The “Highly Crucial” Decision Making Model and the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Normalization of Relations

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The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it seeks to devise the “highly crucial” decision making model, which is applicable to a specific type of foreign policy formulation process in postwar Japan. This model embraces perspectives derived from the fields of decision making, communications, factional politics, leadership, public opinion, and civic culture. Second, my paper will test the validity of the model in the light of Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama’s policy to restore official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956.

I The Locus of the Problem

By definition, a model is viewed as a simplified picture of reality; it depicts the interdependent variables within a specific context that allows one to predict the characteristic behavior of the components. A variety of models have already been devised or applied to explain the foreign policy making process in contemporary Japan. They include the Marxist-Lenist model, the bureaucratic politics model, the factional politics model, the tripartite model, the ringisei model, the “critical” decision model, and the political modernization model. Yet none of these succeeds in illuminating the representative features of “highly crucial” decision making in contemporary Japan, although most of them, with a few notable exceptions, claim applicability regardless of the issue area involved.

One of the indisputable facets of “highly crucial” foreign policy decision making in postwar Japan is that the prime minister plays a central role in the decision making process when he decides to commit himself to the task; he initially advocates the solution of a pending “highly crucial” diplomatic issue and tries hard to achieve the settlement, sometimes even at the cost of his political life. Among the aforementioned models, perhaps the two most popular and influential ones are (1) the tripartite model, which emphasizes the activities of politicians of the ruling political party, senior bureaucrats, and big businessmen, and (2) the factional politics model. In both of the models, the prime minister is conceived of as a dependent variable. He is at best pictured as the puppet of either big business, factional leaders in the ruling political party, or officialdom. For Professor Chitoshi Yanaga, who believes the myth of zaikai omnipotence, organized big business has had a decisive impact on the foreign policy formulation in postwar Japan because it retains the “power of life and death over governments.” And in the view of Donald C. Hellmann, the factional struggle in the ruling party is “synonymous with the foreign policy making process.”

An innovative model that makes particular reference to the prime minister in a “highly crucial” decision is Professor Haruhiro Fukui’s “critical”(hiijoigata) decision model, which is elaborated in his work on the 1972 Okinawa reversion and the Sino-Japanese rapprochement of the same year. Due to its theoretical nov-
elty, the “critical” decision model was spotlighted in Japan as soon as it was proposed.

Nonetheless, as Professor Fukui himself admits, his “critical” decision model is still an “incomplete analytical notion” that needs to be refined. In seeking to rectify the failure of the other models to assign a significant role to the prime minister, Fukui goes too far, and, in the end, he overevaluates that role. Fukui argues that in all critical decisions, the prime minister exercises very active and strong leadership over other major political actors and that he is free from any kind of domestic constraints. It is true that prime ministerial power is, to a great extent, enhanced in the postwar Constitution, which provides that the cabinet shall “manage foreign affairs” (Article 73 of the New Japanese Constitution). This is in contrast to the prewar period, when the power of diplomacy belonged not to the prime minister, but to the Emperor as a sacred and inviolable right, to be exercised in practice by his agents, of which the prime minister was only one of several. However, postwar Japanese prime ministers have not become independent variables in “highly crucial” foreign policy making. They do not enjoy dominance over other major political actors as do US presidents and as Fukui’s model suggests. It is necessary, therefore, to construct a decision making model that will accurately reflect the role of the prime minister in “highly crucial” decision making as that of an autonomous, central player struggling against various political constraints but not completely dominating them.

II The “Highly Crucial” Decision Making Model

A “highly crucial” decision in postwar Japanese foreign policy is defined here as one which is related to issues of high politics, i.e., the territorial jurisdiction and security of the nation. It involves a change of the status quo in Japan’s relation with a superpower or a regional power. The settlement of such issues with profound political significance invariably requires active involvement by top-level political leaders. In the context of postwar Japanese diplomacy, “highly crucial” decisions were perceived to be watersheds both by the decision makers and by observers. And there exist five cases which fit the definition of being “highly crucial” decisions: (1) Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s 1952 San Francisco peace settlement and his signing of the US-Japanese Security Treaty; (2) Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama’s 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization of diplomatic relations; (3) Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s 1960 revision of the Security Treaty; (4) Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s 1972 Okinawa reversion; (5) Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s 1972 Sino-Japanese rapprochement. If Japan decides to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in the future, it will be the sixth case falling into the category of a “highly crucial” decision making.

“Highly crucial” foreign policy decisions are politically extremely sensitive and controversial. Alternative outcomes could dramatically change Japan’s international position. Precisely because of the controversial nature of the decision, a considerable number of actors, including LDP and opposition party politicians and leaders of interest groups, push hard to influence the decision process. Opinion within the LDP coalesces around the political factions, and in this situation factional politics become a keynote of the Japanese decision making process.
Importantly, however, the process of official policymaking is dominated by a very small ad hoc group in which the prime minister plays a central role with other actors assuming subordinate roles.

Theorists of international relations usually attribute three elements to the international crisis decision: a high degree of perceived imminent threat to a nation's security and survival, surprise, and short decision time. In the "highly crucial" decision in Japan, the degree of unexpectedness is not great, since the moves to be taken by the other state at the negotiating table can normally be predicted to a considerable degree.

In terms of an extremely small decision making unit led by the chief executive, a "highly crucial" foreign policy decision in Japan has a flavor of the international crisis decision. Yet, as to the situational element, it is quite different. Compared with international crisis decisions, "highly crucial" decisions are formulated in a situation where imminent threat to the nation is less obviously detected. This is perhaps in part related to the fact that Japan has enjoyed the protection of America's nuclear umbrella since the Second World War.

As to the time available for decision, the formulation of a "highly crucial" decision in Japan is not demanded as promptly as in the case of an international crisis decision, and usually the available decision time is sufficient to permit a gradual buildup. Admittedly, however, in case the international situation surrounding Japan suddenly undergoes a great change and the cost of no decision or postponement appears unbearably high in the eyes of the prime minister, the "highly crucial" decision time inevitably becomes quite short and constrained.

Obviously, a "highly crucial" decision sharply differs from non-politicized, routinized and incremental decisions, which are primarily handled by lower ranking members in the bureaucracy. In postwar Japan, decisions dealing with technical or administrative issues of no political significance as well as the non-crucial, non-controversial, day-to-day or status quo-oriented types of decisions are generally handled by the bureaucracy in accordance with the rules of the ringisei system. Given the nature of the decision required, activity levels of non-governmental actors are low. This is true of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition party, and the executive elite as well. A policy is drafted first by an official of lower rank, and then circulated among other officials in the bureaucracy concerned, who are required to affix their seals if they agree with the policy proposed. By complex and circuitous paths, the document gradually works its way up to higher and higher administrators and finally reaches the minister or top executive official. When he approves the policy draft, the decision is made. Under the ringisei system, a decision is "not made until after every actor more or less related to the case at issue has participated." In such circumstances, many officials are involved in the policy formulation process; and when the case at issue covers the jurisdiction of several ministers, the number of bureaucrats participating in the decision making process inevitably increases to a considerable degree.

As Morton Halperin points out on the basis of American experience, the bureaucratic system is an entity which prefers to maintain the status quo, and at any one time only a small group advocates change. Henry Kissinger echoes Halperin in this respect, arguing that when the issue is how to transform the existing framework, the bureaucratic machinery tends to "act as a brake."
Tokyo the situation is similar. When Japanese bureaucrats draft a *ringisho*, or a policy draft, they usually observe the following guidelines: (1) pay the utmost attention to deviate as little as possible from the official policy line in existence; (2) refrain from presenting a new proposal, a new approach, or a new program; (3) avoid making a recommendation whose conclusion has a good chance of provoking hot debates. In essence, bureaucrats can hardly be counted upon to assume leadership in initiating a drastic change in the existing official diplomatic stance. In the cases which are being identified here as “highly crucial” decisions in postwar Japan’s foreign policy, the decision making unit is small in size, with the prime minister playing the leading role and the autonomy of the bureaucrats being greatly reduced.

Thus far, the problems of the prevalent decision making models have been delineated, and the definition of the “highly crucial” decision has been attempted. The subsequent major task is to devise the “highly crucial” decision making model for postwar Japan. A hypothesis might be defined in this article as a statement to be proved or disproved by investing the relevant variables. The “highly crucial” decision making model for postwar Japan’s foreign policy embraces the following nine hypotheses:

(1) The prime minister is the central, supreme coordinator of decisions, with other actors assuming subordinate roles.

(2) The decision making unit which formulates a “highly crucial” foreign policy is small in size.

(3) The time available for decision is not severely constrained, except when the international situation surrounding Japan changes abruptly and the cost of non-decision or postponement of making a decision appears unbearably high in the eyes of the prime minister.

(4) The prime minister’s decision whether to tackle a pending “highly crucial” diplomatic problem is made at a very early stage of his administration, or even before his rise to power. Having no concrete diplomatic strategies to resolve the issue, he broaches his decision in general terms.

(5) The prime minister makes his initial commitment to the settlement of the issue in the belief that (a) it will be politically advantageous for himself and that (b) it could be legitimized in terms of the national interests as he understands them.

(6) The prime minister actively involves himself only when he is rightly or wrongly convinced, especially by signals from the negotiating partner, that the solution of the problem can be achieved during his term in office.

(7) Once the prime minister commits himself, at his discretion the prime minister appoints non-bureaucrats as his personal foreign policy advisors or sets up an *ad hoc* advisory group when he perceives that the bureaucrats concerned (a) vigorously oppose, (b) are very reluctant to endorse his policy to the settlement, or (c) lack the expertise to find a suitable solution. Furthermore, he tries to intensify contacts with reliable actors in the partner nation, both official and unofficial, to obtain more reliable information and to achieve a more favorable response from abroad, using formal as well as back-stage channels of communication.

(8) As in other types of policy making, in the “highly crucial” decision making process the prime minister is expected to exercise his leadership in accordance
with the tacit rules of consensus politics. The more the prime minister asserts his leadership in terms of an autonomous, central decision maker against the rules of consensus politics, the more likely he is to face bitter emotional opposition from major actors. On occasion, he may be forced to resign from the prime ministership as the political cost of settling the issue.

(9) As is true with other categories of policy making, the prevailing public mood or public opinion functions as a source of policy and/or as a constraint, beyond which the prime minister cannot afford to venture except at his own risk.

III Testing the Model

This chapter shall briefly appraise the applicability of each of the hypotheses of the “highly crucial” decision making model in the context of Prime Minister Hatoyama’s Soviet policy of rapprochement. This case is generally conceived to have a set of exceptional features not shared with the other examples of “highly crucial” diplomatic decisions. To put it concretely, unlike the aforementioned four cases, the 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization agreement was completed by a semi-paralyzed aged premier leading a weak minority-party government. And this was achieved despite opposition from the foreign minister, the Foreign Ministry, and big business, as well as Washington. The validity of the hypotheses seems particularly compelling if they do fit this unusual case.

Hypothesis 1 assumes that the prime minister is the central, supreme coordinator of decisions, with other actors assuming subordinate roles. This hypothesis is clearly applicable to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case. Early in 1955, when newly elected Prime Minister Hatoyama came to openly discuss his idea of restoring official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, a majority of his ruling Democratic Party members were strongly against it. In addition, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and the Foreign Ministry, the zaikai, and the Liberal Party were critical of his policy of rapprochement with the Soviets. The differences between Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu over Japan's Soviet policy were denounced by the press in Japan as a typical example of “dual diplomacy.” Yet Prime Minister Hatoyama, largely driven by his wish to score a diplomatic victory equal to that of his political adversary, ex-Prime Minister Yoshida, who had achieved the San Francisco peace settlement, finally managed to terminate the legal state of war with Japan’s northern giant.

Some argue that the semi-paralyzed and aged Prime Minister Hatoyama was nothing but a “puppet” manipulated by Bukichi Miki, a shrewd veteran politician, and Ichiro Kono, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. But as far as the Soviet-Japanese normalization problem was concerned, his eagerness overcame the doubts of his close aides as to the attainability of a settlement during his tenure as prime minister. Finally in October 1956, bypassing Shigemitsu's Foreign Ministry, he led the delegation to Moscow himself and signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué.

Hypothesis 2 assumes that the decision making unit which formulates a “highly crucial” foreign policy is small in size. The applicability of Hypothesis 2 is obvious in Prime Minister Hatoyama’s decision making for the restoration of
diplomatic relations with the USSR. The foreign decision making unit was basically composed of Prime Minister Hatoyama, Shun'ichi Matsumoto, Plenipotentiary of Soviet-Japanese peace talks, and Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono, all of whom were anti-Yoshida non-bureaucrats. In the initial stage of his Soviet policy formulation, Prime Ministerial contender Hatoyama chose Arata Sugihara as his foreign policy advisor. Sugihara was the former director of the Treaties Bureau in the Foreign Ministry and a victim of the so-called "Yoshida Purges" that had swept the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late 1940's. After his rise to power in December 1954, Hatoyama was heavily dependent upon Sugihara, especially because the Foreign Ministry mainstream headed by Shigemitsu was vigorously opposed to his Soviet policy of rapprochement.

Prime Minister Hatoyama's initial idea to swiftly restore official diplomatic channels with the Soviets, deferring settlement of the controversial territorial issue, was a product of intensive deliberations conducted mainly between Sugihara and Matsumoto. As for Kono, he was at first doubtful of the attainability of a prompt restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But once persuaded by Hatoyama in person, he became actively supportive of the prime minister's Soviet policy. Kono's major role in the normalization negotiations began with his efforts during the "fishery" talks in the spring of 1956 and continued in the second phase of the Moscow peace talks in the fall of the same year. According to Matsumoto, Kono got carried away by a strong sense of his own importance, and ventured to conduct tête-à-tête talks with First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev in the second phase of the Moscow peace talks. As a consequence, the Hatoyama mission had no choice but to agree to the adoption of the "very disadvantageously worded" Joint Communiqué of 1956.

Hypothesis 3 assumes that the time available for decision is not severely constrained, except when the international situation surrounding Japan changes abruptly and the cost of non-decision or postponement of making a decision appears unbearably high in the eyes of the prime minister. The 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case demonstrates the validity of this hypothesis. Hatoyama's Soviet policy was not formulated hastily. His Soviet policy became gradually crystallized following his meeting with Sugihara in Hakone, 1952. As stated above, the idea to swiftly restore official diplomatic channels with the USSR, deferring settlement of the controversial territorial issue, was a product of deliberations conducted mainly between Sugihara and Matsumoto.

It might be instructive to note that, of the aforementioned five "highly crucial" foreign policy cases, the short decision making time is only applicable to newly-elected Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's policy of Sino-Japanese rapprochement. His China policy was formulated in great haste, under the nationwide, overwhelming mood for normalization, in the immediate aftermath of President Richard Nixon's unexpected announcement to visit China.

Hypothesis 4 assumes that the prime minister's decision whether to tackle the pending "highly crucial" diplomatic problem is made at a very early stage of his administration, or even before his rise to power. Having no concrete diplomatic strategies to resolve the issue, he broaches his decision in general terms.

In August 1952, Hatoyama, whose purge had finally been lifted after five years and three months, was contemplating a strategy to unseat Prime Minister Yoshida.
He was visited by two former officials, i.e., Arata Sugihara and Hisanari Yamada, who had been forced out of the Foreign Ministry under the "Yoshida Purges." During their visit, they stressed both the importance of a foreign policy independent of the United States and the necessity of restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Their argument was immediately supported by Hatoyama, who was eager to devise a set of dramatic new foreign and domestic policy goals in order to unseat Prime Minister Yoshida. At his request, Sugihara hurriedly drafted a proposal which greatly helped to crystallize Hatoyama's diplomatic position.

It was against this background that in September 1952 Hatoyama marked his return to public life with a speech in Tokyo's Hibiya Park. Before the cheering crowds Hatoyama stressed, albeit in broad terms, (1) a constitutional revision for a "legal" build-up of the Self-Defense Forces, and (2) the prompt normalization of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. He denounced Yoshida for the furtive manner in which he attempted to increase Japan's military power and for his foreign policy, which was excessively pro-American. His dramatic speech was made just over two years before his ascent to power in 1954.

Hypothesis 5 assumes that the prime minister makes his initial commitment to the settlement of the issue in the belief that (a) it will be politically advantageous for himself and that (b) it could be legitimized in terms of the national interests as he understands them. The applicability of Hypothesis 5 to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case is also demonstrated. As may be inferred from his "anti-Communism statement" made in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Hatoyama was originally a liberal politician with a strong antipathy toward communism as well as toward the Soviet Union. As stated earlier, it was primarily his wish to unseat the regime of his political rival Yoshida that led Hatoyama to publicly call for the prompt normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. In order to capture the attention of a public that was critical of the excessively pro-US incumbent prime minister, he stressed the importance of achieving an autonomous foreign policy.

Hatoyama's goal of quickly reaching a *modus vivendi* with the USSR was, he contended, legitimate in terms of the national interests of Japan; it would, for instance, lead to the termination of the legal state of war with the USSR, thereby contributing to Japan's peace and security. It would strengthen Tokyo's bargaining clout vis-à-vis Washington, enabling it to have a more autonomous foreign policy orientation. Japan's admission into the United Nations, which had been repeatedly vetoed by the Russians in the post-Occupation period, would help to enhance its status in the international community. Also, realizing the repatriation of Japanese detainees in the USSR and the ensuing safety of fishing operations in the contested northern waters would be in the national interests.

Hypothesis 6 assumes that the prime minister actively involves himself only when he is rightly or wrongly convinced, especially by signals from the negotiating partner, that the solution of the problem can be achieved during the period of his term in office. The 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case demonstrates the validity of this hypothesis. Ever since his days as a prime ministerial hopeful, Hatoyama had openly pressed for the prompt restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, once elected prime minister, as his press inter-
view statement of December 10, 1954 illustrated, he retreated from his aggressive
stance in favor of a more gradual improvement of relations with the Soviet
Union.31 But a series of political signals from the USSR—including the Radio
Moscow broadcast of December 14, 1954, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.
Molotov’s statement of December 16, and Chief of the former Soviet Mission in
Tokyo Andrei N. Domitsky’s second confidential visit to Hatoyama on January 7,
1955—convinced the newly-elected prime minister to actively commit himself to
the swift achievement of Soviet-Japanese normalization in a year or so, during his
term in office.32

Hypothesis 7 assumes that once the prime minister commits himself, at his
discretion he appoints non-bureaucrats as his foreign policy advisors or sets up an
ad hoc advisory group when he perceives that the bureaucrats concerned (a)
vigorously oppose, (b) are very reluctant to endorse his policy to the settlement, or
(c) lack the expertise to find a suitable solution. Furthermore, he tries to intensify
contacts with reliable actors in the partner nation, both official and unofficial, to
obtain more reliable information and to achieve a more favorable response from
abroad, using formal as well as back-stage channels of communication.

As already analyzed, following his meeting with Arata Sugihara in 1952,
Hatoyama appointed him as his private foreign policy advisor. Newly-elected
Hatoyama heavily relied on Sugihara, Kono, and Matsumoto to achieve his long-
cherished goal of restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in view
of the strong opposition from the Foreign Ministry. And especially just prior to
his departure for the USSR as his hanamichi, Prime Minister Hatoyama intensi-
fied his contacts with the Soviet side, using formal as well as informal channels
of communication, with a view to sounding out the Soviet position.43 The exam-
ple of such efforts included Kono’s secret talks with Sergei Tichvinsky, the
successor to Domnitsky, Hatoyama’s personal note to Premier Bulganin, and the
dispatch of Matsumoto to the Soviet capital in late September, 1956.

The validity of Hypothesis 7 (b) is demonstrated by the 1972 Okinawa rever-
sion case. Out of his frustration and distrust of the Foreign Ministry officials
who were reluctant to systematically work on the Okinawa reversion problem,
Prime Minister Sato set up an ad hoc informal consultative body which was
known as the Okinawa Base Problems Committee (Okinawa Kichi Mondai Ken-
kyukai) under the chairmanship of Tadao Kusumi, authority on military affairs in
Japan.34

On the other hand, Hypothesis 7 (c) is, for instance, validated by Prime
Minister Yoshida’s decision making for the San Francisco peace settlement. In
addition to an extremely small team consisting of Foreign Ministry officials,
Prime Minister Yoshida quietly established two different study groups, which were
remarkably small in size: one consisted of prominent figures in political, business,
and academic circles, the other composed of former officers of the defunct Impe-
rial Army and Navy. Yoshida gave specific assignments to each. Particularly, in
conjunction with the sensitive issues regarding American pressure for Japanese
rearmament, which were inseparably connected with the San Francisco peace
settlement, Yoshida’s reliance on the former officers group reflected the fact that
“no expertise on military affairs remains” within the machinery of the Japanese
Government four or five years after the capitulation.35
Hypothesis 8 assumes that, as in other types of policy making, in the "highly crucial" decision making process the prime minister is expected to exercise his leadership in accordance with the tacit rules of consensus politics. This implies that all major actors will be consulted and the minority views will be respected before a decision is formulated, and that this decision will then reflect a feeling of unanimity among them. The more the prime minister asserts his leadership in terms of an autonomous, central decision maker against the rules of consensus politics, the more likely he is to face bitter emotional opposition from major actors. On occasion, he may be forced to resign from the prime-ministership as the political cost of settling the issue. The success then becomes his hanamichi (glorious way out). Hypothesis 8 also proves valid in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case.

As previously mentioned, in striving to restore diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union, Hatoyama was driven by a strong sense of rivalry with ex-Prime Minister Yoshida, who had achieved the San Francisco peace settlement. Hatoyama was bitterly criticized by the pro-Yoshida forces for the motivation behind his Soviet policy of rapprochement. The conservative merger of November 1956 worked against him, as the pro-Yoshida forces were brought into Hatoyama's own party in large numbers, where they continued their efforts to block the establishment of official diplomatic ties with the USSR. They intensified their campaign against him in close collaboration with the zaikai, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, the Foreign Ministry mainstream, senior diplomats and Washington.36

Despite the strained domestic political situation and despite US Secretary of State John F. Dulles' bluff on August 19, 1956 against Soviet-Japanese diplomatic normalization,37 Hatoyama decided to push ahead in an effort to achieve his goal. After Shigemitsu's Moscow peace talks reached an impasse, he had no recourse but to travel to Moscow himself. But he did so without broadly based support, and it cost him his political life. On December 20, right after the Joint Communiqué was ratified by the Diet, Prime Minister Hatoyama announced the resignation en masse of his cabinet.

Hypothesis 9 assumes that, as is true with other categories of policy making, the prevailing public mood or public opinion functions as a source of policy and/or as a constraint, beyond which the prime minister cannot afford to venture except at his own risk. This proposition too is applicable to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case. Being party politicians, Hatoyama and his close aides were extremely sensitive to the prevailing public mood. Recognizing the increasingly widespread public dissatisfaction with Yoshida as prime minister, they were convinced that they would surely be able to unseat him by publicly advocating a set of fresh policies that differed from those that he pursued.38 Hatoyama's two major policy goals, i.e., the speedy normalization of diplomatic relations with the USSR and constitutional revision to allow for a "legal" remilitarization of Japan, were formulated against this background.

In addition to its role in policy making, public opinion worked as a constraint on Hatoyama's Soviet policy. Initially, Prime Minister Hatoyama believed that he would be able to promptly restore diplomatic relations with Moscow by shelving the territorial issue.39 Yet, contrary to his original expectations, the public
felt strongly about the territorial issue, partly as a result of the nationalistic reporting of the Japanese press with a tint of nationalism. A *Yomiuri Shimbun* nationwide opinion survey of August 9, 1955, showed that as many as 53 per cent of the respondents called for the reversion of South Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the Habomais and Shikotan. According to a *Mainichi Shimbun* opinion poll published on July 12, 1956, only 10.9 per cent of the sample supported the idea that Japan should accept the Habomais and Shikotan and give up its other claims. This mood of inflated irredentism among the public constrained Prime Minister Hatoyama in his efforts to quickly restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It also prevented him from concluding a peace agreement with the USSR which stipulated Japan's renunciation of its claims to the northern territories. The "modified Adenauer formula,"40 which he finally adopted, was devised to satisfy conflicting public demands which called for an early restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR while at the same time making maximum territorial demands.

IV Conclusion

The validity of my model has thus been demonstrated in the context of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese normalization case. In concluding my article, I wish to comment on the theoretical relevance as well as the major limitations of this study.

First, in the field of Japanese politics, my model represents a contribution to theorizing about postwar Japan's "highly crucial" foreign policy formulation process. In addition, my model casts a new light on the role of the postwar Japanese prime minister. This is an area, as John C. Campbell notes in his *Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics*, in which "curiously enough, no systematic studies" have been made.41

My model can also be useful in the field of international relations. Although various scholars, including Graham T. Allison, Ole R. Holsti, and Charles F. Harmann, have published celebrated studies on the decision making process, few serious studies have been conducted by scholars of international relations on "highly crucial" decisions, which are made in a situation where the prospect of war is not imminent.

Further, my model will be rewarding in the field of comparative politics. It will have some relevance for the "highly crucial" foreign policy making process under other prime ministerial systems, such as the United Kingdom, although I anticipate that the element of consensus politics may not be as prevalent there as it is in contemporary Japan.

Lastly, the model does have a major limitation. As my earlier remarks suggest, it is applicable only to postwar Japan's "highly crucial" foreign policy formulation process. By definition, it is inappropriate to assume that my model can illustrate the "highly crucial" foreign policy making in "prewar" Japan, whose political setting was grossly different from that of today. Nor will it be applicable to the foreign policy formulation process in the area of "low politics" related to international trade and economics.
NOTES


16 Students of international relations generally use the term "dual diplomacy" to describe a strategy pursued by a nation caught between two opposing great powers: the nation attempts to expand its own national interests by manipulating both powers. In Japan, however, the phrase implies the existence of two contradictory diplomatic mechanisms. Among the most frequently cited instances of discord resulting in dual diplomacy are that between the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Imperial Court in the closing years of the Edo era; between the cabinet and the *genro* (elder statesmen) in the Meiji period; between the civilian government and the military authorities in the early Showa era. Katsumi Ono, *Kasumigaseki Gaiko* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1978), pp. 215-216.
19 Miki was originally of the view that Hatoyama’s ambitious idea of normalizing relations with Moscow was “playing with fire.” Hokkaido Shim bun, June 21, 1956. As for Kono’s initial view on the Soviet-Japanese normalization issue, see his Ima Dakara Hanaso (Tokyo: Shun’yodo, 1958), p. 6.
23 Kono, Ima Dakara Hanaso, p. 10.
29 Hatoyama, Hatoyama Ichiro Kaiko Roku, pp. 38-43.
31 Asahi Shim bun, December 11, 1954.
32 For his active commitment, see his speech, as reported in Asahi Shim bun, January 28, 1955.
33 Matsumoto, Mosukuwa ni Kakeru Niji, p. 121.
36 For further details, see, for instance, Kubota, Kuremurin e no Shisetsu, pp. 175 ff.
37 During his meeting with Shigemitsu in London, Dulles issued a surprising warning to the Japanese foreign minister: the United States would be eligible to obtain equal benefits from Japan under Article 26 of the San Francisco peace treaty if the Japanese Government accepted the Soviet proposed to conclude a peace treaty on the Russian terms. This implied threat to annex Okinawa in case Japan accepted the Soviet claim to the southern Kuriles was apparently issued to show American displeasure and thereby bring a halt to Soviet-Japanese normalization.
38 Miyazawa, Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan, p. 143.
40 The so-called “Adenauer formula” implies the prompt restoration of diplo-
matic relations through a joint declaration, deferring the settlement of territorial questions for future negotiations in return for the exchange of ambassadors and the repatriation of detainees in the USSR. Under the "modified Adenauer formula," two other conditions, i.e., the non-exercise of the Soviet veto against Japan's entry into the United Nations and the effectualization of the fisheries convention, were added as the terms for the resumption of the official diplomatic ties.