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ORGANIC WORK AS A PROBLEM IN POLISH HISTORIOGRAPHY*

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"The (Polish) nation (in the nineteenth century)," according to the historian Michał Bobrzyński, "pursued independence along two roads: through armed insurrection and through organic work," paths which frequently intersected during a period which "witnessed the internal rebirth of the nation."¹⁾ Understandably Polish historiography has venerated the violent reaction to the loss of independence, the armed insurrections against the partitioning powers. The socialist Bolesław Limanowski, speaking of the January Insurrection, termed it "a manifestation of the national spirit," and argued that the insurrectionary movement contributed to the democratization of the masses, instilling in their hearts "a feeling of human dignity and enkindling national sentiment."²⁾ This emphasis upon the active struggle for independence permeated inter-war Polish historiography: it suited the mood of a nation enjoying independence for the first time in 123 years, and was politically convenient for the Piłsudski camp, which readily associated itself with this tradition, having itself engaged the enemy in armed combat.³⁾

This veneration obscured the fact that organic work, Bobrzyński's second alternative, was also a reaction to the loss of independence and to the deeply felt need to preserve the nation's heritage in the face of foreign occupation. Characterized by unobtrusive cultural and economic activity aimed at the conservation and cultivation of national resources, organic work can also be traced to the period following the Third Partition. The traditional view of organic work, however, described it in political terms as the "program advanced by the Warsaw positivists and the Galician conservatives after the 1863 Insurrection. They did not see Poland's future in the organization of secret societies or in wars for independence, but in the peaceful development of the economic and cultural resources of the country."⁴⁾ Within this context opponents of conspiracies and insurrections came to be associated with the

* This paper was presented at the Second Congress of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences, New York, April, 1971.

1) Michał Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie* (Warsaw, 1931), III, v.

2) B. Limanowski, *Historia demokracji polskiej* (4th ed., Warsaw, 1957), II, 378, 382. Even the persistent English critic of Polish romanticism, R. F. Leslie, concluded: "That despair and submission, counselled by the Polish conservatives (after 1863), had not destroyed Polish morale was in no small measure due to the revolt of 1863." R. F. Leslie, *Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856-1865* (London, 1963), p. 251.

3) Bernard Ziffer, *Poland. History and Historians: Three Bibliographical Essays* (New York, 1952), pp. 33-40.

4) *Wielka ilustrowana encyklopedia powszechna* (Cracow and Warsaw, n. d.), XII, 14.

phrase “organic work”, often confused as a synonym for “tri-loyalism” or “Warsaw positivism”. Organic work became one of two mutually exclusive political alternatives, each based upon conflicting political systems: romanticism and positivism, which in succession dominated Polish political thought in the nineteenth century. A classic illustration of this is Bobrzyński's *Dzieje Polski w zarysie* (A History of Poland in Outline), where the section dealing with the 1831–1864 period was entitled “Polityka romantyczna” (Romantic Politics), whereas “Polityka pracy organicznej” (The Politics of Organic Work) described the 1864–1908 era.⁵⁾

This antagonistic dichotomy stemmed from the bitter polemical autopsy performed after 1864 upon the politics which culminated in the January Insurrection. In 1865 the Galician conservative Paweł Popiel condemned revolutionaries as political “charlatans” and demanded that the nation break with the policies and tactics of political romanticism. Urging the reconstruction of society on the basis of organic work, Popiel publicly counselled submission to the partitioning powers.⁶⁾ Józef Szujski, a founder of the Cracow School of history,⁷⁾ equated the continuous insurrectionary stance of Polish revolutionaries, which he termed the *liberum conspiro*, with the *liberum veto*, which he in turn linked with the notorious Targowica Confederation.⁸⁾ Szujski's vendetta against the *liberum conspiro* culminated in 1869 in *Teka Stańczyka*, a satirical political tract which scornfully described Poland as “an incessant insurrection” and portrayed insurrectionists as blackguards prepared to push the nation into a hopeless struggle in order to satisfy personal ambitions.⁹⁾

The bitter polemics were continued in the early 1870's by the “War Between the Young and the Old Press” in Warsaw. The young Warsaw positivists, who

5) Bobrzyński, *op. cit.*, III.

6) Paweł Popiel, “Kilka słów z powodu odezwy X. Adama Sapieha”, in Michał Bobrzyński, et al., *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego Galicji: 1859–1873* (Warsaw, 1905), p. 221.

7) The Cracow School of History was closely tied with the ruling conservative class in Galicia. Its leading contributors, Józef Szujski, Walerian Kalinka, and Michał Bobrzyński, condemned the worship of conspiracy and revolutionary romanticism, at the same time exalting strong monarchical rule. Kalinka criticized the historical optimism and the republicanism of the Leleweł school of history, which emphasized the great moments of Poland's past, attributed supra-European virtues to the Polish nation, and which, in Kalinka's estimation, profanely concluded that Poland was the “Christ among the nations”. Discussing the reasons for the partitions of Poland, Kalinka wrote: “The final word of the historical witnesses which have or which will be published from this epoch is this: the Poles themselves were the cause of their own fall. The misfortunes which have befallen us then or later were merited by the nation as a penance.” Walerian Kalinka, *Ostatnie lata panowania Stanisława Augusta*, excerpted in M. H. Serejski, *Historycy o historii* (Warsaw, 1963), I, 331.

8) Józef Szujski, “Kilka prawd z dziejów naszych ku rozważaniu w chwili obecnej”, Bobrzyński, *op. cit.*, pp. 288–93, 294.

9) *Teka Stańczyka* was a series of letters which appeared in *Przegląd Polski* between May and December, 1869. The most important are: “List Sycyniusza”, *Przegląd Polski*, III (1869), vol. IV, 294–6; “List Brutusika”, *ibid.*, pp. 457–60; and “List Optymowicza”, *ibid.*, IV (1869), vol. I, 117–23. All but the last three letters can be found in *Dzieła Józefa Szujskiego. Wydania zbiorowe*. Series III (Cracow, 1894), II. The letters were co-authored with Stanisław Tarnowski, Stanisław Koźmian, and Ludwik Wodzicki.

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enthusiastically embraced Comte's empiricism in their search for a "realistic" alternative to political romanticism, lashed out at the preceding generation for failing to understand the nation's needs: education, commercial and industrial development, and respect for hard work.¹⁰⁾ Under the slogan *praca u podstaw* (Work at the Foundations), the positivists argued for the integration of the peasantry into the social organism: they also insisted upon the recognition of the middle class as a factor in the nation's future. The post-1863 political conditions necessitated a reversal of national priorities, a prospect the leading positivist publicist, Aleksander Świętochowski, did not find uncongenial. Świętochowski wrote in 1882 in his controversial essay, *Wskazania polityczne* (Political Markings):

The happiness of the people is not strictly dependent upon their power and independence, but upon their participation in universal civilization as well as upon the advancement of their own civilization. ...

Dreams of regaining external independence should be replaced today by efforts to regain internal independence. This independence can only be achieved by strengthening material and intellectual resources, and by comprehensive national development united with universal progress.¹²⁾

Stańczyk tri-loyalism and the apolitical reversal of national priorities urged by the positivists, sometimes described as cultural nationalism,¹³⁾ were unacceptable to the Limanowski wing of the Polish socialists movement, and to the founders of the National Democratic Party. However, the patriotic reaction of the 1880's and 1890's, in the case of the National Democrats, was not fundamentally a reaction against the economic activism of organic work, but rather against organic work defined as political passivity and resignation from independence. Although Roman Dmowski in *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (Thoughts of a Modern Pole) stressed the importance of political action based upon an analysis of the current international situation, he did not deprecate the significance of organic work, calling for intensified national efforts in economic and social spheres. As the title of Dmowski's work implied, his purpose was the creation of a modern nation, an integral historical and national organism formed in the continuing struggle for national survival. Rejecting the old Polish gentry type, which he believed infected with passivity and idealism, Dmowski's "modern Pole" was a member of the emerging commercial-industrial class.¹⁴⁾ The patriotism of economic activism, however, remained to be historically justified in a nation in which the agrarian gentry was the preponderant social class. Among the

10) Aleksander Świętochowski, "My i Wy", *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, no. 44 (1871), 357-9.

11) Aleksander Świętochowski and Leopold Mikulski, "Praca u podstaw--ogólne jej pojęcie", *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, no. 10 (1873), 73-5; Aleksander Świętochowski, "Nowa Resursa", *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, no. 4 (1873), 26.

12) Quoted in Jerzy Rudzki, *Świętochowski* (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 124, 128.

13) Peter Brock, "Polish Nationalism", in Peter Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, 1969) p. 333.

14) Roman Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (5th ed., Warsaw, 1934), pp. 62-4.

initial attempts in this direction were the works of two economists who belonged to Dmowski's National Democratic Party: Henryk Radziszewski and Władysław Grabski.

In the search for the proto-type of the "modern Pole" Radziszewski and Grabski went back beyond 1863 to the pioneering industrialist Piotr Steinkeller, Prince Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki, Finance Minister of the Kingdom of Poland (1821-1830), and Andrzej Zamoyski, an aristocratic proponent of agrarian modernization. Their activities were treated as reflecting both a civic-minded concern for native industrial growth and a cognizance of the need for altered socio-economic values within new economic conditions.¹⁵⁾ In his study of the Bank of Poland, founded in 1828 by Lubecki, Radziszewski remarked:

The national leaders understood that the nation must be self-reliant, ... internally strong, healthy, and compact within its ranks. Only when the nation gathers its resources can it survive, and often to survive means to triumph. ... The (interest of the) leaders of that period (Staszic, Lubecki, ... Łubieński) in commercial and industrial expansion was not primarily motivated by personal aggrandisement, but only by the desire to intelligently exploit all national resources.¹⁶⁾

Grabski, in his monumental apologia for the landowners, *Historya Towarzystwa Rolniczego: 1858-1861* (The History of the Agricultural Society: 1858-1861), concurred with Radziszewski's estimation of the national character of organic work and of the good intentions of the possessing classes. He also agreed that the purpose of organic activity was to provide a new, self-sufficient, productive economic basis for the modern nation.¹⁷⁾ Both the social and economic aspects of Zamoyski's program, in Grabski's words: "assured the organic process of society, progress flowing from the base, slow, gradual, but continuous."¹⁸⁾

Radziszewski and Grabski treated Lubecki, Zamoyski, and Steinkeller as national models, whose altruistic commercial and industrial enterprises were considered to have made a significant psychological, as well as economic, contribution to the formation of the modern nation. This identification of the economic, self-sufficient character of organic work with national preservation and development was prominent in pre-World War I and inter-war historiography. Stanisław Koszutski, a liberal economist, drew attention to the fact that the nation since 1772 had sought salvation

15) Henryk Radziszewski, "Zarys rozwoju przemysłu w Królestwie Polskim", in Stanisław Bukowski, et. al., eds., *W naszych sprawach, II, Szkice w kwestjach ekonomiczno-społecznych* (Warsaw, 1900), pp. 354-5, 376-7.

16) Henryk Radziszewski, *Bank Polski* (2nd ed., Poznań, 1919), vi-vii.

17) Władysław Grabski, *Historya Towarzystwa Rolniczego 1858-1861* (Warsaw, 1904), II, 429.

18) *Ibid.*, I, 120.

19) *Ibid.*, I, 130.

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in commercial and industrial undertakings after each political disaster.²⁰⁾ He presented as the original theoretician of organic work the nineteenth-century political economist Józef Supiński, who had warned the nation: "The success and position of *individual citizens* is the prosperity and power of the nation. For this reason knowledge of social economy constitutes civic virtue and political wisdom."²¹⁾ For Koszutski organic work reflected an awareness of changing economic realities, i. e., the emergence of capitalism in Poland.²²⁾ Another liberal economist, Stanisław Kempner, maintained that the program of both the positivists and the Galician conservatives, and the struggle against Germanization in the Grand Duchy of Poznań, possessed a conscious objective — the achievement of economic self-sufficiency as a means of resisting the "unification" attempts of the three partitioners.²³⁾

The role of organic work as a constant factor in Polish political thinking prior to 1863 was glossed over in works which treated Warsaw positivism. These studies emphasized the abrupt gap which existed between the proponents of political romanticism and the anti-romantic post-1863 generation, sharply focusing upon the emergence of new social and economic attitudes after 1863.²⁴⁾ This is a compartmentalized interpretation of nineteenth-century Polish history: it reduces the significance of the precursors of organic work and implies that such activity was valid as a national policy only when no other political alternative remained. The most prominent representative of this approach was Bobrzyński, a member of the Cracow school of history. When he wrote: "The nation pursued independence along two roads: through armed insurrection and through organic work," he was not so much concerned with organic work defined as economic activism as he was with legitimizing the

20) Stanisław Koszutski, *Rozwój ekonomiczny Królestwa Polskiego w ostatnim trzydziestoleciu: 1870–1900* (Warsaw, 1905), p. 25.

Bujak wrote that organic work originated during the final years of the reign of August III and in the first years of the reign of Stanisław August. He caustically commented that organic work had always been "done in" by insurrection and armed struggles, only to reappear after defeat. He attributed the gentry's inability to understand and effectively engage in organic work to their martial psychology and to their long years of exploiting the peasantry, which placed them in the roles of consumers rather than economic producers. See Bujak's introduction to Erzam Kostołowski, *Studia nad kwestią włościańską w latach 1846–1864 ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem literatury politycznej* (Lwów, 1938), vi–viii.

21) Koszutski, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–7.

22) *Ibid.*, pp. 33–7.

23) Stanisław A. Kempner, *Rozwój gospodarczy Polski od rozbiorów do niepodległości* (Warsaw, 1924), pp. 314–9.

24) Piotr Chmielowski, a participant in the "War Between the Young and the Old Press", wrote that 1864 "ended only the history of our romanticism, substituting the application of the utilitarian principle to existing conditions for the messianic idea." Piotr Chmielowski, *Historia literatury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1905), V, 191.

This view is mirrored in the following works: Auriel Drogoszewski, *Pozytywizm polski* (Lwów, 1931); K. Wojciechowski, *Przewrót w umysłowości i literaturze polskiej po roku 1863* (Lwów, 1928); Ryszard Wroczyński, *Programy oświatowe pozytywizmu w Polsce na tle społecznym i gospodarczym* (Łódź, 1949); and Feliks Araszkiewicz, *Pozytywizm polski* (2nd ed., Lublin, 1947).

tri-loyalism of the Stańczyks. Tri-loyalism implicitly repudiated national unity and independent statehood as national objectives, and opted for separate accommodations with each of the partitioning powers as the framework in which the Polish nation would have to develop for an indefinite period: it was not, as Bobrzyński asserted, a synonym for organic work.²⁵⁾ Nonetheless his description of the years 1864-1908 as "The Politics of Organic Work" was a political justification of the organic work concept which had a significant impact on inter-war historiography. Bobrzyński's dictum was cited with approbation by two historians active today: Witold Jakóbczyk and Stefan Kieniewicz.

In his laudatory biography of Patron Jackowski, the organizer of peasant agricultural circles in Prussian Poland in the 1870's and 1880's, Jakóbczyk wrote that Polish society desired to organize "along modern lines" and to erect "a national economy." Jackowski's "social work" according to Jakóbczyk had great national importance, especially during the era of Germanization in Wielkopolska.²⁶⁾ "Even by today's standards," Jakóbczyk concluded, Jackowski "was a unique model of disinterested social reformer."²⁷⁾

Jakóbczyk accentuated three elements: the socio-economic importance of organic work in the formation of the modern nation; the national, altruistic role of the possessing classes, and the patriotic character of organic activity. These elements appeared in Kieniewicz's excellent biography of Adam Sapieha, which elaborated upon Bobrzyński's belief that armed insurrection and organic work frequently intersected in an area in which the internal rebirth of the nation was achieved. Attempting to mollify some of the residual bitterness towards organic work which survived the post-insurrectionary polemics, Kieniewicz turned to Leon and Adam Sapieha, both of whom engaged in the armed struggle and in organic work: he believed that their organic activity was inspired by the desire to increase the material and spiritual resources of the nation for the "future hours of battle." Kieniewicz commented:

Organic work is a convenient term without clearly defined content. All social and economic efforts - from the egoistic gathering of riches to the noblest sacrifices for education and charity - are placed under its roof. But it is necessary to recognize that to draw the line where private interest ends and the public good begins is quite difficult.²⁸⁾

The inter-war historians concerned primarily with the active struggle for independence adopted a tolerant even benevolent attitude towards organic work. Szymon

25) See Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie, op. cit.*, pp. 271-2.

26) Witold Jakóbczyk, *Patron Jackowski* (Poznań, 1938), ix. Two other works which treated organic work favorably within the context of the German-Polish conflict were by Andrzej Wojtkowski: *Edward Raczyński i jego dzieło* (Poznań, 1929), *Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk w Poznaniu w latach 1857-1927* (Poznań, 1928).

27) Jakóbczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-6, 308-9.

28) Stefan Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha: 1828-1903* (Lwów, 1939), pp. 399-400.

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Askenazy wrote a favorable introduction to a collective monograph of the industrialist Leopold Kronenberg; Adam Skałkowski, who wrote extensively on the Polish legions, wrote a monograph for the hundredth anniversary of the Poznań Bazar; Marcelli Handelsman presented the activities of the first major practitioner of organic work, the Poznań physician Karol Marcinkowski, as a realization of the positive side of Adam Czartoryski's program – the economic preparation of the nation for independence.²⁹⁾

The only critical evaluation of organic work appeared in *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej: 1864–1914* (The History of Polish Political Thought: 1864–1914), by Wilhelm Feldman, a socialist-oriented literary critic and supporter of Piłsudski. Adopting as his critical criterion the attitude of an individual or a political grouping towards national independence, the author grouped under the term tri-loyalism the proponents of organic work, loyalism, and conciliation. Feldman charged the Galician conservatives with having abandoned the nation as a political unit for the sake of class interests and for a modest voice in the affairs of the Habsburg Monarchy: Warsaw positivism, based upon philosophical empiricism and literary realism, he viewed as a decided break with the nation's historical continuity and as a form of political opportunism.³⁰⁾ Feldman disputed Świętochowski's reversal of national priorities. He charged that Świętochowski's "political resignation" undoubtedly delayed the political maturity of the third estate; ... (leaving) the urban element unprepared to assume historical tasks."³¹⁾ For Feldman organic work was not a simple reversal of national priorities motivated by an altruistic concern for the nation, but political resignation from the objective of independent statehood motivated by the socio-economic interests of the conservatives and the middle and upper bourgeoisie. Tri-loyalism was synonymous with political and economic opportunism.

Further discussion was terminated by the outbreak of World War II. Once again the Polish nation was confronted with the choice between armed resistance or collaboration with an occupying power. Rejecting the latter, the nation struggled heroically against Hitler's armies: for many, however, the armed struggle again seemed to have been in vain. When Poland was liberated in 1945 she found herself devastated by the war and occupied by Russian forces: for opponents of the new, communist regime the options had not changed. In these circumstances, reminiscent of the nineteenth century, there was renewed interest in organic work and political realism.

The immediate problem was to eradicate the war's human and economic devastation. In 1946 Jakóbczyk published a popularized biography of Karol Marcinkowski, who, as with the case of Jackowski, he presented as a disinterested social reformer,

29) Stefan Kieniewicz, "Problem pracy organicznej: 1840–1890", in *VIII Powszechny zjazd historyków polskich. Referaty i dyskusja* (Warsaw, 1960), I, 199.

30) Wilhelm Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej: 1864–1914* (Warsaw, 1933), pp. 131, 133, 143–4.

31) *Ibid.*, p. 154–5.

worthy of emulation by the postwar society. Jakóbczyk believed that "Marcinkowski showed us the necessity of pooling individual... reserves into a collective resource... the necessity of continual *organic work* in uplifting the nation, and the indispensability of a common center for the diffused circles of national life."³²⁾

The post-war European political constellation and Poland's place within it, renewed interest in Alexander Wielopolski, a fact noted by Adam Skałkowski in 1947 in his sympathetic biography of the nineteenth-century political realist and proponent of the Russo-Polish conciliation.³³⁾ In the same year a collection of historiographic essays by Alexander Bocheński, provokingly entitled *Dzieje głupoty w Polsce* (The History of Stupidity in Poland), bitterly denounced the exoneration of the romantic tradition in inter-war historiography, and presented the case for political realism. Stressing, as did Świętochowski, that the nation superceded the state, Bocheński argued that Poland's geopolitical situation allowed her either autonomy and union with another state organism (in which the nation could play a role and develop), or great power status. Rejecting the second alternative as unrealistic, Bocheński accused historians who glorified the romantic, revolutionary tradition, which he associated with this alternative, of deceiving the nation. Either they could not admit that Poland was a small weak nation in relation to her neighbors, or they suffered from an inferiority complex which made them believe: "Without our own independent state or at least without hopeless attempts to regain it through arms, we cease to be a nation." The result was "We overestimated the importance of armed strength and failed to appreciate the value of education."³⁴⁾

The nation, Bocheński insisted, must be told the truth and choose between Germany and Russia. Conspiracies and insurrections did not restore independence, but cemented the Russian-German alliance. Only after 1863 when the nation broke with insurrections did this alliance dissolve, creating favorable international conditions facilitating the re-establishment of an independent Poland. Bocheński flagellated romanticism, which equated political realism, i. e., cooperation with Russia in the tradition of Stanisław August, Lubecki, Wielopolski, and Dmowski, with treason, and which glorified "crime and stupidity as heroism."³⁵⁾ Under existing circumstances it was clear that Bocheński's choice was Russia.

Bocheński's work was balanced by Henryk Wereszycki's *Historia polityczna Polski 1864-1918* (A Political History of Poland 1864-1918) which appeared in 1948. This distinguished historian recognized the positive contributions of organic work, but like Feldman his ultimate criterion was the position of the proponents of organic

32) Witold Jakóbczyk, *Doktor Marcin, Jan Karol Marcinkowski: 1800-1846* (Poznań, 1946), "od autora" and p. 186.

33) A. M. Skałkowski, *Aleksander Wielopolski w świetle archiwów rodzinnych* (Poznań, 1947), I, 3.

34) Aleksander Bocheński, *Dzieje głupoty w Polsce: pamflety dziejopisarskie* (Warsaw, 1947), pp. 11-2, 16-7.

35) *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 9, 24-6, 41-3. Another work which advocated political realism was Ksawery Pruszyński's pseudo-historical study, *Margrabia Wielopolski* (Warsaw, 1946).

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work on independence: by this standard organic work, because it diverted society from political matters, was judged to be alien to Polish traditions and the Polish national character.³⁶⁾

As the political situation in Poland deteriorated after 1947, political activism became hazardous. Historians, like politicians, had to adopt new values. Relying upon quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and even Bierut, the proponents of dialectical materialism officially usurped a preeminent place in Polish historiography.³⁷⁾ The people (*lud*), i. e., the peasant and the worker, became the embodiment of the social and political revolutionary struggle for independence. According to Witold Kula, the task of Marxist historiography was to uncover "the creative role of the people in history."³⁸⁾ Citing Marx, Stanisław Śreniowski insisted that only an agrarian revolution was capable of liberating Poland during the first part of the nineteenth century,³⁹⁾ whereas Kieniewicz, departing from the middle-of-the-road position he had occupied in 1939, and using 1848 as an illustration, flatly asserted that anyone "who wished for independence in Poland had to cooperate with the revolutionary camp."⁴⁰⁾

Uncovering the "creative role of the people in history," judging individuals by "whether they were against or for the masses, whether they expressed the needs of the masses or whether they oppressed them,"⁴¹⁾ brought about a drastic negative reassessment of organic work. Organic work was not the central problem of Polish historiography in the early 1950's but it functioned as a schematic background for the presentation of left-wing political currents by some historians, who pre-judged both the motives and accomplishments of the proponents of organic work. Organic activity no longer coincided with national interests. For Jakóbczyk the proponents of organic work ceased to be disinterested social reformers, but members of the possessing classes who feared the consequences of social revolution, and who engaged in economic reform in an effort to adapt to new socio-economic conditions and to ensure their primacy in the social structure.⁴²⁾ Agrarian modernization and the abolition of serfdom through rent conversions, according to Kieniewicz, were not undertaken out of a sense of civic responsibility, but in an effort to stifle social, i. e., national revolution.⁴³⁾ The purpose of Zamoyski's Agricultural Society was nothing more than to preoccupy the gentry with organic work and to divert them from

36) Henryk Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna Polski 1864-1918* (Warsaw, 1948), pp. 70-81, 97-8.

37) For an excellent discussion of post-war Polish historiography until 1950 see Elizabeth Valkenier, "Soviet Impact on Polish Post-War Historiography 1946-1950", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XII, no. 4 (January, 1952), pp. 372-96.

38) Witold Kula, "Rok Mickiewiczowski", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 2 (1955), 5.

39) Stanisław Śreniowski, *Uwłaszczenie chłopów w Polsce* (Warsaw, 1956), pp. 33-4.

40) Stefan Kieniewicz, "Z postępowych tradycji polskich ruchów narodowo-wyzwoleńczych", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 2 (1953), 199.

41) Kula, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

42) Witold Jakóbczyk, *Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski w XIX w.: Dzieje pracy organicznej 1815-1914* (Poznań, 1951), I, 101-84. These pages cover the *Liga Polska*.

43) Kieniewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 194; Kula, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

politics, a step judged to be in the interest of the Tsarist government.⁴⁴⁾ Education no longer instilled national consciousness in the peasantry; that was accomplished by agrarian revolutionaries. That the possessing classes participated at all in the struggle for independence was attributed solely to the effects of revolutionary propaganda,⁴⁵⁾ fear of which later prompted the theoretical justifications of conciliation and tri-loyalism.⁴⁶⁾ Jakóbczyk modified his earlier opinion about organic work as an alternative road to independence in the first volume of his history of organic work in Wielkopolska (Great Poland), ambiguously concluding that organic work was a "defensive" program "which only facilitated the preservation of the nation and the formation of Polish society."⁴⁷⁾

Parallel discussion about Warsaw positivism rejected the conflict-of-generation thesis because it implied Warsaw positivism was primarily a political reaction to the defeat of the January Insurrection. Marxist historians and literary critics, in a manner reminiscent of Radziszewski, Grabski, Koszutski and Kempner, pre-dated positivism to the emergence of capitalistic economic relations in the Kingdom of Poland, going one step further to identify positivism with the emergence of a profit-oriented, anti-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It was easy to impugn the motives of the positivists, but difficult to deny the progressive character and accomplishments of Warsaw positivism (i. e., the call for the industrialization and modernization of society; the secular, anti-clerical attitude of the positivists; their crusade against gentry prejudices about engaging in industry and commerce; the positivists' interest in mass education; the empirical sciences, in female emancipation, and their support for Jewish civil rights). The approach to this problem was to "confront" the positivists' ideology with the programs of left-wing agrarian revolutionaries and those of the nascent Polish socialist movement. On this basis the liberal character of Warsaw positivism was defined on the question of Polish independence; the peasant problem; and the workers' movement. By these national and class standards the resignation of the positivists from the revolutionary pursuit of independence, their acceptance of the 1864 settlement of the peasant question, and their stress on the organic unity of society as opposed to class conflict — Warsaw positivism was judged to be an ideological regression.⁴⁸⁾

The exaggerated role of the people remained unchallenged until the political

44) Stefan Kieniewicz, *Sprawa włościańska w powstaniu styczniowym* (Wrocław, 1953), pp. 99–107.

45) Stefan Kieniewicz, "Problem rewolucji agrarnej w Polsce w okresie kształtowania się układu kapitalistycznego", in *Z epoki Mickiewicza: Zeszyt specjalny Przeglądu Historycznego w rocznicę śmierci Adama Mickiewicza, 1855–1955* (Wrocław, 1953), pp. 9, 38; Krzysztof Groniowski, *Problem rewolucji agrarnej w ideologii obozów politycznych w latach 1846–1870* (Warsaw, 1957), p. 26.

46) Groniowski, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

47) Jakóbczyk, *op. cit.*, I, 186.

48) The discussion, which I have tried to summarize, was extensive, and can be traced in some of the following articles and books: Jan Kott, *O "Lalce" Bolesława Prusa* (2nd ed., Warsaw, 1949); *Pozytywizm*, I–II (Wrocław, 1950, 1951); Celina Bobińska, "Spór o ujęcie pozytywizmu

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events of 1956.⁴⁹⁾ Shortly thereafter, at the Eighth General Congress of Polish Historians in 1958, Wereszycki provocatively maintained that to believe that Poland's fate was exclusively dependent upon the development of social relations was inconsistent with "historical reality" and "illogical". He bluntly reminded his appreciative audience that the primacy of historical materialism was the result of political and ideological considerations. "People's Poland," he declared, wished to have a history of the Polish people in order to highlight the social injustices endured by the lower classes "because these injustices were some kind of a historical justification of People's Poland."⁵⁰⁾

At the same Congress organic work began to undergo a rehabilitation, which, curiously enough, was initiated by Kieniewicz.⁵¹⁾ In a separate report to the Congress he summarized the Marxist judgements of organic work which emerged after 1948, emphasizing the identification of organic work with the emergence of capitalism and

i historyków pozytywistów", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 1 (1954), 178-204; Henryk Markiewicz, "Pozytywizm a realizm krytyczny", *Pamiętnik Literacki*, no. 2 (1955), 386-419; Henryk Holland, "W walce z pozytywizmem warszawskim—Z dziejów narodzin ideologii marksistowskiej w Polsce", *Myśl Filozoficzna*, no. 1 (1954), 100-39; Jerzy Rudzki, "U źródeł ideologii polskiej burżuazji doby Wielkiego Proletariatu—'Prawda' Świętochowskiego w walce z ruchem robotniczym w latach osiemdziesiątych XIX w.", *Myśl Filozoficzna*, no. 1 (1954), 140-76; Marian H. Serejski, "Miejsce pozytywistycznej szkoły warszawskiej w historiografii polskiej XIX stulecia", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 3 (1955), 66-98; Janina Żurawicka, "W sprawie oceny liberalizmu i kryteriów postępowości (Z konferencji Wydziału I PAN)", *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 3 (1955), 190-96; Jan Detko, "Spór o pozytywizm," *Polonistyka*, no. 3 (1956), 11-26.

One interesting result of this discussion was the publication of the positivist-Marxist polemics of the 1880's as an illustration of the Warsaw positivism's restricted progressive character. See Mieczysław Falkowski and Tadeusz Kowalik, eds., *Początki marksistowskiej myśli ekonomicznej w Polsce. Wybór publicystyki z lat 1880-1885* (Warsaw, 1957).

49) For a discussion of the impact of 1956 on Polish historiography see Elizabeth Valkenier, "Sovietization and Liberalization in Polish Historiography," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIX, no. 2 (July, 1959), 149-73.

50) Wereszycki, who was brutally attacked in the fifties, challenged the widely held view among Marxists that if the peasants had been emancipated in 1830/31 the chance of military victory would have been improved. He argued that emancipation would have hastened Prussian and Austrian intervention, and, therefore, the end of the Insurrection. Henryk Wereszycki, "Powstanie polskie na tle sytuacji międzynarodowej," in *VIII powszechny zjazd historyków polskich*, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-122.

51) Adam Bromke compares post-1956 Poland to the Kingdom of Poland after 1870. The fact that a bloody Polish-Russian clash had not occurred in 1956, he considers an indication of a new realistic Polish political maturity. The post-October generation, like its post-1870 counterpart, soberly recognized its military weakness and dependence upon the Soviet Union. Bromke believes that by the abandonment of conspiratorial activity, Polish society expressed its approbation of the Communist regime. These reactions were accompanied by a disillusionment with the West and a continuing fear of German power, trends also in evidence in Poland after 1870. Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 86-103.

The one great difference is that Poland existed as a state in 1956. Soviet accepting Poland as a genuine partner within defined parameters and permission for Gomułka to follow the Polish path to socialism, Bromke sees as factors strengthening this turn to political realism. This remains to be seen, for it is entirely inconceivable that limited autonomy will whet the Polish appetite, as happened under Wielopolski.

an anti-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and continuing to question the motivations of the possessing class for engaging in organic work. Kieniewicz, however, also modified rigid Marxist attitudes towards the propertied classes. He conceded that these groups thought they were following an alternate path to independence, and accepted the attempt to replace a gentry, agrarian oriented society with a bourgeois, industrial nation as a positive task in its day.⁵²⁾

Kieniewicz cautiously restored the national role of the propertied classes, and narrowed the definition of organic work to periods when there was no possibility of legal political activity, thereby excluding those inclined to conciliation and cooperation with the partitioners (i. e., Lubecki, Wielopolski, and the Cracow conservatives). He also questioned the political and economic logic of organic work because of the inherent distrust of the partitioning powers towards any Polish undertaking and because industrialization created a revolutionary, class-conscious proletariat. While recognizing the significance of economic progress and the importance of education in deepening national consciousness, Kieniewicz nevertheless concluded that in the Polish context organic work was "a blind alley."⁵³⁾

Kieniewicz's report prompted scholarly studies of non-left political groupings, and facilitated the emergence of a new official interpretation. These new evaluations of organic work were substantially negative: as did Feldman, recent authors still question the ultimate political objective of organic work, the motivation of its proponents, and its accomplishments. These works have substantiated the charge that economic self-interest frequently motivated the landowners and the bourgeoisie. However, fear of social revolution as the primary impulse prompting the possessing classes to engage in non-revolutionary, social and economic reform has been put into historical perspective as the influence of external political factors has been taken into consideration. Barbara Skarga's study of the philosophical origins of Polish positivism readily acknowledges the influence of political conditions in the selection of a particular path towards independence, and does not belabor the significance of socio-economic conditions.⁵⁴⁾ Jakóbczyk, who concluded in his trilogy on the history of organic work in Wielkopolska (Great Poland) that the organizational efforts of Polish society in the Grand Duchy of Poznań could have been more effective, recognized that the encompassing nature of the German threat facilitated the confluence of class and national interests.⁵⁵⁾ And Ryszard Czepulis in an interesting study of the social philosophy of the founders of the *Towarzystwo Rolnicze* did not condemn their program of social solidarity, but rather explained what the landowners hoped to accomplish through evolutionary, progressive economic reforms undertaken in difficult political conditions.⁵⁶⁾

52) Kieniewicz, "Problem pracy organicznej: 1840-1890," *op. cit.*, pp. 169-74.

53) *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180, 204.

54) Barbara Skarga, *Narodziny pozytywizmu polskiego: 1831-1869* (Warsaw, 1964), 331-5, 344-7.

55) Jakóbczyk, *op. cit.*, III, 230-41.

56) Ryszard Czepulis, *Myśl społeczna twórców Towarzystwa Rolniczego: 1842-1861* (Wrocław, 1964), pp. 203-14.

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The most interesting aspect of the post-1958 historiography, in contradistinction to that of the 1948-1956 era, has been the recognition of organic work as a factor in the formation of the modern nation, a view approaching that of Radziszewski, Grabski, Kempner, Bobrzyński, and the prewar Kieniewicz and Jakóbczyk. Ryszard Kołodziejczyk vehemently denies that Steinkeller's enterprises or the Bank of Poland were established out of a sense of national obligation, but agrees that these undertakings, economically benefitted the nation and reaffirmed the separate status enjoyed by the Kingdom of Poland.⁵⁷⁾ Jerzy Rudzki, while reiterating that the liberal character of Warsaw positivism was limited by its posture towards the peasants, the workers, and the question of national independence, believes that the cultural, educational, secular, and scientific currents of Warsaw positivism had a positive, progressive influence in shaping contemporary Polish attitudes in the latter part of the nineteenth century.⁵⁸⁾ In his thoughtful study, *Polska—Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu: 1764-1870* (Poland—The Origins of the Modern Nation: 1764-1870), Tadeusz Łepkowski wrote: "The main factor in the development of modern patriotism and nationalism was 'self-determination through opposition,' ... national opposition to foreign powers and neighboring nations, opposition evident in both the insurrectionary movements and in organic currents."⁵⁹⁾ The author considered organic work a form of political action which "sought in various forms of peaceful (cultural and economic) activity a better future for Poland," and believed that the "preservation and defense of the nation" was the purpose of organic work.⁶⁰⁾

The rehabilitation of organic work assumed a subtler form in three monographs by Kieniewicz which appeared in the 1960's: *Między ugodą a rewolucją: Andrzej Zamoyski w latach 1861-1862* (Between Conciliation and Revolution: Andrzej Zamoyski in the Years 1861-1862); *Dramat trzeźwych entuzjastów: O ludziach pracy organicznej* (The Drama of Sober Enthusiasts: The Practitioners of Organic Work); and his recent *Historia Polski 1795-1918* (History of Poland 1795-1918), written as the standard text for Polish universities.⁶¹⁾ Kieniewicz continued to limit the concept of organic work to individuals who did not cooperate with the partitioning authorities, or to periods when the possibilities of legal political activity were severely circumscribed. The heroes of *Dramat trzeźwych entuzjastów* are not Lubecki, Wielopolski, or the Stańczyks, but such figures as Andrzej Zamoyski and the Galician

57) Ryszard Kołodziejczyk, *Bohaterowie nieromantyczni: o pionierach kapitalizmu w Królestwie Polskim* (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 68-69. Kołodziejczyk feels such results were unintended. He is the harshest critique of the bourgeoisie's patriotism. See also his *Piotr Steinkeller 1799-1854* (Warsaw, 1963) and his earlier *Kształtowanie się burżuazji w Królestwie Polskim: 1815-1850* (Warsaw, 1957).

58) See Rudzki's, *Aleksander Świętochowski i Pozytywizm Warszawski* (Warsaw, 1968).

59) Tadeusz Łepkowski, *Polska - Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu: 1764-1870* (Warsaw, 1967), pp. 449-450.

60) *Ibid.*, pp. 406-407.

61) Stefan Kieniewicz, *Między ugodą a rewolucją: Andrzej Zamoyski w latach 1861-1862* (Warsaw, 1962); *Dramat trzeźwych entuzjastów: o ludziach pracy organicznej* (Warsaw, 1964); *Historia Polski 1795-1918* (Warsaw, 1969).

industrialist Stanisław Szczepanowski, and organizations such as the *Liga Polska*. Kieniewicz wrote that he occupied himself with those "who honestly perceived their social obligations, who in good faith sought means to save the Fatherland, and who followed the path which seemed best to them... Today we need a legion of equally talented, indefatigable, self-sacrificing people: doctors like Marcinkowski, teachers like Promyk, and industrial pioneers like Szczepanowski."⁶²⁾

By insistently distinguishing between organic work and conciliation, Kieniewicz rejects political cooperation with the partitioners as a valid Polish national policy in the nineteenth century, but at the same time sanctions organic work defined as cultural and economic activism untainted by political loyalism. This distinction allows the Warsaw historians to treat organic work as a valid concept in contemporary Poland, and, at the same time, to affirm the nation's historical individuality. In a circuitous manner, Kieniewicz confirms Brobrzyński's belief that there were indeed two roads to contemporary Poland – that of armed insurrection and that of organic work, both of which made vital contributions to the formation of the modern nation.

* * *

Polish historians have raised the fundamental considerations for a study of the organic work concept. The initial problem revolves around the origin of the concept: did it emerge primarily as a political reaction to 1863, or was it a constant factor in the political life of partitioned Poland? Secondly, what was the nature of organic work: was organic work limited to progressive cultural and economic activity aimed at the preservation of the nation's identity and heritage, or could it be extended to encompass political cooperation with the partitioners when such possibilities existed within the context of limited autonomy? This, in turn, raises the question of motivation: did an individual engage in organic work for personal, financial benefit; out of fear of and in an effort to stifle social revolution; or out of a civic-minded concern for the national good? Finally, what was the ultimate objective of organic work? Was it the *status quo* or the economic preparation for independence? Was organic work simply a defensive program or was organic work an alternate path, and not a substitute for Polish independence?

Poland's fate since the Partitions, especially the terrible years of World War II, has impressed upon Western consciousness her dynamic and violent struggle to regain and maintain her independence, and there are those who consider Poland's situation today analogous in some external aspects to her position in the nineteenth century. Curiously enough the Polish nation since 1945 has on two occasions (1956 and 1970) avoided the bloody insurrections which typified its history since 1794. If a case can be made for political realism in contemporary Poland, it is valid to explore the roots of this current in seeking a partial explanation of the ever-perplexing "Polish Question".

62) Kieniewicz, *Dramat.....op. cit.*, p. 209.

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S. Blejwas 氏は 1939 年生れで、1970 年以來コロンビア大学東・中央ヨーロッパ研究所所長補佐および同大学歴史学講師の地位にある。氏は 1967-70 年ワルシャワ大学に留学し、その成果を博士論文 *Warsaw Positivism 1864-1890: Organic Work as an Expression of National Survival in Nineteenth Century Poland* としてコロンビア大学に提出している。この博士論文はまもなく刊行される予定である。ここに掲載した論文は、表題への注記が示すようにニュー・ヨークのポーランド芸術科学研究所の第 2 回大会 (1971 年) に提出されたものであり、1973 年 11 月にスラブ研究施設に送られてきた。この論文は内容的に博士論文執筆の際のひとつの副産物と思われる。

有機的労働 *praca organiczna* については、ポーランド近代史にとってのその基本的な重要性にもかかわらず、いままでのところ運動全体を俯瞰した手頃なモノグラフィーが存在しない。わが国においては阪東宏、「ポーランド革命史研究 — 一月蜂起における指導と農民」、東京 (青木書店) 1968 と宮島直機、「戦間期ポーランドとピウスーツキ — 政治における神話」、『法学新報』LXXIX (1972), 1-3, 5, 12 号が簡単にこの問題に触れている。S. Blejwas 氏の論文は有機的労働についての史学史的研究であるがそのテーマの重要性のゆえに 19 世紀末から今日までのひとつのポーランド史学史となっている。この好論が刺戟となってわが国においても有機的労働、ひいてはポーランド近代史そのものに対する関心が高まり、すぐれた研究が出ることを期待する次第である (伊東孝之)。