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Citation	Acta Slavica Iaponica, 9, 134-145
Issue Date	1991
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/8027
Type	bulletin (article)
File Information	KJ00000034197.pdf



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Attempts at Fostering Collaboration among the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War

Antti Kujala

When the hostilities between Japan and Russia had commenced in February 1904, Colonel Akashi Motojirô, the Japanese Military Attaché to Russia, was appointed Military Attaché to Sweden to serve at the newly-established legation in Stockholm. This exceptional post, which was under the direct control of the General Staff, was created to establish the Japanese intelligence network in Russia, to sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway and to support the opposition movements within the Russian Empire.¹ Akashi's activities were a consequence of the fact that Japan was forced to seek compensation for being the weaker party in regard to resources through the help of many diverse strategies.

Colonel Akashi's name attained fame for the first time in 1906 when the Russian state police published a booklet² about his secret activities during the war. The correspondence between Akashi and his fellow conspirators published therein demonstrated that the Japanese Military Attaché had overstepped the normal limits of his office and had, using considerable sums, funded revolutionary movements functioning within the Russian Empire.

Akashi's cooperation with the opposition movements among Russia's minority nationalities was closer than with the revolutionary movements led by Great Russians. The representatives of the national minorities served as middlemen, and as a smoke screen, for his work with the latter.

From 1899 onwards the Russian authorities embarked on a series of policies aimed at integrating Finland more closely, politically and administratively, with the rest of the Empire. These policies were directed by and identified with the then Russian Governor-General in Finland, Nikolai Bobrikov. The Finnish constitutionalist opposition, comprising the Swedish Party and the Young Finns, adopted a policy of passive resistance in a bid to maintain Finland's autonomy. The majority of the constitutionalists were conservative in their political and social outlook. In the spring of 1903, the Tsar issued a special decree granting Bobrikov a range of extraordinary powers to allow him to eliminate the opposition which had emerged. Under these new powers a significant number of the leaders of the constitutionalist opposition were ordered into foreign exile.³

The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War

Following the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East in February 1904, secret discussions were begun between a number of Finnish exiles in Stockholm and the Japanese Military Attaché, Colonel Akashi, to sound out the possibility of developing some form of cooperation between the Finnish opposition and Japan. Already the previous year Akashi had realized that the Finnish opposition could be used as a means to weaken Russia from within.

One of the most active in pursuing this new avenue was Konni Zilliacus, a

Finnish journalist resident in Stockholm.⁴ He and another Finnish exile, Jonas Castrén, were instrumental in putting Japanese representatives in contact with the Polish National League which was the major non-socialist opposition group in Russian Poland.⁵

Zilliacus had already in 1902 proposed that the Finnish opposition act as a catalyst to unite opposition forces across the Russian Empire. In his opinion, the Finnish opposition, because of its non-socialist character, was ideally suited to the task of putting forward the idea of increased inter-party collaboration. By working together, the opposition groups would have a much greater chance of overthrowing the Russian autocracy than by continuing the anti-government struggle separately. Within the constitutionalists Zilliacus represented the radicals, a small minority group, whose views the mainstream Finnish opposition did not share.⁶

In December 1903, Zilliacus had presented his ideas to various leading Russian Socialist Revolutionaries living in Western Europe.⁷ He felt close affinity with this Russian party. Zilliacus was a Finnish nationalist but he argued that united opposition action could pose a serious threat to the government only if ethnic Russian forces took the lead. After the beginning of the war, he outlined a plan of cross-party cooperation and finalized it in his discussions with F. V. Volkhovskii and N. V. Chaikovskii whom he met in London in April 1904. According to the plan, a joint conference of the various opposition movements was to be convened to agree on a common campaign of anti-government activities. Russia's military setbacks and the ensuing social unrest should be used to overthrow the autocracy.

Having secured the approval of two leading Socialist Revolutionaries⁸ to his plan, Zilliacus lost no time in presenting it to the Japanese diplomats resident in London, Minister Hayashi Tadasu and Military Attaché Utsunomiya Tarô. Zilliacus approached the Japanese on his own initiative. He needed Japanese assistance to fund the various stages of the plan. Funds were to be channelled to the various opposition parties involved as the overall plan progressed. The intention was to disguise the origin of the money from the ethnic Russian parties.

Unrest and disturbances on the home front would, as Zilliacus saw things, prevent Russia from deploying all her military forces against Japan. It was this bait which he hoped would attract Tokyo's interest. His own aim in the longer term was for the establishment of a constitutionally-administered Russia and the granting of as wide as possible a measure of self-government to Finland.⁹

The Japanese General Staff approved Zilliacus' plan at the end of August 1904 and decided to free funds to finance it. In its instructions sent to Akashi and Utsunomiya, the General Staff emphasized that the proposed plan was to include all the opposition parties.¹⁰

Akashi must, in fact, have given Zilliacus the green light at the end of July, i. e. a month earlier than the General Staff sanctioned the subversion plan.¹¹ More than once Akashi not only anticipated the decisions of his superiors but also overstepped the limits sanctioned by Tokyo. His behaviour resembles to some extent that of the Swedish General Staff officers in charge of reconnaissance regarding Russia. The latter helped Akashi and his assistants in military reconnaissance although the Swedish government adhered to a strict policy of neutrality

in regard to the participants of the Far Eastern War.¹²

Independently of Zilliacus, a small group¹³ of Finnish constitutionalists (Jonas Castrén, Julio Reuter and some others) tried to persuade the governments of Japan and Britain to commit themselves to procuring for Finland, with the conclusion of peace, as much independence from Russia as possible. In return the group proposed that the Finns might rise in rebellion against the Russian government. This, however, would have required Britain's participation in the war and massive aid from her fleet; other conditions for rebellion also had to be as favourable as possible. Since Britain had no desire to go to war and Japan was not interested in undertaking military or political responsibilities in Europe, Reuter's alliance proposals in May 1904 in London to the Japanese Minister Hayashi Tadasu and Military Attaché Utsunomiya Tarô and the British Minister of War H. O. Arnold-Forster met with a cool reception.

It was ill-advised of the Finns to request such a large quantity of weapons as 50,000 rifles for a small border area like Finland at a time when Japan needed to concentrate all her efforts and resources to prevent herself being crushed under the Russian colossus.

The small group led by Castrén and Reuter probably never received a final answer from the Japanese to their offers of cooperation. By not closing the door completely on this proposal, the Japanese hoped to be able to keep it in reserve in the event that changes in the military situation would make it more attractive. Through their non-committal stance, the Japanese did, however, put a brake on any further development of the idea, and little more was done about it for the remainder of the war.¹⁴

Japanese authorities also opposed their country's involvement in the Polish question. On hearing of Zilliacus' plan, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) responded by developing its own variant. This called for the holding of a joint conference of socialist and revolutionary organizations representing the oppressed national minorities within the Empire. The conference was to be charged with agreeing a programme of anti-government actions. The parties attending the conference should also commit themselves to supporting a federal, non-centralist, form of future government. The ultimate aim of the PPS was to foment a rebellion within Russian Poland. The uprising was to be supported by other minority nationalities.¹⁵

Józef Piłsudski of the PPS went to Japan in the summer of 1904 and requested that Tokyo enter into an alliance with the Poles. Japan was to provide a subsidy or arms for the planned anti-Russian insurrection. Nevertheless, Tokyo decided against giving the Polish Socialists any aid.¹⁶

Zilliacus, in contrast, did not ask the Japanese for any diplomatic or military commitments and limited his request for weapons to no more than perhaps about a thousand small arms.¹⁷ These would not have been enough to start a revolution in Russia but enough to tie down some Russian forces in Europe and hamper the overall Russian war effort. Japan had no wish to be instrumental in triggering a revolution in Russia.¹⁸

Zilliacus realized the need to ask the Japanese only for as much as would be likely to be acceptable to them while at the same time meeting his own minimum requirements. His skill lay in his ability to develop an approach flexible enough

to embrace the various aims of all the parties involved, the Japanese, the Russian revolutionaries and the Finnish opposition. A factor contributing to Zilliacus' success was the reluctance¹⁹ of the Japanese to supply funds for specific particularist interests.

In his efforts to convene the joint conference of the opposition movements, Zilliacus had so far been obliged to abide by the guidelines given by the Finnish constitutionalists as it was they who had financed his trips in Europe. Zilliacus abandoned this position when Tokyo decided in the summer of 1904 to begin funding his plan. The brake on his freedom of movement was now removed.

Zilliacus' activities brought him close to being a Japanese agent, although it should be noted that he refused to help in military intelligence-gathering work.²⁰ Zilliacus was too independent-minded to become a docile stooge of the Japanese. Thus e. g. when Akashi advised him not to invite the Russian liberals to the conference, Zilliacus ignored the advice.²¹

Zilliacus' conference plan found more support among the opposition parties of the Russian Empire than the PPS' proposal and served to bury the latter. The minority nationalities-led insurrection envisaged by the PPS never materialized, following the Japanese refusal to support it.

The joint conference was held on Zilliacus' initiative between 30 September and 5 October 1904 in Paris. Only eight parties were represented there, including the Union of Liberation (the Russian liberals), the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, the Polish National League, the Polish Socialist Party and the Finnish opposition.²² The results of the conference were of minor importance. Unrest did increase in a number of areas of the Empire towards the end of 1904, but primarily as the result of independent action taken by individual parties.

In his memorandum on the conference, Zilliacus requested Japan to state officially that it would rather conclude peace with a Russian constitutional government than with Tsarism, which it considered to be its real enemy.²³ His request was not well received within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, used as it was to working through traditional diplomatic channels.²⁴ The General Staff refused Akashi's request to allow him access to additional funds for subversion beyond the sum already granted.²⁵ After the Paris conference, Zilliacus kept on passing various Japanese subsidies to the parties which had attended the conference, taking care not to reveal the origin of the funds to the Russian parties.²⁶

Soon after the termination of the conference, the Finnish constitutionalist opposition, whose leadership had only halfheartedly backed Zilliacus' efforts or been totally averse to them, decided to rescind its association with the conference. As a result of this move, Zilliacus founded a new radical opposition group known as the Finnish Active Resistance Party. The new party signed the official documents connected with the conference instead of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition which had actually been represented at the conference.

Unlike the constitutionalists, the Activists were ready to resort to an armed struggle and terrorism against the Tsarist authorities and link forces with the Russian revolutionary movement. The party lacked any policy programme covering social issues. The main aim of the Finnish Activists was the implementation of national self-determination in cooperation with forces of the Russian opposition. Absolute separatism was contrary to closer association and was therefore not

implemented as a political programme.²⁷ (The Activists began, however, to endorse Finland's complete independence from Russia in 1907.)

The failure of the Paris conference to attract as wide a range of participants as had originally been hoped for by its organizers resulted, in the main, from the revelation of Zilliacus' links with the Japanese, which prevented the social democratic parties from sending their representatives to Paris. The social democrats found out about Zilliacus' liaison with the Japanese General Staff due to the Finn's own lack of caution,²⁸ but in any case it would have been impossible for him to disguise his secret links with the latter in the long run. As the Japanese were interested in organizing inter-party cooperation only on a truly broad base, they would have been wise not to finance Zilliacus' activities at this stage. The actual results might have been better if Zilliacus had acted independently of the Japanese.

The Revolution of 1905

The 1905 revolution began with the shots fired on Bloody Sunday (22 January 1905²⁹) in St Petersburg. The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries now began in earnest the task of bringing together the revolutionary parties and engaged Father Georgii Gapon, the hero of Bloody Sunday, as the figurehead for their venture.³⁰

The conference of the revolutionary parties (e. g. the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, the Polish Socialists, the Finnish Activists) met in Geneva on 2-8/9 April 1905.³¹ The Mensheviks had already in advance backed out of the venture³² and the representatives of the other social democratic organizations soon walked out of the conference.³³ The inability of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to come to any form of agreement about the role of terrorism emerged as the major stumbling block which restricted the range of participants at the Geneva conference.³⁴ The disagreements existing between the main wings of the Russian revolutionary movement effectively frustrated all the attempts made during the spring of 1905 to establish a common front.

The main role in the lead-up to, and in directing, the conference belonged to the Socialist Revolutionaries. Zilliacus took no part in the preparations and did not attend the conference. As the social democratic parties had decided to boycott the Paris conference because of Zilliacus' links with the Japanese, someone else would have to be entrusted with the task of organizing a follow-up conference. Zilliacus satisfied himself with exercising influence over developments indirectly through the Socialist Revolutionaries.³⁵

After Bloody Sunday Zilliacus and Akashi began to organize a rebellion in Russia.³⁶ In order to achieve positive results, collaboration between as many revolutionary parties as possible was a necessity. The efforts to organize a new conference of all revolutionary forces active within the Russian Empire served excellently Zilliacus' and Akashi's intentions.

Following the battle of Mukden in March 1905, the Japanese government and General Staff abandoned their former caution on the subversion question and allocated even prior to the Geneva conference a million yen to backing an armed uprising in Russia. If Russia could not be made to yield by force of arms, it would be possible, according to Japanese thinking, to break the Russian determination to continue the struggle by paralysing the country from within through

subversion.³⁷

After the break-up of the conference and the failure of the attempts that had been made to develop some kind of working relationship between the two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement, Zilliacus and Akashi had to resign themselves to the fact that only the Socialist Revolutionaries and their allies would be involved in the plans for a rebellion. This must have been a source of major disappointment to Zilliacus, but particularly for the Japanese, who had considered it important to gain as wide a base as possible for the planned campaign of subversion.

The uprising was planned to start in St Petersburg following the arrival of the arms shipment from the West. The aim was to stage a final settling of accounts with the autocracy. Even if the uprising in the capital was to fail, it would be sufficient, it was assumed, to trigger popular rebellions in Poland, the Caucasus and elsewhere, which would serve to provide the impetus for a revolution embracing the Empire as a whole. Zilliacus, Akashi, Chaikovskii and the Georgian revolutionary, G. Dekanozi, began to acquire arms and the vessels needed to transport them to Russia in the period immediately following the Geneva conference. The weapons purchased were intended for the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Finnish Activists, the Polish Socialists and the Georgian revolutionaries. Gapon was recruited to serve as a figurehead to lead the uprising planned for St Petersburg.³⁸

The Socialist Revolutionary leaders must have realized that the money Zilliacus was offering them, allegedly as funds collected in America, had its origin in Tokyo, but they saw fit to accept Zilliacus' explanations at face value.³⁹

The freighter *John Grafton* sailed for St Petersburg at the beginning of August, loaded with 15,560 rifles and 2,500 revolvers, together with ammunition and explosives. About a third of the cargo was destined for the Finnish Activists.⁴⁰ Zilliacus approved the inclusion of the underground organization of the Finnish constitutionalists, the *Kagal*, and the Bolsheviks in the operation. The latter were collaborating in this venture with the *Kagal* (a fact that some *Kagal* leaders subsequently wanted to conceal).⁴¹

Zilliacus and Chaikovskii aimed for the uprising to get under way immediately on the arrival of the arms in St Petersburg. Akashi's desire for events to be put in hand as quickly as possible to take some of the pressure off Japan, which, despite all her military victories, was by this stage sorely in need of a respite from the conflict, undoubtedly contributed to this decision.⁴²

The Socialist Revolutionary party leadership, on the other hand, argued for stockpiling the weapons until Russia was truly ripe for revolution.⁴³ Zilliacus and Chaikovskii shut their ears, however, to the warnings of the party leadership, putting their faith instead in Gapon's completely unsubstantiated assurances that the St Petersburg workers were just waiting for the sign to mount the barricades.⁴⁴

At the beginning of August, the Activist leadership in Helsinki decided to accept the argument for the need to delay the planned rebellion and openly challenged Zilliacus, the party's founder and undisputed authority until then. An additional reason for this change of policy was the lack of preparation witnessed in St Petersburg. The Activist leadership also decided to bypass Zilliacus' prom-

ises made to the *Kagal* and the Bolsheviks regarding the arms shipment.⁴⁵ These changes resulted from the intervention of the Socialist Revolutionary party.⁴⁶ The control of the project slipped thus out of the Japanese hands.

I shall not go into further details of this project because it ended in a total failure, when the *John Grafton* ran aground on the Finnish coast and the crew blew her up. This happened a few days after the conclusion of peace in September 1905.⁴⁷ The result may have been a serious personal disappointment to Akashi, but to his country it did not really matter any more once she had concluded peace with Russia. Whatever the result, the money spent in financing the arms shipment had been lost and could not be regained.

As Inaba Chiharu has concluded, the Japanese General Staff used the Russian revolutionaries as one uses mercenaries, providing financial support for the sake of military victory. The General Staff broke off the relations with the opposition groups of the Russian Empire when the war drew to a close. Japan did not intend to remain on unfriendly terms with Russia.⁴⁸ This sealed the termination of the contacts and collaboration with the Finnish opposition, too.

The best investment the Japanese made with a view to hampering the Russian war effort was their subsidies not to Zilliacus and the inter-party collaborative initiatives but to the Polish Socialist Party and its violent activities within Russian Poland. Even early in 1904, before the latter began, the Russian government maintained an army of 250,000 men in Poland. At the outbreak of the war in February 1904, the manpower of the Russian armed forces stationed east of Lake Baikal was only 135,000 men. Although every Russian military unit was needed in the Far East, the government had to increase its armed forces in Poland by 50,000 men by mid-1905.⁴⁹

Russian Political Parties and Inter-Party Collaboration

The efforts to establish a common front between the various political and national opposition movements of the Russian Empire should not be viewed merely from the perspective of a Japanese subversive policy. After the outbreak of the war, the idea of greater collaboration arose in a number of quarters totally independently and, above all, in some cases irrespective of the Japanese, but Zilliacus' greater success served to bury these initiatives. In the final analysis, Zilliacus and Akashi were successful because their policy corresponded to the actual needs of the revolutionary parties. An unprofitable and unpopular war created ideal conditions for the opposition's efforts towards unity.

Although Japanese aid did play a certain role in the revolutionary events of 1904-05 in the Russian Empire, these events resulted mainly from internal causes.

Of the two main parties, the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) and the Socialist Revolutionaries, the former, firmly committed to its own ideological orthodoxy and centralist philosophy, was clearly the less flexible in its attitude towards cross-party collaboration. Differences of opinion nevertheless existed within the party, with G. V. Plekhanov's attitude to joint action generally being more positive than that of the hard-core Mensheviks, such as F. I. Dan and Iu. O. Martov.⁵⁰ The conciliatory approach adopted by V. I. Lenin in the spring of 1905 towards the other parties owed much to the Bolsheviks' desire to

break out of their isolated position.⁵¹

The various competing socialist parties representing many of the border areas within the Empire often, however, enjoyed significantly worse mutual relations than those existing between the Russian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries. Internecine competition came to dominate local opposition politics in a number of regions, particularly in the case of the Polish and Latvian⁵² socialist movements.

The weak overall position of the minority nationalities tended to prompt their most important revolutionary parties to promote collaboration between revolutionary forces across the Empire more actively than the Russian parties. The activity of the minorities in this field was especially prominent in the early stages of the development of the idea of joint action during the spring and summer of 1904. As a result of the smaller degree of influence wielded by the minority nationalities, none of these parties was in a position to be able to torpedo the common front idea alone, unlike the larger Russian parties such as the RSDWP.

The Polish Social Democrats (SDKPiL) reacted to the question of collaboration between the social democrats and the other revolutionary parties and opposition movements the least favourably of any party within the whole of the Empire. In the lead-up to both the Paris and Geneva conferences, the SDKPiL consistently followed policies at odds with those espoused by the RSDWP and the other social democratic parties. Despite this, the Russian Social Democrats, both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, favoured the Rosa Luxemburg-led party because of its renunciation of the type of nationalism advocated by its competitor, the PPS. The SDKPiL's unambiguous internationalist stance made the party an important ally for the Russian Social Democrats.⁵³

The Polish Socialist Party's attachment to Polish nationalism, together with its anti-Russian sentiments, forced the party into a position within the opposition movement far from matching its potential significance as the main socialist party of the Empire's second most important national group. The PPS' traditional separatism was based in large measure on the weakness of the Russian revolutionary movement. The strengthening of the Russian opposition during 1904 forced at least part of the party to reassess its attitude to separatism and to the idea of collaboration, and led to a number of disputes within the party over its future policy position.⁵⁴

Of the other parties, the Jewish Bund in particular attempted to promote unity among the social democrats,⁵⁵ while among the Finnish opposition, Zilliacus, together with his supporters, similarly aimed at the creation of a joint front embracing all revolutionary forces, albeit one biased in favour of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. Since the Finnish Activists were much less separatist and Russophobic than the PPS, it was much easier for the Russian revolutionary parties to cooperate with the former. Mostly for this reason Zilliacus rose to the head of efforts for the Empire-wide collaboration of revolutionary and opposition parties in 1904.

The other minority nationality parties inevitably tended to play second fiddle to the major parties, or satisfied themselves with the role of onlooker.

The obstacles in the way of cooperation between the revolutionary parties proved, in the final analysis, insurmountable. This alone, however, can hardly

explain the failure of the 1905 revolution. The revolutionary parties were much weaker comparatively at the beginning of 1917, when even the small measure of collaboration existing in 1905 was lacking. The 1905 revolution remained no more than a “dress rehearsal” for things to come because of the fact that, despite its weakened position, the autocratic regime was able, drawing on what reserves it had left at its disposal, to avoid the type of complete breakdown which it was to encounter only 12 years later.

NOTES

- 1 Inaba Chiharu, “Akashi’s Career,” in: Akashi Motojirō, *Rakka ryūsui : Colonel Akashi’s Report on His Secret Cooperation with the Russian Revolutionary Parties during the Russo-Japanese War*, Olavi K. Fält and Antti Kujala, eds. (Helsinki, 1988), p. 18.
- 2 *Iznanka revoliutsii : Vooruzhennoe vozstanie v Rossii na iaponskiiia sredstva* (S.-Peterburg, 1906).
- 3 Tuomo Polvinen, *Valtakunta ja rajamaa : N. I. Bobrikov Suomen kenraalikuvernöörinä 1898-1904* (Porvoo, 1984); Pertti Luntinen, *F. A. Seyn : A Political Biography of a Tsarist Imperialist as Administrator of Finland* (Helsinki, 1985); William R. Copeland, *The Uneasy Alliance : Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground, 1899-1904* (Helsinki, 1973).
- 4 Antti Kujala, “Nichirosensōjiniokeru finrandorikkenshugiteikōhato nihon, igirisu, suweedenzo kyōryoku,” *Hokuōshi kenkyū*, No. 5 (1987), pp. 39-41.
- 5 K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim, 11 March 1904, Eino I. Parmanen Collection XXX, Valtionarkisto [National Archives] (VA), Helsinki; Konni Zilliacus, *Från ofärdstid och oroliga år : Politiska minnen*, I (Helsingfors, 1919), pp. 124-131; Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, p. 38; Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski*, I (London, 1963), p. 475.
- 6 (K.) Z (illiacus), “Den ryska oppositionen och Finlands framtid,” *Fria Ord* (12 September 1902), pp. 3-4; (K.) Z (illiacus), *Den ryska oppositionen och Finlands framtid* (Stockholm, 1902).
- 7 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius, 6 January 1904, Arvid Neovius Collection, VA; L. A. Rataev to A. A. Lopukhin, 2 January 1904/20 December 1903, Okhrana Archives, XXI F. 1, Hoover Institution (HI), Stanford (copy: USA tk 18, VA).
- 8 Chaikovskii never formally joined the party but he was a member of its Foreign Committee. See Manfred Hildermeier, *Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Russlands : Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich (1900-1914)* (Köln, 1978), pp. 55-56; Arkhiv Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov (PSR) No. 18, International Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam.
- 9 K. Zilliacus to F. V. Volkhovskii, 1 and 31 March 1904, F. V. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius, 13 April and 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén, 18 April 1904, Jonas Castrén Collection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to T (probably Th. Homén), 19 March 1905, J. N. Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, Abo Akademis Bibliotek (ÅAB), Turku/Åbo.
- 10 Inaba Chiharu, “The Politics of Subversion: Japanese Aid to Opposition Groups in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War,” in: Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*,

- p. 75 (see also p. 57).
- 11 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius, 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.
 - 12 See Kujala, "Nichirosensōjiniokeru," *Hokuōshi kenkyū*, No. 5 (1987), pp. 41-43, No. 6 (1988), pp. 40-45; Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, pp. 170-172.
 - 13 It is, however, worth emphasizing that the great majority of the Finnish constitutionalists remained loyal to the imperial connection.
 - 14 Olavi K. Fält, "Collaboration between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish Underground during the Russo-Japanese War," *Asian Profile*, vol. 4 (1976), pp. 222-228; Kujala, "Nichirosensōjiniokeru," (1987), pp. 36-51, (1988), pp. 40-53.
 - 15 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius, 27 June and 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Zilliacus to Neovius, 22 August 1904, Leo Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; "Primiritel'nye popytki 'Bunda' v 1905 godu," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, No. 11 (1922), p. 168; Wł. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Józef Piłsudski, 1901-1908: W ogniu rewolucji* (Warszawa, 1935), pp. 174-177; Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia*, pp. 480-481; Walentyna Najdus, *SDKPiL a SDPRR, 1893-1907* (Wrocław, 1973), pp. 181-183.
 - 16 Jerzy J. Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War," in: *The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Third Series, VII (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 69-97.
 - 17 See K. Zilliacus to L. E. Shishko, 10 May and 1 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA).
 - 18 Inaba, "The Politics of Subversion", pp. 71-78.
 - 19 Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, p. 57.
 - 20 Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, p. 37.
 - 21 Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, p. 40.
 - 22 *Listok Osvobozhdeniia*, No. 17, 19 November (2 December) 1904, pp. 1-2; Adolf Törngren, *Med ryska samhällsbyggare och statsmän åren 1904-1905* (Helsingfors, 1929), pp. 241-255; *Russkii politicheskii syisk za granitsej*, pod red. L. Men'shchikov, I (Paris, 1914), pp. 182-195; K. Zilliacus, La conférence & Mémoire I (October 1904), Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu) No. 3, 1.6.3.2-9, Gaikō shiryōkan (GS), Tokyo. I am indebted to Inaba Chiharu for bringing Zilliacus' reports to the Japanese Foreign Ministry to my attention.
 - 23 K. Zilliacus, Mémoire I (October 1904), Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu) No. 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS.
 - 24 Michael Futrell, "Colonel Akashi and Japanese Contacts with Russian Revolutionaries in 1904-5," in: *St Antony's Papers*, 2, *Far Eastern Affairs*, 4 (London, 1967), p. 18.
 - 25 Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, p. 57; Inaba, "The Politics of Subversion," p. 75.
 - 26 K. Zilliacus to T, 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB.
 - 27 Antti Kujala, "March Separately - Strike Together: The Paris and Geneva Conferences Held by the Russian and Minority Nationalities' Revolutionary and Opposition Parties, 1904-1905," in: Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, pp. 129-130, 158-159.
 - 28 Zilliacus, *Från ofärdstid och oroliga år*, II (1920), pp. 14-17; Zametki o konspirativnom soveshchanii delegatov rossiiskikh sotsialisticheskikh partii (22 August 1904), M 6-9, 80, Bund Archives of the Jewish Labor Movement, New York. Many thanks to Benjamin Nadel for bringing this document to my

attention.

- 29 All dates in this essay are new style, unless otherwise indicated.
- 30 Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 137-148.
- 31 Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 148-159.
- 32 Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 141-145.
- 33 *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, No. 65, (25 April 1905) (old style), pp. 5-6.
- 34 See the documents in: PSR No. 758/11/b, IISH.
- 35 Akashi, *Rakka ryūsui*, pp. 61-62, 66; Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 138-140, 149-150, 159.
- 36 Futrell, "Colonel Akashi," pp. 17-18.
- 37 Inaba, "The Politics of Subversion," pp. 78-82.
- 38 Antti Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement and the Finnish Opposition, 1905: The John Grafton Affair and the Plans for an Uprising in St Petersburg," *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol. 5 (1980), pp. 261-262, 269.
- 39 Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 161-162 (see also pp. 100-101).
- 40 The annual report of the party council for 1904-05 (19 November 1905), Finnish Active Resistance Party Archive, VA.
- 41 Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement," pp. 257-275.
- 42 Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement," p. 262; Kujala, "March Separately", p. 163.
- 43 M. R. Gots to N. V. Chaikovskii, 12 August 1905, No. 115 item 14, B. I. Nikolaevskii Collection, HI (USA tk 19, VA).
- 44 N. P. Petrov, "Zapiski o Gapone," *Vsemirnyi vestnik*, No. 2 (1907), IV, pp. 14-23; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius, 15 May 1905, Neovius Collection, VA; Zilliacus, *Från ofärdstid och oroliga år*, II, pp. 40-41.
- 45 Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement," pp. 268-271; Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 163-164.
- 46 H. Biaudet to "Sliotoff" (a representative of the Socialist Revolutionary leadership), 31 October 1905, the portfolio of copies of Henry Biaudet's letters, ff. 31-33, in his collection, VA.
- 47 Kujala, "The Russian Revolutionary Movement," pp. 271-275.
- 48 Inaba, "The Politics of Subversion," pp. 83-84.
- 49 Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray* (Stanford, 1988), p. 158; John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, 1964), p. 147. The Russian troops in Poland were naturally needed to ward off potential external attacks too.
- 50 Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 110-125, 131-145.
- 51 The minutes (and their draft version) of the Foreign Committee, 7 April 1905, PSR No. 18, IISH; "K biografii Gapona," *Minuwshie gody*, No. 7 (1908), pp. 40-41; V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, izd. 5-e, t. 10 (Moskva, 1960), p. 181, t. 47 (1964), p. 20, 22.
- 52 *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, No. 65, (25 April 1905) (old style), p. 5; *Bureau Socialiste International: Comptes rendus des réunions, Manifestes et circulaires*, Georges Haupt, ed., I (Paris, 1969), pp. 241, 265, 376-379, 391-392.
- 53 See Najdus, *SDKPiL a SDPRR*, and Georg W. Strobel, *Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs, Lenin und die SPD: Der polnische "europäische" Internationalismus in der russischen Sozialdemokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1974), passim.

- 54 See Anna Żarnowska, *Geneza rozłamu w Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej 1904-1906* (Warszawa, 1965), *passim*.
- 55 Kujala, "March Separately," pp. 114-115, 119, 135-137, 145-146.