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Author(s)	Ohyama, Nobuyoshi
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WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT AS AN AMBIVALENT PROCESS : A JAPANESE CASE

NOBUYOSHI OHYAMA*

ABSTRACT

The participative management style in Japanese industry has been put into practice as one of the special cases of joint consultation system that aims at getting better relations between workers and employers. This paper tries to examine to what extent our trade unions positively participate in the determination of management strategy, production planning, personnel policy, human development programme, not to speak of working conditions of employees. The result of our research indicates that the higher is the degree of workers' participation, the more positive the unions in the field of their activities and the managers in their concerns of human-relation control. Most firms in Japan have, however, not yet attained such a high level of participation as the European types have occupied. As for the attitudes on both sides toward industrial democracy, the union leaders want to extend their influence upon managerial decisions, while the managers are, if anything, wary of the growing influence of the former.

INTRODUCTION

As King and Vall (1978) describe, there are three models of industrial democracy in contemporary societies: the Yugoslav system of workers' management, the British system of joint consultation, and the west Germany's co-determination system in coal and steel industries. These are not all possible models of participation, and we can find an infinite variety of form and content. Having examined some hypotheses of the uniqueness of Japanese labor-management relations, Maruo (1982) suggests that there exists a Japanese system of joint consultation as a special case of workers' participation. Most larger firms in Japan have, under their unique institution of enterprise unionism, estab-

* Associate Professor of Sociology, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan.

lished the joint consultation system and, thus, gradually realized workers' participation in managerial decisions. There are another practices of participation in these firms: QC circles, ZD movemests, suggestion systems, and so on. These practices at workshop level have attracted a great deal of attention from abroad, both from students and industrial executives, especially since Japan has got over the difficulties linked with the 1970's world-wide recession and unemployment, and achieved a constant employment and good economic performance.

Foreigners have also kept their eyes on our joint conference of labor and management, and have become to evaluate its function to managerial efficiencies. With regard to the evaluation of Japanese industrial relations, White and Trevor (1983) refer to "a consensual style of decision-makings, giving all workers some opportunity for involvement in the company's affairs." It may not be appropriate, however, to estimate the Japan's success in business from such an over-simplified point of views. In his critical essay, Sarikwal (1982) says that "ambivalence is a significant dimension of participative management." In other words, a contradiction lies in the fact that there are, implicitly or explicitly, incompatible normative expectations between labor and management. Congruent with the company, the Japanese labor unions have a sort of paradox of conflict and identity with management under so-called paternalistic climate of business.

Our study is an attempt to clarify the present state of workers' participation in Japan from the sociological point of view, or in terms of normative expectations. The following section refers to the concept of joint consultation. The third deals with the goal-orientative function of the system, and examines the attained degree of participation by comparison with various firms. The fourth analyses the correlation of the achieved degree of participation with the union activity and the company's personnel control. The concluding section discusses the implications of the findings in terms of the attitudes of union leaders and managers toward the further extension of workers' participation.

THE CONCEPT OF JOINT CONSULTATION

Joint Consultation As a System of Interactions

Joint consultation in management is to be regarded as a form of organized systems of social interaction. A significant issue on interaction theory lies in whether we should regard the social system of actions as an integrated one or not. Dunlop (1958) who applies the Parsonian functional theory of action to industrial relations attaches great

importance to an integrative aspect of the system with a shared normative pattern of values. It is true that Dunlop's system approach was strongly supported by Flanders (1965), Eldridge (1968), Gill (1969) and others, but it has been modified and criticized by a number of writers since 1970. According to Bain and Clegg (1974), the system approach has in itself two major defects: the ambiguities of the concept and the inappropriate variables of explanation. In short the criticism has been converged on Dunlop's argument that a system is "an ideology or a set of ideas and beliefs commonly held by the actors that helps to bind or integrate the system together as an entity." To Fox (1966), Dunlop's formulation for industrial relations systems is no other than a "unitary frame of reference" that postulates "an identity of interests within the industrial enterprise" and "one source of authority and one focus of loyalty." Contrary to the unitalism, Fox's pluralistic frame of reference accepts the divergence of interests, aims and aspirations between sectional groups, that provides the legitimate basis for union activity. As Clegg (1975) points out, the aim of pluralism is to combine social stability with adaptability and freedom, and to solve the conflict between sectional groups by compromise. Pluralists argue that if managed properly, conflict may lead to more effective and desirable arrangement of different interests. In spite of Hyman's (1975) criticism that the pluralist idea is an ideology and nothing but a "moral integration," the pluralistic frame of reference is, if aptly elaborated, may be more verifiable than a unitary one to explain the present state of labor-management relations. It is because any industrialized society today is characterized by highly differentiated interests which render the activity of workers' organization legitimate, both within and without the workplace.

With the previous discussion in mind, we define the joint consultation as a reciprocal system of actions, contingent on the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of divergent interests and expectations of the parties concerned. Figure 1 shows the position of joint consultation system in Japanese industrial relations. In this model, industrial relations within the enterprise consist of two triads of union-management relations (M-J-U)




FIGURE 1
The Position of Joint Consultation in Japanese Enterprise
(M : Management, U : Union, J : Joint consultation, C : Collective bargaining, W_1 : Worker as Employee, W_2 : Worker as unionist)

on one hand and worker-management relations (M-W-U) on the other. Speaking of M-J-U relations, the system of joint consultation may possibly be understood, in respect of its goal-orientative function, as 'consulting-bargaining' system between interested parties, since the collective bargaining is not always independent of the joint consultation. The parties in both meetings, as Caldarola (1979) describes, "are identical so that they may deal with a broad range of problems of mutual concern in a comprehensive and systematic manner." Because of its double functions, this compound system is given as 'J=C' in Figure 1. The primary concern of joint consultation is to deal with such matters as management policy, production planning, introduction of new technology, hiring of workers, shop regulation, occupational safety and health at workshop, and so on. However, joint consultation in most cases performs bargaining or pre-bargaining function. It is important for us to recognize that there are three cases of J-to-C relations. The first and most general case is that the matters which should be discussed at the bargaining table are dealt also in joint consultation conference itself. The second case is that the joint conference functions as pre-bargaining system, which, if the negotiation for working conditions fails, may be switched to the collective bargaining table. The third is the complete separation of the two. In the strict sense of the word, J=C implies the first one that could constitute the model of Japanese industrial relations.

On the other side of the model, worker-management relations comprise the three dyads of M-U, M-W₁, and U-W₂ and each of them has its own dimension of meaning. 'W₁' and 'W₂' stand for the worker's two roles of expectation. Under the enterprise unionism, every employee becomes compulsorily a member of labor unions organized within the company, where W₁ and W₂ are embodied in two roles as an employee and a unionist. Though M-W₁ and U-W₂ are theoretically separated into two dimensions, they are closely related to each other in reality. To illustrate M-W₁, employer-employee relations in the workplace, there are a variety of problems between two actors: introduction of manpower policy, improvement of efficiency, transfer of workers to another workshop, and so on. These problems, if the workplace problems in themselves, are now in reality, to a greater or less extent, those of union leaders (U) and their followers (W₂). Moreover, the employees' grievance and complaint at the workplace are filed not only at the formal or informal meetings with their forman and supervisor but also at the joint consultation as a superior body of conference. Thus, the lower triad M-J-U in our model comes to be profoundly correlated to the upper triad M-W-U.

Our research that follows tries to examine the present state of industrial relations,

especially of the union's influence upon decision makings, and refers to the evaluation of C=J organizations.

The Sample

Our research was undertaken in June 1979 as a task of a Select Committee on Joint Consultation, a chairman of which was N. Ohyama, organized within the Union-Management Council of the Hokkaido Productivity Centre (Ohyama, 1980). The results and commentary were already announced at the 1982's meeting of the Japan Sociological Society held at Kobe University.

We sent questionnaires to 500 union leaders and also 500 labor-section directors of the companies in Hokkaido, and recieved 122 responses from union leaders and 130 from directors. They may, if limited in number and location, be useful to consider the present state of industrial pariticipation in Japan.

Table 1 indicates the company size (number of employees) and Table 2 the industrial distribution of the sample. As to the attribute of data, companies with less than 300 employees are dominant, and service industry forms the majority in number. Our resources have its distinctive quality as compared with previous works that have focused mainly upon the large-scale manufacturings.

TABLE 1

Comany Size(number of employees)

<i>Size</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
less than 100	59	45.4
100-299	45	34.6
300-999	19	14.6
over 1000	7	5.4
	130	100.0

TABLE 2

Industrial Distribution

<i>Industry Group</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
mining and building	12	10.0
manufacturing	50	38.5
service	67	51.5
	130	100.0

FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM AND PARTICIPATION DEGREE

Goal-orientative Function of the System

According to the research conducted by the Japan Productivity Centre (1981), there exists the organized system of joint consultation in more than 90% of the large companies

and about 70% of all companies. This tendency holds virtually true of our enquiry. Figure 2 exhibits the rate of the establishment of joint consultation system by company size. It is obvious that at the enterprise level a company size effects the rate of the establishment. The joint conference of union and management is much more institutionalized in large scale firms than in small ones, because a large organization in industry requires more chance to control jointly the tensions in employer-employee relationships concerning on the determination of resource allocations. As compared with joint conference at enterprise level, workshop-level system of joint consultation has not yet spread so much without regard to the company size. Though the informal meetings among formen or supervisors and their workers have been held frequently at their workplace, the formal consultation at this level including managers has been at lower rate of establishment.




FIGURE 2
Rate of the Establishment of Joint
Consultation By Company Size

Motivational-orientation of joint consultation is found in about three peculiar interests : communication between union and management, effectiveness of the enterprise, and maintenance and improvement of working conditions. It is noticeable in Figure 3 that both union leaders and labor-section directors regard the communication between them as a primary aim of joint consultation council. At this point they may have a common goal to be attained. Next in the order of important motives comes the effectiveness of their enterprise in directors' response, whereas the maintenance and improvement of the working conditions in union leaders' response.




FIGURE 3
Goal-orientation of Joint Consultation System

Their responses may be plausible for the twin reasons. First, in most of the enterprise that has the system of joint conference, a common goal of the system is put in writings on the collective agreements which mention not only the pursuit of good communication between the parties, but also the harmony between each party's interest. The second reason is that they evaluate the practice of joint consultation as the efforts on getting better relations between employers and employees. It is also noteworthy that both union leaders and labor-section directors do not necessarily take their consultation system for the union's participation in management. Even if their responses express the manifestation of their own experience, joint consultation system in Japan has more or less functioned as a sort of practice of workers' participation.

In the generally accepted sense of the word, participation implies a matter of affairs in which two or more parties influence each other in making their plans, policies and decisions. As Cardarola (1979) says, "it necessarily involves a sharing of power in joint activity oriented toward the achievement of a common goal." When we apply this defini-

tion to industrial relations, a careful consideration must be paid to the following aspects.

1) The main concern of union and management is to exchange efforts for reward by transactions between them. Our inquiry proves that efforts for reward have been directed toward the effectiveness of enterprise on manager's side, and the maintenance and improvement of labor conditions on employee's side.

2) There may be divergent and even opposed interests of expectations between the parties. Though the joint consultation system in Japan has been promoted mainly by the employer's intention to increase the productivity through tension-management, it has been, at the less expense of others, run on the premise of the existence of divergent interests.

3) The exchanging process of their efforts is inherently contentious and sometimes unstable. We have scarcely ever confronted with industrial disputes, but have sometimes been in the latent possibilities likely to cause the contention, because the area of managerial decisions in which workers can participate is relatively limited.

4) Each party may seek to maximise their gratifications within the law or procedural rules. As already pointed out, the collective agreement in almost all cases in Japan admits and justifies the right to fulfill each party's gratifications.

5) In negotiating process such resources as power, influence and persuasion may be available to employers and employees. Japanese unionism has become to display its influence upon the process of managerial decision-makings, especially in the common interests such as the worker's retirement age, the property formation of employees, the social responsibility of enterprise, and so on. The chance of persuasion has been enlarged to solve these common problems linked with the improvement of their working conditions.

Presuming the above-mentioned aspects, the joint consultation in Japan facilitates the exercise of union's influence toward management in order to solve the practical problems which are relevant to the fulfillment of the common interests of the two parties. There is a sound reason why managers and workers have been oriented to the attainment of one common goal and two distinctive aims at joint council table. The reason is assigned in the fact that the divergent interests or expectations are normatively regulated by value system based on the collective agreement and procedures, which permit the worker's participation in managerial determination within accepted bounds so that workers do not infringe on manager's prerogatives. It seems reasonable to conclude that the joint consultation is to be regarded as a representation of 'participative management' in which we find a certain contradiction incorporated with each party's efforts for reward.

An interesting addition to the results of our enquiry is that the company size is likely to effect the goal-orientative function of the system. As Figure 2 denotes, the companies with more than 300 employees show a higher rate of responses to the pursuit for enterprise effectiveness, while the smaller companies take the improvement of working conditions. It seems probable that the leaders in small unions expect to raise the relatively low wages of workers through the direct negotiations with managers at joint consultation tables.

Attained Degree of Workers' Participation

Japanese enterprise has not yet necessarily introduced an overall participative system in the sense that the representatives of union and management jointly make almost all decisions about the related issues of business policy. In Japan union's control over management is dissimilar in quantity as the issues may be. We have listed in our questionnaires five main issues and fourteen sub-issues for consultation, and studied the attained degree of workers' participation in the determination of each issue. We try to measure the degree of participation in determining each matter of consultation by five grade scaling as follows.

- 1) The matters executed by mutual consent between union and management. (.5 point)
- 2) The matters executed on managers' responsibility if the representatives of two parties disagree in opinion as a result of consulting. (.4 point)
- 3) The matters executed on management discretion by explaining the intention of executives to the union. (.3 point)
- 4) The matters executed only by giving managerial information to the union. (.2 point)
- 5) The matters executed with no consultation and information. (.1 point)

These scale order represents the degree of workers' participation in each issue. The result of responses to five main issues are shown in Table 3, where the cluster of company denotes a statistical set of companies measured by the differences of mean-score of participation degrees. As is shown by Table 3, the order of attained degree of union's participation varies with the matters for consultation. In the numerical order of mean-score, the first is the issues on worker's welfare and labor conditions which may be influenced strongly by union's leadership. The second comes the issues on personnel policy and human-development programme, in which unions may be more liable to take part than the issues on management strategy and production planning.

TABLE 3

Degree of Union's Participation in Decisions By the Matters for Consultation (1)

Cluster of Companies	Management Strategy	Production Planning	Personnel Policy	Human-Development Programme	Worker's Welfare & Labor Conditions	Mean
A(n=21)	.324	.336	.412	.410	.482	.396
B(n=39)	.209	.210	.292	.274	.426	.292
C(n=37)	.145	.161	.158	.158	.317	.200
Mean	.209	.219	.567	.259	.396	.279

(The statistical significance among mean-scores of each cluster is at the confidence level of 95 %.)




FIGURE 4

Degree of Union's Participation in Decisions By the Matters for Consultation(2)

Further detailed information is imparted to Figure 4, in which all sub-matters for consultation realize the statistical significance among the average scores of respective cluster. It is quite evident that there is a great difference of the attained degree of participation between the companies of cluster A and those of cluster C. Generally speaking, each cluster's curve culminates at the point of the issues on worker's welfare and labor conditions, and falls at the point of those on annual budget-making, and that the matters on an adoption of standard for promotion and job allocation take rather a medium position

between them.

Over and above, the union size effects the achieved extent of workers' participation in managerial decisions. Table 4 indicates that the larger is the size of unions, the greater the degree of participation. In Japanese industries union size is roughly equivalent to company size, and therefore company size may have a separate and distinct effect on the degree of participation. The correlation coefficient in our data between the union size and the participation degree of each cluster is .459, and its significance level is at .01.

TABLE 4
Attained Degrees of Workers' Participation by Union Size

<i>Matters for Consultation</i>	<i>Union with more than 1000 members</i>	<i>Union with less than 300 members</i>	<i>t-value</i>
(1) Management strategy	.288	.200	**
(2) Production planning	.250	.209	
(3) Personnel policy	.383	.252	**
(4) Human-development programme	.382	.232	**
(5) Worker's welfare and labor conditions	.444	.379	*
<i>Mean</i>	.355	.264	**

* $t \leq .05$.

** $t \leq .01$.

Our findings in this section are summarized as follows.

(1) The goal-orientative functions of joint consultation system are found in one common goal and two distinctive aims of labor and management.

(2) There is a distinct degree of workers' participation by the clusters of companies, each of which defines the attained degree of participation in each matter of consultation.

(3) In each cluster by union size and possibly by company size, the determination of such consulting issues as layoff and discharge of employees, change of working hours, occupational safety and health of workers, has been markedly influenced by the resources of union's power.

(4) Whereas, the decisions on management and production planning including annual budget-making, new business investment, development of new technology, have a tendency to be made chiefly by manager's leadership.

UNION'S ACTIVITY AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Union's Activity and Extent of Participation

Union members in Japan are apt to display much interest in social and economic subjects within their company, and not to be absorbed, if anything, in the political matters outside the enterprise. Under this circumstances, union leaders have emphasized such activities as uplifting their member's consciousness as a unionist and strengthening the solidarity of their fellow workers. Quite recently they have made another attempt at cultivating their ability to assimilate managerial informations in order to improve the workers' living condition and to perform their social responsibility as well.

One of the trade union's activity is to delegate their representatives to the joint consultation conference in which they can exchange opinions with managers on various issues concerned. As already described, union leaders regard the joint conference with managers as a chance of improving working conditions, but in this conference they substantially take part in or at least influence upon decision-makings of the enterprise.

Table 5 exhibits the correlation of the liveliness of union's activity with the achieved extent of workers' participation by each cluster of companies. The mean-score in it is calculated by three-grade scaling of its liveliness. It seems clear that in the companies with high degree of workers' participation, trade unions tend to be more positively in any field of their activities. Making comparison between average scores of cluster A and B, it permits ready conclusion that the active union is eager not only to participate in managerial decisions, but also to revitalize their activity itself. Still more, our survey obtains

TABLE 5
Degree of the Liveliness of Union's Activity by the Cluster of Companies

<i>Fields of Activity</i>	<i>Cluster of Companies</i>			<i>t-value</i>	
	A	B	C	A : B	A : C
(1) Uplifting the consciousness as a unionist	.262	.205	.173	**	**
(2) Strengthening the solidarity of workers	.257	.200	.183	**	**
(3) Cultivating the leader's ability to assimilate managerial informations	.233	.197	.172	*	*
(4) Bringing up the workshop leaders	.229	.161	.150	**	*
(5) Conducting the research on behavior and consciousness of union members	.210	.163	.151	*	*
(6) Practicing the voluntary-group activity	.200	.146	.153	**	**
(7) Bringing up the union leaders	.210	.185	.161		*
(8) Participating in managerial decisions	.181	.154	.128		**

* $t \leq .05$.

** $t \leq .01$.

the result that the large-sized union is more positively in any fields of activity than the small one.

An interesting addition to our inquiry is that as far as Table 5 is concerned, the union's activity toward participation in management may be less lively in any cluster of companies. It is because the term 'participation' is unfamiliar to the respondent union leaders, and that they choose substance over appearance. While keeping the idea of 'participation' at a perplexed distance, they take interest in the gathering and mastication of managerial information. Their ability to assimilate the informations about company's policy, decision and planning will be needed increasingly as the chance of workers' participation will be enlarged.

Personnel Control and Workers' Participation

Personnel control in Japanese enterprise has been practiced as a form of human-relations control over employees, which makes them responsive to certain kind of management incentives. The most popular form of human motivation is a publication of company journals. Most large-scale companies publish their own house organ at periodic intervals. Japan's enterprise has recently practiced the suggestion system as a mean of mutual communications, in order that the workers keep up morale and get satisfaction in their job. As Dore (1973) refers to the suggestion schemes, British and Japanese firms "try to mobilize creative ideas from the shop floor, partly to improve productivity, but partly to increase the sense of involvement." It may bring better relations between workers and employers based on the reciprocity of contract, through which the workers are expected to contribute his own private ideas to their foreman or supervisor and get reward for contributions. The number of firms that introduce the suggestion system has increased so that it is bounded up with the activation of workplace.

We try to analyse the extent of personnel-control activities by three-gravity scaling. Hypothetically, the firms that develop participative management aggressively practice the human-relations control over the workers. It can be generally stated that the higher is the extent of activity on personnel management the greater the attained degree of workers' participation. However, a careful note should be made of this fact. The correlation of the personnel control with participation degree is not so evident as that of union's activity with its influence on workers' participation. In Table 6, usual forms of control such as publication of company journals and enforcement of counselling are not always related to participation degrees, and what is more a new type of control like suggestion system from

young workers is at lower rate of establishment. For all that, it is relatively true that the companies with influential union on managerial decisions have exercised personnel control by management more positively than those with less influential unions.

TABLE 6
Fields of Human Relations Control
and the Degree of Worker's Participation

<i>Fields of Human-Relations Control</i>	<i>Cluster of Companies</i>			<i>t-value</i>	
	A	B	C	A : B	A : C
(1) Publication of company journal	.168	.142	.164		
(2) Establishment of suggestion system from general workers	.226	.184	.164	*	**
(3) Establishment of suggestion system from young workers	.170	.135	.141		
(4) Enforcement of counselling	.164	.151	.136		
(5) Practice of voluntary group activity	.218	.182	.150	*	**
(6) Research activity for worker's morale and behavior	.178	.141	.136	*	*
				* $t \leq .05$.	** $t \leq .01$.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Attitude on Workers' Participation

In this final section we consider the union leaders' and managers' attitude toward workers' participation and refer to the evaluation of joint consultation system as a form of participative management. As we examine in the third section the attained degree of participation, joint consultation of Japanese enterprise is by no means the system of co-determination, since it places relative limit at union's influence upon managerial decisions. The problem here is how union leaders and managers think about the further extension of union's participation in management determination. It is probable that the quest for participation is tacitly recognizable on union side, whereas managers react to it in a serious-minded way.

Table 7 denotes the distinct attitude of union leaders and labor-section directors toward workers' participation by the matters for consultation. Each numerical value in this table is gained by taking subtract the mean-score of the *status quo* extent of participation from that of the *ideal* degree of union's influence. As is obvious known, there exists more definite gap of responses between union leaders and labor-section directors. Then, a greater demand for further expansion of union's influence is found in the companies with less influential union in *status quo* (Table 8).

Japanese managers tend to evaluate their joint consultation in particular as a system in which the matters on worker's welfare and labor conditions are commonly decided. However, they do not want to expand rapidly the union's impact upon the issues which should be determined by management discretion. Besides, they may think that the workers' participation has been, to a certain extent, permitted and practically realized by involving the representatives of workers in joint consultation tables. Notwithstanding the wary attitude of manager's side on the extension of union power, managers and workers have tried to study commonly the related problems on management through their joint research committees. According to our survey, this kind of special committee is established at the rate of 50% in the company with more than 300 employees and about 45% in the company of our cluster A. This implies the necessity of joint investigation on management problems so that they may obtain a deeper understanding of each party's interest.

TABLE 7

The Difference of Union's and Manager's Attitude Toward Worker's Participation by the Matters for Consultation

<i>Matters for Consultation</i>	<i>Labor-section Directors</i>	<i>Union Leaders</i>
(1) Management strategy	0.542**	1.136**
(2) Production planning	0.647**	1.351**
(3) Personnel policy	0.363*	1.511**
(4) Human-development programme	0.436**	1.319**
(5) Worker's welfare and labor conditions	0.159	0.804**
<i>Mean</i>	0.421**	1.193**
		* $\alpha \leq .05$.
		** $\alpha \leq .01$.

TABLE 8

The Difference of Union's and Manager's Attitude Toward Workers' Participation By the Cluster of Companies

<i>Cluster of Companies</i>	<i>Labor-section Directors</i>	<i>Union Leaders</i>
A	0.342*	0.393**
B	0.320**	1.960**
C	0.745**	1.805**
<i>Mean</i>	0.421**	1.193**
		* $\alpha \leq .05$.
		** $\alpha \leq .01$.

Conclusion

Japanese enterprise more or less accepts workers' participation through their attendance at joint consultation conference. As to the systems, workers and managers pursue one common goal for getting good communications and two distinct aims at fulfilling respective interest of each party. The system itself is normatively controlled by collective agreements and procedures, but implicitly or explicitly involves rather an ambivalent process of participative management. Even if the divergent interests between the two are normatively regulated by a shared pattern of value, joint consultation does not give full satisfaction to union leaders with their exercise of influence upon management. Small-sized union in particular wants to expand their influential power over management within the enterprise.

Joint consultation in Japanese industry has not got thus far to industrial democracy in its strict meaning. Elliott (1978) says that the term 'industrial democracy' implies "far more workers' right in the board room and shop floor because it takes the issues into the realms of national economic and other policies of government." In Japan the future extension of workers' power, influence and persuasion for participation depends largely upon the workers' attitude toward the industrial and national-wide problems which may be relevant to augment the quality of their life.

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