



Title	<BOOK REVIEW>GENDAI NO GUNBIKANRI, GUNSHUKU : KAKUHEIKI TO GAIKO, 1965-85 [ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AT THE PRESENT : NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DIPLOMACY, 1965-85], By Eiichi Sato, Tokyo : Tokai University Press, 1989,650pp., 9,500
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GENDAI NO GUNBIKANRI, GUNSHUKU : KAKUHEIKI TO GAIKO, 1965 – 85 [ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AT THE PRESENT : NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DIPLOMACY, 1965–85]. By *Eiichi Sato*. Tokyo : Tokai University Press, 1989, 650 pp. ¥9,500.

Eiichi Sato is a professor of Toyo Eiwa Junior College and known as an author of numerous articles and books on arms control. This book is comprised of twenty three studies published in various journals from 1970 through 1988, which are divided into four parts : the parts dealing with Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), SALT I and II, development of nuclear weapons in developing countries, and Part IV dealing with different aspects of recent arms control and disarmament negotiations, including the first INF and START negotiations. Since this is a collection of Professor Sato's works written at various times, it seems to lack in coherence, especially in Part IV. Nevertheless, by reading through Parts I, II and Chapters 1 and 2 of Part IV, readers will be able to touch the author's skillful analysis of nuclear negotiations.

It provides basis for understanding the major issues of nuclear arms control negotiations. The author discusses military strategy and technological progress, the nuclear development of developing nations and the national security decision-making processes of the non-nuclear countries, such as Japan, West Germany and Finland, giving the reader a comprehensive picture of these negotiations.

The author explains how NPT which superpowers originally undertook to prevent horizontal proliferation made them to set about the SALT negotiations for restrictions of the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The author says that Article 6 of NPT which requires the superpowers to start nuclear disarmament negotiations is "a changeling of NPT," because NPT aimed at establishing the rule of the two nuclear superpowers in reality bore fetters on them. But they succeeded in mutilating the substantive meaning of Article 6 of NPT. Under SALT I the superpowers, signalling the change in emphasis of strategy from defensive damage limitation to assured destruction, could "throw themselves completely into improving the assured destructive capability without any anxiety."

The author says that SALT II was also merely a result of reconfirmation of the era of MIRV and as such it accelerated the arms race by improving the MIRV capability. It also left open ever more "grey areas" which were not subject to SALT II limitations. Under the SALT II negotiation the superpowers could improve the damage limiting capability of strategic offensive weapons.

A weakness of the book is that the author does not assign much space to the analysis of Soviet nuclear strategy. The two superpowers have not always developed the same nuclear thinking. Rather due to their technological gap that the author points out, the Soviets could not but consistently put emphasis on damage limiting capability of offensive weapons. Although the author emphasizes the victory of the United States and the concessions on the side of the Soviet Union in the negotiations, we want to hear more about what benefits the Soviets received from the SALT regime.

To our regret, the analysis ends at the time when the Geneva Comprehensive Disarmament Negotiations started, and did no more than point out the future prospect of reappearance of the old issue of "MAD or damage limitation" caused by SDI. In addition, Gorbachev's new thinking which has had a formidable impact on the recent disarmament negotiations is also absent for the analysis.

In sum, however, this book is a valuable contribution to the Japanese literature on dis-

armament. It demonstrates the importance of case studies, which have been missing from most research to date. Moreover, the author's effort to understand arms control as a product of strategic theories, weapons developments, and arms limitation agreements, provides us with an in-depth understanding of the issue. Professor Sato's next theme is a theoretical analysis of arms control and disarmament, and we can eagerly anticipate for another fine book.

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