DSpace Collection: 2003
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/38985
20032024-03-28T19:31:49ZТ. И. パシコヴァ『一六世紀前半のロシア国家における地方支配 : 代官と郷司』
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39023
Title: Т. И. パシコヴァ『一六世紀前半のロシア国家における地方支配 : 代官と郷司』
Authors: 宮野, 裕
Description: 書評2002-12-31T15:00:00Z宮野, 裕研究のグローバル化の中における日本のロシア史研究 : Новый мир истории России. Форум японских и российских исследователей. К 60-летию профессора Вада Харуки / Под редакцией Бордюгова Г., Исии Н., Томита Т. Москва: “АИРО-ХХ”, 2001. 592 с. への書評
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39022
Title: 研究のグローバル化の中における日本のロシア史研究 : Новый мир истории России. Форум японских и российских исследователей. К 60-летию профессора Вада Харуки / Под редакцией Бордюгова Г., Исии Н., Томита Т. Москва: “АИРО-ХХ”, 2001. 592 с. への書評
Authors: ゲラシモフ, イリヤ
Description: 書評論文. 露文より松里公孝が訳2002-12-31T15:00:00Zゲラシモフ, イリヤM. A. バクーニンにおけるスラヴ問題 : 研究史と問題提起
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39021
Title: M. A. バクーニンにおけるスラヴ問題 : 研究史と問題提起
Authors: 山本, 健三
Description: 研究ノート2002-12-31T15:00:00Z山本, 健三ロシア聖書協会と聖書ロシア語訳事業 : 歴史的位置付けについての覚え書き
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39020
Title: ロシア聖書協会と聖書ロシア語訳事業 : 歴史的位置付けについての覚え書き
Authors: 兎内, 勇津流
Description: 研究ノート2002-12-31T15:00:00Z兎内, 勇津流サハリン島水産業(1875-1904)をめぐる紛争 : 実態と構造
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39019
Title: サハリン島水産業(1875-1904)をめぐる紛争 : 実態と構造
Authors: 神長, 英輔
Description: 研究ノート2002-12-31T15:00:00Z神長, 英輔結核と革命
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39018
Title: 結核と革命
Authors: 後藤, 正憲
Description: 研究ノート2002-12-31T15:00:00Z後藤, 正憲ストルィピン農業改革期ロシアにおける区画地経営
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39017
Title: ストルィピン農業改革期ロシアにおける区画地経営
Authors: 崔, 在東
Abstract: Уже в начале Столыпинской реформы было ясным то, что хотя и дореформенные землеустроенные хозяйства оказались в более лучшем положении, они не очень отличались от окружающих общинных и подворных хозяйств. Тем не менее, именно в 1909 году, с целью увеличить число землеустроенных хозяйств, правительство предложило новую политику, то есть разверстание целых селений в хуторские и отрубные хозайства, имеющие больший эффект, чем отдельные выделы. В частности, при разверстании целых селении, конечно, были включены и многие малоземельные крестьяские хозяйства. В действительности, более половины целых землеустроенных хозяйств имели меньшее количество десятин, чем предельный размер дробления хуторских и отрубных владений. В результате возникли многие неспособные и ненадежные землеустроенные хозяйства, которым крайне трудно было рассчитывать стать самостоятельными. Что касается землеустроенных хозяйств, создавшихся при помощи Крестьянского земельного банка, и имеющих относительно больший размер земель, то более половины из них создавались из менее 6-ти десятинных хозяйств, и около 20% из неимевших земли, почти не занятых до того времени. Так как они моглу брать брали 100%-ные ссуды из Крестьянского земельного банка, у них были большие долги, и они должны были вовремя возвратить определенные долги и уплатить проценты. Так как для избежания принудительного отчуждения купленных участков были необходимы своевременные выплаты, то многие хозяйства были вынуждены сдавать свои участки в аренду дешевле, чем процентная плата в Крестьянский банк, и продавать зерно дешевле. При таком тяжелом положении многие банковские хозяйства предпочитали перепродажу участка, иногда приносящую большую денежную прибыль. В целом, хозяйственное положение столыпинских землеустроенных хозяйств мало отличалось от положения дореформенных землеустроенных. Они имели преимущество, хотя очень маленькое, перед общинными и чересполосными личными хозяйствами, но пока не успели стать показательными хозяйствами. Для этого были необходимы агрономическая помощь и огромные денежные пособия. Так как при переходе к хуторскому и отрубному хозяйству требовалось гараздо большее количество времени и денег, у них было досточно повода и энтузиазма перестройть хозяйство как можно скорее. Они более активно приняли участие в разного типа агрономичестких работах, проводимых не только правительственными органами, но и земскими. При этом можно было ожидать улучшения и интенсификация хозяйств. При этом положении дробление хозяйств, возникающее в результате наследования, семейного раздела, переуступкой или сделкой, явилось тяжелым ударом по только что возникшим землеустроенным хозяйствам. Не говоря уже о хозяйствах, имеющих менее предельного размера, и хозяйства более предельного размера, то есть приблизительно 90% из цельных крестьянских хозяйств в случае раздела могли оказаться в ряду хозяйств, имеющих менее предельного размера. Между тем, добровольные попытки избежать дробления хозяйств наблюдались чрезвычайно редко. Тем менее, хотя и были попытки предотвратить дробление путем духовного завещания и переуступки, при жалобе в суд против этого со стороны другого законного наследника, такие попытки не обязательно удовлетворялись. Для удовлетварения нужно было преодолеть стену крестьянских обычаев, образовавшихся за долгое время при общинном землевладении и семейной собственности существования. В действительности, у столыпинских землеустроенных хозяйств, несмотря на короткое время существования, уже наблюдалось дробление хозяйств. И у многих дробленных хозяйств вновь появились чересполосные участки. В целях принудительно предотвратить дробление землеустроенных хозяйств, Министрество Внутренных Дел и Главное Управление Землеустройства и Земледелия приступили к составлению проектов законов о наследовании в землях мелкого владения и о мерах к ограничению дробления мелкой земельной собственности, образованной с содействием правительства. В России многие прежние крестьянские законы, пытающиеся ограничить дробление крестьянских хозяйств, в конце концов оставались мертвой буквой. Одной из их самых значительных причин было то, что ограничительные законы не сошлись с традиционным правосознанием русских крестьян. Поэтому два министерских законопроекта так же имели большую возможность остаться мертвой буквой, как и прежние. Тем не менее, необходимая финансовая помощь должна была стать обременительной для правительства. С одной стороны, преимущественный наследник должен вновь брать в долг болшую сумму для того, чтобы уплатить сонаследникам наследственную долю. С другой стороны, в случае когда сонаследников более двух, наследованная доля уменьшается, то вести самостоятельное хозяйство большинству было бы трудно.2002-12-31T15:00:00Z崔, 在東Уже в начале Столыпинской реформы было ясным то, что хотя и дореформенные землеустроенные хозяйства оказались в более лучшем положении, они не очень отличались от окружающих общинных и подворных хозяйств. Тем не менее, именно в 1909 году, с целью увеличить число землеустроенных хозяйств, правительство предложило новую политику, то есть разверстание целых селений в хуторские и отрубные хозайства, имеющие больший эффект, чем отдельные выделы. В частности, при разверстании целых селении, конечно, были включены и многие малоземельные крестьяские хозяйства. В действительности, более половины целых землеустроенных хозяйств имели меньшее количество десятин, чем предельный размер дробления хуторских и отрубных владений. В результате возникли многие неспособные и ненадежные землеустроенные хозяйства, которым крайне трудно было рассчитывать стать самостоятельными. Что касается землеустроенных хозяйств, создавшихся при помощи Крестьянского земельного банка, и имеющих относительно больший размер земель, то более половины из них создавались из менее 6-ти десятинных хозяйств, и около 20% из неимевших земли, почти не занятых до того времени. Так как они моглу брать брали 100%-ные ссуды из Крестьянского земельного банка, у них были большие долги, и они должны были вовремя возвратить определенные долги и уплатить проценты. Так как для избежания принудительного отчуждения купленных участков были необходимы своевременные выплаты, то многие хозяйства были вынуждены сдавать свои участки в аренду дешевле, чем процентная плата в Крестьянский банк, и продавать зерно дешевле. При таком тяжелом положении многие банковские хозяйства предпочитали перепродажу участка, иногда приносящую большую денежную прибыль. В целом, хозяйственное положение столыпинских землеустроенных хозяйств мало отличалось от положения дореформенных землеустроенных. Они имели преимущество, хотя очень маленькое, перед общинными и чересполосными личными хозяйствами, но пока не успели стать показательными хозяйствами. Для этого были необходимы агрономическая помощь и огромные денежные пособия. Так как при переходе к хуторскому и отрубному хозяйству требовалось гараздо большее количество времени и денег, у них было досточно повода и энтузиазма перестройть хозяйство как можно скорее. Они более активно приняли участие в разного типа агрономичестких работах, проводимых не только правительственными органами, но и земскими. При этом можно было ожидать улучшения и интенсификация хозяйств. При этом положении дробление хозяйств, возникающее в результате наследования, семейного раздела, переуступкой или сделкой, явилось тяжелым ударом по только что возникшим землеустроенным хозяйствам. Не говоря уже о хозяйствах, имеющих менее предельного размера, и хозяйства более предельного размера, то есть приблизительно 90% из цельных крестьянских хозяйств в случае раздела могли оказаться в ряду хозяйств, имеющих менее предельного размера. Между тем, добровольные попытки избежать дробления хозяйств наблюдались чрезвычайно редко. Тем менее, хотя и были попытки предотвратить дробление путем духовного завещания и переуступки, при жалобе в суд против этого со стороны другого законного наследника, такие попытки не обязательно удовлетворялись. Для удовлетварения нужно было преодолеть стену крестьянских обычаев, образовавшихся за долгое время при общинном землевладении и семейной собственности существования. В действительности, у столыпинских землеустроенных хозяйств, несмотря на короткое время существования, уже наблюдалось дробление хозяйств. И у многих дробленных хозяйств вновь появились чересполосные участки. В целях принудительно предотвратить дробление землеустроенных хозяйств, Министрество Внутренных Дел и Главное Управление Землеустройства и Земледелия приступили к составлению проектов законов о наследовании в землях мелкого владения и о мерах к ограничению дробления мелкой земельной собственности, образованной с содействием правительства. В России многие прежние крестьянские законы, пытающиеся ограничить дробление крестьянских хозяйств, в конце концов оставались мертвой буквой. Одной из их самых значительных причин было то, что ограничительные законы не сошлись с традиционным правосознанием русских крестьян. Поэтому два министерских законопроекта так же имели большую возможность остаться мертвой буквой, как и прежние. Тем не менее, необходимая финансовая помощь должна была стать обременительной для правительства. С одной стороны, преимущественный наследник должен вновь брать в долг болшую сумму для того, чтобы уплатить сонаследникам наследственную долю. С другой стороны, в случае когда сонаследников более двух, наследованная доля уменьшается, то вести самостоятельное хозяйство большинству было бы трудно.近代ロシア思想における「外来」と「内発」 : F・F・マルテンスの国際法思想
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39016
Title: 近代ロシア思想における「外来」と「内発」 : F・F・マルテンスの国際法思想
Authors: 天野, 尚樹
Abstract: Since the era of Peter the Great the history of modern Russian thought is one characterized by cultural contact with European thought. The purpose of this paper is to examine the thought of a representative pre-revolutionary scholar of international law, Fedor Fedorovich Martens, from the angle of cultural contact with European thought. The main themes of Martens' thought were affected by Western thought. His, however, was bound to undergo modification in accordance with traditional Russian legal thinking. Let us consider this way of thinking from three interrelated points. The first point concerns the concept of "pravo." Martens defines the key concept of international relations as "the idea of law [pravo]." International law manages the international social and cultural exchange between "civilized nations." Martens refers to this international activity as "international life," that is, the role of international law is to govern "international life." He calls this role "international administration." Martens' thought reflects the influence of Lorenz von Stein. The concept of "law [pravo]" in Martens' context, however, differs from that of "law [Recht]" in Stein's work. The second point is connected with the Russian concept of social community and its characteristics. Martens views international relations as taking place within the "international community." He regards the essence of international law to be an "international community" in which "civilized nations" have an "international life." The "international community" is the voluntary association of "civilized nations." "Civilization," in other words, means the prerequisite for membership in the "international community" which does not have any authority over states. According to Martens' theory, international conferences function as administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the "international community." This idea is inspired by the Russian understanding of social community. The third point concerns the Russian concept of natural law. Martens' key concept of international relations, "the idea of law," is relevant to structural change in the "international community." This change refers to the expansion of "international life" on a global scale. The turning point of this change was the Crimean War, which resulted in Turkey's entering the "international community." Before the war, the members of this "international community" were restricted to "civilized nations," that is, only Christian-European nations. This restriction, however, became invalid with the entry of Turkey into the "international community," thus extending the "international community" beyond Europe. Martens applied the following condition to meet this situation: the idea of the "eclectic combination of natural law and positive law." Martens argues that this idea is an outgrowth of the Grotian tradition of international law. Martens defines non-European nations as "uncivilized nations," meaning that positive law cannot be applied to them. Instead Martens applies natural law in these situations. This usage, however, differs from the Western legal tradition, because Martens recognizes natural law in Russian way. According to Russian legal traditions, pravo is not distinguished from the orders of specific political authorities, such as an ukaz from the tsar. The Russian masses do not try to exercise their subjective rights, which is the essence of Recht. On this point, the Russian legal traditon differs from that of the West. The attitude of the Russian masses allows the exercise of unlimited power by political authorities. This is due to the nature of traditional Russian social communities that lack autonomous bodies to exercise their subjective rights. This attitude stems from the Russian concept of natural law. Whereas Western people recognize natural law metaphysically, the Russians grasp it empirically. I call the Russian concept the "realistic natural law." The validity of the "realistic natural law" ultimately rests on political power. The Russian legal consciousness is reflected in Martens' recognition of the "international community." As stated above, Martens applies natural law to "uncivilized nations." According to his theory, "uncivilized nations" are not allowed to exercise their subjective rights. Therefore, it is possible for "civilized" Russia to exercise her power over "uncivilized nations" without any restrictions. Martens' concept of the "eclectic combination of natural law and positive law" is deeply influenced by Russia's "realistic natural law."2002-12-31T15:00:00Z天野, 尚樹Since the era of Peter the Great the history of modern Russian thought is one characterized by cultural contact with European thought. The purpose of this paper is to examine the thought of a representative pre-revolutionary scholar of international law, Fedor Fedorovich Martens, from the angle of cultural contact with European thought. The main themes of Martens' thought were affected by Western thought. His, however, was bound to undergo modification in accordance with traditional Russian legal thinking. Let us consider this way of thinking from three interrelated points. The first point concerns the concept of "pravo." Martens defines the key concept of international relations as "the idea of law [pravo]." International law manages the international social and cultural exchange between "civilized nations." Martens refers to this international activity as "international life," that is, the role of international law is to govern "international life." He calls this role "international administration." Martens' thought reflects the influence of Lorenz von Stein. The concept of "law [pravo]" in Martens' context, however, differs from that of "law [Recht]" in Stein's work. The second point is connected with the Russian concept of social community and its characteristics. Martens views international relations as taking place within the "international community." He regards the essence of international law to be an "international community" in which "civilized nations" have an "international life." The "international community" is the voluntary association of "civilized nations." "Civilization," in other words, means the prerequisite for membership in the "international community" which does not have any authority over states. According to Martens' theory, international conferences function as administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the "international community." This idea is inspired by the Russian understanding of social community. The third point concerns the Russian concept of natural law. Martens' key concept of international relations, "the idea of law," is relevant to structural change in the "international community." This change refers to the expansion of "international life" on a global scale. The turning point of this change was the Crimean War, which resulted in Turkey's entering the "international community." Before the war, the members of this "international community" were restricted to "civilized nations," that is, only Christian-European nations. This restriction, however, became invalid with the entry of Turkey into the "international community," thus extending the "international community" beyond Europe. Martens applied the following condition to meet this situation: the idea of the "eclectic combination of natural law and positive law." Martens argues that this idea is an outgrowth of the Grotian tradition of international law. Martens defines non-European nations as "uncivilized nations," meaning that positive law cannot be applied to them. Instead Martens applies natural law in these situations. This usage, however, differs from the Western legal tradition, because Martens recognizes natural law in Russian way. According to Russian legal traditions, pravo is not distinguished from the orders of specific political authorities, such as an ukaz from the tsar. The Russian masses do not try to exercise their subjective rights, which is the essence of Recht. On this point, the Russian legal traditon differs from that of the West. The attitude of the Russian masses allows the exercise of unlimited power by political authorities. This is due to the nature of traditional Russian social communities that lack autonomous bodies to exercise their subjective rights. This attitude stems from the Russian concept of natural law. Whereas Western people recognize natural law metaphysically, the Russians grasp it empirically. I call the Russian concept the "realistic natural law." The validity of the "realistic natural law" ultimately rests on political power. The Russian legal consciousness is reflected in Martens' recognition of the "international community." As stated above, Martens applies natural law to "uncivilized nations." According to his theory, "uncivilized nations" are not allowed to exercise their subjective rights. Therefore, it is possible for "civilized" Russia to exercise her power over "uncivilized nations" without any restrictions. Martens' concept of the "eclectic combination of natural law and positive law" is deeply influenced by Russia's "realistic natural law."ロシアにおける賃金未払問題の再検討
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39015
Title: ロシアにおける賃金未払問題の再検討
Authors: 杉浦, 史和
Abstract: The problem of non-payment in Russia has been a notorious epidemic since the start of its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. Though the economic reforms in 1990s were to establish a monetary economy, they led to such 'demonetizations,' as widespread barter deals. Non-payment can also be viewed as one of the widespread forms of demonetization. There are five forms of nonpayment: the non-payment between enterprises, between the government and enterprises, between banks and enterprises, from the pension fund to pensioners, and from enterprises to workers. This article analyzes the formation and development of the non-payment problems by focusing on the evolution of the non-payment of wages in Russia. With the widespread demonetization and non-payment of wages, the situation grew worse and the population has been seriously affected. However, one of the most serious aspects of wage arrears lies in the fact that it is almost impossible to resolve the problem by utilizing quasi-money, such as payments in kind, or the pseudo-settlement mechanisms, such as zachet or offsets. The payment of wages, in principle, should be made in cash as should be wage arrears. Therefore, there have been relatively few cases of wages being paid in kind between enterprises. This means the wage debts have piled up continuously and will likely grow much larger. Second, whether workers necessary receive wages promptly is directly related to the amount of their disposable income to assure standard of living. With wage arrears, workers can get smaller incomes and their living standard falls. That is why the non-payment of wages is one of the most serious phenomena of the demonetizations. Third, it is widely believed that the non-payment of wages prevents the restructuring of enterprises, because even without laying off the excess labor, the enterprises can reduce their payroll costs through wage arrears. Indeed it reflects the malfunction of the labor market in Russia. The non-payment of wages peaked just after the August crisis in 1998. Both the federal and local governments were responsible for 15 to 20 percent of the total non-payment of wages. The federal government owed army salaries and payments for state orders for the military complex, while the local governments owed wages for workers in the education, health, and other sectors. The remaining part of wage arrears was responsible for enterprises' themselves. In the public sector, the non-payment of wages takes place because the government, especially local governments, are eager to maintain the regional level of employment regardless of their severe budget constraints. Despite the wage arrears, local governments maintain employment levels with the help of federal transfers and subsidies. At the same time, even though the federal government provides the financial resources to respond to the local authorities' requests for aid, the latter do not necessarily allocate those funds properly. The local governments have an interest to maintain a certain level of wage arrears in the region. In the private sector, our analysis of the wage payment from the viewpoint of both managers and workers found that the managers do not pay primarily because of the lack of working capital. The widespread demonetizations mean a shortage of cash for salaries. They cannot but delay the the payment of wages. Even if there is cash revenue, the payment of taxes should have a higher priority. The government tries to pursue the cash revenue. For instance the effective tax rate to the tax delinquent enterprises was as much as 100%. The second aspect of management behavior concerns the exploitability of wage non-payment. Because of wage arrears, the firms ask the government for subsidies while the local government has good reason to believe this necessary to prevent social unrest. If the managers know workers will not move in spite of the wage arrears, then wage non-payment becomes a lower priority. On the contrary, wage nonpayment can guarantee that workers will not be laid off, due to the expensive severance pay. They also assure that the enterprise will continue to supply social services. Lastly demonetizations complicate the economic situation of the firm manager and workers alike. This enables the managers to manipulate financial flows in their favor and to embezzle funds with ease. Next follows an explanation for why managers prefer the nonpayment of wages to layoffs. One reason is the harsh legal environment for layoffs in Russia. Firms have to pay 3-months of serverance pay. Second, they want to retain their labor force, because they are optimistic about the near future and believe that they have to maintain their labor force for the anticipated increase in demand. It has also become clear that non-payment of wages can be used to differentiate the labor force. Some get wages promptly, some with a 1-month delay, and some with a 3-month delay. By so doing managers can segregate employees. But that does not mean they want to dismiss the least skilled workers, rather through the non-payment of wages, they can reduce their wage taxes. The third question concerns why they are not eager to decrease salary levels while the wage arrears pile up. That is because inflation works as a tool to discount the debt. The wage bills tended to inflate under the pressure of the insider-employees, but inflation discounts the value of these wages. The national wage tariff system also plays an important role in preventing wage adjustments. There is a downward rigidity of wages in Russia. Workers accept wage arrears. First, employees have no legal recourse against wage arrears. Second, labor unions are so weak and fragmented that they have no clout. Workers do not move despite the wage arrears because the housing market in Russia is not developed and it is very expensive to move for a new job, especially out of town. Third, without wages, employees often pilfer from enterprises to provide materials for their own side businesses. At the same time, continued employment at a formerly state-owned enterprise means they remain eligible for social services. Although managers and workers are in the state of confrontation, they have a common desire to exploit wage arrears. For the workers it is more beneficial to exploit wage arrears than to change jobs. In this sense, they provide an element of cohesion. This is the main reason why wage arrears continue to accumulate. In our analysis of the role played by labor unions, we have found that there are two types of unions in Russia. Traditional labor unions have common interests with their enterprise managers. Both tend to appeal in critical situations to the local government for support. In contrast, newly established unions are more radical and take legal action to secure proper wage payments. These two types of unions often work in opposition to each other. Such divisions prevent the development of an effective alliance against management. We cannot neglect one of the important aspects of the non-payment of wages. This is the social and historical background surrounding enterprises. We all know that the Soviet Union tried to separate its monetary circulation into two parts: cash and non-cash. Workers received cash wages to meet the needs of their daily economic life, mainly in the retail sphere. At the same time people did not pay for health care services, for example, because those services were provided by their place of employment. That was a non-monetary side of Russian economic life. The extension of the monetary economy in Russia remains quite limited even after the transition. Workers are more sensitive to losing these non-monetary benefits from enterprises than to losing their wages. With wage arrears, people have to make ends meet by using networks of relatives and friends and by growing their own food, making the Russian economy more and more non-monetary. Enterprises in Russia are quite important for both employers and employees, not because they are capital assets that can create profits, but because they serve as hosts for a variety of parasitic activities: managers can get cash flow while workers can get both cash flow and social services. For the Russians it is quite natural to remain in an enterprise that regularly cannot meet payroll. This explains the paradoxical non-payment of wages during the economic transition of the Russian Federation. Both workers and managers can gain, not lose, from the non-payment of wages.2002-12-31T15:00:00Z杉浦, 史和The problem of non-payment in Russia has been a notorious epidemic since the start of its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. Though the economic reforms in 1990s were to establish a monetary economy, they led to such 'demonetizations,' as widespread barter deals. Non-payment can also be viewed as one of the widespread forms of demonetization. There are five forms of nonpayment: the non-payment between enterprises, between the government and enterprises, between banks and enterprises, from the pension fund to pensioners, and from enterprises to workers. This article analyzes the formation and development of the non-payment problems by focusing on the evolution of the non-payment of wages in Russia. With the widespread demonetization and non-payment of wages, the situation grew worse and the population has been seriously affected. However, one of the most serious aspects of wage arrears lies in the fact that it is almost impossible to resolve the problem by utilizing quasi-money, such as payments in kind, or the pseudo-settlement mechanisms, such as zachet or offsets. The payment of wages, in principle, should be made in cash as should be wage arrears. Therefore, there have been relatively few cases of wages being paid in kind between enterprises. This means the wage debts have piled up continuously and will likely grow much larger. Second, whether workers necessary receive wages promptly is directly related to the amount of their disposable income to assure standard of living. With wage arrears, workers can get smaller incomes and their living standard falls. That is why the non-payment of wages is one of the most serious phenomena of the demonetizations. Third, it is widely believed that the non-payment of wages prevents the restructuring of enterprises, because even without laying off the excess labor, the enterprises can reduce their payroll costs through wage arrears. Indeed it reflects the malfunction of the labor market in Russia. The non-payment of wages peaked just after the August crisis in 1998. Both the federal and local governments were responsible for 15 to 20 percent of the total non-payment of wages. The federal government owed army salaries and payments for state orders for the military complex, while the local governments owed wages for workers in the education, health, and other sectors. The remaining part of wage arrears was responsible for enterprises' themselves. In the public sector, the non-payment of wages takes place because the government, especially local governments, are eager to maintain the regional level of employment regardless of their severe budget constraints. Despite the wage arrears, local governments maintain employment levels with the help of federal transfers and subsidies. At the same time, even though the federal government provides the financial resources to respond to the local authorities' requests for aid, the latter do not necessarily allocate those funds properly. The local governments have an interest to maintain a certain level of wage arrears in the region. In the private sector, our analysis of the wage payment from the viewpoint of both managers and workers found that the managers do not pay primarily because of the lack of working capital. The widespread demonetizations mean a shortage of cash for salaries. They cannot but delay the the payment of wages. Even if there is cash revenue, the payment of taxes should have a higher priority. The government tries to pursue the cash revenue. For instance the effective tax rate to the tax delinquent enterprises was as much as 100%. The second aspect of management behavior concerns the exploitability of wage non-payment. Because of wage arrears, the firms ask the government for subsidies while the local government has good reason to believe this necessary to prevent social unrest. If the managers know workers will not move in spite of the wage arrears, then wage non-payment becomes a lower priority. On the contrary, wage nonpayment can guarantee that workers will not be laid off, due to the expensive severance pay. They also assure that the enterprise will continue to supply social services. Lastly demonetizations complicate the economic situation of the firm manager and workers alike. This enables the managers to manipulate financial flows in their favor and to embezzle funds with ease. Next follows an explanation for why managers prefer the nonpayment of wages to layoffs. One reason is the harsh legal environment for layoffs in Russia. Firms have to pay 3-months of serverance pay. Second, they want to retain their labor force, because they are optimistic about the near future and believe that they have to maintain their labor force for the anticipated increase in demand. It has also become clear that non-payment of wages can be used to differentiate the labor force. Some get wages promptly, some with a 1-month delay, and some with a 3-month delay. By so doing managers can segregate employees. But that does not mean they want to dismiss the least skilled workers, rather through the non-payment of wages, they can reduce their wage taxes. The third question concerns why they are not eager to decrease salary levels while the wage arrears pile up. That is because inflation works as a tool to discount the debt. The wage bills tended to inflate under the pressure of the insider-employees, but inflation discounts the value of these wages. The national wage tariff system also plays an important role in preventing wage adjustments. There is a downward rigidity of wages in Russia. Workers accept wage arrears. First, employees have no legal recourse against wage arrears. Second, labor unions are so weak and fragmented that they have no clout. Workers do not move despite the wage arrears because the housing market in Russia is not developed and it is very expensive to move for a new job, especially out of town. Third, without wages, employees often pilfer from enterprises to provide materials for their own side businesses. At the same time, continued employment at a formerly state-owned enterprise means they remain eligible for social services. Although managers and workers are in the state of confrontation, they have a common desire to exploit wage arrears. For the workers it is more beneficial to exploit wage arrears than to change jobs. In this sense, they provide an element of cohesion. This is the main reason why wage arrears continue to accumulate. In our analysis of the role played by labor unions, we have found that there are two types of unions in Russia. Traditional labor unions have common interests with their enterprise managers. Both tend to appeal in critical situations to the local government for support. In contrast, newly established unions are more radical and take legal action to secure proper wage payments. These two types of unions often work in opposition to each other. Such divisions prevent the development of an effective alliance against management. We cannot neglect one of the important aspects of the non-payment of wages. This is the social and historical background surrounding enterprises. We all know that the Soviet Union tried to separate its monetary circulation into two parts: cash and non-cash. Workers received cash wages to meet the needs of their daily economic life, mainly in the retail sphere. At the same time people did not pay for health care services, for example, because those services were provided by their place of employment. That was a non-monetary side of Russian economic life. The extension of the monetary economy in Russia remains quite limited even after the transition. Workers are more sensitive to losing these non-monetary benefits from enterprises than to losing their wages. With wage arrears, people have to make ends meet by using networks of relatives and friends and by growing their own food, making the Russian economy more and more non-monetary. Enterprises in Russia are quite important for both employers and employees, not because they are capital assets that can create profits, but because they serve as hosts for a variety of parasitic activities: managers can get cash flow while workers can get both cash flow and social services. For the Russians it is quite natural to remain in an enterprise that regularly cannot meet payroll. This explains the paradoxical non-payment of wages during the economic transition of the Russian Federation. Both workers and managers can gain, not lose, from the non-payment of wages.コムソモールと「非公式団体」の対立と協調 : ペレストロイカ期コムソモールの変質過程
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39013
Title: コムソモールと「非公式団体」の対立と協調 : ペレストロイカ期コムソモールの変質過程
Authors: 森, 美矢子
Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between Komsomol and informal organizations under Perestroika. Perestroika brought immense social change to Soviet society. Komsomol had to face, for the first time in its long history, rival informal youth organizations not subordinate to, but independent of its power. An investigation of this new situation and analysis of the transformation of formal organizations like Komsomol sheds light on the transition and social change experienced during the final days of the Soviet system. First, this paper will examine the appearance of various informal youth organizations under Perestroika, ranging from amateur hobby clubs to political groups. Simultaneously it will explore the tactics used by Komsomol to compete with them for support among young people and to survive in the new situation. This discussion will include an examination of the roles played by Komsomol and the informal youth organizations during Perestroika. This paper focuses on the period from the 20th Komsomol Congress held in April, 1987 until June, 1988, when there were heated demands for democratization at the 19th Party Conference. It was in this period that the informal organizations not only played the most important role in promoting social change, but Komsomol also devised strategies to revive its role as a youth organization. As background, we will trace the history of the relations between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations. At first, Komsomol had to take young people from traditional youth organizations in order to become the only formal youth organization in the Soviet system. Although Komsomol acquired this status in the late 1920s, there was an ongoing struggle to retain this monopoly in the face of continual attempts to create informal youth organizations. In the 1970s, informal organizations of youth, mostly hobby clubs like rock music clubs became an essential part of life for ordinary young people. They enjoyed their leisure time in a subculture beyond the influence of Komsomol. These organizations were not directly anti-Soviet nor even politically oriented. Nevertheless, they were threatening to the authorities as potential enemies because they were making Soviet ideology less influential among the youth, the future-builders of Soviet society. The renewed Cold War that broke out at the beginning of the 1980s made Komsomol confront a hard situation: how to protect Soviet youth from the evil subculture of the West. Under these circumstances, Komsomol adopted a new policy for informal organizations. That is, instead of suppressing all of them, Komsomol began to select "better" organizations both to promote and to keep under control the leisure activities of Soviet youth. Second, this paper will examine this new Komsomol policy toward informal youth organizations. After Perestroika began, as society became more and more active, ideological restrictions rapidly weakened. Komsomol decided to "register" the informal youth hobby clubs and permit them to operate freely under its supervision. This new approach greatly increased the possibility both for cooperation and friction between Komsomol and the informal organizations. In addition, new organizations appeared such as those protecting cultural assets or others promoting ecological awareness. Further, youth groups involved in political discussions gradually emerged. These new organizations were considered the pioneers of Perestroika and were starting to rival Komsomol. The 20th Komsomol Congress was the first opportunity to discuss the relationship between Komsomol and the emerging informal youth organizations. At this Congress, Komsomol declared that they could not become an alternative to Komsomol. It also tried to transform itself into a political organization to represent youth interests. Third, this paper analyzes the politicization of the informal youth organizations in the spring just before the 19th Party Conference. At last, Komsomol recognized that it could not avoid talking on equal terms with the informal political organizations concerning the future of all youth organizations, including Komsomol itself. The informal organizations and Komsomol delegates met several times to discuss political problems in general and to make a joint appeal to the 19th Conference. The 19th Conference was a very important venue for Komsomol to insure its role and status in the emerging system. After the discussions with the informal organizations, Komsomol devised a new strategy: It would become one of many youth organizations and it would cooperate with the others to advance Perestroika. Komsomol abandoned its earlier strategy of maintaining a monopoly over youth organizations. It realized that it could survive only if it became reconciled with the informal organizations that were more popular and more influential among the youth. To improve its image and survive, Komsomol would have to work in partnership with the other groups. After the 20th Congress, a partnership was gradually established between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations in the area of leisure and cultural activities because such cooperation would serve to make Komsomol more popular. Ironically however, Komsomol was losing its organizational unity and identity as a youth organization due to its success in constructing a cooperative relationship with the informal organizations. In addition, after the 19th Conference, the search for a political partnership between Komsomol and the informal organizations became more difficult. Under Perestroika, Komsomol had to transform itself in order to compete with the informal organizations. This transformation process and the evolving relationship between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations are ongoing. They are a topic for future research on the role of Komsomol under Perestroika.2002-12-31T15:00:00Z森, 美矢子This paper focuses on the relationship between Komsomol and informal organizations under Perestroika. Perestroika brought immense social change to Soviet society. Komsomol had to face, for the first time in its long history, rival informal youth organizations not subordinate to, but independent of its power. An investigation of this new situation and analysis of the transformation of formal organizations like Komsomol sheds light on the transition and social change experienced during the final days of the Soviet system. First, this paper will examine the appearance of various informal youth organizations under Perestroika, ranging from amateur hobby clubs to political groups. Simultaneously it will explore the tactics used by Komsomol to compete with them for support among young people and to survive in the new situation. This discussion will include an examination of the roles played by Komsomol and the informal youth organizations during Perestroika. This paper focuses on the period from the 20th Komsomol Congress held in April, 1987 until June, 1988, when there were heated demands for democratization at the 19th Party Conference. It was in this period that the informal organizations not only played the most important role in promoting social change, but Komsomol also devised strategies to revive its role as a youth organization. As background, we will trace the history of the relations between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations. At first, Komsomol had to take young people from traditional youth organizations in order to become the only formal youth organization in the Soviet system. Although Komsomol acquired this status in the late 1920s, there was an ongoing struggle to retain this monopoly in the face of continual attempts to create informal youth organizations. In the 1970s, informal organizations of youth, mostly hobby clubs like rock music clubs became an essential part of life for ordinary young people. They enjoyed their leisure time in a subculture beyond the influence of Komsomol. These organizations were not directly anti-Soviet nor even politically oriented. Nevertheless, they were threatening to the authorities as potential enemies because they were making Soviet ideology less influential among the youth, the future-builders of Soviet society. The renewed Cold War that broke out at the beginning of the 1980s made Komsomol confront a hard situation: how to protect Soviet youth from the evil subculture of the West. Under these circumstances, Komsomol adopted a new policy for informal organizations. That is, instead of suppressing all of them, Komsomol began to select "better" organizations both to promote and to keep under control the leisure activities of Soviet youth. Second, this paper will examine this new Komsomol policy toward informal youth organizations. After Perestroika began, as society became more and more active, ideological restrictions rapidly weakened. Komsomol decided to "register" the informal youth hobby clubs and permit them to operate freely under its supervision. This new approach greatly increased the possibility both for cooperation and friction between Komsomol and the informal organizations. In addition, new organizations appeared such as those protecting cultural assets or others promoting ecological awareness. Further, youth groups involved in political discussions gradually emerged. These new organizations were considered the pioneers of Perestroika and were starting to rival Komsomol. The 20th Komsomol Congress was the first opportunity to discuss the relationship between Komsomol and the emerging informal youth organizations. At this Congress, Komsomol declared that they could not become an alternative to Komsomol. It also tried to transform itself into a political organization to represent youth interests. Third, this paper analyzes the politicization of the informal youth organizations in the spring just before the 19th Party Conference. At last, Komsomol recognized that it could not avoid talking on equal terms with the informal political organizations concerning the future of all youth organizations, including Komsomol itself. The informal organizations and Komsomol delegates met several times to discuss political problems in general and to make a joint appeal to the 19th Conference. The 19th Conference was a very important venue for Komsomol to insure its role and status in the emerging system. After the discussions with the informal organizations, Komsomol devised a new strategy: It would become one of many youth organizations and it would cooperate with the others to advance Perestroika. Komsomol abandoned its earlier strategy of maintaining a monopoly over youth organizations. It realized that it could survive only if it became reconciled with the informal organizations that were more popular and more influential among the youth. To improve its image and survive, Komsomol would have to work in partnership with the other groups. After the 20th Congress, a partnership was gradually established between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations in the area of leisure and cultural activities because such cooperation would serve to make Komsomol more popular. Ironically however, Komsomol was losing its organizational unity and identity as a youth organization due to its success in constructing a cooperative relationship with the informal organizations. In addition, after the 19th Conference, the search for a political partnership between Komsomol and the informal organizations became more difficult. Under Perestroika, Komsomol had to transform itself in order to compete with the informal organizations. This transformation process and the evolving relationship between Komsomol and the informal youth organizations are ongoing. They are a topic for future research on the role of Komsomol under Perestroika.