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Articles

The Image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in Russian Political Thought (1860-1945)

Volodymyr A. Potulnytskyi

The perception of Ukraine by the Russians is important not only as a factor of the tsarist policy, but also as an element of Russian national identity. New works by Paul Bushkovitch and David Saunders specify that Russian political opinion in all political camps in the first half of the nineteenth century, for the most part, regarded Ukraine and the Ukrainians positively.¹ Interest in the Ukrainian language, literature and history was considerable, and Ukraine's contribution to common Russian or Slavic culture was generally recognized. Many Russians could even be described as Ukrainophiles, although their attitudes were predicated on the view of Ukraine as different from Russia but at the same time a complement, not a rival, to Great Russian culture and the assumption, that "Little Russian" local patriotism was perfectly compatible with loyalty to the Tsar.² Studies on the first half of the last century³ arrive at a common conclusion that about 1850 an overturn from romantic Russian "Ukrainophilism" to a complete denial of any manifestations of Ukrainian selfhood had taken place (the first features of Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood's Ukrainian national programme of 1846-1847; an argument between Pogodin and Maksymovych concerning the heritage of Kievan Rus' in 1856). The final overturn is observed after the Polish uprising in 1863, when a clearly marked anti-Ukrainian official policy was launched (Valuev circular of 1863; Ems decree of 1876).⁴

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- 1 Paul Bushkovitch, "The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3/4, 1986, pp. 355-376; David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750-1850*, Edmonton, 1986. At the same time in his vision of Ukraine in Russian culture, for example, Paul Bushkovitch was separated from the Ukrainian perspective, the structure of its reaction and self-articulation. See: Grygorii Grabowicz, *Do istorii ukrains'koï literatury*, Kyïv, 1997, pp. 111-113.
 - 2 P. Bushkovitch, "The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790-1860: The Evidence of the Journals," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Band 39, H. 3, 1991, S. 361.
 - 3 P. Bushkovitch, *Ibid.*, S. 339-363; D. Saunders, *op. cit.*; G. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Sevchenko. Polarity in the Literary Ukraine 1798-1847*, München, 1971.
 - 4 Andreas Kappeler, "The Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, 1860-1914," in: A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites (Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. 6)*, Aldershot, New York, 1992, pp. 105-131; Idem, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*, München, 1992, S. 208.

Since the 1840s and, especially, since the years of 1863-1870 the Ukrainians were discredited by the Russian state and society due to the following reasons: (a) the emergence of the Ukrainian national movement with political claims; (b) the instance of national revolutions of 1848; (c) the growth of Russian national consciousness, which usually included "Malorussians" (the Ukrainians) in the Russian nation that was being formed; (d) the uprising of the "treacherous Poles," whose image was transferred on to the Ukrainians who for centuries had lived under Polish rule. Those were the reasons that formed the principles of Russian political opinion on the Ukrainian problem.

Elucidating the image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in Russian political opinion we, in the first place, are interested in the answers to the following questions:

- (a) whether the repressive state policy towards the Ukrainians, beginning from the middle of the nineteenth century, and the anti-Ukrainian tendency in Russian political opinion were related;
- (b) whether a conception of the existence of an anti-Ukrainian tradition in Russian political opinion, having its roots in the last century and extending up to this day, may be confirmed by studying its main tendencies;
- (c) whether the problem of Ukraine in Russian political opinion was considered separately from solving the problem of Russian national identity;
- (d) whether the idea of the Ukrainians' ability to become a nation by themselves existed in Russian political opinion;
- (e) whether the similarity between general doctrines of Russian political thought and their attitudes to Ukraine really existed.

We want to try to answer all these questions on the basis of comparative analysis of the views on the Ukrainian problem by the representatives of six "generation units" within the framework of three "actual generations"⁵ of Russian political thought: conservative and liberal nationalists of the second half of the nineteenth century; conservatives and liberals of the first quarter of the twentieth century; Eurasians and Europeanists in interwar emigration. The representatives of all these trends shared accordingly in their chronological dimension a common "space-time location" (to use Karl Mannheim's term)⁶ and represented diametrically opposed viewpoints on issues concerning one generation in one country and one cultural milieu.

First generation

It was not until the times of reforms after 1855 that public opinion developed in the Russian Empire, manifesting itself by a greater number of periodicals, an increasing circulation, the appearance of a daily press, by the first corporate publications of jour-

5 See Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generation," in: *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1952, pp. 302-304

6 *Ibid.*

7 C.A. Ruud, *Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906*, Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1982, pp. 98 f, 117; S.R. Tompkins, *The Russian Intelligentsia: Makers of the Revolutionary State*, Norman, 1957, p. 69; H. Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution 1881-1917*, London, New York, 1989, p. 57 f.

nalists, by the slackening of censorship.⁷

The representatives of Russian conservative nationalism, which emerged in Russia in the 1860s-1870s⁸ and became one of the main trends in Russian political opinion, considered Ukraine in the general context of the Russian problem.⁹

Among the important representatives of Conservative Nationalism in Russia during the 1860s and 1870s, were the epigones of the original Slavophiles — Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887) and Iurii Samarin (1819-1876). M. Katkov in his views emphasized that the development of national feeling and cohesion was one of Russia's most urgent tasks.¹⁰

In his writings Katkov argued that the language of the works by Ukrainian intellectuals (Ukrainophils - V.P.)¹¹ was entirely artificial, and that, in their intention to create the Ukrainian literary and scientific language, these Ukrainian intellectuals were going the wrong way, contradicting the demands and directions of real popular culture. According to Katkov, in order to achieve this goal, one had to go the other way round, following "the writers of Chervona Rus'" (Galicia - V.P.) who, in his opinion, strove to make their literary language more like literary Russian. "The language, used by the South Russian writers in Galicia" — he writes — "is much closer to our literary language than that Malorussian (Ukrainian) dialect, in which our Ukrainian men of letters write. Everyone of us can quite easily read everything written in the South-Russian dialect; just like Russian people in Galicia quite freely and very readily read Russian books. The writers of Chervona Rus' strive mainly to bring their dialect closer to the literary one, not following the example of our Ukrainian men of letters who mimic all the shades and tones of the popular dialect."¹² In 1862 Katkov, on the one hand, printed a letter on the progress of serf emancipation in Russian Ukraine which applauded the use of the Ukrainian language in dealings between Russian officials and Ukrainian peasants; on the another hand he claimed that the language spoken in Ukraine differed less sharply from standard Russian than did certain local dialects to be found elsewhere in the Slavic part of the empire, and that such dialects nowhere competed with the

8 About conservative nationalism in Russia see: A. Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*, Oxford, 1975; Edward C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia*, Seattle, 1964; Idem, *Interpreting History: Collective Essays on Russia's Relations with Europe*, New York, 1990.

9 The term Conservative Nationalism refers to the efforts of certain nineteenth-century political and intellectual leaders in Russia and Central Europe to use nationalism as a means of developing feelings of emotional attachment to traditional values and institutions and of promoting harmony and national unity between all social classes. See: E. Thaden, *Interpreting History*, p. 203.

10 See: D. Saunders, "Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov: A Note on Petr A. Valuev's anti-Ukrainian Edict of 1863," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 3-4, 1993, pp. 365-383.

11 "Ukrainophils," a term this paper will use, is the Russian word for the members of the Ukrainian National movement.

12 *Sovremennaia Letopis'*, No. XVIII, 1861, p. 124.

general language of the people.¹³

In 1863, being under a strong impression of the Polish uprising, Katkov uses the words “separatism” and “Polish plot” speaking about the Ukrainian cultural movement. Having begun his article by emphasizing the unity of the “Russian people,” and, having registered the development of Ukrainophilism in the last two or three years, he (“all of a sudden, for some reason or other”) speaks about the current demands of Ukrainophiles and indicates here a Polish plot.¹⁴ And, in the end, addressing Kostomarov, Katkov says that he will no longer print the former’s appeals for contributions to the publishing of the popular books in the Ukrainian language. “Is it not the high time for those “Ukrainophiles” to understand that they are in a suspicious affair, and that they are the instrument of the most hostile and dark plot?”¹⁵

Katkov thought that although Ukrainians and Belarussians spoke differently from Russians, they did not possess their own languages. To him, Ukraine has never had a distinctive history, has never been a separate state; the Ukrainian people are a purely Russian people, an essential part of the Russian people, without which the Russian people cannot go on being what it is. “We love Ukraine, wrote he, — as a part of our Motherland, as a most essential part of our people, as a part of us ourselves, and therefore we hate every attempt to bring the feeling of *my* and *your* in the mutual attitudes among Russia and Ukraine... *Le patriotisme du clocher* is a very important feeling, but it must not exclude the wider type of patriotism; the interests of the motherland (*rodiny*) cannot be opposed to the interests of the patrimony (*otechestva*).¹⁶ He thought that Ukrainians and Russians were one people and Ukrainophilism was a recent construct. Under the Ukrainophiles’ demands for national autonomy for Ukraine he commented “the foundation will be based on national separatedness.”¹⁷

Later, in a further polemic on Ukrainophilism Katkov underlines the possibility of a great harm, which, in his opinion, will be done by giving an official sanction to Ukrainophil attempts to create and spread a common literary Ukrainian language. Katkov advised Kostomarov not to publish such works as “Black Council” (*Chorna Rada*) by P. Kulish: “...nobody reads them, and, when reading, nobody understands them. But the textbooks are designed for students, and the students, willy-nilly, will read them and adopt the language in which they are written, and they will be written in a language that has never existed and which will be made up intentionally for this purpose.”¹⁸ “No science, — Katkov wrote again, — has yet been expressed in Malorussian. It is necessary, therefore, to create a complete vocabulary and to develop a correct, systematic

13 See: D. Saunders, “Mikhail Katkov and Mykola Kostomarov: A note on Petr A. Valuev’s Anti-Ukrainian Edict of 1863,” pp. 370-371.

14 At the same time Katkov found the Poles’ aspirations for independence objectionable, and accepted, that Polish claims were rational, because Poland had once been an independent state and Polish was certainly a separate language. See: *Ibid.*, p. 372.

15 *Osnova*, No. XX, 1863, pp. 327-329.

16 Mikhail Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statei “Moscovskikh vedomostei” 1865 god*, M., 1897, p. 87.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 805.

18 *Osnova*, 1863, No. XX, p. 340.

speech; in a word, a new language must be created. And when, due to the unreason of society, this intentionally composed language is thrust upon the eleven million people, it (this society - V.P.) will come to its senses, it will be necessary by force to eradicate the existing and to fight the invigorating and fortifying evil. A wise, conscious, brisk society prevents evil when it is still in embryo and does not neglect rudiments (*nachatkami*), notwithstanding how small they may be.”¹⁹

Ivan Aksakov, who was one of the leading journalists of the time, also contributed significantly to the popularization of Slavophilism among educated Russians. In his endeavor to apply Slavophile ideas to Russian reality, Aksakov often distorted and vulgarized the doctrines of the original Slavophiles.²⁰

As to the Ukrainian problem, Aksakov, more fully than Katkov, expressed the same views of Russian conservative nationalists. He writes to Kostomarov that he sees no possibility for the existence of a separate Ukrainian literary language and refuses to admit any artificial attempts to break the completeness of common Russian development and to lead the Ukrainian writers away from writing in Russian. He finishes with the effective instruction that all the attempts of Ukrainophiles contradict life and history. “I do not believe in a possibility” — he writes in one of his letters — “of creating a Malorussian common literary language, except for purely popular works of art, and I do not see any possibility of that, and I do not want and I cannot want any artificial attempts to destroy the wholeness of common Russian development, the attempts to lead the Malorussian artists away from writing in the Russian language. Thank God, that Gogol’ had lived and worked before these demands appeared: we would have no “Mertvye Dushi”; you, or Kulish, would have fettered him with a tribal egoism and would have narrowed his horizon with the outlook of a single tribe! But, of course, no one of us has ever wanted or intended to stand in your way. Write as much as you please, translate Shakespeare and Schiller into the Malorussian dialect, dress Homer’s characters and Greek gods in a Malorussian free-and-easy sheepskin coat (*kozhuKh*)!”²¹

Aksakov, for objective reasons, recognizes the right of Ukrainian intellectuals to use their native language, but cannot refrain from the hint about the Greek characters and gods in a Ukrainian sheepskin coat. In comparison with Katkov, Aksakov expresses himself gently and does not deny the right of Ukrainian intellectuals to develop their native language, but, at the same time, he considers a separate Ukrainian literature unnecessary and harmful.

Aksakov’s scheme for remodelling a common Russian identity took into account two points: 1. The sacred right of Russian culture; 2. So-called obligations of Russians in their attitude to the junior brothers. He considered, that: “Its attitude to the ancient Russian districts, which are inhabited by our brothers, Malorussians, Chervonorussians, Belorussians, Russia is basing on the most undoubtful right among all the rights — moral right (*nравственное право*), or, to say correctly, the moral duties of brotherhood.”²²

19 *Ibit.*

20 See: E. Thaden, *Interpreting History*, p. 206.

21 *Sovremenniaia Letopis’*, No. XVII, 1861, pp. 124-125.

22 Ivan Aksakov, “Nashi нравственные отнoшения к Пол’ше,” *Den’*, November 18, 1861.

On the one hand he marked, that “we are standing for the full freedom of life and the development of each people.”²³ On the other hand, he wrote: “We consider Belorussians as our brothers and think that Russians of all denominations (*naimenovanii*) must compose one common unifying family.”²⁴ These “moral” duties and obligations of the Russians in their attitude to Ukrainians and Belorussians Aksakov underlines as the most important reason for the Russian empire to take part in the partitions of Poland. “If we are at fault anywhere” — conceded Aksakov — “it is perhaps in our indulgence of the ambitious pretensions of our neighbors and our sanctioning the subjection of a free Slavic people to a foreign rule. Speaking generally, Russia was less unjust in the partitioning and destruction of Poland, but being a moral power, it feels the injustice in this affair all the more heavily.”²⁵ In another place he noted: “I do not love the Poles, and have excoriated them for their pretensions to Kiev. But I cannot rail at them for their pretensions to Warsaw, Poznan and Cracow.”²⁶

“For me a *Maloross* (a Ukrainian) and a *Velikoross* (a Russian) are one: Russian” — Aksakov writes again — “and that is why, I do not presuppose any union or federation, etc. here. I am personally acquainted with all the colony of Malorussian “patriots” in St. Petersburg. They are exactly “patriots,” but not popular people. They dream about separateness and federation and feel an inclination to the Poles, but these latter are unable to make use of their benevolence and, foolishly, do not recognize Malorussia.”²⁷ Because of this, in sympathizing with the cultural striving of the Galician Ukrainians, Aksakov emphasizes their sympathy towards Russia and is very indignant at the article by Chernyshevskii on the literary-elucidative activity of the Galician Ukrainians. When Chernyshevskii published an article in *Sovremennik*, entitled “A National Tactlessness” (*natsional’naia beztaktnost’*), where he advises the Ukrainians in Galicia to hold on to their native tongue, their national individuality, Aksakov replied: “This article, abusing the Galicians in their most sensitive, spiritual strivings, condemns their desire to write in the Russian literary language, advising them to hold on to Malorussian tribal peculiarity.”²⁸ However, in a similar case, which concerns the cultural development of the Ukrainians in Russia, Aksakov puts forward a certain condition that the national basis of such developments should do no harm to cultural “All-Russian” unity. That is why Aksakov limits independent Ukrainian literature only to public education and, while saluting a publication of the Ukrainian folk legends, looks at the novel “Chorna Rada” by P. Kulish and other literary works in Ukrainian for intellectuals with animosity, because, for intellectual readers there should be only one language, i.e. Russian. There is no need, according to Aksakov, to pay attention to local linguistic peculiarities, since even the Moscow language will, probably, not be well understood, let us say, by a simple

23 I. Aksakov, “Pol’skii vopros i zapadno-russkoe delo,” in: I. Aksakov, *Sochineniia*, Vol. III, M., 1886, p. 15.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

25 I. Aksakov, Moskva, “18-go noiabria 1861 g.,” in: *Sochineniia*, Vol. III, p. 7.

26 The Letter of I. Aksakov to Countess Bludova, in: N.P. Barsukov, *Zhizn’ i trudy M.P. Pogodina*, SPb., 1905, p. 121.

27 *Sovremennaia Letopis’*, No. XVII, 1861, pp. 141.

28 *Den’*, No. XVIII, 1861, p. 133.

Riazan' or Novgorod folk. Aksakov assigns the Ukrainian language, in the limits of the popular use, a great task in the Western Russia in the struggle against Polish cultural influences. "I would advise it (*Osnova* - V.P.)" — he denotes — "to make use of the Malorussian tribal peculiarity to counteract the Polish civilizational element in the western provinces by raising the locals; exactly as in Belorussia, where a feeling of Belorussian tribal peculiarity should be awakened in the people. All this, of course, is true only for simple people and not for the society, which is armed with all the instruments of the all-Russian consciousness."²⁹

Finally Aksakov insisted that: "the Malorussian question does not exist for Malorussia in general. The Malorussian question does not exist because this question is All-Russian, popular, the question of the all Russian land... Ukraine and Belorussia is not a conqueror land, it is a part of the living body of Russia; here is not a place for the question or for the dispute."³⁰

Iurii Samarin, whose thought was more profound and politics were more liberal than Aksakov's, also contributed to the vulgarization of Slavophile and conservative-nationalistic ideas in Russia. Stressing Russian state interests rather than Slavophile idealism in writing about the nationality question, Samarin was convinced that federalism and special rights and privileges for non-Russians in the borderlands could only denationalize and weaken Russia.³¹ What about Ukraine? In 1850 Samarin noted in his diary, that the Ukrainians should remember that they had only been able to maintain their religion and identity as a people through their association with Moscow after the seventeenth century. He admitted that the Ukrainians had suffered considerably in one way or another under Moscow but emphasized that it was only through the Russian tsar that they could hope to obtain any improvement of their lot. The Ukrainian people should not forget, he concluded, that "its historical role is within the frontiers of Russia, not outside her, within the general framework of the Muscovite state."³²

In 1863 Samarin clearly stated his view of the essential task of Russian state policy in the southwest region in an article published in September of that year in the Slavophile newspaper *Den'*. Samarin's vision of a Russian supreme power (*verkhovnaia vlast'*) acting positively on the behalf of the peasant peoples in the western borderlands was clearly an ideal type that he used heuristically to determine the actual nature of official borderland policy and to reveal its shortcomings. The Russian state, according to Samarin, had the choice of following one of two conflicting principles in defining the nature of its relationship to the Ukrainians: the Russian-Orthodox principle on the one hand, or the Polish-Catholic one on the other.

His contribution to the analysis of the Polish question was to reduce it to its component parts: 1. The Polish people as a national concept; 2. The Polish state as a political concept; 3. "Polonism" as a cultural concept.³³ Samarin's vision of Polonism pro-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³⁰ I. Aksakov, "Pol'skii vopros i zapadno-russkoe delo," pp. 132-133.

³¹ E. Thaden, *Interpreting History*, p. 207.

³² Idem, *Conservative Nationalism*, p. 137.

³³ See: Iurii Samarin, "Sovremennyi ob'em Pol'skogo voprosa," in: Iu. Samarin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 1, M., 1877, pp. 319-343.

ceeded on the premise, that the “most dispassionate” Polish historians argued that Poland fell because “Polish honor could not be reconciled with the idea that the Ukrainians and White Russians were equal in rights, and because Jesuitism could not allow the Orthodox Church alongside it.”³⁴ As an example of the “new” attitude of the contemporary Poles to the Ukrainian question, Samarin cited “a small group of Poles who had recently asked the Russian government for the Province of Podoliia, despite the fact that they had been saved from peasant axes by Russian bayonets alone.”³⁵ Samarin deemed it imperative to localize the political question of Poland within the boundaries of the old Congress Kingdom, by extirpating the roots of Polonism in the western area and in the Ukraine. His suggestions ranged from removing Polish landlords from positions of local power, to the strengthening of the Orthodox clergy and the establishment of popular (*narodnye*) schools, which would consciously spread an Orthodox-Russian education among the Orthodox masses of Ukrainians and Belorussians. For Samarin Poland was the creation of a Westernized gentry, a liberal intelligentsia and a Latin clergy. It was the renegade vanguard of the Romano-Germanic world against Russia as the leader of Greco-Slavic world. He assumed, that other “nationalities” which possess a different historical past, a set of historically derived institutions and a different idea or outlook of life, such as the Germans, could never be Russian. He stressed that “people who are Germanized through and through are lost to Russia completely.”³⁶ Samarin saw the entire purpose of the Polish Catholic nation to convert the Orthodox to one true faith.³⁷ This line of thought meant “Poland is a wedge driven by *Latinstvo* into the very heart of the Slavic world with the goal of chopping it up into kindling.”³⁸

Samarin was consistent in maintaining that two forces opposed Russia: the *Latinstvo* of the Jesuits and Poles and the Germanism. By virtue of their Christian basis they could Polonize or Germanize the nationalities on the Western borderland, and once this occurred, such groups would be lost to Russia, forever. The Empire would be in the end become a sort of “Hotel Ragatz” in which every group would talk and no one would understand, in which there would be neither consensus nor collective spirit.

Samarin understood that Ukrainians were not Russians, in contradiction to Katkov and Aksakov. He recognized, that all the Slavic peoples were moving in different directions, that they did not have open-hearted, candid feelings to Russia, were looking in the eyes of western countries and always were ready to give ear to their civilizations.³⁹ Samarin understood also that Russia was a multiethnic empire ruled by a tsar whose most trusted advisers came from a narrow social stratum, an elite that consisted predominantly of Russians but included non-Russians and tended to be cosmopolitan rather than national and Russian in its basic orientation. “The interest of the Russian state and of the Russian land, — write Samarin, — are connected with the triumph of the first over the

34 *Ibid.*, p. 331.

35 *Ibid.*

36 Iu. Samarin, “Okrainy Rossii,” Vol. I, in: *Sochineniia*, Vol. VIII, M., 1890, p. 146.

37 Iu. Samarin, “Sovremennyi ob'em Pol'skogo voprosa,” p. 332.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 333.

39 B. Baron, E. Nol'de, *Iurii Samarin i ego vremia*, Paris, 1978, p. 210.

second. The Russian principle is embodied in the mass of the village population, in the common people and in the Orthodox clergy. The Polish — in the landed nobility and in the Latin clergy. On our side, i.e. on the side of the government and Russia, are the strength of numbers and the strength of the nation; against us are wealth and education, the strength of corporate organization and political usage, and the ownership of land as the foundation of social preeminence.”⁴⁰ The elite certainly had an interest in preserving within the empire a leading position for those who were organized corporately, owned land, or who had wealth or education. But the interests of this elite hardly coincided with the interests of the Russian state in a multiethnic borderland controlled socially and economically by non-autochthonous elites in the age of the national state in Europe. For the Russian state, Samarin believed, it was of central importance to bring the peasants in multinational borderlands closer to the rest of the empire, which he thought could be most effectively done by assuring the peasant’s right to land and by protecting them from arbitrary treatment at the hands of the local non-autochthonous, landowning nobility, because, “everywhere the masses (in the borderlands - V.P.) gravitate toward Russian nationality, but the false leaders of the masses (pull) in other, various directions.”⁴¹ In so doing, the government had to act firmly and consistently in pursuing policies that assured the welfare of the majority of the population in these borderlands. Samarin tried to avoid imposing the values and goals of his own social class on the peasants of the empire, Russian and non-Russian alike. He demonstrated a degree of logical rigor and breadth of knowledge not to be found in the writings of Ivan Aksakov and Mikhail Katkov.

The representatives of Russian liberalism⁴² regarded the problem of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in a somewhat different way.

The leading theorist of nineteenth century Russian liberalism was Boris Chicherin (1828-1904). He strove hard to work out a few practically possible solutions of the national question, but the concept of federalism is not to be found among them.⁴³ Chicherin’s views on the national and confessional composition of a state were as follows:

40 *Den’*, No. XXII, 1863, p. 134.

41 Iu. Samarin, “Moskva, March 18, 1867,” in: *Sochineniia*, Vol. IX, M., 1898, p. 469.

42 Liberalism, which generally is the aspiration for a lawful state, in which the state establishes and protects the personal freedom and property relations, in Russia, like in other “undeveloped” countries, is the aspiration for greater social justice, lesser expenses and preservation of the right to private property, as well as issuing laws which are common and usual for Western liberalism. About liberalism in Russia see: Sumner Benson, “The Conservative Liberalism of Boris Chicherin,” *Forschungen Östeuropäische Geschichte*, No. 21, 1975, S. 17-114; Friedrich Diestelmeier, *Soziale Angst: Konservative Reaktionen auf liberale Reformpolitik in Rußland unter Alex II (1855-1866)*, Frankfurt a. M., 1985; M. Raeff, “Some Reflections on Russian Liberalism,” *The Russian Review*, Vol. 18, July 1959, pp. 218-230; Leonard Schapiro, *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, New Haven, 1967; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*, Oxford, 1967; Hans Joachim Torke (ed.), *Die russischen Zaren, 1547-1917*, München, 1995.

43 Boris Chicherin, *O narodnom predstavitel’stve*, M., 1866, pp. 187f, 192, 396, 400fff.

the diversity of the national makeup of a state is a retarding factor for introducing and functioning of a representative system; the latter brings political freedom which in turn engenders and fortifies the centrifugal strivings of national minorities, if the cultural status of the dominant nation is not at such heights as to make advantageous coexistence of all nationalities in one political community. Under the influence of Hegel's thought, Chicherin drew a very distinctive line between the nations possessing their statehood and those being stateless, considering only the former the true makers of history. "Independent nations, — he stressed, — are the crown of mankind."⁴⁴ With regard to Russia, he saw the national question to be reduced to the three following issues: Polish, Jewish and Finnish.

He did not consider the Ukrainians as a separate people, and only as an ethnic branch of the Russian nation. But he was deeply offended that their language and cultural manifestations were persecuted.

One of the best known liberals was Konstantin Kavelin (1818-1885), a well-known Russian scholar, historian, lawyer, professor of Moscow (1844-1848) and St. Petersburg (1857-1861) Universities, also known as the founder of the so-called "theory of ancestral mode of life" (*teoriia rodovogo byta*) of the ancient Rus'. Kavelin believed that princes of the pre-Mongolian Kievan Rus' considered all lands of Rus' as a common property of their princely family of the Rurik kin. The relations between elder and younger princes were purely ancestral but not the state ones: the eldest of the kin sat in Kiev, and the rest sat at the other tables. This ancestral order began to weaken in the second half of the twelfth century. With the fall of Kiev's hegemony, the northern Vladimir-Suzdal' Rus' appeared in the forefront, which established a completely different kind of relations.⁴⁵ Especially in the second of his undermentioned works Kavelin recognizes the anthropological, ethnological and cultural-historical differences between the Ukrainians and the Great Russians, explaining them by the assimilation of the Eastern Slavic tribes, which had conquered and colonized the basin of the upper Volga and Oka, with the Finnish tribes.⁴⁶ Kavelin indicates a great affinity with the Great Russians with the Finns, and on this basis he develops his own theory. Nevertheless, he did not develop his views to the end and did not make appropriate conclusions as to the cultural-historical differences between the two main Eastern Slavic peoples: the Russians and the Ukrainians.

A broader idea of the Ukrainian problem is presented by another Russian scholar and journalist of the liberal trend Aleksandr Pypin (1833-1904). In his autobiography Pypin wrote, that he was familiar with peasant Ukrainian life from childhood. "Meanwhile my father" — he remarked — "lived for a time in the large village of Baland... populated almost entirely by Ukrainians. Ukrainian speech, costumes, practices were kept to the hilt and here for the first time... the physical and moral differences of the two branches of the Russian people struck me."⁴⁷ In the early 1850s Pypin accepted a con-

44 B. Chicherin, *Neskol'ko sovremennykh voprosov*, M., 1862, p. 33.

45 See: K. Kavelin, *Vzgliad na iuridicheskii byt drevnei Rossii*, M., 1847; Idem, *Mysli i zametki o russkoi istorii*, SPb., 1866.

46 K. Kavelin, *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. I, SPb., 1897. p. 599.

47 A.N. Pypin, *Moi zametki*, M., 1910, pp. 44-45.

cept that had underlain Kostomarov's programme for the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and that permeated his historical writing (especially his essays in *Osnova*) namely that Ukraine and Great Russia were equal partners in sharing a common Slavic heritage.

From the one side, Pypin was one of the few figures in Russian political thought willing to push the matter and take up an actual defence of Ukraine. Pypin emphasized the distinction throughout his Ukrainian essays. He attacked "the Moscow exclusiveness of the latest Slavophilism" and the "backward idealism" of the old.⁴⁸ Pypin said of Kostomarov that he "had little in common with the (Moscow - V.P.) Slavophiles, whose "narodnyi principle" was imbued with "Moscow exclusiveness."⁴⁹

Pypin condemned the attacks against Ukraine in the Russian press. Just as destructive as government measures, those attacks focused on the phenomenon of *ukrainofil'stvo*, while in the years following the Ems decree, the conservative Russian press increasingly denounced Ukrainian separatism, labelling it *ukrainofil'stvo*. Pypin insisted that *ukrainofil'stvo* was a feeling to which the Ukrainians were perfectly entitled. *Ukrainofil'stvo*, "an awkward, bookish term," was simply "the healthy feeling of a people for their homeland."⁵⁰ This "simple feeling of attachment to one's homeland" was "a natural human feeling" and "constituted the basis of *ukrainofil'stvo*."⁵¹ Pypin argued that love for one's region is "naturally joined to love for the fatherland."⁵² When in 1863 Katkov wrote, that the word *ukrainofil'stvo* meant nothing less than "a Polish intrigue" to cause Ukraine to break away from Russia, Pypin answered, that "the self-professed patriots who... made the famous discovery that *ukrainofil'stvo*... was a weapon of 'Polish intrigues' ... how could there occur this unbelievable discovery?... when all the heroes of Ukrainian poetry and history are the enemies of Poland."⁵³ Pypin, an acknowledged expert on Polish culture, called the accusations "a vulgar absurdity."⁵⁴

Pypin questioned the assertion that language is a valid test of who is and who is not Russian. He therefore attacked the justification that all Russians "must be restored to the borders of old Rus'." In his opinion, the Eastern and Western branches lived apart for so long and had been subjected to such diverse pressures, that they could no longer be considered truly Russian. He noted that in the language of the seventeenth century Russia, the Little Russians of the South were called the Cherkassian nation, and the White Russians of the West were called the Lithuanian peoples.⁵⁵

From the other side, many of Pypin's arguments were purely Russian ones. He thought that the contributors of the journal *Osnova* deserved the right to their own

48 A.N. Pypin, "Malorusskaia etnografiia poslednykh dvadtsati piati let," *Vestnik Evropy*, No. 1, 1886, p. 337.

49 A.N. Pypin, "Obzor malorusskoi etnografii," *Vestnik Evropy*, No. 10, 1885, p. 799.

50 A.N. Pypin, "Volga i Kiev," *Vestnik Evropy*, No. 7, 1885, p. 213.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 206.

52 *Ibid.*

53 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 211.

55 A.N. Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi etnografii*, Vol. IV, SPb., 1912, p. 12.

journal because they had done so much for Russian culture. The great collectors of Ukrainian poetry like Kostomarov, Kulish, Sreznevskyi and Maksymovych had gathered “numerous poetical works of unusual beauty that... had excited Pushkin and... inspired Gogol.”⁵⁶ Pypin wrote, that the loss of ethnographer Chubynskyi, “whose work occupies first place in the history of... Ukrainian ethnography” was “a great loss for all Russian ethnographic science.”⁵⁷

The suppression of the Ukrainian language, Pypin argued, was the most harmful policy of all because of the profound debt that Russian culture owed that language in one form or another. He cited numerous instances. For example, without “ancient Kievan writing (*pis'mennost'*)”... Russian literature is unthinkable, both southern and northern.”⁵⁸ In the seventeenth century when Moscow needed scholarly forces for purifying the church, for the conduct of schools, for the decorum of the Tsar's court, scholars came from the Kievan Academy of Petro Mohyla.⁵⁹ Mohyla's classical philologists represented “the first firmly grounded Russian scholarship” which was “a fully southern Russian cause.”⁶⁰

One of the themes that underlay all of Pypin's Ukrainian essays was the conviction that the “southern Russian people are (themselves - V.P.) a Russian people.”⁶¹ And again, “the southern Russian people (*narodnost'*) are mostly Russian,”⁶² “one common root of ethnicity” existed for both peoples.⁶³ Pypin thought, that in order to know themselves, Russians had to know more than the history of state politics; they needed to know the history of all the Russian peoples, which also included the history of Ukrainians. Because of that fact, the fulfillment of Russian self-consciousness (*samosoznanie*) or self-knowledge depended on knowledge of Ukrainian culture. “The unfamiliarity of our great writers with Kiev and in general southern Russian life closed for Russian literature a whole side of Russian nature and peasant life. If we ignore them “our so-called *samosoznanie* will remain an empty phrase.”⁶⁴ In even stronger terms Pypin reiterated that without knowledge of the people who “populate the Russian land from Poland to the Caucasus, all talk about national distinctiveness will be empty nonsense.”⁶⁵ In this conclusions Pypin show that he had found his own point of view, a thoroughly Russian perspective, from which to defend and research Ukraine.

Second generation

At the turn of the century the Russian liberal opposition was enforcing its ideas of

56 A.N. Pypin, “Obzor,” *Vestnik Evropy*, No. 12, 1885, p. 805.

57 A.N. Pypin, “Malorusskaia etnografiia,” *Vestnik Evropy*, No. 1, 1886, p. 316.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 334.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 336.

60 A.N. Pypin, “Volga i Kiev,” p. 204.

61 A.N. Pypin, “Malorusskaia etnografiia,” p. 344.

62 A.N. Pypin, “Volga i Kiev,” p. 203.

63 A.N. Pypin, “Malorusskaia etnografiia,” p. 334.

64 A.N. Pypin, “Volga i Kiev,” p. 215.

65 A.N. Pypin, “Malorusskaia etnografiia,” p. 334.

individual liberty and the ways of limiting the dominant role of tsar and the state. The opposition was doing it at first through *zemstvos* and *dumas* and then through different professional organizations. In the autumn of 1905 the first congresses of legal liberal parties were taking place, and in April 1906 Russia became a constitutional monarchy.

The two foremost theorists of the twentieth-century Russian liberalism were Pavel Miliukov (1859-1943) and Petr Struve (1870-1944). In his first scholarly works Miliukov tried to underline the difference between Kievan period of Russian history from the Moscow one. Three major premises connect the vision of Russian history by Miliukov in his early historical works: the changeability of Russia throughout its existence, due to its own internal dynamic; in decided contrast to this, the external nature of the formative influences on the state order, culture and national ideas; and the fact of the imposition of borrowed culture from above. Also of great importance was the decision to exclude Kievan history from the history of state order and of national ideas, since "in the north-east there were entirely different conditions of historical development than in the south."⁶⁶ At the same time this statement represents a retreat from his bolder assertion, in the lecture course, that "The ancient Kievan period of our history is separated from more recent times not only chronologically, but actually."⁶⁷ At that time Miliukov considered that existed some separateness in ethnogenesis reached by Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians as early as the fourteenth century, because feudalism affected only the southwestern part of the country, adjacent to Poland and Lithuania, with which Russia had close contacts.

In his political activity, in contrary to his earlier historical views, Miliukov, particularly on the nationality questions, was found under the influence of preconceived ideas of state structure, which were deeply embedded in him. Therefore he was largely inclined toward unitary and unionist tendencies in the solution of the nationality problem and left partly without attention the existing historical preconditions as well as the movements of national feeling. During his political activity from 1905 till 1914 Miliukov did not touch directly the Ukrainian question.⁶⁸ Only on the very eve of the war he was quite active in supporting certain aspirations of the Ukrainians. During the famous "Shevchenko debate" in the Russian Duma (February-March, 1914), which continued for several sessions, Miliukov attacked the nationalistic Russian speakers in Kiev, whose attitude towards the Ukrainian question was, in his opinion, unusually injurious to the interests of Russia, and also the attempt, on the part of the Count Kapnists, to show that the Ukrainian movement should be considered as not a popular movement. "In reality, — said he, — we have here to do with a national movement the object of which is

66 Pavel Miliukov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury*, Vol. I, SPb., 1896, p. 17.

67 P. Miliukov, *Lektsii po "Vvedeniuiu v kurs russkoi istorii,"* Pt. I, M., 1894-1895, p. 17.

68 For example, during the zemstvist-Polish conference of April, 1905, particularly in respect to the question of autonomy for the Kingdom of Poland, Miliukov marked, that in those regions, where the Poles comprise one of the nationalities, namely, in Lithuania and Ukraine, it is "necessary to postpone a more detailed definition of the boundaries and content of Polish autonomy until a thorough investigation of the question." See: *Russkie vedomosti*, No. 98, April 11, 1905, p. 3.

autonomy, the rebuilding of Russia on federalistic lines.”⁶⁹

Before delivering his speech Miliukov had made a special trip to Kiev and gone over the whole Ukrainian problem with a group of Ukrainian progressivists. He left convinced that he had persuaded them to give up not only demands for a separate state, but also demands for a Russian federation, and to be satisfied with cultural autonomy.⁷⁰ “You can clearly understand the significance of this fact, — Miliukov continued, — only when you realize what a dangerous undertaking it is for a Ukrainian village to manifest its national character. The mere obtaining of a Ukrainian newspaper is construed as a manifestation of a treacherous disposition. In spite of this Ukrainian books find their way readily to the villagers while Russian books are rejected... The (Ukrainian - V.P.) movement exists and you can neither suppress it nor alter its significance; the sole question is whether you wish to see this movement as inimical or friendly. That will depend upon whether the movement will regard you as friends or enemies.”⁷¹ Miliukov told Duma that the real separatists were the Russian nationalists, who were denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and literature and encouraging governmental persecution. It was they who had forced the Ukrainian movement to establish its center in Austrian Galicia, where the development of Ukrainian separatism was possible.”⁷² “Shall I mention” — Miliukov wrote again — “those numerous people’s educational societies which were established almost without any support from the educated classes and are now mercilessly persecuted; shall I point out the interest in the Ukrainian theater which manifests itself plainly when in February, in weather of unusual severity, the peasants march 45 *versts* to see a Ukrainian play? All sides of life are penetrated by the national element. The Russian army, the Russian school, the Russian authorities create a national reaction and inflame the national feeling of the Ukrainians. At the same time, the Ukrainian movement is thoroughly democratic; it is, so to say, carried on by the people itself. For this reason it is impossible to crush it. But it is very easy to set it on fire and in this way direct it against ourselves, and our authorities are successful in their work in this direction.”⁷³ Miliukov stated, in particular, that the Ukrainian movement, being profoundly democratic in its contents, is no longer a priority of intellectuals alone, but is carried out by the people itself. That is why, it is impossible to stop, but to turn it against the Russian state, by taking away the last hope for any improvement of its situation within the imperial complex, is very easy. Addressing the parliamentary majority, Miliukov warned that, in case of the continuation of such a policy, separatists in Ukraine would be counted not in individuals or dozens, but in

69 *Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Chetvertyi sozyv, Stenographicheskie otchety, 1914, Sesiia II, Part 2, SPb., 1914, p. 915.*

70 C. Jay Smith, Jr., “Miliukov and the Russian National Question,” *Harvard Slavic Studies*, Vol. IV, Cambridge, Mass, 1957, p. 405.

71 *Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Chetvertyi sozyv, Stenographicheskie otchety, 1914, Sesiia II, Part 2, pp. 915-916.*

72 P. Miliukov, *Vospominaniia, 1859-1917*, Vol. II, New York 1955, pp. 167-168.

73 *Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Chetvertyi sozyv, Stenographicheskie otchety, 1914, Sesiia II, Part 2, pp. 915-916.*

hundreds, thousands or millions.⁷⁴

In May 1917, Miliukov, explaining the Kadet's party programme⁷⁵ in the sphere of regional reform connected with the national strivings of the peoples of the empire, expressed confidence in the party's ability to find such a decision which, while giving separate areas in Russia the possibility to create regional autonomy based on local laws, at the same time would not ruin the state unity of Russia. Preserving the integrity of the imperial state complex, stressed Miliukov, "is that limit which determines the party's last decision. Decomposition of the state into sovereign independent units is regarded by it as completely impossible."⁷⁶

Finally, Miliukov protested against the oppression of the Little Russians in a way that showed the danger of the Ukrainian movement to the entirety of the Russian empire. Even in 1918, contrary to his new pro-German orientation, regarding the Ukrainian question, Miliukov remained in the same position. The main task of the Volunteer Army and the Allied intervention, as Miliukov interpreted it, was the "occupation of the Russian South and the elimination of all remnants of Ukrainian nationalism."⁷⁷ "Our first task" — he explained — "is to oppose disintegration in principle, and to put an end to it."⁷⁸

The famous Russian "liberal on the right" (former "liberal on the left") Petr Struve (1870-1944) in his perception of the Ukrainian problem thought that as a nation Russia was still in *statu nascendi*. Unlike Austria-Hungary, which Struve classified as a "multi-national empire," Russia should be viewed as a "genuine national empire," because it had the potential to assimilate non Russian cultures. "National unity" was to be achieved not ethnically (as in Austria-Hungary), but culturally.

Richard Pipes characterized Peter Struve's attitude toward Ukraine thus: "The Ukraine was always Struve's blind spot. He would readily acknowledge the legitimacy of Polish and Finnish national aspirations, and he was prepared to grant extensive internal autonomy to both these nationalities... He also abhorred the disabilities imposed by Imperial Russia on its Jewish population. But he stubbornly refused to recognize not only the existence of a Ukrainian... nationality with a claim to political self-determination, but even the very existence of a distinct Ukrainian culture..."⁷⁹

74 *Ibid.*, p. 915.

75 Some observations of the attitude of the Kadet's party toward the Ukrainian question can be found in: S. Breiar, "Ukraina, Rossiia i kadety," in: *In memorial: Istoricheskii sbornik*, M.-SPb., 1995; Idem, "Partiia kadetov i ukrainskii vopros (1905-1917)," in: *Issledovaniia po istorii Ukrainy i Belorussii*, Vyp. 1, M., 1995; Irina Michutina, "Ukrainskii vopros i russkie politicheskie partii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny," in: A.I. Miller, V.F. Reprintsev, B.N. Floria (eds.), *Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*, M., 1997, pp. 197-208.

76 *Rech'*, May 10, 1917, p. 2.

77 P. Miliukov, "Dnevnik," October 13, 1918, p. 220, in: Columbia University Russian Archives.

78 *Ibid.*, November 18, 1918, pp. 295-299.

79 Richard Pipes, "Peter Struve and Ukrainian Nationalism," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. III-IV, Part II, 1979-1980, p. 675.

Already in March, 1905 in the debates on the program, adopted by the third congress of the Union of Liberation, Struve marked that Poland had to be granted the same status as Finland, and such a status was completely inapplicable to such regions of Russia as the Transcaucasus, Lithuania and Little Russia.⁸⁰ As a result of this, he concluded, the point of the program on regional self-government had either given too little to Poland or had gone too far in respect to the other regions of the country besides Finland and Poland.⁸¹

The clue to this uncompromising position is revealed by what Struve said in 1911: "Should the intelligentsia's 'Ukrainian' idea... strike the national soil and set it on fire... (the result will be) a gigantic and *unprecedented* schism of the Russian nation, which, such is my deepest conviction, will result in a veritable disaster for the state and for the people. All our 'borderland' problems will pale into mere bagatelles compared to such a prospect of bifurcation and — should the 'Belorussians' follow the 'Ukrainians' — the 'trifurcation' of Russian culture."⁸²

At the beginning of 1911 Struve initiated a discussion of the nationality question by inviting a number of non-Russians to present their views. These problems were discussed in a series of articles in the journal of Russian liberal thought *Russkaia mysl'*. In the first series of articles Struve began the discussion by calling attention to the fact that the Russians constituted 43 percent of the population of the empire, and that while this was a respectable figure, he argued, no other nationality in the empire possessed a national culture in the true sense of the word: One can partake in the local cultural life of Warsaw and Helsingfors without the knowledge of the Russian language, but without a mastery of Russian, one cannot partake (in the cultural life - V.P.) of Kiev...⁸³ Furthermore, none of the nationalities, according to Struve, possessed the potential for further development without the support of Russian culture. Accepting this support and depending upon it, the alien cultures were voluntarily subjugating themselves to Russian hegemony. "Among the alien people" — noted Struve — "Russian culture reigns supreme, not solely because of the physical superiority and numerical predominance of Russians. This hegemony rightfully belongs to Russia because of her spiritual power and wealth."⁸⁴ Of course, Struve was willing to agree that the inferior local cultures, theoretically at least, could develop and even eventually reach a high level of Russian cultural development, but to him this endeavor of creating a "multitude of cultures" in Russia would absorb too many valuable human resources, which could be utilized for the enrichment of culture in general.

Concerning the Ukrainian question in particular Struve made no attempt to ascribe its emergence to a foreign intrigue or to the restrictive policies of the tsarist re-

80 Petr Struve, "K programme Soiuzu Osvobozhdeniia," *Osvobozhdenie*, No. 69 / 70, May 7 / 20, 1905, p. 307.

81 *Ibid.*

82 Quoted in R. Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Right, 1905-1944*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 211-212.

83 P. Struve, "Chto takoe Rossiia?," *Russkaia mysl'*, No. XXXII, January 1911, p. 185.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 187.

gime. Neither did he try to minimize its significance. The success of the struggle for the preservation and development of Ukrainian culture, which so far had been exclusively the concern of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, hinged, in Struve's opinion, on whether the movement would be joined by the Ukrainian population in general. Struve was confident that this would not happen, in view of the fact that the socio-economic forces operating in twentieth century Russia — such as industrialization, urbanization, the institution of universal conscription, mass education and mass media — were rapidly drawing the Ukrainian public into the realm of Russian culture.

"I am convinced" — stressed Struve — "that beside the Russian civilization and language the Little Russian is only a provincial branch. The position of the latter is conceivable only as a derivation from the former; a change in the *status quo* is possible only in this matter through a disruption of the political and social body of Russia."⁸⁵ Precisely because the members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were aware of this fact, Struve continued, they were desperately trying to preserve local particularism. It was primarily due to this consciousness among the Ukrainian intelligentsia that the Ukrainian culture was consigned to extinction that, Struve thought, provided the impetus for the intensity of the Ukrainian cultural revival at the turn of the century. He called for a merciless ideological struggle against Ukrainianhood. "Russian progressive public opinion, — insisted Struve, — must enter into an ideological struggle against 'Ukrainianhood' without any ambiguity and indulgence as against a tendency to weaken and even abolish a great acquisition of our history — an All-Russian Culture."⁸⁶

In spite of his confidence that the socio-economic forces in Russia were operating in favor of assimilating the nationalities, Struve cautiously pointed out that the unity of the Russian empire would be in danger if local cultures were given an opportunity to evolve into a higher stage of development. Therefore, he most emphatically insisted that Russian must remain the language of instruction in high schools and universities and even in elementary education, unless, for pedagogical considerations, local languages were considered indispensable for the education of the children. By Struve, only one high and dominant Russian culture was to be permitted in the empire, with the Russian language elevated to the status of the *koine*, comparable to the Ancient Greek *koine* and German *Hochdeutsch*. For the Ukrainians, Struve foresaw a modest regional development, a phenomenon whose culture was to be confined largely to elementary education and patois literature. The Ukrainian population of the West Ukrainian lands (Galicia, Bukovina and Trans-Carpathia), according to Struve and the other Russian liberals, belonged to the ethnographic massif of the Russian nationality.⁸⁷

The another well known Russian liberal and member of the Kadet party, the first President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Vladimir Vernadskii (1863-1945) as the basis of his political views considered the notion of Russianness (*Russkosti*) — a certain supranational phenomenon of the common to all of the people's value, which is

85 P. Struve "Obshcherusskaia kul'tura i ukrainskii partikuliarizm: otvet ukrainstvu," *Russkaia mysl'*, No. XXXIII, January 1912, p. 65.

86 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

87 P. Struve, "Velikaia Rosiia i Sviataia Rus'," *Russkaia mysl'*, No. XII, 1914, p. 178.

higher than simply national consciousness. Vernadskii wrote, that the role of world powers must be played by the so-called “big” peoples (Russians, Germans, Frenchmen), but the “small” peoples (Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians) must enslave themselves from the “accumulations (*nanosy*), which is calling out by the desires to obtain the world significance.”⁸⁸ Vernadskii, as his intellectual predecessors, the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles, dreamed about the unification of all the Slavs under the guidance of Russia. Being Ukrainian by origin, he named himself as a “Russian man” (*ruskii chelovek*) and differentiated among the three, in his opinion, very different notions: Ukrainian, Great-Russian (*velikoross*) and “Russian” (*ruskii*). “It seems to me” — he wrote — “that every educated person must make a difference and clearly distinguish among Russian, Ukrainian and Great-Russian.” And further: “Russian and Great-Russian — that is the different meanings, and all the people know and feel this difference.”⁸⁹ His indication “*Ruskii*” means Russian person, that is identifying himself personally not by ethnic origin, but by political choice, by the belonging to the state. Such Russians were Theofan Prokopovich, Bezborodko, Gogol, Dostoevskii, Chaikovskii, Glinka, Vernadskii himself and very many others. To him, the Ukrainians were “Germanophiles,” the desires to unite with Galicia — “*avstrofil'stvo*,” Ukrainian literary language — artificial dialect (*shtuchnoe iazychie*), the wish to have a cultural equality-narrow chauvinism, national aspirations — primitive nationalism. From this point of view Vernadskii evaluated the policy of Germany and France in attitude to Ukrainian question.⁹⁰

In his polemics with Hrushevs'kyi⁹¹ on the subject of the necessity to create Ukrainian Academy of Science in Ukraine in 1918, Vladimir Vernadskii perceived the point of view, that Russian scholars on the territory of Ukraine, when working for the Ukrainian culture, will be working at the same time for the true and authentic development (*pravil'no-go razvitiia*) of the Russian culture.⁹² He underlined the possibility for the Ukrainian language and culture to grow and obtain equality during the time span of the equal, not antagonistic development of both cultures in Ukraine.⁹³

The Russian conservative nationalists of that time, whose views were represented, especially in 1905-1917 by so-called Right Parties,⁹⁴ always drew a sharp distinction between the “Mazepists,” i.e. the Ukrainian intellectuals, and the Ukrainian masses,

88 Vladimir Vernadskii, *Dnevniky 1917-1921*, October 1917 - January 1920, Kiev, 1994, p. 158.

89 *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 103.

90 *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 159.

91 About Hrushevs'kyi's views on the subject see: V. Potul'nyts'kyi, “M. Hrushevs'kyi iak sotsiolog,” *Visnyk Kyivs'koho Universytetu, Istorychni i filologichni nauky*, No. 1, 1991, pp. 1-19; Idem, “Naukova diial'nist' M. Hrushevs'koho v emigratsii (1919-1924),” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 2, 1992, pp. 48-58; Idem, *Narysy z ukrains'koï politologii (1819-1991)*, Kyiv, 1994, pp. 82-101, 116-130; Idem, “Das ukrainische historische Denken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Konzeptionen und Periodisierung,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Band 45, H. 1, 1997, S. 2-30.

92 V. Vernadskii, “O M.S. Hrushevskom: Iz dnevnika Vernadskogo 1934 goda,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 4, 1997, p. 202.

93 *Ibid.*

considering the latter to be essentially loyal constituents of the All-Russian nation. The members of the national monarchist organization — the Union of the Russian people considered that when a state does exist, it is to be identified with its dominant nationality. The members of the Union perceived the point of view, that England by its very name indicated that it was the state of the English people. Likewise, Russia was the state of the Russian people, and it was “Russian” everywhere within its political boundaries. “Russia for Russians” made sense, — were said in the words of a *Russkoe Znamia* editorial, — “not just for the indigenous land of Rus’, but for the entire Russian empire, including all the territory of its allied peoples,” that is, all those minority nationalities that had been incorporated within the borders of the Russian state. The Russians should predominate over all other nationalities in the empire.⁹⁵ Since the Poles did not have a state, it was meaningless for them to say, “Poland for Poles.” In regard to the Ukrainians and Belorussians they affirmed that both of these peoples were actually Russian, and accepted them as such without criticism.”⁹⁶ The member of the Chief Council of the Union of the Russian People and the founder of the Union of the Archangel Michael, Vladimir Purishkevich (1870-1920) taking part in the above mentioned “Shevchenko debate” in the Fourth Duma in 1914, expressed the attitude of Russian conservative nationalists. The essence of his speech was that in the current conditions the Duma had no moral right to give a permission for the poet’s commemoration, because the Ukrainians would, for certain, use the opportunity to form a political movement and would develop ideas, utopian from the All-Russian point of view. For this reason, any attempt to encourage the commemoration of Shevchenko, who “was, in the eyes of the Russian intelligentsia a foreteller of some special theses, a poet, who was a bearer of ideals that have nothing in common with Russian state ideals, for me, a Russian, for our faction, are completely unacceptable.”⁹⁷ Another representative of Russian monarchist circles, the leader of the state Council and former Minister of the Interior in Witte’s cabinet, Petr Durnovo (1844-1915) expressed his attitude to the Ukrainian problem in his opposition to the prospect of an anti-German and anti-Austrian war. In his memorandum to

94 About the Russian Right Parties in 1905-1917 see: R. Edelman, “The Russian Nationalist Party and the Political Crisis of 1909,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 34, 1975, pp. 22-54; Caspar Ferenczi, “Nationalismus und Neoslavismus in Rußland vor dem ersten Weltkrieg,” *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, No. 34, 1984, S. 7-127; H. Jablonowski, “Die russischen Rechtsparteien 1905-1917,” in: *Rußland-Studien: Gedenkschrift für Otto Hoetzsch*, Stuttgart, 1957, S. 43-55; H.-D. Löwe, “Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik als Integrationsstrategie im zaristischen Rußland,” A. Kappeler (ed.), *Die Russen: Ihr Nationbewußtsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Köln, 1990, S. 55-79; H. Rogger, “Russia,” in: H. Rogger and E. Weber (eds.), *The European Right: A Historical Profile*, Berkeley 1965, pp. 443-500; Idem, “The Formation of the Russian Right, 1900-1906,” *California Slavic Studies*, No. III, 1964, pp. 66-94; Idem, “Was there a Russian Fascism? The Union of Russian People,” *The Journal of Modern History*, No. XXXVI, 1964, pp. 398-415.

95 *Russkoe Znamia*, January 28, 1906, pp. 1-2.

96 *Ibid.*

97 *Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Chetvertyi sozyv, Stenographicheskie otchety, 1914, Sesiia II, Part 2*, p. 729.

Nikolai II, he provided a penetrating insight into the international aspect of the nationalities problem.⁹⁸ Pointing out that Ukrainian, Polish, Armenian and other minorities weakened Russia's positions vis-a-vis the Central Powers, and opposed the annexation of Eastern Galicia as a Russian foreign policy aim (1912-1914) and Russia's principal war aim (Sept. 1914), Durnovo insisted: "It is obviously disadvantageous to us to annex, in the interests of national sentimentalism, a territory that has lost every vital connection with our fatherland. For together with a negligible handful of Galicians, Russian in spirit, how many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainized Uniates we would receive! The so-called Ukrainian, or Mazeppist, movement is not a menace to us at present, but we should not enable it to expand by increasing the number of turbulent Ukrainian elements, for in this movement there undoubtedly lies the seed of an extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism which, under favorable conditions, may assume quite unexpected proportions."⁹⁹

Within the broad spectrum of Russian conservative nationalists there also existed the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists — a political and cultural organization established in Ukraine in 1908 to promote Russian national consciousness in the western borderlands and to defend Russian interests against Polish pressure and Ukrainophilism. The club attempted to raise public awareness concerning the dangers of the Ukrainian movement, which it viewed as a Polish-Austrian-German-Jewish intrigue. Russian conservative political leader and leading member of the Kiev Club Vasilii Shul'gin (1878-1976) named the Ukrainian national movement as a part of a Jewish-Masonic intrigue (*zhido-masonskii zagovor*) and in his general perception of the national question envisaged Russia divided into autonomous regions with boundaries determined not on the nationality principle but on economic, geographical and other factors.¹⁰⁰ In 1907 Shul'gin's definition of Ukrainians was next: "By nationality they (Ukrainian peasants) were Russian, or as they were called then, Little Russians, now called Ukrainians."¹⁰¹ In 1915 his views on Ukrainians obtained a certain evolution and he began to differentiate among southern Russians (Ukrainians - V.P.) and simply Russians. "For us, southern Russia, — indicated Shul'gin, — in other words, Kiev, is what Moscow is to you Russians, the motherland."¹⁰² In 1917 he remarked, that the real Ukrainian (*nastoiashchii khokhol*) is very cunning, and found even a trend among "Ukrainians" to be unbelievers, socialists and robbers.¹⁰³

98 "Zapiska Durnovo," *Krasnaia Nov'*, Vol. VI, M., 1922, pp. 182-189. See transl. in: Frank Golder (ed.), *Documents of Russian History: 1914-1917*, New York-London, 1927, pp. 10-16.

99 *Documents of Russian History*, p. 12.

100 See more widely: A. Storozhenko, *Proiskhozhdenie i sushchnost' Ukrainofil'stva*, Kiev, 1912; R. Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907-1977*, New Brunswick, 1980.

101 Vasilii Shul'gin, *The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 1906-1917*, New York, 1984, p. 21.

102 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

103 Vasilii Shul'gin, *Dni*, L., 1926, pp. 151, 156.

Another active member of the Kiev Club and its founder Anatolii Savenko perceived the Ukrainian movement as “Austrian intrigue.” He explained: “Everybody knows that Ukrainian separatism arose and fortified itself in Galicia... How can we fight Ukrainophilism within the borders of the Rus’ State if we do nothing about the movement in Subjugated Rus’, Rus’ *irredenta*.”¹⁰⁴ The other organization of conservative nationalists — the St. Petersburg Galician-Russian Society (*Galitsko-russkoe blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo*, est. 1902) considered as its main purpose to provide moral and material support to Russians in Galicia, combat the Ukrainian movement in Austro-Hungary and to do everything for the active promotion of an irredentist Russian movement in Austro-Hungary. The founder of the Galician-Russian Society Anton Budilovich fought against official recognition of the very idea of a separate Ukrainian language and people: “This theory” — he wrote — “has greater significance than all the teaching about the autonomy of the borderlands or federalism and its relations to the center because it attempts to split the very nucleus of the Russian state...”¹⁰⁵

In 1918 Shul’gin and Savenko again presented their views on the Ukrainian question in a declaration by which they declined to accept Ukrainian citizenship. In the declaration addressed to Skoropads’kyi’s government, Shul’gin categorically refused to recognize any historical, ethnic, socio-economic and political basis for the existence of a separate Ukrainian state: “...the establishment not only of a Ukrainian but also a separate South-Russian state, so to speak forever, does not have any foundation whatsoever... We should not forget that the Russian people as a whole achieved their real independence and security only after the unification of the Great Russian and Little Russian people. And no matter what the plans and intentions of our neighboring states are, the north and the south of Russia, artificially separated by a Chinese wall of the twentieth century, will instinctively strive toward unification, and in the end will unite. But the struggle for the unification of the Russian people will lead to new bloody clashes, new tremors of war. Whoever does not wish to contribute to innumerable new hardships, equally onerous for the south and the north, should not participate in the formation of the Ukrainian state.”¹⁰⁶ At that time Shul’gin argued, that it is possible to solve the Ukrainian question by the division of the Ukrainian territory into “approximately three autonomous regions: New Russia with Odessa as its center, Little Russia with Kiev as its center; and a Khar’kov region with Khar’kov as its center.”¹⁰⁷ The official language was to be Russian, the government officials were to use the Russian language only, others could speak “even Chinese if they so desired.”¹⁰⁸ After the civil war, Shul’gin as an

104 A. Savenko, “Zametki,” *Kievlianin*, March 13, 1910.

105 *O edinstve russkogo naroda*, SPb., 1907, p. 38.

106 V. Shul’gin, A. Savenko, “Is it possible to recognize the Ukrainian State? (Motives for rejecting Ukrainian citizenship by V.V. Shul’gin and A.I. Savenko),” in: Statni ustredni archiv v Praze, Ukrajinsky museum, 13, 349, 1, pp. 14-17.

107 Letter by Shul’gin to an unknown addressee to Omsk, February 15, 1919, Wrangel Military Archives, Hoover Institution Archives, File 132. Quoted in: Anna Procyk, “Nationality Policy of the White Movement: Relations Between the Volunteer Army and the Ukraine,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1973, p. 110.

108 *Ibid.*

émigré, continued to polemicize both with Ukrainians and the Jews.¹⁰⁹

Third generation

While the leaders of Russian Provisional Government and White movement, as mentioned above, in the short time of war and revolution simply rejected the existence of separate Ukrainian states in 1917-1920,¹¹⁰ and to a considerable extent repeated the prewar liberal and conservative considerations of Ukraine, the Russian political thought on emigration again demonstrated a new degree of the scholarly and theoretical attitude toward the Ukrainian question.

The Ukrainian problem was very widely envisaged in the studies of the representatives of a well-known trend in Russian political thought — *evraziistvo*.¹¹¹

The territory of Russia — the USSR — Eurasians perceived as a special historical and geographical world belonging neither to Europe nor to Asia, as peculiar historical and geographical individuality.¹¹²

According to one of the founders of *evraziistvo*, the son of Vladimir Vernadskii — Georgii Vernadskii (1897-1972), the total Slavic population of Eastern Europe was largely

109 He ridiculed the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution and published books and articles grossly anti-cemitic and Ukrainophobic in character. See: V. Shul'gin, *Ukrainstvuiushche i my*, Belgrade, 1935; Idem, *Chto nam v nikh ne nraivitsia*, Paris, 1929; Idem, *Le plus grand mensonge du XXe siecle: L' Ukraine*, Paris, 1939.

110 See more widely: Wolodymyr Stoiko, "The Attitude of the Russian Provisional Government Towards the Non-Russian Peoples of the Empire," Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1969; A. Procyk, op. cit.; Ia. Zamoiskii, "Otnoshenie 'beloi' russkoi emigratsii k ukrainskim voprosam," *Slavianovedenie*, No. 4, 1993, pp. 39-49; Ia. A. Slashchov-Krymskii, *Belyi Krym 1920: Memuary i dokumenty*, M., 1990, pp. 185-205.

111 A definition of *evraziistvo* as a world of ideas which were formed in the Russian emigration of the twentieth into a system known under the name of *evraziistvo* was made by prince Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938). "A national substrate of that country which earlier was called the Russian Empire and now is called the USSR — he wrote in 1927, — should necessarily include all the totality of the peoples inhabiting this country which is regarded as a specific multinational nation and, as such, possessing a specific kind of nationalism. We call this nation Eurasian, its territory — *Evrasia*, its nationalism — *evraziistvo*. See: *Evraziiskaia khronika*, No. 7, Paris, 1927, p. 64.

112 The Eurasians' main ideas were: 1. A selfhood of the Eurasian culture, the foundation of which is the Great Russian culture; 2. The domination of ideology, the foundation of which is Orthodoxy and domination of culture which expresses the nationwide interests; 3. Russian destiny is defined by its geostrategic location and self-ascribed role of a bridge between Europe and Asia. About *evraziistvo* see: M. Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration. 1919-1939*, New York-Oxford, 1990; *Rossia mezdu Evropoi i Aziei: evraziiskii soblazn*, M., 1993; L.N. Gumilev, *Ritmy Evrazii*, M., 1993; L.E. Gorizontov, "Evraziistvo. 1921-1931: vzgliad iznutri," *Slavianovedenie*, No. 4, 1992, pp. 86-105; V.T. Pashuto, *Russkie istoriki emigranty v Evrope*, M., 1992; V.A. D'iakov, "O nauchnom soderzhanii i politicheskikh interpretatsiakh istoriosofii evraziistva," *Slavianovedenie*, No. 5, 1993, pp. 101-116.

inclined toward unification and making a united Russian people, which would build a united country. Vernadskii gives a general history of the Eastern European population, i.e. Slavs and their neighbours.¹¹³ As to the Russian history, he stands on the positions of the old historiography: be it Kiev or Novgorod, Smolensk or Moscow — they are “Russian” towns. “The division of the Russian people into three branches: the Great Russians, the Malorussians and the Belorussians” — he writes — “goes back to a much later period. Until the thirteenth century there was no, more or less, distinct branching.”¹¹⁴ To Vernadskii, the understanding by a people of its “place — development” (*mestorazvitiia*) leads to the establishment of its organic conception of the world. The historical world outlook of the Russian people (or its ruling classes) is far from being always connected with its perception of the “place — development.”¹¹⁵ In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, in place of the All-Russian federation, all the members of which used the same constitution, we find a sharp division between the Eastern Rus’ (Muscovite - V.P.) and the Western Rus’. In addition, military powers of a new type (the Cossacks) had appeared in the southern borderlands of both of them.¹¹⁶ They had represented old Russian democratic traditions, though these traditions now received a new peculiar form: a military brotherhood. Aristocratic element of the authority had not only been preserved in the Western Rus’, but it had been even more intensified under the Polish influence. It was this element that had become the foundation of the Western Rus’ (Ukrainian and Belorussian - V.P.) political system.¹¹⁷

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russian state had come to a vast expansion, and “the Russian people almost in its complete composition had found themselves within a single country.” But, after that had been achieved, the attempts of separatist strivings began out of the middle of the Russian nation by a part of Ukrainian and Belorussian activists. The separatists try to ground the state independence of Ukraine and Belorussia by the cultural originality of the Ukrainians and the Belorussians, which, essentially, according to Vernadskii, is a political fiction, since the Ukrainians and the Belorussians are the branches of a single Russian people. The reunification of the seventeenth century had resulted in a movement from Malorussia to Moscow and to increase of the cultural influence of the former on Moscow. “Russians born in Malorussia, — noted Vernadskii, — had worked in all branches of culture.”¹¹⁸ In the nineteenth century this process had been even more intensified, since those “born” in the Malorussia not only had been accepted by the All-Russian cultural movement, but they had even headed it for some time. Vernadskii concluded that “the Empire’s statehood, culture

113 Georgii Vernadskii, *Nachertanie russkoi istorii*, Part 1, Praha, 1927.

114 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

115 Vernadskii’s coined term, *mestorazvitie*, was subsequently accepted even by his strong opponent, Miliukov. See: P. Miliukov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul’tury*, rev. ed., Vol. I, Part I, Paris, 1937, pp. 35-36.

116 G. Vernadskii, *A History of Russia*, Vol. III, *The Mongols and Russia*, New Haven, 1959, pp. 335-336.

117 *Ibid.*, pp. 337-338.

118 G. Vernadskii, *Nachertanie russkoi istorii*, pp. 229-230.

and language should not be considered as being only of the Great Russians; all this is a product of the whole Russian people.”¹¹⁹ The underlying forces in the political make-up of Eurasia were psychological similarity. Though Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, each of whom represents a cultural branch of Eastern Slavs, have some differences, politically and psychologically (the desire of a strong state power, Orthodox religion, and so on) they stand together. Both the century-long westward expansion of the Mongols and the later eastward expansion of the Russians, Vernadskii maintained, were dictated by “geopolitical” conditions and a common striving for the realization of one and the same idea of a Eurasian state.¹²⁰ The Union of Ukraine with Russia he perceived as the decisive event in the attitudes among the eastern Slavs and Poland, and accordingly of the formation of the Russian empire and Eurasian statehood.

Nikolai Trubetskoi saw fit to argue for the vitality of the “All-Russian” cultural idea while accentuating the unproductiveness of its Ukrainian counterpart. His argument, in summary, consisted of these major points: “It is obvious that Ukrainians participated actively and on an equal footing with the Great Russians not only in the genesis but in the development of this all-Russian culture; and they did so as Ukrainians, without abandoning their ethnic identity... This culture lost over time any specific Great Russian or Ukrainian identification and became all-Russian... It is simply impossible to deny the fact that Russian culture during the post-Petrine era is All-Russian and that it is not foreign to Ukrainians.”¹²¹

Trubetskoi’s reasoning was reminiscent of ideas that echoed in Ukrainian society during 1860s and 1880s: in the 1920s, however, his ideas were a glaring anachronism that went against prevailing Ukrainian cultural self-perceptions. In many respects Trubetskoi was speaking the language of P. Kulish, M. Kostomarov and M. Drahomanov. Like Trubetskoi, the three renowned nineteenth-century intellectuals conceptualized Ukrainian culture in relationship to, and in terms of, all-Russian culture, which, of course, was ubiquitous in the life of every Ukrainian living in the Empire. These men posited Ukraine and Russia as regional societies within a bi-cultural (Rus’) state. “A regional and tribal differentiation of Russian culture” — wrote Trubetskoi — “should not extend to the very top of the cultural edifice, to cultural assets of a higher order. There must be no tribal or regional boundaries (i.e., Great Russian or Ukrainian) on the top story of Russian culture in the future... Any new Ukrainian culture would fail because talented people... given completely free choice... will quite naturally opt for the culture of the ethnological whole (i.e. all-Russian culture - V.P.) and not for the culture of a part of that whole (i.e. Ukrainian culture). It follows that the only people who could opt for Ukrainian culture are those biased in some way or limited in their freedom of choice.”¹²²

Ideally, the obligation of that bi-cultural (Rus’) state was to preserve and cultivate

119 *Ibid.*

120 G. Vernadskii, *Opyt istorii Evrazii s poloviny VI veka do nastoiashchego vremeni*, Berlin, 1934, pp. 7-8.

121 “The Ukrainian Problem,” in: N. Trubetskoi, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity*, Ann Arbor, Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991, pp. 251, 255-256.

122 *Ibid.*, pp. 263, 258.

the cultural identities of both Slavic peoples in a fair and equitable manner. In the eyes of Trubetskoi, Ukrainian culture was certainly not a “variant” of Russian (Muscovite) culture, but it was, nevertheless, acknowledged to exist in a *complementary* and *auxiliary* relationship within a larger, i.e., imperial (Russian) system that, significantly, was conceived as something (at least partially) “native.” Trubetskoi remarked: “However likely it is that a new Ukrainian culture would resolve the problem of conforming the bottom story (low culture - V.P.) of its edifice to its foundations in the people, it will never resolve even partially the other problem: creating a new top story (i.e., high culture) that could satisfy the needs of the intelligentsia more fully than the top story of the old all-Russian culture did. A new Ukrainian culture would be in no position to compete successfully with the old culture in meeting these spiritual and intellectual needs.”¹²³ This concept of Ukrainian culture reflected the existential reality of individuals like Kulish and Kostomarov (and before them many other, including Gogol’) who played dual roles in the Empire as preeminent contributors to both Ukrainian and all-Russian (Imperial) society. Trubetskoi, like Kulish, Kostomarov and Drahomanov in the nineteenth century was to concede that Ukrainians were generally neglected and “under-appreciated” in the Empire.¹²⁴

Trubetskoi thought that thus the differences between the Russian (Eastern-Slavic) tongues — Great Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian are not so great as to prevent communication between the speakers of these tongues, it was not linguistically necessary to create a separate Ukrainian literary language.¹²⁵ To Trubetskoi, in the poetical works of Shevchenko, Kotliarevskyi and other better Ukrainian authors the language is deliberately popular, deliberately nonliterary. Stressing that without the link of Ukrainian influence Europeanism could hardly have taken root on Russian soil and that the Ukrainization of Great Russian culture opened the Russia road to Europeanization, he argued that from the other hand Russian literary language naturally became the language of educated Ukrainians.¹²⁶ Trubetskoi remarked: “A literary language must choose adequate means for the expression of concepts or shades of thought which are alien to the thinking of the uneducated popular masses and for that very reason it is obvious that the popular language must lack the means necessary to express such concepts. The literary language of the majority of educated Ukrainians was the Russian literary language. This, of course, by no means excluded the use of purely popular Ukrainian in works of a certain literary genre in which the author, himself belonging to the intelli-

123 “The Ukrainian Problem,” p. 257.

124 Drahomanov framed this particular vision in terms of a tripartite concept which mapped out a “Ukrainian,” “Russian” and common East Slavic (in other words, “all-Russian”) component in the Imperial culture. See: V. Potul’nyts’kyi, *Narysy z ukrainskoi politologii (1819-1991)*, Kyiv, 1994, pp. 17-25; Idem, “The Image of Russia and the Russians in Ukrainian Political Thought (1860-1945),” in: K. Inoue, T. Uyama (eds.), *Quest for Models of Coexistence: National and Ethnic Dimensions of Changes in the Slavic Eurasian World*, Sapporo, Slavic Research Center, 1998, pp. 163-195.

125 N. Trubetskoi, *The Common Slavic Element in Russian Culture*, New York, 1949, pp. 21-22.

126 *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 24.

gentsia, deliberately limits his outlook to that of an uneducated person.”¹²⁷

Trubetskoi believed that in future the Ukrainian language and culture would cease to be the instrument of a narrow national self-restriction and separation but would become the instrument of creating a really great culture, a Ukrainian individuation of the All-Russian culture, equal in rights and value with the Great Russian culture. He wrote that for the Ukrainians he considered as the most proper the following form of self-perception: “for the Ukrainians there is, first of all, the understanding that they are not only Ukrainians, but also Russian, and not only Russians, but also Ukrainians, that there is no “Russian” outside “Ukrainian,” as the Russian nation — individuality, actually, does not exist outside, but only within its individuations: the Great Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian.”¹²⁸

The main opponents of the Eurasians — the “Europeanists,” being mainly from the camp of Russian historian positivist emigrants — Miliukov,¹²⁹ Evgenii Shmurlo (1853-1934), Petr Bitsilli (1879-1953), Georgii Fedotov (1886-1951) and others, unambiguously in their geopolitical dimensions of Russian national identity, side with the Euro-Atlantic community, thus continuing the quest started by Peter the Great. They do not much differ from their intellectual predecessors, the nineteenth century Westernizers, who also looked at Russia as, potentially, a normal European power, though somewhat delayed in its development.

Professor of history of Novorossiisk and, later, Sophia University, Petr Bitsilli, remarked, that in the USSR there is a “very funny and awful process of artificial language — made from the dialects of the Russian language — Ukrainian and Belorussian.”¹³⁰ This Ukrainian culture, which is constructed under the coercion “is not a culture, but only its vision.”¹³¹ Bitsilli, believing that if there is no culture, there is no nation and, recognizing the existence of the Ukrainian culture, nevertheless, classified the Ukrainian nation as an underdeveloped one. “For those Ukrainians” — he wrote — “who realize and appreciate their ties with the Russian culture, the Ukrainian language is either “only a dialect,” or “the second language,” just like, for a Provençal, the Provençal language is: but to no Provençal would ever come to head to renounce, for Mistral’s sake, Racine and Balsac. For those Ukrainians, who do not feel and appreciate these ties, the Ukrainian language is the only *one* (*sic* by Bitsilli) “native language.”¹³² So, according to Bitsilli’s deepest belief, any Ukrainization would have to be carried out by force,

127 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

128 N. Trubetskoi, “Otvét D.I. Doroshenku,” *Evrasiiskaia khronika*, No. X, Paris, 1928, p. 59.

129 The Eurasian school has been subjected to severe criticism by Pavel Miliukov (See, particularly, his essay: “Eurasianism and Europeanism in Russian History,” *Festschrift Th. G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstag*, Vol. I, Bonn, 1930, pp. 225-236) and Petr Struve (See: “Rossiia,” in: P. Struve, *Patriotika: Politika, kul’tura, religiia, sotsializm*, M., 1997, pp. 408-420). Another severe critic of the Eurasians’ ideas was Vasilii Shul’gin. See his article: “Zlost,” *Vozrozhdenie*, December 16, 1926.

130 Petr Bitsilli, “Natsiia i iazyk,” *Sovremennye zapiski*, No. 40, Paris, 1929, p. 409

131 *Ibid.*, pp. 419-420.

132 *Ibid.*, p. 416.

since the Russian culture is to that extent powerful that, in the conditions of a free competition, the Ukrainian language is unable to develop close to it. He believes that it is impossible to make the Russified Ukrainians adopt the Ukrainian culture, because the Ukrainian people, if given the freedom of “cultural self-determination” will assimilate with the Russian people. “It is insane to stand in the way of the people’s *free* (*sic* by Bitsilli) assimilation process... Let us presume that the Ukrainian people had freely and unnoticingly for itself adopted the Russian (i.e. the All-Russian) language. The Ukrainian people would not “lose its identity” by doing this; it would become unified with the Russian people; it would receive communion to “the soul” of Pushkin and Tolstoi, just like, in his time, Gogol’ had received communion to it, who, in his turn, had very immensely enriched “the Russian soul.”¹³³ Bitsilli viewed the Ukrainians only as an ethnic group. Though he presupposed, that Ukrainians could become a nation in future, he considered the creation of a separate Ukrainian identity as a useless goal, because only with the help of “differentiation without disintegration” Ukrainians could recall and recover their own native culture.¹³⁴ The notions of Ukrainian “separatists” that every ethnic group can obtain its own state and thus become a nation he called utopian. “In reality” — wrote he — “the mutual attitudes among ‘the nation’ (culture) and ethnography (*narod*) — are more complicated.”¹³⁵ Bitsilli was convinced, that Kiev will be never transferred, in contrary to L’vov, into Ukrainian town.¹³⁶

Historian and philosopher G. Fedotov announced that the representatives of the Russian political and historical thought themselves stressed the way to Ukrainian separatism, because they investigated the Ukrainian question, particularly the legacy of Kievan Rus’ without significant background. He considered the attitude to the third of the three capitals, i.e., Kiev, as the phenomenon, which touches on the very essence of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. “It seems strange to speak about Kiev in our times, — remarked Fedotov. Until very recently, we ourselves used to renounce Kiev’s glory and infamy, tracing our descent from (the banks of) the Oka and the Volga (rivers). We ourselves gave Ukraine away to Hrushevs’kyi and paved the way for Ukrainian separatism. Did Kiev ever occupy the center of our thought, of our love? A striking fact: modern Russian literature has completely left Kiev out.”¹³⁷

At the same time, in Fedotov’s opinion, “the returning of Russia’s image to its rebelling sons” in the USSR during the repressions against the leaders of the national republics was a very positive fact. “In the USSR ‘Motherland’ was announced as a sacred word!” — he concluded.¹³⁸

133 *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421.

134 P. Bitsilli, “Problema russko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii v svete istorii,” in: P. Bitsilli, V. Iartseva (eds.), *Izbrannye trudy po fililogii*, M., 1996, pp. 114, 134.

135 Here under the nation Bitsilli understand the Russians and under the *narod* — Ukrainians. See: P. Bicilli, “Natsiia i narod,” *Sovremennye zapiski*, No. 37, Paris, 1928, pp. 351, 352.

136 P. Bicilli, “Problema russko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii v svete istorii,” p. 132.

137 Georgii Fedotov, “Tri stolitsy,” *Novyi Mir*, No. 4, 1989, p. 215.

138 G. Fedotov, “Novyi idol,” *Sovremennye zapiski*, No. 57, Paris, 1935, p. 400.

Conclusions

1. The Ukrainian perspective in Russian political thought was the perspective of the educated and nationally-oriented representatives of a major European, “historic” people. They were well disposed toward Ukrainians and had some knowledge of their history and local customs, but they considered them (like other “unhistoric,” peasant peoples in the borderlands of the empire) to be incapable of independent political and cultural development. The brief comparison of the views of Ukraine of the representatives of the three “generations” in Russian political thought seems to be a good illustration of the range of possible modifications — and, above all, possible ideological uses — of the same national stereotype. In the frame of their generally opposed political doctrines their attitudes to Ukraine were quite similar in synchronic dimension. At the same time in diachronic dimension the comparison of the ideas of the representatives of three “generations” shows some kind of evolution in the whole of Russian political thought toward the deeper understanding of Ukrainian peculiarities.

2. Russian political opinion, since the second half of the century, when the national movement had acquired political meaning, considered any move away from the Russian language and culture to be already dangerous for the unity of the Russian nation. It was intensified by the fact that “the Malorussians” were perceived as a part of the Russian nation, and, also, the religious community was an important factor.

Nearly all the trends in Russian political thought recognized the cultural and linguistic individuality of the Ukrainians as a fact but did not attach any special importance to it. At the same time, the community of the lower strata of Ukrainian and Russian society was emphasized. The attempts of the Ukrainian authors to raise the Ukrainian language to a scientific level (e.g. P. Kulish) were rejected and perceived as an unnecessary separation.

3. The First generation mainly applied Count Uvarov’s definition of “Official Nationality” to the whole population of Ukraine, and admitted that the Ukrainian culture and history can be developed only in the general framework of All-Russian culture. Second generation considered Ukrainians more like junior partners than equals. Russia was looked upon as moving faster and paving the way to modernity for Ukraine which lagged behind. The highest degree of theoretical analysis of the Ukrainian problem was achieved in the geopolitical doctrines of Russian emigration. They came close to the problem of the double Ukrainian-Russian identity and loyalty and made a difference among three notions of intelligentsia in Ukraine: Russians, Russified Ukrainians and national Ukrainians. Their level of evaluation of Ukrainian question demonstrates some similarity with the vision of Ukraine in the theoretical constructions of Ukrainian conservatives at the turn of the century. At the same time they did not imagined the Ukrainian language and culture beyond the All-Russian context — a statement, renounced by Ukrainian political thought, represented mainly by Hrushevs’kyi, already at the end of the nineteenth century. In the vast majority of theses, the twentieth century experience of the Ukrainian position in Russian political thought can be directly projected on the nineteenth century.

4. All the trends in Russian political thought, from Russian conservative nation-

alists of the nineteenth century to the Eurasians of the twentieth century, wanted to use the Ukrainians and their culture in formulating certain conceptions of modern Russian nation. On principle, a tradition was preserved which already in the first half of the nineteenth century determined the position of Russian political thought: the Ukrainian theme was essential for formulating Russian identity as it was the instrument of argumentation; there was no "Ukrainophilism" as a self-sufficient goal. It follows from this that there was no sharp overturn to Ukrainophobia in Russian political thought of the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. And this means that the change in Russian state policy in the second half of the nineteenth century did not result in an automatic change in the whole of Russian political opinion toward Ukraine.

The national cultural aspirations of the Ukrainians were rejected by the vast majority of the representatives of Russian political thought, since it seemed that these aspirations threw doubts on the unity of the Russian nation, which embraced the Great Russians, the Malorussians and the Belorussians. Thus, the Ukrainian problem became a key problem of Russian national identity.