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Minority Rights Abuse in Communist Poland and Inherited Issues

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1.

Throughout most of its independent existence Poland was a multiethnic country. In the interwar period 1918-1939 approximately one third of its 36,000,000 population consisted of non-Poles (mainly Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Jews, Germans and Russians) who inhabited predominantly over half of its territory.

The consequence of World War II was what was labeled as the reduction (or “return”) of Poland to “its ethnic borders” forced by the allied powers. Poland was thus officially proclaimed a monoethnic state with no national minorities and this proclamation was an essential and sensitive, though minor, part of the ideology imposed by the Communist rulers in spite of the fact that some twenty ethnic groups identified themselves as such and emphasized their (cultural, religious, linguistic, historical, etc.) separateness from others. To secure firm control over these undesirable sentiments, after the post-Stalin Thaw the rulers created authoritatively certain institutional possibilities for some cultivating by some ethnic groups of some aspects of their ethnic self-identification.

Nevertheless, the repertory of persecution and abuse of ethnic minority rights was quite impressive. It included:

1.1. The so-called “**verification of autochthons**” on territories formerly belonging to the German state (esp. Kashubian, Slovincian, the so-called Pomeranian, Mazurian population).

1.2. Forced deportations, displacements, resettlements, settlements of nomadic groups, prohibition or administrative obstacles in granting rights to emigrate.

Deportations in the first place involved the Germans, but representatives of other groups also suffered. For instance, on the basis of an agreement between Communist Poland and Soviet Byelorussia several thousands of Byelorussians were “repatriated” to

*Although never actually published before in a specialist journal, the present text has been relatively well-known among specialists and referred to, having been distributed in several preprint versions starting from the Leningrad Minority Rights Conference of June 1991. Constant demand for further copies of the paper as well as the fact that the material it contains does not need any revision brought about the decision to ultimately print it. The decision in turn to publish it in the present journal reflects both my high esteem of the Slavic Research Center and its journal and recollections of my pleasant stay in the Center in 1997. The text happens also to be closely related to my research goals pursued so fruitfully during this stay (A.F.M.).

the USSR. Basing, on the other hand, on a personal opinion of a village official (*sołtys*), himself a newcomer from behind the Bug river line, the “authorities” decided to deport to Germany at the beginning of the 1950s inhabitants of three villages with Lausatian (Sorb) population from the Zielona Góra Province. From the town of Wilamowice all those who had during the Nazi occupation signed the so-called *Volksliste* were also forcibly removed (after 1956 they could return to their households).

On the *recovered lands*, formerly belonging to Germany, the local population was discriminated by administration (autochthons were unlawfully deprived of the right to hold administrative posts and higher professional positions) as well as by the Polish newcomers who soon outnumbered the local population (on some territories, as e.g. Gdańsk, Szczecin or Koszalin provinces, they constituted up to 65-90% of all inhabitants) who treated, with the evident approval of the authorities, all autochthons with hatred as Germans. Such policy forced waves of emigration to West Germany of Mazurians and Varmians (*Ermlanders*), Silesians, but also Kashubians and Slovincians. Forced deportations and resettlements often were of a criminal nature (as e.g. in the case of Lemks, *cf. below*).

The policy of forcible settling of nomads involved Gypsies. The process started in 1949 with promises of material rewards on the part of the authorities which triggered mass declarations of willingness to give up nomadic life. The Gypsies, however, soon changed their minds and returned to their traditional way of life. Hence the authorities started applying other policies (created fixed labor places, etc.) including the formulation and implementation of a special act of law issued by the government (No. 452/52) concerning the Gypsies which was not published as is required by law. This act revealed a total lack of understanding and knowledge of Gypsy culture and customs. The Gypsies fiercely opposed the implementation of the act which followed in pattern similar acts issued in the Soviet Union.

While certain groups were more or less forcibly being removed from the country, representatives of certain other groups were deliberately being deprived of the right to leave Poland. Jews may serve as an interesting example in the latter case, with the action of organized illegal emigration from Poland labeled *Aliya Bet* and coordinated by secret groups *Brikha*. In this way, several tens of thousands of Jews managed to leave the country for Germany (mainly via Szczecin and Świnoujście) and Czechoslovakia (mainly via Kudowa Zdrój). It is not out of place to stress here that Soviet as well as British soldiers closely cooperated with their Polish colleagues in preventing such escapes and the escapees when caught were turned back into Polish hands.

1.3. Deethnicization through destruction of the attributes of ethnic self-identification.

On the Easter holiday in 1949 the local priest in Wilamowice had to read from his church pulpit the decree of the authorities banning under penalty the usage of the local vernacular even in family setting and private conversation and of their distinctive costumes. This was to speed the process of assimilation of the inhabitants of Wilamowice treated officially as Germans (the label they fiercely reject) and was very successful: the Wilamowiceans (*Wymysojer*) lost their cultural identity practically within one genera-

tion.

1.4. Polonization of proper names (personal and geographical).

This procedure was applied very extensively in relation to representatives of various ethnic groups. That German place names on formerly German “recovered lands” were Polonized can be understandable, acceptable, even obvious, but also here cases of abuse can be found. One such case concerned the Czech place Husinec in Lower Silesia (derived from the name of the famous Czech historical and religious figure Jan Hus), used in this form even by the Germans, which after the War was by the Polish administration changed into Gesiniec (meaning “geese pen”; *husa* is incidentally the Czech word for “goose”); this was by the Czechs regarded as act of profanation of the name of their eminent compatriot.

Polonization of place names in the Białystok region continues practically uninterrupted (since the 19th century) till these days, predominantly through phonetic alternations which, however, usually distort the original etymological ties. These changes are in principle not announced, contrary to law, in official law publications. In 1983 Byelorussian circles initiated a wave of protests to stop the procedure.

Massive place name replacement esp. in South-Eastern Poland took place in mid 1970s on political (pro-Soviet) grounds; former names started reappearing on maps only quite recently (*cf. below*).

Marginally, it can be noted here that Polish administration supported the Greek refugees in Poland in forcible Hellenization of personal names of Aegean Macedonians, representatives of whom came to Poland together with the Greeks (in Greece, Aegean Macedonians have also been persecuted as ethnic minority).

1.5. Educational policy was also ground for persecution and minority rights abuses, although positive effects must also be acknowledged. We described this problem more detailedly elsewhere (*cf. Majewicz & Wicherkiewicz, 1990*); here a few examples can suffice as illustration. One such example is a long-standing constant denial to positively meet the demand for the introduction of obligatory courses of the Byelorussian language into schools and some, even limited, official bilingualism in the Białystok region.

Another, similar, example is the official silence or outright rejection in response to demands for region-oriented education for Kashubians that would include lessons in the Kashubian vernacular. The silence was broken only in 1991 with the foundation of the first Kashubian secondary school in the town of Brusy (also in 1991 the first Kashubian primary school was founded in the village of Głodnica).

Schooling for certain groups was limited (such is the case of the already mentioned Macedonians), for many was unavailable, on varying grounds. In the case of Lithuanian institutionalized education in Poland, numerous facts of Soviet interference have to be mentioned.

1.6. Acts of devastation or destruction of churches, temples and cemeteries other than Roman-Catholic as well as manifestations of varying degree and intensity of

intolerance towards non-Roman-Catholic were — and are — unfortunately frequent. Frequent were and are forcible (!) seizures of prayer buildings of other denominations by Roman Catholics and refusals to allow representatives of other denominations even to enter Roman-Catholic churches, in spite of the official support for ecumenism.

The policy of the Roman-Catholic church towards Byelorussians is clearly anti-Byelorussian and pro-Polish. No Catholic service in the Byelorussian language is offered and within the last years orders (!) could be heard from church pulpits prohibiting the believers visits in Orthodox churches or even in homes of the Orthodox church followers during their holidays (like e.g. in Krynki in the Białystok Province). There are also only few Orthodox churches offering service in Byelorussian, in most of them prayers are said only in Russian (and Old Church Slavonic, of course).

After the reintroduction of religion lessons into schools in autumn of 1990, conflicts arose in Zelów, a town with Czech minority belonging to the Reformed-Evangelical (Calvinist) Church. The local Roman-Catholic priest did his best not to allow religious instruction in school for Protestant children and, to some extent, he won, for in primary schools no such instruction was introduced. In secondary schools, religion lessons for Protestants were introduced due to uncompromising stand of pupils.

Language is often the source of conflict in religious life. Decades of ban of the Lithuanian language in churches on territories with predominant Lithuanian population seriously aggravated Lithuanian-Polish relations. Similar language conflict existed on territories inhabited by both Poles and Slovaks — in this case, acts of violence against the Slovaks and the locking of one church (in Nowa Biała, Province of Nowy Sącz) for 11 years took place. Recently, the situation improved considerably in both cases.

Jewish cemeteries and synagogues (as well as old German and Ukrainian cemeteries and roadside crosses) were systematically devastated and destroyed throughout the whole post-War period either by deliberate neglect or actively, in undertakings inspired by the Communist Party as well as the Roman-Catholic Church. Many synagogues were turned into storehouses, movie theaters, schools, regional culture centres, or even swimming pools (as in Poznań).

Not long ago, a serious Jewish-Polish conflict concerning the localization of the Carmelite nunnery in the direct neighborhood of the former concentration camp in Auschwitz, with accents in statements of Polish church hierarchy considered anti-Semitic made headlines throughout the world.

On the other hand, an outburst of interest in the Jewish culture among younger generations is worth mentioning here. President Wałęsa's visit to Israel and Israel's reciprocation as well as development of direct Israeli-Polish contacts in combination with the mentioned interest in all Jewish can create promising prospects for what has been left after the Jews in the country where, unfortunately, soon there can be no Jews left.

1.7. Administrative obstacles in the organization of ethnic minority institutions, in the realization of cultural, educational, economical, etc. initiatives, were permanent and abundant in quantity. The below mentioned "socio-cultural" societies had the authority's blessing only as long as they realized the policy and *raison d'état* of So-

cialist Poland. All other activities of these societies, not to mention uninstitutional initiatives, were outrightly banned.

Typical here would be the case of Byelorussians. Their **Byelorussian Socio-Cultural Society** founded in 1956 loyal to the state administration was officially promoted and financially supported, while all initiatives that emerged outside the Society were persecuted. Byelorussian writers were invigilated by secret police and could publish, with the support of the Society, only materials that were “useful for the Society.” Many books could not appear at all. Many cultural events were organized by youth and considered illegal; such were e.g. rehearsals of amateur theatrical groups, declamatory contests for children, student meetings, tourist excursions, etc. When in 1981 Byelorussian students founded their Union, the authorities refused to recognize it legally, while exactly at the same time they recognized as legal the Union of African Students. The official legal recognition of the former was possible only in 1989. Over a decade ago, the then existing Byelorussian Museum was liquidated and from a part of its collections a new Museum of Byelorussian Culture and Revolutionary Movement (apparently in accordance with the Soviet practice) was founded. In 1981 a petition was directed under the auspices of the Byelorussian Socio-Cultural Society to the Communist Party boss S.Kania in which the petitioners complained about the cultural and administrative discrimination of Byelorussians; the petition stressed “the role of the Byelorussian minority in the strengthening of the people’s rule” in Poland. On the other hand, the Białystok branch of the “Solidarity” trade union postulated the removal of all the Byelorussians from all influential posts and the elimination of influence of the Orthodox church in the Białystok region.

Various administrative obstacles and moves practically destroyed most of the cultural, political and economic institutions created by the Jews whose population after the repatriation from the USSR in July of 1946 reached quarter of a million. These institutions were in bloom till 1949 when the Communist Party decided that they all were nationalist in character and banned all Jewish political parties, cooperatives and organizations and created one **Jewish Socio-Cultural Society**. Needless to say, all Jewish institutions and other initiatives, including cultural ones, were closely watched by the political police (*state security office*).

All forms of Kashubian self-government and cultural autonomy were gradually limited and there were serious obstacles in the implementation of new initiatives. The foundation of certain organizations (e.g. the Kashubian Congress or the Pomeranian Union) proved impossible, the life of certain institutions proved very short (e.g. the scholarly Baltic Institute was dissolved in 1950). [One should mention here that finally, after almost 50-years’ attempts, the Kashubians succeeded in organization of the 2nd Kashubian Congress which took place in June 1992 in Gdańsk.]

A number of Kashubian press titles appeared but much fewer than in the pre-War period and in most cases they pretty soon ceased appearance. The Kashubian flag magazine *Pomerania* was one among the longest banned titles of non-underground press in Poland after the introduction of the martial law in 1981. Kashubian matters in mass media were limited only to a few folkloristic motifs.

Similar problems had the Lithuanians whose cultural society was also reduced to

an organizer of folkloristic spectacles while their Lithuanian language quarterly *Aušra* could not be turned into a monthly.

Folklore was also the only domain incompetently tolerated by the state administration in the case of the **Rroma** (Gypsy) **Socio-Cultural Society**; no artistic supervision promised by the governmental 452/52 act of law, however, was provided. Polish authorities in close cooperation with the **Organization of Political Refugees from Greece** imposed limitations upon the schooling for Macedonians and successfully prevented them from creating their own organization which could be finally founded and officially recognized as late as 1989. There were also obstacles in access to literature in Macedonian and the Macedonian version of the Greek-language paper *Dimokratis* ceased to appear in the 1960s.

1.8. Orchestrated political campaigns were directed in the first place against the Jews, even after almost all of them left the country. The campaign of 1968 was an event of major importance in contemporary history of Poland when anti-Semitic slogans were widely and loudly used by prominent Communist figures to explain both the economic stagnation in the country as well as the roots of the widespread students' protests against the Communist regime. An overtly anti-Semitic and nationalistic organization **Grunwald** could print and disseminate their publications and organize meetings unharmed by the authorities. In May of 1990, 27 organizations in Poland were said to have been officially registered in the Ministry of Internal Affairs with programs including anti-Semitic statements and slogans.

Various nationalist organizations and parties that emerged recently express sentiments also in relations to groups other than Jews.

1.9. Overt criminal acts of violence against ethnic minority groups were not frequent. The most lamentable and tragic cases to be mentioned here include inspired *pogroms* of Jews (in 1946-1968, allegedly four such *pogroms* took place, the most tragic one in Kielce on July 4th, 1946, resulted in 40 deaths and 36 wounded Jews; other *pogroms* were to take place in Cracow and in Lower Silesia). A spontaneous *pogrom*-like act of violence against Gypsies, triggered by dissatisfaction resulting primarily from apartment shortage, took place in Konin in 1981 and resulted in death casualties. Another case of massive attack against the Gypsy population took place in Mława in 1991.

Gypsies were particularly unlawfully harmed when leading their traditional nomadic way of living but the harassment continued also in the 1960s and 1970s when a campaign allegedly took place to persuade Gypsy women to get sterilized.

Representatives of ethnic minorities were often for their "nationalist" activities kept in prisons or in the forced labor camp in Jaworzno.

A criminal act of a different nature was the Soviet-style deportation of almost the whole ethnic group of Lemks (some 30,000-35,000 persons) and up to 140,000 Ukrainians in April - July of 1947 in the so-called "Operation *Vistula*" from regions in South-Eastern Poland inhabited by them for centuries to various places in Northern and Western Poland and settled there scattered in very small groups over large territories. The official propaganda kept accusing them of murderous acts directed against Poles, so

they met with persecution and hatred from local people in places of their forced deportation.

* * *

In the preceding paragraphs cases of persecution and abuse of human and ethnic minority rights were classified, briefly characterized and exemplified.

The following sections outline in points specific exemplary case studies.

2. Exemplary Case Studies

2.1. UKRAINIANS and LEMKS

(1) At the end of World War II approximately 650,000 of Ukrainian population (including Lemks) found themselves within the territory of the People's Republic of Poland (PRL).

(2) In 1944-1945, on the basis of a treaty between Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukr. SSR) concerning mutual exchange of population contracted in 1944, about 480,000 Ukrainians (in this number, about 70-80 thousand of Lemks) were "repatriated," mainly to Lemberg (Lvov) and its neighborhood and to the Tarnopol region. Ukrainian-Polish commissions were vigorously persuading departures, frequently forcing people to petition for "the right to leave." Territorial "people's councils" (e.g. in Nowy Sącz) circulated statements warning those resisting "voluntary repatriation" that "special administrative measures would be applied." Pressure was made also by means of various taxes, while those expressing their wish to leave were freed from any taxes. Voluntary leaves predominated till September 1945, later resettlements became compulsory.

(3) In April-July 1947 the so-called **Operation "Vistula"** (*Akcja "Wisła"*) took place. Its aim was to deprive the detachments of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), still fighting against the communist regime mainly in the Bieszczady Mountains region, of any civil and material support. The operation followed the killing "in ambush" of a communist general named Karol Świerczewski. Recent opinions among historians openly point to the murder as a communist provocation in order to procure the evident cause and necessity to "solve the Ukrainian problem in the PRL."

Resettled in the **Operation W** were people not only from the Bieszczady and parts of Lower Beskid regions on which UPA was active, but also from territories on which no clashes with UPA "bandits" had taken place. The Ukrainian population was also removed from the Lublin Province as far to the north as Terespol and the Rzeszów Province, as was the Lemk population from the Cracow Province (as far to the west as Szczawnica). Altogether, about 140,000 persons were resettled in the **Operation W**, including about 30,000-35,000 Lemks.

(4) As the result of the **Operation W** vast territories (some 1.5 thousand km²) of Bieszczady and Lower Beskid were almost completely deserted and remained such till 1956; there were about 170 abandoned villages on the said territory.

(5) Certain persons, certain couples of mixed extraction and even certain whole

villages remained untouched during the Operation W, on premises still to be explained.

(6) The Ukrainian and Lemk resettlers constituted in 1947 the last wave of settlers to populate the western and northern territories deserted by the Germans, hence they were to inherit the worst, most devastated and plundered ex-German households and farms. The semi-official propaganda depicting the newcomers as “Ukrainian murderers and bandits” (special term *banderowcy* had been coined) preceded their arrival. Many conflicts emerged almost immediately, when the newcomers were, because of the shortage of households, located in houses already occupied by Poles.

(7) It was not allowed to settle more than just a few Ukrainian or Lemk families in the same village or town. Families coming from the same village had, as a principle, to be separated; all this aimed at the destruction of former communities.

(8) In certain regions emptied by the Ukrainians and Lemks, Polish newcomers — mainly repatriants from the USSR, Podhale highlanders and refugees from Greece were being settled and *sovkhoz*-type state-owned farms (PGRs) were being founded.

(9) One more organized forcible resettlement took place in 1951 — a small ethnic subgroup labeled in Polish *Rusini Szlachetwscy* (some 15 families altogether) were removed from the Nowy Sącz region.

(10) The Ukrainians and Lemks initially did not want to cultivate the land they had been allotted. They worked only to survive for they believed to be able to return soon to their abandoned farms in South-Eastern Poland.

(11) Many of the more active leaders of Ukrainian and Lemk communities were imprisoned in the Central Forced Labor Camp in Jaworzno (in existence since 1948) in Silesia. Ex-Nazi-soldiers were kept there alongside with those who were against the “repatriation to the USSR” or to the “Recovered Lands.” It remains to be established how many Ukrainians and Lemks perished in the camp — a former notorious Nazi concentration camp.

(12) In April 1957 the ruling communist party allowed the return of those whose houses and farms were still unoccupied and not used. All other Ukrainians and Lemks were ultimately deprived of their property rights. A few hundreds of families, chiefly Lemk (some 350 families) returned to their former land.

(13) In 1956 the Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Society (*Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne* UTSK) was founded and allowed to organize courses of the Ukrainian language and some other cultural (mainly folkloristic) events among the dispersed Ukrainian population. It was, however, but a tool in the hands of the communist authorities intentionally conceived to become a sort of an Ukrainian *ghetto* without any possibilities to extend any influence or activity beyond its own frame. One of the goals of the Society was the Ukrainization of those Lemks who dared consider themselves to constitute another nationality, distinct from Ukrainian. This policy was supported by the country’s authorities. The Lemks were for 35 years denied any right to organize themselves; there existed only the Section for Development of Regional Lemkish Culture (*Sekcja do spraw Rozwoju Regionalnej Kultury Lemkowskiej*) which embraced only the Lemks with pro-Ukrainian orientation. The Ukrainian-language UTSK weekly newspaper *Nashe slovo* started publishing in the 1960s one page (*Lemkivska storinka*) in the Lemkish ethnolect.

The Ukrainians associated in the UTSK were ill-disposed towards the returns of the Lemks to their previous regions for it was believed that in the new places of habitation conditions for the Ukrainization were more favorable (by means of education, contact with the half-legal Greek-Catholic church and the UTSK itself). As it turned out, these beliefs were ill founded, for it was exactly on the "Western Lands" (*Ziemie Zachodnie*) where the Ukrainian-Lemk conflicts proved the strongest (esp. in the Legnica region) and where the first after World War II independent (separatist) Lemkish organization emerged.

(14) After the boundary shifts following World War II, the pre-War **Apostolic Administration for the Lemk Region** (*Administracja Apostolska Lemkowszczyzny*) and part of the Przemyśl Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Diocese, which in 1936 had altogether about 544,000 followers and 400 priests, found themselves within the Polish territory. The communist government initially recognized as existing and legal in Poland three Catholic Church denominations (rites): Roman (Latin), Greek (Ukrainian, Byzantine) and Armenian. Soon, however, following the Soviet-Polish "repatriation" treaty (*cf. above*) all Greek-Catholic bishops and many priests were resettled forcibly to the USSR (where they were imprisoned and in most cases perished), others from the 115 remaining were arrested in Poland and placed in the Jaworzno labor camp; the abolition of the Greek-Catholic Church in the USSR and Poland's breaking with Vatican brought about decrees in 1947-1949, on the force of which the property of the Church was confiscated, service was prohibited, and any mention about the denomination was suppressed by censorship.

Some 500 Uniate churches remained on territories deserted by the Ukrainians and Lemks and as early as 1946 the Roman-Catholic Diocese Curia in Przemyśl decided to hand them over to Roman-Catholic parishes. State authorities, on their part, captured the majority of buildings and plots belonging to the Church, deliberately allowing or participating in their destruction. While in the turmoil of the years 1939-1949 only six historical churches were destroyed in the Rzeszów province, 95 of them ceased to exist in the period 1949-1956. In most cases, the churches were crushed by tanks or heavy machinery, blown out (even in the 1980s), burnt down, or handed over to other denominations.

Conflicts, having their source in the efforts of the Ukrainians to regain their Greek-Catholic churches and the Lemks striving to recover their Greek-Catholic and Orthodox churches, continue till these days. Most severe or "most famous" among them took place in Krynica, Gładyszów, Bielanka, Polany, Hrubieszów, and recently in Przemyśl.

Religious-national conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians are frequent and encouraged or at least tolerated by both the former and present state administration as well as the Catholic Church hierarchy. Not infrequent are cases of the occupation of Uniate and Orthodox houses of prayer by Roman-Catholics, barring Ukrainian and Lemkish funeral processions from cemeteries or various obstacles in the case of mixed Polish-Uniate or Polish-Orthodox marriages.

(15) In 1971 the UTSK branches of Gorlice and Sanok addressed a complaint to the Communist Party 6th Congress in which suppression of Ukrainian language courses and folkloristic ensembles, and making the organization of a Ukrainian song festival

impossible were enumerated as acts of discrimination against the Ukrainian population. As a result the branch headquarters were suspended, UTSK activists fired from the party, the Society (*sic!*), and from jobs with no possibility to find another job, or even forced to emigrate to the USA.

(16) The attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians was and is often hostile. Graffiti “*Away with the Ukrainians*” appeared on the UTSK buildings, children and youth from Ukrainian schools were harassed, the status of the Ukrainian language was considered lower than that of Polish even in places inhabited predominantly by the Ukrainians, prejudice and superstition in relation to the Ukrainians are quite common.

(17) On August 9th, 1977, the Polish Ministry of Administration, Regional Development and Protection of Environment issued a decree on the force of which 122 place names in the Krosno, Tarnobrzeg, Nowy Sącz, Przemyśl and Rzeszów Provinces, mostly toponyms of Ukrainian origin “with un-Polish phonetic features” were changed. Some of the new toponyms were derived from the names of local communists and army unit commanders. An anecdote has it that it was the then-Minister’s (a lady) bow of courtesy towards the Prime Minister who was said to particularly hate the letter *h* (cf. Pałka, 1981).

(18) In 1989, after decades of futile endeavors, a Lemk organization named the **Lemk Association** (*Stowarzyszenie Łemków*) was permitted and officially recognized; its stand was that the Lemks constitute an ethnic group distinct and separate from the Ukrainians. In 1990, another organization of Lemks — those who consider themselves part of the Ukrainian nation (*Zjednoczenie Łemków* — the **Lemk Union**) was also founded and officially recognized.

(19) In 1989, Lemk organizations applied for the return of forests and fields which had been robbed from them as the result of the 1947 **Operation W** resettlement and for financial compensation of the losses. A group labeled **Lemk Citizen Circle** (*Krąg Obywatelski Łemków*) demanded also for Lemks as an ethnic minority a special “charter of civil rights for Ukrainians in Poland.”

(20) Ukrainian youth organizations: the **Ukrainian Students’ Union** (*Związek Studentów Ukraińskich*, illegally active since the 1970s) and the **Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth** (*Związek Ukraińskiej Młodzieży Niezależnej*) have been officially registered.

(21) In 1990 the Senate of Republic of Poland officially condemned the 1947 **Operation “Vistula.”**

(22) In 1990 the UTSK transformed itself into the **Union of Ukrainians in Poland** (*Związek Ukraińców w Polsce*) which is to be political-party- and trade-union-independent and among its goals to have the introduction of Ukrainian-language radio and TV broadcasting nationwide with lessons of the language and the increase of the number of Ukrainian schools.

2.2. GERMANS

(1) The German ethnic minority population within the pre-War Poland’s borders was 741,000 (1931 census). 128,000 Germans were repatriated by Nazi authorities from Poland’s territories captured by the USSR (mainly the Volhynia, *Wołyń*, region). The

so-called “Recovered Lands” (*Ziemie Odzyskane*) were in 1939 inhabited by 8,860,000 people. On the force of the Potsdam Conference acts, Czechoslovakia and Poland were granted the right to remove the German population from their territories.

(2) Some 7,000,000 persons from the “Recovered Lands” moved to Germany, about 2/3 of this number during the wartime. In 1946-1948 Polish authorities removed for Germany about 2,214,000 ethnic Germans.

(3) About 1,000,000 of autochthons (defined as local population having before the War German citizenship who declared their Polish extraction) — Mazurians (*cf. below*), Varmians (*Warmiacy, Ermlanders*), Kashubians, Slovincians, Pomeranians, Silesians — were left on the Polish territory after the evacuation of Germans. Left were also about 50,000 of German specialists in coal mining in the region of Wałbrzych and Nowa Ruda and an unspecified number of Germans in the Szczecin and Koszalin Provinces as a labor force in state farms (these people were resettled to Germany in the 1950s).

(4) For the Germans remaining in Poland a network of German-language primary, professional and secondary schools as well as cultural and social institutions was created and German-language press was published. The German schooling system was administratively abolished in 1956 and in the Opole region the teaching of the German language *in any form* was totally banned in the 1960s.

(5) In 1952 a **German Socio-Cultural Society** (*Niemieckie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne*) was founded with headquarters in Wrocław and Wałbrzych; in its residual form (a few hundred members) it survived till the end of the 1980s.

(6) In the case of the autochthons, only those of them who received an overall “positive opinion” in the process of so-called verification could be granted Polish citizenship.

All those who in Silesia declared German nationality were placed in the resettlement camp in Łambinowice (Lambsdorf) where they had to spend long time in harsh conditions before being taken to Germany. All their property has been confiscated without any compensation. Regions deserted by the removed Germans have been populated by newcomers from territories captured by the USSR, re-emigrants from Yugoslavia, Rumania, France and Belgium, political refugees from Greece, resettled Ukrainians and Lemks (*cf. above*) and Polish Jews arriving from the USSR. Larger groups of German “autochthons” remained only in the Opole region of Silesia, on the right bank of the Oder river (437,000), in Mazury and Warmia (150,000), and smaller groups — near Babimost and Złotów.

The autochthons’ family and given names were Polonized.

(7) In 1955, a campaign of “family reunions” was initiated for people who insisted on their German ancestry; approximately 600,000 persons left for Germany, in this number about 425,000 (179,000 from Upper Silesia and 51,000 from Mazury and Warmia) in 1968-1982 (*cf. Maryński, 1984*)

(8) According to Polish official statistics of that time, about 3-3.5 thousand Germans remained in Poland in 1961-1962; West German statistics estimated the number of Germans remaining in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s at 1,100,000; West German constitution considered all those who till 1939 lived on the territory of the German Reich as Germans. Since early 1960s the official stand of both the communist and church

authorities in Poland was that “a German minority in Poland does not exist” (despite the continued family reunion business). In 1968 the Central Statistic Bureau organized a “tentative” census in the Opole, Katowice, Koszalin and Olsztyn Provinces in which some 150,000 persons declared themselves as Germans.

(9) On territories formerly belonging to Germany all German traces were systematically removed. Cemeteries (both Protestant and Catholic) were devastated, German-language inscriptions were removed from grave stones and crosses, German churches and chapels were transformed into Catholic churches (in few cases, into Greek-Catholic or Orthodox churches for the Ukrainian and Lemk newcomers) and their German interior decorations, often historical, were destroyed; German monuments and commemorative tablets were removed, etc.

(10) Towards the end of the 1980s a rapidly growing number of people, especially in the Opole region of Silesia, insistingly demanded religious services in German and German-language classes in schools. To a limited degree, German-language religious service had, in fact, existed prior to this popular demand.

(11) In 1989, first in Silesia, later also in Pomerania, esp. Gdańsk and in southern Poland, various German minority organizations started emerging. The strongest of them (in number of members) turned out to be the **Association of German Minority People in the Opole Region of Silesia** (*Stowarzyszenie Mniejszości Niemieckiej na Śląsku Opolskim*); it was several times denied the right to register on the grounds of the official stand that “no German minority existed in Poland” before it was finally officially recognized. In 1990 almost all German minority organizations associated themselves into the **Central Council of German Societies in the Republic of Poland** (*Centralna Rada Towarzystw Niemieckich w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, CRTNRP) claiming their membership to number in hundreds of thousands (approximately 250,000 in the Opole region only).

(12) During the Senate supplementary elections in February of 1990 in the Opole Province, one of the two candidates, a well-known German-minority activist and member of the executive committee of CRTNRP, named Heinrich Kroll, won over 100,000 votes; he lost the election to his counter-candidate, a university professor and specialist in history who during the election campaign had estimated the number of those who “have right to consider themselves Germans (basing on language, religion, traditions, etc.)” at 15,000.

The following slogans, among others, appeared during the said campaign: “*Germans to Germany*,” “*Kroll to gas chamber*,” “*Silesians — yes, Volksdeutsche — no!*” (Dziadul, 1990).

The election campaign to the Parliament in October 1991 brought the German minority activists much more significant success: they won 7 seats in the Sejm and 1 in the Senate chamber.

(13) German minority organizations in Poland have ambitions and far-reaching plans concerning economy (e.g. the establishment of branches of German banks, foundation of special German Trade Chamber in Katowice and of German Economic Society), education (the foundation of German-language high school is postulated) and culture.

2.3. MAZURIANS

(1) The population of the Warmia and Mazury region taken over by Poland after World War II was about 1,000,000 in 1939; about 50% of these people were Polish-speaking or regarded themselves as Poles. In 1945 only about 31,000 of Mazurians and Varmians found themselves on the territory in question. Towards the end of the 1940s, after the return of people from Germany and the USSR this number rose to about 100,000-125,000. The awareness of national and ethnic identity among them varied and was unstable, with most of them, however, opting for “Mazurian” or “German” self-identification. The number of those declaring themselves Polish was relatively small.

(2) Regions inhabited by Mazurians and Varmians were the first Third Reich territories to be invaded by the Soviet Red Army. Soviet soldiers treated autochthons as if they were Germans. Mazurians were imprisoned in forced labor camps, deported deep into the USSR, Mazurian farms (with very developed agriculture) were robbed and burnt, women were raped.

(3) The economic situation of the Mazurians sharply deteriorated. There were massive epidemics of infections, especially venereal diseases. The poor crop of 1945 and 1946 was stolen by Soviet soldiers and Poles who similarly to the former treated the autochthons as Germans, i.e. extremely badly.

(4) Uncontrolled Polish colonization brought about the loss of farms among very many Mazurians. Polish authorities as a principle approved and legalized such acts of the robbery of Mazurian property and many Mazurians had to work as hired labor force on their own lands stolen from them by the Poles.

(5) Catholic propaganda enforced the prejudice towards Mazurians: “*Pole equals Catholic, Protestant is German*,” was their slogan. The Evangelical-Uniate and Old Lutheran Churches disintegrated after the War. In accordance with a decree of October 19th, 1946, the Evangelical-Augusburgian Church was to inherit all their properties but several scores of churches were taken over by Catholics. There were cases of forcible Catholicization of Mazurians.

(6) The very painful so-called **verification of autochthons** was based on the assumption that all Mazurians should be treated as Germans and only those who successfully passed the process of “verification” could eventually be granted Polish citizenship. In August of 1947 some 35,000 of Mazurians and Varmians out of the total of about 120,000 remained “unverified” becoming thus the “second-category people.” Various discriminatory measures were applied in relation to those people, including the deprivation of the right to hold administrative positions (only 0.15% and only “verified” autochthons constituted the authoritative body of local administration, although one has to bear in mind that but about one hundred Mazurians had secondary or university level education). In 1949-1950 almost all Mazurian activists were removed from their posts, many of them underwent a trial and imprisonment or were forced to leave the Mazury region in 1949. Some of them were held in the camps for Germans near Warsaw and Königsberg.

(7) The UNRRA supplies for Mazurians were usually stolen immediately after coming by both the civil population as well as uniformed and ununiformed (ORMO) militia. Hundreds of families were several times robbed of the property they managed

to accumulate. As a result e.g. some 50% of children could not attend schools solely because they had no shoes or clothing.

(8) Many Mazurians insisted on declaring “Mazurian” or “German” as their nationality.

(9) In 1949 an old meritorious and prestigious institution named Mazurian People’s University had its profile drastically changed and was deprived of its permanent location.

(10) In February of 1949 the “verification” became obligatory and was enforced with terror and physical force. All so-far “unverified” Mazurians were forced to sign a declaration of their “Polishness.”

(11) In 1952, following the new passports regulations, the Mazurians were required to fill special forms and acquire new passports. Many people refused accepting new passports or even forms to fill in, or allowing to be photographed. About 25,000 Mazurians were physically forced to be handed new passports, and whole villages were terrorized in order to bend their inhabitants to declare “wish to accept” Polish citizenship and Polish *internal* passports. Many young Mazurians refusing to serve in the Polish People’s Army decided to declare at that time German nationality. The process of Polonization of personal names markedly gained force in 1947; not only German but also French or Flemish names underwent Polonization at that time.

(12) In 1950-1953 special underground armed groups named **Masurische Befreiungstruppen** (*Germ. Mazurian Liberation Detachments*) were formed as response to the official policy of terror and force.

(13) Between 10 and 20 thousand Mazurians left Poland in 1950-1951 within the so-called **Operation Link** organized and coordinated by the German Red Cross and about 11,000 more left for East Germany as the result of an agreement between that country and Poland. Within the “family reunion” process, 100,000 persons left mainly for West Germany in 1955-1980, in this number almost all Mazurians.

(14) In 1956 several Mazurian organizations were founded, but all of them encountered numerous obstacles in their work and were soon dismantled. The longest living was the **Varmian-Mazurian Socio-Cultural Society** (*Warmińsko-Mazurskie Towarzystwo Kulturalno-Społeczne*) existing till 1963.

(15) The beautiful and attractive Mazury Lakeland landscape attracted the attention of prominent communists in the 1970s who initiated a campaign of forcible sale of Mazurian farms and households for emigration passports. Mazurians were granted “rights to emigrate” for land on which corrupted communist party bosses built their *dachas*. A vast territory near Łańsk was fenced to become attractive hunting ground for Poland’s rulers and their guests; several Mazurian villages within the fenced territory had, naturally, to be emptied by their inhabitants.

(16) Mazurian Protestant cemeteries were devastated, German-language or Gothic-script inscriptions chiseled out or covered with paint (this, of course, only strengthened pro-German attitudes among the remnants of the folk). Protestant hymn books sent specially for Mazurians from Sweden were not allowed to enter the country.

(17) In 1981, **Mazurian Cultural Association** (*Mazurskie Zrzeszenie Kulturalne*) was founded with the aim to save the remnants of the Mazurian culture and to repre-

sent the 6,000 strong Mazurian community still living in Poland.

In 1990, the **Mazurian Society** (*Stowarzyszenie Mazurskie*) representing the Mazurian population with pro-German orientation was called into existence. They publish their own journal in German entitled *Masurische Storchepost* and organize annual Pan-Mazurian meeting-congresses in the Mazury region; first of them took place in July 1991 in Karwia near Mrągowo.

* * *

What follows are a few remarks on the present-day situation and prospects for ethnic minority groups and their protection after the downfall of the communist system in the country.

3.

Acts of minority rights abuse catalogued and exemplified — doubtlessly incompletely — so far could not have no impact upon what has been inherited.

In most basic terms the present situation can be described as a fertile soil for an almost uncontrollable proliferation of movements, political parties, social organizations, and other organisms of pressure — both minority-supporting (emerging from or organized by particular minorities or minority group alliances as well as formed by Poles) and nationalist, strongly or utmostly nationalist, opposing any idea of even the recognition of the right of any minority group to exist, not to mention any other rights.

The most spectacular is without doubt the activity of numerous German organizations swelling in numbers of members and supporters reaching hundreds of thousands, having their strong representation in both chambers of the Polish Parliament, introducing bilingual education and bilingual road and other informative signs and captions, initiating and promoting economic development on the basis of combined Polish-mainly-German capital, organizing cultural, religious and political events that are heard of throughout the country. Simultaneously, it is the Germans who are mostly feared of as ones who can “buy out Poland cheaply,” or otherwise create danger to “vital Polish (i.e. nationalist and ‘Catholic’) interests,” and more and more often are the object of attack from gangs of skinheads — one such attack ended with a brutal murder of a German citizen, a truck driver, solely because he was a German. To some extent, though it does not constitute any excuse, such attacks are a kind of response to frequent acts of a shameful treatment of Poles in Germany, also for being Poles only.

Many ethnic minority groups realized the existence of a chance to improve their lot and prospects in the sweeping changes taking place in Poland. It is not a proper place here to discuss or even list their initiatives in detail but some examples should suffice to more fully depict the opening opportunities.

Worthy of praise and close observation is the Kashubian group which started promoting regional education (unthinkable of under communists) which includes the foundation of a Kashubian secondary school and introducing the Kashubian ethnolect to primary schools, their own regular TV programs with video-courses of their language,

and sponsorship of academic research embracing sociology, history, linguistic and literary studies related to their own minority, and economic research aiming at identifying and defining optimal factors for regional development. An impressive Kashubian Congress under the label "The Future of the Kashubs" took place in June 1992 in Gdańsk with associated events organized throughout the whole year. The Kashubians are also strongly represented in the Parliament.

Regional development is also a priority for Byelorussian political movements: the regions inhabited by the Byelorussian minority comprise territories of the so-called "eastern wall" — the poorest and least-developed areas of the country in the east with deserted villages, abandoned land, and Byelorussian youth escaping to urban centers where acculturation and loss of language and Byelorussian self-identification are inevitable.

Resentments against Byelorussians are not weak but are regional and ignored by ignorant authorities; they are associated with the fact that during clashes and regular fights between Polish and Byelorussian groups of varying political orientations that were frequent between 1945-1947 and on a smaller scale lasted till 1957 the Byelorussians too often stood by or supported the communists and even the idea of transferring the whole Białystok region to Soviet Byelorussia.

Resentments against Ukrainians are incomparably stronger and on a nationwide scale. The Ukrainians continue to be largely dispersed and although their activity towards cultural development is more visible now, their material basis for it seems to have considerably deteriorated: the buildings of their only secondary school, for example, which for communist authorities was a showcase of their tolerance towards and protection of minority interests have turned into a ruin endangering the lives of the pupils and teachers.

Conflicts between minority groups and the Polish majority are also generated by the growing intolerance on religious grounds, at times triggered by monstrously growing appetites of representatives of the Catholic Church but at times occurring evidently against the will of the Church authorities. The former can be exemplified by the uneasy situation of Protestant pupils of Czech extraction in Żelów in central Poland after the reintroduction of religious education to schools or the anti-Jewish hysteria after a — far from rational and honest — interpretation of the event in Auschwitz described above (sec. 1. 6.) by the Polish Church Primate. The latter — by the case of a prolonged opposition of Catholics to the handing over a church to Uniates (the transfer was approved by the Pope himself). There are also cases of clashes over the language of church services between members of minority and Poles of the same religious denomination from the same parish (one such case from a region inhabited by Slovaks and Poles was presented in a shocking TV coverage nationwide).

Religion can be stimulative for a minority language maintenance but it can also be destructive. The above mentioned Czech community from Żelów is afraid of requesting some form of education in Czech (taught only at home) precisely because of the very hostile attitude of both the majority Poles as well as the local Catholic church. On the other hand, the Catholic Church supports the promotion of Kashubian in church services and the Kashubian translation of the New Testament was published in 1992

with the Bishop's blessing and "nihil obstat." The Kashubian region is peculiar as the only region in Poland at present where a "battle for the language" actually takes place with a very strong movement to upgrade the linguistic status of Kashubian under communism officially declared "a local dialect of Polish."

The tendency to upgrade, or change, the status of a language — although on a much smaller scale and among dispersed minorities the minority status of which (in sharp contrast to Kashubian) was never disputed — can be observed among the Lemks and Gypsies: both started publishing their own press.

The statistics concerning ethnic minorities in Poland still has to be collected. Generally, with the strengthening renaissance of minority ethnic self-consciousness, but also with other factors (as economy in the case of the Germans or those pretending to be Germans), the population of certain minority communities grows, but the decrease in the population of certain others is evident — sometimes it is biology that is decisive (as e.g. in the case of Karaims, Wilamowiceans, or Tatars), sometimes still politics and intolerance (as e.g. in the case of Czechs or the very few remaining Jews).

As stated, the growth of minority ethnic self-consciousness goes together with intolerance — individual, rooted in ignorance, as well as institutionalized — in nationalistic parties or movements. The prevailing tendency, however, seems to lead towards a more tolerant society, as one may conclude from unprecedented interest of Poles, especially the younger intelligentsia, in minorities, their cultural heritage and their differentness. Books, especially on Jewish heritage, but also those concerning other minorities, are among best-selling literature.

What is alarming and distressing is the complete ignorance of the political authorities (and so-called "political elites") of the country in this respect and their absolute lack of preparation and readiness to deal (not to speak of solving) with minority problems. Some of the politicians are outrightly nationalist and openly reject the very idea of minority rights but also those who are "intellectually" aware of the problem (often outstanding and respectable figures) group themselves into official or semi-official bodies to "assist" selected (because simply they know nothing of the very existence of other) minority groups; although their obvious incompetence and lack of basic knowledge and qualifications is evident from their (rare) initiatives and (frequent and abundant) talking, the idea of looking around for people competent and experienced in the domain would not even occur to them.

Political short-sightedness results e.g. in such schizophrenic attitudes as simultaneous support (or demand) for the foundation of a Polish university in the capital of independent Lithuania and outrage upon hearing rumors about possible demands for the foundation of a German university in Polish Upper Silesia.

Unfortunately, equally ignorant are Poland's academic circles. Organizing a much publicized conference on Poland's national minorities in Warsaw in September 1992, the Polish Academy of Sciences invited very distinguished speakers; the pity was that none of them was a specialist in minority issues and none of them even tried to touch minorities and their problems in their otherwise very sophisticated and intellectually stimulating speeches. The Academy simply knew nothing of any research in Poland or researchers involved and the money at the disposal had to be spent. Fortunately, repre-

sentatives of minorities were present and did protest.

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