open access

https://hdl.handle.net/2115/39282

The Russian Federal System from a Comparative Perspective

日本語

2006

北海道大学スラブ研究センター

Slavic Studies

53

267-298

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia changed from a communist regime to democratic rule. Federalism was chosen to coordinate the center-regional relationship: and Russia was reborn as the "Russian Federation." Recently, various Russian regional researches have been published, since "Rebellion" in the Russian region has often been observed. These provided exhaustive knowledge for Russian regional politics, but few paid attention to the type of relationship that has been built between center (federal government) and region (the components of the Russian Federation). Russia institutionalized the federal political system, which is recognized in most studies on federal political theory. Therefore, we need to explain Russian regional politics from the perspective of federalism, in order to deepen the comprehension of contemporary Russia. The aim of this thesis is to grasp the system of Russian federalism in the framework of comparative federalism. The traditional approaches to federalism are: the constitutional approach, the sociological approach, "the process to integration" approach, and the bargaining approach. While these four approaches provide an explanation that is somewhat effective with respect to federalism, they do not provide a concrete concept for an adequate comparison. Ronald Watts, who is one of the pioneers of comparative federalism, succeeded in resolving the problem of how to combine the multifarious factors of a federal state. He clarified the definition of federalism, and conceptionalized the following six features of a federal political system: 1. Two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens 2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the two orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order 3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by the particular form of the federal second chamber 4. A supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units 5. An umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums) to rule on disputes between governments 6. Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap (Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, pp. 6-7) What kind of conclusions can be deduced when analyzing Russian federalism based on Watts's framework? I examined the jurisdiction between governments, the allocation of fiscal power, the functions of the senate, the constitutional amendment procedures, the role of constitutional courts, and the intergovernmental relations in comparison with other federal states. In the field of jurisdiction, the Russian federal government has never had wide-ranging power. However, the constitutional provision (Article 70, f): "the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in thc spheres of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural and national development of the Russian Federation" can confer a power that can interfere in regional jurisdiction. Various powers are allocated in joint jurisdiction, but consensus building between governments is still unstable. With respect to fiscal matters, revenue resources allocated to the regions are larger than the average allocation in other federal states, but the fiscal gap between regions is very serious in Russia. Now, Putin's reform is pushing to change fiscal federalism. The aim of this reform is to clarify the fiscal responsibility of governments. It is possible that the reform causes regions' fiscal dependence on the federal budget because most regions do not have sufficient fiscal resources. And thus, the Russian Senate (Federal Council) holds an unstable institutional position. The Duma can override the veto of the senate, and the president can also enact law by decree. Since Putin's reform, the influence of the senate on the policy-making process continues to weaken; however, the senate is maintaining its status as the organ of regional representatives. In Russia, it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution, and the rigidity assures federalism. Federal government basically intends to recentralize the Russian Federation. However, the rigidity should protect the principles of federalism. The Russian constitutional court tends to deliver judgments including contents to defend federal jurisdictions. However, the court always tries to remain neutral in political conflicts among other federal, and regional organs. For example, the resolution, which was decided on 18 July 2003, repelled interference in the judiciary by the federal executive branch. Generally, the federal President takes the initiative in intergovernmental relationship construction because the Federal President is able to deal with center-regional problems flexibly through promulgation of the presidential decree. The federal government continues to exert pressure on regional governments, and it is difficult to reorganize regional political regimes. Therefore, stability of the Russian federal political system is inclined to depend on presidential influences. However, this system satisfies Watts's six features: I can confirm that the rigidity of the constitution, the independence of the constitutional courts, and the principle of regional representatives in the senate help to maintain federalism. The Russian federal political system seems to be wavering and is dependent on presidential initiative, but it does have the robustness of a constitutional system. The intergovernmental relations have been repeatedly transformed since 1993, but the principle of federalism has not changed.

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