<BOOK REVIEW>ソレン・グニ・シシュツブノスイケイ [AN ANALYTICAL ESTIMATE ON SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURE], By Haruki Niwa, Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1989, xv+385pp., ¥2,800

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It is very important to know about the Soviet military expenditure to review the effects on not only Soviet economy and U.S.-Soviet relations, but also the security of Japan. The annual military budget announced by the Soviet Union is not considered to reflect actual expenditure, so there is little choice but to rely on estimates by foreign information or research organizations, or to conduct one's own analysis. This latter method is made all the more difficult by a difference of the system and a lack of data.

Professor Niwa, who has mastered econometrics and is a leading expert on the Soviet economy, chose this difficult course and has published the result of his analysis. The book reviewed here is a collection of his major works on the subject.

This book contains three distinctive features. Firstly, it comprises nine articles that he has published during the past ten years. This has caused some duplication in each article (chapter), but it adds detail to help the reader understand the process, and also acts to stress important points. Secondly, the author has challenged an unknown area. As a result, he lifts one veil after another as if he were solving a riddle, which brings the whole aspect to light. Thirdly, it contains antagonistic arguments in response to criticism by Professor Mochizuki of Hokkaido University. This occupies almost one-third of the book, and appeals to readers while helping them understand the analytical processes of the author.

The basic views of the author seem to be as follows: (1) The military budget announced by the Soviet Union only covers current and maintenance expenditure, such as personnel and food expenditure. (2) An increased portion of the national stock expense must be used for weapons procurement as "concealed funds". (3) A great amount of military expense must be included in the announced science expenses. The formula for estimating the actual military expenditure of the USSR is therefore the announced total military (defense) expenditure, plus the increased portion of the national stock, plus the military R & D expense contained in the announced science budget.

Professor Mochizuki's criticism includes the point that adding an increased portion of national stock to the total military expenditure that has been announced is double calculation because there is some overlapping between both items, and there is no trade-off relation as weapons procurement expenditure must be included in fixed capital investment. In response, the author tries repeatedly to justify his own views. On the other hand, he agrees with neither the CIA estimation by the building-block approach which is not well coordinated with national economic accounting, nor the SIPRI's underestimated calculation.

Almost ten years ago, Professor Niwa forecasted that the reckless military expansion of the USSR could break economic potentiality and military efforts as it is now. In addition, the estimate shown in this book closely resembles the total military budget recently announced for the first time by the Soviet Union. This is proof that his work is a remarkably academic achievement. It is therefore not surprising that his work is highly evaluated by people concerned with this field not only in Japan, but also in the U.S.A.

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