DSpace Collection: 2014-09
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/60182
2014-092024-03-29T00:27:29ZChallenges for Professional Loyalties
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/60184
Title: Challenges for Professional Loyalties
Authors: Kleinig, John
Abstract: The paper develops a conception of “professional loyalties” and then reviews several challenges that professional loyalties encounter. The conception of professional loyalty is developed against George Fletcher’s attempt to marginalize such loyalties. Instead of being viewed primarily as loyalty to clients, it is characterized as loyalty to the ends of the profession. That conception gives rise to several challenges, which are then discussed in turn: (1) whether professions have enough unity to enable a coherent account of professional loyalty to be given; (2) whether the loyalty that professions warrant is only contingent or should be seen as integral to their nature; (3) whether professional loyalties have characteristics that undermine the moral accountability of their subjects; and (4) how normative tensions arising out of institutionally embedded professional loyalties may be resolved.2014-08-31T15:00:00ZKleinig, JohnThe paper develops a conception of “professional loyalties” and then reviews several challenges that professional loyalties encounter. The conception of professional loyalty is developed against George Fletcher’s attempt to marginalize such loyalties. Instead of being viewed primarily as loyalty to clients, it is characterized as loyalty to the ends of the profession. That conception gives rise to several challenges, which are then discussed in turn: (1) whether professions have enough unity to enable a coherent account of professional loyalty to be given; (2) whether the loyalty that professions warrant is only contingent or should be seen as integral to their nature; (3) whether professional loyalties have characteristics that undermine the moral accountability of their subjects; and (4) how normative tensions arising out of institutionally embedded professional loyalties may be resolved.Professional Ethics without Moral Theory : A Practical Guide for the Perplexed Non-Philosopher
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/60183
Title: Professional Ethics without Moral Theory : A Practical Guide for the Perplexed Non-Philosopher
Authors: Davis, Michael
Abstract: My thesis is that any course in professional ethics —even in a philosophy department —is, all else equal, better without moral theory than with it. In defending this thesis, I shall return to a debate I had with Bernie Gert and Ed Harris a few years ago, itself the culmination of almost four decades of teaching professional ethics and more than two decades of teaching others to do the same. I am, I should make clear, not against moral theory (the attempt to understand morality as a reasonable undertaking). Indeed, not only do I enjoy teaching a course in moral theory every few years and publish on the subject now and then, I would agree that, in principle, moral theory can not only enlighten students but also be useful to them, helping them to identify moral issues they might otherwise overlook, seek information they might otherwise not think relevant, and formulate courses of action that might otherwise not occur to them. My thesis is entirely practical: Given the time normally allotted to a course in professional ethics (45 or so classroom hours), moral theory will never be useful enough. There is always a less-timeconsuming way to do what moral theory can also do, leaving more room for other topics that a course in professional ethics should include. Moral theory is, therefore, always a waste of time in a professional-ethics course.2014-08-31T15:00:00ZDavis, MichaelMy thesis is that any course in professional ethics —even in a philosophy department —is, all else equal, better without moral theory than with it. In defending this thesis, I shall return to a debate I had with Bernie Gert and Ed Harris a few years ago, itself the culmination of almost four decades of teaching professional ethics and more than two decades of teaching others to do the same. I am, I should make clear, not against moral theory (the attempt to understand morality as a reasonable undertaking). Indeed, not only do I enjoy teaching a course in moral theory every few years and publish on the subject now and then, I would agree that, in principle, moral theory can not only enlighten students but also be useful to them, helping them to identify moral issues they might otherwise overlook, seek information they might otherwise not think relevant, and formulate courses of action that might otherwise not occur to them. My thesis is entirely practical: Given the time normally allotted to a course in professional ethics (45 or so classroom hours), moral theory will never be useful enough. There is always a less-timeconsuming way to do what moral theory can also do, leaving more room for other topics that a course in professional ethics should include. Moral theory is, therefore, always a waste of time in a professional-ethics course.