Evolution of the Epistemology of Control and the End of Communism

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Hegel once wrote that all great social changes (including revolutions) begin in the imagination.

The transformation described here fully confirms this observation: for a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of revolutions from above was the previous radical reinterpretation of the concept of control and security. This demanded changes in the epistemological filter ramifying the cognitive and decision-making processes in the circles of the communist power apparatus.

Not only the content of the concept “control” underwent change, but also the standards of the rationale of control. This involved moving from a rationale of control based on “auto-referentiality” to the acceptance of more universal, external standards. In other words, it was the renunciation of internal-only criteria of the rationale of control (where actions were “rational” if they were logical from the point of view of the ideological postulates of communism and/or the pragmatics of preserving power) and the acceptance of external criteria and more universally recognised criteria (standards and constraints of the global market, principle of the “rule of law” and formal rationale; human rights and international conventions). This was accompanied by a gradual recognition by the communist elites that these external standards formed the frontier of their power and had to remain outside the range of the manipulations undertaken in the name of short-term political interests. For in the course of that epistemological evolution there was a growing awareness that a condition of the control of real processes is the existence of a sphere which is independent from those in power and which constitutes an external, objective measure of the sense of their actions. Total power, by liquidating such a sphere, leads to the elite regarding itself in the mirror of its own deeds and to fiction taking root in the world.

The history of the evolution of the epistemology of control described here may be epitomised as a series of chaotic attempts at the self-limitation of total power for the sake of exercising genuine control over real processes. The causes of the dual reinterpretation of content and standards of control which accompanies these attempts at self-limitation, have to be sought first and foremost in the experience of the ungovernability of communism which is the same in all countries. Essential, too, are the challenges which accompanied the process of globalization in the 1970s and 1980s.

The course of this mental evolution was, however, modified in every case by the general epistemological dispositions of a given cultural context. This confirms the thesis formulated in the previous chapter that the historical epistemology (or manner of “problematising” reality in a given historical period) has to be analysed in the more general perspective of the lasting epistemological dispositions of the given cultural sphere.

Even the starting point of this evolution was somewhat different in every case,
in spite of the similar problems arising from the ungovernability of communism. For
the initial sense of the concept "control" was modified by the local, historical expe-
rience of the beginnings of communism in a given country, and by the ontological
stratum of the cultural context. For the understanding of the term "control" of
reality was in every case a function of the cultural postulates on the manner of
existence of that reality. Likewise the initial dilemmas of control by virtue of the
ideology-generated character of communism were experienced in a different manner in
the culture of antinomy (Russia), the culture of paradox (China) and in the culture of
opposition based on the paradigm "identity and difference" (Central Europe).

Thus the point of departure of the evolution of the epistemology of control (or
the acceptance of external standards as the frontiers of power) was modified by the
cultural context. For in each of the contexts there arose a tendency towards its own
selection of external standards and the acceptance of those closest to its own cultural
tradition.

Two factors became catalysts of this evolution of the epistemology of control. They
were:

-the "learning processes" which accompanied the search for and absorption of
new conceptual systems. This was a matter of concepts facilitating a mental
approach to the real processes masked by the obligatory ideology; concepts
which at the same time did not attack the postulates of that ideology head-on;

-errors in understanding: this is a matter of "systematic errors" conditioned by
collective experience (systemic or generational) and not by random errors of
individuals.

And here the modifying role of culture becomes apparent. For as I shall show later,
in every cultural context (Russia, China, Central Europe) the general epistemological
dispositions influenced the selection of the new concepts introduced into the discourse
of control and also to a great degree determined the character of the systematic errors.

The crisis of communist ideology became a fertile ground for the evolution of
the epistemology of control described here. For this ideology had been in the past the
basis of the pretensions of the communist elite that they represented the "objective
laws of history" and not merely a narrow internal rationale of control.

Of paramount importance, however, was the awareness of the growing ungover-
nability of the communist economy and state.

For here it must be stressed once again as forcefully as possible, that the
communist elite carried out their reinterpretation of the concept and standards of
control in order to increase — not decrease — their possibilities of control. In other
words, there was a renunciation of total power (and then, gradually and in a manner
which they themselves did not perceive) crossing of the boundary between communism
and post-communism, in order to exercise real control!

1. Starting point: the dilemmas of control

The dilemmas of control connected with the very construction of communism
and with the contradictions encoded into its "generative grammar" became the com-
mon experience of the communist elite in all countries. On this common experience
were superimposed local dilemmas connected with the historical circumstances of the introduction of communism in a given country. An important role was played, too, by the differentiation of cultural contexts and the associated experience of communism (somewhat different in each context) as a definite epistemological situation: this is clearly seen in the different in the different in each case manner of articulation of the dilemmas associated with the ideology-generated nature of communism.

The understanding of how in each case the currents of common formative experience are intertwined with the local historical and cultural experience allows one to comprehend the initial differences in the starting point and the specific course of the evolution of the epistemology of control described here.

1.1 The Ungovernability of Communism: Joint experience of the communist elites

I wrote about the dilemmas of control built into the construction of communism in the introductory chapter. Here I shall merely recall that this concerns inter alia the systemic inability to control real processes in the economy due to the lack of a market (and hence the objectivization of economic semantics) and the absence of key economic interests in a system without defined laws of property. In the political sphere, ungovernability is connected with dual authority within the framework of the non-formalized party-state complex and the lack of corrective political mechanisms which leads to the accumulation of stresses. Another source of the dilemmas of control was formed by the epistemological barriers associated with the ideology-generated character of communism.

Even Stalin, right back in 1938, spoke about the dilemmas of control within the framework of a communist state. His pronouncement sounds like a surrealist echo of the earlier statement of Berdiaiev that the state in Russia was in a profound crisis being ruled by the Bolshevik party with its naturally “anti-state” outlook.

Stalin also drew attention to the “anti-state” nature of the communist power, with its lack of a boundary between the social element and the administration, which acts above the law and without established procedures (“as if we were constantly taking part in a conspiracy”) on the basis of personal arrangements and informal understandings. Stalin also stressed the difficulties of co-ordinating actions within the structures of the Soviet state. He proposed as a remedy the termination of the phase of social mobilization, and increased centralization and professionalization; he suggested that the source of standards of control should be not ideology but science.

A similar hankering for bureaucracy (in the Weber sense) appeared many years later with Andropov (in the Report on Corruption prepared under his direction in 1978) and earlier with Liu Shaoqui in his polemics with the military faction of Mao Tsedong on the form of the state (at the time of work on the Chinese constitution at the beginning of the 1950s).

In Stalin’s later pronouncements (e.g. at the meeting with German politicians from the Eastern occupation zone in Moscow at the beginning of 1947) one may find a suggestion of further on-going experiments aimed at rationalizing the wielding of power. There appeared, for example, a proposal to introduce from above a system based on two left-oriented parties. It is characteristic that Aleksandr Yakovlev returned to this idea in the 1980s (see his memoir “Prologue, Collapse, Epilogue”
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Moscow Novosti, 1992). I shall quote here an extract of an exchange between Stalin and the German communists, since it illustrates not only Stalin's distancing of himself from the Communist Party of Germany but also the defensive stance of the politicians from the Soviet zone of occupation.

Stalin: “It would be very good to have in the West a single socialist party. There you are represented only by the CPG. The population read the program of the CPG — it destroys and destroys the democratic proletariat, etc. This scares off many elements of the workers. For socialists and communists it would be more convenient if one had there a single socialist party, which would make it easier for many elements of the workers to grow accustomed to socialism. Don’t go for numbers!”

A Voice: “We think that our demand to allow the SEPG [Socialist United Party of Germany] in the Western zone will raise the question of allowing the SDPG [Social-Democratic Party of Germany] in the Soviet zone. Our position is that there is no necessity to allow the SDP in the Soviet zone.”

Stalin: “This must be decided.”
“What are you afraid of?
“One need not be afraid of this.”
“Nothing will be accomplished by the ban of the occupation authorities.”
“If you are against Schumacher, without the occupation authorities you’ll not be able to stand up, because you are weak.”

Stalin drew also attention at this meeting to the destructive effect of economic autarky or in my terminology — the negatives locked into the formula of "internal" only rationale of control, with no possibility of objectivizing the sense of one's own actions with the aid of independent, external standards. It should be stressed that the above conversation took place within the context of Stalin's renewed suggestions for the unification of Germany, which he finally abandoned in 1952.

Later (in December 1949), during a meeting with Mao Zedong in Moscow, Stalin went even further. In the context of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur (in breach of the Yalta Agreement), Stalin spoke thus of the advantages to be gained from such a manoeuvre:

“We would [sic] gain much in the arena of international relations if, with mutual agreement, the Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur. In addition, the withdrawal of Soviet forces would provide a serious boost to Chinese communists in their relations with the national bourgeoisie. Everyone would see that the communists have managed to achieve what [Nationalist Chinese leader] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] could not. The Chinese communists must take the national bourgeoisie into consideration.”

In a later conversation (January, 1950), Stalin spoke directly (I cite the entire exchange).

Mao Zedong: “But changing this agreement goes against the decisions of the Yalta Conference ?!”
Stalin: “True, it does — and to hell with it! Once we have taken up the position that treaties must be changed, we must go all the way.”

After reading the above, the suggestion inescapably arises: in the 1980s, Gorbachev began his “new thinking” (including the problem of the unification of Germany) at the point where Stalin left off. The similarity is so marked that the definition forces itself on one: Gorbachev = Stalin from before the start of the Cold War.

Ironically (or rather, tragically), the dimension of the above pronouncement of Stalin is linked with the fact that the first (from 1938) occurred before the next wave of terror. After all, Stalin stated right out in this pronouncement that the changes he suggested (today we would define them as a transition from totalitarianism to an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime) did not mean a lessening of the repressions. For these latter, in his terms, had their basis in the international threat. The second, 1947, pronouncement, on the negative consequences of autarky, took place shortly before the beginning of the Cold War in Europe and the long years of isolation of the communist bloc. Finally, the conversation with Mao came just before China’s involvement in the Korean War and the spreading of the Cold War to Asia.

In each of the counties of the communist bloc a local strategy was established for increasing the governability of communism, by making use of the material of its own cultural tradition. Here, I want to draw attention to one such strategy, namely “regulation by crisis.” Within the framework of this particular “regulation” crisis situations (often artificially hastened or transferred by the manipulation of symbols to a sphere more favorable to the authorities — one which permits the social isolation of protestors) are treated as a pretext to use extraordinary means, contrary to the normal logic of the system. This permitted the periodic discharge of tensions and delayed the implosion encoded into the contradictions of communism and realized by its “internal rationale.” In the beginning of communism this was in most cases an extraordinary redistribution of means. Later, together with the exhaustion of reserves, there was mainly a policy of symbols (the sacrifice of “scapegoats” from their own ranks), the borrowing of legitimation from the church. In the last phase, there was usually a flight to the disarticulation of communism and covert or overt Bonapartism.

The technique of “regulation by crisis” was used first and foremost in Poland, due to its tradition of symbolic politicization right back to the time of the partitions and the particular character of the symbolic space. In certain spheres this space was so homogeneous that it was easy for the authorities to provoke mass reactions and at the same time, so differentiated that it was sometimes possible to “call” on to the political scene protests now by intellectuals and now by workers (but not the two together — as, for example, in 1968 and 1970 in Poland). This kept the critical mass of such protests below the level at which they would threaten to disintegrate the system. Only August 1980 (with its new formula of articulation of protest) made crisis the beginning of change and not a means simply of temporarily reducing tensions and a special means of regulation.

Poland’s successive crises became for the communist elites in other countries a basis for “learning.” Valery Bunce, among others, wrote about this. For these elites, observing the causes and course of mass protests in Poland, introduced preventive
changes in their own countries. The phenomenon of the “learning process” of the communist elite is symptomatic of a more general mechanism essential to the understanding of transformation in the communist bloc. That is, social facts which could appear only in the context of a given cultural tradition (e.g. the establishment of a collective subject) were — erroneously — treated by communist elites operating in different contexts as a threat (or chance) for them, too.

This considerably hastened the process of emergence from communism. Attempts to counteract the ungovernability of communism led to gradual disarticulation. For the reproduction of the system depended to an ever greater degree on informal auxiliary structures, which often had recourse to standards contrary to “official reality.” This method was in accord with what was typical for Russia (and the countries within the orbit of its influence) — the replacement of unequivocal institutional changes by the differentiation of the whole space into “official” and “unofficial,” the use of two parallel principles of regulation (ordinary and extraordinary), a special “fissuring” of the hierarchy (with different rules at the top and at the bottom, and the periodic repetition of devaluing positions of the selected members of the elite, which significantly reduced frustrations in the lower ranks of the hierarchy). This was accompanied by a tendency to “excessive semioticity” in the discourse within the power apparatus, where everything became a symbol of something else. In this manner the poverty and artificiality of the official ideological language was overcome.

The dilemmas of control by virtue of the ideology-generated character of communism were experienced differently in the individual cultural contexts, and this differentiated the starting point of the specific “revolution in imagination” described in this chapter.

Thus in Central Europe, the “culture of identity” (with an ontology which had recourse to Aristotelian logic — “identity, difference and contradiction”), the ideology-generated character of communism was experienced, first and foremost, as a situation of Hegelian “appearance” (Der Schein). For real communism was something different from what was laid down in its “assumptive reality.” At the same time, however, to renounce these ideological propositions for the sake of grasping the factual reality of communism threatened — according to this cultural perspective — an “identity crisis” and the collapse of the “internal rationale” of the system.

In Russia (the USSR) with its antinomic ontology (in which the sense of a given element was mediated by the current interpretation of the whole), The ideology was expected first and foremost to play the role of such a synthetic interpretation. The crisis of ideology in Russia came about not in view of its divergence from reality (as in Central Europe). The epistemological dispositions of the binary ontology of Russian culture did not require from the “super-idea” an expression of what is but of what is not (and which constitutes its complement with respect to the true “whole” in the Platonic sense). In the USSR people began to speak of the communist ideology as a “lying principal idea” when it became obvious that its promises about the future global role of the USSR were an illusion.

In China, with its non-essentialist cultural epistemological dispositions, there was a renunciation both of a clear-cut identity of elements and of the formula of a synthetic interpretation of the whole. The social process is treated as an “alteration
of aspects"32 and change of relations which is accompanied by an unceasing transformation (at different rates) of form33 and matter.34

From this mental perspective, which operated to its fullest extent in the ramifications of the paradox, attention was paid, first and foremost, to the dogmatizing aspect of ideology. For there was a general fear of situations of sui generis scholasticism and ideology functioning as a "stupendous filing system"35 which sucked into its rigid classification system all new ideas and rendered impossible the expression of the paradoxical status of reality and events.36 In other words, there is fear of the pitfalls, known in the past, of "magic materialism"37 based on a "symbolic correlation system" With such an approach, the ideology of communism was treated first and foremost as a peculiar type of hermeneutics, which interpreted social facts as "signs" and forced definite acts from a limited ideological repertoire.

It was no coincidence that the discussion during the meeting of the army chiefs with Deng Xiping before the use of troops in Tienanmen Square in 1989 oscillated around the question: how to classify the situation on in the square (since on this depended the mode of reaction) and the cynical: "what interpretation do we need"?38

These "signs," in accordance with cultural tradition, were interpreted as signals giving information about how far away was "turning point" and shift to the second phase of the cycle.39 Within the framework of this perspective, the said turning-point was treated as something inevitable and repeating itself cyclically. In accordance with such fatalistic concept of control,40 the appropriate interpretation of symbols permits the kick-starting of effective "masking" processes41 or processes conducive to the growth of a given element above the level of its destruction imposed by the force field, or processes of "destruction of the destroyer"42 consisting of the identification of the current embodiment of the destructive processes and pre-emptive attempts to weaken them.43 An over-dogmatic and under-subtle ideological hermeneutic makes impossible the correct interpretation of the system which would permit effective modification (or in this perspective, "control") of the said inevitable processes.

The above described experience of the uncontrollability of communism, common to the power elites of all countries (but lived through somewhat differently in individual cultural contexts, but everywhere leading to the conclusion that total power does not mean complete control) was accompanied by local dilemmas of control.

1.2. Local dilemmas of control: Historical circumstances of the Introduction of communism

The manner of introducing communism in a given country (and, in particular, the initial relations with Moscow) influenced the manner of articulation of the initial dilemmas of control. The attitude to these dilemmas became a source of permanent (and self-reproducing) divisions within the communist power elite. This introduced a factor of continuity into the evolution of the epistemology of control described here, in spite of the gradual reinterpretation of the very concept of control.

In the case of China, three such dilemmas appear to be of key significance:
- Firstly, how to continue the revolution, while at the same time building a state?
One should remember that the formation of a strong state (capable of integrat-
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ing the nation) was one of the basic imperatives of the communist revolution in China. From the beginning of the existence of the Chinese People's Republic, two lines were drawn. On the one hand there was Lui Shaoqui, who realized the impossibility of reconciling the revolutionary formula of non-formalized state-party ties with the idea of a strong state. He postulated a solution which recalled the prescriptions of the Legalists, a stern but unequivocal law, binding on all, including the elites; a centralized state based on the institutionalization of mutual relations between the communist party and the state administration; the sacrifice of "revolutionality" (realized according to the Leninist prescription of mobilization, the new "displacing the old" and the rejection of the factor of law) in favor of effectiveness and stabilization. Liu Shaoqui also proposed the preservation of the traditional institutions of local markets. For Mao Tsedong, however, the linking of the imperative of a strong state with the idea of "revolutionality" was possible, but required a war as a ramifying situation. For a war situation not only mobilized, disciplined and facilitated dealing with opposition politicians, but also became a plane of reference for repression alternative to the law. In other words (according to Mao) it rationalized the situation of control without the necessity of the anti-revolutionary formalization postulated by Liu Shaoqui. War also permitted the continuation of rule by the army with its self-legitimizing hierarchy, which temporally disposed of the problem of finding a formula for the state. The fact that the army had its roots in the rural structures (due to the tradition of the underground military state and partisan war before the victory of the communists in China) gave in Mao Zedong's view a guarantee of the stabilization of this model of the state.

Secondly, how to survive — politically, economically and militarily, when Stalin's policy in the 1940s (right up to the beginning of the Cold War) put the geopolitical interests of the USSR before considerations of communist ideology? Mao often compared the situation of the communist revolution in China with the struggle of the communist partisans in Greece, who were betrayed by Stalin (in accordance with the Yalta division of spheres of influence). The response to this dilemma formulated the concept of control maintained to this day by the power elites in China. This was, first of all, a prescription of self-reliance. It was within this context that Mao described as positive the US sanctions imposed after China's entry into the Korean War: for these compelled China to self-reliance and liquidated the orientation towards externally-assisted economic development (and the interests and structures associated with it). Another reaction to this dilemma was a struggle against the hegemony of any country whatsoever: this became a permanent feature of the epistemology of the Chinese elites. This is well expressed by the following quotation of an Instruction of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party regarding foreign policy: "From the very beginning China had depended on checks and balances between several states to maintain its independence, that is, using barbarians to deal with barbarians. If China had been exclusively controlled by one state, then it would have disintegrated long time ago." This concept allowed the Chinese elites to conduct a pragmatic foreign policy
during the military revolution of the late 1970s and 1980s. The fear of excessive subordination to only one side likewise dictates today’s policy regarding the purchase of technology or joint ventures.53

A third permanent element of the Chinese elites’ epistemology of control, shaped as a consequence of the initial dilemmas of the communist revolution is the fear of a power vacuum. The complex of the fiction of central power has accompanied the ruling elites from the beginning of Chinese statehood.54 The manner of the communists’ take-over made this complex more profound, for Mao realized that what was decisive in this case was not so much the power of the communists themselves as the situation of the peculiar power vacuum. The Kuomintang was in no position to organize an apparatus of control over the territory which it nominally ruled. In particular, it did not manage to dominate the sphere traditionally considered in China to be inseparably associated with political power — control of the lines of communication.55

A permanent feature of the epistemology of control shaped by this experience was the conviction that it was necessary at any costs to prevent the fictitious character of the central authority becoming apparent. In accordance to this pessimistic estimation of their own power, the Chinese elites treated (and continue to treat) preventive repression as a means of ensuring that events do not develop to a scale on which they would reveal the real helplessness of the central authority.

The above dilemmas shaped the initial concept of control and the political optics of the Chinese communist elites. The two last-named remained unchanged; the other is today only a means of making the other two operational. Thus for example the question of “hegemony” is thought of today mainly from the aspect of economic dependence. Regarding the first dilemma, since 1978 the Liu Shaoqui line, represented today by the neo-authoritarian current, has had a decided victory. As I showed earlier, in my discussion of the Chinese variant of the military revolution, it was only the kick-starting of the institutions of the traditional markets which allowed China to grasp the new opportunities associated with its military and diplomatic reorientation.

For the communist elites in Central Europe (where communism was introduced as a result of the military disposition of forces which arose at the end of World War II),56 the principal dilemma of control was bound up with a perpetual oscillation between two threats. The first of these threats was the cyclically recurrent possibility of the withdrawal of the Soviet army from this area in accordance with the geopolitical calculations of the USSR (e.g. if greater gains in the security sphere seemed likely with the unification and neutralization of Germany57 and a return to the letter of the Yalta agreement on Soviet and Western sharing of influence in Central Europe58). For the communist elites in Central Europe this would have meant an end of their power. The maintenance of communism in this region without the presence (and trouble-shooting capacity) of the Soviet army would have been impossible, especially if Stalin had extended his experiments with “two left parties”59 to the Central European area too. From the viewpoint of the communist elites remaining in power (with growing aspirations of society towards freedom and a lack of support from Moscow) would have entailed either the use of a greater measure of terror or else finding a new means of striking roots in society. Hence the various attempts at
national communism (from Ceaucescu to Gierek). Stalin's "To hell with Yalta" was therefore read by the Central Europe elites in a double sense; as a possible end to the practice of Yalta (exclusive domination by Moscow) in favor of the letter of Yalta (shared influence) and as a threat of abandoning the settled policy concerning the western frontier of the communist bloc. The manoeuvre of military revolution in its final phase (after 1984), leading to Moscow's withdrawal of its troops from Central Europe took the Central European elites unawares. Even those leaders who earlier had themselves tried to weaken the ties between the Warsaw Pact and Moscow in connection with another threat (see below) tried to delay this manoeuvre.

This other threat was bound up with the cyclically recurrent possibility that Central Europe could become an area of military conflict — a battlefield between the forces of the Pact and of NATO. These anxieties first appeared in the mid-1960s: it was then that the first wave of the "aborted" military revolution began. This was confined to Central Europe and ended in failure. The reason was the lack of the element which determined the success of the military revolution of the 1980 — the conflict between the political and military elites in Moscow. However, right back then, in the 1960s, there had arisen all the elements which returned in the 1980s; attempts at a political shift towards the West and towards neutrality in the security sphere. Both these attempts were dictated by the feeling of the elites of the physical threat of the peoples of this region.

Both these threats returned cyclically, in step with the cycles of détente and Cold War. Each successive cycle radicalized the local communist elites in their search for a means of survival without the support of Moscow and without the threats which close links with Moscow entailed. This oscillation became in my opinion the fundamental experience which forced the evolution of the epistemology of control in this region. On top of this experience there was imposed another — globalization — the entry of part of the power apparats into the sphere of meta-exchange and the appearance of material interests in moving beyond the construction of communism.

The tensions due to the oscillation between these two alternatives; "abandonment" by Moscow or physical sacrifice by Moscow, accompanied profound frustrations in the sphere of identity. The power elites of Central Europe, a region with a tradition of weak, Satellite states — even before communism experienced disquiet about their status. They were always making a play for recognition of their status both by their neighbors and their own societies. The communist politicians in this region continued that policy of status. For them, a synonym for "to control" was "to be perceived as the controlling side." It was not fortuitous that the principal strand in the negotiations in the Gdansk Shipyard in August 1980 on the establishment of the free trade unions was the content of the preamble in which the workers' side "recognized" the leading role of the communist party — the PZPR. For the communist elite in Poland treated that "recognition" as the confirmation of its status as the center of control. It was at the same time a method of paralysing the workers' side which was also enmeshed in this "status politics." This manoeuvre of effecting the autoparalysis of the opposite side was used once again by the communist side during the Polish round table in 1989. The adoption of the formula of "legal revolution" legal-
ized the Polish People’s Republic and became an intellectual, moral and political trap for the Solidarity side which accepted this formula. For it legalized the very thing the legality of which had been questioned through years of struggle. The “crude line” and the expansion of nomenklatura capitalism were inevitable implications of this stance.

2. The Communist Elites’ “Learning process”

The experience of the dilemmas of control and the challenges of globalization was not the only factor which dynamized the evolution of the epistemology of control described here. Also of great importance was a special learning process. And it is here that the differentiating effect of the cultural context becomes particularly clearly marked. For this context influenced the selection of new concepts (paradigms) which entered into the internal circulation in the communist power apparatus in the given country, and which were intended to assist the mental grasp of the real processes masked by the language of ideology.

Terms and conceptual systems were chosen which did not make a direct attack on the ideological propositions (and hence were a “safe” instrument of communication within the framework of the hierarchy of power) and at the same time suited the culturally consolidated manner of “problematizing” social reality.

Thus in China with its culturally rooted ontology which stresses the repetition of the same patterns at different levels of reality, rejecting anthropomorphism and suggesting a continuity between Nature and society this was first and foremost cybernetics and systems theory and also the theory of living organisms.

In the 1980s, there was published a series of works linked with the Prigogine theory of “producing order out of chaos” within the framework of the laws of natural dialectics. These drew attention to the role of the communication process, treating information as a powerful agent restraining the tendency of the system towards increasing entropy (in my terms — towards implosion). Within the framework of this trend, attempts were made to translate even the works of Mao into the language of cybernetics. In China, this was given the name of the “science of control and equilibrium.” The linking of hierarchical solutions based on positive feedback with local self-regulation began to be treated in China as a prescription for decentralization without the Center losing control. The mathematical simulation of social processes was recognized as the basis of predicting “tendencies” at the lower levels of the system and as a sui generis substitute for democracy. The above formulations promised the cybernetic resolution of the systemic contradictions of communism through new principles of the circulation of information. Especial importance was associated with the concept of “ultrastability,” understood as the stabilization of a system through constant adjustments. For this concept accorded well with the traditional world-view with its recourse to relations and meta-norms.

In Central-Eastern Europe — especially in Poland and Hungary — the new conceptual system which in the mid 1980s became popular among party intellectuals was known as the school of property rights.

This school, superficially close to Marxism (since it stresses the system-generating role of property relations) explained in a manner comprehensible to people...
trained in Marxism in what precisely the ineffectiveness of communism lay. This concept also related directly to the principal problem distressing the communist elites — the uncontrollability of the system. For the school of property rights demonstrated that the reasons for the systemic difficulties of control (in spite of their nominally possessing full authority over the agents of production) had to be sought in the lack of economic interests to which appeal could be made in the course of giving orders. For without specified shares decreases in resources cause no loss to anyone, while their increase brings no individualised gains. Another reason is the lack of vital information which cannot arise without a market. While the latter demands clearly defined laws of ownership of individual resources.

The prescription for the lack of control must therefore be — according to this school of thought — a change in the sphere of ownership relations. This prescription, constituting — in the perception of the communist apparat — a promise of the recovery of control over the economy, became the starting-point for the first attempts at building the structures of political capitalism.

This prescription also suited the epistemological disposition consolidated in that cultural milieu. For in accordance with the propositions of the nominalistic ontology of "identity and difference" an unambiguous definition of identity (including the "right to") is treated as a synonym of rationalization.

For me personally, the direction of thought suggested by the school of ownership rights makes it easier to understand the "inert structure" phenomenon (with its rejection of communism in moral terms but its lack of economic interests in change). Within the framework of this paradigm it is also possible to understand the character of exploitation in communism. For the latter is connected not so much with the seizure of economic surplus by certain groups as with the fact that there is no such surplus and the system's attainment of equilibrium at a lower level than would have occurred with other property relations. Both the "inert structure" and that special mechanism of exploitation are implications of the interests encoded in collective ownership.

It is worth adding that the communist elite's understanding of the "inert structure" phenomenon and the associated special character of rebellion in communism increased their conviction that the manoeuvre of a revolution controlled from above was possible without the risk of setting off avalanche transformation processes.

Paradoxically, it was among opposition circles in Poland and not the communist elites that the myths of means of rationalizing the economy other than by changing ownership relationships endured longer. Especially destructive was the influence of Oskar Lange with his vision that the higher morale of decision-makers, linked to the best — cybernetically programmed — exchange of information will rationalize the economy without the need for ownership changes. Likewise the views of Wlodzimierz Brus (which he retracted towards the end of the 1980s) on decentralization and self-government as a sufficient step, delayed the democratic opposition's acceptance of the necessity of ownership changes.

In the USSR, a new heuristic tool which acted as a catalyst of epistemological evolution (since it accelerated and structured the reinterpretation of the concept of control) was the theory of dependency.
This theory, coined for the analysis of Third World countries, quickly became in the USSR a methodological tool which permitted a new conceptualization of the problem of globalization. This new conceptualization also brought about the recognition of globalization as an inevitable process.

This theory, by virtue of its being rooted in Marxism, became a safe vehicle of internal discussions in the Soviet power apparatus. It also demanded a new look at the place of the communist bloc in the world system and hastened the acceptance that the CMEA formula was “worn-out.” All this satisfied the arguments of the faction seeking a political solution to the problems of security within the framework of the “military revolution.” And we have to remember that in the USSR the main vehicle of transition was the “military revolution from above.”

Theoreticians who addressed the problems of “dependency capitalism” and “moderately developed capitalism” became the first experts to reflect on what “capitalism after communism” might look like. Interest in this problem grew with the development of the structures of “nomenklatura capitalism” in China after 1978 and in Central Europe from the beginning of the 1980s onwards.

Particularly revealing (and confirmed by the later course of events) in this regard are the works of Professor V.M. Davydov. His early analyses back in the 1970s influenced a discourse of control at the highest rungs of power in the USSR and KGB. This is particularly true of his analysis of new forms of subordination (though the imposition of the model of consumption and purchase of technology). These works became in the USSR in the second half of the 1970s a powerful argument in the internal discussion on the risk of détente. Here is must be remembered that the political advocates of limiting (if not eliminating) détente (Andropov, Ustinov, Suslov, Gromyko), were at the same time opponents of the use of force in Europe (cf the scenario of the Ogarkov Doctrine). In this situation it hardly surprising that the decision on intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was taken within this very group. In my interpretation, this decision served to embroil the Soviet Army in Central Asia (making it difficult for it to be simultaneously engaged in Europe), while at the same time limiting the détente which was perceived by this circle as a means of subordination.

Most interesting, however, from the point of view of the reinterpretation of the concept of control and control and the emergence from communism directed from above are Davydov’s later analyses of “dependency capitalism.” For these works provide, as it seem, the initial concepts in which the communist nomenklatura in the USSR formulated the dilemmas of possible capitalism after communism. This viewpoint had important practical implications since it led to the undertaking still within the communist system of certain institutional preparations. These preparations related to the seizure of certain institutions and significant currency transfers abroad.

Davydov, in his text which was extremely influential in the ruling circles by recourse to the example of Mexico, confirmed for example that late-come capitalism (and that introduced in conditions of advanced globalization) is characterized by such significant discrepancies from the classical model that one may speak outright of a different formation. It is worth stressing that the argument about “another capitalism” was of key importance in the internal discussions of the communist power
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apparatus which preceded the manoeuvre of revolution from above.\textsuperscript{93}

In Davydov's opinion, the fundamental differences (which, let us add, also arose in “capitalism after communism”) were:

- political genesis (conquests in Latin America; political actions from above in \textit{nomenklatura} capitalism, creating groups interested in the transition to “capitalism after communism” interwoven with the political aspects of economic globalization);
- fundamental modification of economic laws. Davydov notes here: skipping of the phase of free competition,\textsuperscript{94} penetration of capital from the countries of developed capitalism producing a “premature”\textsuperscript{95} modification of the economic conditions of early dependency capitalism. This is especially a matter of rapid monopolization, and in the case of “capitalism after communism” of rapid entry into the phase of casino capitalism and the appearance of a financial oligarchy.\textsuperscript{96}

The latter is based, \textit{inter alia}, on financial speculations making use of different exchange rates and interest rates in foreign and domestic currency operations. The parameters of these operations are to a great degree regulated by the “internationalized corporate state” in cooperation with international financial institutions.

Davydov (writing, let us recall, about Latin America, though his works were also read from the point of view of “capitalism after communism”), treated dependency as a system-generating force\textsuperscript{97} and wrote, analyzing the special character of dependency capitalism:

“that, being a formation which began back in the era of imperialism (we, analyzing post-communism would say rather, in the era of globalization, J.S.) in fact it did not pass through the phase of free competition because the natural conditions were lacking. Moreover, the periods of passing through the next stages were shortened in time, while the circumstances of the formation of state-monopoly capitalism develop in a very short time.”\textsuperscript{98}

Davydov often uses the term “compensating.” It may be postulated that this observation became one of the circumstances of the conscious interventions of “\textit{nomenklatura} capitalists” described in the second part of this book. For they tried to compensate the weakness of domestic capital through pressure on the institutionalization policy advantageous to this capital, making use here of their own political connections. Such a way of looking at capitalist transformation through the prism of the dilemmas of globalization is continued in full by influential politicians of today's Russia.\textsuperscript{99}

It may also be postulated that the above arguments on “dependency capitalism” (perceived as the possible future of the USSR) contributed to the intensification of the geopolitical climb-downs of the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze team in the relation to the West in the second half of the 1980s. For it was expected, falsely\textsuperscript{100} that the USSR would obtain in this situation better conditions of entry into the world system than would result from an exclusively economic logic of the globalization process. This was also furthered by the concept of “development by association” which in the second half of the 1980s among influential circles of Soviet specialists on international affairs replaced the term “dependency development.”\textsuperscript{101}

All this radically hastened the reinterpretation of the concepts of control and
security (and thus also revolution from above, which, as I have shown, in the USSR took the form of military revolution from above).

In addition to dependency theory, from the second half of the 1970s, another new element of the discourse of control among the Soviet (and also the Polish) power elites was the theory of organization and management. In important documents from this period, it is stressed that dyarchy based on a weakly formalized interlacing of the two (party and state) hierarchies hampered the enforcing of responsibility and the struggle against corruption. The (albeit tacit) conclusion demanded by this analysis was the postulate of the “formalization of the leading role of the party.” These discussions also drew attention to the phenomenon of the implicit functioning of conflicts. For since the official interpretation of the ideology laid down that conflicts quite simply could not appear, there was a lack of systemic mechanisms for resolving them, which led to the accumulation of stresses. Another disadvantageous implication of the lack of systemic conflict-resolving mechanisms was the consolidation of the above-mentioned unformalized “leading role of the party.” For this absence of formalization allowed the party elites to undertake in crisis situations extraordinary actions which went beyond the routine of the state administration. In this situation, one pathology (crisis as the only situation of systemic regulation) consolidated another (dyarchy without clear rules of responsibility), leading inter alia, to corruption.

The above situation, linked with the perception of the root of this state of affairs in the ideological identity of communism, became a milestone in the reinterpretation of the concept of control, leading the communist apparats — at least in thought — outside the structure of communism. The phenomenon indicated above, where one pathology is conducive to the reproduction of another, contributed at the same time to the surprising capacity of communism to reproduce itself in spite of having an initial structure so full of contradictions.

Uncertainty about the direction of the succession to Brezhnev and also the fear that he would share the fate of Khrushchev restrained Andropov from taking any bolder steps. Strengthening the state (and limiting the role of the communist party) with the aid of a special form of Bonapartism (as Jaruzelski did in Poland in December, 1981) was impossible in the USSR. The murderous war being waged in parallel between the faction to which Andropov belonged and the General Staff (within the framework of the “military revolution” described earlier) made it too risky to attempt to utilize a military form as a vehicle for de-ideologizing the state. For such a manoeuvre might have resulted in the actual take-over of power by the army. In this situation, there remained only a less spectacular quiet coup d’etat by KGB under the slogans of a struggle against corruption in the ranks of the party nomenklatura. It was hoped that the atmosphere of populist Puritanism would frighten (and restrict) the party apparat and at the same time furnish arguments those who supported getting out of this cramping ideological costume. The fundamentalism of Solidarity (with its introduction of moral terms as a formula of political articulation) confirmed the thesis of the carrying capacity of this type of legitimizing argument. However, the degree (and depth) of corruption (blat) in Soviet society was underestimated and hence its aversion to anti-corruption slogans (due to its own guilty conscience). Andropov’s
team likewise did not understand the secret of the success of Solidarity. This relied on the instant suppression of social atomization through an "identity policy" which had recourse to a mutual exclusion formula (society excluded from access to power due to the ideological proposition of the leninist "avant-garde," in its turn excluded the rulers from access to the moral high-ground). Such an articulation formula was impossible in the Soviet Union for cultural, as well as political reasons. Antinomic epistemology, operating within the framework of a bipolar whole, ruled out such a clear cut division of the sides to the conflict. Furthermore, Orthodoxy has a different concept of the relationship between good and evil from that of Catholicism.

Andropov's death interrupted the political fight against corruption. Earlier (towards the end of the 1970s) the search for sources of legitimation other than communist ideology, had brought Andropov close to the National Bolsheviks. In this manoeuvre it was a matter of finding a formula which would be capable not only of replacing Leninism in its role of "main idea" but also, which would stop "small nationalisms" with an ethnic base. The model for this new formula of "Russianess" as a "supranationalism" was, it would seem, Islam. For the latter functioned simultaneously as a special model of society (and a cultural screen protecting against excessive "westernization") and also as an instrument of supra-ethnic integration. The current of Euro-Asianism of the 1970s thus wanted to model "Russianism" in the USSR on the pattern of Islam.

National Bolshevism however, was very quickly reborn as an anti-western movement with strong anti-Semitic overtones: hence Andropov's demonstrative moving away from it as early as 1982.

Both these currents of seeking a means of moving away from ideology as the binding force of the system (and from the leading role of the party as its organizational principle) had a profound effect on Gorbachev. As I shall show later, analyzing his errors in understanding (and their role in the course of reinterpretation of the concept of control and security), Gorbachev with his supranational nationalism underestimated the dilemmas of such a supra-ethnic structure. At the same time, he over-estimated the role of populism as a means of neutralizing the rapidly advancing national integration in the republics.

As may be seen from the above, the search for new discourses of control in the USSR at the end of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, oscillated between dependency theory, theory of organization and neotraditionalism.

A major role was also played by system theory. In the USSR, (where in the Brezhnev era there was an awareness of the "low-level equilibrium trap"), what was sought in this theory however was (unlike China) not so much an answer to the question how to stabilize the system as how to put change in motion without losing control.

3. Errors of reasoning

The third factor (in addition to the dilemmas of control and the learning process) which had a decisive effect on the evolution of the epistemology of control described here consisted of errors of understanding on the part of the communist reformers.
One of these was the lack of recognition of the moment of crossing the frontier between communism and post-communism. These were not simply errors arising from the natures of individual persons; they had explicit systemic roots. Moreover, it was here that the differentiating effect of cultural context arose.

3.1. Failure to see the frontier between communism and post-communism

The concept “frontier of a system” is exceptionally multi-valued. It may denote, for example, Derrida’s Le Brisure or the boundary of variation. The latter determines what forms are possible within the framework of a given system (e.g. language) for it is located in the repertoire denoted by its “grammar.” In this context the assertion “running into a frontier” is impossible: for the essence of Le Brisure is its obviousness, naturalness, unambiguity. We begin by perceiving the grammar of the system as something bounding it, making it impossible to go “beyond” (and at the same time, as something relative, for it characterizes only the given system and is not universal), until such time comes when we are, in practice, actually crossing the rules of that “grammar” (or — crossing the frontier).

Thus, for example, the “inert structure” phenomenon described in this book which indicates the systemic frontiers of articulation in communism (in view of the epistemological barriers in conditions of property without exclusive property rights) is perceived only when — mentally — the frontier of the system has been crossed. For only when an analytic formulation had been made of the theoretical interest in the change of property structures, did it become clear that there were no mass social forces, which would have treated such a change as lying in the field of their current interests.

Another understanding of “frontier” (as “boundary”) is an implication of the mechanism of “autopoiesis,” or, as Luhmann termed it, the mechanism of self-referentiality.

For Maturana, the creator of what is known as “biological epistemology” the essence of the reproduction of a network of autopoietic organic cells lies in the constant recognition and defence of the systemic frontier (with the aid, inter alia, of immune mechanisms). “Cells need external resources but they decompose and recompose external resources according to autopoietic operations” wrote S. Fuchs referring to Maturana’s theory. And further “Autopoiesis requires self-description, that determines systemic identities by demarcating systems from their environment.”

According to Luhmann (who uses the term “self-referentiality” instead of Maturana’s “autopoiesis”) “self-referential systems are able to observe themselves. By using a fundamental distinction scheme to delineate their self-identities, they can direct their operations towards their self-identities.”

The end of such self-referentiality in communism arose even before the end of communism itself, and was connected with several factors.

Firstly, it was a consequence of the impossibility of defining a systemic identity. This difficulty had accompanied communism practically from the beginning due to its ontological status of “appearance.” For the system was, in its actual functioning,
something different from what it proclaimed of itself in its ideological “propositional reality,” while at the same time it could not recognize its actual identity without abandoning the language of ideology. This threatened the breakdown of “internal rationality” and the semantic foundations of the discourse of control.

Right up to the end of the existence of communism, this intellectual dilemma was never resolved by the communist elites. The dramatic outburst of one of the Polish communist reformers is characteristic: “What in fact is it that has to be changed, what is the reality of the system?” The splitting of social practice into official and unofficial strata, where the latter supported the former (since it reduced the pressure for it to change, by making life possible) and at the same time constantly questioned it, made the problem of the “frontier” of the system ever more acute. This dualism (and the particular symbiosis on which it was based) was never properly defined right up to the end of communism. Firstly, due to the lack of proper concepts, and secondly due to the reluctance to give it a name. For in accordance with the nominalist epistemological perspective, the act of naming reinforces and preserves what was treated as a temporary prothesis.

All this made it difficult for the communist elites to perceive where communism ended and post-communism began. In accordance with the concept of self-referentiality this meant at the same time an incapacity to select the proper actions from the viewpoint of the reproduction of the system. Such intellectual erosion of the reality of communism accelerated its end. Conducive to this was the fact that the imperative of control/stabilization compelled the communist elites more and more frequently to transfer the emphasis to the unofficial sphere and to undertake actions contrary to their ideological interpretation. For the power elites, the reality of keeping control was more tangible than the ideological propositional reality. Crossing the frontier of the latter was the price which the communist elite paid in order not to cross another frontier: that between chaos and order. The revolution from above, by sacrificing the generative grammar and ideology of communism, allowed order to be maintained. Hence, from the perspective of the power apparats, it allowed them to avoid crossing the frontier which was most important to them (more important than the ideological and institutional identity of communism).

The mechanism of systemic self-referentiality was abandoned by part of the power apparat even earlier, due to the dynamic of “military revolution” and political capitalism.

The desire to avoid the deadly threats to the security of their countries drove the elites of Central Europe to loosen their ties with Moscow, while the reproduction of communism demanded the preservation of those ties (and Moscow as trouble-shooter).

In its turn, the entry of part of the power apparat into the orbit of meta-exchange (due to the economic dynamic of globalization) resulted in its ceasing to perceive its own interest in the reproduction of communism. For the mechanism of meta-exchange created new interests and a new mental perspective oriented towards the futures markets. The appearance of these interests was also the crossing of a frontier.

The realization that the structure of communism made it impossible to develop all the potentialities of the sphere of meta-exchange came after the structural appear-
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ance of this element in communism. Together with that realization, the circles of the apparat involved in meta-exchange began to assert pressure for the legalization of the new potentialities for economic actions and the rights of ownership which they informally possessed.

The boundary had, in fact been crossed: now it was only a matter of its formal displacement — now outside the structure of communism. This was accompanied by the appearance of a new mechanism, still operative today, the self-referentiality mechanism of the post-communist order.

The essence of this new self-referentiality of post-communist order is the formation of capital in conditions of globalization within the framework of the institutions of political capitalism (and hence with the preservation of the social and political structures constituting its base).

Not only the identity crisis described above contributed to the exhaustion of mechanism of self-referentiality in the last phase of communism (since its batteries were exhausted) but also its fragmentation. Together with the development of contradictions, and the movement of the system towards implosion, the search became intensified for local strategies of spontaneous self-organization which would partially restore the impression of control. These strategies not only increased the range of informal actions, but — each off its own bat-went beyond the ideological framework of identity of the system. This was accompanied by a growing lack of faith in the possibility of rationalizing the system as a whole. Accompanying this was an atmosphere which can be defined as “cultural undecidability” regarding the further endurance of the system. This, however, took place only in silence and each of the players could have the impression that it was only he who had infringed the frontier of the system and that everything else was functioning as before.

After years when the communist system, paralysed by its own ideological identity, had been able to function only thanks to “management by exceptions” no one was aware when those exceptions became the de facto “rule” (albeit still not the official rule). Perception of the scale of this phenomenon was further hampered by the fact that each of the players had an interest in covering up his own infringement of what until then had been the “norm”.

The problem of the “frontier” as the “cutting edge” appeared long after the actual, unnoticed crossing of the line dividing communism from post-communism. For it appeared when the “frontier” of communism had been already, mentally crossed (together with the abandonment of the proposition that this formation was without alternative, natural and inevitable), when interest in the reproduction of that frontier was exhausted, and together with it came the end of the systemic mechanism of “self-referentiality.”

This difficulty in determining the moment when communism ended and post-communism began was fundamental to the course of the whole process. For in this situation it was difficult to mobilize that part of the communist apparat which still thought along orthodox lines.

The problem of the “frontier” was experienced differently in different cultural contexts. In Central Europe with its nominalist epistemology of “identity and difference” the demonstrative stressing of the symbolic “turning point” became a part of the
process of transformation. In Poland and Hungary this occurred long after the frontier of communism had actually been crossed and came down, in effect to a symbolic and legal recognition of political and economic facts which already for some time, had informally defined a new “self-referentiality” mechanism. This recognition was, however, a kind of threshold, since it fundamentally altered the reproduction of those facts, by making their existence independent of the attitudes of the ruling team of that time.

In other countries of Central Europe, the symbolic, simulated “turning point” occurred before the crossing of the frontier: emergence from communism took place (and is taking place) within the framework of a nominally post-communist identity. Only in the Czechoslovakia these two moments overlap.

In the USSR/Russia (with its cultural epistemology in which the identity of the elements is mediated through the formula of the “whole”), the symbolic crossing of the frontier took the form of a change in the interpretation of that “whole.” De facto, this took place in only one aspect (albeit the most important aspect for that Empire), that is, in the security and foreign policy sphere. For revolution from above in the USSR was first and foremost a military revolution. Other facts with a revolutionary note as for example Yeltsin's ban on communist party cells inside the state structures of Russia118 were a by-product of the power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, which were not treated as a crossing of any definitive frontier. Conversely, the practical use of systemic reforms as an occasion for expanding one's personal domain of power (or limiting that of a rival) was — at least since the Khrushchev era, a permanent feature of political life under communism. Hence, in spite of the actual crossing of the frontier, a sense of continuity prevailed.

Further, ownership changes, consisting of the evolutionary privatization of state property through the gradual precization and formalization of property rights) was extended over a period of time, limited to members of the nomenklatura, and gave the impression of a recombination of old elements. Hence it is difficult in this case to determine the instant of crossing the frontier. All the more so because these changes stabilized the social hierarchy formed in the era of communism, replacing the political foundations of the privileged status of the communist nomenklatura by economic ones.

In China, with its lack of an epistemology of identity and the traditional vision of incessant permutations (with different rhythms of change in the spheres of “form” and “matter”), the problem of the frontier did not manifest itself at all. The fact that the revolution from above in China consisted of a change in accents and a stronger emphasis on certain aspects (but without a definite renunciation of others) made the problem of crossing the boundary irrelevant. For example, the “unfreezing” of the institutions of traditional markets at the end of the 1970s strengthened the alternative “disposition” as against communism.119 At the same time, however, this disposition became a sui generis damper for the stresses arising in the state sector. In this perspective, when the system is perceived as a sheaf of relations (and not fixed states) it would be possible to speak of stabilization rather than change. For in spite of the fact that a process was set in motion which gradually changed the critical mass of the communist system, in the perspective of the meta-norm of equilibrium, it was perceived throughout as a policy of stabilization. And it was at this point, therefore, that
there arose what was so characteristic of the transformation described here, the \textit{bifunctionality of the solutions, which became a motor of change}.

This blind spot regarding the crossing of the frontier between communism and post-communism seems, on the surface, surprising. For one is dealing with a system with its own, distinct and clearly defined identity. The "blind spot" was possible first and foremost due to the advancing crisis of identity and the advancing decomposition of the system which made it more and more difficult to define what the "frontier" was. The accompanying globalization and, under its influence, introduction to the system of previously non-existent interests in meta-exchange and futures markets hastened the \textit{extinction of the self-referentiality of communism}. In other words, the internal energy of the system conducive to the reproduction of its "frontier" and its specific nature became exhausted.

The final attempt at the intellectual reconstruction of communism as a specific whole, which attempted to interrupt the intellectual fragmentation and erosion of the system was the Solidarity rebellion in 1980. The intellectual condition of the fundamentalist rejection of communism in the name of moral values was thus earlier symbolic reconstruction, "visualization" of the system as — in short — the domain of "evil."

Paradoxically, in Central Europe (with its formula of "legal revolution"), the institutional identity of communism returned even after the crossing of the frontier (both symbolically, by the ritual of the "round table," and in reality, associated with the new mechanism of self-referentiality). For within the framework of the building of a "law-governed state," it was recognized that a law which was not changed in a law-governed manner (and hence in accordance with the law then in force) would continue to remain in force. One of the effects of this evolutionary (and not revolutionary) transformation from above was — \textit{de facto} — the recognition of communism as a system existing in a legal manner. How ironic that the communist system had been denied this status throughout all the years of struggle against it, when in reality it did exist, and only after its death did it receive the high dignity of legality! This also meant the legalization of the vested privileges of the \textit{nomenklatura}, making it difficult to prosecute those responsible for crimes against the nation which had \textit{been committed within the framework of the existing} — albeit unjust — law. In other words, the system could not be prosecuted nor sentenced. This made it easier to forget what had Communism had been and deepened the sense of continuity in the mass consciousness.

An example of the absurd situation which arose after the adoption of the concept "legal revolution" (in other words, the acknowledgement of the legality of communism as an institutional-legal system) was a decision of the Polish Supreme Court in June 1995.\textsuperscript{120} The Appeal Court in Poznan had referred to the Supreme Court the question whether compensation for repressions during the communist period also applied to persons prosecuted by the Soviet authorities in the territories east of the "Curzon line" (i.e. within the pre-1939 frontier of Poland). In accordance with international law, these lands were part of the Polish state right up to 3 February, 1946, when the treaty between the communist government of Poland and the USSR was ratified. The Supreme Court, citing the \textit{Decision adopted by the (communist) Polish Committee...}
of National Liberation on 26 July, 1944 (secret annex to the Manifesto of the PCNL granting permission to the Soviet military authorities carrying out repressions behind the front line and turning over such actions to the jurisdiction of the USSR military courts), decided that these past Soviet prosecutions had a basis in law. The Minister of Justice, Jerzy Jaskernia (who was dismissed — on other grounds — only in February, 1996) announced regarding this Supreme Court ruling that it withdrew the right to financial compensation for persons repressed with the agreement of the PCNL authorities. He cited the continuity of law between communist Poland (the Polish People's Republic) and the present, “post round-table” Third Republic.

3.2. Other failures of understanding: their systemic and cultural sources

The difficulty of defining the moment of crossing the frontier between communism and post-communism is only one of the systemic misunderstandings. “Systemic,” since they are occasioned not so much by the specific character traits of individual persons as by the systemic frameworks of perception, the epistemological disposition of a given cultural context and the experience of a given age-group.

The basic failures of understanding of the Soviet power elite (which were of key significance to the course of transformation) were of four kinds.

Firstly, there was the over-optimistic interpretation by Gorbachev and his entourage of the signals coming from the West at the time of the “military revolution.” This was bound up with the fact that these signals were read not literally and directly, but through the prism of the special, new, and optimistic interpretation of East-West relations embodied in the formula “common European home.” For in accordance with the Russian, culturally grounded epistemology described in the previous chapter, “change” consists primarily of change in the synthetic interpretation of the whole, while the interpretation of the sense of individual elements is mediated by that interpretation. In this situation every signal coming from the West was over-valued. For in Moscow, they ascribed to its author intentions corresponding to their own, new interpretation of the entire situation. They did not take into consideration that western politicians operate within a different, culturally grounded heuristic, based on an essentialist approach to individual elements, without building them into an a priori whole. In other words, they did not take cognizance of the fact that the incoming signals had to be taken in their literal sense.

To the Russian politicians of the perestroika era, (who — understandably — had an unreflecting approach to the specific features of their own epistemological perspective, and treated it as the only one possible), it did not occur that in the West things were understood differently. Paradoxically, the West for its part did not understand the heuristic model within which Gorbachev operated. The situation in which declarations were not accompanied by institutional moves was treated with ever greater distrust. It was not understood that in the Russian, culturally grounded concept of “change,” a new definition of the whole is the key issue, and it is expected that a change of the elements will follow automatically and spontaneously.

Another error was the failure of Gorbachev’s team to understand the institutional, cultural and geopolitical bases of the success of the Chinese reforms, and the belief that the USSR would be able to take the same path. They underestimated the
key role in the Chinese reforms of the institutions of local markets which were absent in the USSR and other countries of the communist bloc. The reasons why the West at the end of the 1970s accorded China new economic and technological opportunities was likewise misunderstood in Moscow. For this was not a matter of rewarding the Chinese for reorienting their foreign and military policy but — first and foremost — one of the global context associated with the crisis of détente between the USA and the USSR. A much more spectacular reorientation, but without this crisis context, could not have brought Moscow the expected pay-offs.

A third error, which had its roots in the experience of the age-group of Gorbachev's entourage was to view the events in Central Europe in 1989 through the prism of the 1968 “Prague Spring.” Obviously, the military motif was similar — 1968 was, as I showed earlier (and not only in Prague) — an aborted attempt at local military revolution and breaking free from the domination of Moscow. Only then the accompanying vision of change was a matter of the reform of the structures of communism from within and not as in the 1980s, exit from these structures. For in 1968, there did not exist the other element which determined the dynamics of the revolution from above at the end of the 1980s, namely, the factor of economic globalization. This factor (and, in particular, introduction — informally — of the dimension of meta-exchange into the structures of communism) created an orientation towards futures markets and interest in exit from communism within the communist power apparatus itself.

Gorbachev's fourth and most important mistake, however, was his failure to appreciate the essence and dynamics of nationalism within the republics of the USSR. According to one of his close colleagues this was bound up to a considerable degree with his personal awareness of his own “Russianness” as identification with the state, irrespective of ethnicity. In this “state patriotism” of Gorbachev, the element of culturalism was likewise absent. In speaking of the culturalistic vision of “Russianness,” I have in mind the outlook which stresses that its specific epistemology rooted in Orthodox culture is a defence against the threat of acculturation implicit in contacts with the West, and from this point of view should have been accepted by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. This outlook was represented by the Russian Slavophils. It also manifested itself in Andropov’s formula of nationalism, which — by reason of its Greek roots — could treat the Eastern interpretation of Christianity as a cultural formula for integration broader than the ethnic one.

Gorbachev, in his “state patriotism” not only was unable to distinguish “Russianness” from “Sovietness,” but also expected that a similar attitude, oriented towards the imperial center, would be held by the communist elites in the republics. He perceived the latters' swing towards ethnic nationalism too late and it came as a shock. Newly accessible documents on the work of the authorities of the USSR in the last phase of communism are striking in their helplessness regarding the nationalist platforms common to society and the elite in the republics. Gorbachev deceived himself too long that the perestroika current of criticism from below and democratization which he had set in motion favored rather the closer adherence to Moscow of the nomenklatura of the republics, and would isolate these elites from their own societies.

It is worth stressing that a similar crisis dynamic of imperial patriotism occurred
in the past in the Ottoman empire. The secularization of the Ottoman empire (which earlier had been based on pan-Islamism) robbed the formula of imperial patriotism of its content. The attempt to fill the vacuum by pan-Turkism evoked in its turn a wave of local, ethnic nationalisms. An additional impulse (similar to the case of transformation in the USSR, described here) was the fact of the instrumental treatment of nationalism by local, corporate structures — the “millet system.” A similar dynamic occurred in the case of the Soviet empire: crisis in the communist ideology — National Bolshevism as an attempt to fill the vacuum — local nationalisms as a response, intermeshed with the instrumental treatment of this new plane of integration by the communist elites of the republics.

Gorbachev and his entourage did not foresee such a course of events, and the power-struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin hastened the collapse of the empire even more.

All this was accompanied by a total lack of understanding of the political implications of globalization, in spite, as I have already shown, of the accurate forecasts regarding the economic implications and the form of dependency capitalism. The collapse of the artificially created administrative whole (characterized by unbalanced development) (USSR, Yugoslavia) and a merely selective integration of certain elements into the world system made the operation cheaper from the perspective of the players from developed countries.

Only now is the political dimension of globalization beginning to be recognized in Russia. The various appraisals of the course of this process and the dissimilarity in the proposed strategies have become in Russia today the principal axis of political divisions.

It is worth noting that in the principal current of this discussion there is criticism not only of liberal “mondalism” (as they term globalization dominated by the USA) but also the Bolshevik utopia of a world communist system. For both these “mondalisms” demand an arbitrary systematization and integration of societies at the expense of their historical identities. What is interesting in this global perspective is also seen in discussions of the formula of a Euro-Asian union proposed by Nazarbaev. The critics of this formula see in it not only a threat to the historical identity of Russia, but also a vehicle for entry to the world system at a lower cost and with Russian aid, which is being used by the republics of Central Asia and finally, as a threat that the culturalistic vision of supra-ethnic “Russianness” will be sacrificed to purely political and military ends. Interestingly, such a strategy is opposed both by Ziuganov’s communists and by the neo-traditionalists from the current of post-Andropov culturalism. They propose, rather, a vision of modern Byzantinism — with Russia mediating between civilizations.

The main pit-fall in understanding of the Chinese power elites has its roots in the too early creation (back in pre-modern times) of an integral system of political socio-technique.

This system was based on two pillars. On the one hand, there was the experience of feudal bureaucratism. The idea of feudal bureaucratism was directed against status and positions of privilege and the idea of the inheritance of office. The transition from feudalism to feudal bureaucratism appealed to the following principle:
"To remove the strong by means of a strong (people) brings weakness (for the state. J.S.) To remove the strong by means of a weak (people) brings strength."\textsuperscript{136}

In other words, to combat the feudal lords (in today's terms, the local corporate networks consisting of the local party nomenklatura, "war-lords" and business), but without strengthening society, so that the only strong player left is the state. It turns out that the philosophy of reform of today's Chinese neo-authoritarians is an exact continuation of this principle. Feudal bureaucratism acknowledges as the chief attribute of power the capacity for redistribution. Traditionally, (and, once again, right up to the present time) "over-localized accumulation" is recognized as the fundamental threat to the state. Already the famous Treatise on Salt and Iron (first century B.C.) sought remedies in the form of various forms of state intervention and redistribution. The latter demanded the control of "key points"\textsuperscript{137} with a changing definition of which points were "key."

A second experience was the non-anthropocentric philosophy of society, which perceived the social order as a continuation of the natural order. This was accompanied by a non-essentialist ontology, which attributed the value of "objectivity" to relational meta-norms and not to absolute, universal norms. In China, this anti-anthropocentrism and relativism impeded the discussion of the frontiers of power. The conviction of the consciousness of the continuity of the natural order and social order made it difficult to accept the rule of laws proclaimed by the people.\textsuperscript{138}

This all overlapped with a fatalistic vision of recurring cycles\textsuperscript{139} driven by the "internal tendency of things" and a structural resonance in relation to an unchanging field opposing (and equilibrium-seeking) forces.\textsuperscript{140} As I have already said, according to this vision, these cycles are not amenable to external control. They can only be somewhat modified by attempts at "masking" and "the destruction of the destroyer." An essential part of this vision was a special system of hermeneutics, which interpreted "signs." This was supposed to make possible the determination of the phase of the cycle in which China currently found itself, and the identification of threats. This hermeneutic role was fulfilled by the "magic materialism" of the book of I-Ching and later by Mao's Little Red Book.

This traditional socio-technique (and the underlying epistemology based on a symbolic correlation system and associative thinking) was to a considerable degree absorbed by communism. Today, its role has increased still further.\textsuperscript{141}

This paradigm of control, built around a hierarchical order of rigid systems of interpretation was useful so long as there prevailed the hyper-political bipolar world of the Cold War (with its cycles, simple system of signs and states as the principal subjects of history). Today, however, the thinking and political operation within this paradigm leads to erroneous reactions. The further interpretation of the international situation by the Chinese elite in terms of inevitable cycles imposes the stamp of self-fulfilling prophecy. For one of its implications is the failure to reckon with the international implications of "masking" and "preventive" actions\textsuperscript{142} owing to the conviction that a phase of coolness will inevitably come.

Departure from the mechanical repetition of the repertoire of "masking" redistribution actions and preventative repressions ("destroying the destroyer") has been
further delayed in China by the memory of how useful these actions were in the past and the false reading of the experience of the disintegration of the USSR. The Chinese elite's do not understand that the "new nationalisms" and centrifugal tendencies in the former USSR were the result not so much of the action of dissidents or of insufficient redistribution as — first and foremost — a survival strategy of the middle rungs of the communist nomenklatura. These separatist trends also make it easier for the nomenklaturas in the republics to seize for themselves a considerable part of the state property. China already has this stage of the informal distribution of sections of property behind it. One should not, therefore, expect a reshaping of separate ethnic identities into nationalism in order to strengthen their claims. In China, too, there is nothing corresponding to the murderous struggle which arose between Russia and the USSR (Yeltsin and Gorbachev), owing to the introduction of a federal model at the beginning of the 1990s. Finally, as I have shown, China had a different variant of "military revolution"; conducive to the integration of the political and military elites and not, as in the USSR to their fragmentation and internal struggles within the state apparatus.

As for the communist elites in Central Europe, certainly the fact that they underestimated the informal "affranchisement" of the nomenklatura accelerated transformation. This "affranchisement" had, basically, to stabilize the communist system, by easing market stresses, by introducing motivation for a better use of existing means and possible new western credits. This solution also eased the frustrations of the middle power apparat. In Poland, these frustrations were associated with a permanent social confrontation on the one hand, and with the quiet ousting of the communist party from the state structures on the other. In other countries, they were associated with the expectation of similar processes and the growing uncontrollability of the system. This error in thinking was associated with the nominalist ontology which prevented the facts of unclear identity from being seen.

The communist elites' underestimation of the fact that, together with "affranchisement," there had appeared new interests and identities had the nature of a systemic error. For it arose from the experience of functioning in communist structures characterized by thinking in terms of personal patronage-based loyalties, and not of formal roles and institutions. The affranchisement of the nomenklatura had a fundamental effect on the reinterpretation of the costs and benefits of a possible change of the system, which, it appears, was underestimated by the communist elites who failed to perceive the said reorientation in their own power apparatus. Probably if such a dynamic of interests had been foreseen from above, there would have been more hesitation in granting permission or the — initially informal — share-out of property.

Conclusion

The intellectual experience of the communist elites described above (dilemmas of control, errors in understanding, contact with new conceptual systems, tensions due to the ideology of communism, and finally the challenges and opportunities of globalization) led to the reinterpretation of the concept of control and security. Without
such epistemological evolution, the revolution from above in the communist countries would have been impossible. This reinterpretation took place over a period of time and in a discreet manner, which was often not noticed by those with the greatest interest in it.

Here cultural context was an intervening variable. For the character of that context to a great degree determined the manner of experiencing and “problematizing” communism, the character of the perceived dilemmas of control, the means of selecting new concepts, and even the character of errors of understanding.

In the course of this evolution of the content of the concept “control,” the standards of rationality of control also underwent change. Paradoxically, the motive guiding the communist elites was the desire to increase — not to decrease — their control over real processes. The price which they had to pay for this was to relinquish part of their power. For it was recognized — and this was the principal effect of the intellectual evolution described here — that a condition of control is the existence of a sphere independent of the controllers and constituting a measure of the sense of their actions.

The culmination of the epistemological evolution described here was the recognition of the boundaries of power (and standards of external control towards the communist ideology).

One of these standards was the principle of the “rule of law.”

And here, too arose a clear differences associated with the character of the cultural context of the transformation.

The idea of the “rule of law” was accepted most easily in Central Europe with its cultural tradition of Roman Law, and most strongly resisted in the course of the Chinese transformation.

The cultural sources of this defence were accurately summed up by Bong Duch Chun, President of the Korean Legal Center in Seoul:

“Roman law assumed the people have different (and conflicting) interests in their social life, and law was therefore defined as rendering to each his due: \textit{voluntas ius suum cuique}. In this view, law defines the limits of the power of individuals to further their own interests... In contrast, Oriental legal systems... were based on the premise that social life is to be regulated by moral norms in the general sense... Law was used as a means to achieve the ends defined by the moral code, and has no autonomous function. The goal was to arrive at a society ruled not by law but by Confucian morals.”

Furthermore, within the framework of the Confucian tradition, “new laws were effective only when they did not conflict with the old laws,” while in Roman Law “a latter statute nullifies the effect of a prior one.”

The reason for this difference lies in the culturally consolidated vision of history based on recurring cycles in Confucianism and the idea (now ever more dubious) of “progress” in Europe.

Russia is a special case here. The culturally consolidated epistemology of the “two truths” (empirical truth and “eternal verity”) and the vision that the social world is built on a basis of antinomy (while the sense of elements depends on the interpretation of the “whole”), makes it difficult to accept an unequivocal legal formulation.
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The law thus became despised as "casuistry" and the emphasis was placed on "substantive" not "formal" justice.

Elements of this attitude to law and justice in have endured in Russia until our own times.

Notes

3 Mikhail Gorbachev wrote as follows concerning the motives behind perestroika: "It would be a great exaggeration to say that from the beginning we imagined the scope and the difficulties of perestroika. Moreover, its original intentions did not go beyond the framework of the system, neither ideologically nor politically. For us it was then the improvement of the existing society." In: "Mir na perelome" [The world at a turning point], Svobodnaia mysl', No. 16 (Nov. 1992), p. 10.
4 "I. V. Stalin o Kratkom Kurse Istorii VKP (b)" [I. V. Stalin on the Short course of history of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], Stenographic transcript of his speech at a meeting of propagandists of Moscow and Leningrad 1938 in Istori­cheskii arkhiv (Moscow, 1994), No. 5, pp. 4-32.
5 See: N. A. Berdiaev, "Pis'mo A. V, Tyrkovoi, Noiabr' 1922" [A letter of A. V. Tyrkovaia, November, 1922], Istoriicheskii arkhiv (Moscow, 1995), No. 3.
6 Stalin, op. cit. "Someone sits there, he is working, but whether he does his work well or badly they do not know. None of them take any interest, none of them ask. And if, once or twice, somebody were to call, they help him but then they abandon him, they abandon him and do not help. I am afraid that the party offices are in that state, they abandon people, they do not lead them, they do not ask them, they do not check up. And what can come out of this? Different opinions in propaganda. A consults B, C consults D, E consults F. Things must be more or less centralized. I am against stifling people's initiative. No, it is a very important matter — people's initiative. But things must be arranged to be the same at the center and the periphery, so as to check up on people. Well, that's what has to be done. Well, when one listens to people it is evident that there is total lack of control and total autonomy in the party offices, there is no centralization, neither in organizing propaganda and nor in organizing consultation. There is no centralization, there is complete autonomy of individual points, circles, party offices. There, should be good people sitting there, but it is necessary to help them. For that's how people here are lost, and perish politically."
7 Ibid., p. 27. "It is an incorrect approach, in my opinion, to have circles. Why do we need so many circles, what are they for? People can read for themselves. It is all written in Russian. If they do not understand something, there is the
dictionary, one can ask someone or other. Is it really necessary to have thousands of circles in order for them to understand what they have read. I do not understand it. Very little use is made of the press, and all the time they are struggling in circles. No, when we had not come to power, the press was not ours. Then it could be done, but now the press is ours.”

And, further, p. 28. “What distinguishes the state from a lone craftsman? The fact that the state can try to generalize things to the All-Union level, but the craftsman remains within the frame of his own craft skill, no one knows him. Why did we come to power if we have to skulk in offices in the old, lone craftsman style.”

8 Ibid., p. 26. “The state formulation of the question is one thing, and the craftsman’s formulation is another. We don’t need all these circles and too little use is made of the press.”

9 Ibid., p. 27. “All our people consist of intellectuals, this must be beaten into the head. The intelligentsia should be the salt of the earth for us, but in fact it good for nothing, because it serves not earth but heaven, not the people, but the exploiters.”

10 “Nasha linia takaia...” [“Our line is as follows...”]. Documents from the meeting of I. V. Stalin with the leaders of the SEPG, Jan.-Feb. 1947, In: Istoriicheskii arkhiv (Moscow, 1994), No. 4, pp. 22-44.

11 Ibid., p. 39.

12 Ibid., p. 40. Stalin: “It is necessary that Germany gets back on to its feet, and enters into the world markets. Germany with its population of 70 million cannot be crossed out of history. It must be borne in mind that if Germany is not allowed out on to the world market, it will be weak and its population impoverished. All Europe will be short of goods.”


14 Recently declassified materials from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Moscow.


17 Stalin, op. cit., pp. 22-25.

18 For an analysis of the dynamic of these conversations, see: Michael Korzec, “Five Years after Yalta: The Inner History,” Socio-Political Dimensions of the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido Univ., 1996), pp. 221-266.

19 For a fuller discussion of this regulation, see: Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s
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20 Staniszki, *op. cit.* Chapter on 1956 in Poland.

21 For an analysis of relations between the Gieriek regime and the Catholic Church in Poland in the 1970s, see: Staniszki, *op. cit.*


23 The explicit role of the army — Poland, after the proclamation of Martial Law in December, 1981. Hidden — the present role of the army in China, which during the period of search to the succession to Deng Xiao Ping became a broker in the political sphere. The term “Bonapartism” is used in the sense of Karl Marx: “The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.”


25 The role of the trade unions was increased, corrections were made to the excessive wage differences (the so-called “chimneys”), the rhetoric in the mass media was changed.


28 I treat actions as “internally rational” if they are logical from the point of view of the intra-systemic (organizational) propositions on the manner of existence of reality (including the relation between means and ends). This term corresponds to the definition of “bounded rationality” used by H. Simon and J. March in “Organizations,” 1966.


32 Chuang Tzu distinguishes changes in “appearances,” “forms” and “matter” —
in order to understand change it is necessary "to follow two courses at once," tr. Fuyendak, *op. cit.*

33 The term "pien" denotes gradual change of form (melting of snow); when pien is sufficiently advanced, "hua" occurs — a sudden change of matter: the whole of the snow is turned into water. The importance is emphasized of the boundary situation, when the "matter" has become something new, but impressions, perception and the recognizable experience still indicates the presence of the old form (now, in practice, deprived of matter). It is emphasized that change takes place earlier without than within. This approach to change rejects the method of the symbolic turning-point used in Central Europe, (where change in the symbolic interpretation of the form is made publicly visible) which in the majority of cases precedes the change of matter.

34 In Chuan Tzu (*op. cit.*, Ch. 49), attention is drawn to four components of the concept of "change": cyclically recurring differences in the field of two opposing sources which nevertheless strive for equilibrium; changes accomplished within but invisible from without; change consisting of the development of an "internal tendency" but preserving certain previous properties; the impossibility of defining when something ceases to belong to one category (class) and begins to belong to another, new category.


36 This refers to an over-mechanical classification of phenomena. See the dispute between supporters of Confucianism and the Legalists described by Needham, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-214.

37 Term of Chang Tung Sun, *Epistemology and Culture* (Shanghai, 1940) (in Chinese, summarized for me by a Chinese scholar).

38 Information obtained in Beijing in 1993 in a conversation with an informant who wishes to remain anonymous.

39 The school of Chinese Naturalists analyzed the "transmutations of the Five Powers" and the six "relationships"; the dynamic of this process is based on recurring cycles of "mutual production and destruction." This approach has recourse to the theory of the five elements (*wu hsing*), the two fundamental forces (*yin and yang*) and to the Book of Changes (*I-Ching*). See: A. Forke, *World-Conception of the ancient China* (London. 1925).

40 The controller is the one who possesses the power of "destroying the destroyer" in the course of the "mutual conquest order." See the discussion of the books of Thung Te Lun and Huan Non Tzu in: Forke, *op. cit.*; also Needham, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-260.

41 The concept of "masking" (Needham, *op. cit.*, p. 258). It refers to the masking of a process of change by some other process which produces more of the substrate or produces it faster than it can be destroyed by the primary process. In Chinese, "Hsiang hua."

42 Destruction of the destroyer may be delayed or weakened, but the change-over associated with the lasting, unchanging field of *yin and yang* cannot be reversed.

43 The Book of Changes (*I-Ching*) has become the basis for hermeneutics permitting the significance of facts to be identified from the point of view of their role
in the mutual cycles (destruction and production).

44 Mao Zedong in the dispute over the Chinese constitution at the beginning of the 1950s referred directly to the dispute between the Legalists and the supporters of the Confucianist ethic (without legal formalization), taking the side of the latter, while Liu Shaoqui defended the former.

45 According to many researchers into China's decision to enter the Korean War, this viewpoint was decisive.

46 According to the report of the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, Roshchin (10 July, 1950), citing a conversation of Ledovskii, the consul in Manchuria, with Gao Gang, (the secretary of the Communist Party in Manchuria), in Manchuria itself around 300,000 “American spies and Kuomintangists” were active (Russian text in the materials relating to the Korean war, sent from the Presidential Archives of Russia to the Wilson Center, Cold War History Project). China’s entry into the Korean War provided an opportunity for mass repressions in Manchuria and a chance for Mao to settle accounts with his political opponents.

47 Gao Gang himself, who was viewed by Mao as a rival, was ousted and condemned; for Stalin, who until then had supported him, sent Mao materials on Gao Gang with the Soviet authorities — as a reward for China’s entry into the Korean War.

48 From 1937, the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet side were often in dispute over the means of conducting the war with the Japanese. At the time of the Battle of Jinnan, the Soviet adviser I. V. Chuikov expressed support for the GMD’s (Kuomingtang’s) attempt to remove CCP troops. See: Niu Jin, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “The Origin of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” Paper presented at Hong Kong Univ., Department of History, Conference on the Cold War in Asia (Jan. 1996). For a long time Stalin supported not only Chang Kai Shek, but also Mao’s rivals within the Communist Party of China (Wang Ming and Gao Gang). In June 1944, Stalin (in a conversation with Averill Harriman, the US Ambassador in Moscow), described the Chinese Communists as “margarine communists” and the communist party in China as “no more than a nationalistic peasant party and petty bourgeois political party that did not possess much real power” (See: Foreign Relations of the US, 1944, Vol. VI, The Far East, pp. 799-800). At Yalta, Stalin, who was interested in a stable China as a buffer on his south-eastern frontier “tried,” so wrote Niu Jun, (op. cit., p. 4) “to cooperate with the United States on Chinese issue — including the recognition of the legitimacy of the GMD Government Jiang Jeshi (Chang Kai Shek).”

49 At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (December 1947), Mao Zedong reiterated his stance formulated in April 1946, that compromise between the Soviet Union and the USA “did not necessarily mean that people in various countries must also follow and make compromise at home.” Mao gave as an example Yugoslavia, where Tito had refused to accept the idea of divided spheres of influence of the superpowers and achieved a unified state. See: Research material Section (Beijing, the Chinese People's Univ., the Department of Party History), No. 6521/2, 5, quoted after Niu Jun, op.
This was the reaction when Stalin, wanting to improve relations with the Kuomintang in the Northern Territories of China which were under his control, forbade activities of the Chinese Communist Party in the large towns of Manchuria and other provinces of North East China. The recommendation was made that the CCP should “try to avoid unrealistic dependence on Soviet assistance and blind optimism or pessimism as a result of the increase or decrease of the Soviet aid.” “A few comments on the work in Manchuria, 30 November, 1945,” Chen Yan wenxuan [Selected works of Chen Yun] (Beijing, 1984), pp. 221–224, quoted after Niu Jun, p. 14.


This was the stance of the initial Chinese leaders in 1946, cited by Niu Jun (op. cit., p. 15) on the basis of Chinese archival material relating to talks on the armistice in the North East, at the beginning of 1946.

This is clearly seen in the current efforts of the Chinese army not to be dependence on a single source of military technology. “China doesn’t make military alliances with anyone.” (Li Fenglin, Chinese ambassador to Moscow, Newsweek, 12 Feb. 1996).

As early as the eight century BC there was a crisis of state, which was interpreted — according to traditional Chinese sources, as the “collapse of the fiction that a tightly unit feudal empire existed.” For an analysis of this shock and its effect on Chinese political thought of the time of Confucius, see: Needham, op. cit., Chapter 1.

The reason for the crisis of state was traditionally viewed in China to reside in the impossibility of organizing a unitary financial (tax) system, and in the lack of control over lines of communication. On the role of “key economic areas” in the Chinese epistemology of power, see: Chi Chao Ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, as revealed in the Development of Public Works for Water Control (Allen and Unwin, London, 1936).

The presence of Soviet troops in Central Europe was the decisive factor in the consolidation of the communist governments. According to archive material which has recently become available (secret annex to the documents of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, July 1944, Lublin), the Soviet military authorities on the territory of Poland (that is, a country which, unlike Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania, had been on the side of the allies in World War II) received from the puppet Polish authorities in the liberated territories the right of exclusive military jurisdiction at the rear (behind the front line). This facilitated the elimination of the political opponents of the Polish Workers’ Party (i.e. communist party) and the Lublin government.
57 Until 1947 Stalin was opposed to the division of Germany (see Staritz Dietrich, *op. cit.*), the question of unification (conditional upon neutralization) returned in the negotiations about the status of Austria (1953–55). Earlier, Beria was also an advocate of the unification of Germany. See: J. Richter, “Re-examining Soviet Policy towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum,” Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Working Paper, No. 3, 1992; Gerhard Wetting, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deuschlandpolitik in Fruhjahr, 1953” [One the state of research on Beria's policy towards Germany in spring, 1953], *Deutschland Archiv*, 26–6 (1993), pp. 674–682. Elements of a return to this political line may be found also in Khrushchev. Probably it was this, in addition to his attempts to strengthen the state administration at the expense of the communist party, and his attempts to demilitarize the Warsaw Pact, which led to his downfall. Fear of a USSR-German axis (at the expense of the territorial interests of the countries of Central Europe, in particular, Poland) became, and remains, a determinant of politics in this region. The question put to Stalin by the German politicians: “Is it possible to think about small corrections to the Eastern Frontier?” (in “Nasha liniiia takaia,” *op. cit.*), is still relevant. (See: “Zloveshchaia ten’ prodannoi Alaski nad Kaliningradom” [The menacing shadow of the Alaska sale over Kaliningrad], *Pravda*, 5, 12–99, Jan. 1996, linking the status of Kaliningrad with the question of the Polish Western Lands).

58 The vision of spheres of influence, in accordance with the letter of the Yalta Conference (February, 1945) was close to what had been agreed between Stalin and Churchill and was expressed precisely by M. Litvinov, in his report prepared for the Yalta Conference. He wrote about spheres of divided interest, in which one superpower would have strategic predominance (but not exclusivity). See: Litvinov, “On the Question of Blocs and Spheres of Influence,” *The War and the Working Class* (15 Dec. 1944). Quoted after Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three after War II,” Working paper, No. 13, Cold War International History Project, 1995, p. 14. The assent of the USA (State Department) to this concept is analyzed in: Eduard Mark, “Charles E. Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe,” *Diplomatic History*, 3–2 (Spring 1979), pp. 201–213. The condition for acceptance of spheres of divided influence was, for the State Department, their “open and limited character” (Mark, *op. cit.*). Negotiations between the USA and Moscow in the Gorbachev era were — at least from the perspective of Moscow, conducted with the intention of a strong “return to the letter of Yalta” in the sense of spheres of divided influence. This is indicated by the remarks of S. Karaganov, a political strategist from the era of military revolution. See: Interview with him in *Rzeczpospolita*, 4–5, XII, 1993.


60 Second Conversation with Mao, *Cold War Bulletin, op. cit.*

61 The threat seemed to the Polish elite so explicit in view of Stalin's equivocal
stance and the arguments about the “temporary administration of these lands by Poland” in the electoral campaign of the German Communist Party, that Wladyslaw Gomulka made an attempt to force Stalin to take a less ambiguous position. See: A. Werblan (ed.), Pamiętniki W. Gomulki [Memoirs of W. Gomulka] (Warsaw, 1992). He paid for this later; he was charged, under pressure from Moscow, with “nationalist deviation” and was repressed until 1955.

62 A good example here is General Wojciech Jaruzelski. His introduction of Martial Law in December 1981 hampered the realization of the Ogarkov Doctrine. Later, he sought political means of shifting Poland towards the West—see the diplomacy concerning Poland’s accession to the IMF in 1982, contacts via the Vatican and Trilateral Commission. However, when Moscow itself began to seek political solutions to security problems (with proposals to withdraw its troops from Central Europe), Jaruzelski was probably afraid of anarchy and a violent mobilization of society in the absence of the bogey-man of Soviet intervention. Jaruzelski also encountered internal opposition from a faction which feared a “return to Yalta” (in the sense of a sphere of divided influence). According to information which I received in Warsaw (from an informant who wishes to remain anonymous), some kind of putsch was in preparation against Jaruzelski (1984–85). In this situation, he hardened his own stance in internal politics and in the international arena. This is mentioned (without explanation) by J. Attali in his memoir about the period of his cooperation with Mitterand.

The Polish politicians who were active in that period write very little about these events in their own memoirs. See: Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan Wojenny — dlaczego? [Martial Law — Why?] (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); W. Jaruzelski, Les chains et le recuge (Paris: Lattes, 1992); Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, General Kiszczak mówi...prawie wszystko [General Kiszczak speaks...almost everything] (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); Vitaliy Pavlov, Wspomnienia rezidenta KGB w Polsce, [Memoirs of a KGB Resident in Poland] (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). However, the reconstruction of the areas of ambiguity (“blank spots”) in the said memoirs confirm the divisions beneath the surface mentioned above. The negotiations with the West and the differences in the apparat are addressed directly only by General W. Pozoga in his book: Czego Jaruzelski nie powiedział [What Jaruzelski did not say] (Warsaw, 1993).

63 This relates to the change of military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact towards preparations for a “limited war” in Europe (with the approval of the CC CPSU in December, 1966, see: V. Mastny, Militarization of Warsaw Pact, op. cit., p. 11), the earlier Warsaw Pact military exercises “Buria” [Storm] which included simulation of a nuclear first strike by the Soviet Union, and pressure from Moscow for an organizational consolidation of the Warsaw pact, see documents from the meeting of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact (records of the meeting of 17 March, 1969, J IV, 2/202–264 Bd SAPMO), Cited after V. Mastny, op. cit.

64 The most active was Ceaucescu: as early as October 1963, Romania informed the
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65 Based on my own observations as an adviser to the strike committee during the negotiations on a formula for free trade unions.


67 Chuang Tzu, *op. cit.*

68 See: the neo-Confucian "philosophy of the organism," of, for example, Chu Hsi. See: Needham, *op. cit.*, showing the manner of linking knowledge of mechanisms with vitalism and holism. A similar approach may be found in L. von Bertalanffy's Systems Theory, which is popular in China.


70 Xu Jimin, *op. cit.*

71 Sum Fayang and Ye Dumping (eds.), *Philosophical Questions and Examples from Science* (Shanghai, 1986).


76 The discussion on property rights started in 1983 with the article of J. Strzelecki presenting the theory of the School of Property Rights presented at the meeting of the Solidarity network. It was the beginning of a discussion which led to the formation of the circle of Gdansk liberals. The author of the present work published an article on the necessity of ownership changes in the same year in *Przegląd Polityczym* (Gdansk) and in underground "Krytyka" "Three years after August (1980)." Also discussions in the circles of the journal *Colloquia Communae* at the University of Warsaw, published by young scholars from communist party.
In Hungary, the beginning of the discussions on ownership was the article of G. Liszka on the exclusion of ownership in the form of managerial leasing (in *Acta Economica*, in the mid-1980s, Budapest, Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

In the Higher School of Social Sciences (later, the Academy of Social Sciences) attached to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party the works of Alchian, Pejovic and Demsetz were translated for internal use. The lecturer responsible at the Academy of Social Sciences for these problems was Leszek Balcerowicz.

This concerned the exclusion of parts of the property in order to individualize feelings of decreases (as losses) and increases (as gains).

The beginnings of the actual exclusion (task teams, group ownership) occurred back in the first half of the 1980s. See the Chapter on political capitalism in my book *The Dynamics of Breakthrough* (Univ. of California Press, 1991). The first discussions related to experiments with the dual status of immoveable property: state property when it was used to realize the aims of an enterprise and was — *de facto* — excluded, while when it was not used by the enterprise it was used by the managerial team (or workers/ brigades) for production on their own account. This form was very popular also in the USSR in the second half of the 1980s. In Poland, it was the brainchild of a young economist from the University of Warsaw, Artur Sliwinski who later worked in the party *apparat*; he used the term “the two-door cupboard,” speaking of a structure which could be opened in two ways.

The argument that de-etatization in the ownership sphere and clear-cut identity of owners would increase control over the economy was used by the Spanish liberals in the last years of the Franco regime as a means of encouraging the ruling elite towards ownership reform. See: J. Anderson, *Economic Reforms in Authoritarian Spain*.


An analysis of the “inert structure” was made in these terms at the seminar conducted by Colonel S. Kwiatkowski (Director of the Center for Research into Public Opinion) for party intellectuals in the second half of the 1980s (steno-graphic transcripts from these meetings).

The beginning of the discussion was the work of L. V. Stepanov, *Problema ekonomicheskoi nezavisimosti* [Problem of economic independence] (Moscow, 1965). This began the application of the language of dependency theory to the analysis of the situation in the communist bloc. The discussion was concentrated first in the Institute of Latin America of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and later also in the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (including the team of V.L. Tiuganenko and R. M. Avkov). See: V. L. Tiuganenko (ed.), *Razvivaiushchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy* [The countries are developing; laws, tendencies, prospects] (Moscow: vyd. Mysl., 1974).

The theoretical argument behind the thesis of the “exhaustion” of the CMEA...
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(formulated openly in 1985 by the then Premier of the USSR Ryzhkov) was the concept of "dual dependency" (dependency of the communist bloc on the world system and the politically imposed dependence within the framework of the CMEA). The task of the latter was to reduce the tensions due to the first type of dependence by the imposed division of labor, forced transfers. I wrote about this in The Ontology of Socialism (Oxford, 1993).

Besides those mentioned above, first and foremost V. M. Davydov with his article "Modernizatsiia otstalosti — tendentsiia zavisimogo kapitalisma" [Modernization of the outdated — a tendency of dependency capitalism], Latinskaia Amerika, 1977, No. 1, pp. 17-37.

First and foremost: Viktor Sheynis, "Strany srednerazvitogo kapitalizma," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, op. cit.


See also the stenographic transcript of the discussion at the seminar on the Afghanistan War in the series organized by the Cold War History Project (The Wilson Center, Washington DC) and the Nobel Institute, Oslo.

The beginning was the establishment of economic subjects connected with the Communist Party and authorized to carry out financial transactions and the introduction of a law on the export of hard currency. In Poland this was the Economic Agency attached to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers; Party, established in 1988; it received from the Ministry of Finance about 800 such permits. A similar structure was first set up in the CPSU only in 1991. See: "Postanovlenie Politiburo TsK KPCC: 'O proizvodstvenno-khoziaistvenoi deiatelnosti partiinykh komitetov i partuchrezhdenii' 11 iulia 1991. No. PB -10/2g (Sekretno)" [Resolution of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, 'On the industrial-economic activity of party committees and party bodies' 11 July, 1991. No. PB -10/2g (Secret)], published in Istoricheskii Arkhiv, No. 1, 1992. Here began the special mutual education process of the elites: Premier Pavlov and Vice-President Yanaev consulted together on this question with the post-communist Social-Democratic Polish Republic in 1990 and 1991.

"O svoevremennom etape razvitiia kapitalizma v Meksike" [On the contemporary stage of development of capitalism in Mexico], Latinskaia Amerika, 1978, No. 5, pp. 70-119.

Ibid., pp. 101-102.

See: Inter alia, the article of M. Krajewski, at that time head of the Ideology Section of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party in the second half of the 1980s. Also the discussions within S. Kwiatkowski's party seminar, op.cit.

Ibid., pp. 102-105.

Ibid.
See the article of the leader of the Communist Party of Russia, Gennadii Ziuganov in Nash Sovremmenik, Oct., 1995. Also the report prepared under the direction of E. Primakov in 1995 on the international situation of Russia and the strategies towards it of the developed countries also operates with a similar paradigm of "dependency capitalism." The problem of globalization viewed as an agent ramifying changes in the USSR became one of the first problems discussed in the forum of the party leadership by Mikhail Gorbachev after becoming General Secretary of the CPSU. See: "Postanovlenie politbiuro TsK SSSR 4-go sentiabria 1996: '0 merakh po usileniu nashego protivodeistviia amerikanskoi politike neoglobalizma' [Resolution of the CC CPSU 'On measures to intensify our counter-action to the American policy of neoglobalism'], Istochnik (Journal of the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation), No. 2, 1995.

Gorbachev expressed his conviction that cooperation with the West was a necessary condition of reform in the USSR as early as 1986 (see his speech to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU. 25 February, 1986). The possibility of "non-conventional" options in the foreign policy of the USSR (including the unification of Germany) was formulated by Viacheslav Dashchev, head of the Department of Foreign Policy in the Institute of the World Economy of the Socialist System of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He repeated it in his expert report of November 1987, being already Chairman of the Scientific Council attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The effects, however, were less than expected: Western investment turned out to be fairly modest. German investment, for instance, fell from 236 million DM in 1992 to 86 million in the first half of 1994 (Der Spiegel, 7. II,1994). At the same time, Russian investment in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic was significantly higher (381 million DM in 1992; 153 million in 1993, — Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 13. I. 1995). This included significant sums lodged in Western Banks by Russian exporters (inflow of hard currency in 1990-1995 is estimated at around US$100 billion).


KGB Report on corruption (1979); the fragments discussed were published only in 1982 (Pravda, 11, XII, 1982).

In Poland at this period a sociological survey conducted in party circles of views on the formalization of the "leading roll of the party": 46% were in favor. Pawel Gieorgica, Higher School of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Warsaw, 1978).

Scientific conference on the conflicts in Poland organized by the Polish Sociological Society in 1977 and the ensuing discussions (inter alia in the Society of
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Scientific Organizations and Leadership) on the theme of "conflict regulation."


106 The general test of this formula of change were the purges in Azerbaijan in 1969 and repeated in 1982 by KGB General Aliev. He was a protege of Andropov: the latter brought him into the Politburo in 1982 (10 days after the death of Brezhnev). These purges, and similar purges in Georgia in 1978, were accompanied by economic experiments sponsored by the KGB (for example, Shevardnadze, in Georgia, in at that time a KGB General, experimented in 1978 with linking the private and state sectors in agriculture — using the model of the first version of the NEP as the "linkage."[Smyczka] These connections became the precursor of the limited nomenklatura-type privatisations of the early 1980s).

107 See the attack on Brezhnev's daughter and her set — even before Brezhnev's death.

In July 1983, "political organs" were created in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD); their purpose was "to enhance the responsibility of personnel for the discharge of their duties," Pravda, 30 July 1983.

Andropov represented a stance reminiscent of the Chinese Legalists (and repeated by Liu Shaoqui at the beginning of the 1950s) regarding severe law (and not ideology or ethics) as the adhesive of the state. On Andropov's "legalism," see: Zhores Medvedev, Andropov (New York, 1983).

108 Andropov's biographers indicate his sympathy to the group known as "Russo­phile patriots" who considered the state to be of greater importance than the (ethnic/cultural nation). See analysis of this trend in: V. Shlapentokh, Intellectuals and Soviet Politics (London 1992), Chapter 8. The book of F. Nestorov, Sviaz' Vremen[i] [Connection of the times], 2nd edition (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1984), is representative of this trend. See also: Yu. Andropov, Izbrannye Rechi i Stat' [Selected Speeches and Articles] (Moscow: Polizdat, 1983) (speeches from 1980 to 1981, after Andropov's links with the National Bolsheviks had become weaker).


110 The first problem was posed by F. Znakov, who proposed a division from above in the power elite (the communist party, which he termed the "second pivot") as a means of setting in motion the dynamic of the system without loss of control.


112 Term used in Humberto Maturana, Erkennen. Der Organisation und Verkörp­ung von Wirklichkeit. Ausgewagte Arbeiten zur Biologischen Epistemology (Braunschweig, 1982).


114 Stephen Fuks, "Translation and Introduction" to Tautology, op. cit., p. 23.
117 See: Staniszkis, *The Ontology of Socialism, op. cit.*
119 This traditional term from the Chinese, culturally conditioned ontology was used in the course of the discussion on the fate of traditional markets in the context of the agricultural reform at the beginning of the 1950s.
120 See the article of Piotr Wysocki, “Zbyteczne’ ofiary: Sad Najwyzszy nie pomoze represjonowanym” [“Needless” sacrifices: the Supreme Court does not help the repressed], *Zycie Warszawy* (23 June 1995).
121 For example: the interpretation put in Moscow on the observations of President Bush on “strengthening Europe within the framework of the CSCE” (which were taken to indicate his agreement to the subordination of NATO to the CSCE — now the OSCE — which the Russians demanded and continue to demand). An interpretation along the same lines, too, was also put on the statement of the Chief of Staff of NATO in London on 5 July, 1995, concerning readiness to cooperate with states allied to “former opponents.” This interpretation was also promoted by the stance of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal German Republic, who spoke of the continued presence of NATO in West Germany but not on the territory of East Germany (see interview in *Der Spiegel* of 14.V.1990). The scale of foreign investment and help as a reward for agreeing to the unification of Germany was likewise over-estimated. See, for example, pronouncements on this subject of the leading experts on German questions N. Portugalov and V. Dashchev.
122 See the decision of the G-7 (London, July 1991) arguing that large-scale help to the USSR should be withheld in view of the unclear relationship between the army and Gorbachev.
123 Part of Gorbachev’s entourage was derived from the “Kussinen circle” (to which in the past Andropov had also belonged). Some of them had been side-tracked during the Brezhnev era (among others the editors of *Novoe Vremia*, based in Prague, who in 1968 had observed the events there first-hand). See for example the remarks of Fedor Burlatskii who quit that circle over the necessity for reform, *inter alia*, in: “Mezhudatartsarstvie ili kronika vremen Den Syaoping” [Interregnum, or a chronicle of the times of Deng Xiaoping], *Novyi Mir*, No. 4.
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124 Aleksandr Tsypko, memoirs from the time of his work with A. Yakovlev and M. Gorbachev, written during his time at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido (mimeo in library of the SRC, in Russian).

125 Information from the book of Solov'ev and Klepikova, op. cit.

126 See the resolution, prepared under Gorbachev's leadership, “Postanovlenie TsK KPSS ‘O srochnyh merakh po protivodeistviyu vykhoda Litvy iz sostava SSSR’ 6 marta 1990, sekretno” [Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU: On urgent measures to prevent Lithuania leaving the USSR' of 6 March 1990, secret], Istoricheskii Arkhiv, No. 1 (Moscow, 1991).

127 A repertoire of actions was proposed on improving information policy, see the secret Resolution of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 2 December, 1990, “O pervoucheredyhkh meropriiatiahkh po uluchsheniuy osvesheniiu v tsentral'noi pechati i mestnykh organov informatssii Azerbaidzhanskoj i Armianskoj SSR” [On the most necessary to improve questions of inter-nationality relations in the central press and the local organs of information of the Azerbaijanian and Armenian SSRs] in: Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documents of the Russian Federation — the former CC CPSU Archive in Moscow, Fond 3, Nr. P 143/2/ on the use of force. See Politburo of the CC CPSU “O pravovom regulirovaniy rezhima chrezvychainogo pozhishiya” [Legal regulation of a state of emergency] 9 December 1988, secret in Center for Preservation, op. cit., for the unsuccessful attempts to influence personnel policy in individual republics so as to oust members of local elites who used the formula of national post-communism.


129 See the resolution prepared under Gorbachev's leadership: “Postanovlenie Politburo TsK SSSR ot 4-go sentiabria 1986 g.: O merakh po usileniiu nashego protivodeistviyu amerikanskoj politike 'neoglobalizma'” [Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU: On measures to strengthen our opposition to the American policy of “neoglobalism”], Istochnik (From the Presidential archives), No. 2, 1995.


The leaders of the Russian All-National Union, N. Narodnitskaia and Kseniia Mialo, “Eshche raz o Evraziiskom soblazne” [Once more on the Eurasian temptation], Nash Sovremennik, No. 4, 1995. Narodnitskaia is the Deputy Head of the All-Russian National Legal Center and a member of the First All-Russian Sobor.

131 See report of the meeting in Alma Ata (Diplomacheshkij Viestnik, February 1995), where Nazarbaev proposed creating a Euro-Asiatic Union as the executive organ of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The proposal
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was rejected.

132 Narochnitskaia, op. cit. p. 132.

133 The opinion of Sergei Karaganov, Vice Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an adviser to Gorbachev and Yeltsin, critical of the ideas of Nazarbaev.

134 Narochnitskaia, op. cit., p. 133, writes of the idea of an anti-Atlantic German/Euroasiatic Union/China axis based on their common open or covert anti-Americanism (Euro-Asiatic = Russia and the states of Central Asia).


138 See: debate between the legalists and supporters of Confucian philosophy, Needham, op. cit., pp. 204-220.

139 See the concept of "circumambient causation" and the non-linear concept of time in Chinese tradition, Needham, op. cit., pp. 287-289.

140 See A Forke, World Conception of the China, op. cit.

141 Today's neo-authoritarians in China are directly linked to the traditional political thinking of China — including the disputes between the Legalists and supporters of Confucius. See: Steven Mufson (citing Xiao Gongqin from the Shanghai Teachers' University), "The most major problem facing China's modernization today is the question of how to seek and find a new source for the legitimacy of authority. The answer is founded on mainstream Confucian culture. As China booms, fear of chaos fuels new force," Washington Post (11 Nov. 1995). It also appears that the present radicalization of unification policy regarding Taiwan (the threat of conflict included) is treated by the military sector of the power elite as an internal ramification of efforts to strengthen the state. It is a continuation of the division which arose on the eve of the Korean War in 1950 between Mao (and part of the army) and Zhou Enlai, Lin Piao and Ling Shaoqui — who viewed such a method of strengthening the state as too costly and risky.

142 This refers, inter alia, to the new wave of repression of supporters of democratization in China.


146 A Walicki wrote about this in his work analyzing the reception of liberalism in Russia (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995).