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Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union

Mayumi Itoh

I. Introduction

This research examines the perceptions of the Soviet Union held by Japanese foreign policy elites. It also suggests ways in which these perceptions are related to decision-making towards the Soviet Union. To this end, both a qualitative and a semiquantitative analysis are made.

A. Framework

At the outset, three terms require definition. "Perception" in this research refers to images of another nation held by foreign policy elites, who include both decision-makers and "influentials." Decision-makers are those who actually make foreign policy decisions. Influentials are those who are not directly involved in the decision-making but who have power to influence decision-makers.

The research employs the two analytical frameworks of Robert Jervis and of W. Ofuatey-Kodjo concerning foreign policy elites' perceptions in foreign policy analysis. Jervis' central thesis is that the decision-maker's perception is an important intervening variable in foreign policy decision-making, between events (independent variable) and foreign policy decisions (dependent variable).2

In order to extend Jervis' theoretical framework concerning foreign policy decision-making to broader foreign policy elites that include the influentials, his framework is combined here with that of W. Ofuatey-Kodjo. Ofuatey-Kodjo identifies influentials' perceptions as an independent variable, that affects decision-makers' perceptions (intervening variable), and thereby affects foreign policy decisions (dependent variable).3 This combined framework postulates a correlation among events (independent variable), perceptions of foreign policy elites (intervening variable), and actual foreign policy decision outputs (dependent variable).

B. Research Design

Data on the Japanese foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union were acquired through open-ended, in-depth interviews with sixty-five persons in the foreign policy elites in Japan. They include personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) and other political parties, the academic community in Soviet affairs, and the mass media. The interviews were conducted in Japan during October-November 1986. Writings of the Japanese foreign policy elites on their perceptions of the Soviet Union are also used for supplementary purposes.

It should be noted that these results do not, by any means, represent the perceptions of all the members in the foreign policy elites concerned. They would number in the hundreds. Even among those from whom an interview was sought (89 potential interviewees), some (24 interviewees) were simply not available. (Please refer to the List of Interviewees in the Appendix). Although this is neither a comprehensive nor a random sample, the researcher believes that, at least, this survey covered many of the important foreign policy elites in Japan, and that it is possible to grasp their general tendencies from these results. This is the objective of the analysis here.

In addition, it should be mentioned that about three years have passed since these inter-
views were conducted. This research should be regarded as a study of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union at the initial stage of the Gorbachev era. With information on this base period, comparison can be made with changing perceptions over the past several years.

The names of the interviewees are kept anonymous in this article in consideration of the sensitivity of the subject. This is so because Soviet issues have been regarded as “taboo” in Japan. The Japanese are afraid to be labelled either “pro-Soviet” or “anti-Soviet.” In fact, a few of the interviewees specifically asked that their names not be revealed.

C. Definition of the Spectrum of Ideologies

In order to facilitate the analysis, the spectrum of ideologies held by the Japanese foreign policy elites concerned are divided into five categories; right, right of center, center, left of center and left, with the following definitions. Those on the right are hardliners within the conservative camp, are intensely anti-Soviet (meaning that they dislike the Soviet government, but not necessarily the Russian people) and anti-communist, and regard the Soviet threat as real and direct. They see cooperation with the U.S. as necessary and as sufficient for Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. The majority advocate revision of the constitution to permit a Japanese military buildup. They also strictly link the economic policy towards the Soviet Union with political and security considerations. This includes hardliners in the MFA, “uniformed” officers in the JDA, some hawkish LDP Diet members, some military-strategic specialists, and the Sankei Shimbun (newspaper).

Those on the right of center are the majority within the conservative camp, are moderately anti-communist, and regard the Soviet threat as indirect. They see cooperation with the U.S. as a prerequisite for the Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, but sense that a somewhat autonomous and flexible Japanese approach to the Soviet Union is necessary. They also suggest a looser linkage policy in economic relations. They regard revision of the constitution as unnecessary. This includes moderates in the MFA, military-strategic specialists in the JDA (civilians), the majority of the LDP Diet members, the Democratic-Socialist Party, some security specialists, and the Yomiuri Shimbun (newspaper).

Those in the center are neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Soviet, but are anti-communist. They regard the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as necessary, but consider the present defense budget as adequate. They defend the constitution. This includes MITI, the Kōmeítō (the Clean Government Party), some Soviet specialists in academic circles, the NHK (network), and the Mainichi Shimbun (newspaper).

Those on the left of center are moderately sympathetic to the Soviet Union but not pro-communist, see the Soviet threat as minor, and regard accommodation and coexistence with the Soviet Union as necessary. They accept the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a fact of life,” and regard the SDF as a “necessary evil.” They advocate an economic policy towards the Soviet Union separate from politics; a nonlinkage policy. This includes business circles, some scholars, and the Asahi Shimbun (newspaper).

Those on the left are in the anti-establishment “progressive camp,” are strongly sympathetic to the Soviet Union and towards socialism, advocate repealing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and call for an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Some assert an “unarmed neutrality” policy, by which Japan would disband its SDF and ally itself with neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union. This includes the mainstream in the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), some specialists on the Soviet Union and pacifist scholars, and Japan-Soviet friendship associations.

Unfortunately, the space available is inadequate to define many of the above categories with precision. Our sample is also too small to state confidently which organizations belong
underneath each heading. Nonetheless, the findings based on the interviews should be suggestive of the major divisions in Japan. They can be useful for further research based on published sources.

II Correlations Among Perceptions, Sources of Perceptions, and Foreign Policy

A. Qualitative Analysis: Patterns of Perceptions

The following patterns of perceptions are deduced from the qualitative analysis of interviews with and writings of the Japanese foreign policy elites.

(1) Nature of the Soviet Internal System and Soviet Power

As of the fall of 1986, the majority of those interviewed in the foreign policy elites, with the notable exception of some on the left, maintained that Russian history and its political culture were the most important determinants of the Soviet system. They held that the Soviet system did not work due to its built-in structural deficiencies. Its totalitarian political system had stagnated as a result of the inertia of the bureaucracy and the vested interests of the nomenklatura. The planned economic system had become paralyzed because of its denial of intrinsic human nature. The social system had encountered problems, with decreasing population growth and increasing ethnic imbalance.

There was also a near consensus among the foreign policy elites on their evaluation of Soviet power. Except for those on the left, they perceived that it was unbalanced with outstanding military power and poor political, diplomatic, and economic power. In addition, the majority considered that Soviet military power was inferior to the U.S. qualitatively, if not quantitatively. They thought that its ideological influence, as well as diplomatic and economic power, had also gone down. In the overall evaluation, the majority perceived that the weight of Soviet power in the international balance of power was declining. They concluded that history had proved that the Soviet system was unworkable and that the Soviet Union was in transition. Unless it takes drastic measures to reconstruct its system, it might lose its superpower status. However, the foreign policy elites disagreed on the nature of and the prospects for Gorbachev's domestic perestroika and the stability of the Soviet Union.

The majority, ranging from the right to the center, were skeptical about Gorbachev's perestroika, regarding it as merely "reforms within the system." They predicted that it would fail, due to the triple constraint on the reform: the systemic constraint (ideology), the organizational constraint (vested interests), and the personal constraint (Russian political culture). In comparison, some on the right of center considered that it "remained-to-be-seen" if it was merely reform within the system or the "systemic reform" (reform of the system), and if it would succeed or not. The majority in the business circles on the left of center were pessimistic about the reform, if not skeptical. Conversely, those on the left thought that perestroika is genuine systemic reform and were optimistic about its success.

Despite the seriousness of the problems derived from the structural defects of the Soviet system, the majority, from the right to the left, focused on the stabilizing factors for the Soviet Union. They regarded the Soviet system as basically durable. Those on the right watched the Soviet Union with caution, while those on the left watched with relative optimism, and those in the center watched with a mixture of both. In contrast, some on the right and the right of center paid attention to the destabilizing factors in the Soviet Union. They regarded it as on the verge of collapse.

The controversy about the stability of the Soviet Union could be boiled down to two contrasting perceptions. According to the perception of the "unstable school," the Soviet Union...
could not and would not be able to override its framework of ideology because ideology provided its *raison d'être*. According to the opposite perception of the "stable school," the Soviet Union would evolve to overcome the rigidity of ideology and opt for a more flexible adaptation of capitalism: No ideology could suppress intrinsic human nature and would have to succumb to it in the long run. It remained to be seen whether the Soviet Union would stick to its ideology and collapse, or modify its system and survive as a more flexible socialist nation.

(2) Soviet External Behavior and Foreign Policy Objectives

The overwhelming majority of the Japanese foreign policy elites, ranging from the right to the left, regarded history as the determinant of Soviet external behavior. Some on the right regarded ideology as the source of Soviet external conduct. Those in the center regarded it as a mixture of history and ideology. However, there was a critical difference between the right and the left. The majority on the right regarded external behavior as an extension of Czarist expansionism. The majority on the left regarded it as basically defensive.

Those on the right and in the center held that the Soviet external behavior derived from its intrinsic nature and that this behavior was fundamentally different from that of other nations. The majority regarded history as the "essence" of the Soviet external behavior and stressed the continuity between Russia and the Soviet Union. In contrast, some on the right contended that ideology was the guiding "engine" of the Soviet Union. Conversely, some on the left maintained that the Soviet external behavior was separate from Czarist Russian expansionism and nothing peculiar: the Soviet Union merely sought to preserve its national interests and security as other nations did.

The majority in the elites except those on the left found the Soviet global objectives irreconcilable with those of the free world camp. They held that the Soviet Union was trying to defeat the U.S. indirectly by splitting the West, avoiding military confrontation with the U.S.

As of the fall of 1986, they ascertained in Gorbachev's new diplomatic style no fundamental change in the Soviet global objectives. They thought that it still focused on bilateral relations with the U.S. and on military-strategic matters, and concluded that his "multipolar diplomacy" and "smile diplomacy" were merely a change in style. Some on the right of center had "it-remains-to-be-seen" perceptions on whether his change was merely of style or substance. Only those on the left regarded the initiatives positively as a change in substance in Soviet foreign policy objectives.

There was a consensus that the short-term objectives of Gorbachev's disarmament proposals were to reduce the external burden in order to concentrate on *perestroika* (and to contain SDI). However, the elites' perceptions differed on its long-term objectives. Those on the right and in the center regarded them as his "peace offensive" to split the West, while those on the left saw them as a genuine effort for disarmament. The majority were still skeptical about Gorbachev's intentions behind *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

(3) Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives Towards Japan

As of the fall of 1986, the majority in the foreign policy elites on the right and in the center held that the Soviet Union was using conventional tactics of a propaganda offensive and military bluff in order to split Japan from the U.S. and in the long run to "Finlandize" Japan. The short term objectives were to use Japanese economic power for its economic *perestroika* and to shelve the Northern Territories dispute. The majority perceived no direct Soviet military threat to Japan, assuming that Japan has sufficient deterrence with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Some on the right thought that there was an actual threat. Furthermore, they saw under Gorbachev no fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy objectives towards
Japan nor in perceptions of Japan. They regarded Gorbachev's changes only as changes in style. Conversely, those on the left generally evaluated the Soviet proposals at their face value. They took as changes in substance Gorbachev's foreign policy objectives and perceptions toward Japan.

(4) Japanese Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union

Although there was a consensus among the foreign policy elites that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty System had laid down the foundation of the postwar Japanese foreign policy, there was a dichotomy in its evaluation. Except for those on the left, the majority evaluated it positively and regarded the Japan-U.S. alliance as the essence of Japan's foreign policy in terms of its national security and its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. However, certain differences emerged. Those in the MFA on the right of center regarded as correct the present foreign policy which aims at stabilizing Japan-Soviet relations in a non-antagonistic way within the framework of the Security Treaty. Conversely, those on the right held that to stabilize relations was unnecessary and even dangerous. To those on the right consolidation of the Western alliance was the prerequisite. Others on the right of center (including military specialists) perceived that total dependence on the U.S. was undesirable. They advocated a defense build-up of Japan's own and a more autonomous and flexible diplomacy towards the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, those on the left dismissed the Security Treaty as the cause of unstable Japan-Soviet relations, and demanded its repeal. They advocated unarmed neutrality or an "omni-directional" foreign policy, instead.

To sum up: The perceptions of the right of center were based on the premise that the Soviet Union was a potential enemy, and of the right that it was a present enemy, and of the left that it was a friendly nation. The elites' evaluations also differed on the specific foreign policy issues with the Soviet Union.

(5) Northern Territories Issue

The great majority of the foreign policy elites advocated the **yon tô ikkatsu henkan ron** (the four islands package reversion). Some on the left advocated the **nitô henkan ron** (the two islands reversion). However, an important point here is that, although the elites were divided between the two schools, their main differences lied with the tactics for the reversion more than with the nature of the issue. In fact, except for a minority on the left, few question Japan's legal possession of the Northern Territories. The **yon tô ikkatsu henkan ron** asserted that the Soviet Union should return all four islands simultaneously at the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty. The **nitô henkan ron** advocated at least getting the two islands that the Soviet Union once promised to return, rather than waiting in vain for the return of all four islands. In this sense, most of the advocates of the **nitô henkan ron** were just being practical. Few were genuine advocates of the **nitô henkan ron**. It should be recalled that the opposition parties on the left demanded all of the Kurile Islands.

The foreign policy elites were divided on how to realize the reversion. Linked with their perceptions on how to improve Japan-Soviet relations, this issue had become the focal point of these relations. Those on the right (including the MFA) took the minimalist approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, called the **iriguchi ron** (entrance theory), a "Northern Territories or nothing" position. This position had been intensified now that they perceived that the power balance had been shifting towards Japan. They held that Japan should do nothing but wait for a Soviet move, while consolidating the Western alliance and public opinion. Those on the left took a contrasting approach, the **deguchi ron** (exit theory). They maintained that Japan should improve relations with the Soviet Union, separately from the Northern Territories issue. They also thought improvement might "spill over" to the return of the islands.
(6) Japanese Defense Policy

Those on the right of center (including the MFA) regarded a gradual defense build-up within the framework of the constitution as sufficient to establish a deterrent force against the Soviet Union, along with more burden-sharing under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In comparison, those on right advocated a more substantial conventional defense build-up and revision of the constitution. However, the great majority of them perceived no necessity for nuclear armament. Conversely, those on the left renounced any armament, as they were the defenders of the "peace constitution." They advocated the disbandment of the SDF and the repeal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

(7) Japanese Economic Policy Towards the Soviet Union

There was a clear correlation between position in the spectrum of ideology and perceptions on how to formulate Japanese economic policy towards the Soviet Union. Those on the right, including the government, emphasized the political implications of Japan-Soviet economic relations and adopted a linkage policy. It is called the seikei fukabun gensoku (the principle of the indivisibility of economics from politics), which links politics (the Northern Territories issue) with economic policy. In contrast, those on the left, notably in business circles, advocated a "nonlinkage" policy called the seikei bunri gensoku (the principle of separability of economics from politics). They de-emphasized the political impediments to Japan-Soviet economic relations, and thought that the real impediments to those relations were economic. They also dismissed the government's linkage policy as pointless on the ground that Japan-Soviet economic relations were not mature enough for the linkage to work. Further, they stressed the significance of economic relations as an avenue to improve relations. They held that the only way to improve Japan-Soviet relations was to unlash the Northern Territories issue from economic relations, given the stalemate on this issue.

Within the government, the bureaucracy in principle acts in unison, by arriving at a consensus. However, inter-bureaucratic discords emerged in the case of the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The MFA supported the measures, stressing the importance of cooperation with the U.S. MITI opposed them, because it stood for the economic interests of the private sector. This represented a striking contrast between the unity in each specific ministry and the disunity among the ministries.

(8) Correlation Between Perception and Foreign Policy

As of the fall of 1986, there was a high correlation between the foreign policy elites' perceptions of the Soviet Union and Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Being on the right of center, the MFA adopted a policy that could be called "minimalist diplomacy." It was frigid, doing nothing except demanding the reversion of the Northern Territories. It was passive, not taking any countermeasures against the Soviet so-called active measures (propaganda offensives). However, it was not an antagonistic policy. It maintained diplomatic channels and tried to stabilize relations. Those on the right criticized this as "beggar diplomacy." They also criticized it as "coward diplomacy" because the MFA feared the Soviet military threat and had been submissive. Those on the left criticized this as "dependent diplomacy," because of Japan's dependence on the U.S.

To put it differently, there were wide perception gaps between the foreign policy decision-making establishment and the anti-establishment group concerning the Soviet Union. There was a striking unity in the decision-making group, converging on the right of center, while the anti-establishment group converged on the left. The homogeneity in perceptions among the decision-makers made the perceptions of the influentials virtually irrelevant. This also left no room for the perceptions of the anti-establishment on the left. The U.S. (White
House) perceptions of the Soviet Union and its intentions were more important intervening variables for Japanese foreign policy decision-making towards the Soviet Union than the perceptions of Japanese foreign policy influencers.

The anti-Soviet perceptions of the decision-makers at the MFA, coupled with their extreme concern with U. S. intentions, made Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union hardline. This was symbolized by the uncompromising position on the Northern Territories: the iriguchi ron (entrance theory). To the degree that the decision-makers were set in their distrust and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, the basic Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union would remain the same. The power of the influencers remained minor.

(9) Sources of Perceptions of the Soviet Union

The great majority of the foreign policy elites had anti-Soviet perceptions, characterized by fear and distrust. Even those on the left had anti-Soviet sentiments in some respects. This was so because the most important source of their perceptions of the Soviet Union was history, rather than ideology. Just as Robert Jervis showed in his analysis of the generational effects of issues important to the nation as a whole, ruthless Soviet behavior at the end of World War II (the eleven year detention of some hostages in Siberia and the unprovoked seizure of the Northern Territories) formed anti-Soviet perceptions. These perceptions were not rooted in ideology, but rather in national interests. Therefore, the JCP was demanding the reversion of all of the Kurile Islands, which is much more than the LDP demands. It was working for compensation for the former Siberian hostages and their families.

There were four critical turning points in the history of Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. The first turning point occurred during the 18th century. Encounters with Russia's eastward expansion initiated a Russophobia which was confirmed by Russian attacks on northern colonies including Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands (1806).

The second turning point was in 1905. Victory in the Russo-Japanese War temporarily overshadowed the Russophobia, which was replaced by the romantic and lovable image of Russia drawn from Russian literature. The two Russian Revolutions added the influence of ideology which split into two perceptions: one of an ideological threat, and the other of sympathy for the revolution. This resulted in contrasting Japanese perceptions of Russophobia and Russophilia: the military and ideological threats of the "Red Bear" for the political leaders and general public recapitulated the negative image of the nineteenth century, while the romantic and revolutionary image of the "Cherry Orchard" for the leftist intellectuals reinforced the newly positive literary image.

The third turning point was in 1945. The ruthless Soviet behavior at the end of World War II added distrust to the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union. Then, when Japan was incorporated into the U. S. alliance system the systemic factor in international politics crystallized anti-Soviet perceptions.

Finally, the fourth turning point was in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan awakened Russophobia that, among some groups of intellectuals, had been "dormant" since the Russo-Japanese War. Russophobia was intensified by the subsequent Soviet military build-up in the Far East, including the Japanese Northern Territories. In particular, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shooting down of the Korean airliner have shifted some elites from a pro-Soviet to an anti-Soviet position. Some on the left have discarded their "illusions" of communist ideology. Some even reverted to nationalist conservatism, as exemplified by Ikutaro Shimizu's transformation from a leftist intellectual leader to an advocate of nationalism. Thus, the Japanese political culture was in a dramatic transition in the early 1980's.
In brief, the Japanese have traditionally been anti-Russian, due to the historical fear of a military threat, which derives from the geopolitical factor as well as from Russian expansionism. The fear of an ideological threat was added. Differences between the Russians and the Japanese in ways of thinking and behavioral patterns deepened the distrust towards the Soviet Union: the Japanese recoil against the Soviet lack of empathy for others and blatant examples of ruthless behavior. All of these factors reinforced each other, adding up to the current anti-Soviet perceptions.

The contrast in Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union and China indicated that “ideology was not a major factor in the anti-Soviet perceptions of the Japanese, as compared to the U. S. perceptions of the Soviet Union.” Those on the right regarded as correct “the Russophobia and anti-Soviet perceptions in Japan based on the Soviet military threat.” Those on the right of center held that the threat was exaggerated and criticized the emotional antipathy towards the Soviet Union. Conversely, some in the center see “the current anti-Soviet perceptions as merely a temporary reaction, which would not last.” Those on the left thought that “the Japanese perceptions of the Soviet Union were manipulated by the U. S. and Japanese governments.” Firsthand experience with the Soviet Union (specific sources) reinforced the elites’ perceptions formed through the general sources, both for the right and the left.

B. Semiquantitative Analysis: Continuum

A statistical summary of correlations among perceptions, sources of perceptions and the foreign policy orientation of Japan is given in Figure 1 for the purpose of grasping their general tendencies. This figure, in the same form as the continuum of W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, was constructed as a summary of the interview results, and was deduced from the sixty-five interviewees’ statements.

(1) Foreign Policy Elites’ Perceptions of the Soviet Union

The result in Figure 1 indicated that the largest category in the spectrum of ideology of Japanese foreign policy elites was to the right of center, in terms of their positions (47%) [1-a]. This closely corresponded to sentiments towards the Soviet Union, 44% being moderately anti-Soviet [1-b]. However, their sentiments towards the Soviet Union did not exactly correspond to those towards Russia: the percentage for “moderately anti-Russia” (37%) was somewhat less than that for “moderately anti-Soviet” (44%). The percentage for moderately pro-Russia’ (30%) was substantially more than that for “moderately pro-Soviet” (11%) [1-c]. This was so because negative aspects tend to be attributed to the rigid Soviet communist system, whereas positive aspects tend to be attributed to “romantic and lovable Russia.” Russophile sentiments cultivated by Russian literature were still shared, even by those to the right of center. The majority perceived a Soviet threat in one form or another, but to many it was in the political and psychological sense rather than in the real military sense [1-d].

Concerning Gorbachev’s reforms, the majority (51%) had a skeptical and pessimistic prognosis: { “merely reform within the system and should fail” (31%) + “merely reform within the system and will fail” (20%) } Only a minority (21%) had optimistic and positive evaluations: { “genuine systemic reform and will succeed” (8%) or “genuine and may succeed” (13%) } [1-e]. This result correlated relatively well with changes in perceptions of the Soviet Union: The largest percentage thought that their unfavorable perceptions would not change even with Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost (44%); only 9% thought that their favorable perceptions would not change despite negative Soviet performances [1-f].
Figure 1. Correlations among Perceptions, Sources of Perceptions, and Foreign Policy

1. Foreign policy elites’ perceptions of the Soviet Union

   a) Their positions in the spectrum of ideology

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   b) Sentiments towards the Soviet Union

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<th>Neither</th>
<th>Moderately anti-Soviet</th>
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<td>11%</td>
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<td>44%</td>
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   c) Sentiment towards Russia

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<th>Neither</th>
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<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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   d) Evaluations of the Soviet threat

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<th>Real military threat</th>
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<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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   e) Evaluations of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policy

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<th></th>
<th>Genuine systemic reform, and will succeed</th>
<th>Genuine and may succeed</th>
<th>Remains-to-be-seen if genuine or merely style</th>
<th>Merely reform within the system, and should fail</th>
<th>Merely reform within the system, and will fail</th>
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<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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The most common source of perceptions of the Soviet Union by the interviewees was the "history of Japan and Russia-Soviet Union" (45%), followed by the "history of Russia-Soviet Union" (24%) [2]. With the two combined, 69% considered that history was the most important source of perceptions of the Soviet Union. This was even larger than the percentage in the "anti-Soviet" group (59%): { "moderate anti-Soviet" (44%) + "anti-Soviet" (15%) } [1-b] or that in the "anti-Russia" group (51%): { "moderate anti-Russia" (37%) + "anti-Russia" (14%) } [1-c]. This result suggests that the Japanese Russophobia was deeply rooted in history, and was shared even by some on the left of center.

Ideology as a source of perceptions of the Soviet Union was minor (8%): { "pro-communism" (2%) + "anti-communism" (6%) } [2]. It was not a major source of perceptions of the Soviet Union among the Japanese.

Concerning how to achieve the Northern Territories reversion, there was a wider distribution in their positions, ranging from strict deguchi ron (exit theory) advocated by the left to strict iriguchi ron (entrance theory) by the right. Nonetheless, despite the wide distribution, the majority position (61%) was still the iriguchi ron: { "strict iriguchi ron" (35%) + "moderate iriguchi ron" (26%) } [3-b]. This corresponded well to the total of "right of center" and "right" (47% + 16% = 63%) on the spectrum of ideology [1-a].

On defense policy, the largest category favored a "gradual defense build-up along with the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty" (63%), as endorsed by the lifting of the "1% GNP ceiling" in the defense budget. Support for a "substantial defense build-up along with the Security Treaty" category was small (9%) [3-c]. This was even smaller than the percentage that regarded the "Soviet military threat as real," which was 19% [1-d]. As a strong reaction to prewar Japanese militarism, the elites still had reservations about substantial armament (only 9% advocate it), not to mention nuclear armament (only 1%) [3-c].

The aversion to armament becomes clearer in the next entry. Only 6% advocated the revision of the "peace constitution" that prohibited rearment for Japan. The great majority (83%) held that the constitution should not be revised: { "absolute defender" (11%) + "moderate defender" (38%) + "flexible interpretation suffices" (34%) } [3-d]. The "peace constitution" had symbolized postwar Japanese demobilization and democratization instituted by General MacArthur's U. S. Occupation Army. It had been regarded as a "sanctuary." As of the fall of 1986, a new awareness that Japan should graduate from the "postwar mentality" (the loss of self-confidence as a nation) and stand on its own feet was emerging. Thus Japanese defense policy was in a very slow and gradual transition.

Regarding economic policy towards the Soviet Union, there was a wide distribution in positions. The largest category was the "strict linkage with politics" (31%), the seikei fukan gensoku (principle of indivisibility of economics from politics) [3-e]. This suggested that, in the high-tech age, the nature of Japan-Soviet economic relations had to alter from covert seikei bunri gensoku (principle of separability of economics from politics) to overt seikei fukan gensoku. Japan-Soviet economic relations were likely to develop slowly under these circumstances.

Another point here is that the category which advocated "strict nonlinkage with politics"
(27%) was larger than that of the “left” (5%), and even larger than that of the “pro-Soviet” group (11%). This was so because many in the business circles appeared to the left of center as the defenders of free trade and of capitalism. Although they were neither pro-communist nor strongly pro-Soviet, they advocated expanding Japan-Soviet economic relations.

In an overall evaluation of the foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, the great majority (81%) thought that Japan was dependent on the U. S. and lacked autonomy and flexibility: {“too dependent on the U. S.” (12% + 21% = 33%) + “dependent on the U. S.” (17% + 31% = 48%)} [3-f]. However, 48% still regarded the situation as acceptable: {“acceptable” (31%) + “marginally acceptable” (17%)} , while 19% evaluated it positively as “good.” Only 33% regarded it as unacceptable: {“absolutely unacceptable” (12%) + “unacceptable” (21%)} [3-f].

Accordingly, 56% called for a “pro-U. S. but more autonomous foreign policy towards the Soviet Union,” followed by 22% for a “strict pro-U. S. policy,” and 16% for an “omni-directional foreign policy” [3-g]. Still, the great majority (78%) supported a pro-U. S. foreign policy in general: {“strict pro-U. S.” (22%) + “pro-U. S. but autonomous” (56%)} [3-g]. The majority held that, although total dependence on the U. S. was not desirable, insofar as the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty was the basis of Japanese foreign policy, Japan could not operate outside this framework.

4) Foreign Policy Orientation of Japan

As of the fall of 1986, the foreign policy orientation of Japan was “strict pro-U. S.,” employing a “moderate minimalist” approach vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, it was not “antagonistic” to the Soviet Union, as the “absolute minimalists” on the right advocated. There was a fairly high correlation among the positions on the ideological spectrum of the Japanese foreign policy elites (the mainstream being right of center), their perceptions of the Soviet Union (“moderately anti-Soviet”), and the actual Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union (“strict pro-U. S.” but “moderate minimalist” position). Thus the results obtained by a semi-quantitative method corresponded well to the patterns found in the perceptions of the foreign policy elites from a qualitative analysis.

NOTES

This article is adapted by the author from her Ph. D. Dissertation of the same title, completed in September 1988, at the Graduate School of the City University of New York. Since this is a short article, only the dissertation’s concluding chapter is summarized here. Those who seek a more extensive examination of the subject should refer to the original dissertation.

The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Rozman and Professor Donald S. Zagoria. She would also like to thank all the interviewees who were willing to talk about their perceptions despite their extremely busy schedules.

All quotations from the interviews are put into quotations marks, although they are not the exact words of the interviewees, but are translations or paraphrases by the author.

1 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, “A Theoretical Framework for the Research and Analysis of the Foreign Policies of African Countries,” (Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Interna-
Appendix: Japanese Foreign Policy Elites with Respect to the Soviet Union

1 This list refers to all decision-makers and influentials from whom an interview was originally sought.
2 The position listed is that as of the fall of 1986.
3 The positions listed in parentheses are those held previously.
4 * was not interviewed.

1 Top Decision-Makers
1 * Nakasone, Yasuhiro (1918), Prime Minister, House of Representatives (H. R.).
2 * Kuranari, Tadashi (1930), Foreign Minister, H. R. (Nakasone faction).

2 Bureaucracy
a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3 Hogen, Shinsaku (1910), Research Institute for Japan’s National Policy Secretary-General, Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) Director, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Advisor Emeritus, (Permanent Vice-Minister, Ambassador to Austria, Eurasian Bureau Director-General, MFA Advisor).
4 Hyodo, Nagao, Minister to the U. S., (Soviet Union Division Director).
5 Ide, Keiji, Information and Research Bureau Analysis Division.
6 * Matsumoto, Shunichi (1897), (LDP [H. R.], MFA Treaties Bureau Director-General, Ambassador to England and to France, plenipotentiary to the 1955-1956 Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty Negotiations).
7 Nakagawa, Toru (1911), Northern Territories Issue Association Vice-President (NTIA), Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) Vice-President, Permanent Court of International Justice (the Hague) Judge, KDD Advisor, (Ambassador to the Soviet Union).
8 Niiseki, Kinya (1916), JIIA Chairman, (Ambassador to the Soviet Union).
9 * Nomura, Kazunari, Eurasian Bureau Deputy Director-General.
10 * Okazaki, Hisahiro (1930), Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, (Research & Planning Department Director-General, Japan Defense Agency Senior Counselor [1979-1981]).
11 Owada, Hisashi (1932), Treaties Bureau Director-General, (Minister to the Soviet Union).
12 Shigemitsu, Akira (1916), Special Advisor to NTT Public Corporation, (Ambassador to the Soviet Union [1974-78]).
Shigeta Hiroshi, Soviet Union Division Director.
Shimoda, Takezo (1907), MFA Advisor, Permanent Court of International Justice (the Hague) Judge, (Ambassador to the U. S. and to the Soviet Union, Supreme Court Judge).
Shinoda, Kenji, Northeast Asia Division Assistant Director.
Takashima, Masuo (1919), Supreme Court Judge (Permanent Vice-Minister, Ambassador to the Soviet Union [1982–84]).
Tamba, Minoru (1938), Boston Consul-General, (Soviet Union Division Director, Minister to the Soviet Union).

b) Defense Agency and Its Subsidiary Institutions
Inoki, Masamichi (1914), RIPS President, Aoyama Gakuin University Professor, (National Defense Academy President).
Miyauchi, Kuniko, National Institute for Defense Studies Professor.
Momoi, Makoto (1923), Momoi Research Institute, (National Institute for Defense Studies Official & Research Department Director).
Nishihara, Masashi (1937), National Defense Academy Professor, RIPS Research Associate.
Onishi, Seiichiro, RIPS Executive-Director, (JDA official).
Saeki, Kiichi (1913), Nomura Research Institute Senior Advisor, RIPS Director, (National Institute for Defense Studies Director-General).
Sakonjo, Naotoshi, RIPS Research Associate, (Vice-Admiral, Marine Self Defense Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman).
Sase, Masamori (1934), National Defense Academy Professor (International Relations), RIPS Research Associate.
Yoshio, Sawada, Colonel; Assignment Division Director, Department of Personnel, Ground Staff Office (Military Attaché to the Soviet Union).

c) MITI and Its Subsidiary Institutions
Ogawa, Kazuo, Japan Association for Trade with the Soviet Union and Socialist Countries of Europe (Sotōbo) Department of Economic Studies Director.
Ozawa, Michinari, on loan to the National Land Agency as Minister’s Secretariat Counselor, (South Asia & East Europe Division Director).

d) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Kaneda, Tatsuo, JIIA Principal Researcher, on loan from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.

e) Northern Territories Affairs Association (NTAA) and Its Subsidiary Institutions
Ikura, Toshihiko, Northern Territories Issue Association Division Director, Management & Coordination Agency.
Inoue, Tatsuo, NTAA Counselor, Management & Coordination Agency.
Kodama, Yasuko (1945), Liaison Committee for Northern Territorial Reversion Movement Secretary-General, Northern Territories Issue Association.
Murata, Shozo, Northern Territories Issue Association Secretary-General, Management & Coordination Agency.
35 Oya, Haruyoshi, Nemuro City Mayor, Hokkaido.
36 Suetsugu, Ichiro (1922), Study Group on Security Issues Secretary-General, Organizer of Japan-Soviet Specialists Conferences.

3. Political Parties
a) Liberal-Democratic Party
37 Akagi, Munenori (1904), H. R., Komoto faction, Japan-Soviet Friendship Association President, (JDA Director-General, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries).
38 Hatoyama, Iichiro (1918), H. C. son of Hatoyama Ichiro, Japan-Soviet Parliamentary Friendship Association Vice-President, (Foreign Minister).
39 Horie, Masao (1915), House of Councillors (H. C.), Tanaka faction, Japan Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) Vice-Chairman, (Ground Self Defense Force General & Chiefs of Staff Vice-Chairman).
40 Kato, Koichi (1939), H. R., Miyazawa faction (Kōchi kai), LDP Policy Research Council First Deputy Chairman, (JDA Director-General).
41 * Machimura, Kingo (1900), Union for the Northern Territories Reversion (Sapporo) President, (H. R., H. C., Hokkaido Governor).
42 * Shiina, Motoo (1930), (H. R.), H. R. Security Committee.
43 Utsunomiya, Tokuma (1906), H. C. Shinsei Club President, Japan-China Association President, Utsunomiya Disarmament Research Institute.

b) Japan Socialist Party
44 Maruyama, Hiroyuki, Central Executive Committee’s Secretariat.
45 * Matsumae, Shigeyoshi (1901), (H. R.), Japan Cultural Association President, Tokai University President.
46 * Yokomichi, Takahiro (1941), (H. R.), Hokkaido Governor.

c) Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō)
47 Watanabe, Ichiro (1931), H. R., Party Central Executive Committee.

d) Democratic-Socialist Party
48 Ouchi, Keigo (1930), Party Secretary-General, (H. R.).
49 Ozawa, Sadataka (1916), H. R. Party Parliamentary Affairs Committee Chairman.

e) Japan Communist Party
50 Nishiguchi, Hikaru, International Affairs Department, Party Central Committee.

4 Business Community
a) Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations)
51 Anonymous.
52 Anonymous.
53 Kimbara, Kazuyuki (1956), International Economic Affairs Department Staff Economist (Economic Cooperation Department).

b) Private Companies
55 Kurosawa, Shinsuke, Komatsu Ltd. U. S. S. R. & East Europe Department Overseas Division Sales Manager, (Moscow Branch).
56 Onda, Hisao, Tsuruga Women's Junior College Associate Professor (Sumitomo U. S. S. R. & East Europe Department's Moscow Branch Sales Manager).

5 Academic Circles
57 * Eto, Jun (1932), Tokyo Institute of Technology Professor (Comparative Literature).
58 Eto, Shinkichi (1923), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor (International Relations), University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus, RIPS Director, Japan Peace Research Group (JPRG).
59 * Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi (1941), Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center Professor (Strategic Studies).
60 * Hosoya, Chihiro (1920), International University Vice-President, Hitotsubashi University Professor Emeritus (International Law and International Relations), JPRG.
61 Ito, Kenichi (1938), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Tokyo Representative, (MFA Russian Service).
62 * Kikuchi, Masanori (1930), University of Tokyo Professor (Russian History).
63 Kimura, Hiroshi (1936), Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center Director and Professor (Political Science), RIPS Research Associate.
64 * Kosaka, Masataka (1934), Kyoto University Professor (International Politics), IISS (London) Director, RIPS Director-General.
65 Minagawa, Shugo (1940), Nanzan University Professor (Soviet Domestic Politics).
66 * Mochizuki, Kiichi, Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center Professor (Soviet Economy), (Director).
67 Mushakoji, Kinhide (1929), United Nations University (Tokyo) Vice-Rector, (Sophia University Professor), JPRG.
68 * Nagai, Yonosuke (1924), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor, (Tokyo Institute of Technology Professor) (International Politics).
69 Nakagawa, Yatsuhiro (1945), Tsukuba University Associate Professor (Political Science and Strategic Studies).
70 Nishimura, Fumio, to be Shizuoka Prefecture Women's University Professor (Soviet Sociology), (JIIA Editor for USSR Study).
71 Sato, Seizaburo (1932), University of Tokyo Professor (Japanese Politics), RIPS Director and Research Associate.
73 * Shimizu, Ikutarō (1907), Shimizu Research Institute, (Gakushuin University Professor) (Sociology).
74 Teratani, Hiromi (1937), Aoyama Gakuin University Professor (Soviet Sociology).
75 Tsujimura, Akira (1926), to be Shizuoka Prefecture Women's University Rector, University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus (Sociology).
76 * Yano, Toru (1936), Kyoto University Southeast Asia Research Center Professor (International Politics), RIPS Research Associate.
6 Mass Media

a) Asahi Shim bun
77 Chuma, Kiyofuku, Editorial Writer.
78 Shirai, Hisaya, Editorial Writer, Senior Staff Correspondent, (Correspondent to Moscow).

b) Mainichi Shim bun
79 Hirano, Hiroshi, Deputy Executive-General, (Foreign Correspondents Department Director-General, Correspondent to Moscow).

c) Sankei Shim bun
80 Sawa, Hidetake, Foreign News Section, (Correspondent to Moscow).

d) Yomiuri Shim bun
81 * Otsuki, Junichi, JIIS Researcher.

e) NHK
82 Yoshinari, Taishi, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Lecturer, (Moscow Branch Director-General).

f) Others
83 Isoda, Sadaaki, Jiji News Service, Political Department Deputy Director-General, (Correspondent to Moscow).
84 Matsumura, Tadayuki, Nippon Network Corporation (NTV) Cultural Projects, (Correspondent to Moscow).
85 Sakai, Kosuku, Hokkaido Shim bun, Foreign News Section Press, (Correspondent to Moscow).
86 Takahashi, Minoru, Kyodo News Service, Editorial Writer, (International Bureau Director-General, Correspondent to Moscow).

7 Japan-Soviet Friendship Associations
(37 Akagi, Munenori, Japan-Soviet Friendship Association President.)
87 * Hoshino, Takeshi, Japan-Soviet Society Secretary-General.
(45 * Matsumae, Shigeyoshi, Japan Cultural Association President.)
88 Nakachi, Aki, Japan-Soviet Exchange Society Secretary-General.
89 Yochi, Tsuyoshi, Japan-Soviet Exchange Society Auditor.
### Changes in perceptions

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<td>Favorable perceptions that had slightly decreased</td>
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<td>Unfavorable perceptions that might change</td>
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<td>Unfavorable perceptions that would not change</td>
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### Sources of perceptions towards the Soviet Union

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<td>History of Japan and Russia-Soviet Union</td>
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<td>History of Russia-Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contacts with the Soviet Union in general</td>
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<td>Ideology (anti-communism)</td>
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### Perceptions of Japanese foreign policy towards the Soviet Union

#### a) Positions on the Northern Territories reversion

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<th>2%</th>
<th>7%</th>
<th>88%</th>
<th>2%</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Spoils of war (no reversion)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Four islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Should be only two islands</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cannot help but accept two islands</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Four islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>All the Kurile Islands</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### b) Positions on how the Northern Territories should be returned

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<th>18%</th>
<th>17%</th>
<th>4%</th>
<th>26%</th>
<th>35%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strict deguchi ron (exit theory)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate deguchi ron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neither iriguchi ron (entrance theory)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate iriguchi ron</td>
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</table>

#### c) Positions on Japanese defense policy

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3%</th>
<th>24%</th>
<th>63%</th>
<th>9%</th>
<th>1%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed neutrality; disband the SDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accept the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gradual defense build-up</td>
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<tr>
<td>Substantial defense build-up along with Japan-U. S. Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear armament</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Foreign policy orientation of Japan

**JAPAN**

- **Pro-Soviet**
  - non-aligned
  - Neutral
  - Pro-U. S.
  - Strict
  - Independent nationalist

- **Pro-U. S.**
  - But more autonomous

- **Neutral**
  - Omnipresent

- **Strict**
  - Pro-U. S.

- **Independent nationalist**
  - But more autonomous