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The Russians in Nagasaki, 1853–54: Another Look at Some Russian, English, and Japanese Sources

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The history of modern Russo-Japanese relations begins with the arrival of a Russian naval squadron and diplomatic mission to Japan in 1853 headed by Vice-Admiral Evfimii Vasilievich Putiatin. The Putiatin mission was the first serious attempt to open Japanese ports to Russian ships for almost forty years.¹ It was also the first large-scale naval expedition to Japan that had been planned and executed by the Russian government and its military and diplomatic arms. It had originally been scheduled to depart in 1843 but was cancelled for financial and political reasons. However, when word came of the American plans to send a large-scale naval expedition to Japan, the Russian government, spurred by a feeling of rivalry and jealousy² toward the American ambitions to open Japanese ports to its ships, decided that its own expedition could be postponed no longer.

Putiatin, who came to Japan about the same time as the much more famous Commodore M.C. Perry, for approximately the same purpose as Perry, is much less known in Japan, and almost completely ignored in America, and other western countries. American scholarly works about the Perry expedition tend to give too little space and credit to the Putiatin expedition and inaccurate information about it.³ The one great exception to this tendency and the only works in English that provide a detailed history and recognize the role of the Russian expedition in “opening Japan” are those of the Russo-Japanese historian G.A. Lensen.⁴ However, even he overlooked some important sources that were available at the time (see below) and of course could not include those that have since become available to foreign researchers in Russian archives. As almost all the primary sources concerning the Putiatin expedition are in Russian, or in Japanese, it was bound to receive far less attention from scholars in the English-speaking world, without knowledge of either of those languages. However, because of the unreliability, or incompleteness, as well as the difference in national, and individual viewpoints of the primary sources, a knowledge of both Russian and Japanese and consultation and comparison of both Russian and Japanese sources is essential to establish the most accurate historical picture, as Lensen rightly pointed out. One of the aims of this article will be to try to fill in some of the gaps left by Lensen’s generally impeccable scholarship and to round out his narrative. Another aim will be to closely compare the major Russian and Japanese sources that are available in Japan with each other in order to establish a more complete and accurate picture of some of the key individuals and events during the Russians’ three visits to Nagasaki in 1853 and 1854. All these major sources are somewhat complementary to each other and so provide different information, and perspectives on various aspects of the expedition and the relations between Russians and Japanese, as well as their perceptions of each other.

The first of these Russian sources is the book *Frigate Pallada*, by Ivan

Goncharov,⁵ secretary to Putiatin during the Nagasaki phases of the expedition. It is by far the best-known and most-read account of the Putiatin expedition, and is justly considered a classic of travel literature of the mid-19th century. However, as an account of the expedition as a whole, and of its visits to Japan it has serious shortcomings. It is above all a work of literature that follows the literary design of its author, and only secondarily a concise, and factual account of the expedition. Even though the people and events described may be real, the interpretation of them is literary, and constantly infused with the humor and irony, sarcasm and mockery of its cranky and gifted author. It omits significant aspects of the expedition, such as the frequent storms encountered and consequent damage and repairs to the frigate. As its title indicates, it is an account of the voyage of the frigate *Pallada* only, and so does not describe the conclusive phase of the expedition aboard the ill-fated frigate *Diana*, except partially in a chapter added twenty years later and based on the accounts of others.⁶ Although in some ways the most detailed account of the three Russian visits to Nagasaki in 1853 and 1854, in other respects, it is not. It says very little about the character of Putiatin, and his negotiating skills, or about the negotiations themselves. It refers frequently to earlier scholarly works on Japan, such as those of Kampfer, Golovnin and Siebold and contains some interesting passages about Japanese customs, the Japanese government system, and the dilemma that the arrival of the American and Russian "black ships" presented to the Shogunal government. In short, it may be read with pleasure, but it is not a full account of the Putiatin expedition. Although Lensen argued justifiably for its essential "historicity,"⁷ it does not extend to all events and conversations reported, and is also compromised as a historical document by its many omissions.

For an account of the entire expedition one must turn to the official report written by Putiatin,⁸ and to the report published by the Russian Ministry of the Navy.⁹ Putiatin's report is valuable for the insight it gives into the thinking of the leader of the expedition, and the motivation and justification for his actions. It is a view from the top, but also one written for his superiors in the Russian government and so not one free of self-censorship and prudent omission, and one that reflects favorably on himself. Thus, it is also by no means a complete account of all aspects of the expedition. The report of the Russian Ministry of the Navy is a summary of the main events and dates of the expedition based on different sources brought together. It is also very favorable to Putiatin, even to the point of contradicting its own narrative. While including some important and interesting details, it omits many others.

The letters of Capt. K.N. Posyet,¹⁰ second in command of the diplomatic mission, who performed the invaluable role of interpreter for Dutch during the expedition, contain some interesting details about the intentions of Putiatin while still in China and about the Russians' first visit to Nagasaki. However, they are completely silent about the character of the Japanese and the negotiations themselves.

Lastly, there are the diaries and letters of Lt. Voin Andreevich Rimsky-Korsakov,¹¹ the commander of the steam schooner *Vostok* during the Nagasaki phases of the Putiatin expedition. His diaries concerning the Putiatin expedition to Nagasaki were published more than twenty years after his death. His letters to his parents and younger brother, Nika,¹² at home in Russia during his voyages in the far east have

only comparatively recently (1980) been published in book form. In it are described his voyages (1852-1857) to Japan, Sahalin, and the Amur and his return to the Baltic port of Kronstadt. Thus it covers a longer period of time than does *Frigate Pallada*. It is complementary to it, and is an interesting and well-written travelogue in its own right. As a very knowledgeable and experienced naval officer, with some literary talent and a highly-developed artistic sense, his view of the Japanese in Nagasaki and his evaluation of certain aspects of Japanese culture, as well as the Russians' interaction with that culture, deserve our attention. They differ significantly from those of Goncharov in some respects. In addition, his writings contain information and descriptions of some of the other Russian officers, including Putiatin, Posyet, Unkovsky, Nazimov and Furuhelm, the latter three being the commanders of the three other Russian ships of the Putiatin expedition besides his own, about whom Goncharov is mostly silent. In addition, there are descriptions of Goncharov himself, not all of which are complimentary. In his diary and letters Rimsky-Korsakov felt free to criticize his commanding officer, Putiatin, in a way that Goncharov, as his secretary, and writing an official history of the expedition probably did not. Lensen did not make use of his diaries or letters, or the letters of Posyet, in his book on the Putiatin expedition.

As for Japanese original sources, Tokyo University's important compilation of *bakumatsu* era documents concerning Japanese relations with foreign countries is a valuable source of information on the policies and actions of the Shogunate, and the views and opinions of its officials. The diaries of two of the Japanese plenipotentiaries who came to Nagasaki to conduct negotiations with Putiatin, Kawaji Toshiakira¹³ and Koga Kinichiro,¹⁴ are contained in it and provide a Japanese perspective on events and a Japanese view of the Russians. Other Japanese diaries about the Russian visits to Nagasaki also exist, but these two are the most important. A very valuable secondary source is the excellent book by Wada Haruki concerning the Putiatin expedition and the negotiations leading to the first Russo-Japanese treaty.¹⁵ It makes use of all the major Japanese and Russian sources, including the diaries (but not letters) of Rimsky-Korsakov, as well as sources concerning the Perry expedition.

Putiatin does not state in his report what his original intention had been, but from comments in their letters, both Rimsky-Korsakov and Posyet were under the impression that Putiatin intended to go directly to Edo bay. Posyet wrote that "it would be desirable to join [the Americans] there and pay the Japanese a visit in as large a company as possible."¹⁶ Considering that he was second in command of the diplomatic mission and in close contact with Putiatin, it would seem very likely that this was also Putiatin's intention.

Indeed, recent research conducted by Yasuda Kouichi on documents obtained from Russian archives confirms that Putiatin had been instructed to proceed first to Uraga. However, the supplementary instructions that Putiatin received in the Bonin islands instructed him to go to Nagasaki, not Uraga, and to pursue negotiations through the Shogunal governor there.¹⁷ Here, the influence of the German Japanologist Siebold was crucial. Due to the advice received by the Russian government from Siebold, the instructions Putiatin received in the Bonins directed him to proceed to Nagasaki so as not to antagonize the Japanese.¹⁸

This article will now summarize (from different points of view) some of the most important incidents and events from the three separate visits of the Russian squadron to Nagasaki.

The Russians in Nagasaki: First Visit, August 21–Nov. 23, 1853

The Russian sources all agree that the Russian squadron of four ships, the frigate *Pallada*, the steam schooner *Vostok*, the corvet *Olivutsa*, and the transport *Knyaz Menshikov* first arrived at the entrance to Nagasaki bay on August 21, 1853.¹⁹ However, it was dusk, and not desiring to enter an unfamiliar harbor in the dark, they spent the night under sail outside it. After this, Russian accounts differ in the degree of detail and do not always agree in detail. Putiatin reports that the following morning he ordered his Imperial emissary's banner to be raised on the frigate as well as a white flag with the inscription in Japanese meaning 'Russian ship' hoisted on each ship. He writes that the Russian ships were met by Japanese officials a "few miles from Nagasaki port,"²⁰ but in his letters Rimsky-Korsakov (R-K.) describes how "at the very entrance [to the harbor] the wind died down completely and we came to a standstill. At this time from out of the depths of the bay appeared [four] large rowboats..."²¹

These were the boats that brought the first Japanese interpreters to the Russian ships with the standard list of questions that greeted all foreign ships. R-K. and Posyet describe how at first the questions were attached to a pole and passed up to the Russian ships. R-K. found only two of them to be different from the "usual questions asked of foreign ships in any colonial port." One was the question about whether there were any Japanese castaways on board and the other was a warning that Dutch ships, or ships of other nations, were allowed to come only to Nagasaki port, and that they must not enter the middle roadstead without permission "on pain of great unpleasantness." R-K. thought that the phrase "or ships of other nations" was due to the increasing numbers of non-Dutch European and American ships coming to Japan and a significant concession by the Japanese authorities to changing times.²² Putiatin thought the Japanese were frightened by the sight of four Russian warships and only went through the motions of asking the questions, performing their duty as officials.²³ R-K. noted in his diary for that day that the Japanese had asked questions about everything except about the number of cannon, "probably so as not to show that they were afraid."²⁴ In contrast, Goncharov mentions that they did ask about the number of cannon on the frigate.²⁵ So perhaps it was only on the "*Vostok*" that they didn't ask. Since it had only four cannon the Japanese could have easily counted them themselves.

R-K.'s diary explicitly states that when the first group of interpreters arrived on board the frigate, Putiatin "sent [interpreters] to inform the Nagasaki governor that he intends to anchor in their harbor, but not wanting to violate the laws of the country requested that the Nagasaki governor designate a place for the Russian ships to anchor."²⁶ Putiatin's report merely states that the permission to anchor at the more secure middle roadstead came before the Russian ships had entered the third, or outermost, roadstead. This implies that the Nagasaki governor granted permission

on his own initiative, as one might also gather from reading Lensen's narrative, based on Putiatin's report. Putiatin felt that the governor had granted permission to enter the middle harbor in order to avoid showing his inability to prevent them from doing so and the weakness of the *bakufu*.²⁷ When the "first Japanese boat came to the frigate at 7 a.m.,"²⁸ Goncharov was still asleep. "I just woke up," he wrote.²⁹

Late that afternoon the Russian ships entered the harbor in battle formation, with a white flag raised on each ship, to the sound of the Russian national anthem "God Save the Tsar" and with full solemnity fitting the occasion. R-K. describes the Russians' feelings at this moment in a letter to his parents thusly: "Our patriotic feelings were aroused, and I am sure all, as I was, were suffused with a pleasant awareness of the dignity of the Russian flag, under whose protection four ships had fearlessly appeared to open an empire of thirty million souls."³⁰ Goncharov on the other hand, did not feel so fearless: "We were entering with a somewhat compressed heart, at least I was, with the feeling with which one enters a prison, even though the prison is planted with trees."³¹ The Russians were entering a "hermit empire" with a reputation for hostile reception of European ships. Nevertheless, all the Russians felt that their initial reception was not at all bad, and much better than that given to previous expeditions.³²

At their first meeting with senior officials from the Nagasaki Shogunal governor (*bugyo*) on August 23, the Russians informed them about the two letters they had brought from the Russian State Chancellor Nesselrode, one for the Nagasaki governor and one for the Supreme Council (*roju*). They asked for a meeting with the governor in order to transmit the letters. They also asked for a place on shore to rest and to adjust their navigation instruments. Goncharov wrote that "the Japanese were not what they were 40-50 years ago" and found them "kind and obliging." Although it was certainly true that the Japanese officials were much more hospitable than they had been to Rezanov or Golovnin, they still could not treat them as trusted guests. They showed their mistrust of the Russians' intentions by asking why four ships were needed to bring only one letter. R-K. thought that such "naive cleverness might perplex anyone"³⁴ It must have seemed like curiosity mingled with suspicion to the Russians.

Although Putiatin was able to transmit the letter to the Nagasaki governor through his senior officials (*baniosi*) within 6 days (Aug. 28), the governor declined to receive the second letter to the *roju*. Considering the distance from Nagasaki, Putiatin agreed to wait 30 days for the governor to receive permission from Edo to accept the letter and instructions regarding the proper ceremony to receive it and the Russian delegation. But he also threatened to take his ships to Edo and deal with the supreme council directly if the answer did not arrive within that time. As Perry had taken his ships to Edo bay a few weeks before, Putiatin's threat was probably more credible and effective.

On August 30 Putiatin sent the schooner on a reconnaissance mission to Sahalin and the Amur basin. R-K. would not return to Nagasaki until November 15, and so his diary and letters do not report firsthand about the events there during that time. On September 2 the transport was sent to Shanghai for provisions.

The Russians got very bored waiting for word from Edo about the place on shore and the ceremony for the acceptance of the second state letter. Finally, word

came about September 17 and the Russians and Japanese spent the next few days arguing about all the different details for it. Here Goncharov's narrative is the most detailed and interesting of all the Russian sources:

“You in Europe worry at this moment whether ‘to be or not to be,’ but we spend days agonizing over such questions as: ‘to sit or not to sit,’ ‘to stand or not to stand’ and then, ‘how and on what’ to sit, and so on. The Japanese proposed that we sit as they do, on the floor, on our heels... We informed them that we don’t know how to sit like that. Wouldn’t the governor like to sit as we do, in armchairs? But the Japanese also don’t know how to sit like us... Remember how the Fox and the Crane treated each other — this is literally the same thing.”³⁵

This fable of the Fox and Crane Goncharov knew from La Fontaine, the French writer, and he would refer to it again as an apt analogy for the intercultural dilemma that the Russians and Japanese faced in Nagasaki. Neither side was willing to conform completely to the customs of the other, because both were very concerned to maintain their own dignity in conformity with their own customs. Since their customs were often incompatible, their interaction led to many incongruous occurrences, which Goncharov describes with his characteristic light humor. However, one may wonder if this ‘fabalization’ of the intercultural encounters between Russians and Japanese in *bakumatsu* Nagasaki did not also distort or exaggerate them, in order to fit into the Goncharovian “world of Japan.”³⁶ It is certain that not all the events he described so humorously were viewed in that way by the Japanese, and also likely that not even all the Russians saw them that way.

The first meeting with the Nagasaki governor took place on September 21. The Russian state letter to the *roju* was formally accepted, but the governor said that the issues raised in it — the opening of ports to Russian ships and the determination of the northern borders between the two countries — were complex and communication with Edo was slow so some time would be required before an answer could be given. Hearing this, Putiatin suggested to the Governor that his going to Edo directly might expedite matters. At this, the governor’s expression changed abruptly and he seemed to lose all his haughtiness. He said that as much as the action of the Russians in coming to Nagasaki had pleased the Japanese, the sight of [Russian] ships in Edo would be painful to Japanese eyes. Putiatin then said that it was up to Edo to keep him in Nagasaki by sending a quick reply. Both Putiatin and Goncharov agree as to the essence of this conversation.³⁷

Goncharov adds a humorous slant to this meeting when he describes how the canvas slippers that the Russians had sewn for their boots to avoid soiling the Japanese *tatami* kept coming off and how he had finally put them in his hat.³⁸ It is unlikely that the rows of unsmiling, motionless *samurai* the Russians walked past found anything humorous about the sight of the Russians walking on the *tatami* with their boots on. On a later occasion when the Russians would tramp indoors with their dirty boots Koga complained to his diary: “how impolite of the barbarians.”³⁹

On September 26 (or 27),⁴⁰ the transport ship Knyaz Menshikov came back from

Shanghai with fresh provisions and bearing the first news of the expected break between Russia and England and France. This news must have made Putiatin even more anxious and impatient with the slowness of the Japanese response to the Russian demands. Anxious to hear more about the situation in Europe, on October 3,⁴¹ he sent the transport back to Shanghai again, only three days away in favorable winds.

In the remaining days of September, the Russians informed the Japanese that their guard boats were coming too close to the Russian ships and that they would be towed away by the Russian cutters if necessary. R-K. relates how the Russians learned to break through the rings of Japanese boats encircling their ships by knocking against the Japanese boats in their cutters, as if by accident, and then pulling up their anchors and towing them to one side on the pretext of preventing such future 'accidents.' He reports that the Japanese never resisted such forceful tactics and soon stopped chaining their boats together.²⁴ According to Goncharov, in the middle of October Japanese attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of Russian boats in the harbor led to two Japanese boats being forcefully towed away. After this, the Japanese guardboats did move much farther away from the Russian ships. Goncharov reports that Putiatin ordered his officers to take in tow any Japanese boats that followed too closely.⁴³

On Oct. 21 the Japanese came to inform Putiatin that the state letter had been received in Edo and to announce that the Shogun had died on Aug. 26 (He had actually died on July 27). As a result, the answer to the Russian state letter would be delayed. Goncharov greeted the announcement cynically. Putiatin expressed Russian condolences, but did not accept that the answer would have to be delayed. He told the governor that if he did not receive an answer to the letter within six weeks of its receipt by the *bakufu* in Edo, then he would act as he saw fit, in accordance with his instructions.⁴⁴

The transport returned from Shanghai for the second time on November 4 with more news about the situation in Europe. On November 15 the schooner finally returned to Nagasaki, relieving Putiatin of a "heavy burden of worry." He was so overjoyed to see it that he went on a gig to meet it before it even dropped anchor. Its very arrival was in itself good news, but it also brought some very good news concerning the presence of coal deposits on Sahalin.⁴⁵ "How much news!" exclaimed Goncharov.⁴⁶ But neither he nor Putiatin give any further details concerning the voyage of the Vostok to Sahalin and eastern Siberia. In contrast, R-K.'s own writings provide a detailed description.⁴⁷

After his return to Nagasaki, R-K. heard about the meeting with the governor during his absence from the other Russian officers, especially Nazimov, commander of the Olivutsa. From these details he judged that the Japanese side had conducted themselves more tactfully and with greater dignity than had the Russians. He furthermore thought that the Japanese had strictly followed a previously worked-out plan, whereas Putiatin had acted according to circumstances, and with apparent indecisiveness.⁴⁸

R-K. offers insight into one source of motivation for the increased firmness on the part of the Russians in dealing with the Japanese guard boats: "our sloops now move freely over all the roadsteads except the innermost one, and go out to sea

without hindrance. We began to do this from the time we read in the [Shanghai] newspapers about the bold actions of Commodore Perry [in Edo bay]. From that time we also began to drive away the guard boats, so that now no one guards us.”⁴⁹ This is eloquent testimony to the “Perry effect” on the Russians’ behavior.

The return of the *Vostok* meant that Putiatin was free to leave Nagasaki. On November 19 R-K. reported that Putiatin actually wanted to weigh anchor. Suddenly some Japanese officials appeared with news that four plenipotentiaries were coming from Edo. R-K. felt that this was a comedy, prepared in advance for the purpose of detaining the Russians, and most importantly, to find out their intentions. Putting information together from both his diary and letters, it is apparent that he was very impressed by the negotiating skills of the Japanese officials and very disappointed in his admiral’s negotiating skills. He saw how Putiatin revealed his plans and intentions to them without extracting any concessions or hard information in return. He felt that he could have taken more advantage of their great fear of the Russians’ going to Edo, and the governor’s apparent fear of possible criticism of him in Putiatin’s letter to Edo to obtain a more suitable place on shore than the two unsatisfactory places they had finally been offered and to extract concrete information about the plenipotentiaries’ actual whereabouts. According to R-K.’s letters, Putiatin actually told the Japanese officials that he was going to Shanghai for six weeks and that he would return to Nagasaki. Hearing this, the Japanese were greatly relieved and, of course, said that nothing was known about the exact whereabouts of the plenipotentiaries. In his diary, R-K. only mentioned that Putiatin informed them of his intentions in a letter, but then gave them four hours to read it before departing. As such, they made no attempt to stop him.⁵⁰

Goncharov also felt that this scene was a pre-arranged comedy on the part of the Japanese, but he is completely silent regarding any lack of negotiating skills by Putiatin. He reports that Putiatin informed the governor in his letter to him that he would return to Japan before too long and come to Nagasaki and if the plenipotentiaries were not yet there, and there was no answer to his proposals, then he would immediately go to Edo. This agrees with R-K.’s diary, yet according to Goncharov, the Japanese were never told of the Russians’ destination explicitly, but “had guessed” that they were not going to Edo. However, this contradicts what Goncharov had himself reported about the contents of Putiatin’s letter. In addition, Putiatin’s own report and the report by the Russian Ministry of the Navy both clearly imply that the Japanese knew of Putiatin’s intention to return to Nagasaki before he left. Therefore, it would appear that Goncharov’s assumption about Japanese guesswork is incorrect.⁵¹

On November 23, the reunited Russian squadron of four ships left for Shanghai after a little more than three months in Nagasaki. By the end of that period, the Russians had not accomplished any more on the diplomatic front than Perry had achieved in six days, but they had become very well acquainted with the Japanese officials. And the latter had got to know the Russians better than any other Europeans besides the Dutch.

Second Visit to Nagasaki, January 3-February 5, 1854

On January 3 (or 4), 1854 the Russian squadron of four ships approached Nagasaki harbor before dawn and caught the Japanese by surprise.⁵² The Japanese officials were unprepared to meet them. They were met by only one official after they had already entered the outer roadstead.⁵³ At the first meeting with the Japanese officials on the same day (Wednesday), the Russians asked if the plenipotentiaries had arrived. The Japanese said that they had not yet arrived, but that they were near Nagasaki and were expected to arrive in three days, on Saturday. The Russians asked if the plenipotentiaries had not, in fact, already arrived. The Japanese assured them that they had not. Putiatin then agreed to wait, but threatened to go to Edo if they did not arrive by then. R-K. noted in his letters that the plenipotentiaries must have already arrived, but that "Japanese pride did not allow them to admit that Japanese magnates await a Russian admiral."⁵⁵ Such questions and comments show that the Russians also did not trust the Japanese. The Japanese came again to say that it would be five days, and more, before they would arrive. It seemed that the Governor was deliberately trying to detain the Russians in Nagasaki. "How to arrive at the truth?" wondered Goncharov. "All the resources for deception are on their side," he complained, "we cannot believe them."⁵⁶ But the Japanese were telling the truth. The plenipotentiaries actually did not arrive in Nagasaki until January 7, four (three) days after the Russians.⁵⁷ The Russians were informed of their arrival a day or two later. Before their arrival, the governor had asked Putiatin to wait until Jan. 12 and he agreed, provided that the governor would guarantee that the plenipotentiaries would actually meet with him on that date.

Putiatin demanded supplies and was offered them as gifts. The governor later accepted Russian gifts in exchange for the supplies given to the Russians. This kind of barter was evidence of real progress in their relations, and a step in the direction of trade, although the Japanese were still loath to call it "trade" or for it to appear as such.⁵⁸

Despite their continuing belief in Japanese duplicity, from the beginning of their second stay in Nagasaki it seemed to the Russians that the Japanese officials were friendlier than before, and less suspicious and mistrustful of their intentions. Both Nagasaki governors were trying harder to please the Russians, or to make it seem so. Their relations seemed quite the opposite of what they had been just three months before.

Just before leaving in November the Russians had been offered two unsatisfactory places on shore. This time they were shown a map of another place. It contained an "idol temple" and a few other buildings. A few days later a few Russian officers went to inspect it and pronounced it suitable. Thus, it looked as though the Russians could finally have a place to call their own on Japanese soil and one of the sorest points of their relations with the Japanese authorities in Nagasaki during their first stay would be resolved.

Putiatin at first insisted that it was the turn of the plenipotentiaries to come aboard the frigate with the official reply to the Russian state letter that he had taken

ashore the previous September. However, he later agreed to go ashore again to meet the plenipotentiaries, after they had agreed to meet several conditions he had set: for example, that he be met by a secretary at the dock, and one of them at the entrance to the building (*seiyakusho*, or western government office) and that they would dine with the Russians after the meeting.⁵⁹

The meeting took place on Jan. 12. That morning some Japanese came to the frigate to announce that they were ready to receive the Russians on shore. Putiatin announced to him his intention to salute his flag with cannon shots when his gig was lowered into the water. The officials fearfully begged him not to do it as it might be misunderstood by the Japanese soldiers on shore as a Russian attack. But Putiatin ordered it done anyway, and nothing happened on the Japanese side.⁶⁰ Then the Russians went ashore in their own boats and were met at the dock and the entrance to the building as Putiatin had demanded.

The formal meeting between Putiatin and his suite of officers and sailors, and the plenipotentiaries and all their retinue followed the same ceremony as the meeting with the governor. But the Russians were struck by how much more informal and friendly it was. The most senior of the plenipotentiaries, Tsutsui, greeted the Russians in a kindly manner. Goncharov saw in him a universal grandfatherly type of man that one might meet anywhere. Likewise, Putiatin recognized the “intelligence and skill in argument that would make [the second-ranking] Kawaji a distinguished individual in any European society.” Putiatin must have respected him for that, even though as Goncharov later commented, he used his dialectical skills against the Russians themselves. Kawaji thought that Putiatin resembled a certain Japanese feudal lord, and looked much older, about 60, than what he thought was his true age, 31 (actually 51!). He later recognized that Putiatin was “not an ordinary person” and noted the talent of Posyet as interpreter, and the Russians’ cleverness in general, and the need to be careful when dealing with them.⁶¹

R-K., like Goncharov, also saw some common human features in Kawaji and Tsutsui: “in [Kawaji], just as in Tsutsui, was a noticeable, indescribable air of distinction, which without doubt constitutes the aristocratic features of all humanity, and not just of one nation.”⁶² Here, he was showing his own aristocratic roots and his belief in the inherent superiority of and transnational nature of the aristocratic character.

Tsutsui’s friendliness toward the Russians certainly seemed genuine and sincere. Koga, however, was more xenophobic by nature and later wrote that when he greeted the Russians at the entrance to the western government office, he had “felt like it was opening the door to receive robbers.”⁶³

After the meeting and banquet had ended, the Russians returned to their ships to celebrate the New Year. It was December 31, 1853 by the Russian calendar, and after such a cordial meeting with the Japanese, the prospect for achieving their aim in the new year must have seemed brighter than ever.

The plenipotentiaries were due to visit the frigate on January 15. From Kawaji’s diary we learn that prior to going aboard, the plenipotentiaries discussed the possibility that they might be kidnapped and taken away to Russia as was Takadaya Kahei in 1812. The feudal lord responsible for the defense of Nagasaki, Matsudaira,

warned that the Russian ships were too fast for the Japanese cannon to fire upon. He suggested including a number of his samurai “who were ready to die” in their suite so that in case of Russian treachery, they could attack, swords drawn. He also suggested preparing a “*yakibune*,” or powder-laden boat that could be used to set fire to the Russian ship. However, Kawaji argued that such an action would make a powerful enemy for Japan, and that in the case of such Russian betrayal, it would be better for Japan if he were to go to Russia and “talk with the King.” He and the other plenipotentiaries all stated their willingness to die for their country. However, when Matsudaira observed through a telescope how the Russians were busily engaged in cleaning and decorating the frigate for the visit of the Japanese dignitaries, they must have been somewhat relieved.⁶⁴ Such fears on the part of the Japanese are especially interesting when one realizes that the Russians seemed to be unaware of them.

Putiatin had expected the plenipotentiaries to object to his invitation and was surprised by the “obvious pleasure” with which they had accepted.⁶⁵ If so, it would seem like a departure from the traditional samurai masking of real feelings.

When the time came to board the frigate, the Japanese were cordially and respectfully received by the Russians and shown around the frigate, entertained with alarms and calls to battle stations, gun drills and marching, furling and unfurling of the sails, and treated to a many course banquet with abundant wines and spirits. Thus, with the help of alcohol and entertainment, and mutual gift giving, both sides were able to successfully overcome lingering negative aspects of their history.

The Japanese had sent gifts to Putiatin and the other Russian officers. The most impressive of these was the superlative Japanese sword from Kawaji, which the Japanese interpreters told the Russians was meant to be a symbol of friendship, respect and good will.

On the lighter side, the intercultural encounters that Goncharov had so aptly raised to the level of fable, surfaced again. Goncharov mentioned how the Russians took the trouble to make wooden chopsticks for their Japanese guests, “since they cannot use knives and forks.” But he did not mention that at least some of the chopsticks were of unequal length. Koga reported that he had to exchange chopsticks with his colleague Arao Narimasa in order that both might have two of equal length and be able to eat the European-style meal.⁶⁶

The next day the Japanese interpreters visited the frigate and asked the Russians how many would be coming ashore for the ceremonial acceptance of the reply to the Russian state letter. They surprised the Russians when they asked that more come ashore as there would be a big banquet after the ceremonies were completed.⁶⁷ This was just the opposite of the Russians’ first visit ashore in September, when the Japanese had tried to reduce the Russian delegation. The Russians were ceremoniously presented with the official reply to the Russian state letter. It had taken nearly four months since they had presented it to the Nagasaki governor on September 21, and almost three months from the time of its receipt in Edo, twice as long as the six weeks that Putiatin had demanded. Nevertheless, it had at last come, and its content was a clear departure, from the Russian point of view, and a definite step forward from previous Japanese replies to European state letters.

R-K. felt that the reply was of historic significance. “[it] may in time find its

place in history as [the] first example of the Japanese finally feeling their weakness, and [the] arrogant tone of their relations with foreigners fell by 99%” He then gives a Russian translation of the main points of the letter.⁶⁸

After the letter had been presented, the Russians received presents from the *shogun*, and Putiatin gave gifts in return. After that, the Russians sat down to a banquet offering a great variety of dishes. Goncharov liked the lack of oil in the food, but complained about the small portions. Golovnin was right, Goncharov observed: they were not enough to fill northern European stomachs. R-K. concurred in this observation, and he being fond of Japanese food, especially *sashimi*, “ate almost everything” that was served him.⁶⁹

The increasing cordiality and harmony between Russians and Japanese in Nagasaki suffered a setback in regard to the promised place on shore. According to Goncharov, the Japanese delayed making it accessible to the Russians and put such unacceptable conditions on its use that Putiatin told the Japanese that the Russians no longer needed it. “And that is what the Japanese wanted,” he wrote. “They must avoid giving foreigners any reason for going ashore...they hoped to either escape the necessity for it, or postpone it as long as possible.”⁷⁰ Rimsky-Korsakov, one of the officers who had gone to inspect the site, was so angered by the three conditions which the Japanese had “had the temerity to propose” that he listed them in his diary: 1) only two Russian boats may go ashore and they must be accompanied by 12 Japanese boats; 2) when approaching the shore, Russian boats must stop and ask the presiding official for permission to land; 3) the place on shore must be used only from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. “The admiral did not agree to these conditions,” he commented approvingly.

Putiatin ordered the Japanese officials to be told that unless they give him a place he cannot accept the present of rice from the *shogun*. Because there are so many rats on the transport that it must first be unloaded and the rats got rid of before the rice could be loaded on to it. This line of argument was apparently not effective. R-K. thought that Putiatin should have told the officials straight out that such conditions were unacceptable or else simply taken 2 or 3 cutters and gone and occupied the designated place. He was sure the Japanese would not have tried to stop the Russians and so the matter would have been settled favorably for them. Putiatin complained bitterly to the plenipotentiaries through the interpreters: “I ask them to forbid the governors from laying down such conditions, because I don’t allow [people] to act like that towards me.” But the governors and plenipotentiaries only laughed, and said that they would give an answer to Putiatin’s request tomorrow. At the following meeting the plenipotentiaries apologized to Putiatin for the incivility of the governors regarding the assignment of a place on shore.⁷¹

The Japanese seemed to understand the Russians’ feelings. Koga wrote that “when [a few Russian officers] had landed [at the time of the initial inspection], they had been surrounded by Japanese soldiers. They felt that they were being treated as criminals, and became very angry...both [Kawaji and Tsutsui] felt that they should “do something to correct the impolite treatment of the Russians regarding assignment of a place on shore.”

However, they could do little to rectify the situation; the restrictions could not be removed. This was explained to Putiatin and he understood.⁷² But he did not

change his mind. For the Russians never did use the place on shore assigned to them in Inasa. Indeed, Putiatin states explicitly in his report that the Russian officers and sailors greatly enjoyed going ashore in Okinawa, because they had not had the opportunity to do so during their entire stay in Nagasaki (except for the official visits to meet the governors and plenipotentiaries, and the few trips to inspect places on shore).⁷³

As for the negotiations which followed the receipt of the reply from the *roju*, at first, Putiatin interpreted the phrase “old customs cannot be used to regulate current events” as signaling Japanese readiness to open ports to Russian ships in the immediate future. Kawaji disagreed and stressed the importance of the phrase “in 3-5 years,” denying there was any intention to open ports before then.⁷⁴ The issue of the northern borders proved too difficult to resolve. The Japanese, in particular, saw the necessity for further investigation.

By the end of the talks Kawaji had promised that in the event Japan decided to open its ports to trade to a country other than Holland, or China, at some time in the future, it would do so to Russia first. Thus, the special relationship with Japan as a neighboring country, seemed to be confirmed. This held out the definite prospect of ports opening to Russian ships at some time in the future. And Russia seemed to be first in line. Thus, Putiatin could leave Nagasaki with a feeling of success.⁷⁵

On February 1 Rimsky-Korsakov was ordered to Shanghai by Putiatin for more news of the European situation. The next morning (Feb.2) just before he left, Nakamura Tameya, the secretary to the plenipotentiaries, and a member of the new special committee to introduce steam ships to Japan, came to the schooner with Putiatin and a Japanese artist to have a look at its engine. The artist made a quick sketch. It was the first steam ship to visit Nagasaki harbor, and only the third to visit Japan.⁷⁶

On February 5 the three remaining Russian ships left Nagasaki. Kawaji had tried to find out when and where they were going. He was probably afraid that Putiatin would go to Edo and cancel all his efforts.⁷⁷ But Kawaji had no reason to fear. If we are to believe Goncharov, the Russians were quite “fed up with Japan and had no desire to go to Edo.”⁷⁸ Had Putiatin gone to Edo bay, he would almost certainly have found the ships of Perry’s squadron and Perry himself, who arrived off Uruga on February 11. But the impending war with Britain and France was already becoming Putiatin’s major concern and he considered Edo too dangerous in that respect. Thus, he had decided to go south in search of a safe harbor. In Okinawa he learned that Perry had left only two days before for Edo.⁷⁹

The Third Visit to Nagasaki, April 20–26, 1854

The Russian squadron returned to Nagasaki on April 20, this time minus the corvet *Olivutsa*, which had been sent north.⁸⁰ As for the Russian sources regarding this third visit to Nagasaki,⁸¹ Putiatin only mentions that he asked the governor (Mizuno) to send a letter to the plenipotentiaries in which he again asked them to meet him in Aniwa on Sakhalin. Koga later wrote that the letter also contained a warning that if the Japanese did not cooperate in determining the border on Sahalin then the

Russians would settle the matter themselves.⁸² Putiatin also states that he was able to obtain supplies from the governor. R-K. gives an outline of the negotiations between the Russians and the Japanese officials concerning the means to obtain and pay for the provisions. In the end, the governor agreed that supplies sent as gifts would be paid for each time by return gifts from the Russians. R-K. thought the governor (Mizuno) was trying to turn the clock back now that the plenipotentiaries and the other governor (Osawa) had returned to Edo. Goncharov also reported that the Russians were able to obtain supplies from the Dutch. The governor requested that the Russians not approach the Japanese batteries on their boats. The Japanese guard boats again tried to interfere with the Russian boats' freedom of movement, and the latter tried to drive them away. One of the Russian boats broke off the prow of a Japanese boat, which was taken to the frigate.

The Russians asked if the governor did not have something that he wanted to announce to the Russians. But he replied that there was nothing to report. "We learned [from the Japanese] that the Americans are conducting peaceful negotiations," Goncharov wrote. In fact, the US-Japan Treaty of Friendship had already been signed three weeks before (March 31, 1854) in Kanagawa.

Goncharov implies that he had read about the "success of the Americans in Japan, about the trade treaty" while in Manila, but as the Russians left Manila on March 13 this does not seem possible. In any event, the Russians may have come to Nagasaki to try and find out more. However, the Japanese officials there did not breathe a word about it to the Russians. Goncharov thought that the governor was very happy to hear that the Russians were leaving. He sent many more fresh provisions as a farewell present. In return, the Russians sent him a table clock. But Goncharov felt that the best present the Russians gave the governor before they left was the news that they were not going to Edo.

Having sent the *Vostok* on a mission to survey the Goto islands and cautiously obtain more news from Shanghai, Putiatin departed Nagasaki on the *Pallada* for the last time on April 26. He would return to Japan in October on the frigate *Diana*, but not to Nagasaki. Then begins the third and most exciting, if not tragic, phase of the Putiatin expedition, which would achieve its diplomatic aim the following year with the signing of the first treaty between Russia and Japan in Shimoda on Feb. 7, 1855.

Conclusions

Some may look at the above date as the starting point of modern Russo-Japanese relations. However, that point of view ignores all of the groundwork that had been laid in Nagasaki. The real beginning of modern Russo-Japanese history was there, and considering that it began from nothing, or even from a negative standpoint, it was not a bad beginning at all.

In Shimoda Putiatin met Tsutsui, Kawaji, Nakamura and the other Japanese officials he had first met in Nagasaki again. They had only a few days to renew their friendship before the disastrous earthquake and tidal wave that led to the loss of the *Diana* threw the Russians on the mercy of the Japanese. Fortunately, they had already become well acquainted with each other in Nagasaki, and the Japanese saved

the Russians' lives and showed them great generosity, kindness and compassion. Nakamura later become governor of Shimoda, and the Russians' good friend.

In studying international relations it is a mistake to put too much emphasis on the conclusion of treaties, and too little on the development of human relations that often preclude them. The Nagasaki negotiations have been labelled as being "without result" or offering only "empty promises" to the Russians. Although the negotiations did not result in a treaty, they did establish a basis for further talks, and showed the need for further investigation of the northern border issue. Furthermore, the reply to the Russian state letter was a clear departure from previous replies, and an admission that the time to think of ending the 'closed country' policy had arrived. As for the "empty promises," they were only rendered so by Commodore Perry's forcing the issue of signing a treaty, without actually using force, so soon after the Russians' departure from Nagasaki and before Kawaji's promise to Putiatin could actually be tested. Without Perry's forceful diplomacy, Japanese ports might have been opened by treaty to Russian ships first, although not immediately.

In an important sense, Nagasaki had already been "opened" to Russian ships by their three visits there. The Russians had made it clear how intolerable all the restrictions on their freedom of movement were. They would not agree to go ashore under demeaning conditions, and insisted on riding around freely in their boats, and coming and going in their ships as they pleased. They won the right to obtain supplies both through the Dutch and directly from the Japanese by exchange of presents. The frosty arrogance and delaying tactics of the Nagasaki governor were replaced by the warm sympathy of Tsutsui, and the friendly respect of Kawaji. The mutual visits of Russians and Japanese, especially the visits of the Japanese to the frigate, the first by high-ranking Japanese dignitaries to a foreign ship, laid a foundation for friendship.

References and Notes

- 1 Since the embassy of Nikolai Rezanov to Nagasaki in 1804-05.
- 2 Letter from an American, long resident in Russia, from St. Petersburg, Nov. 16, 1852, printed in *The New York Times* (Dec. 10, 1852).
- 3 See for example Lensen note (p.172) about Arthur Walworth, *Black Ships Off Japan* (New York : A. A. Knopf, 1946) or "Old Bruin" *Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, 1794-1858* by Samuel Eliot Morison (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1967), which erroneously states that "Siebold had attached himself to the Russian Japan expedition under Admiral Putiatin...and after returning to Europe published a pamphlet which aroused the Commodore's violent indignation," p.267. However, a careful reading of the said pamphlet clearly implies that Siebold remained in Europe during the expedition to Japan, which a biography of Siebold in German, *Die Würzburger Siebold* by Hans Korner confirms. There is no also no evidence in any Russian or Japanese records that I have seen that indicates that Siebold himself came to Nagasaki with Putiatin. Unfortunately, the most recent book on the Perry expedition, Peter Booth Wiley, *Yankees in the Land of the Gods* (Penguin, 1990), besides other inaccuracies, repeats this error, stating that "von Siebold had accompanied Putiatin to Nagasaki," p.461.

- 4 G. A. Lensen, *Russia's Japan Expedition of 1852 to 1855* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). See it for a detailed narrative of the entire expedition and its diplomatic and other achievements. See Lensen, *The Russian Push Toward Japan* (Octagon Press, 1971) for a summary of the historical background to the above expedition and of the expedition itself, including the Japanese view of it.
- 5 Ivan Goncharov, *Fregat "Pallada"* — ocherki puteshestviia v dvukh tomakh (Leningrad: Nauka, 1986).
- 6 See, for example, B. M. Engelgardt, "Fregat 'Pallada,'" *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, tom 22-24 (Moscow, 1935), or Lensen, *Russia's Japan Expedition*, or Elena A. Krasnostshekova, "'Mir Iaponii' v knige I. A. Goncharova, 'Fregat Pallada,'" *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Vol.11 (1993), pp.106-125, or Nakamura Yoshikazu, "I. A. Goncharov u iapontsev," in *Literatura i iskusstvo v sisteme kul'tury* [Literature and Art in Culture System] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).
- 7 G. A. Lensen, "The Historicity of Fregat Pallada," *Modern Language Notes* (Nov. 1953).
- 8 E. V. Putiatin, "Vsepodanneishii otchet general-adiutanta grafa Putiatina, o plavanii otriada voennykh sudov nashikh v Iaponiiu i Kitai, 1852-1855 god" [Most Devoted Report of the Adjutant-General Count Putiatin about the Sailing of a Squadron of our Warships to Japan and China, 1852-55], *Morskoi Sbornik*, XXIV, No.10, Part 1 (Aug. 1856), pp.22-104.
- 9 "Otchet o plavanii fregata Pallada, shkuny Vostok, korveta Olivutsa i transporta Kniaz' Menshikov, pod komandoiu General-Adiutanta Putiatina, v 1852, 53 i 54 godakh, s prilozheniem otcheta o plavanii fregata Diana, v 1852, 53, i 54 godakh" [Account of the Sailing of the Frigate Pallada, the Schooner Vostok, the Corvet Olivutsa, and the Transport Knyaz Menshikov, under the Command of Adjutant General Putiatin, in the Years 1852, 1853 and 1854...], *Morskoi Sbornik*, XX, No. 1, Part 3 (Jan. 1856), pp.132-173.
- 10 K. N. Posyet, "Pis'ma s krugozemnogo plavaniia v 1852, 1853 i 1854 godakh," *Otechestvennye zapiski*, No. 4, VI (1855).
- 11 V. A. Rimsky-Korsakov, "Iz dnevnika Voina Andreevicha Rimskogo-Korsakova (Ed. F. R-K.)," *Morskoi Sbornik*, No.10-12 (1895), No. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 9 (1896).
 V. A. Rimsky-Korsakov, *Baltika-Amur: povestvovanie v pis'makh o plavaniakh, prikliucheniakh, i razmyshleniakh komandira shkhuny "Vostok"* [Baltika-Amur: a Narrative in Letters Concerning the Voyages, Adventures, and Varied Thoughts of the Commander of the Schooner "Vostok"] (Khabarovsk, 1980).
 There are also several books in Russian about the life and voyages of Voin Andreevich. For a summary of his life and voyages to Japan in English based on the above book and other sources, see my "Bakumatsu Japan Through Russian Eyes: the letters of kapitan-leitenant Voin Andreevich Rimsky-Korsakov, Parts I and II," *Bulletin of Faculty of Education, Humanities*, Nos. 48, 49 (Nagasaki University, March and June 1994). For a summary of the Nagasaki visits in Japanese, see my "Roshiajin no me ni utsutta bakumatsu no nihon" [Japan in the last days of the Tokugawa shogunate as seen by a Russian], *Mado*, No.92 (Tokyo: Nauka, March 1995).

- 12 Nika, only 8 years old when his 30-year old brother Voin left Russia on the frigate Pallada in 1852 would fall in love with the sea from reading his brother's letters and become a naval cadet under his influence. After his brother's untimely death in 1871, he turned to his real love — music, and became famous as the composer Nikolai Andreevich Rimsky-Korsakov.
- 13 Kawaji, Saemon-no-jo (Toshiakira), "Roshia osetsu-kakari Kawaji Saemon-no-jo nikki" [Diaries of Kawaji Saemon-no-jo, charged with the Reception of the Russians], *Bakumatsu gaikoku kankei monjo* [Documents concerning Foreign Relations during the Last Years of the Shogunate], Series C of *Dainippon komonjo* [Ancient Documents of Japan], Supplement 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Univ., 1901), pp.1-193. His diaries have since been reprinted as *Nagasaki nikki-Shimoda nikki*, and annotated by Kawata Sadao, and Fujii Sadafumi, Toyo bunko, No.124 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992) (all citations are from this edition).
- 14 Koga, Kinichiro (Masaru), "Roshia osetsu kakari Koga Kinichiro (Masaru) seishi nikki" [Diaries of the western mission of Koga Kinichiro (Masaru), charged with the Reception of the Russians], in *Bakumatsu, furoku* (supplement) 1 (Tokyo, 1913), pp.194-413. I wish to thank Prof. Takashi Katsumata for his invaluable assistance in reading this, and other, Japanese sources.
- 15 Wada, Haruki, *Kaikoku-nichiro kokkyou koushou* [The Opening of Japan: Russo-Japanese Border Negotiations] (Tokyo: NHK, 1991).
- 16 Posyet, p.118, *Baltika-Amur*, p.90.
- 17 Yasuda, Koichi, "Siebold and the Russian Government: Introduction from a Newly Discovered Collection of Letters," p.35, Siebold's Florilegium of Japanese Plants, Vol. II: Articles and Catalog (Maruzen, Tokyo, 1994).
- 18 Engelgardt, p.317
- 19 All old-style dates from Russian and Japanese sources have been converted into the modern, Gregorian calendar.
- 20 Putiatin, "Vsepod. otchet," p.41. (hereafter as "Vsepod. otchet")
- 21 *Baltika-Amur*, p.116
- 22 *Ibid.*, p.116.
- 23 *Op.cit.*, p. 41.
- 24 R-K., "Iz dnevnika," Aug.10 (22), p.191 (hereafter as "Dnevnik")
- 25 "Fregat," p.249.
- 26 *Op. cit.*, Aug.22, p.191.
- 27 "Vsepod. otchet," p.41
- 28 "Dnevnik," p.191
- 29 "Fregat," p.246
- 30 *Baltika-Amur*, p.118.
- 31 "Fregat," p.246
- 32 *Baltika-Amur*, p.118; Posyet, p.21.
- 33 "Fregat," p.256.
- 34 "Dnevnik," p.191.
- 35 "Fregat," p.267.
- 36 Krasnostchekova, *Acta*, p.106
- 37 "Vsepod. otchet," p.50; "Fregat," p.286.

- 38 Ibid, pp.279-281.
- 39 Koga, p.253.
- 40 "Vsepod. otchet," p.50 and "Otchet," p.155 disagree about this date.
- 41 "Otchet," p.155.
- 42 *Baltika-Amur*, p.137.
- 43 "Fregat," pp.293-294. But according to an addendum (pp.810) such an incident actually occurred earlier, on Sept.27.
- 44 "Vsepod. otchet," p.52.
- 45 "Dnevnik," p.169; "Vsepod. otchet," p.52. Lensen describes how "the Russians began to worry about the Kniaz' Menshikov and the Vostok. Two months had already passed since the transport had left for Shanghai after letters, newspapers, and provisions. Yet, she had been instructed to be back within seven weeks" (p. 31). Here, Lensen seems to be confusing the transport with the schooner, and forgetting what he himself had earlier written: "[Putiatin] decided to send the transport back to Shanghai" (p.24). Putiatin's report confirms that he sent the schooner back to Shanghai, but gives no date. The Russian Ministry report states that it left Oct. 3. Hence, it had been gone only about a month when it returned on Nov. 4. On the other hand, Putiatin had told R-K. to return in six weeks, and so was genuinely worried about the schooner, and had "almost given up hope of [its] return."
- 46 "Fregat," p.303.
- 47 See "Dnevnik," "Baltika-Amur," and "Sluchai i zametki na vintovoi shkune 'Vostok'," *Morskoi Sbornik*, Nos. 5, 6, 12 (1858).
- 48 "Dnevnik," Nov.15, p.169.
- 49 Ibid, Nov.16, p.169.
- 50 Ibid, Nov.19, p.170, *Baltika-Amur*, pp.236-237.
- 51 "Fregat," p.304-06, "Vsepod. otchet," p.56, "Otchet," p.156.
- 52 Both Lensen and Wada give it as Jan. 3, based on Putiatin's report and the Russian Ministry report (Dec.22) and on Japanese sources. The Nagasaki city historical chronicles [Nagasaki shishi nenpyo] also list it as Dec.5 (Jan.3). However, R-K.'s diary, usually very reliable, clearly states that the Russians arrived on Dec.23 (Jan.4) Wednesday. Goncharov does not state clearly what date the Russians arrived, but he does say that it was a Wednesday.
- 53 "Dnevnik," Dec.23 (Jan.4), p.185.
- 54 "Fregat," p.345.
- 55 *Baltika-Amur*, p.238.
- 56 "Fregat," pp.345-346.
- 57 Kawaji, p.46; Koga, p.236.
- 58 "Fregat," p.347.
- 59 "Fregat," pp.347-348, 360.
- 60 *Ibid*, p.352; "Vsepod. otchet," p.57.
- 61 Kawaji, pp.52, 93.
- 62 "Fregat," pp.353-55, 372-73; "Vsepod. otchet," pp.57-58, *Baltika-Amur*, p.251.
- 63 Koga, p.240.
- 64 Kawaji, pp.65-67.

- 65 "Vsepod. otchet," p.58.
66 "Fregat," p.366; Koga, p.244.
67 "Fregat," p.368.
68 "Dnevnik," pp.193-194.
69 "Fregat," pp.370-371; "Dnevnik," Dec.31 (Jan.12), pp.191-192.
70 "Fregat," p.371.
71 "Dnevnik," Jan.24, p.195.
72 Koga, p.254; Kawaji, pp.88-89 (from Nagamochi Kyojiro's record).
73 "Vsepod. otchet," p.61.
74 Kawaji, p.80.
75 Siebold later seized on this small success to claim the lion's share of the credit for "opening Japan" for the Dutch and the Russians. However, even he acknowledged the role of Commodore Perry and the Americans in Kanagawa in inclining the Shogunate toward such a significant departure from its traditional refusal to open ports to foreign ships. This author believes that most of the credit for unlocking the door to Japan should still be assigned to Commodore Perry and the Americans in Kanagawa.
76 "Dnevnik," Jan.21, (Feb.2) p.197.
77 Koga, p.266.
78 Fregat, Letter to the Yazykovs, 13/25 March 1854, p.688.
79 "Vsepod. otchet," p.61.
80 Lensen (p.70) gives the arrival date as April 18, based on a Japanese source. But the Nagasaki shishi nenpyo (historical chronicles) lists it as March 23 (April 20). This date agrees with that given in R-K.'s diary and is also confirmed by a careful reading of Putiatin's report. Goncharov gives it as April 21!
81 "Dnevnik," April 8 (20), p.206; "Vsepod. otchet." p.64; "Fregat," pp.468-471.
82 Koga, p.308.