



Title	The Geopolitical Context of Russian Foreign Policy: 1700-1917
Author(s)	LEDONNE, John P
Citation	Acta Slavica Iaponica, 12, 1-23
Issue Date	1994
Doc URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2115/8063
Type	bulletin (article)
File Information	KJ00000034024.pdf



[Instructions for use](#)

The Geopolitical Context of Russian Foreign Policy: 1700-1917

John P. LeDonne

For Adam Ulam

Russian foreign policy before 1917 remains a much neglected topic in Western scholarship because the focus has been on the Soviet period. It has been assumed that Soviet foreign policy was guided by the precepts of Marxism-Leninism and represented a new type of behavior, showing little or no affinity with the policies of the tsars.¹ This attitude has caused scholars to ignore the rich insights a comparison can yield. I do not propose to deal with such comparisons in this paper, but to discuss a number of principles that guided Russian foreign policy during the Imperial period. Similarities to Soviet foreign policy will readily suggest themselves.

Some have suggested that Russian foreign policy was guided by considerations of a defensive nature, that the great Russian plain exposed to invasion from all sides was a permanent source of insecurity for the Russian government, and that this government sought persistently to create a territorial configuration extensive enough to guarantee security. Others have pointed out that Russian expansion created the largest territorial state in the world and that such expansion cannot be explained by defensive needs alone.² It resulted rather from a basically aggressive behavior, grounded in political ambition, the urge to colonize, and economic interests, in the same way the Spanish, French, and British empires were aggressive expressions of will power, greed, and ambition.

Both approaches are not very useful in helping us to understand Russian foreign policy. There is no question that defensive considerations and aggressive behavior were essential factors, but one must not overlook the broader context in which that policy formulated its objectives. It is suggested here that Russian expansion be viewed against the background of a slow but eventually radical change in a certain balance of power on the Eurasian continent, and that Russian foreign policy benefited from, rather than created, that change. There can be no useful study of Russian foreign policy without an awareness of this geopolitical context. To examine that context, it is useful to turn to Halford Mackinder's theory of the Heartland, Geoffrey Parker's concept of core area, Owen Lattimore's studies of the Chinese frontier and his attempts to work out a theory of the frontier in general.³ One can then show that Russia formed a core area surrounded by five rival core areas within the periphery of the Heartland and was separated from them by successions of zones called frontiers. The history of Russian foreign policy thus becomes the history of a rivalry for the control of common frontiers exacerbated by the containment policy of the Germanic and maritime powers.

I

In January 1904, the English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder read a paper before the Royal Geographic Society on "The Geographical Pivot of History." He later expanded his remarks in a book called *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919) that established its author as one of the founders of a new branch of knowledge called geopolitics. Mackinder looked on the Eurasian continent as a land mass divided into a "Heartland," inaccessible from the sea, surrounded by "Coastlands" that later geographers would combine to form the concept of "Rimland."⁴

The Heartland includes the so-called Great Lowland, or the areas of Arctic and Continental drainage, i.e., the basins of the Siberian rivers, those of the Volga and other rivers draining into the Caspian and Aral seas — both internal seas cut off from the great oceans — as well as Central Asia. Its ecology is not uniform. The great forests of Siberia and the deserts of Central Asia enclose the steppe or grazing lands that begin on the Dniestr, stretch past Kiev, Tobol'sk, and Tomsk to the foothills of the Altai Mountains and to the Ili valley, only to reappear beyond the Altai and Lake Baikal in the Mongolian upland all the way to the Great Khingan in Manchuria. Despite the area's diversity, it is knit together by one great physical circumstance — the entire territory lies under snow in the wintertime. It was for centuries the land of the nomad, rich but unplowed, and inaccessible to ships.

The Heartland is flanked by the European Coastland in the west and the Monsoon Coastland in the east. The former includes Western Europe with the North Sea and the Mediterranean, the latter India and China, and extends farther north to include the entire Pacific coast of the Heartland to the Bering Strait. Both coastlands were the regions of plowmen and shipmen.⁵ The beneficial influence of the Gulf Stream and the monsoon favored the development of agriculture capable of supporting high-density populations, and the indented coasts broadened the appeal of the sea and stimulated trade. Sea trade created flexible structures and regional economies, while the dynamic of the Heartland sought to overcome distances and diversity by fostering unity, integration, rigid administration, and autarkic economy.

A core area is defined by its geographical location, social and political constitution, and drive for hegemony. It arises at the periphery of another, in an acceleration of centrifugal forces seeking to strike out an independent course. It seeks a center of "hydrographic convergence or divergence" to facilitate its expansion. Its emergence creates a turbulence that attracts restless elements and leads to the development of a new type of political and social system motivated by an aggressive ideology. That system may be a centralized and militarized society in land-based core areas, or a decentralized and mercantile society using naval power to support its expansion. In either case, the emerging core area possesses an ideology embodying "simplistic and fundamentalist" attitudes shaping the world view of an intolerant political elite, such as we find in early Christianity, in Islam, Protestantism, and

Catholicism, and in the secular assumptions of the Enlightenment and Social Darwinism. This elite seeks to achieve political unity and linguistic and cultural homogeneity to justify its rule and make it legitimate. The strains and stresses attending the formation of the core area provide a reserve of accumulated energy generating a drive for expansion, a "logic of unity," a forward movement toward "natural" boundaries, be they rivers, seas, or mountain ranges.⁶

If we now apply these concepts of Heartland and core area to the political situation on the Eurasian continent from the sixteenth century to about 1700, we find, first of all, a Russian (Muscovite) core area that developed at the periphery of Orthodox and Latin Christendom, of the Kipchak Khanate (Golden Horde), and the Hanseatic League. The Volga-Oka mesopotamia was its center of hydrographic divergence. Its princely house developed a siege mentality and fundamentalist attitudes, immensely reinforced by the support of the metropolitan of "all the Russias." The close association between church and ruling house gave it universalist claims. Its government was highly centralized, its population gradually enserfed. Its distinguishing ecological feature was the forest and land cleared by an advancing population of settlers. It "ended" where the world of the nomad began, in the boundless steppe.⁷

We then find, arranged in a semi-circle around this Russian core area, five other core areas. The Swedish core area emerged as the northernmost margin of the Scandinavian world, at the junction of the Germanic and Finnish worlds, of the Germanic and Slavic worlds, of Latin and Greek Christianity. The Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia formed its zone of hydrographic convergence, its ideology was an intolerant Lutheranism that instilled in the king's subjects the virtues of unconditional obedience. The second core area was the Polish, at the very edge of Latin Christianity, the Vistula its center of convergence, its Catholicism and social order based on serfdom strengthened by the constant struggle against Orthodox Russia and Lutheran Germany. The third was Turkey, at the junction of the Turkic and Byzantine worlds, of Islam and Greek Christendom, of both nomadic and sedentary populations. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles were its center of hydrographic divergence, its faith was Sunni orthodoxy, its political and military organization based on the enserfment of Christian captures. Persia was the fourth core area, but one without a hydrographic center. Its ethnic identity was reinforced by the adoption of Shi'ism, a minority confession of Islam, with which Sunni orthodoxy remained permanently at war. Its absolutist government rested on an army of slaves, but geography, not unlike that of Poland, imposed structural weaknesses that no government could overcome. The fifth was China, because it had a common frontier with Russia, although Mackinder places it in the Monsoon Coastland. There is no doubt about its being a separate core area – with its hydrographic network, society of walled cities, sedentary farmers, and dynastic government in the name of Confucian principles.⁸

These core areas were not contiguous but were separated by frontiers. A frontier is not a line (or a boundary) but a succession of zones, an “historical structure of zones which varies from time to time.”⁹ Zones are of various kinds. Some are physical and ecological, others are economic. They support human communities with different patterns of settlement, different ethnic structures and social organization, different religious beliefs. Zones, like core areas, do not have clear boundaries, do “not have an edge, but shade off into a margin of uncertainty.”¹⁰ Their essential characteristic is that they do not possess — except in very few instances — the necessary combination of hydrographic network, sturdy political organization, social discipline, ideological conformity, and fiscal resources to become core areas. Therefore, they are destined to become the battleground for the ambitions of rival core areas propelled by an inner dynamism to seek the incorporation of these zones into the core area’s empire.

The frontier thus represents a succession of zones at various distances from two core areas, each core area bordering on a proximate zone followed by intermediate zones, with its ultimate zone being also the opposite core area’s proximate zone. Proximate zones determine the vital interests of a core area, and intermediate zones help maintain a balance between conflicting ambitions until the core area’s advance into the frontier leaves a single zone, the last defense of the rival core area’s territorial integrity. The advance creates two frontiers. The zones incorporated into the core area’s empire constitute an inner frontier, the others become an outer frontier. It also raises the question of “optimum conquest”¹¹ beyond which empire-building becomes counter-productive, when the inner frontier becomes a factor of dissension instead of consolidation.

Russia was thus separated from the other core areas by frontier zones. There was a Russo-Swedish, Russo-Polish, Russo-Turkish, Russo-Persian, and Russo-Chinese frontier. The first two can be combined into a Western Frontier, the next two into a Southern Frontier, and the Russo-Chinese frontier becomes the Eastern Frontier.

The Western Frontier was the drainage basin of the Eastern Baltic, where Catholic Poles and Protestant Swedes fought each other before running up against Russian expansion. A Russo-Swedish segment consisted of three zones — a coastal strip from the tip of Estland to Finland’s lake district; Finland; the Gulf of Bothnia. At the end of the seventeenth century it was entirely under Swedish control. A Russo-Polish segment consisted of eight zones — Livland or the lower course of the Dvina with Riga at its mouth; Bielorussia or the basin of the upper Dvina and upper Dniepr; Lithuania or the basin of the Niemen separating it from the Polish core area. Kurland may be added as a purely historical and human, not geographical, zone. Another three were Volhynia, Podolia, and the Kiev lowland, the so-called Right-Bank Ukraine. The eighth was the Left-Bank Ukraine to the skirt of the Central Russian Upland, the western perimeter of the Russian core area. In 1645, this entire area constituted the Polish Empire. After 1667, when the first

partition of the empire took place, the Russians had acquired the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Kiev lowland.

The Southern Frontier was longer and more complex. It was first and foremost the drainage basins of the Black, Caspian, and Aral Seas, where Turks and Persians fought ideological and bloody battles until the Russians, moving down the Volga in the direction of the Caucasus, separated them. In each of their three frontiers, the Russians encountered a lasting hatred between two peoples and used it to their advantage.

The Russo-Turkish segment was the basin of the Black Sea and belonged to the Ottoman Empire. It began along the southern skirt of the Central Russian Upland and the line of hills around which the Don makes a long detour before turning toward the Black Sea. A first zone stretched from the Dniepr opposite Kiev to the Don-Volga watershed and was bound in the south by the Donets upland. This was Russia's proximate, Turkey's ultimate zone, the land of the Cossacks.¹² A second zone was the basin of the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea's "younger brother," and included the Crimean peninsula, the steppe around the sea from the lower Dniepr to the Kuban. This was the land of the Crimean Tatars. The third was the steppe zone stretching from the lower Dniepr to the delta of the Danube, the home of several roaming Tatar hordes. The Black Sea itself formed a fourth zone between the Caucasus and the Balkans and divided this segment into two sectors. In the west, the crescent-shaped land between the Carpathians, the Danube and the sea – the so-called Danubian Principalities – followed by the Balkan Mountains of Bulgaria formed two additional zones. In the east, the valley of the Rion and other small rivers descending from the Caucasus formed the last zone. This was western Georgia.

The Russo-Turkish, Russo-Persian, and Turco-Persian frontiers interlocked in the Caucasus. The broad chains of the Caucasus, with their countless valleys separated by high-crested mountains, formed a rich ethnographic succession of zones favoring the penetration of Russian, Turkish, and Persian influences. Beyond the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea formed the first zone of the Russo-Persian frontier. East of the Caspian, we find three more zones – the Turkmen lands, the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, and the Kokand khanate. This Russo-Persian frontier interlocked with India's northwestern frontier in Afghanistan, where Russia, Persia, and Britain would seek hegemony in the nineteenth century.

The Eastern Frontier consisted of the upper reaches of the Siberian rivers, the basin of Lake Baikal, and beyond the Iablonoi and Stanovoi ranges, the drainage basin of the Amur facing the Pacific. It can be divided into three segments. One began along the Ural river, curled along the Mongolian Altai and rested along the Kuen-lun range. It consisted of three ecological zones – the Kazakh upland, Zungharia, and Kashgaria. The second segment was Mongolia from the Mongolian Altai to the Great Khingan and Iablonoi range, the latter forming the watershed between the basin of Lake Baikal and that of the Amur. The third was Manchuria – the valley of the Amur, between the

Great Khingan and the Sea of Japan, the Stanovoi range and the Great Wall of China. Most of this frontier had been claimed by China for centuries. With the founding of Tomsk in 1604, Irkutsk in 1651 and Nerchinsk in 1657, the Russians began to claim it, zone by zone.

A core area in process of empire building needs to define its policy toward the frontier zones. Its policy toward the inner frontier is an internal matter – whether to assimilate or institute various degrees of autonomy. Toward the outer frontier it has a choice between a close border policy and a forward policy.

The term “close border policy” was coined by the British in their Northwestern Frontier separating Afghanistan from present-day Pakistan.¹³ A close border policy draws a “red line” on the map across passes and hills, beyond which military parties were forbidden to go. On the other hand, the line did not keep hill men from crossing into British-held territory to plunder and kill. That is why “close border policy” is not quite appropriate. It established an artificial boundary separating related human communities. It was a policy of exclusion, separating indigenous society from the intrusive society of the white man. It assumed the recognition of a line of optimum conquest, a perimeter beyond which it was neither feasible nor profitable to expand, and reflected a willingness to stop the expenditure of energy that had made possible the creation of the core area and its transformation into an emerging empire. A close border policy was often maladapted to the needs of an expanding core area, because “the limits of an empire created by the ruthless assertion of an active principle could not be safely defined by resting passively on the line of a negative, defensive, containing Frontier.”¹⁴

A “fortress-fleet strategy” at sea was the equivalent of a close border policy on land. It assumed that the purpose of a fleet, with its supply depots and berthing installations on land, was not to project power beyond the proximate zone of the empire but to guard an imaginary line against intrusions by foreign ships. It sought not so much to gain possession of straits to the wide oceans as to prevent entry by foreign ships in order to eventually transform the proximate maritime zone into an inner frontier zone of the empire.¹⁵

By contrast, a forward policy denied the existence of a linear boundary and actively intervened in the frontier zones. The purpose of the intervention was to give the core area’s dynamism an expanding field of action as well as to neutralize any actual or potential threat from communities with different ways of life and uncertain allegiance, often manipulated by the no less dynamic ambitions of the opposite core area.

A forward policy took various forms. It established friendly relations with the “men of power”¹⁶ in the proximate and even intermediate zones. It sought to gain the right to mediate their disputes, to turn their tribal leaders outward, to redirect their energies away from raids into the core area, to give them a stake in transforming the zone they occupied into an outer defense line of the core area. In the last resort, it sent punitive expeditions to impress tribal leaders with the might of the core area government.

A forward policy was the most effective when a core area was expanding. It used the diversity and interdependence of the frontier to destabilize it and incorporate one zone after another. It was thus a policy of inclusion, fostering social interaction and the integration of local elites into the ruling elite of the core area, gradually subverting the independence of the frontier zones. A frontier zone became a sphere of influence, then a protectorate, then a satellite, finally an inner frontier zone of the empire, and the first intermediate zone became a proximate zone.¹⁷

A forward policy was complemented by a “fleet-in-being” strategy. Such a strategy concentrated naval forces in a maritime proximate zone in order to seize the straits — the “passes” in the landman’s language — leading to the high seas. The straits were channels through which the core area projected power across great distances, protected its merchant marine and, in the event of war, sank enemy warships on the high seas. It was an offensive strategy in which the sea was a dynamic frontier and not the ultimate zone of a continental empire.¹⁸ However, as in all human affairs, these two policies were not mutually exclusive, and the core area government borrowed elements of both at any time or switched from one to the other. They merely provided broad alternatives to guide policy makers as they directed their core area’s advance into the frontier.

II

The major thrust of Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the eighteenth century was in the Western Frontier and especially its Swedish segment. It seemed in 1700 that Sweden was the weaker rival core area because its king was young and inexperienced. Its defeat would open up the Baltic coast at a time when Russia’s only access to the sea was at Arkhangelsk, open to sea-going ships only two months a year. It was in Russia’s interest to improve its access to international trade routes in order to obtain gold and silver, two precious metals in which it was deficient at the time. To capture the mouth of the Neva would enable Russia to channel Dutch and British trade seeking “naval stores” — timber for masts, cordage and tar — away from Arkhangelsk to a much more favorable location.¹⁹

The war, however, became a long and costly one that lasted nearly twenty years and ended with the treaty of Nystadt of 1721. Russia acquired not only the entire coastal zone from Estland to Finland’s lake district but Livland as well, which the Swedes had seized from the Poles a century earlier. It deprived Sweden of its richest provinces and dealt a mortal blow from which the Swedish core area never recovered.²⁰ After Nystadt, Russian policy toward Sweden became a close border policy in the remainder of the frontier. The Russians showed no real interest in Finland even though they had occupied it in 1714 and would occupy it again in 1742; even during the Russo-Swedish war of 1788-90, they refused to take advantage of a Finnish national movement seeking, if not independence, at least considerable autonomy from

Sweden. Nevertheless, Russia became increasingly aware after 1790 that Petersburg was vulnerable to an invasion across Finland. Placing its capital in a frontier zone had been a daring act for a great power, but the Court, flushed by Russia's victories in Poland and the south during Catherine's reign, could by the end of the eighteenth century no longer tolerate having its security at the mercy of a surprise attack. The rise of Napoleonic France increased the danger. By 1803, a consensus had been reached that Russia must acquire Finland all the way to the Torneo River, and thereby gain full control of the Gulf of Bothnia, Sweden's proximate zone, placing Stockholm at the mercy of a Russian attack.²¹ Napoleon's encouragement²² after Tilsit (1807) made the annexation possible, thus completely reversing the roles of Russia and Sweden in the frontier. The entire Russo-Swedish frontier passed under Russian domination until 1917.

The Russian advance into the Russo-Polish segment took much longer, not only because the structure of zones was much more complex but also because Russian policy never freed itself from a certain ambiguity. The Russo-Swedish war of 1700-21 was also fought on Polish territory – and left it in ruins. The Russians learned to behave as it were an occupied country, because the advancing disintegration of the Polish core area left Poland unable to stand up to their pressures. The enormous increase in Russian power between 1700 and 1721 was matched by a corresponding decline in Polish power, leaving the entire Russo-Polish frontier exposed to Russian encroachments. Russia's Polish policy was a forward policy, bent on destabilizing the entire frontier. This was achieved by using the dissident issue. Dissidents were non-Catholics, chiefly Orthodox and Uniates, against whom the Polish government and the Catholic Church began to discriminate more intensely in the 1710s. They turned to Russia for support and formed local parties favoring a Russian advance.²³ On occasions, Polish and Lithuanian magnates also took a pro-Russian stand in their squabbles with other magnates. The alliance between Russia, on the one hand, and the local "men of power" – magnates and dissident bishops – on the other, invited a Russian advance.

While it had been possible for Russia to annex one zone of the Russo-Swedish frontier after another without provoking the intervention of other powers, that could not be done in the Russo-Polish frontier. Poland was not only the largest continental empire at the time – outside Russia – but its core area bordered on Prussia and the Austrian Empire – in the latter case with only the Galician zone in between. Russo-Polish relations could not develop in isolation, but were bound to remain inextricably linked with Russo-Prussian and Russo-Austrian relations. Prussia had its own dissidents in Poland and had territorial designs on the core area, Austria on Galicia. Should Russia retain the Polish empire as a protectorate or partition it with the Germanic powers? That was the Russian dilemma.

Keeping it as a protectorate meant keeping troops in Poland as far as the Vistula, within striking distance of the Oder that linked Prussia with

Austria.²⁴ Partitioning it meant advancing into the frontier, transforming zones into inner frontier zones of the Russian empire, but withdrawing from the Vistula behind the Niemen and letting the Germanic powers partition the core. We know the dilemma was solved in 1772, 1793, and 1795, as a compromise designed to reduce the rising antagonism between Russia, Prussia, and Austria.²⁵ The entire Russo-Polish frontier became part of the Russian empire, and the Polish core area was partitioned among the Germanic powers.

That was not the end, however. Napoleon's victories recreated a Poland almost identical with the Polish core area by combining the Prussian and Austrian shares of the partitions. After Napoleon's defeat in 1815, most of this new Poland became an autonomous part of the Russian Empire — this was the first partition of *Poland* to which Russia became a party — with an autonomy much smaller than that granted to Finland.²⁶ Russo-Polish relations came to an end in 1815 as a topic of international relations to become one of inner frontier relations within the Russian Empire.

In the Southern Frontier, Russian expansion encountered its most stubborn enemy. Russia fought 13 wars with the Turks between 1700 and 1917,²⁷ more than with all the other core areas taken together. From the very beginning, Russian policy toward the Ottomans was a forward policy. Its instrument was the Cossacks in the proximate zone who fought the Crimean and other Tatars in Turkey's own proximate zone. Cossacks and Tatars also intermarried — an excellent example of a policy of inclusion so characteristic of a forward policy. That policy had a long history, and may have been borrowed from the Mongols. Russia had always welcomed Turco-Mongol "men of power" into the ranks of the ruling elite, if only they would convert to Orthodoxy.²⁸

The Russians also used the dissident question in their frontier with Turkey. Dissidents there were the Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans, the Rumanians in the Danubian Principalities, and Christians of other denominations in Georgia and Armenia. As in Poland, they formed local parties that welcomed the Russian advance in the hope a Russian presence would bring their persecutions to an end.²⁹ Everywhere, but especially in the Caucasus, rivalries between rival communities invited a Russian advance whenever Ottoman power became unable to maintain order and keep corruption within acceptable limits. Perhaps nowhere else in the entire Russian frontier was the importance of the balance of power between rival core areas so great as in this Russo-Turkish frontier. Russia's eventual victory became possible only in the last stage of Turkey's disintegration, beginning in the 1850s.

The conquest of the Russo-Turkish frontier took place in three stages. The first was the annexation of the Black Sea littoral from the Dniestr to the Kuban. Its completion required the destruction of the Turks' first line of strategic defense — linking the fortresses of Khotin, Ochakov, and Azov — and the elimination of the Crimean khanate, the most unsettling element in

the Southern Frontier. Azov was annexed in 1736, Ochakov in 1791, Khotin in 1812. The Crimean khanate was annexed in 1783 and Russia reached the Dniestr in 1791.³⁰

The conquest of the Crimea created two fronts against the Turks, a secondary one in the Caucasus, the main one in the Balkans. The annexation of Eastern Georgia in 1801 enabled Russia to separate the Turks from the Persians and to fight each in turn, even both at the same time. Western Georgia was annexed in the 1810s, but Russia would have to wait until 1878 before annexing more territory in the Kars area. There, Russia penetrated Western Armenia, the inner frontier zone of the Turkish core area, bound in the west approximately by a line running from Trebizond via Erzerum to Lake Van.³¹ Its conquest could take place only in the event of a total disintegration of the Turkish core area.

In the Balkan theater, the second stage of the Russian advance was the establishment of Russian rule in the Danubian Principalities and along the Danube, the second line of strategic defense. The Russians crossed the Danube in 1773, but it was not until 1828 that they could establish lasting control of an important network of Turkish fortresses. Much to their discomfiture, they discovered they could not annex the Principalities because of Austrian and British opposition, and their control remained more potential than real. The third stage was the occupation of Bulgaria – the Balkan Mountains with the Shipka Pass were the third line of defense – during the war of 1877-78, when Russian troops reached the outskirts of Constantinople. The annexation of Bulgaria would have sealed the fate of the Principalities – renamed Rumania – but a local reaction against Russian bullying forced the Russians to recognize their failure in 1887.³² By 1917, the entire Russo-Turkish frontier had been *occupied* at one time or another, but the inner frontier of the Russian empire did not go beyond the Prut. This raised two questions. One was that Russia had reached an optimum of conquest beyond which its integration of local “men of power” could no longer take place because these men had developed a frontier interest and a strong enough local base to resist Russian *annexation*. But their strength also depended to a large extent on the fact that they could count on the support of other core area governments, namely those of the Germanic powers. In other words, the Turkish presence had been replaced by the influence of the Germanic powers capable of stopping the Russian advance. This was the question of containment, to be discussed presently.

In the Russo-Persian frontier, Russian policy oscillated between a close border and a forward policy. Peter I inaugurated a forward policy in 1722 with a war that was not much more than a punitive expedition against a decaying Safavi dynasty. Its result was the annexation of Persia’s provinces on the southern shore of the Caspian and the transformation of that sea – Persia’s proximate zone – into a Russian sea, although that was not officially recognized for another century. But the very location of these provinces made them vulnerable to Persian counterattacks, and the climate created

difficulties for the Russians. Russia had gone beyond the range of optimum conquest, and returned the provinces to Persia in 1732.³³

In the Caucasian frontier zones, however, Russia pursued a vigorous forward policy. The annexation of Eastern Georgia in 1801 was a challenge to Persian rule. Russia annexed one khanate after another in the 1810s, and completed the annexation of eastern or Persian Armenia in 1828. It reached its “natural” boundaries on the Araks River and has remained there ever since.³⁴ East of the Caspian, the Russians pursued a dual policy. One, carried out from the Orenburg headquarters, sent punitive expeditions against nomads who plundered merchant caravans and captured Russians to be sold on the slave markets of Khiva and Bukhara.³⁵ The establishment of the Orenburg Line, however, exemplified a close border policy. Its purpose was to attract trade to towns along the line but also announced a line beyond which Russia was not prepared to advance into the steppe. The other was more original. It consisted in strengthening Russian influence in Tehran and then encouraging Persian designs on Herat in order to spread Russian influence into Afghanistan under the cover of the Persian flag. It was a policy aiming eventually at incorporating Persia into the Russian sphere of influence in order to take over its eastern frontier zones, a policy that can be understood only in the geographical context of Central Asia. It failed, however, largely because of British India’s opposition.

The conquest of Central Asia’s frontier zones began in the 1860s and took twenty years. Only Khiva and Bukhara retained some autonomy, but were now surrounded by Russian-held territory. The conquest of the Turkmen frontier zone led to the demarcation of the Russo-Persian boundary, leaving the strategic Zulfikar Pass in Persian hands in order to block the Russian advance into Afghanistan. The demarcation of the eastern Afghan border caused endless difficulties between Russia and British India, because these two powers inherited the old boundary disputes between Bukhara and Kabul. Russia’s attempt to reach its “natural” border along the Hindu Kush and establish its influence in Kabul led to an Anglo-Afghan war in 1878-79. Afghanistan was forced to become a British protectorate, and the boundary was established along the Amu Daria.³⁶ By 1917, the entire Russo-Persian frontier had been incorporated into the Russian Empire.

Russia’s policy in its Eastern Frontier was for a long time essentially a close border policy. The Manchurian segment was the most troublesome in the seventeenth century, as Cossacks moved eastward toward the Pacific. They established settlements along the Amur River, but the Manchus saw them as a threat to their homeland. Skirmishes took place until the Manchus decided to eliminate the settlements – including Albazin, the most important one – in 1685. Nowhere else in their entire frontier did the Russians encounter such superior power as that of the Manchus who had just conquered China. This and the enormous distances separating Moscow from China forced the Russians to negotiate the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. It blocked Russian access to the Amur and established a boundary along the Argun, the

lower Shilka, and the Stanovoi range to the Sea of Okhotsk. Thereafter, Russia pursued a close border policy in the Manchurian segment, but it was a policy imposed on it by the Manchus' ability to contain Russian expansion. It lasted until the 1840s, when the greed of the East India Company induced the British government to "open" China. The success of that endeavor exposed the weakness of Manchu China at the very time the appointment of a Russian proconsul in Irkutsk, Nikolai Muravev, signaled a fundamental shift in Russian policy. Muravev was determined to gain control of the Amur, only to discover that the river flowed into a barren sea. The disappointment increased the value of the so-called maritime province between the Amur, the Ussuri, and the Sea of Japan. By 1860, this enormous and largely empty territory had been incorporated into the Russian Empire.³⁷

The triangle formed by the Stanovoi range, the Sea of Japan, and the Amur can be called China's ultimate frontier zone. Manchuria was its proximate zone. Its penetration began some 35 years later when the Russians received a concession to build the so-called Chinese Eastern Railway from Chita to Vladivostok. As in the case of Poland, Russia's policy was ambivalent. One option was to seek the transformation of Manchuria into a Russian protectorate giving Russia a dominant influence in Peking. The other was to partition Manchuria, but that could not be done without Japanese approval. Japan played in Manchuria the role of Prussia in Poland. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 and the Russo-Japanese treaties of 1907, 1912, and 1916, partitioned Manchuria between the two powers. Russia was more successful in Mongolia. It pursued the same close border policy there until late in the nineteenth century, because the Mongols in Urga recognized the suzerainty of the Manchus in Peking, and because Mongolia was a secondary prize. But the economic penetration of Manchuria could not leave Mongolia unaffected, and the collapse of Manchu power in 1911 broke the dynastic tie between Peking and the Mongols. By 1916, Mongolia – essentially so-called Outer Mongolia – and northern Manchuria had become Russian protectorates.³⁸

The Russians were highly successful in the western segment of the Russo-Chinese frontier. The building of a Siberian Line from the Ural River to the Irtysh and along the Irtysh to the confluence of the Bukhtarma north of Lake Zaisan seemed to typify a close border policy, but the Manchus' decision to wipe out the Zunghars in the 1750s created a turbulence among the Kazakhs that facilitated Russia's penetration of their power structure, and the three hordes, one after the other, eventually gave their allegiance to Russia. Their incorporation into the empire was a prerequisite to the annexation of the Central Asian khanates. Russian expansion stopped along the Tianshan chain and the succession of lower chains separating Russian from Chinese Turkestan. The temptation was great, however, to annex the entire valley of the Ili and the Muzart Pass linking Zungharia with Kashgaria. If successful, that annexation would have paved the way for the penetration of Western Mongolia and Tibet, and extended Russian influence to the passes into

Northern India. The Russians were stopped by the Chinese counteroffensive of 1881.³⁹ Russia thus failed to reach its eventual goal of bringing the entire segment into the empire, but the annexation of Kazakhstan was nevertheless a considerable gain.

III

There remains to examine Russia's relations, no longer with its frontier zones, but with the rival core areas themselves. These relations were dominated by a persistent attempt to destabilize the core area government while standing up, paradoxically, for the political status quo and "legality." This was very much in evidence in the Western Frontier. Following the death of Charles XII in 1718, a reaction took place in Sweden against the absolute monarchy, and the Swedish parliament introduced a new constitution in 1720. It gave two major political parties a decisive role, one favoring Russian interests, the other anti-Russian, seeking a return of the Baltic provinces, by war if necessary. Russia subsidized the pro-Russian party and declared itself the defender of the "constitution of 1720," a rather incongruous policy on the part of the most autocratic government on the continent. By supporting "legality," that policy guaranteed the maintenance of chaos because the two parties fought each other viciously, hoping that chaos would bring about the disintegration of what remained on the Swedish empire from within. It sought to transform, eventually, the Swedish core area into a Russian dependency. That in turn would make it possible to declare the Baltic a closed sea in which Russia, in alliance with its two satellites, Sweden and Denmark, would exercise a paramount influence and, in the event of war, would close the Sound to the warships of other nations. One can easily see the first signs of such a policy in the eighteenth century, especially during the reigns of Catherine and Paul, when the Baltic was in fact declared a closed sea for the duration of the American colonial war and during the early stages of the war with France. It was a policy without realistic prospects, however, because Britain would go to any lengths to keep the Sound open, a conflict Russia could not win.⁴⁰

If the policy of destabilization ultimately failed in Sweden, it succeeded in Poland. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia became the great defender of "Polish liberties" – the election of the king, the *liberum veto* in the Diet, and the right to form "confederations" or associations of "men of power" for any purpose, including the overthrow of the king. The election of the king meant that Poland could never become a hereditary monarchy and that Russia, together with Prussia, would have the power to veto the election of a candidate they disliked. The *liberum veto* was a scandalous procedure by which any deputy in the Diet could veto the passage of any piece of legislation and thereby prorogue the Diet. Polish liberties were a prescription of chaos, a state of affairs for which the Russians had a particular dislike and fear at home, yet one they encouraged in Poland. As a result, Russia gained complete

control of the Polish core area, and it fell in 1793 like the rotten apple it had become.⁴¹

In the Southern Frontier, we find in Persia an analogous situation. The structural weaknesses of Persia were similar to those of Poland. In Poland, geography favored the development of regional autonomies – between Great and Little Poland, the Duchy of Poznan and Mazovia – and in Persia, between Tabriz and Herat, Fars and Khorasan. They blocked the development of powerful dynasties, and this factor in turn strengthened those autonomies in an unbreakable vicious circle. Beginning in the 1720s, Russia sought to maintain the disintegrating Safavi dynasty, then lost interest in Persia for the remainder of the century, then sought to regain control of the Qajar dynasty (1795-1925) in the nineteenth century. It sought to turn Tehran outward toward Herat in order to facilitate the advance of Russian influence toward Afghanistan but also to stifle irredentist nostalgia for the lost Caucasian provinces. Incidentally, we encounter a similar policy in Poland and Sweden. Russia supported Sweden's annexation of Norway to compensate for the loss of Finland, and the creation of the Polish kingdom in 1815 was expected to turn Poland westward away from the lost Lithuanian provinces. The annexation of the Russo-Persian frontier east of the Caspian accelerated the disintegration of Persia and increased Russian pressure on Tehran. High officials of the Persian government were openly doing Russia's work, and a so-called Cossack Brigade was sent to protect the dynasty against its own people. By 1900, Russia's control of the Persian government resembled its control of the Polish government in the 1760s. Strikingly enough, the result was the same. In 1907, Russia partitioned Persia with Britain, and in 1915 Britain agreed to Russia's transforming its "sphere of influence" into a de facto part of the Russian Empire.⁴²

It proved impossible, however, to obtain similar results in Turkey. The Ottoman government remained better structured and more resilient, and Russia could never gain a dominant influence in its internal affairs, because the rejection of the infidel was stronger at the Constantinople Court, the awareness of Russia as the archenemy much more pronounced, and British influence often decisive. On the other hand, Russia's naval policy toward Turkey provides an excellent example of a fortress-fleet strategy, worked out in a much more consistent fashion than was possible in the Baltic.

Until 1774, the Turks allowed no infidel to "defile the virgin waters" of the Black Sea,⁴³ but Russia – and others later – obtained that year the right to send its merchant ships through the Straits. Merchant ships never became an issue, but warships soon became one. A fleet-in-being strategy would have led Russia to demand the right of passage for its warships in order to engage in offensive operations in the Mediterranean. Russia resorted to it only during Paul's reign, when it sought to counter French influence in the Mediterranean and established naval bases along the Greek coast. At other times, Russia sought to obtain the maritime powers' agreement to forbid the passage of warships through the Straits, transforming thereby the Black Sea into a

closed sea to all but Russian and Turkish warships. The Black Sea fleet assumed not only a defensive role – the protection of the Russian coastline in the event of war – but an offensive role as well – against Turkey. This policy of transforming the Black Sea into a closed sea won its final success in 1915, when the maritime powers agreed to the cession of Constantinople to Russia at the end of the war.⁴⁴

What has been described as a relentless Russian expansion into frontier zones and the destabilization of three out of four core areas had its limits, however. Those developments were made possible by a radical change in the balance of power on the Eurasian continent brought about by the rise of Russian power and the disintegration of rival core area political systems. They were correspondingly brought to a halt, or at least considerably slowed, by the rise of new core areas. These were of two kinds, continental and maritime.

There were two continental core areas, Prussia and Austria. Prussia arose on the margin of the Holy Roman Empire, dominated by Austria. It straddled the Oder, channeling the wealth of Silesia to the Baltic. It was fortunate in its Hohenzollern dynasty of determined and parsimonious kings and its Lutheran faith that demanded unconditional obedience to the secular authorities. Austria straddled the Danube, the great axis of the basin of the Black Sea, on the watershed between the basin of the Baltic and that of the Mediterranean, and at the crossroads of all the major trade routes of Europe. Its Catholicism gave it a special mission as the defender of Europe against the Turk, and its Habsburg dynasty was one of the great dynasties of Europe.⁴⁵ By 1700, Austria had been the natural ally of Russia for some time, while Prussia was only emerging on the international scene.

It soon became obvious, however, that whatever common interests bound Russia and the two Germanic powers against the Turks and the Poles, a deep rivalry would inevitably dominate the relationship. The partition of Poland became part of a policy to contain Russian expansion, a threat to both Germanic powers. As Prussia advanced into Poland, Russia had to retreat into Lithuania.⁴⁶ For Austria, the partition rolled back Russian influence to a safe distance from the Carpathians and Hungary. Beginning in the 1760s, Austria and Russia also became rivals in the Principalities and the Balkans, and a partition of the Ottoman Empire in Europe served to contain Russia behind the Danube and later keep it away from the Aegean Sea where it would block Austria's own advance toward Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire became a Russo-Austrian frontier of four zones – the Principalities, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The partitioning powers met head-on in Serbia, and their rivalry would become the immediate cause of the First World War. The Austro-German alliance of 1879 combined the two Germanic core areas into a single one, bent on containing the Russian advance not only in the Balkans but in the Near East as well. Its containment policy succeeded brilliantly, but only for a short time.⁴⁷ The First World War expelled Russia from its entire Western Frontier and rolled it back in 1918 to

the very periphery of the Russian core area — along the skirt of the Central Russian Upland.

The maritime core areas were France and England. Both developed on the margin of the Roman and Germanic worlds, of Christendom and pagan tribes; both the London area and the Ile de France had been strategic zones in the Roman system of defense, and both possessed in the Strait of Dover a center of hydrographic convergence and divergence. Both developed early a strong national consciousness by fighting a one-hundred year war. Later, they went their separate ways, one building a commercial and Protestant empire beyond the seas, the other a continental and Catholic empire seeking to recreate the unified Europe of the Carolingians.⁴⁸ Despite the rising antagonism between them — an antagonism resembling the Austro-Prussian hatred but sustained over a much longer period — both developed a common interest in containing the growth of a continental core area in the Heartland, as soon as Russia made a bid to join the concert of European nations.

France developed, almost by accident because that policy was at first directed against Austria, a frontier of zones across the whole of Europe including the German states, Sweden, Prussia, Poland, and even Turkey, that served to contain Russian expansion. That system disintegrated in the course of the eighteenth century, but Napoleon made a last attempt to incorporate this Franco-Russian frontier into his empire. Lord Curzon, who knew something about frontiers, once wrote that Napoleon's error had been "the adoption of a mistaken Frontier policy," to hold out "for an impossible Frontier for France."⁴⁹ The collapse of France was followed by the emergence of England as Russia's main opponent. England would use force to keep the Sound open and block Russian naval expeditions beyond the Baltic. It continued France's policy of supporting the Ottomans even at the risk of war, as happened during the Crimean War and almost happened again in 1878. British India enabled England to project power in the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan to prevent the Russians' crossing the periphery of the Heartland. England's naval power could destroy Russia's trade and its superior financial resources could deal an unacceptable blow to the Russian Treasury.⁵⁰

In its Eastern Frontier, Russia encountered another core area — Japan. The Japanese core area developed on the margin of the Chinese world, from which it derived its architecture, Buddhism, and even its written language. During the Ashikaga shogunate (1338-1573), based in Kyoto, it developed its own indigenous military culture, its own religious beliefs centered on Zen Buddhism and Shintoism, its own feudal land-owning structure. It possessed its own center of hydrographic convergence — the Inland Sea and the Strait of Tsushima linking it with the mainland. The emergence of the Tokugawa family was a marginal development within a marginal development — the Kanto plain was a distant and swampy land toward the end of the sixteenth century — but the foundations of modern Japan were laid there during the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867).⁵¹ Japan's experience during this period was unique, because it involved a suspension — one may even say a

mutilation — of the expansionist impulse that had grown during the preceding centuries. An island or an archipelago has its own “natural” boundaries, and its unification under a single, even though feudal, leadership completed the stage of core area formation. Self-imposed isolation to avoid entanglements with foreign powers gave Japanese civilization its distinctive quality. If there ever existed a close border policy in the full sense of the term, the Tokugawa shoguns carried it out successfully. It was a policy of exclusion with its rejection of the outside world.

A core area does not have a frontier until its striving for hegemony creates one. Until about 1800 there was hardly any Russo-Japanese frontier. The Russians, excluded from China by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, continued their expansion toward the Pacific. They discovered Kamchatka in 1697, and from then on, isolated Russian settlements on the Sea of Okhotsk would pick up shipwrecked Japanese fishermen and merchants and return them in a vain attempt to open up relations with Japan. The Russian advance continued along the Kuril archipelago between Kamchatka and Hokkaido, occasionally called Kuril Island N. 22 in eighteenth-century Russian documents.⁵² When the Japanese government sent officials to Sakhalin in 1786 for the first time, a first segment of the Russo-Japanese frontier came into being. Eric Laksman’s expedition landed at Nemuro in 1792, and sailed on to Hakodate.⁵³

The Russian push toward Japan accelerated in the nineteenth century, and culminated in the Putiatin visit and the Shimoda treaty of 1855 that opened up Japan to Russian trade. Hakodate became the center of the Russian presence in Japan,⁵⁴ and it is not hard to see the emergence of a Russian policy aiming at making the Kuril archipelago with Hokkaido the outer perimeter of Russia’s Far Eastern possessions, a prelude to the transformation of the Sea of Okhotsk into a closed sea. The collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867 released Japanese energies to contain the Russian expansion. The struggle focused on Sakhalin, and an agreement was reached in 1875, when Japan gave up its claim to the southern half of the island in exchange for the Kuril archipelago up to the tip of Kamchatka.⁵⁵ The effect was to partition this segment of the frontier and to preclude Russia’s close border policy.

Japan’s rapid development as a core area with hegemonic tendencies created a second segment of the Russo-Japanese frontier consisting of three zones — Korea, Northern and Southern Manchuria, or the valley of the Liao River. This region, like the Balkans and Georgia, was also one where the Sino-Russian, Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese frontiers interlocked, thereby assuming great strategic value. Korea was Japan’s bridge to China, its proximate frontier zone. Japan quickly acquired the right to intervene in Korean affairs, and struck at China in 1894 in order to expel it from Korea. The Treaty of Shimonoseki recognized the independence of Korea from China and gave Japan the Liaotung Peninsula.⁵⁶ The Sino-Japanese war, however, was fought as much against Russia as against China, because the Japanese understood that the building of the Transsiberian railroad would enable

Russia — in due time — to project power across Manchuria into Korea itself. It was the first war for the control of the Russo-Japanese frontier.

That the Russians thought along similar lines explains their determination, with French and German support, to force Japan to surrender the peninsula and Port Arthur in 1895. Three years later, they obtained from China a 25-year lease on both. Port Arthur would later be linked by rail with the Chinese Eastern Railway, enabling Russia to move troops to within striking distance of Peking itself. From Port Arthur and Vladivostok the Russians could envelop Korea in a pincer movement, hoping to clinch it by obtaining a third naval base near Pusan on the southern coast of Korea. This bold move triggered a Japanese offensive culminating in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, at the end of which Russia had to surrender the peninsula and the southern half of Sakhalin.⁵⁷ The Japanese had been no less bold; their move had indeed been the boldest made by the maritime powers, because it not only contained Russian expansion but rolled back the Russian presence at the entrance of the Pacific. As in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia's policy there was also a fortress-fleet strategy. However, the aggressiveness of its policy on land set into motion the containment policy of a dynamic maritime core area, and its ships in 1904 were no more than sitting ducks.

* * *

Russia's expansion, it bears repeating in conclusion, was made possible not only by the growth of Russian power but also by a corresponding decline of the core areas surrounding the Heartland. After two centuries of relentless expansion into three frontiers, the Russian core area had occupied most of Mackinder's Heartland, and one can well understand why an Englishman writing in 1904 was impressed by the overwhelming presence of this continental empire and concerned over its future growth. Nevertheless, it was also obvious that the disintegration of the five core areas had been matched by the rise of a Germanic core area and of two maritime core areas — one in the European Coastland, the other in the Monsoon Coastland — capable of pursuing an effective containment policy.

Certain developments, however, threatened to upset the new balance of power and give the Russian advance a new impetus. The antagonism between a Germany striving for hegemony on land and at sea and the maritime powers of Europe seeking to maintain the status quo, brought about an alliance between the Russian Heartland and those powers to contain Germany; the containment of Germany, on the other hand, cancelled out Germany's containment of Russia. The price had to be paid in 1915, when England and France agreed to let Russia occupy Constantinople and the Straits, its objective since the eighteenth century. This concession was merely the culmination of a British policy of retrenchment in the Eastern Mediterranean that may have begun in 1897, when the Foreign Secretary declared that the

defense of Constantinople was “an antiquated standpoint,” and was confirmed in 1903, when the Committee of Imperial Defense concluded that the exclusion of Russia from the Straits was not for Britain “a matter of primary naval or military interest.”⁵⁸ The capture of the Straits would have opened up for Russia the way to the Near East, and Russia’s anticipated victory against the Germanic powers would have brought Russian troops to the Elbe, on the very boundary of the Heartland, and given Russia an exclusive influence in the Balkans.

Other factors, however, militated against a renewal of that irresistible Russian expansion. The question has to be raised whether Russian annexations did not already exceed the range of an “optimum conquest” beyond which a dangerous frontier “drag” converts itself into “a reactive inward pressure against the center.”⁵⁹ If it is allowed to gain force, that pressure can set off an explosion in the entire frontier. Russia had not only occupied the entire frontier (except in the East), it had also destroyed two core areas, the Polish and the Persian, and was about to destroy the Ottoman. Only Japanese intervention blocked the advance on Peking. Had favorable circumstances continued, the Russian government could have looked forward to the destruction of four of the old five core areas, and of the Germanic core area as well. Such phenomenal success, however, would have only recreated within the inner frontier of the Russian Empire the same stresses that had marked Russia’s relations with the core areas. Political, social, economic incompatibilities would have exacerbated tensions which the inclusion of the frontier zones and the exclusion of the core area had reduced to a tolerable level. Turkey, Persia, and Northern China could not possibly have been integrated into the administrative structure of the empire without destroying it by restoring their gravitational pull on the inner frontier zones, and forcing Russia to deploy troops far beyond the range of effective action. Thus, the very successes of Russian foreign policy on the eve of the Revolution threatened to destroy all its gains. Like the steppe empires with which it had much in common, the Russian Empire exhibited in 1917 “a formidable fragility.”⁶⁰ It remained for the Revolution and the Germanic powers to expose that fragility and stop the Russian advance until another radical change in the balance of power during the Second World War caused the resumption of this advance to the very periphery of the Heartland. The resulting “reactive inward pressure” recently exposed its “formidable fragility” once again.

Notes

- 1 A good illustration of this approach is M. Heller and A. Nekrich, *Utopia in Power. The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present* (New York, 1986), pp. 9-11, 729.
- 2 C. Black, “The Pattern of Russian Objectives” in I. Lederer (ed.), *Russian*

- Foreign Policy. Essays in Historical Perspective* (New Haven, 1962), pp. 3-38, here 7, 13-14, 23.
- 3 G. Parker, *The Geopolitics of Domination* (London, 1988); O. Lattimore, *Inner Frontiers of China* (New York, 1940); and *Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers 1928-1958* (Paris, 1962).
 - 4 *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23 No. 4 (1904), pp. 421-37; *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919). The term Rimland was coined by N. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York, 1942), p. 184.
 - 5 Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals...*, Ch. III-IV.
 - 6 Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-75.
 - 7 Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-94.
 - 8 Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-19 for Turkey. Parker discusses only France, Spain, Brandenburg, Austria, Turkey, and Russia. I have expanded his model to include Sweden, Poland, Persia, and China because they meet at least some of the basic criteria of a core area.
 - 9 Lattimore, *Studies...*, pp. 115, 470.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, p. 471.
 - 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.
 - 12 Those of the Ukraine of Settlements and the Don. Their lands, together with those of the Left-Bank Cossacks, formed a continuous zone of Cossack settlements from the Dniepr to the Don.
 - 13 Lattimore, *Inner Frontiers...*, pp. 244-245; R. Bruce, *The Forward Policy and Its Results* (London, 1900). Bruce was an officer in the administration of the Northwest Frontier.
 - 14 Lattimore, *Studies...*, p. 114.
 - 15 A. Westcott (ed.), *Mahan on Naval Warfare* (Boston, 1941), pp. 256-275.
 - 16 Lattimore, *Studies...*, pp. 510-511.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, p. 196; *Inner Frontiers...*, pp. 245-246. On frontiers of inclusion and exclusion see H. Lamar and L. Thompson (eds.), *The Frontier in History. North America and Southern Africa Compared* (New Haven, 1981), pp. 73, 100; S. Dyson, *The Creation of the Roman Frontier* (Princeton, 1985), pp. 73, 100.
 - 18 Westcott, *op. cit.*
 - 19 J. Lisk, *The Struggle for Supremacy in the Baltic 1600-1725* (London, 1967); and V. Vozgrin, *Rossiiia i evropeiskie strany v gody Severnoi voiny* (Leningrad, 1986), pp. 16-54.
 - 20 M. Roberts, *The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 145-152.
 - 21 K. Zlobin, "Diplomaticcheskie otnosheniia Rossii i Shvetsii v pervye gody tsarstvovaniia Imp. Aleksandra I do prisoedineniia Finliandii k Rossii," *Sbornik Imp. Rossiiskogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva*, II (1868), pp. 1-95, here 1, 22-23; and N. Dubrovin, "Russkaia zhizn' v nachale XIX veka," *Russkaia Starina*, IV (Oct.-Dec.)(1898), pp. 481-516, here 482-483.
 - 22 L. Krabbe, *Histoire du Danemark des origines jusqu'à 1945* (Paris, 1950), pp. 219-222.

- 23 H. Kaplan, *The First Partition of Poland* (New York, 1962), pp. 7, 11-14, 32-34, 50-51, 67.
- 24 W. Stribrny, *Die Russland Politik Friedrichs des Grossen 1764-1786* (Würzburg, 1966), pp. 17-20.
- 25 The three partitions are discussed in Kaplan; R. Lord, *The Second Partition of Poland. A Study in Diplomatic History* (Cambridge, USA, 1915); and J. Rydzal, "The Third Partition of Poland and Its Immediate Internal Impact," unpub. Ph. D. diss. (Kansas, 1958).
- 26 F. Thackeray, *Antecedents of Reform. Alexander I and the Polish Kingdom 1815-1825* (Boulder, Colo., 1980).
- 27 R. Ramazani, *The Northern Tier. Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey* (New York, 1966), p. 114.
- 28 Lattimore, *Studies...*, pp. 172, 510-514.
- 29 F. Venturi, *The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 1768-1776* (Princeton, 1989), pp. 23-41; L. Rhineland, "The Incorporation of the Caucasus Into the Russian Empire: The Case of Georgia, 1801-1834," unpub. Ph. D. diss. (Columbia, 1972), pp. 29-40; and M. Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828* (Minneapolis, 1980), pp. 29-31.
- 30 M. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923* (New York, 1966), pp. 1-27. See also A. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772-1783* (Cambridge, 1970).
- 31 Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-217; H. Armani, "The Russian Annexation of the Kingdom of Imeretia 1800-1815," unpub. Ph. D. diss. (Georgetown, 1970).
- 32 Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-260.
- 33 R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941* (Charlottesville, VA, 1968), pp. 19-25.
- 34 *Ibid.*, pp. 38-43.
- 35 J. Strong, "Russian Relations with Khiva and Bukhara, and Kokand, 1800-1858," unpub. Ph. D. diss. (Harvard, 1954).
- 36 S. Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924* (Cambridge, USA, 1968); and G. Alder, *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-95* (London, 1963), pp. 151-52, 165-83, 191-92.
- 37 A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Asia* (Ann Arbor, 1951); V. Chen, *Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (The Hague, 1966); and E. Besprozvannykh, *Priamur'e v sisteme russko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii XVII- seredine XIX v.*, (Khabarovsk, 1986).
- 38 B. Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria, 1892-1906* (New York, 1974), and P. Berton, "The Secret Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916," unpub. Ph. D. diss. (Columbia, 1956).
- 39 Th. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier. Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, 1989); and I. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis. A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881* (Oxford, 1965).
- 40 V. Roginsky, *Shvetsiia i Rossiia. Soiuz 1812 goda* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 37-

- 46; Krabbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-222; C. Nordmann, *Grandeur et liberté de la Suède 1660-1792* (Paris, 1971), pp. 237-39, 254-67, 276-84, 380-91.
- 41 W. Reddaway et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Poland From Augustus II to Pilsudski 1697-1935*, 2 vols., II (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 49-71.
- 42 Lobanov-Rostovsky, 109-252; F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914. A Study in Imperialism* (New Haven, 1968), pp. 210-231, 406-407, 508-509.
- 43 J. Shotwell and F. Déak, *Turkey at the Straits. A Short History* (New York, 1940), pp. 7-9.
- 44 G. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missonghi to Gallipoli* (London, 1971), pp. 34-35, 66, 157; Shotwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-32, 98-102; Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-331.
- 45 Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-6, 45-56.
- 46 M. Müller, *Die Teilungen Polens* (München, 1984), pp. 65-68.
- 47 Th. V. Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns Seit 1866*, 2 vols., (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1913-14), I (1913), pp. 18-20, 27-28, 36, 53, II (1914), pp. 388-393.
- 48 Parker, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-45.
- 49 Lord Curzon, *Frontiers. The Romanes Lectures, 1907* (reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976), p. 5.
- 50 R. Greaves, *Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892* (London, 1959), pp. 188-191.
- 51 G. Sansom, *Japan. A Short Cultural History*, revised ed., (New York, 1962), Parts V-VII.
- 52 E. Fainberg, *Russko-iaponskie otnosheniia v 1697-1875 gg.* (Moscow, 1960), p. 35.
- 53 Fainberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43, 54-59, 64-65; G. Lensen, *The Russian Push Toward Japan. Russo-Japanese Relation, 1697-1875* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 96-120.
- 54 Fainberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-180; G. Lensen, *Russia's Japanese Expedition of 1852 to 1855* (Gainesville, Fla., 1955); Lensen, *Russian Push...*, pp. 475-477.
- 55 Lensen, *Russian Push...*, pp. 425-426, 495-506; Chihiro Hosoya, "Japan's Policies Toward Russia," in J. Morley (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941* (New York, 1974), pp. 340-406, here 340-48.
- 56 Romanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-8, 52, 102-103, 390; W. Rockhill (ed.), *Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea 1894-1904* (Washington, 1904), pp. 14-20.
- 57 Romanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95, 441; E. Trani, *The Treaty of Portsmouth. An Adventure in American Diplomacy* (Lexington, KY, 1969), pp. 136-155, 161-170.
- 58 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 259; M. Florinsky, *Russia. A History and an Interpretation* (New York, 1954), pp. 1349-1350.
- 59 Lattimore, *Studies...*, pp. 113-114, 118.

60 W. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500-1800* (Chicago, 1964), p. 6.