Title

<BOOK REVIEW> SORÉN NO NAISEIRIKIGAKU TO GAIKO [THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION], By Kenji Iwata, Tokyo: Toshindo, 1989, xiii+316pp., 3,800

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This book is mainly concerned with the extent of interaction between Soviet domestic politics and Soviet foreign economic policy under Brezhnev.

The author has carried out an empirical analysis of this question quite systematically. I should quickly note that the author has succeeded in depicting two main internal political factors and the power relationships among the top Soviet leaders associated with these factors. The major findings are that, first, the differing assessments made by both Brezhnev and Kosygin respectively on putting too much reliance on Western technology became the prime factor by which both top leaders decided whether or not to adopt a positive or negative stance in regard to their foreign economic policy toward Western countries. Secondly, the disputes over the direction of economic reform and the order of priority of resources distribution turned into a disagreement between their two types of foreign trade strategies (that is a “vertical” international specialization strategy vs. a “horizontal” one), and this became the second factor which decided what was to be the contents of a Soviet foreign economic policy. The above dissension also touched on the question of administrative reform since Brezhnev intended to introduce Western technology in order to enhance economic efficiency while still maintaining a centralized economic system. Kosygin, on the other hand, had intended to restore the strength of the economy by introducing liberal reforms but without recourse to excessive reliance on Western technology.

The most interesting and important insight of the author as the reviewer sees it is his demonstration to try to decipher the esoteric communications exchanged between and among the key top leaders. The author has identified skillfully who is communicating what to whom, and he has intelligently scrutinized the actual channels and impacts of such communications.

The book also brings out an important point concerning the difficulties in carrying out the Gorbachev’s reforms by stating that the reforms would be influenced by the extent to which Soviet leaders could overcome the negative legacies of Brezhnev’s approach. At the same time, the author has vindicated the existence of an attitudinal frame for learning by the successive leaders of their predecessors’ experiences.

If there is any criticism to be made of this book, the author may have placed rather too much emphasis on the study of the interplay between the individual leaders and the Soviet Union’s technological needs, and paying too little attention to the role of the peculiar power structure of leadership which existed under Brezhnev, a set of ideas, the external environment, and political culture in the shaping of Soviet foreign economic policy. It is just as important to understand not only how the views of individual leaders have influenced others but also how these views were formed in the first place. The latter question cannot be answered without paying attention to the factors mentioned just now. True, the author has paid some attention to the role of, for instance, specialists in policy processes, but these analysis seem to be somewhat cursory. It is generally believed that under Brezhnev, a large number of specialists became associated with policy questions. Yet, Brezhnev’s performance in both domestic and foreign policy areas was said to be generally quite poor. We would be interested in finding out how the author explains, from his point of view, the question of a seemingly ineffective mobilization of these specialists.

In the preface of the book, the author appeared to be intent on predicting the future of
Gorbachev’s reforms. What the author seems to do, if the reviewer understands it correctly, is to predict the likely determinants of Gorbachev’s intended reforms, not necessarily the outcome of the reforms. The latter question cannot be pursued successfully by employing the same analytical method as the author has employed in the book, for two grounds. First, the economic reform under Brezhnev has not been a part of Perestroika. The Gorbachev’s policy agendas have been introduced with a view to affecting fundamental political, economic and social structures of the country. Secondly, a number of the policy agendas appear to be quite extensive, so, if some of these are to be realized for the realization of further larger goals, then extensive power politics among the wider variety of groups and individuals interested will necessarily be called into play.

Despite such shortcomings, the book in general adds to our understanding of the spectrum of Soviet economic foreign policy-making. I commend the author and the publisher to publish such a full-fledged academic book, given the fact that the market for such books of this nature is rather limited in Japan.

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