Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting

Itaya, Jun-ichi; Okamura, Makoto; Yamaguchi, Chikara

Discussion Paper, Series A, 2006, 176, 1-28

Permalink : https://hdl.handle.net/2115/16912

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アクセス権	open access
URI	https://hdl.handle.net/2115/16912
タイトル	Asymmetric Tax Competition in a Repeated Game Setting
著者	Itaya, Jun-ichi ; Okamura, Makoto ; Yamaguchi, Chikara
e-Rad_Researcher 20168305 著者名 Itaya, Jun-ichi 板谷, 淳一
著者名 Okamura, Makoto
著者名 Yamaguchi, Chikara
言語	英語
キーワード	Tax competition
	Asymmetric regions
	Cooperation
	Repeated game
	Tax coordination
発行日	2006-12-11
出版者	Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University
収録物名	Discussion Paper, Series A
巻(号)	176
ページ	1-28
抄録	The purpose of this paper is to reveal how fiscal policy cooperation can result from repeated interactions in an asymmetric model of capital tax competition. We investigate how regional differences in the per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affects the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination in a multi-period framework. It is shown not only that there may exist cases where tax coordination is facilitated as regional asymmetries increase but also that the larger the asymmetry in terms of the net capital-exporting positions among regions, the easier is the cooperation to sustain tax coordination. (JEL classification: H73, H77)
資源タイプ	紀要論文
出版タイプ	Version of Record