. 39)

Fuwa starts with the observation that Perestroika uses two slogans: (1) "Return to Lenin" and (2) "New [Political] Thinking." The first is very simple but sets a clear formula to restore Lenin's theory and practice and resolve current problems in the spirit of Lenin. Contrary to this, the second slogan, "New Thinking" is given no concrete definition other than the word "new." Fuwa goes on to say that recent Soviet documents show that some trends of thinking and theses proposed under the name, "New Thinking," belong to trends or currents contrary to scientific socialism.

Recalling Lenin's criticism of revisionism ninety years earlier, Fuwa examines various aspects of the "New Thinking" represented by current Soviet foreign policies, comparing them with Lenin's theory and practice of diplomacy.

In Chapter 2, Fuwa critically examines the thesis that the earth shares a "common destiny," a typical argument representing Gorbachev's "New Thinking," and that "with the coming of the nuclear age, a fundamental change has taken place in the relationship of coexistence, which makes the conventional class-based view outdated."

Chapters 3 through 7 of Fuwa's article examine the peaceful coexistence theory of the "New Thinking," stressing that Lenin was strict and exact in his class-based assessment of imperialism.

In dealing with the problem of peaceful coexistence, Fuwa points out four basic points of the class approach, the betrayal of which would lead the future of the world to depend upon false expectation for a peaceful "change" in the nature of imperialism.

First, even though imperialism and capitalism accept relations of peaceful co-existence with socialist countries, their substance of reaction and aggression cannot change.

Second, even when peaceful coexistence is realized, socialist countries should carry the important role of struggling against imperilist countries, as long as the latter are pursuing the policy of aggression and war in various forms.

Third, in order to maintain and strengthen peaceful coexistence, it is necessary to struggle against the imperialist aggression and reaction.

Fourth, breaking through the imperialist and capitalist system in this or that country, expands the basis of international relations of peaceful coexistence.

In Chapters 8 through 11, Fuwa takes up Lenin's consistent, principled attitude on the border questions and national questions; how the subsequent power chauvinism and hegemonism displayed by Stalin trampled on this fundamental policy; and how Lenin's and Stalin's successors caused the Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and other "incidents." Fuwa makes clear
that despite Perestroika these questions still remain as “blanks in history.”

In Chapters 12 through 15, Fuwa examines how the “New Thinking” has affected the Soviet attitude toward social democratic parties, and illustrates how far it deviates from Lenin’s view, citing Soviet glorification of the Japanese Socialist Party as a typical example.

Fuwa concludes by again bringing up Lenin, on the attitude a ruling party of a socialist country should take toward the class struggle in a capitalist country:

We witness that Perestroika, now going on in the Soviet Union, is lagging far behind in the sphere of international relations. Not only are the Soviets making no self-examination of their great-power chauvinist errors (which did great damage to world liberation movements), but they are also reflecting on the fact that by glorifying social democratic parties they have been making interferences that obstruct the class struggle and the intra-political party struggle in capitalist countries. At the root of this lies their indifference to the liberation movement and the cause of social progress of that country, while regarding a capitalist country as a mere counterpart of their diplomacy. From these facts, we cannot but stress that the immediate task is to return to Lenin.

“Return to Lenin” to the JCP means that the Soviet Union should forthrightly admit their errors in invading Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, abandon its newly-found community of “integral world” interests with the United States, and, above all, stop obstructing class struggle and interfering in Japanese politics by continuing to glorify and have close relations with the Japanese Socialist Party.

VII. THE JCP ESCALATES ATTACKS ON THE CPSU

The ceremonies the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide the JCP with a litmus test of the CPSU’s attitudes toward the Japanese Communists, as well as Japanese Socialists and the Sohyo labor federation. The anti-nuclear movement in Japan split in 1963 over the support or rejection of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into a Communist-dominated organization Gensuikyo and a Socialist- and Sohyo-led Gensuikin. Following the break between the JCP and the CPSU in 1964, the Soviet delegations attended the Socialist-led Gensuikyo ceremonies for three years. Beginning in 1977, the two organizations sponsored a unified ceremony for almost a decade, only to split up again in 1986 and continue staging competing ceremonies. Following the new split, the Soviet Union sent a six-man delegation only to the Communist-sponsored Gensuikyo in 1986 and an eleven-man delegation in 1987. But in August 1988, the Soviet delegation attended not only the JCP-sponsored Gensuikyo ceremonies, but also the rival Gensuikin’s, thus adding ammunition to the JCP’s disapproval of Soviet ties with the Japanese Socialists. Miyamoto directly linked the Soviet Union sending a delegation to “a meeting of obstructionists who had split from the World Conference Against A and H Bombs” to the “New Thinking” and Perestroika: “This has revealed what their “Perestroika” is.” In the wake of the unsatisfactory CPSU letter on its relations with the JCP (discussed above) and the Soviet attendance of the Socialist-led anti-nuclear ceremonies, the JCP escalated its attacks on the Soviet Party and its “New Political Thinking.” A well-known and unusually well informed anti-Communist specialist on the JCP reported that a special “K Office” was established at the Party Headquarters to deal with the anti-CPSU offensive.
On the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, August 20, 1988, Akahata came out with an article entitled, “Limited Sovereignty as Rationale of Military Intervention Should be Challenged.” The paper noted that while the Soviet Union is going back to the original principles of socialism and Lenin’s thinking, Gorbachev, in his book Perestroika, justified the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia as “appropriate measures.” He also referred to the invasion of Czechoslovakia as “the crisis in 1968.”

Akahata called the Soviet action “the error of great-power chauvinist and hegemonist interference” and said it did “serious damage to the ideal of socialism. It exposed the so-called ‘Threat of Counter-Revolution’ and the imperialist concept of ‘sphere of influence’ and ‘policy of strength’.” On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the invasion, the JCP again proposed that the Soviet leadership re-examine its aggression in Czechoslovakia and the “limited sovereignty” argument, by truly accepting the responsibility of its own statement, that “none of the parties can have a monopoly on truth.”

B. Celebration of Miyamoto’s Eightieth Birthday: “New Thinking” is the Biggest Error Since the Death of Lenin

On October 19, 1988, the JCP Presidium organized a party in honor of Miyamato’s eightieth birthday. The Chairman was in good spirits, and his response was published in Akahata. He expressed his appreciation and gratitude to the organizers, as well as to the many Japanese and foreign well wishers who sent him congratulatory messages. He was particularly proud of a decoration from the government of Vietnam, and took the opportunity to remind his listeners about America’s “aggressive war” against Vietnam. Aside from his expression of thanks, Miyamoto touched upon only two topics: the totalitarian Japanese Imperial system and “serious problems” in the international Communist movement. He referred to Gorbachev’s concept of the “priority of the interests of all humankind” over class interests as a very grave problem. Although he conceded it was a sensitive matter to bring up, he bluntly characterized this concept as “the biggest error in the international Communist movement since the death of Lenin.” This error, he added, was being propagated in the world under the title of “New Thinking.”

Why Miyamoto decided to use this ultimate insult is difficult to answer. If Gorbachev’s policies are the biggest error since the death of Lenin, then it follows that Stalin’s purges and the ensuing terror are less deplorable than the “New Thinking.” Did Miyamoto think through the consequences or was it an offhand remark? Judging from subsequent JCP statements, however, it is clear that Miyamoto’s remark presaged a new, tougher line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

C. Heated Debate Between the Japanese and Soviet Research Institutes

At the end of October 1988, a four-member delegation of the JCP Central Committee’s Social Science Research Institute went to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The Japanese delegation was headed by the Institute Director Uno Saburo and included the head of the Institute’s study group on socialism Kikunami Hiroshi, who a year earlier himself headed a JCP delegation invited by the CPSU Central Committee to observe Perestroika.

On October 25, Uno gave a lecture at the Institute on the topic of “Present-Day Japan and the Japan-U. S. Military Alliance.” He went back to the adoption of the JCP Program
in 1961, recalling the controversy about the argument of "independent Japanese imperialism," and pointed out the correctness of the JCP position that the Japan-U. S. military alliance (with Japan subservient to the United States) is the decisive factor in present-day Japan. He also said that the subservience to the U. S., and the revival and strengthening of Japanese monopoly capital should not be treated as contradictory but grasped in a unified way. Japan is deeply subservient to the United States politically and economically, with military subservience as the axis.

Uno concluded that forces that approve the Japan-U. S. military alliance give a helping hand to the U. S. nuclear strategy, even though they speak about "nuclear disarmament." He mentioned not only domestic forces like the Japanese Socialist Party, which is going through an "accelerated rightward degeneration," but also the Communist Party of China. This was a not so subtle warning to the Soviet Union not to cozy up to American imperialism.

The meeting between the Japanese and Soviet researchers started the next day and turned out to be a prolonged and heated exchange. Uno led off with a five-hour speech, Kikunami and another JCP delegate spoke the next day for another five hours. The third day, October 28, two Soviet researchers spoke for almost five hours. Because of the weekend, the meeting resumed on Monday, October 31, with a Soviet presentation in the morning, followed by a discussion that went on for three days (one day was added to give the Japanese a chance to refute some of the statements made by the Soviets).

The honor of the first presentation was given to Uno, as the head of the Japanese delegation. He began by extolling "the epochal significance and the present-day importance of the [December 1984] Joint Statement of the Japanese and Soviet Communist Parties" and said that what is referred to as "New Political Thinking" was a serious stumbling block to the implementation of that Joint Statement. He cited facts and theories to make clear that there are "no laws for a unified world" and that the case for "priority of common human values" can never be built without belittling, ignoring, and obstructing the people's struggles around the world, notably the people's struggles and class struggles in capitalist countries, a clear reference to his own country. Uno went on to say that if the case for "priority of common human values" led the Soviets to regard the world as a "fate-sharing community" and let this idea provide a basis for the execution of foreign policy, they would be following a "new collaborationist" policy and committing "the worst error of opportunism and lack of principles since Lenin's death." The Soviet participants interrupted Uno to protest that he was making political remarks that went beyond the limits of an academic discussion. Uno retorted that he was basing his speech on fact and scientific socialist theories and that these theories were inseparable from politics.

Kikunami sketched out the objectives of and errors committed by the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes. He claimed that despite some reflection in the Soviet Union on these errors, the "New Political Thinking" carries on the Soviet Union-first principle. This takes the form of interference in the struggles of the Japanese people, glorification of the Japanese Socialist Party, and participation in a "splitters' meeting" and obstructing the work of the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

The Soviet speakers insisted that they gave their opinions in their "personal capacity." They described the "New Political Thinking" not as Marxist, but as inspired by Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell. And they did not respond to the Japanese criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the military intervention in Afghanistan. They justified compromise in Soviet negotiations with the United States, arguing that the fate of the world depended on U. S.-Soviet negotiations. The Soviet scholars and Party officials also held their
ground on the necessity of cooperating with social democratic parties, presumably also including the Japanese Socialists, although the JSP was not specifically mentioned in the initial exchange. Later in the discussion, when the JSP was mentioned, the Soviet participants simply rehashed the Soviet position as spelled out in the June 1988 CPSU reply to the JCP, described above.

The conference was thrown into an uproar when the Japanese expert Dmitry Petrov of the Far Eastern Institute praised the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (which the JCP had condemned) and linked it to the signing of the INF treaty in 1988. He attacked the JCP for its position on the problems in Poland and Afghanistan and said that the JCP criticism of the “New Political Thinking” went too far. He even accused the JCP of not conforming to the principles of that dreaded code word of Soviet diktat “proletarian internationalism.” The Japanese immediately demanded retraction of Petrov’s remarks as a serious distortion of facts. An extra day was added to the agenda to allow the Japanese delegation to present their counter-arguments.

In his concluding remarks, the Soviet delegation head V. P. Kuzmin stood his ground on the basic Soviet position that “priority of common human values” did not run counter to class struggle, but ended on a positive note that the 1984 Joint Statement of the two parties constituted the basis for future cooperation. Uno, on the other hand, in his final observations, alleged that the “priority of common human values” has actually resulted in “restraining” class struggle, and ended rather negatively saying that the present exchange of opinions convinced him that there was no need to change the JCP’s assessment of the Soviet “New Political Thinking.”

D. The JCP Youth League Attacks “New Thinking”

The World Federation of Democratic Youth held a meeting at Frankfurt in West Germany from November 4 to 6, 1988. This international conference had as its theme “Peace, Global Problems — Challenges to Progressive and Youth Organizations,” and was attended by some seventy delegates from many countries, including a delegation from the Japanese Komsomol, i.e., the JCP-affiliated Democratic Youth League of Japan (DYLJ).

The opening lecture by a delegate from the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee praised the “New Political Thinking” in which “the values of the entire humanity” were held to be higher than the interests of the working class. The Japanese delegates took the floor several times to point out that the “New Political Thinking” erroneously assumes that the nature of imperialism and monopoly capital has changed. This stand by the DYLJ was later praised by Chairman Miyamoto.

On a personal note, when I attended the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region at Nakhodka in the Soviet Far East in late July 1988, I talked to two League delegates and received a copy of their statement which critically analyzed the “New Thinking.” I was also present when they protested that the final statement on the conference failed to reflect their position.

E. Miyamoto’s Speech at the Third Plenum, November 1988

The Third Plenum of the JCP Central Committee opened on November 10 at the Party Headquarters. The agenda of the plenum included “international questions,” and Miyamoto in his introductory speech explained the Party’s international activity since the Second Plenum, especially its relations with the Soviet Party. He characterized the JCP response to the CPSU letter “on the issue of the Soviet glorification of the Socialist Party of Japan” as “not
mere criticism but a refutation based on reason.” Miyamoto went on to say that
what the JCP paid attention to were the fundamentals of the Soviet error, or the “New
Political Thinking.” The Soviet argument for the “New Thinking” lacks the position of his-
torical materialism that it is the people who change society through the struggle in internal
contradictions. The JCP has pointed out that Perestroika has not yet been implemented in-
ternationally. The point at issue is not method or timetable. It should be considered
more seriously that underlying the Soviet error in the international field is that “New Think-
ing” lacks the viewpoint of historical materialism.

The “New Thinking” curbs the class struggle and advocates cooperation and dialogue
with imperialism on the pretext that a nuclear war would annihilate the human race. The
reason the JCP calls it the “biggest error since the death of Lenin” is because it is unpre-
cededented in the harm it does to the struggle of the people of each country, who are the
driving force of social progress.

Calling Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” the CPSU’s “biggest error since the death of
Lenin,” the JCP has thrown the gauntlet and we may expect further criticism and further de-
terioration of relations between the Japanese and Soviet Communist parties.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Japanese Communist Party’s view of Gorbachev’s Perestroika has undergone con-
siderable change since its inauguration in 1985. At first, the JCP attempted to ignore Gor-
bachev and his reforms. It was cool toward his first summit meeting with President Reagan
at Geneva in November 1985 and warmed up to Gorbachev only with his January 1986 call for
a total abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

The Party’s initial public comments on Gorbachev’s reforms were limited to statements
that it had “high expectations” of Perestroika and wished the Soviets well. The JCP seemed
to have made a clear distinction between domestic and international aspects of Soviet reform.

As a past victim of Soviet (as well as Chinese) interference in its own internal affairs, the JCP
wanted to avoid publicly criticizing the domestic reforms, so as not to create the appearance
of meddling in Soviet internal affairs. International aspects, however, were considered fair
game for criticism. The JCP kept commenting adversely on past Soviet behavior in Czech-
slovakia and Afghanistan, and deploiring the fact that despite the Soviet admission that they
had no monopoly on truth, glasnost did not extend to acknowledging past errors.

By 1988, it also became clear to the JCP that Soviet glasnost policy was highly selective.
On two occasions, the Soviets invited the JCP authorities to submit articles to their publica-
tions and on both occasions the Soviet editors chose not to publish the Japanese contribu-
tions. One of the Japanese articles was a critique of Soviet policy in Afghanistan and the other chal-
lenged Gorbachev’s key concept in his “New Political Thinking.” The new Soviet idea was
that the fate of the entire planet was at stake because of the destructive nature of nuclear
weapons, and under those circumstances the interests of humanity as a whole took prece-
dence over Marxism’s class interests.

Criticism of “New Thinking”

In addition to the notion that human concerns (survivability of mankind in a nuclear age)
override class concerns, there is the related issue of whether capitalism can change its
stripes. The JCP’s short answer is “No”: hence, the fallacy of Soviet collaboration with the
United States.

While the JCP welcomes Gorbachev's "Back to Lenin" principle, it also points out that Lenin practiced a policy of self-determination of nations.\(^{34}\) It unflatteringly compares Lenin's return of Tsarist Russia's annexed territory to Afghanistan with the 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

The strongest JCP criticism by far is reserved for the Soviet approach to non-Communist (and often anti-Communist) forces, such as social democratic parties. This especially includes the CPSU's ties to and Soviet glorification of the Japanese socialists. The JCP claims that the JSP has "degenerated" to the right ever since its 1980 agreement with the Komei Party to recognize the Japan-U. S. security treaty and the Japanese Self-Defense forces—which is, incidentally, a JCP distortion of the Socialist position. The Japanese Communists attempted to change the Soviet attitude toward the JSP during the Fuwa-Gorbachev summit in May 1988. They were utterly dismayed by the CPSU letter which defended its position vis-à-vis non-Communist social democrats in general and the Japanese socialists in particular.

By the fall of 1988, after a Soviet delegation attended an anti-nuclear rally in Hiroshima sponsored by the Socialists, the JCP stepped up its public criticism of Gorbachev's "New Thinking," calling it the biggest error since the death of Lenin.

Some Final Points

In discussing Soviet reforms, the JCP has a problem. On the one hand, it has to maintain that socialism has positive aspects (at the beginning of this article I gave a quote from Miyamoto in which he admitted that most Japanese people have a negative image of socialism). Since Gorbachev's Perestroika has been positively reported in the Japanese press, the JCP, like the French and other Communist parties, portrays Perestroika as a sign of vitality in the socialist world. On the other hand, the JCP must criticize the Soviet Union and distance itself from Soviet actions to show its independent status. Therefore, the JCP criticizes the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, etc. etc. (mentioned above)—actions that give "Socialism" a bad image in Japan.

The JCP cannot accept Gorbachev's rapprochement with the United States, as the Party predicates its policies on the theory that American imperialism (along with Japanese monopoly capitalism) is the source of all evil. (This is not unlike Mao Tse-tung's problem after Khrushchev tried to explain peaceful coexistence to him, when the Soviet leader came to Peking straight from Camp David to celebrate the PRC's tenth anniversary in 1959.)

The JCP cannot accept the CPSU's rapprochement with the Japanese socialists, as this undermines the JCP claim that with the rightward "degeneration" of the JSP, the Communist Party is the only progressive (revolutionary) force in Japan.

Today, in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev is the leader intent on changing Soviet society and economy. All signs honoring both Brezhnev and Chernenko are being removed. In the West, Brezhnev and Chernenko are portrayed as having presided over a period of stagnation, while Gorbachev is seen as a progressive who can get the Soviet Union moving again. What a contrast is Miyamoto's view that since the death of Lenin, Chernenko is the greatest Soviet fighter for peace and Gorbachev's reforms are the Soviets' biggest error.

While one can understand why Miyamoto is pursuing a critical policy toward Gorbachev's Perestroika, this stand in not likely to help enhance the JCP's position on the Japanese political scene, nor improve the Party's relations with the CPSU and its allies in the international Communist movement. The Japanese Communists remain loyal to the ideals of Communism by strongly supporting the Marxist-Leninist dogma. Should Perestroika fail in the Soviet Union,
as it surely may, it will be small consolation for the Japanese Communists to say “We told you so.”

Notes

*. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the panel, “Eurocommunist Views of the Evolution of Soviet Society,” organized by Professor Robert V. Daniels of the University of Vermont at the Twentieth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 18–21, 1988.

I approached the Japanese Communist Party Headquarters by letter, telephone, and in person. While I was not able to obtain interviews with high-ranking Party officials, members of the International Department provided me with a number of references to relevant books and journals, and with specific citations in the Party daily organ Akahata [Red Flag]. They also spelled out official Party policy on several pertinent matters (see Note 53). I am very grateful for all their assistance.

I wish also to thank Paul Langer of the RAND Corporation for a critical review of the paper and many penetrating comments and suggestions, and Randall Houston of the University of Southern California for timely research and editorial assistance.

Needless to say, I am alone responsible for the final product.


5. The JCP has repeatedly advocated that the journal cease publication, but did not resign from membership as the Italian Communist Party did in April 1988.


7. For the statement and the two letters to the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, see Akahata, June 19, 1983; Bulletin, No. 504, 10 pp.


10. See, for example, the October 3, 1983, letter from the JCP to the CPSU in Akahata, October 4, 1983; Bulletin, No. 509, 30 pp.

   Translation of *Sutarin no Taikokushugi* (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha, 1982).
22. Ibid., p. 13.
23. Ibid., p. 15.
25. Miyamoto Kenji, “Sekai to Nihon no Hoko wo do Miru ka—Nihon Kisha Kurabu de no Koen” [How Do I See the Course of the World and Japan—A Lecture at the Japan Press Club], *Zen'ei* [Vanguard], No. 4 [561] (April 1988), pp. 34–53.
   The lecture was given on February 19, 1988.

For an analysis of the second Fuwa-Gorbachev meeting, see also Nishida's article cited in the preceding note.


41. “Kotoshi no Gensuikin Sekai Taikai wo Furikaette” [Looking Back at This Year’s Anti-Nuclear World Conference], *Koan Joho*, No. 419 (August 1988), pp. 69–84.


45. “Miyamoto Gicho no 80-sai wo Iwau Kai’ kara Rekishi no Ayumi, Jimmin to To no Seicho wo Jikkan” [“Celebration of Chairman Miyamoto’s Eightieth Birthday”: The March of His-


52. Ibid., p. 9.

53. At the JCP Headquarters I was given to understand that the Party made a clear distinction between the domestic and international aspects of Soviet reform, and that domestic reforms, as an internal matter, were solely the concern of the Soviet Union. I was further told that if the Japanese Communists thought the Soviets were pursuing an erroneous course in domestic matters, they would give their opinion in private. Criticism of Soviet foreign policy, on the other hand, was another matter, and could be done publicly.

54. Western historians would disagree with this assessment and argue that it was only a temporary tactic on Lenin’s part.