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Back to the Future in Eastern Europe:  
A Comparison of Post-1989 with Post-1918 Tendencies  

Sabrina Petra Ramet

I

Twice in this century, Eastern Europe has been liberated from foreign rule, and new indigenous elites have taken power, promising democracy and a more equitable division of the wealth. In 1918, the end of World War One saw the tumbling of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties, the final disintegration of the long crumbling Ottoman empire, and the withdrawal of Russia from Finland and the Baltic States, and, for a brief period, also from Belorussia (as it was commonly called then) and Ukraine. In 1989, the sudden collapse of the communist political order in Eastern Europe, accompanied by the rapid shrinkage of Soviet power, swept virtually all the region’s communist elites out of power — everywhere except in Serbia and Montenegro, although many consider Romania a hybrid case. The purpose of this essay is to assess points of comparison between the two historical situations, to consider the similarity in the challenges and complications confronted and in the responses devised, and to examine some mitigating factors which, in spite of all the commonalities, might enable at least some of the states in the area to chart a different course.

The argument unfolds over the four succeeding sections. In sections 2-4, I explore seven aspects in which there are some significant parallels between the two historical periods, closing section 4 with a brief listing of some additional factors in which there may also be a comparison. In these sections, I develop the argument that there are some respects in which Eastern Europe’s leaders are returning to tasks undertaken before, in the interwar period, noting the ways in which the outlook and assumptions of present-day elites reproduce, albeit with variations, those of the interwar elites. The argument casts doubt on the prospects for democracy and stability in the region. Section 5 is devoted to exploring certain significant differences between Eastern Europe in the interwar period and Eastern Europe today, and makes an effort to assess what these differences will mean in political terms. The article closes by identifying certain crucial policy tasks which analysts should watch closely to obtain a gauge on the overall political tendencies.

In part, the question of the potential for the political recapitulation of the past is conjoined to an ineluctable choice of one view of history over others. There are, as far as I am aware, at most four alternative views of history, two of ancient vintage, and two of them more modern in origin. The ancient approaches, developed and articulated in Greece some 2,400 years ago, are the cyclical view of history (associated with Parmenides and Plato), and the linear-dialectical view of history (associated with Heraclitus, and, more recently, with Hegel). The birth of the liberal tradition with Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke gave rise to two further possibilities: the linear-
nondialectical (liberal-optimistic) view, which I would associate with nineteenth-century Social Darwinism (especially Herbert Spencer); and the chaotic-antiteleological (liberal-pessimistic) view, which underlies much popular and journalistic writing about world politics.

In developing my argument, I am suggesting that the cyclical view of history may be more useful than any of the linear approaches — whether dialectical or nondialectical — though this should not be given a crass interpretation nor lead the observer to expect exact replications of historical developments. The point is that certain themes reappear, certain problems recur, or perhaps, remaining permanently unresolved, are confronted in ways that evolve cyclically, certain historical patterns return, like ships coming into port.

II

In looking for parallels between the post-1918 and post-1989 situations in Eastern Europe, there are a number of aspects in which a comparison may be drawn. I propose, in the following pages, to take up the following aspects: the general historical context; the rupture of transport systems and trade regimes as a result of border changes; the reopening of border questions and the stimulation of local conflicts; difficulties in adjusting in the legal, cultural, and economic spheres; the delegitimation of the old order and the need for entirely new principles of legitimation; the challenges of democratization in lands hitherto ruled by authoritarian systems; and the kindling (or rekindling) of ethnic animosities. Certain other factors will be noted very briefly after that, viz., comparisons with regard to economic duress, land reform, controversies about the place of religion in society, and challenges associated with the need to reconstruct a new infrastructure, especially in education and in the media.

**Historical context.** Both periods involve region-wide political and economic transition, in which the prevailing socio-political order collapsed very abruptly. Transition may be understood as the processes that span the period of instability between the breakdown of a once-stable political pattern and the attainment of a new equilibrium, a new stability; this understanding is founded on the principles of systems theory. The goal of any transition is stability. The goal of the post-1989 transition, as seen by most of the elites in most countries in the region, is stable democracy. By this, the East European elites understand parliamentary democracy on the West European model, albeit with some American admixture. The focus on democracy is evident: from the work habits of the region's constitutional commissions which, in framing their own constitutions, have first studied and reviewed the constitutions of many other states, mostly of Western Europe and the US; from the invitations to American and British constitutional and legal scholars to present seminars to legislators in these countries (mostly in the years 1990–91); and from the important role that lawyers and judges of the American Bar Association have played in assisting the elites in drawing up legislation across many policy spheres.¹

Both transitions (post-1918 and post-1989) are characterized by what we might call “the acceleration of history.” The triumph of the Western Allies in World War
One, together with the revolutionary upheavals in Russia and throughout the region, led to the sudden collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg dynasties in 1918, and of the Ottoman Empire, also in 1918. The entire region was affected by these changes. In 1989-90, the communist order collapsed throughout the region, and only in Serbia and Montenegro were the incumbent communist elites able to prolong their hold on power, and here only by abandoning the communist program and embracing a new nationalist-chauvinist program. The Habsburgs and the Ottomans had been attempting major systemic reforms during the last decade of their sway, and the Habsburg monarch offered the federalization of the realm in 1918 in a last-ditch effort to save the empire and his throne. In the 1980s, the communists undertook various reform schemes and the words “reform” and “democratization” were constantly on the lips of communists everywhere in the region, except in Albania.

The end of World War One put six new states on the map: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and, insofar as its sovereignty had been limited within the Habsburg Dual Monarchy, Hungary, as well as city-states in Fiume and Danzig. The number increases to 10 if one counts also the Baltic states and Finland. Between 1989 and February 1994, the division of preexisting states has given rise to seven new states: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro). Again, adding the Baltic states brings the total to 10.

In both cases political transition brought into politics many persons who either were not professional politicians or had been actively fighting the preexisting system. In both cases, thus, the new elites have included literary intellectuals (Masaryk, Havel), musicians (Paderewski, Landsbergis), professors (Tsankov, Antall), revolutionaries (Pilsudski, if I may characterize his rather complex career in this way, and Walesa), and chauvinistic nationalists (Horthy, Milošević). Some of these had been engaged in behind-the-scenes politicking for years, even though their professional careers were prima facie nonpolitical (here: Marasyk, Havel, Paderewski, Tsankov).

And in both cases, the incoming elites have, with few exceptions, promised democracy and a more equitable division of resources.

*Rupture of transport and trade systems.* The wholesale border changes in 1918 and again in 1989 have inevitably complicated transport systems and trade regimes.

This problem confronted almost all the East European states in 1918. Czechoslovakia was a case in point:

The railroad and road networks of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia had been designed to connect them with Vienna, while those of Slovakia and Ruthenia had focused on Budapest; consequently, the transport connections between these formerly Austrian and formerly Hungarian parts of Czechoslovakia were poor. Initially, indeed, the only main railroad line between them was the one running through the disputed Tesin area, and by the end of the interwar period there were only four additional secondary connections.\(^2\)
Yugoslavia, stitched together from Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of the dissolved Habsburg empire, faced even more severe problems. Again railroads in formerly Habsburg areas (e.g., Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia) had been laid out with an eye to integrating these regions into Austria-Hungary, and hence connections to regions east and southeast were poor. This situation was further complicated by differences in railway gauge, and by the generally lower level of development of non-Habsburg regions. Thus, while the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes inherited 59 km. of railway lines per 1,000 km² in Croatia and Slavonia, and 65 km. per 1,000 km² in Slovenia and Medjimurje, the corresponding figures for Bosnia-Herzegovina, northern Serbia, and southern Serbia were 33, 34, and 20 km. of railway lines per 1,000 km², respectively.3

Other new states had similar problems. There were, thus, almost no rail connections between the three sections of Poland (the sectors occupied respectively by Germany, Austria, and Russia), or between Transylvania and the Regat (the Old Kingdom).4

The breakup of the old empires also meant the end of de facto customs unions. The new state of Czechoslovakia soon renounced its trade treaty with Hungary and the two states erected tariff walls.5 Until 1918, Slovakia had been entirely integrated into the larger Hungarian market, but in the 1920s, Slovak trade was gradually reoriented to the Czech lands, and Czech capital bought out Hungarian interests in Slovakia. The Budapest industrial region suffered, of course, from being cut off from a number of its former sources of raw materials (especially in Slovakia and Transylvania) and from its former domestic markets. In Poland, the new frontiers produced an element of chaos in local industry and agriculture for similar reasons, but also because of Russia's disappearance from world trade.

The post-1989 transition does not involve (at this writing) the merger of any hitherto separately-administered regions (unless we count Germany as integral to the region), but is characterized throughout by tendencies toward fragmentation and secession. But even here there are some respects in which similar considerations may be applied vis-a-vis the transport sector. Macedonia is a clear example. After working for years on the "Brotherhood and Unity" highway linking Macedonia with Serbia and other parts of Socialist Yugoslavia, Macedonians now worry that that highway could be used by Serbian tanks, and are dismayed by the underdevelopment of road and railway links with Bulgaria.

But the trade sector provides a much closer parallel. The breakup of COMECON, the economic and political decline of Russia, and the disappearance of the Soviet-era trade regime based on the "transferable ruble" are macro-level factors that are providing the driving force for major reorientations of trade in the region. But there are also additional factors specific to certain countries. The breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had a major impact on trading patterns. Trade between the Czech Republic and Slovakia fell 60 per cent in January 1993, for example, compared with the average monthly level for 1992.6 Both republics, like other states in the region, scrambled to boost trade with the West, and by May 1993, 55 per cent of Slovakia's exports, for instance, went to Western Europe.7 The former Yugoslav republics have also had to adjust to changing markets. In their case, the outbreak of
war between Serbia and two of its neighbors has compelled these states to make even more drastic adjustments. The imposition of the UN economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter, Serbia and Montenegro) in May 1992 (toughened in April 1993) has forced Serbia to rely on trade with sympathetic states willing to defy the embargo — in particular Greece, Russia, China, and Libya.

In both transition periods, the disruption of transport and trade systems was sudden, compelling the states concerned to make major economic adjustments under duress, while still in the process of establishing, or transforming, their political systems.

**Creation or reopening of border questions.** What is especially striking about both transitions is that both began with widespread social chaos, revolutionary upheavals, and local conflicts. The First World War officially ended at the end of 1918, but the borders of several states in the region were only settled in 1921, after Czechoslovak troops had seized Polish-inhabited Tešín, Austrian-inhabited Sudetenland, and Hungarian-inhabited areas that became part of southern Slovakia, after the Serbian/Yugoslav army seized the Hungarian-inhabited Vojvodina by force, after Romanian troops had penetrated deep into central Hungary, securing Romanian conquest of Transylvania, and after Poland went to war with Russia in an ultimately successful endeavor to annex a large swathe of Ukrainian and Belorussian territory. The only plebiscites conducted in Eastern Europe were held in what became Austrian Burgenland, and in Silesia (divided between Germany and Poland).

The entire region was riddled with border disputes. Germany and Poland quarreled over the “Polish corridor” in which mostly Germans lived, while German-Lithuanian relations were strained over Lithuania’s occupation of the Baltic port of Memel. Lithuania resented Poland’s occupation of the Wilno district, but the Poles in turn resented Czechoslovakia’s seizure of Tešín. Hungary had border disputes with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, who in turn formed the anti-Hungarian “Little Entente.” Bulgaria resented the loss of the Southern Dobruja to Romania, of Macedonia to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later renamed Yugoslavia), and of its Aegean outlet to Greece. Albanian irredentism riveted on sections of Yugoslavia and Greece, while Greece, in turn, craved southern Albania, which it referred to as “Northern Epirus.” There was not a country free of border conflicts in the entire region. The situation was so extreme, and the borders drawn with such utter contempt for the actual wishes of the local inhabitants, that by 1932, even Britain and France, the countries most responsible for the Versailles system, were showing some sympathy for the idea of revising the peace treaties in favor of the Hungarians and the Bulgarians.

Happily, the post-1989 scenario is not as extreme. But even so, a number of border conflicts have flared up, some of them with pernicious effect. Here, the most obvious border conflicts are those between Serbia and Croatia, and among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. But there are other border conflicts in the region, with varying potency to influence domestic and foreign policy agendas. Here I might mention Russian separatism in Moldova, which has already entangled Romania to the extent that Romania satisfies some of Moldova’s import needs. Other border con-
flicts would include the Serb-Albanian dispute over Kosovo, Hungarian sensitivities about the treatment of Hungarians in Slovakia and Vojvodina, Greek frictions with Albania over what Athens still refers to as “Northern Epirus,” and Greek nonrecognition of the Republic of Macedonia. Interestingly enough, two of the noisiest border disputes of the communist era — between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania, and between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia — seem to have largely faded from view. This development is due, at least in part, to caution in Budapest and Sofia lest reckless rhetoric inflame political passions and stoke interethnic conflict.

Difficulties in adjusting in the legal, cultural, and economic spheres. After 1918, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia were all faced with the task of integrating territories with disparate legal, cultural, and economic traditions and patterns into a common system. This process of integration took years, and in some respects, was not even complete when the region plunged again into war.

The three sections of Poland operated initially under different systems of taxation and education. Only Germany had introduced universal education, but the Germans had not permitted any Polish-language schools, not even at the primary level. In Austrian Galicia, by contrast, the educational system had been under Polish control and there were two universities (Kraków and Lwów); but the system itself was primitive and illiteracy was widespread in ex-Austrian Galicia. In Warsaw, the Poles inherited a university which had been offering classes in Russian only.

During late 1918 and 1919, there were as many as six currencies in circulation in Poland: German marks, Austrian crowns, Russian rubles, Polish marks, “occupation marks” issued by the German High Command in the east, and varieties of Russian currency. Until 1920, there was still a tariff barrier between former Prussian Poland and the rest of Poland, and one even needed a passport to travel from Warsaw to Poznań. There was no unified transport system either: more than 50 Austrian-built and German-built railway lines extended to the limit of their former holdings; where the Russians had ruled there were only 10 rail lines. The differences in the rail system extended to differences in signalling, in braking systems, in safety devices, and in gauge.

There were also four legal systems functioning in the emergent Poland (in the Russian sector, the region of the “Congress Kingdom” retained a modified version of the Napoleonic code, while elsewhere, the same legal system had obtained as in the rest of the Russian Empire). The long separation had affected the political culture and even the perceived identity of the Poles, so that in Galicia, a kind of dual identity had taken hold and locals thought of themselves simultaneously as “Poles” and “Austrians.”

In Czechoslovakia, the Czech provinces inherited the Austrian legal code, while Slovakia and Ruthenia initially operated under the less liberal Hungarian code. There were also economic differences between the Czech and Slovak regions. Farm holdings in the Czech regions were, for example, tangibly larger than those in Slovakia, contributing to a higher standard of living for rural Czechs. Indeed, the Czech peasantry produced for the market and thus welcomed increases in agricultural prices, while the Slovak smallholders had to purchase a substantial portion of their diet and
therefore were averse to such price increases. And there were also important differences in religious temper between the two regions. It bears recollection that Fr. Andrej Hlinka (1864-1938) founded his clerical Slovak People’s Party in 1912 in order to combat and resist the influence of Czech “free thinking” among Slovak intellectuals and the spread of socialist ideas from Czech workers to Slovak workers: Slovak autonomism, thus, was born of differences in religious and cultural outlooks.

The situation in the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was even more complex. At first, six distinct legal-administrative systems prevailed, fueling uncertainty and administrative chaos. And even though the government soon established a special ministry to standardize the laws, progress was slow. Even the Serbian Orthodox Church found itself saddled with significant administrative differences from one region to another. Orthodox bishops in Karlovac and Bosnia-Herzegovina were especially dogged in resisting changes which they feared would reduce their local autonomy, and it was not until 1929 that the Serbian Orthodox Church achieved organizational and administrative unity.

Similar problems also plagued Romania in the early years after 1918, as authorities confronted the need to synchronize the diverse legal and administrative systems found in the Regat, in Transylvania, in Bukovina, and in Bessarabia.

I have already suggested that the post-1989 transition is characterized by a more general tendency toward fragmentation. There are, thus, only two places where this issue has presented itself in the same form — in Germany (with the integration of East Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany) and, in a very different way, in the Serbian-occupied territories which, as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić has admitted, Serbs intend to absorb into a “Greater Serbia.” But other states in the region may yet face parallel tasks in the future, such as Albania (if Kosovo is eventually conjoined to it), Croatia (if it succeeds in annexing what it calls “Herzeg-Bosna”), and Romania (if and when Moldova is ever finally reunited with Romania proper).

In the short run, the German experience betrays some parallels to the earlier cases. These parallels include local resistance to specific changes in legislation (especially among women opposed to the delegalization of abortion, and also in regard to regional consciousness, with a sudden realization on the part of East Germans that they do not share the same cultural and political outlooks as West Germans), and differential levels of unemployment, feeding inter-regional resentments.

But if there are some differences between the post-1918 and post-1989 transitions in terms of the roots of the problem, elites in both transitions have nonetheless faced the same result: chaos in bureaucracy and administration. All the elites in the region have been confronted with the urgent need to adopt entirely new legislation affecting all spheres of public life, to mold and change the institutional structures of the system, to overcome the overlap of functions which was a hallmark of the communist system, and to train new personnel or carryovers to function according to new procedures within the framework of new legislation. When I visited Ljubljana in March 1992, for two weeks of interviews with government ministers and party leaders, I was struck by the degree to which most of them felt overwhelmed by the enormity

67
of the tasks which confronted them, and impressed with the large number of bills passed into law each month.

Legitimation of the new order. In interwar Eastern Europe, after the overthrow of the dynasties, there were several competing sources of legitimation, among which the most important were (a) the appeal to peasant democracy (associated with Stamboliski in Bulgaria,\textsuperscript{18} Radić in Croatia, and Tăranism in Romania\textsuperscript{19}); (b) national­ism, always associated with the glorification of past history and when appropriate, associated also with irredentism; (c) religion (most overtly manifested in the loud appeals to religion made by the Slovak People’s Party of Hlinka and Tiso and by Codreanu’s League of the Archangel Michael, but also relevant for other politicians, including Masaryk, who believed that one of the primary tasks in politics was “how to resurrect the values of Christianity,”\textsuperscript{20} and Hungary’s Bishop Ottokár Prohászka, generally regarded as the spiritual leader of the Horthyite counterrevolution, who traced Hungary’s territorial losses in the Treaty of Trianon to Jewish influence and championed “positive Christianity,” order, traditional values, and opposition to Jewish influence\textsuperscript{21}; (d) the appeal to charismatic authority (the most obvious example being Poland’s Marshal Piłsudski who once described himself, in a speech before the State Tribunal, as “the greatest man in Poland,”\textsuperscript{22} although Bulgaria’s Tsar Boris and Romania’s Corneliu Codreanu clearly made a similar appeal, and for that matter, after Piłsudski’s death in 1935, Poland’s ruling elite (the Sanacja) tried quite deliberately to build a new hero-cult around Piłsudski’s chosen successor, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły\textsuperscript{23}; briefly (e) radical egalitarianism (briefly promoted in Hungary by coercive means, by Béla Kun, before his overthrow by Admiral Horthy in summer 1919); and (f) parliamentary politics.

I pointedly refer, in (f), to “parliamentary politics,” rather than to liberal-democratic values, because in spite of the familiarity of some of the elites with liberal ideas, they lacked sufficient force to serve as an exclusive vehicle for legitimation. “Parliamentary politics” is, of course, the formal-institutional expression of what might be liberal democracy. But in its East European interwar incarnation, parliamentary politics was too often understood in terms of everyone getting his or her share — and hence, Stamboliski’s well-known contempt for the old-style political parties. Liberal democracy, thus, lacked independent force for legitimation in interwar Eastern Europe, and even parliamentary politics was often viewed as a rather shabby, even sordid, display. Hence, something else was needed. And given the shared history of lengthy struggles against foreign rule, combined with border problems rife in the area, nationalism was the most obvious and most commonly employed legitimating force, typically harnessed in combination with other available legitimating resources.

In fact, despite the nominal profession to want to create functioning democratic systems, the interwar elites frequently rejected the individualism which is entailed in liberal concepts of democracy.\textsuperscript{24} The ideas of Heinrich von Treitschke were the common currency of the age, and most East European ruling elites in the interwar period would have agreed with the following remarks by Treitschke:

How far is the individual responsible for the morality of the State to which he
Back to the Future in Eastern Europe

belongs? Here the Natural Law, which defines the State as nothing but a collection of small individualities, goes seriously astray. We have already recognized that la volonté générale is not the same thing as la volonté de tous. The pure individualism of the Natural Law teaching came to the preposterous conclusion that the citizen has the right to desert the State if it declares a war which he holds to be unjust. But since his first duty is obedience, such infettered power cannot be granted to his individual conscience. For me, the upholding of the mother country is a moral duty. The machinery of the political world would cease to revolve if every man made bold to say “the State should not; therefore I will not.”

But if the claims of the state come first, the claims of nationality, for Treitschke, are not far behind. As Treitschke put it,

...even at present a man feels himself primarily a German or a Frenchman, and only in the second place as a man in the wider sense. This is stamped upon every page of history. It is then both historically and physiologically untrue that human beings enter upon existence first as men, and [only] afterwards as compatriots.

Thus, for Treitschke, one is a citizen first, a national second, and a human being only third and derivately. This same ordering inspired the social and political systems of interwar Eastern Europe.

The interwar elites dealt with the question of legitimacy by construing it in terms of the boundaries of the state, rather than in terms of its form of government. It is for this reason that the “Czechoslovak nation” and the “tri-named people” (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) were invented, and that the Polish government made energetic efforts to Polonize the Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants in Poland’s eastern territories.

The collapse of communism 1989–90 reopened the question of legitimacy in Eastern Europe and of the five most common appeals for relegitimation, three of them recapitulate interwar options. The three “old” options are: nationalism, religion, and charismatic authority; the new options are appeals to liberal democracy valued either as a safeguard against oppression or as a route to economic prosperity. The appeal to nationalism has been central to most secessionist states in the area, specifically Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia, but much less so in the cases of Slovenia and Macedonia, and where nationalism has been raised to a dominant position, chauvinism has followed in its wake.

Religious legitimation has figured as a secondary, even ancillary, resource in Poland, Croatia, and perhaps surprisingly, Serbia as well, where Milošević received the Orthodox Patriarch at one time and began to have the Orthodox Church praised as a bulwark of Serbian national culture.

The two “new” appeals share a common feature: they both appeal to the welfare of the community as a collectivity — the one to the political welfare of the community, the other to its economic welfare. And unlike appeals to nationalism, religion,
and charismatic authority, they admit of some “objective” neutral criteria of success.

Comparing the two transitions in the light of the question of legitimation, one may say that the interwar endeavor to build democracies was already subverted in advance by the strong appeal to nationalism, while the post-1989 endeavor shows greater diversity from state to state, suggesting one reason why the prospects for democracy in the region vary at this juncture from state to state.

III

Challenge of democratization. It is commonly noted that Eastern Europe’s experimentation with democracy in the interwar era was short-lived. In Hungary, liberal democracy did not even have a chance to entrench itself; Count Mihály Károlyi, an aristocrat with liberal-democratic views, took office as Prime Minister on 2 November 1918, and attempted to carry out a liberal program. But pressures from the victorious Allies contributed to the fall of the Károlyi government in March 1919. He was succeeded first by a communist dictatorship of the proletariat, lasting 133 days, and subsequently by the anti-democratic, reactionary government of Miklós Horthy. A new franchise law of 1922 reduced the Hungarian electorate by about 25 per cent; intricate restrictions included minimal education requirements, effectively disenfranchising almost the entire agrarian sector, and opposition parties were, in any event, barred from organizing in the village.

In Poland, Marshal Piłsudski seized power in May 1926 and thereafter combined manipulation, preemptive arrests, and curtailment of the right to form associations, to establish a “soft” dictatorship. The elections of 1930, in particular, were held after the summary arrest of several thousand opposition leaders, and the government’s electoral commissioners invalidated 214 election lists before allowing the voting to take place. On 1 March 1932, the autonomy of the universities was curtailed, and the Ministry of Education was given the power to remove professors who were (politically) “unfit.” A 23 August 1932 decree revoked the irremovability of judges and in October of that year, the right to form associations was subjected to new limitations. In 1935, one of the first acts of Piłsudski’s successors was to restrict the franchise — a move justified as eliminating professional politicians and making the Sejm “less partisan and more patriotic.”

Elsewhere royal dictatorship was imposed — in Yugoslavia in 1929, in Romania in 1938, and in Bulgaria in 1935 (but toughened in 1938). Only in Czechoslovakia did democracy fare somewhat better. But even here, the founders of the state pointedly excluded German, Hungarian, and Ruthenian deputies from the provisional National Assembly’s deliberations about the state constitution; only when the constitution had been adopted were the representatives of the national minorities permitted to participate in the proceedings. What the Slovaks and Ruthenes wanted above all was political autonomy (which in fact had been promised to them) — and neither Masaryk nor Beneš was willing to discuss this. What the Sudeten Austrians and the Hungarians wanted was that plebiscites be conducted in their areas to allow them to determine whether or not they wished to be conjoined with the new state of Czechoslovakia. “A vicious circle was soon established [in Czechoslovakia].
national minorities were denied regional autonomy because their loyalty was in doubt, and they remained disloyal because they were given no self-government. 38

Why did democracy fail to take root in interwar Eastern Europe? I believe that at least five reasons may be cited. The first, already discussed above, is the fact that the borders of these states were drawn by force without regard to the wishes of the populations concerned. The only problem-free borders in the entire region were the Hungarian border with Austria, and Romania's borders with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It is not without significance that the first of these was one of only two borders in the region which had been fixed by the outcome of a plebiscite, and that the parties involved in the latter two cases were co-signatories of the so-called “Little Entente.” In this respect, the contemporary situation is somewhat more promising; the borders of Poland and the Czech Republic, at least, are problem-free, and Hungary has long since given up any irredentist dreams (although full-scale genocide against the Hungarians of Vojvodina could change this). But in post-1989 Eastern Europe, problematic borders are largely restricted to the Balkans.

A second factor was the sheer proliferation of political parties. In Czechoslovakia in 1920, 23 parties contested the elections, and 17 of them elected deputies to the parliament; in elections for the Constituent Assembly in Yugoslavia, held that same year, 22 political parties or groups fielded candidates, and 16 of them elected deputies. In Poland, 92 political parties registered to contest the 1925 elections, and 32 of these obtained representation in the Sejm. And in Romania, 102 political parties vied for seats in the elections of December 1933. Moreover, the number of political parties actually increased over time in Yugoslavia and Romania. 39 The proliferation of parties in parliament made necessary elaborate coalitions which could only prove highly unstable. Cabinets fell with regularity throughout the region, including in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, in these conditions, responsible government was more difficult to attain, and ambitious politicians found it expedient to resort to extremist and even alarmist rhetoric in the effort to build their electoral bases.

In this respect, Eastern Europe since 1989 has gotten off to an inauspicious start. As early as the beginning of 1990, there were already 17 political parties operating in East Germany, 80 in Poland, 35 in Czechoslovakia (with 22 of them actually fielding candidates in the June 1990 elections), 22 in Hungary, 78 in Romania, 35 in Bulgaria, and at least 86 in Yugoslavia. 40 As in interwar Eastern Europe, some of these parties have rivetted on narrow issues, such as the Rock'n' Roll Party in Serbia, the Liberal Sexual Party in Hungary, the Hungarian Health Party, and the Friends of Beer Party and Union of Rabbit Raisers, both in Czechoslovakia. And as in the interwar period, the plurality of parties has contributed to parliamentary weakness in Poland (at least until the elections of September 1993), 41 Romania, and Bulgaria. In Croatia and Serbia, on the other hand, the same result (parliamentary weakness) has resulted from other factors.

A third factor underlying the failure of democracy in the interwar period was the rise of fascist parties throughout the region, gaining especial importance in Croatia, Serbia, Romania, and Hungary. 42 Indeed, the growing strength of the fascist Iron Guard contributed directly to Romanian King Carol's decision in February 1938 to outlaw all political parties, enlarge his own powers, and appoint a nonparty
government under the nominal prime ministership of Orthodox Patriarch Miron Cristea. 43

In contemporary post-1989 Eastern Europe there are both atavistic neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties operating throughout the region, 44 and “new-style” nationalist formations such as the Romania Mare party in Romania, István Csurka’s Hungarian Truth Party, 45 and the authoritarian regimes of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia. 46 Vladimir Mečiar’s governing style, in Slovakia, also shows some marked tendencies toward chauvinistic nationalism, and he has been accused of making anti-Semitic comments in public speeches. 47 The neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties do not have any chance of coming to power anywhere in the region, at least not in the foreseeable future, but they have the capacity, all the same, to make a great deal of trouble, harassing people who are “different” in any way, polarizing societies, and distorting political agendas. But in both the short run and the long run, it is the “new-style” nationalists who are apt to constitute the more dangerous threat to tolerance and democracy in the region.

The fourth factor which I would like to highlight as corrosive of democracy in the interwar period was the lack of a “civic culture” in the East European societies — itself a reflection of the absence, in the educational system at the time, of an educational philosophy which might stress the importance of tolerance, of compromise, of coexistence, of the capacity for empathy. And yet, on the contrary, the educational system of interwar Eastern Europe placed especial emphasis on the times of “glory” when the armies of one’s own country savaged and occupied other peoples’ territories, and East European youth in the region as a whole were taught to regard their own nation as racially, morally, intellectually, and psychologically “superior” to their neighbors. 48 Hugh Seton-Watson highlighted the importance of this factor in 1942. As he wrote at the time,

The most essential condition...for the establishment of democratic Government in Eastern Europe is an improvement and intensification of general Education. This means not only the education of the youth, but the raising of the tone of the press, literature, and all forms of expression of public opinion. 49

The failure to educate the populations for democracy was reflected in the rapid growth of authoritarian parties in several of these states, and in the ease with which democracy was subverted.

And yet, the elites of the interwar era were not oblivious to the importance of this factor. Kazimierz Bartel, Piłsudski’s first Prime Minister, said as much in May 1926:

The Government understands that it is not enough today to maintain legal order provisionally. It is further necessary to raise public life to a level of morality which will be the measure of the internal regeneration and recovery of the Republic. This moral regeneration, this development of the Republic, through respect for law and social justice, and by the elimination of all party and individual egoism, the Government considers, not only its future function, but
also its present task.  The communists, of course, promised to educate people in such a way as to foster coexistence and harmony among peoples and “democratic behavior”; but in actual fact, the communist regimes completely failed in this ambition to fashion a “new socialist person.” And in some societies, the communist system actually worked in the opposite direction, to foster social atomism and withdrawal.  The overall effect of communist rule in Eastern Europe was to replicate a pattern which Alexis de Tocqueville identified in all despotic systems (I would say some), in which people become

...far too much disposed to think exclusively of their own interests, to become self-seekers practicing a narrow individualism and caring nothing for the public good. Far from trying to counteract such tendencies despotism encourages them, depriving the governed of any sense of solidarity and interdependence; of good-neighborly feelings and a desire to further the welfare of the community at large. It immures them, so to speak, each in his private life and, taking advantage of the tendency they already have to keep apart, it estranges them still more.

And, as Ken Jowitt has suggested, the Leninist legacy in Eastern Europe may be said to have fostered just such a frame of mind (though, I would add, with less success in Poland than elsewhere, and with more success in Romania than anywhere), so that contemporary political culture in Eastern Europe, despite all the professions to want to build democracy, is on the whole more conducive to authoritarian-capitalism rather than to liberal democracy. I would add only that the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and to some extent Poland and Hungary as well, constitute important exceptions to this general trend, although Hungary has an additional challenge of being overly “Budapest-centric.” But it is interesting to note in connection with Poland, that in an August 1992 poll, 46 per cent of Poles said that democracy was only “useful” if it produced economic prosperity, while only 13 per cent felt that democracy actually contributed to economic development.

And the fifth and final factor which contributed to the failure of democracy in interwar Eastern Europe is that, to a considerable extent, the elites of Eastern Europe either did not know what they were doing (this certainly applies to many of the politicians in Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, and to some Czech politicians), or were more interested in feathering their own nests than in creating workable democracies (this applies to most of the politicians in interwar Romania, as well as to most Bulgarian politicians after the fall of Stamboliski).

IV

Ethnic animosities. I have already discussed the border problems endemic in the region in both interwar and post-1989 Eastern Europe. But in both periods, there have also been serious ethnic animosities within the states themselves. In the inter-
war era, this related above all to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, both of which were dismantled at the end of this earlier period (Czechoslovakia 1938–39, Yugoslavia in 1941). But other states in the region also confronted serious internal problems of this kind — among them, and most obviously, Poland, but also Romania, with its Magyar, German, Ukrainian, and Russian minorities.

The policies pursued in this area, in Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia showed some surprising consistencies. In each of these cases, the government resisted demands for autonomous status, and pursued policies of linguistic assimilation and religious favoritism — in the Yugoslav case to the extent of wanting to deny that the Slovenian language was anything more than a bastardization of Serbian, as a result of Austrian manipulation.55

All four states adopted land reform packages that discriminated against ethnic minorities. Thus, in Czechoslovakia, the land reform bill was designed essentially to confiscate the estates of Austrian/German and Hungarian landlords and turn them over to Czech and Slovak tenants, and in Ruthenia, the land reform was carried out in such a way as to benefit Czech colonists from the western part of the country, rather than local Ruthene peasants.56 In Yugoslavia, a similar reform was applied in Bosnia, principally with an eye to breaking up the large estates of Muslim landowners, while the Yugoslav government also authorized the seizure of Hungarian estates in Bačka (Vojvodina) and the Banat, and the possessions of the Croatian nobility. In addition, Belgrade authorities seized 154,287 acres of land from Albanians in Kosovo, under the pretext of agrarian reform, turning about a third of it over to Serbian “colonists” (retaining the remainder for governmental and military uses) and drew up plans for the settlement of 50,000 Serbian families in Macedonia.57 Similarly, in Poland, land reform included an element of ethnic Polish “colonization” in erstwhile Ukrainian and Belorussian areas,58 while in Romania, the “wholesale removal of Magyars from Romanian government posts” was accompanied by “the expropriation of rural property belonging to ‘foreign’ [i.e., Hungarian and Saxon] landholders in Transylvania, Crisana, Maramures, and the Banat.”59

Again in education, ethnic discrimination was official policy in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania. After forcibly suppressing a renewed effort by the Albanians of Kosovo to join Albania, Belgrade authorities closed down all Albanian-language schools in the region. As Ivo Banac records,

The authorities first tried to assimilate Albanian children and youth by allowing them only Serbian-language education, using Bosnian Muslim teachers of proved pro-Serbian orientation for the purpose. But when it appeared that the Serbian schools, far from Serbianizing [the] Albanians, were providing them with the intellectual skills that could be used against the regime, Belgrade started discouraging public education for Albanians, permitting them only catechetical instruction, conducted by Muslim imams and Catholic priests. The authorities were convinced that these predominantly Muslim schools...would keep the Albanians...ignorant...60

In Vojvodina, the Yugoslav government closed all Hungarian-language schools, both
primary and secondary, although two of these were eventually reopened. Later, after
the assassination of King Alexander, the government used this as a pretext to expel a
large number of Hungarians from the Vojvodina.61

In Poland, authorities largely liquidated the existing system of Belorussian
primary schools by 1924/25, and curtailed the number of Ukrainian-language elemen­
tary schools by 80 per cent between 1921/22 and 1934/35. In fact, both the pre-Pił­
sudski and Pilsudski-ite governments obstructed Ukrainian and German efforts to
obtain schooling for their children in their own languages.62

Linguistic assimilation was pursued by vigorous policies of linguistic discrimina­
tion. Czech efforts to “Czechize” the Slovak language have already been noted, as
well as parallel efforts in Yugoslavia to promote the Serbian variant of Serbo-Croatian
as the sole language and variant of the country. A similar course was pursued in
Poland, where the 1931 census showed that only 68.9 per cent of the population claimed
Polish as their native language.63 In spite of that, a law passed in March 1933 made
Polish the official language in all local government bodies and curtailed the rights of
self-governing villages. Needless to say, non-Poles resented the policies and among
the Ukrainian minority, extremist organizations sprang up which burned crops as a
measure of resistance. Already in 1930, the Polish government replied by dispatching
“pacification squads” which burned down entire Ukrainian villages, slaughtered inno­
cent peasants, and tortured both adult and child-age Ukrainians taken into custody.64
Ironically, all of these excesses occurred after the Polish parliament had passed a law,
in 1922, recognizing the right of the Ukrainian-inhabited regions of Poland to local
autonomy: in spite of that formal recognition, the Ukrainians of Poland did not fare
any better than the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia or, until 1939, the Croats in Yugoslavia,
in their efforts to obtain autonomous status.

In many ways, the ethnic question remains the most troublesome in post-1989
Eastern Europe, with considerable potential for destabilizing given political systems,
polarizing societies, and as events have shown, fueling internecine war. The auton­
omy issue recurs in the post-1989 period with especial force. Some Serbs of Croatia,
for example, demanded wide-ranging autonomy as the price of remaining within
Croatia, although others began talking in terms of annexation to Serbia once it became
clear that Yugoslavia was breaking up.65 Tudjman’s failure to extend an offer of
political autonomy encouraged the growing violence to escalate to full-scale war, and
thus played into Serbian President Milosević’s hands. In Serbia, similarly, authorities
suppressed the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina between 1989 and
1990, and have consistently rebuffed requests from the Muslims of the Sandžak for
autonomous status.

In Slovakia and Romania, petitions by local ethnic Hungarians for autonomous
status have been rejected,66 while in the neighboring Czech Republic, there has been
strong sentiment among the public against any negotiations with the expelled Sudeten­
landers regarding any form of restitution.67 Demands by Istrians for autonomy within
Croatia, and by ethnic Serbs in Hungary for their own autonomous zone seem even less
likely to be met, but also less likely to lead to local turmoil.68

Other issues. Space limitations do not permit a detailed exploration of other
spheres of policy. But in brief, it is striking that in both transition periods, the elites had to deal with the question of land redistribution (agrarian reform in the 1920s; decollectivization in the 1990s); with economic stresses and dislocations rooted in region-wide, even continent-wide processes; with controversies between clericalist forces eager to place religion at the center of public life, to incorporate religion into the school curriculum, and to draft certain laws on the basis of dogmas of the dominant religion, and those opposed to such measures; and with the sundry complications associated variously with establishing or restructuring educational and media systems.

V

Given the parallels between Eastern Europe “then” and Eastern Europe “now,” it is not surprising that some energies that were let loose in that earlier era, are once again making their presence felt — whether nationalist chauvinism, or intolerant religious zeal, or even varieties of fascism. But, tallying up the balance, what factors might one cite which might dispose one to expect a less unstable developmental course in the 1990s than the region took in the 1920s and 1930s?

There are a number of factors which come to mind which, taken collectively, lead to the conclusion that however similar the challenges, it is not the same Eastern Europe which is confronting them.

The first, and in many ways a crucial variable, has to do with literacy and education levels. Illiteracy was a major problem in the earlier period. By 1918, illiteracy was minimal in Western Europe — e.g., 0.2 per cent in Denmark, 0.4 per cent in Germany, 6.8 per cent in Sweden. But it stood at 33 per cent in Hungary that year, and was still in excess of 30 per cent in Poland in 1931, after 12 years of compulsory education. In Romania, illiteracy (1930) ranged from 27.5 per cent in the Banat to 33.6 per cent in Transylvania, 34.2 per cent in Bukovina, 44.1 per cent in the Old Kingdom, and 61.4 per cent in Bessarabia. But universal compulsory education was introduced throughout the region after World War One, and in the years 1918-41, the East European states made huge strides in reducing illiteracy, even if certain regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bessarabia in particular) lagged dramatically behind (with an illiteracy rate in excess of 80 per cent in Bosnia even as late as 1941).

In contemporary Eastern Europe, illiteracy has been reduced to less than 10 per cent. This reduction fundamentally changes the nature of the body politic and its receptivity to political messages. However, as the history of Serbia since 1986 has shown, this change is not always in the direction expected by humanists. The printed word, with its implied authoritative factuality, alongside television — now commonplace in the countryside as well as in the city — are able to disseminate political messages quickly and with greater efficacy. This means, ironically, that the public may be more easily manipulated in the 1990s than it could be in the 1920s and 1930s.

A second difference between Eastern Europe “then” and Eastern Europe “now” has to do with social structure. In 1918, the peasantry accounted for 80 per cent of the population of Bulgaria, 78 per cent in Romania, 75 per cent in Yugoslavia, 63 per cent in Poland, 55 per cent in Hungary, and 34 per cent in Czechoslovakia. And although the proportion in Czechoslovakia was exceptionally low, even here most Czechs and
Slovaks were at most one or two generations removed from the countryside and this fact reduced the psychological distance from the village. Moreover, in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, there was no native aristocracy and no old commercial class; so the peoples of these three countries were overwhelmingly peasant peoples.\footnote{74}

Urbanization has changed all of this, and peasant culture has been considerably marginalized or transformed in the years since 1945. These changes make it less likely that clerical parties like that of Hlinka and Tiso\footnote{75} could dominate the political landscape of any of these countries, although fascist-populist movements, with their appeals to “the simple people,”\footnote{76} are still within the realm of the possible, as the governing styles of Milošević and Tudjman have amply shown. This difference, like the first one mentioned, reflects universal processes.

A third important difference between the two periods is, by contrast, specific to the East European context and has to do with the stability of the northern tier. In the era post-1918, Germany and Hungary were driven by irredentist yearnings, while Poland and Czechoslovakia were internally weakened by serious ethnic discontent. In the 1990s, by contrast, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have all become status quo powers, and the latter three\footnote{77} have few internal ethnic problems. And while this has not prevented the appearance of chauvinistic groupings in these countries,\footnote{78} it does make it less likely that they could be sucked into a maelstrom of Balkan manufacture.

There are other differences between these two periods, including: differences relating to Germany and Russia; the greater skills possessed by contemporary elites; NATO’s presence; and (on the negative side) uncertainties about Greece’s ambitions in Albania and in Macedonia. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the European economic depression of 1929 played a crucial role in undermining stability in the region and in fueling fascism. Any drastic economic reversal in the years to come would entail the risk of having a similar effect.\footnote{79}

So where does that leave us? I have argued that the dilemmas, developments, and tendencies in the post-1989 period show a striking parallel to those in the post-1918 period, but I have also highlighted some important differences. I would argue, then, that Eastern Europe is at the same point in the cycle, in the 1990s, that it was in the 1920s, but that the cycle itself has shifted, so that it is not exactly the same cycle. To use an image from music, it is as if we were listening to Vaughan Williams’ “Variations on a Theme by Thomas Tallis”; each variation bears a relationship to the others, but yet is somewhat different — and will not necessarily entail everything found in the previous variation.

Historical development is the outcome of the combination of predictable cycles, unpredictable contingencies, and programmatic policies adopted by decision-makers. If, for example, we could predict whether or not there would be a major economic crash at the end of the 1990s, as there was in 1929, we would be in a better position to make some predictions about the future prospects for the radical right. Moreover, if we knew now what policies would be pursued over time in key policy spheres, and which adaptations would be stressed, again the prospects for prediction would be enhanced. In this regard, political science is not much different from medical science: a physician, to make the point explicit, cannot know whether the medication she
prescribes will suffice to cure the patient unless she can be sure that the patient will actually take the medicine and abide by her instructions.

And yet there are some lessons to be drawn from this comparison. In the first place, the failure of the interwar effort to stabilize democratic systems can be traced to the ways in which certain challenges and tasks were confronted; this in turn will suggest other routes to be preferred in confronting parallel tasks today. Second, the pernicious effect of chauvinistic nationalism cannot be doubted, after the experience of the 1930s and 1940s, and this should induce both political observers and decision-makers to take this phenomenon more seriously than was the case in the 1930s. Third, this analysis suggests certain key policy spheres to be watched, as measures of the ultimate tendencies of the system. These would include: in the first place, the educational system and the content of instruction about politics and history; the resolve and success of policy-makers in working toward a distribution of the wealth which is accepted by the population in question as fair and equitable; policies affecting church-state separation; policies regarding the media, and the uses that the media make of their possibilities; and the ability of policy-makers to move beyond border squabbles and beyond petty attempts to suppress the national cultures of minority peoples. And fourth, the mere reappearance of something like the earlier pattern alerts one to the folly of self-congratulatory repose of the “end-of history” variety; on the contrary, the same or similar battles must be fought and refought ad infinitum.

Notes


9 When, in June 1993, Albanian authorities deported a Greek Orthodox cleric who had been distributing propaganda calling for Greek annexation of southern
Albania, the Greek government protested loudly and within a matter of weeks, deported more than 12,500 Albanians. See Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich: 26/27 June 1993), p. 7; and Frankfurter Allgemeine (30 June 1993), p. 3.


11 Ibid., p. 52.


17 A June 1993 poll found that “only 22 per cent of West Germans and 11 per cent of Easterners say they feel a common identity” with each other. — International Herald Tribune (Tokyo ed.: 28 June 1993), p. 1.


26 Ibid., p. 9.


33 Ibid., p. 331.

34 Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, p. 165.

35 For an account of the period of unstable parliamentary government up to the parliament of the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia, see Branislav Gligorijevič, Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji (1919–1929) (Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1979).


38 Pauley, Habsburg Legacy, p. 119.

39 Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia, p. 69; Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia, pp. 21, 36; and Heinen, Die Legion 'Erzengel Michael', p. 266.


41 In the parliamentary elections of October 1991, more than 20 political parties obtained representation in the Polish parliament, rendering coalition governments unstable. Walesa, who had criticized the election law already in its draft form, obtained revisions to it in summer 1993, resulting in a smaller number of parties obtaining representation in the September 1993 elections. For back-
Back to the Future in Eastern Europe


42 On this subject, see Peter F. Sugar (ed.), *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1971).


46 Re. the character of the Milošević regime, see Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking Yugoslavia's Break-up 1980–92* (London: Verso, 1993); re. the character of the Tudjman regime, see Dijana Pleštica, “Democracy and Nationalism in Croatia: The First Three Years,” in Ramet and Adamovich (eds.), *Beyond Yugoslavia*.


63 Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland*, p. 35.


66 Re. Romania, see *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (19 June 1993), p. 12; re. Slovakia, see *Stuttdeutsche Zeitung* (4 January 1994), p. 5; and *International Herald Tribune*
68 Re. Istria, see Vjesnik (28 July 1993), p. 5; and Glas Istre (Pula) (2 June 1993), pp. 3-4.
69 Jášzi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, p. 7.
70 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 53.
71 Heinen, Die Legion 'Erzengel Michael', p. 45.
72 Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, p. 139.
73 Ibid., p. 75.
74 Ibid., pp. 124-125.
77 Re. Germany's increasing problems with ethnocentrism and right-wing extremism, see Sabrina Petra Ramet, “The Radical Right in Germany,” in In Depth, vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1994).
78 Details in Ramet, “Triple Chauvinism.”
79 It might be thought that these differences reflect a concession to “linear thinking.” But in fact they serve to highlight the way cycles shift and evolve, so that no cycle ever exactly replicates any other.